6. RURAL BANK OF BUHI VS. CA
procedural due process
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Buhi Bank was a rural bank. Its books were examined by the Rural Banks division of the
Central Bank
However, it refused to be examined. As a consequence, its financial assistance was
suspended
Later, a general examination of the bank’s affairs and operations were again conducted.
The rural bank’s division found out massive irregularities in the operations, giving out
loans to unknown and fictitious borrowers, and sums amounting to millions past due to the
Central Bank. There were also promissory notes rediscounted with the Central Bank for
cash.
As a result, the Buhi Bank became insolvent.
The division chief, Odra, recommended that Buhi be placed under receivership.
Thus, the Monetary Board adopted a Resolution # 583, placing the bank under
receivership. Odra, the division chief, was made the receiver.
Odra thus implemented the resolution, authorizing deputies to take control and possession
of Buhi’s assets and liabilities.
Del Rosario, the Buhi Bank Manager, filed an injunction against the receiver, arguing that
the resolution violated the Rural Banks Act and constitutes gadalej. The bank claims that
there was a violation of due process. They claim that the bank was not given the chance to
deny and disprove the claim of insolvency or the other grounds and that it was hastily put
under receivership.
Later on, the Central Bank Monetary Board ordered the liquidation of the Bank.
The judge ruled in favor of the Bank and issued a writ of execution.
The CA however restrained the enforcement of execution, citing that the Judge did not
follow the orders, and thus required the Bank to yield to the CB.
ISSUE: Was due process observed?
SC: YES. CLOSURE VALID.
Under Sec 29 of the RA 265, on proceedings regarding insolvency, there is NO REQUIREMENT
that a hearing be first conducted before a bank may be placed under receivership. The law
explicitly provides that the Monetary Board can IMMEDIATELY forbid a banking institution from
doing business and IMMEDIATELY appoint a receiver when: 1) there has been an examination
by CB, b) a report to the CB, and c) prima facie showing that the bank is insolvent.
As to the claim that the RA 265 violates due process, the claim is untenable. The law could not
have intended to disregard the constitutional requirement of due process when it conferred
power to place rural banks under receivership.
The closure and liquidation of the bank is considered an exercise of POLICE POWER. It maybe
subject to judicial inquiry and could be set aside if found to be capricious, discriminatory,
whimsical, arbitrary, etc. The appointment of a receiver may be made by the Monetary Board,
WITHOUT NOTICE AND HEARING, but subject to the JUDICIAL INQUIRY, to insure protection
of the banking institution.
Due process does NOT necessarily require a PRIOR HEARING. A hearing or an OPPORTUNITY
TO BE HEARD may be made SUBSEQUENT to the closure. One could just imagine the dire
consequences of a prior hearing: bank runs would happen, resulting in panic and hysteria. In
that way, fortunes will be wiped out, and disillusionment will run the gamut of the entire
banking industry.
There is no question that the action of the MB may be subject to judicial review. Courts may
interfere with the MB’s exercise of discretion. Here, the RTC has jurisdiction to adjudicate the
question of whether the MB acted in bad faith when it directed the dissolution of Buhi Bank.
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7. POLLUTION BOARD VS. CA
procedural due process
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The board issued an EX PARTE ORDER directed against Solar Textile to immediately cease
and desist from utilizing its waste water pollution source installations. The installations
were allegedly discharging untreated waste water directly into a canal leading to the
adjacent Tullahan Tinejeros River.
The ex parte order was signed by Factoran, the Board’s Chair.
The order was based on the findings made after inspection of Solar’s Plant by the National
Pollution Control Commission, and by the DENR. They found out that the installation
generated 30 gallons per minute of wastewater pollutants, in excess of that allowed under
PD 984.
The order was received by Solar. A writ of execution was issued.
Solar assailed the order, contending that the same was issued without due process
The Board claims that it has authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend operations,
under PD 984, when there is prima facie evidence of waste water discharge beyond the
allowable limits. According to the investigator’s reports, there was prima facie evidence.
Solar insists that the order may issue only when there is immediate threat to life, public
health, safety and welfare. It contends that there was no such finding.
ISSUE: Order valid?
SC: YES.
It is clear to this Court that, based on the numerous reports, THERE WAS AT LEAST PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE before the board that the effluents emanating from the plant exceeded the
maximum allowable lmits of chemical substances, and that accordingly there was adequate
basis supporting the ex parte order to cease and desist. (it will be noted that the previous
owner of the plant had earlier been issued a similar cease and desist order way back in 1985).
It will also be noted that Solar was earlier summoned by NPCC for a hearing in 1986, yet the
Board refrained from issuing an ex parte order until after 1986, and 1988 when they
conducted re-inspections. Thus, the Board appears to have been forbearing in its efforts to
enforce the applicable standards against Solar. Solor however, remain casual about its
continued discharge of untreated wastewater. Here, the order was issued not by a local
government, but directly by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency tasked to
determine whether the emissions of a particular industrial establishment comply with the antipollution law.
Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like these
since stopping the continuous discharge of pollutants into the river cannot be made to wait
until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its
full course, including multiple and sequential appeals (which Solar has taken), which may take
several years.
The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and
promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health,
and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of animal and plant
life, commonly known as POLICE POWER. The ordinary requirements of procedural due
process may yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, through the exercise of
police powers.
The court is not saying that the ex parte order could no longer be contested by Solar. It may
still do so, in a hearing before the Board itself. Where the establishment affected by an ex
parte case and desist order contests the correctness of the prima facie findings of the Board,
the Board must hold a public hearing where such establishment will have an opportunity to
controvert the basis of the order. That such opportunity is SUBSSEQUENTLY AVAILABLE, is
really all that is required by the due process clause. Thereafter, the Board’s decision may
again be tested by an appeal to the CA.
What Solar should have done is to contest the order in a public hearing rather than going to
court to have the order nullified.
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8. CASTILLO VS. JUAN
due process – right to be heard – fair and impartial judge
 another case by Justice Fernando kaya wordy…
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Castillo, et al are 2 young maidens who are offended parties in 2 rape cases. They ask for
the disqualification of the judge on the ground of bias and prejudice.
Judge Juan allegedly approached them, and in the secrecy of his chambers, he informed
them of the weakness of their case, the likelihood of an acquittal, and impressed on them
that it would be to their advantage to just settle and make the accused indemnify them.
Judge Juan also said that settling can spare them from embarrassment occasion by suits
of this character.
These conversations took place even before the prosecution had finished presenting its
evidence and one of the victims have not yet testified.
Judge Juan’s defense was that he was merely acting out of charity, and as a clear attempt
to humanize justice.
ISSUE: Should the judge be disqualified?
SC: YES.
Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the part of the
judge sufficient to reassure the litigants of his being fair and being just. There is the legitimate
expectation that the decision arrived at would be the application of the law to the facts as
found by the judge who does not play favorites. Justice Dizon once said that in fact, due
process of law requires a hearing before an impartial. And disinterested tribunal, and that
every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE.
A Judge should strive at all times to be wholly free, disinterested and independent. Elementary
due process requires hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal. A judge has both
the duty of rendering a just decisions, and the duty of doing it in a manner completely free
from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity.
In every litigation, perhaps much more so in criminal cases, the manner and attitude of a trial
judge are crucial to everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is
not for him to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the attimes human failing
of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or prejudging
matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion of reacting to feelings
rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own sympathies and predilections. It
must be obvious to the parties as well as the public that he follows the traditional mode of
adjudication requiring that he hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the
risk of reaching an unjust decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess
marked proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true.
This is not to discount in its entirety the submission of respondent Judge, who argued on his
own behalf, that his final decision would be dependent on the evidence that could be
presented by petitioners. What cannot be denied, however, is that after such conferences,
they could no longer be expected to have faith in his impartiality. Even before they had been
fully heard, they were told that their cases were weak. They could very well conclude then
that there was a prejudgment. Under the circumstances, the fact that he acted as he did
because any monetary settlement would benefit petitioners, considering their straitened
financial circumstances, was of no moment. Even if it be admitted that, according to his beat
lights, respondent Judge acted from a sense of sympathy or "charity", his conduct cannot be
said to be consonant with the exacting standard of the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
The administration of justice would thus be subject to a reproach if there be a rejection of the
plea for disqualification.
NOTE: cold neutrality of an impartial judge is an element of due process. Due process does
not only mean a CHANCE TO BE HEARD, but also refers to the QUALITY OF THE HEARER.
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9. WEBB VS. PEOPLE
due process – right to be heard – fair and impartial judge
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This is the same Hubert Webb- Vizconde Massacre case.
Webb sought the disqualification of judge Amelita Tolentino on the ground that the judge
allegedly told allegedly told the media that "failure of the accused to surrender following
the issuance of the warrant of arrest is an indication of guilt." Respondent judge denied
the motion.
Later, Webb filed a second motion to disqualify respondent judge as the latter allegedly
told the media that the accused "should not expect the comforts of home," pending the
resolution of his motion to be committed to Bicutan, Paranaque. Respondent judge again
denied the motion to inhibit.
Again, Biong filed another motion to disqualify respondent judge on the ground of bias and
partiality. This was likewise denied by respondent judge.
After arraignment, Webb filed an Urgent Motion for Hospitalization. He alleged that he was
sick of dermatitis or asthma of the skin which aggravated due to his continuous
commitment at the Paranaque Municipal Jail. The motion was denied by respondent judge.
During trial, there were other incidents when during cross examination (regarding Jessica
Alfaro’s affidavit, and another regarding departure for the US), whenever the prosecution
objects, Judge Tolentino sustains the objection.
Webb thus filed another motion to inhibit on ground of bias and prejudice of Judge. As
usual, Judge Tolentino denied it.
Also, Judge denied the taking of deposition of Webb’s witness who was in the US.
Later, during formal offer of evidence, Judge admitted only 10 out of 142 exhibits offered
by Webb.
According to Webb, all these sets irreversibly, the eventual conviction of the accused.
ISSUE: Should Judge Tolentino inhibit herself on the ground of bias and prejudice?
SC: NO.
The Bill of Rights guarantees that "(n)o person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law."19 A critical component of due process is a hearing before an
impartial and disinterested tribunal. We have ingrained the jurisprudence that every litigant is
entitled to nothing: less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge for all the other
elements of due process, like notice and hearing, would be meaningless if the ultimate
decision would come from a partial and biased judge.20 Hence, the Rules of Court allows a
judge to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing a case for "just or valid reasons" other than
those referring to his pecuniary interest, relation, previous connection, or previous rulings or
decisions.
A party has the right to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear
to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case. This right
must be weighed with the duty of a judge to decide cases without fear of repression. Hence, to
disqualify a judge on the ground of bias and prejudice the movant must prove the same by
clear and convincing evidence. This is a heavy burden and petitioners failed to discharge their
burden of proof.
he alleged adverse and erroneous rulings of respondent judge on their various motions. By
themselves, however, they do not sufficieritly prove bias and prejudice to disqualify
respondent judge. To be disqualifying, the bias and prejudice must be shown to have
stemmed from an extrajudicial source and result in an opinion on the merits on some basis
other than what the judge learned from his participation in the case. Opinions formed in the
course of judicial proceedings, although erroneous, as long as they are based on the evidence
presented and conduct observed by the judge, do not prove personal bias or prejudice on the
part of the judge. As a general rule, repeated rulings against a litigant, no matter how
erroneous and vigorously and consistently expressed, are not a basis for disqualification of a
judge on grounds of bias and prejudice. Extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad
faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to the palpable error which may be inferred from
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the decision or order itself. Although the decision may seem so erroneous as to raise doubts
concerning a judge's integrity, absent extrinsic evidence, the decision itself would be
insufficient to establish a case against the judge.
The only exception to the rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an
ineluctable inference of bad, faith or malice.
Petitioners simply lean on the alleged series of adverse rulings of the respondent judge which
they characterized as palpable errors. This is not enough. We note that respondent judge's
rulings resolving the various motions filed by petitioners were all made after considering the
arguments raised by all the parties. It is true that the respondent judge erred in some of her
rulings such as her rejection of petitioners' one hundred thirty two ( 132) pieces of evidence.
It appears, however, that respondent judge reversed this erroneous ruling and already
admitted these 132 pieces of evidence after finding that "the defects in (their) admissibility
have been cured through the introduction of additional evidence during the trial on the
merits."
There is still another reason why we should! observe caution in disqualifying respondent
judge. The trial of the petitioners is about to end and to assign a new judge to determine the
guilt or innocence of petitioners will not be for the best interest of justice. The records of the
case at bar run into volumes. These voluminous records cannot capture in print the complete
credibility of witnesses when they testified in court. As the respondent judge observed the
demeanor of witnesses while in the witness chair, she is in the best position to calibrate their
credibility.
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10. ANG TIBAY VS. CIR
administrative due process
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Ang Tibay was a manufacturer of rubber slippers.
There was a shortage of leather soles, and it was necessary to temporarily lay off
members of the National Labor Union.
According to the Union however, this was merely a scheme to systematically terminate the
employees from work, and that the shortage of soles is unsupported. It claims that Ang
Tibay is guilty of ULP because the owner, Teodoro, is discriminating against the National
Labor Union, and unjustly favoring the National Workers Brotherhood, which was allegedly
sympathetic to the employer.
NLU filed for new trial, but Ang Tibay opposed.
Ang Tibay, filed an opposition
SC: We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of
Industrial Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence to indicate that
the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union affiliation or activity.
However, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to
make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the CIR and emphasize
certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in
the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative board than a
part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive
organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting only
when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties
litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its
organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasijudicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its
functions are far more comprehensive and extensive.
The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the
rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justiciable cases
coming before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of
due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character.
There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the
evidence presented.
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence
must be "substantial. "Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision
in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and
the reasons for the decisions rendered.
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Last saved by CHAMP 8/16/2005 11:40:21 PM
Important Points for Adminstrative Due Process
1. public hearing – only for administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions, and
NOT rule making powers. (but prior hearing still required when the rule is changed as to
increase the burden of the public).
2. administrative due process does NOT require that the one who heard the evidence is also
the one who renders the decision (as long as the one who decides familiarized himself with the
evidence)
3. If a decision is appealed, the person deciding the appealed decision should not decide on
the appeal. (otherwise, due process is violated).,
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11. CORONA VS. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOC.
substantive vs. procedural due process
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The Phil. Ports Authority (PPA), was created to control, regulate, and supervise pilots and
the pilotage profession.
It promulgated AO 03-85 providing that : that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot
licenses and must train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port
of Manila for four months. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that
they are given permanent and regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor
pilotage until they reach the age of 70, unless sooner removed by reason of mental or
physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.
Later however, another AO 04-92 was issued: all existing regular appointments which
have been previously issued either by the Bureau of Customs or the PPA shall remain valid
up to 31 December 1992 only" and that "all appointments to harbor pilot positions in all
pilotage districts shall, henceforth, be only for a term of one (1) year from date of
effectivity subject to yearly renewal or cancellation by the Authority after conduct of a
rigid evaluation of performance."
In the meantime, PPA issued a Memorandum laying down the criteria or factors to be
considered for the re-appointment of harbor pilots.
The United Harbor Pilots Association questioned this AO 04-92. They requested for the
suspension of implementation of AO 04-92 before DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia.
Sec. Garcia however said that the matter is within the jurisdiction of the Board of Directors
of the PPA.
The Association thus appealed this ruling to the Office of the President (OP).
The OP gave due course to the appeal and directed the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of the questioned AO 04-92.
Now, the OP, through then Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs Renato Corona, dismissed
the appeal and lifted the restraining order issued earlier. Secretary Corona opined that:
"The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of or interference with, property rights without due process. In the limited
context of this case, PPA-A0 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference with, let
alone a wrongful deprivation of the property rights of those affected thereby. As may be
noted, the issuance aims no more than to improve pilotage services by limiting the
appointment to harbor pilot positions to one year, subject to renewal or cancellation after
a rigid evaluation of the appointee's performance. PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but
merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of their profession in PPA's jurisdictional
area."
As to the claim by the Association that there was absence of prior consultation before the
issuance of the AO, Secretary Corona likewise ruled that the law has been sufficiently
complied with by PPA. (the law merely requires PPA to consult with relevant government
agencies. Since the PPA itself is already composed of representatives from the DOTC,
DENR, DPWH, DOF, NEDA, secretary Corona deemed this sufficient compliance with
consultation).
ISSUES: Was procedural due process satisfied? Was substantive due process satisfied?
SC: Procedural – YES. Substantive – NO.
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, x x x."
In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that
there is a deprivation and that such deprivation is done without proper observance of due
process. When one speaks of due process of law, however, a distinction must be made
between matters of procedure and matters of substance. In essence, procedural due process
"refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced," while substantive due process
"requires that the law itself, not merely the procedures by which the law would be enforced, is
fair, reasonable, and just."
PROCEDURAL:
Respondents argue that due process was not observed in the adoption of PPAAO No. 04-92
allegedly because no hearing was conducted whereby "relevant government agencies" and the
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pilots themselves could ventilate their views. They are obviously referring to the procedural
aspect of the enactment.
SC: As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he
cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the
very essence of due process. Moreover, this constitutional mandate is deemed satisfied if a
person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained
of."
Here, the Pilots Association, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 no less than four times before the
matter was finally elevated to this Tribunal. Their arguments on this score, however, fail to
persuade. While respondents emphasize that the Philippine Coast Guard, "which issues the
licenses of pilots after administering the pilots' examinations," was not consulted, the facts
show that the MARINA, which took over the licensing function of the Philippine Coast Guard,
was duly represented in the Board of Directors of the PPA. Thus, there being no matters of
naval defense involved in the issuance of the administrative order, the Philippine Coast Guard
need not be consulted.
Neither does the fact that the pilots themselves were not consulted in any way taint the
validity of the administrative order. As a general rule, notice and hearing, as the fundamental
requirements of procedural due process, are essential only when an administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial function. In the performance of its executive or legislative
functions, such as issuing rules and regulations, an administrative body need not comply with
the requirements of notice and hearing.
SUBSTANTIVE:
There is no dispute that pilotage as a profession has taken on the nature of a property right.
The exercise of one's profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against wrongful
deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process.
Pilotage, just like other professions, may be practiced only by duly licensed individuals.
Licensure is "the granting of license especially to practice a profession." It is also "the system
of granting licenses (as for professional practice) in accordance with established standards."21
A license is a right or permission granted by some competent authority to carry on a business
or do an act which, without such license, would be illegal.22
Before harbor pilots can earn a license to practice their profession, they literally have to pass
through the proverbial eye of a needle by taking, not one but five examinations, each followed
by actual training and practice.
Their license is granted in the form of an appointment which allows them to engage in pilotage
until they retire at the age 70 years. This is a vested right.
It is readily apparent that PPA-AO No. 04-92 unduly restricts the right of harbor pilots to enjoy
their profession before their compulsory retirement. In the past, they enjoyed a measure of
security knowing that after passing five examinations and undergoing years of on-the-job
training, they would have a license which they could use until their retirement, unless sooner
revoked by the PPA for mental or physical unfitness. Under the new issuance, they have to
contend with an annual cancellation of their license which can be temporary or permanent
depending on the outcome of their performance evaluation. Veteran pilots and neophytes alike
are suddenly confronted with one-year terms which ipso facto expire at the end of that period.
Renewal of their license is now dependent on a "rigid evaluation of performance" which is
conducted only after the license has already been cancelled. Hence, the use of the term
"renewal." It is this preevaluation cancellation which primarily makes PPA-AO No. 04-92
unreasonable and constitutionally infirm. In a real sense, it is a deprivation of property without
due process of law.
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12. US. Vs. TORIBIO
substantive due process
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Toribio slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered for human consumption, a carabao,
without permit from the municipal treasurer where it was slaughtered. He was charged for
violation of Act # 1147, an Act Regulating the Registration, Branding, and Slaughter of
Large Cattle.
Toribio argues that in his place, Carmen, Bohol, there is no municipal slaughterhouse, and
thus, under those circumstances, the law does not prohibit slaughter without permit. He
argued that under Sec 30, “no large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the
municipal slaughterhouse except upon permit from the municipal treasurer.
In short, his argument is that the prohibition is applicable only to slaughter of large cattle
for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit.
ISSUE: Can he be prosecuted?
SC: YES.
The prohibition covers 1) slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, ANYWHERE, as
long as it is without a permit from the municipal treasurer, and 2) expressly and specifically to
the killing of large cattle for food at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit. Thus, the
penalty would apply generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
ANYWHERE, without a permit from the treasurer, and specifically to the killing for food of large
cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.
The law primarily seeks to protect the “large cattle” of the Philippines against theft and to
make easy the recovery and return of such cattle to their proper owners. Where the language
of the statute is fairly susceptible of 2 or more interpretation, that construction should be
adopted as will most tend to give effect to the manifest intent of the lawmakers, and promote
the objective for which the statute was enacted. Here, the Act prohibits and penalized the
slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption, large cattle, at any place,
without the required permit.
If we were to adopted the construction which would limit the prohibition and penalty to only
the killing of such animals in municipal slaughterhouses, then it will leave unprohibited and
unpenalized the slaughter of the same outside such establishments. This manifestly tends to
defeat the purpose and objective of the legislator.
ISSUE:  It appears that the Toribio earlier applied for permit to slaughter his carabao, but
was denied because his carabao was not unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes. Toribio
argues that the statute, in so far as it penalizes the slaughter of carabaos without obtaining
the permit, is unconstitutional because that permit will never really be procured in the event
that the animal is not unfit for agricultural work or draft purposes. He contends that the law
violates the constitution that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive of any person of life,
liberty, or property without due process of law.
SC: There is no violation of due process.
The law is not an interference with the right and title of owners, as is involved in the exercise
by the State of the right of eminent domain which would have entitled the owners to
compensation, because the law is no more than a JUST RESTRAINT OF AN INJURIOUS
PRIVATE USE OF THE PROPERTY WHICH THE LEGISLATURE HAD AUTHORITY TO IMPOSE.
Rights of property, are subject to such reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall
prevent them from being injurious, and to such reasonable restraints and regulations
established by the legislature as it may think necessary and expedient. The power involved in
this case is not eminent domain but rather police power, the power vested in the legislature by
the constitution, to make, ordain and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws,
with or without penalties, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the
commonwealth.
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The restrain placed by law on the slaughter for human consumption of carabaos fit for
agricultural work is not an appropriation of property for public use, and thus not under the
power of eminent domain. It is in fact a mere restriction or limitation upon private use, which
the legislature deemed to be detrimental to the public welfare. The limitations and restraints
imposed upon the exercise of rights of ownership by the statute were imposed not for private
pruposes but strictly in the promotion of GENERAL WELFARE, and PUBLIC INTEREST, in the
exercise of the sovereign police power which every state possesses.
Here, the crime of cattle stealing has become extremely prevalent necessitating the
enactment of a special law penalizing the theft of carabaos by roving bands. Thus, the statute
was enacted in the due and proper exercise of police power, justified by exigent necessities of
existing conditions, and the right of the State to protect itself against the overwhelming
disasters incident to the further reduction of the supply of animals fit for agricultural work.
(there was apparently a disease that ravaged the animals during the years prior to the
enactment of the law), It thus threatened not only the work animals, but the very life and
existence of the inhabitants who would be imperiled by the continued destruction of large
cattle by disease or otherwise.
Thus, the Legislature had to adopt reasonable measures for the preservation of work animals,
even to the extent of prohibiting and penalizing would ordinarily would be legitimate and
proper exercise of rights of ownership and control of private property of any citizen.
The police power rests upon the necessity and the right of self-protection.
GUIDELINES: The state may interfere (with property rights), whenever the public interests
demand it. The legislature determines not only what the interests of the public require, but
what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests. To justify the state in
interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear
1) that the interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
really requires such interference,
2) that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and
3) not unduly oppressive upon individuals.
Note that the determination of what is a proper exercise of police power is not final or
conclusive, but always subject to review by the courts.
11
13. PEOPLE VS. VENTURA
substantive due process





Ventura was charged and convicted of illegal practice of medicine, sentencing him to pay a
fine of P500.
Natayan (who was an NBI undercover agent of some sort) was at that time suffering from
pains in his back and he asked the accused to see his sickness. The accused attended to
Natayan; wrote something on a piece of paper; and then he told him that he (Natayan)
'was sick of lumbago'. Thereupon, the accused asked Natayan to pay P5.00 and then
asked him to pay the amount to a lady employee in the clinic which Natayan did. At the
request of the accused, Natayan, then went around the other side of the clinic where he
was given an enema of hot water by a male attendant. Then Natayan was asked to lie
down on a table where his back was exposed to a big bulb for around fifteen minutes and
afterwards to a red colored bulb for another ten minutes. Thereafter Natayan went back to
the accused, who told him. to come back to his clinic for six consecutive days. Natayan
came back. While Natayan was lying on a table about to be given treatment the National
Bureau of Investigation agents raided the place.
He now appeals his conviction.
Appellant, testifying on his behalf admitted that for the past 35 years, he had been
practicing as a naturopathic physician, "treating human ailments without the use of drugs
and medicines" and employing in his practice "electricity, water and hand", without a
license to practice medicine; that during this time he had treated 500,000 patients, more
or less, about 90% of whom were healed, and that he had studied drugless healing in the
American University, Chicago, Illinois for about four years
The records reveal that the accused begun practicing his method of drugless healing 35
years ago. This practice was first discovered by the authorities in 1949. He was prosecuted
and convicted therefore the same year. Sometime after he again set up a clinic. He had a
lucrative clientele and nobody bothered him. the Philippine Federation of Private Medical
Practitioners, complained to the National Bureau of Investigation that appellant was
advertising himself as capable of treating human ailments without drugs. Upon
investigation, apellant was found to be without certificate of registration to practice such
profession either from the Board of Medical Examiners or from the Committee of
Examiners of Masseurs.
ISSUE: Appellant also questions the constitutionality of Section 770 /775 of the Revised
Administrative Code. He contends that to require, of any person whose business is merely to
stimulate by mechanical means the nerves of the body, many years of study in medical
schools, taking up obstetrics, general surgery, gynecology, bacteriology and many other
sciences, is curtailment of the exercise of one's calling, a violation of the constitutional
principle that all men have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness and are
entitled to the equal protection of the law. It is furthermore theorized that inasmuch as
drugless healing is not taught in any of the medical schools prescribed, how could the
members of the Medical Board of Examiners pass on the competence of these drugless
healers?
SC: it is within the police power of the State to require that persons who devote themselves to
the curing of human ills should possess such knowledge necessary for the proper diagnosis of
diseases of the human body.
We must again uphold those immutable concepts of the police power of the State. Under this
power, the State may prescribe such regulations as in its judgment will secure or tend to
secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequences of
ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud. As one means to this end, it has
been the practice of different States, from time immemorial to exact in any pursuit, profession
or trade, a certain degree of skill and learning upon which the community may confidently
rely, their possession being generally ascertained in an examination of parties by competent
persons, or inferred from a certificate to them in the form of a diploma or license from an
institution established for instruction on the subjects, scientific and otherwise, with which such
pursuits have to deal.
12
ISSUE: He also claims that his act of stimulating the affected nerves of the patients without
use of any drug or medicine is not practice of medicine; that "practice of medicine" is confined
only to the systems taught by the medical schools, namely, the regular, the homeopathic and
the electric schools or systems.
SC: The statutory definition as to what acts constitute illegal practice of medicine as provided
in said Section 770 includes the acts and practices performed by appellant. By his own
statements, he admitted to have continuously diagnosed and treated more or less 500,000
instances of different kinds of human ailments and to have prescribed remedies therefor.
ISSUE: He tried to show that medical practitioners, members of Congress, provincial
governors, city mayors and municipal board members wrote to him requesting his help for
persons suffering from all kinds of ailments; that municipal ordinances and resolutions were
also passed authorizing him not only to practice his method of healing but also to put up
clinics in some municipalities, that he was even extended free transportation facilities to work
in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal.
SC: Above plea cannot be sustained by this Court. The doctrine of estoppel does not apply to
the government. It is never estopped by mistakes or errors on the part of its agents, even
assuming without conceding that said municipalities had encouraged appellant's practice. We
cannot allow the bargaining away of public health and safety for the semblance of benefit to a
few government officials, people or even municipalities.
Similarly, there is no such thing as implied license to practice drugless healing by the mere
fact that the Chairman of the Board of Medical Examiners had permitted appellant to serve
free in the Central Luzon Sanitarium in Tala, Caloocan, Rizal, or that countless people
persisted in engaging his services. For one thing, these people might have contracted his
services on the mistaken notion that he was duly licensed to practice his profession; for
another, a repetition of illegal acts can never make them legal.
Last saved by CHAMP
8/21/2005 9:30:45 PM
NOTES:
1) treating human ailments by means of drugless healing without the required license
constitutes illegal practice of medicine.
2) the power of the state to prescribe qualifications of practitioners is within the police powers
of the state.  it may prescribe regulations as in its judgment will secure the general welfare
of the people,  to protect them against ignorance and incapacity, deception or fraud.
13
14. YNOT VS. IAC
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades:
"Strike-but hear me first!' "It is this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he
challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.



Under EO 626-A, the President prohibited interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the age requirements. Said law further
provides that no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another, and the any
carabao or carabeef transported shall be subject to confiscation and forfeiture of
government, to be distributed to the charitable organizations which the NMIC Chair may
see fit.
Ynot was charged for violation of said law, after having transported 6 carabaos in a pump
boat from Masbate to Iloilo. He filed for recovery of said carabao, but the trial court
sustained the confiscation.
The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it
authorizes outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported across
provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is imposed without
according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as
guaranteed by due process. He complains that the measure should not have been
presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional.
ISSUE: Is the law valid? Was due process observed in its enactment? Was there proper
exercise of police powers?
SC: NO.
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently
resilient. This was felt necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the
fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an implacable and immutable command for all
seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty. The very elasticity
of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require. Instead, they
have preferred to leave the import of the protection openended, as it were, to be "gradually
ascertained by the process Of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as
they arise."
The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally speaking,
may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against official
arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of
this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law
and the ancient rudiments of fair play.
The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both
restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power
inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general
welfare.18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described
as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent
powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member
of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and
follows him still after he is dead-from the womb to beyond the tomb-in practically everything
he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome
intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public
welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the
justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, SALUS POPULI EST SUPREMA LEX AND
SIC UTERE TUO UT ALIENUM NON LAEDAS, which call for the subordination of individual
interests to the benefit of the greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A,
amending the basic rule in Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
14
except under certain conditions. The original measure was issued for the reason, as expressed
In one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes
be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We
affirm at the outset the need for such a measure.
But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original
executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second
requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to strengthen the original
measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao, regardless of age, sex, physical
condition or purpose (sic) and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another."
The object of the prohibition escapes us. The reasonable connection between the means
employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing.
We do not see how the prohibition of the interprovincial transport of carabaos can prevent
their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one province
will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them them As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as
otherwise, so says executive order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the
animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live animal for the purpose of preventing
their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to prohibit
their transfer as, not to be flippant, dead meat.
Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would
still have to reckon with the sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition.
The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or carabeef being transported, to be meted
out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the statute was
sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the
court after trial and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no
such trial is prescribed, and the property being transported is immediately impounded by the
police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the government.
To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the
owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is
immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of
the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial
functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers.
15
15. LUPANGCO VS. CA
substantive due process
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

Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as part of its
"Additional Instructions to Examinees to all those applying for admission to take the
licensure examinations in accountancy.
Under said resolution, : No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or
the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during
the three days immediately preceding every examination day including the examination
day.”
Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy filed
with the RTC Manila, a complaint for injunction for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction against PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned
resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Was the regulation valid?
SC: NO.
We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose
which is "to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations However, its good
aim cannot be a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily
seen that it is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class,
briefing, conference or the like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any
school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer,
instructor, official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions The
unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a
watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination
period.
Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the
examinees' right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on
the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations
They cannot be restrained from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of
their ambition to become public accountants. They have every right to make use of their
faculties in attaining success in their endeavors. They should be allowed to enjoy their
freedom to acquire useful knowledge that will promote their personal growth. As defined in a
decision of the United States Supreme Court: "The term 'liberty' means more than mere
freedom from physical restraint or the bounds of a prison. It means freedom to go where one
may choose and to act in such a manner not inconsistent with the equal rights of others, as
his judgment may dictate for the promotion of his happiness, to pursue such callings and
vocations as may be most suitable to develop his capacities, and giv to them their highest
enjoyment."
Also, it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere
with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their
enrolees to meet the standards required before becoming a fullfledged public accountant.
Making the examinees suffer by depriving them of legitimate means of review or preparation
on those last three precious days-when they should be refreshing themselves with all that
they have learned in the review classes and preparing their mental and psychological make-up
for the examination day itself-would be like uprooting the tree to get ride of a rotten branch.
What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and
stop it right there. If corrupt officials or personnel should be terminated from their loss, then
so be it. Fixers or swindlers should be flushed out. Strict guidelines to be observed by
examiners should be set up and if violations are committed, then licenses should be
suspended or revoked. These are all within the powers of the respondent commission as
provided for in Presidential Decree No. 223. But by all means the right and freedom of the
examinees to avail of all legitimate means to prepare for the examinations should not be
curtailed.
16
17. OPLE VS. TORRES
substantive due process


Ople assailed the validity of Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds,
viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly
intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy.
Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government agencies
delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No
citizen will refuse to get this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with
government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a citizen will have difficulty
exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges.
SC: Facially, it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let
alone."
The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers
stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the
basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of
the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual,
firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control.
The right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the
burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need
to provide our citizens and foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with
basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities and (2) the
need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations by
persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough
to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the
vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to
privacy in clear and present danger.
The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned
agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs."
Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to biological
facts; a mathematical analysis of biological data." 45 The term "biometrics" has now evolved
into a broad category of technologies which provide precise confirmation of an individual's
identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics. 46
A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint,
retinal scan, hand geometry or facial features
A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state
whether encoding of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes.
In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System
will contribute to the "generation of population data for development planning." This is an
admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness
of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information
for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN . The potential for
misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed.
An individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency to avail of
basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be
recorded - whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The
individual's file may include his transactions for loan availments, income tax returns,
statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The
17
more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable
information base through the electronic linkage of the files. 55 The data may be gathered for
gainful and useful government purposes; but the existence of this vast reservoir of personal
information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may be too great for
some of our authorities to resist.
Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional infirmity for
again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered
shall be handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what
circumstances and for what purpose. These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and
guaranty the integrity of the information. 58 Well to note, the computer linkage gives other
government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular
computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of
the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored within the system.
The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's
liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his movement; it may also
enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right
against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government
authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. 61 The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are
accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or
placed on his ID, much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. 62 They threaten the
very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to prevent.
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The
threats emanate from various sources - governments, journalists, employers, social scientists,
etc. 88 In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which
by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information
about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services.
DISSENTS:
KAPUNAN: I submit that it is premature for the Court to determine the constitutionality or
unconstitutionality of the National Computerized Identification Reference System. A.O. No.
308 does not create any concrete or substantial controversy. It provides the general
framework of the National Computerized Identification Reference System and lays down the
basic standards (efficiency, convenience and prevention of fraudulent transactions) for its
creation. But as manifestly indicated in the subject order, it is the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee (IACC) which is tasked to research, study and formulate the guidelines and
parameters for the use of Biometrics Technology and in computer application designs that will
define and give substance to the new system. 13 This petition is, thus, premature considering
that the IACC is still in the process of doing the leg work and has yet to codify and formalize
the details of the new system. Before the assailed system can be set up, it is imperative that
the guidelines be issued first.
Without the essential guidelines, the principal contention for invalidating the new identification
reference system - that it is an impermissible encroachment on the constitutionally recognized
right to privacy - is plainly groundless. There is nothing in A.O. No. 308 to serve as sufficient
basis for a conclusion that the new system to be evolved violates the right to privacy. Said
order simply provides the system's general framework. Without the concomitant guidelines,
which would spell out in detail how this new identification system would work, the perceived
violation of the right to privacy amounts to nothing more than mere surmise and speculation.
Last saved by CHAMP
8/21/2005 10:49:46 PM
Read orig for other issues.
18
18. TANADA VS. TUVERA
substantive due process – prior publication
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


Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law.
The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when
it was "otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval.
The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general
applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and
that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette.
Solicitor General on the other hand claimed that the clause "unless it is otherwise
provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication required therein was not
always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be made in the
Official Gazette;
SC: The clause "unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the
requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not
mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any
other date, without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended.
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval
notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after
publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and
they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not
know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly
supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must
also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation. Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in
nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public,
need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their
subordinates in the performance of their duties.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws.
Last saved by CHAMP 8/21/2005 11:01 PM
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16. ESTRADA VS. SANDIGAN BAYAN
substantive due process



Erap assails the constitutionality of the Plunder Law (RA 7080 / RA 7659), on 3 grounds:
(a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt"
standard in criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes
already punishable under RPC, all of which are purportedly clear violations of the
fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him.
The Plunder Law provides, Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates,
subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof,
in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to
death.
Erap, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4.
These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right
to due process.
SC: VALID.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined
parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of his violation. Section
2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or
forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the crime with reasonable certainty and
particularity. Thus 1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members
of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation, conversion,
misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving,
directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of
pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract
or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or
fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any
of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise
of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation
of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by
taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly
enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,
accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those
who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
20
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of
the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the
assailed statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of acts enumerated in Sec.
1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or
ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although
subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are
easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited
acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations
against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent defense.
A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have
to define every word we use.
Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory
command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress
is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so
long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be
interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is
evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those wordsThe
intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to
use
statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words
"combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To
combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in
spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their
popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative deliberations on the bill which
eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2)
acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids
on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets
belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say,
misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical or distinctive
meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically
providing for it in the law.
Under the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is
manifestly misplaced.
The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is most
commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation
that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or
by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In
such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what
21
conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. But the doctrine does not apply
as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise language but which nonetheless
specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous
yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper
construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities. With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed
statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the
language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured
by common understanding and practice. It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not
absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have
been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of
the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other
statutes.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the
doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law.
The overbreadth doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not
be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of
protected freedoms." This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed
for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of
free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free
speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As for the vagueness
doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its
possible applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed
cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of others
.
DISSENTS: KAPUNAN:
The meanings of “combination” and “series” as used in R.A. No. 7080 are not clear.
R.A. No. 7080 does not define “pattern,” an essential element of the crime of plunder.
R.A. No. 7080 makes it possible for a person conspiring with the accused in committing one of the acts
constituting the charge of plunder to be convicted for the same crime.
R.A. No. 7080 does not clearly statethe prescriptive period of the crime of plunder.
READ ORIGINAL..
22
19. VILLEGAS VS. HUI CHIONG TSAI PAO HO
equal protection


There was an Ordinance in Manila, enacted making it unlawful for any person not
a citizen of the Philippines to be employed in any place of employment or to be
engaged in any kind of trade business or occupation within manila without first
securing an employment permit from the mayor’s office.
Pao, an employee in Manila, sought an injunction to restrain the enforcement of
Ordinance 6537. He argues that:
o As a revenue measure, the measure imposed on aliens is discriminatory
and violative of the rule on uniformity of taxation.
o As a police power measure, it makes no distinction between useful and
non-useful occupations, imposing a fixed P50.00 employment permit, and
that it fails to prescribe any standard to guide or limit the action of the
Mayor
o It is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens,
thereby violative of equal protection clause.
ISSUE: does it violate equal protection clause?
SC: YES.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails
to consider valid substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not
forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be based on real
and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the
particular legislation. The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every
employed alien, whether he is casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether
he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule
of the Constitution. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit
from the City Mayor of Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to
denying him the basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of
livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit
aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life
without due process of law. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood. The
shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor
in the exercise of his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a
municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus
conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the
issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an undefined and
unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
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20. PEOPLE VS. CAYAT
equal protection



Cayat, who was a native of Baguio and a non-Christian, was imprisoned for
violation of Act 1639, being a member of a non-Christian tribe, illegally had in his
possession one (1) bottle of A1 gin, an intoxicating liquor.
Under Act 1639, It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who
is a member of a non-Christian tribe to buy, receive, have in his possession, or
drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other
than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves.
Cayat challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
o (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
o (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution; and
o (3) That it is an improper exercise of the police power of the state.
ISSUE: Is the law in accordance with equal protection?
SC: YES. VALID.
The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable,
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon
"accident of birth or parentage," as counsel for the appellant asserts, but upon the
degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to
religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to
natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal
relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is unquestionably
reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the
non-Christian tribes.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to
buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors
which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior
to the passage of this Act," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in
and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as
the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating
liquors by the non-Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes,
thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and
civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The
Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that
the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing influence." On the contrary, the
Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that
hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
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Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a
perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number of
non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the
equality of its application.
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Other issues:
DUE PROCESS:
To constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in
applying a law to particular cases. Due process of law means simply:
(1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative
department of the government;
(2) that it shall be reasonable in its operation;
(3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and
(4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of a class.
POLICE POWERS:
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. Any measure intended
to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase
the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity is a
legitimate exercise of the police power, and unless shown to be whimsical or capricious as to
unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian
tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to
hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate
purpose can be no other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable
race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy
towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in the enjoyment of
those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality
before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored,
by appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the
benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them with their Christian
brothers on the basis of true equality.
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21. ORMOC SUGAR VS. TREASURER
equal protection


The municipal Board of Ormoc City, enacted an Ordinance #4, imposing on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company,
Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%)
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of Ormoc as well
as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause.
ISSUE: Is the ordinance valid? Does it comply with equal protection?
SC: NO.
We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically
situated and does not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and
a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
(2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
(4) the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not
meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's
enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central in the
city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable
to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and
exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar
company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly
points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
26
22. PEOPLE VS. VERA
equal protection





Mario Cu-Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case.
He applied for PROBATION under the provisions of ACT # 4221. He insists that he
is innocent of the crime for which he has convicted, and that he has no prior
criminal record and the he would observe good conduct in the future.
Nevertheless, Judge Vera heard the petition.
The City Fiscal obviously opposed the grant of probation. Among the arguments
raised was that Act 4221 (which granted probation) was violative of the
Constitution because its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and
because section 11 of said Act No. 4221 endows the provincial boards with the
power to make said law effective or otherwise in their respective provinces.
Cu-Unjieng maintains that Act No. 4221 is constitutional because, it does not
constitute an undue delegation of legislative power, does not infringe the equal
protection clause of the Constitution, and does not encroach upon the pardoning
power of the Executive.
ISSUE: Is the Act valid? Does it comply with equal protection?
SC: NO. NULL AND VOID.
The equal protection of the laws, is a pledge of the protection of equal laws." No rule
that will cover every case can be formulated. Class legislation discriminating against
some and favoring others is prohibited. But classification on a reasonable basis, and
not made arbitrarily or capriciously, is permitted. The classification, however, to be
reasonable must be based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it
must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.
Here, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so. In such a case,
the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in the latter.
This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be
liable to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person
similarly situated in another province would be denied those same benefits. This is
obnoxious discrimination.
Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the
necessary funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective
provinces, in which case no inequality would result for the obvious reason that
probation would be in operation in each and every province by the affirmative action
of appropriation by all the provincial boards. On that hypothesis, every person
coming within the purview of the Probation Act would be entitled to avail of the
benefits of the Act. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province,
through its provincial board, should appropriate any amount for the salary of the
probation officer-which is the situation now-and, also, if we accept the contention
that, for the purposes of the Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered
as a province and that the municipal board of said city has not made any
appropriation for the salary of a probation officer.
These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in
the application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided,
inequality is not in all cases the necessary result. But whatever may be the case, it is
27
clear that section 11 of the Probatoin Act creates a situation in which discrimination
and inequality are permitted or allowed. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities
requiring actual denial of the equal protection of the law before courts should assume
the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that score, but premises and
circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11 of Act No. 4221
permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that account bad.
We see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which
permits of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance, yet, if it permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the
constitutional prohibition.
Under section 11 of the Probation Act, not only may said Act be in force in one or
several provinces and not be in force in the other provinces, but one province may
appropriate for the salary of a probation officer of a given year-and have probation
during that year-and thereafter decline to make further appropriation, and have no
probation in subsequent years. While this situation goes rather to the abuse of
discretion which delegation implies, it is here indicated to show that the Probation
Act sanctions a situation which is intolerable in a government of laws, and to prove
how easy it is, under the Act, to make the guaranty of the equality clause but "a
rope of sand".
The clear policy of the law, as may be gleaned from a careful examination of the
whole context, is to make the application of the system dependent entirely upon the
affirmative action of the different provincial boards through appropriation of the
salaries for probation officers at rates not lower than those provided for provincial
fiscals. Without such action on the part of the various boards, no probation officers
would be appointed by the Secretary of Justice to act in the provinces. The
Philippines is divided or subdivided into provinces and it needs no argument to show
that if not one of the provinces-and this is the actual situation now appropriates the
necesasry fund for the salary of a probation officer, probation under Act No. 4221
would be illusory. There can be no probation without a probation officer. Neither can
there be a probation officer without a probation system.
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23. TAXICAB OPERATORS VS. BOT
equal protection






Board of Transportation, (BOT) issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42, phasing
out and Replacement of Old and Dilapidated Taxis. It follows the policy of the
government to insure that only safe and comfortable units are used as public
conveyances.
Under said Memo, no car beyond six years shall be operated taxi. (it also
provided for a scheme of phasing out and disallowing registration of older taxis).
The Regulation also provided that, the rules shall immediately be effective in
Metro-Manila only. Its implementation outside Metro-Manila shall be carried out
only after the project has been implemented in Metro-Manila and only after the
date has been determined by the board.
Petitioners filed a Petition with the BOT, seeking to nullify the memo, and to stop
its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and
subsequent years of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models
which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of registration, they are road
worthy and fit for operation. They claim that fixing the ceiling at six (6) years is
arbitrary and oppressive because the roadworthiness and the use to which they
are subjected, and, therefore, their actual physical condition should be taken into
consideration at the time of registration.
Petitioners also allege that the Circular in question violates their right to equal
protection of the law because the same is being enforced in Metro Manila only
and is directed solely towards the taxi industry.
On the other hand, BOT contends, it is impractical to subject every taxicab to
constant and recurring evaluation, not to speak of the fact that it can open the
door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and
corruption. A reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles
affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The span of six years supplies that
reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that time taxis
have fully depreciated, their cost recovered. and a fair return on investment
obtained .
ISSUE: Is the Memo valid?
SC: VALID.
Older taxicabs are generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable
service to the public specially considering that they are in continuous operation
practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight hours per shift. With that
standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement of due
process has been met.
The Board's reason for enforcing the Circular initially in Metro Manila is that taxicabs
in this city, compared to those of other places, are subjected to heavier traffic
pressure and more constant use. This is of common knowledge. Considering that
traffic conditions are not the same in every city, a substantial distinction exist so that
infringement of the equal protection clause can hardly be successfully claimed.
In fact, the scheme is already being effect also in Cebu City. The BOT is also in the
process of conducting studies regarding the operation of taxicab in other cities.
As enunciated in the preambular clauses of the challenged BOT Circular, the
overriding consideration is the safety and comfort of the riding public from the
dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its police
29
power, can prescribed regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order,
safety and general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort,
safety and welfare of society.5 It may also regulate property rights.6 In the language
of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando "the necessities imposed by public welfare may
justify the exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded."
In so far as the non-application of the assailed Circulars to other transportation
services is concerned, it need only be recalled that the equal protection clause does
not imply that the same treatment he accorded all and sundry. It applies to things or
persons identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or
subject of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial
distinction, which make for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each
member of tire class. What is required under the equal protection clause is the
uniform operation by legal means so that all persons under identical or similar
circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both in privilege conferred and
the liabilities imposed. The challenged Circulars satisfy the foregoing criteria.
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30
24. TABLARIN VS. GUTIERREZ
equal protection





Petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school
year 1987-1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not
successfully take the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the
Board of Medical Education.
They sought to enjoin the DECS Sec., and the Board of Medical Education from
enforcing Republic Act No. 2382, and MECS Order No. 52, which required the
taking and passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of
eligibility for admission in MedSchools.
The Medical Act of 1959 created the Board of Medical Education, authorizing it to
promulgate rules or requirements for admission into medical schools.
The MECS Order No. 52, also established a uniform admission test called the
National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for
issuance of a certificate of eligibility for admission into medical schools of the
Philippines. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward
upgrading the selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and
its calculated to improve the quality of medical education in the country. The
cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall
be determined every year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation
with the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each
applicant, together with the other admission requirements as presently called for
under existing rules, shall serve as a basis for the issuance of the prescribed
certificate of elegibility for admission into the medical colleges.
ISSUE ON EQUAL PROTECTION: They claim that the provision which says that
"the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT,
shall be determined every year by the Board after consultation with the
Association of Philippine Medical Colleges” infringes the requirements of equal
protection. They assert, in other words, that students seeking admission during a
given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different cutoff score
than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against
and that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious."
ISSUE: Is the law in accordance with equal protection?
SC: YES. LAW VALID.
Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing
conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a
given year may be a function of such factors as the number of students who have
reached the cutoff score established the preceding year; the number of places
available in medical schools during the current year; the average score attained
during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test given during the current
year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff score regardless
of changes in circumstances from year to year, may well result in an unreasonable
rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or
capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility
needed to meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores
therein as a condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not
constitute an unconstitutional imposition.
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8/22/2005 11:56 PM
Other Issues:
Validity of exercise of police powers/ due process:
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some
reasonable relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for
admission to medical school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and
safety of the general community, on the other hand. This question is perhaps most
usefully approached by recalling that the regulation of the practice of medicine in all
its branches has long been recognized as a reasonable method of protecting the
health and safety of the public.8 That the power to regulate and control the practice
of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the ranks of those
authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized.
The government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a means
for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improving) the quality of medical education in the country."
We hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of
legislation and regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection
of the public from the potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in
those who would undertake to treat our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
The right of every citizen to choose a profession:
Also, the State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education "accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who
qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements."
32
25. BACHE VS. RUIZ
searches, seizures, arrests
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The CIR Vera, wrote a letter to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of
a search warrant against Bache & Co, a corporation duly organized and existing
under the laws of the Philippines, for violation of Section 46(a) of the National
Internal Revenue Code.
A BIR examiner, de Leon, was tasked to file the application.
De Leon and his witness, Arturo, went to the CFI. They brought with them an
application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an
affidavit of Arturo subscribed before respondent De Leon; a deposition in printed
form of Arturo already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed;
and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by the Judge.
At that time Judge Ruiz was busy hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note,
he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and
Arturo. The stenographer, upon request of Judge Ruiz, read to the Judge her
stenographic notes; and thereafter, Judge asked the witness Arturo to take the
oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without
legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. Judge Ruiz then signed the search
warrant and issued the same.
Later, BIR agents served the search warrant at the office of Bache & Co. along
Ayala Ave. The search yielded six boxes of documents.
Bache & Co protested the search on the ground that no formal complaint or
transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant.
ISSUE: Can a corporation invoke the constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures?
SC: YES.
A corporation is, after all, but an association of individuals under an assumed name
and with a distinct legal entity. In organizing itself as a collective body it waives no
constitutional immunities appropriate to such body. Here, the corporation to whom
the seized documents belong, and whose rights have thereby been impaired, is itself
the petitioner. The rights of a corporation against unlawful search and seizure are to
be protected even if the same result might have been achieved in a lawful way.
ISSUE: Was the search warrant (SW) validly issued?
SC: NO.
1. Judge Ruiz failed to personally examine the complainant and his witness.
The examination of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, should be
conducted by the judge himself and not by others. The Constitution and the Rules of
Court (ROC) require the judge, before issuing a search warrant, to "personally
examine on oath or affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce."
Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is
necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable
cause, because the law prohibits the issuance of warrants except "upon probable
cause." The determination of whether or not a probable cause exists calls for the
exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be allowed to
be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.
Here, no personal examination at all was conducted by Judge Ruiz of the
complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Arturo). While it is true that the
complainant's application for search warrant and the witness' printed-form deposition
were subscribed and sworn to before Judge, the latter did not ask either of the two
any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining
33
whether or not there was probable cause against herein petitioners. Indeed, the
participants seem to have attached so little significance to the matter that notes of
the proceedings before respondent Judge were not even taken.
The participation of Judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the
SW was thus limited to listening to the stenographer's readings of her notes, to a few
words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath
to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal
examination. If there was an examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it
was the one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of Court. But, as stated, the Constitution
and the rules require a personal examination by the judge.
The reading of the stenographic notes to the Judge did not constitute
sufficient compliance with the constitutional mandate and the rule; for by that
manner Judge did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
complainant and his witness, and to propound initial and follow-up questions which
the judicial mind, on account of its training, was in the best position to conceive.
These were important in arriving at a sound inference on the all-important question
of whether or not there was probable cause.
2. The search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense.
The SW was issued simply for "violation of Sec. 46(a) of the National Internal
Revenue Code in relation to all other pertinent provisions thereof particularly Secs.
53, 72, 73, 208 and 209."
The search warrant in question was issued for at least four distinct offenses
under the Tax Code.  (the filing of income tax returns), (withholding of income
taxes at source), (unlawful pursuit of business or occupation), and (failure to make a
return of receipts, sales, business or gross value of output). Under the ROC, no
search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.
3. The search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be seized.
The SW merely stated, “Unregistered and private books of accounts (ledgers,
journals, columnars, receipts and disbursements books, customers ledgers); receipts
for payments received; certificates of stocks and securities; contracts, promissory
notes and deeds of sale; telex and coded messages; business communications,
accounting and business records; checks and check stubs; records of bank deposits
and withdrawals; and records of foreign remittances, covering the years 1966 to
1970."
The SW tends to defeat the major objective of the Bill of Rights, i.e., the
elimination of general warrants, for the language used therein is so all-embracing as
to include all conceivable records of petitioner corporation, which, if seized, could
possibly render its business inoperative.
The evident purpose and intent of this requirement is to limit the things to be
seized to those, and only those, particularly described in the search warrant - to
leave the officers of the law with no discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that 'unreasonable searches and seizures' may not be made, - that
abuses may not be committed.
In this event, the description contained in the herein disputed warrant should
have mentioned, at least, the dates, amounts, persons, and other pertinent data
regarding the receipts of payments, certificates of stocks and securities, contracts,
promissory notes, deeds of sale, messages and communications, checks, bank
deposits and withdrawals, records of foreign remittances, among others, enumerated
in the warrant.
34
26. LIM VS. FELIX
searches and seizures
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On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the
airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport, Congressman Moises Espinosa and
his security escorts were attacked and killed by a lone assassin.
After preliminary investigation, the investigator filed an amended complaint
accusing Vicente Lim and Mayor Susan Lim of multiple murder.
The MTC of Masbate concluded that a probable cause has been established for
the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The court thus issued a warrant of arrest
(WOA).
In the meantime, the SC ordered the transfer of the venue to Makati. The
Accused Lims asked the RTC of Makati to verify again the existence of probable
cause regarding the issuance of the WOA. The RTC of Makati denied the request
and still issued the WOA.
It will be noted that the preliminary investigation was conducted by the MTC of
Masbate, which found the existence of probable cause that the offense of multiple
murder was committed arid that all the accused are probably guilty thereof,
which was affirmed upon review by the Provincial Prosecutor who properly filed
with the Regional Trial Court four separate informstions for murder. Considering
that both the two competent officers to whom such duty was entrusted by law
have declared the existence of probable cause, each information is complete in
form and substance, and there is no visible defect on its face, the Makati Court
finds it just and proper to rely on the prosecutor's certification in each
information which reads.
ISSUE: Can the judge issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the
prosecutions certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists?
SC: NO.
The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise
of judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate. The judge must satisfy
himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of
arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may
disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable
cause.
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedures, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest; or
(2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal'sreport and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in
arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts."
35
First, the determination of probable cause is a function of the Judge. It is not
for the Provincial Fiscal or Prosecutor nor for the Election Supervisor to ascertain.
Only the Judge and the Judge alone make this determination.
Second the preliminary inquiry made by a Prosecutor does not bind the
Judge. It merely assists him to make the determination of probable cause. The Judge
does not have to follow what the Prosecutor presents to him. By itself the
Prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the
affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting
documents behind the Prosecutor's certiftcation which are material in assisting the
Judge to make his determination.
Third, Judges and Prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry
which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the
preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be
held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries are conducted in the course of one
and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about the objectives. The
determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The
preliminary investigation proper-whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe
that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial-is the function
of the Prosecutor.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case
where all the records of the investigation are in Masbate, he or she has not
personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge
commits a grave abuse of discretion.
The records of the preliminary investigation conducted by the Municipal Court
of Masbate and reviewed by the respondent Fiscal were still in Masbate when the
Fiscal issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. There was no basis for
the Judge to make his own personal determinate regarding the existence of a
probable cause fee the issuance of a warrant of arrest as mandated by the
Constitution. He could not possibly have known what transpired in Masbate as he
had nothing but a certification. Significantly, the respondent Judge denied the
petitioners' motion for the transmittal of the records on the ground that the mere
certification and recommendation of the respondent Fiscal that a probable cause
exists is sufficient for him to issue a warrant of arrest.
The Judge has to exercise sound discretion for, after all, the personal determination
is vested in the Judge by the Constitution. It can be as brief or as detailed as the
circumstances of each case require. To be sure, the Judge must go beyond the
Prosecutor's certification and investigation report whenever necessary. He should call
for the complainant and witnesses themselves to answer the court's probing
questions when the circumstances of the case so require.
CHAMP Page 36
2/15/2016
36
27. WEBB VS. DE LEON
searches and seizures
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Again, this is the case of Hubert Webb – Vizconde Massacre.
During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the
sworn statement of their principal witness, Maria Jessica M. Alfaro who allegedly
saw the commission of the crime; (2) the sworn statements of two (2) of the
former housemaids of the Webb family
The DOJ Panel later issued a 26 page resolution finding probable cause to hold
the accused for trial and recommended the filing of information of Rape with
Homicide.
The case was raffled to Branch 25 presided by Judge Escano. It was, however,
another Judge, Judge de Leon, the pairing judge of Judge Escano, who issued the
warrants of arrest against the petitioners.
Judge Escano later voluntarily inhibited himself from the case to avoid any
suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before
his appointment to the bench.
The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who
issued new warrants of arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused.
Later, Webb voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities.
Webb contends that Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of
arrest against them. Webb cites, (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a
matter of few hours, (2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3)
the records submitted to the trial court were incomplete and insufficient from
which to base a finding of probable cause;
He also assails the finding of probable cause by the DOJ.
SC:
WHAT IS PROBABLE CAUSE: The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of
Rights which protects "the right of the people to be secure in their persons x x x
against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature x X X."An arrest
without a probable cause is an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the
privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the State. Probable cause to
warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of
case law reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed
by the person sought to be arrested . Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of
reasonable caution or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man. The terms are
legally synonymous and their reference is not to a person with training in the law
such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street. It ought to be
emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of our technical rules of evidence
of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common sense of
which all reasonable men have in abundance.
The DOJ Panel did not gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause
against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence
showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed
by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
of guilt neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and
definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. While probable
cause demands more than "bare suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which
37
would justify x x x conviction," A finding of probable cause merely binds over the
suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt. (In short, a low quantum
and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause.)
ISSUE: Was the WOA properly issued?
SC: YES.
In arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and
that the person to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any
showing that evidence of the crime will be found at premises under that person's
control."
What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying
himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the
judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence
of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on
the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and
require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a
conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with
the preliminary examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of
concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts,"
In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26page report, the
two (2) sworn statements of Alfaro, and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal
and Lolita Birrer as well as the counter-affidavits of the petitioners. Apparently, the
painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel
Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest
against petitioners. Again, we stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges
merely determine personally the probability, not the certainty of guilt of an accused.
In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence of
probable cause. They just personally review the initial determination of the
prosecutor finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by merely counting
minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review
and affirm the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they
made no personal evaluation of the evidence attached to the records of the case.36
As priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the records of the case
provide substantial basis for a finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The
corpus delicti of the crime is a given fact. There is an eyewitness account of the
imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed
by sworn statements of their former maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the
respondent judges to take the further step of examining ex parte the complainant
and their witnesses with searching questions.
38
28. ALVAREZ VS. CFI TAYABAS
searches and seizures
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The chief of the secret service of the Anti-Usury Board, of the DOJ, presented to
Judge David an affidavit alleging that according to reliable information, the
petitioner kept in his house books, documents, receipts, lists, chits and other
papers used by him in connection with his activities as a money-lender, charging
usurious rates of interest in violation of the law.
In his oath at the end of the affidavit, the chief of the secret service stated that
his answers to the questions were correct to the best of his knowledge and belief.
He did not swear to the truth of his statements upon his own knowledge of the
facts but upon the information received by him from a reliable person. Upon the
affidavit in question the judge, on said date, issued the warrant which is the
subject matter of the petition, ordering the search of the petitioner's house.
Among the articles seized were: internal revenue licenses for the years 1933 to
1936, one ledger, two journals. two cashbooks. nine order books, four
notebooks, four check stubs, two memorandums, three bankbooks, two
contracts, four stubs, forty-eight stubs of purchases of copra, two inventories,
two bundles of bills of lading, one bundle of credit receipts, one bundle of stubs
of purchases of copra, two packages of correspondence, one receipt book
belonging to Luis Fernandez, fourteen bundles of invoices and other papers,
many documents and loan contracts with security and promissory notes, 504
chits, promissory notes and stubs of used checks of the HSBC.
Alvarez asks that the search warrant (SW) be declared illegal and set aside, and
prays that all the articles in question be returned to him. He claims that the
search warrant issued by the court is illegal because it has been based upon the
affidavit of agent Mariano G. Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no
personal knowledge of the facts which were to serve as a basis for the issuance
of the warrant but that he had knowledge thereof through mere information
secured from a person whom he considered reliable.
SC: SW INVALID.
A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the
Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before
the court.
It will be noted that both provisions require that there be not only probable cause
before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based
upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may
produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a
party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and
truthfully; and it is sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person
taking it that his attestation or promise is made under an immediate sense of his
responsibility to God.
The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge
of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of
sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has
been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be
held liable for damages caused.
39
It appears that the affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search
warrant, is insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the
oath was made, and therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrant in question
and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal and
do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioner was subjected.
It is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or
complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Mariano G.
Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to
satisfy the committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense
with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the agent in this case was
insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay,
it is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the
purpose of determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of
the search warrant. When the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains
sufficient facts within his personal and direct knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is
satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the applicant's knowledge of the
facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a personal
knowledge of the facts is necessary. We conclude, therefore, that the warrant issued
is likewise illegal because it was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no
personal knowledge of the facts.
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION: One of the grounds alleged by the petitioner in
support of his contention that the warrant was issued illegally is the lack of an
adequate description of the books and documents to be seized. But where, by the
nature of the goods to be seized, their description must be rather general, it is not
required that a technical description be given, as this would mean that no warrant
could issue. The only description of the articles given in the affidavit presented to the
judge was as follows "that there are being kept in said premises books, documents,
receipts, lists, chits and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as
money-lender, charging a usurious rate of interest, in violation of the law." Taking
into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no other
more adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly because
it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description
so made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the
law who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to
identify the Articles, which he did.
(read orig for other issues)..
CHAMP Page 40
2/15/2016
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29. STONEHILL VS. DIOKNO
searches and seizures
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A total of 42 SW were issued against Stonehill and the corporations of which they
were officers. The SW ordered the seizure of books of accounts, financial records,
vouchers, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, balance sheets, etc. etc.
They were allegedly the subject of the offense, either as the proceeds or fruits, or
used in the commission of the crime. (The crime being the violation of Central
Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Codes, Revenue Code, Penal Code).
Stonehill assailed the SW on the ground that it does not describe with
particularity the books, documents to be seized. (they also contend that the SW
were used as a fishing expedition in the deportation cases filed against them)
SC: SW INVALID.
The documents and papers seized may be classified into 2: 1) those found in the
offices of the corporations, and 2) those found in the residences of Stonehill, et. al
As to the first group: Stonehill has no cause of action to assail the legality of the SW,
since the corporation has a separate juridical personality from them. Hence,
regardless of the amount of shares they had, it is the corporation who can question
the validity of the SW. The legality of the seizure can only be contest by the party
whose rights have been impaired thereby. The objection to an unlawful search or
seizure is STRICTLY PERSONAL. The right to question the SW belongs exclusively to
the corporation, to whom the seized documents belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers like Stonehill.
As to the second group: Stonehill argues that the SW was in the nature of a general
warrant, and that accordingly the seizures made are null and void.
There are 2 points to the constitutional mandate:
1) that no warrant shall be issued except upon probable cause to be determined
personally by the judge  purpose: to grant moral assurance to the court
2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.  purpose: to
deny discretion to police officers as to what will be seized, to prevent arbitrariness
HERE, NONE OF THESE REQUIREMENTS WERE MET.
The SW merely stated “for violation of central bank laws, tariff codes, RPC, etc.”
There was no specific offense alleged in the application. The averments with respect
to the offense committed were abstract. Thus, it was impossible for the judge to
have found the existence of probable cause for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has
performed particular acts, or committed specific offenses.
It would be legal heresy of the highest order to convict anybody by simply allegation
of ‘violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff Codes, Revenue Codes, RPC.”
Furthermore, under the Rules of Court, a SW shall not issue except upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense. In this case, the SW authorized the
seizure of all records pertaining to all business transactions of Stonehill, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The SW thus contravenes the
Constitutional mandate of particularity of description of the things to be seized. It is
in a nature of a general warrant.
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30. SEC OF JUSTICE VS. MARCOS
searches and seizures
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An application for SW filed by Chief of Police of Baguio City, following an affidavit
of one Romeo Amansec, regarding a illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition by the accused, Rogelio, as well as for violation of Central Bank
Regulations for storing a golden Buddha kept at the premises.
The Secretary of Justice argued that the search warrant was not limited to one
offense covering both illegal possession of firearms and violation of Central Bank
rules and regulations; that it did not particularly describe the property to be
seized; that he did not carefully examine under oath the applicant and his
witnesses; (Hence this is an administrative case against the Judge).
An investigation was conducted.
SC:
There can be no question that from a reading of the application for search warrant by
Col. Calano, and the affidavit by witness Romeo Amansec, as well as the search
warrant itself, it can be deduced that-the deposition in writing of Sgt. De Vera, was
valid; and that the Judge did examine under oath, both applicant, Col. Calano, and
witnesses, Romeo Amansec and Sgt. De Vera.
What the Secretary of Justice presented as his sole witness, was the Clerk of Court,
Fernando R. Romero, who declared that, 'Q:Would you be able to tell us more or less
what sorts of questions were propounded by Judge Marcos by way of interrogating
these witnesses? A: I cannot repeat the words because it was a long time ago, but if
I may be permitted to make a gist I may be able to relate. Q: Please do so. A: After
administering the oath individually to Col. Calano, Amansec and de Vera, after giving
their names and other personal circumstances, he dealt on the questions "What were
those articles that were the subject of the application? And they described the
articles, what I heard are a golden Buddha, a rifle with some ammunitions."'
This being the case, we are bound to accept this testimony and must hold that
outside of the literal defect in that Respondent had not taken the written deposition
of Sgt. de Vera, the proceedings he had adopted were not fatally wrong, in fact,
might as well be added that there is something very probable and therefore credible
in the testimony of this witness that time was of the extreme essence, the urgency
of the situation could no longer permit -further going back to the Office of the Clerk
of Court for renewed typing of application and affidavits and warrant, at any rate,
since it was complainant Secretary of Justice himself who presented Clerk of Court
Romero, he should be bound by latter's testimony.
SPECIFIC OFFENSE – NOT OK!: As to the second ground consisting of the warrant
itself being defective because it was issued for two offenses and the description of
the premises to be searched and the objects to be seized being too general, "Since
the warrant really stated that it was issued for, 'Illegal possession of firearms and
Violation of Central Bank Rules and Regulations,' and the body recited that, 'Accused
Rogelio Ro as illegally possess[es] firearms and ammunition without license or permit
to possess the same and a golden Buddha which he is keeping and concealing at his
premises at No. 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City in violation of Central Bank Rules and
Regulations; this warrant violated Sec. 3 of Rule 126 which provides that, 'No Search
warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense.' Investigator must even add
that the particular Central Bank circular or regulation is not determined;
42
PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION --OK! : As to the attack on the description of the
premises to be searched and the objects to be seized, the test of a good description
for purposes of sufficiency of the warrant is that it be one that would not permit
seizure of the wrong property.
Taking into consideration the nature of the articles so described, it is clear that no
other more adequate and detailed description could be given, particularly because it
is difficult to give a particular description of the contents thereof. The description so
made substantially complies with the legal provisions because the officer of the law
who executed the warrant was thereby placed in a position enabling him to identify
the articles in question, which he did,' * * * so that here, since certainly, no one
would be mistaken in identifying the Buddha, whose image image is well known, and
even the firearms and ammunition because these were those without permit to
possess, and all located at No. 47 Ledesma St., Baguio City, so far as description
was concerned, the search warrant perhaps could not be said to have suffered fatal
defects.
PROBABLE CAUSE – OK! : As to the third charge that the search warrant was issued
without probable cause, Justice Gatmaitan started with the affidavit of Amansec
showing that " 'on or about 6:30 a.m. of March 31,1971, I went to Baguio City and
while I passed by a house at No. 47 Ledesma Street, Baguio City I was attracted by
several persons inside the house; That I peeped from outside the house and when
the curtain was moved I saw a Buddha that was inside the house; That I observed
what was going on inside the house and I heard someone say that the golden
Buddha was actually for sale and when I observed them closer I overheard that it
was being offered for sale for 100,000 pesos; That I peeped again and I actually saw
for myself again the Buddha and I heard one of the persons inside whom I later
found out to be Mr. Rogelio Roxas that it was a golden Buddha but that a down
payment was needed; That I am executing this affidavit because I actually saw the
Buddha and that I also saw a firearm and some bullets inside the house.' * * * which
can easily sustain, contrary to complainant's position, that Amansec's knowledge was
not hearsay at all. Also, Sgt. de Vera's knowledge neither was hearsay either.
Neither should it be overlooked that all these if they existed at all were directed to
the conscience of examining Judge who was the one called upon to grade their
credibility, to act with precision; the point is that while at the beginning the
knowledge of witnesses had come was that they were able to confirm the same with
their own eyes, the existence of the suspected articles within the premises, and that
was what they certified under interrogation - from respondent, - as declared no less
by cornplaint's own witness, the Clerk of Court, Fernando R. Romero was present
thereat.
Please read orig. ang gulo kasi ni Justice Fernando.
43
31. UY VS. BIR
searches and seizures
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A certain Abos reported to the BIR that Unifish Packing Corpo, and Frank Uy were
engaged in activities violating the NIRC. The Corporation is allegedly selling
sardines without issuing receipts, and of various tax frauds such as (dictating the
value of the sardines without any receipt, payments are made pay to cash and
without any receipt, smuggling, illegally availing of tax exemption, etc.).
The BIR thus applied for SW to search the premises of Unifish. The SW was
issued. The BIR raided the premises of Unifish and confiscated records and books
of accounts of the corporation.
Unifish assails the validity of the SW claiming that it was issued in gadalej by the
Judge.
SC:
1. DESCRIPTION OF THE PLACE TO BE SEARCHED. The constitution requires that
three be a particular description of the place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized. The description is sufficient if the officer can with reasonable
effort, ascertain, identify the place intended and distinguish it from other places in
the community. As long as the designation or description points out the place to the
exclusion of all others, and that the officers will be led to it, then the description is
sufficient.
Here, it was not shown that a street similarly named Hernan Cortes could be
found in Cebu City. Nor was it established that the enforcing officers had any
difficulty in locating the premises of the corporation. That the first SW inconsistently
identified the city where the premises will be searched is NOT A DEFECT that would
invalidate the SW.
2. DESCRIPTION OF THE PERSONS NAMED IN THE 2 SW. Frank Uy claims that there
was inconsistency in the 2 SW since under SW-1 it was issued solely against Uy Chin
Ho, alias Frank Uy, while SW-2 was issued against Uy Chin Ho alias Frank Uy AND
Unifish Packing Corpo.
The discrepancies are hardly relevant. The Constitution does not require the
warrant to name the person who occupies the premises. Since the SW is solely for
the search of the specifically described premises, the failure to name the owner or
occupant of such property does NOT INVALIDATE the warrant. Where the name of
the owner of the premises is incorrectly inserted in the SW, it is NOT A FATAL
DEFECT if the description is nonetheless correct so that no discretion is left to the
officer in making the search. Inconsistencies in stating the names NOT FATAL.
3. TWO WARRANTS ISSUED AT ONE TIME FOR ONE CRIME AND ONE PLACE. Even if
two SW were issued for the same crime (violation of sec 253 of NIRC), SW-1 should
be deemed superseded by SW-2. Sw-2 merely corrects the inconsistencies in the
address, and was just to include UNifish Corpo. SW-2 was issued so that the names
of the persons and the description of the place would be more precise.
4. PROBABLE CAUSE. Probable cause is defined as such facts and circumstances
which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are
in the place sought to be searched. In the determination of probable cause, the
Consti requires the examination of witnesses under oath. The examination must be
probing, exhaustive and not merely routinary or pro-forma. The judge must not
simply rehash the contents of the affidavit but must make his own inquiry. The
44
witnesses must also testify under oath of their own personal knowledge. The oath
must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or
his witnesses. A SW cannot be issued on loose, vague, or doubtful basis of fact, nor
on mere suspicion or belief.
Here, the judge deposed 2 witnesses, the BIR agent and the former employee
of Unifish. (the transcript was included in the decision I think what was said was
that...) the testimony of the BIR agent was found to be NOT from his own
perception but merely hearsay, while the testimony of the former employee however
is based on personal knowledge because he detailed the schemes employed by Frank
Uy for tax evasion. The employee also described the place where the documents
were kept. In short, the court found that the judge made inquiries that were
sufficiently probing.
5. PARTICULARITY OF DESCRIPTION. A SW sufficiently describes the things to be
seized when the description is as specific as the circumstances will ordinarily allow,
or when the description expresses a conclusion of fact, by which the officer may be
guided in making the search and seizure. It is also sufficient when the things
described are limited to those which bear direct relation to the offense for which the
warrant is being issued.
Here, the SW does not conform to these tests. The description should have
mentioned the dates, amounts, persons and other data regarding the receipts of
payments, etc. The applicant must necessarily have some other evidence, other than
the articles to be seized, to prove the said offense. Here, the description is all
embracing, which includes all conceivable records of the corporation, which if seized,
could paralyze its business. (The SW merely described “books of accounts, ledgers,
journals, cash books, sales books, receipts, delivery receipts, sales invoices, financial
statements, bank statements.” )  in short they were merely generic descriptions,
and hence invalid.
HOWEVER, with respect to the UNREGISTERED DELIVERY RECEIPTS, THEY
ARE SUFFICIENTLY DESCRIBED AS SUCH. There is no need to include in the
description the serial markings because it is impossible to do so precisely because
they are unregistered. It would also be impractical to specify each and every receipt
and the contents thereof. It is not required that a technical description be given.
Taking into account the nature of the articles, no other more detailed description
could be given. THUS, THE SW IS VALID AS TO THE UNREGISTERED RECEIPTS. The
SW is severable, and those items not particularly described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant.
CHAMP Page 45
2/15/2016
45
32. PEOPLE VS. VELOSO
searches and seizures
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Jose M.a Veloso, was found guilty of the crime of resistance of the agents of the
authority.
Jose M.a Veloso was it that time a member of the House of Representatives, and
the manager of the Parliamentary Club, an organization located at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila.
The police of Manila had reliable information that the so-called Parliamentary
Club was nothing more than a gambling house.
The secret service of the City of Manila, applied for, and obtained a search
warrant from Judge Garduño of the municipal court. The police attempted to raid
the Parliamentary Club but when they found the doors to the premises were
closed and barred, one policeman, ascended a telephone pole, so as to enter a
window of the house.
Once inside the Parliamentary Club, Veloso was arrested. Veloso read the search
warrant but told the police that he was Representative Veloso and not John Doe,
and that the police had no right to search the house. The police replied that
Veloso was considered as a John Doe. The policemen insisted on searching Veloso
(because his pockets were bulging with gambling materials), but Veloso insisting
in his refusal to submit to the search.
Veloso was later convicted of gambling.
In appealing his conviction, he argues that since the name of Veloso did not
appear in the search warrant, but instead the pseudonym John Doe was used,
the SW cannot be used against him.
SC: VALID SW.
The affidavit for the search warrant and the search warrant itself described the
building to be searched as "the building No. 124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila,
Philippine Islands." This, without doubt, was a sufficient designation of the premises
to be searched. It is the prevailing rule that a description of a place to be searched is
sufficient if the officer with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and
identify the place intended.
The police officers were accordingly authorized to break down the door and enter the
premises of the building occupied by the so-called Parliamentary Club. When inside,
they then had the right to arrest the persons presumably engaged in a prohibited
game, and to confiscate the evidence of the commission of the crime. It has been
held that an officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested any money
or property found upon his person, which was used in the commission of the crime or
was the fruit of the crime, or did not do an unlawful act by lawful means, or a lawful
act by unlawful means, and so could not be convicted of the misdemeanor of a riot,
with which they are charged in the indictment."
While it is true that the SW failed to name Jose M.a Veloso as the person to be
seized, it however stated that "John Doe has illegally in his possession in the building
occupied by him, and which is under his control, namely, in the building numbered
124 Calle Arzobispo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands, certain devices and effects
used in violation of the Gambling Law."
The warrant in this case sufficiently described the place and the gambling apparatus,
and, in addition, contained a description of the person to be seized. Under the
46
authorities cited by the appellant, it is invariably recognized that the warrant for the
apprehension of an unnamed party is void, "except in those cases where it contains a
descriptio personae such as will enable the, officer to identify the accused." The
description must be sufficient to indicate clearly the proper person upon, whom the
warrant is to be served. As the search warrant stated that John Doe had gambling
apparatus in his possession in the building, occupied by him at No. 124 Calle
Arzobispo, City of Manila, and as this John Doe was Jose M.a Veloso, the manager of
the club, the Police could identify John Doe as Jose M.a Veloso without difficulty.
CHAMP Page 47
2/15/2016
Other Principles:
"'John Doe' Warrants. It follows, on principle, from what has already been said
regarding the essential requirements of warrants for the apprehension of persons
accused, and about blank warrants, that a warrant for the apprehension of a person
whose true name is unknown, by the name of 'John Doe' or 'Richard Roe,' 'whose
other or true name is unknown,' is void, without other and further descriptions of the
person to be apprehended, and such warrant might as well have been arrested, as
being included in the, description, as the defendant himself. Such a warrant was
contrary to elementary principles, and in direct violation of the constitutional right of
the citizen. It was always necessary to express the name or give some description of
a party to be arrested on a warrant; and if one was granted with the name in blank,
and without other designation of the person to be arrested, it was void.
Form and Sufficiency of Warrant. Technical accuracy is not required.
"Name and description of the accused should be inserted in the body of the warrant;
and where the name is unknown there must be such a description of the person
accused as will enable the officer to identify him when found.
"Warrant for apprehension of unnamed party, or containing a wrong name for the
party to be apprehended is void, except in those cases where it contains a descriptio,
personae such as will enable the officer to identify the accused.
47
33. PEOPLE VS. MUSA
searches and seizures – plain view
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Musa was charged and convicted of selling marijuana, following a buy-bust
operation conducted by the police. Narcom agents.
The buy-bust operation took place at Musa’s house, with one of the Narcom
agents acting as the buyer who went inside the house. After the exchange, the
Agent, Sgt Ani, made the arrest.
It appears that Sgt Ani gave a pre-arranged signal to the other narcom agents to
move it and make the arrest. They searched him to retrieve the marked money
but did not find it.
Musa then said that he gave the marked money to his wife. But the other narcom
agents, Sgt Belgra went to the kitchen and noticed something, a cellophane
colored white striped thing at the corner of the kitchen. They asked Musa about
its contents but Musa did not reply. The Narcom agents thus opened the contents
and found dried marijuana leaves.
Musa assails the seizure and admission as evidence of a plastic bag containing
marijuana which the Narcom agents found in the kitchen.
SC: SEARCH and SEIZURE INVALID. NOT ADMISSIBLE.
THERE WAS PROBABLE CAUSE. The testimony of Sgt Ani regarding the buy-bust
operation is credible, direct, lucid and forthright. The day before the buy-bust, Sgt
Ani made a test-buy and successfully bought marijuana from Musa. Thus, Sgt Ani
was able to gain the trust and confidence of Musa to be able to sell to him more
marijuana the following day (during the buy-bust ops).
Also, even if the other narcom agent (Sggt Belarga) did not actually see the sale, it
was not totally impossible for him to have seen Sgt Ani hand to Musa “something”,
and for Musa to give Sgt Ani “something”. Hence, the testimony of the other narcom
Agent corroborates the direct evidence given by Sgt. Ani. The testimony of the
poseur-buyer (Sgt Ani) is sufficient to prove the consummation of the sale.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH. There is no doubt that the warrantless search incidental to
a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of
the person arrested. He may take from the person arrested any money or property
found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the
fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing
violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause.
Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law
enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher
immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. Here, the
NARCOM agents searched the person of the appellant after arresting him in his
house but found nothing. They then searched he entire house and, in the kitchen,
found and seized a plastic bag hanging in a comer.
The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the "plain view" of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented as evidence.
48
The "plain view" doctrine may not, however, be used to launch unbridled searches
and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely
to find evidence of defendant's guilt. The "plain view" doctrine is usually applied
where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.
The justification is that the police officers came inadvertently across a piece of
evidence incriminating the accused. The doctrine serves to supplement the prior
justification-whether it be a warrant for another object, hot pursuit, search incident
to lawful arrest, or some other legitimate reason for being present unconnected with
a search directed against the accused-and permits the warrantless seizure. It is
allowed only where it is immediately apparent to the police that they have evidence
before them; the 'plain view' doctrine may not be used to extend a general
exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges. Stated differently, it must be immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise
subject to seizure.
In this case, Musa was arrested and searched in the living room.Failing to retrieve
the marked money which they hoped to find, the NARCOM agents searched the
whole house and found the plastic bag in the kitchen. The plastic bag was, therefore,
not within their "plain view' when they arrested the appellant as to justify its seizure
The NARCOM agents had to move item one portion of the house to another before
they sighted the plastic bag. The NARCOM agents in this case went from room to
room with the obvious intention or fishing for more evidence. Moreover, when the
NARCOM agents saw the plastic bag hanging in one corner of the kitchen, they had
no clue as to its contents. They had to ask the appellant what the bag contained.
The NARCOM agents in this case could not have discovered the inculpatory nature of
the contents of the bag had they not forcibly opened it. Even assuming then, that
the NARCOM agents inadvertently came across the plastic bag because it was within
their "plain view," what may be said to be the object in their "plain view" was just
the plastic bag and not the marijuana. The incriminating nature of the contents of
the plastic bag was not immediately apparent from the "plain view" of said object. It
cannot be claimed that the plastic bag clearly betrayed its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transprarency, or otherwise, that its contents are
obvious to an observer.
49
34. DEL ROSARIO VS. PEOPLE - G.R. No. 142295
searches and seizures – plain view
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May 31, 2001
Vicente del Rosario was convicted of illegal possession of firearms.
Sometime in May 1996, the police received a report that Vicente del Rosario was
in possession of certain firearms without the necessary licenses. The PNP
Firearms and Explosives Division investigated and found out that the appellant is
not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind and caliber. Thus PNP applied
for a search warrant to enable his team to search the house of del Rosario.
Upon arrival at the house of appellant, the police officers introduced themselves
to the wife of appellant. When the appellant came out, the police informed him
that they had a search warrant and that they were authorized to search his
house. After appellant gave his permission, the police officers conducted a search
of the house.1âwpWhen asked about his license to possess the firearms, the
appellant failed to produce any. This prompted the police officers to seize the
subject firearms. H
He appeals his conviction claiming that the search conducted at his residence was
illegal, and the search warrant was issued in violation of the Constitution and
consequently, the evidence seized was inadmissible. He also submits that he had
a license for the .45 caliber firearm and ammunition seized in his bedroom. The
other firearm, a .22 caliber revolver seized in a drawer at the kitchen of his
house, a magazine for 5.56 mm. cal. Armalite rifle, and two 2-way radios found
in his daughter's bedroom, were either planted by the police or illegally seized, as
they were not mentioned in the search warrant.
ISSUE: was the seizure of the revolver and magazine valid even if they were not
mentioned in the SW?
SC: ILLEGAL.
With respect to the .22 caliber revolver that the police raiding team found in a
drawer at the kitchen of Vicente Del Rosario’s house, suffice it to say that the firearm
was not mentioned in the search warrant applied for and issued for the search of
petitioner's house.
The requisites for a search warrant's validity are: (in the absence of even one will
cause" its downright nullification):
(1) it must be issued upon probable cause;
(2) the probable cause must be determined by the judge himself and not by the
applicant or any other person;
(3) in the determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or
affirmation, the complainant and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and
(4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched and
persons or things to be seized."
Seizure is limited to those items particularly described in a valid search warrant.
Searching officers are without discretion regarding what articles they shall seize.
Evidence seized on the occasion of such an unreasonable search and seizure is
tainted and excluded for being the proverbial "fruit of a poisonous tree." In the
language of the fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose
in any proceeding.
50
In this case, the firearm was not found inadvertently and in plain view. It was found
as a result of a meticulous search in the kitchen of petitioner's house. This firearm,
to emphasize, was not mentioned in the search warrant. Hence, the seizure was
illegal.50 The seizure without the requisite search warrant was in plain violation of the
law and the Constitution. True that as an exception, the police may seize without
warrant illegally possessed firearm or any contraband for that matter, inadvertently
found in plain view. However, "[t]he seizure of evidence in 'plain view' applies only
where the police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but
inadvertently comes across an incriminating object."52 Specifically, seizure of
evidence in "plain view" is justified when there is:
(a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police
are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties;
(b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be
where they are.
(c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and
(d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search. 53
The same is true with respect to the 5.56 cal. magazine found in the bedroom of
petitioner's daughter. The seizure was invalid and the seized items were inadmissible
in evidence.
With particular reference to the two 2-way radios that the raiding policemen also
seized in the bedroom of petitioner's daughter, there was absolutely no reason for
the seizure. The 2-way radios were not contraband per se. The burden is on the
prosecution to show that the two-way radios were not licensed. The National
Telecommunication Commission is the sole agency authorized to seize unlicensed
two-way radios. More importantly, admittedly, the two-way radios were not
mentioned in the search warrant. We condemn the seizure as illegal and a plain
violation of a citizen's right. Worse, the petitioner was not charged with illegal
possession of the two-way radios.1âwphi1.nêt
CHAMP Page 51 2/15/2016
51
35. PAPA VS. MAGO
warrantless searches and seizures – customs
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Martin Alagao, head of the counter-intelligence unit of the Manila Police
Department, obtained a reliable information that certain shipment of personal
effects, allegedly misdeclared and undervalued, would be released from the
customs zone of the port of Manila and loaded on two trucks.
Thus, the Manila Police conducted surveillance at gate No. 1 of the customs zone.
When the trucks came out, the police intercepted them. The load of the two
trucks, consisting of nine bales of goods, and the two trucks, were seized.
Later, a person claimed ownership of the goods and showed to the policemen a
"Statement and Receipts of Duties Collected on Informal Entry No. 147-5501",
issued by the Bureau of Customs, in the name of a certain Bienvenido Naguit.
Claiming to have been prejudiced by the seizure and detention of the two trucks
and their cargo, Remedios Mago and Valentin B. Lanopa claimed that they were
the owner of the goods, having purchased them from the Sta. Monica Grocery in
San Fernando, Pampanga, and that she hired the trucks owned by Valentin B.
Lanopa to transport the goods from said place to her residence at Sampaloc,
Manila;
The claim that that the goods and the trucks were seized without search warrant
issued by a competent court. They also claimed that even assuming that the
goods were misdeclared and undervalued, they should not be subject of seizure,
because Mago had bought them from another person without knowledge that
they were imported illegally.
Later, Mago also filed a motion to release the goods, alleging that since the
inventory of the goods seized did not show any article of prohibited importation,
the same should be released as per agreement of the parties upon her posting of
the appropriate bond that may be determined by the court.
The police however opposed arguing that the court had no jurisdiction to order
the release of the goods in view of the fact that the court had no jurisdiction over
the case, and that most of the goods, as shown in the inventory, were not
declared and were, therefore, subject to forfeiture.
Mago was able to put up a bond of P40,000 and the goods were released.
SC: SEARCH AND SEIZURE VALID.
The Chief of the Manila Police Department, Ricardo G. Papa, having been deputized
in writing by the Commissioner of Customs, could, for the purpose of the
enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seizures, and arrests, of
any cargo, articles or other movable property when the same may be subject to
forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He could
lawfully open and examine any box trunk, envelope or other container wherever
found when he had reasonable cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable
articles introduced into the Philippines contrary to law; and likewise to stop, search
and examine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holding or
conveying such article as aforesaid.
The Tariff and Customs Code does not require said warrant in the instant case. The
Code authorizes persons having police authority under Section 2203 of the Tariff and
Customs Code to enter, pass through or search any land, inclosure, warehouse, store
or building, not being a dwelling house; and also to inspect, search and examine any
vessel or aircraft and any trunk, package, box or envelope or any person on board,
or stop and search and examine any vehicle, beast or person suspected of holding or
52
conveying any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the Philippines contrary
to law, without mentioning the need of a search warrant in said cases.
But in the search of a dwelling house, the Code provides that said "dwelling house
may be entered and searched only upon warrant issued by a judge or justice of' the
peace . . ." Thus, except in the case of the search of a dwelling house, persons
exercising police authority under the customs law may effect search and seizure
without a search warrant in the enforcement of customs laws.
Note also that the policemen did not have to make any search before they seized the
two trucks and their cargo. But even if there was a search, there is still authority to
the effect that no search warrant would be needed under the circumstances
obtaining in the instant case. This is because it was made on a moving vehicle. The
guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is construed as
recognizing a necessary difference between a search of a dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a search warrant may readily be obtained and a search
of a ship, motorboat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not
practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought."
Other issues:
Where the goods in question were imported from Hongkong as shown in the
statement and receipts of duties collected on informal entry and where the
importation has not been terminated, the imported goods remain under the
jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs. Importation is terminated only upon the full
payment of duties, taxes and other charges upon the articles, or secured to be paid,
at the port of entry and the legal permit for withdrawal shall have been granted. 
here, the BoC still had jurisdiction because the duties were still not paid in full.
When the goods were intercepted by the police (who were deputized by the Boc),
then the BoC re-acquired jurisdiction over the goods. Thereafter, the BoC has
exclusive jurisdiction over the imported goods even if no warrant of seizure has been
issued.
53
36. ANIAG VS. COMELEC
warrantless searches and seizures - checkpoints
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Comelec promulgated the Gun Ban starting December 11, 1991, in time for the
May 1992 elections.
Pursuant to this, the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representatives, wrote
Congressman Aniag of Bulacan, requesting the return of the two (2) firearms
issued to him by the House of Representatives.
Thus, Congressman Aniag complied and immediately instructed his driver,
Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return
them to Congress.
There was a checkpoint at the Batasan Complex.
The policemen manning flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached
the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in
their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then
apprehended and detained.
The driver explained that he was merely instructed to return the guns to
Congress.
At the inquest proceedings, Congressman Aniag explained that Arellano did not
violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by
returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was petitioner's driver, not a
security officer nor a bodyguard.
Comelec however still filed charges against Arellano. Comelec also wanted to
disqualify Aniag from running in the elections because of the incident.
Congressman Aniag strongly protests against the manner by which the PNP
conducted the search. According to him, without a warrant and without informing
the driver of his fundamental rights the policemen searched his car. The firearms
were not tucked in the waist nor within the immediate reach of Arellano but were
neatly packed in their gun cases and wrapped in a bag kept in the trunk of the
car.
SC: SEARCH INVALID.
The checkpoint was set up twenty (20) meters from the entrance of the Batasan.
There was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of
a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists
matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning,
transporting Firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor was there any
indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the
suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing
to the culpability of Aniag and Arellano, the search could not be valid.
The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into petitioner's privacy and
the security of his property. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of
petitioner's right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in
any proceeding.
In short, an extensive search of the car without a warrant can only be resorted to if
the officers conducting the search had PROBABLE CAUSE BEFORE THE SEARCH that
the drvier violated the law, or that they would find evidence pertaining to the
commission of a crime in the vehicle.
54
ISSUE: Did the seeming acquiescence of Arellano to the search constitute an implied
waiver of petitioner's right to question the reasonableness of the search of the
vehicle and the seizure of the firearms?
SC: NO. NO WAIVER OF RIGHT.
Only his driver was at the at that time it was stopped for inspection. Driver Arellano
did not know the purpose of the checkpoint. In the face of fourteen (14) armed
policemen conducting the operation, driver Arellano being alone and a mere
employee of petitioner could not have marshalled the strength and the courage to
protest against the extensive search conducted in the vehicle. In such scenario, the
"implied acquiescence," if there was any, could not be more than a mere passive
conformity on Arellano's part to the search, and "consent" given under intimidating
or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of the constitutional
guaranty.
Guidelines should have been made to ensure that no infringement of civil and
political rights results from the implementation of this authority. PNP installed the
checkpoint at about five o'clock in the afternoon and the search was made soon
thereafter, or thirty minutes later. There was no news of impending checkpoints, and
the reason for the same have been announced in the media to forewarn the citizens.
Nor did the informal checkpoint that afternoon carry signs informing the public of the
purpose of its operation. As a result, motorists passing that place did not have any
inkling whatsoever about the reason behind the exercise. With the authorities in
control to stop and search passing vehicles, the motorists did not have any choice
but to submit to the PNP's scrutiny.
CHAMP Page 55
2/15/2016
55
37. PEOPLE VS. USANA / ESCANO G.R. Nos. 129756-58
warrantless searches and seizures - checkpoints
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January 28, 2000
During a COMELEC gun ban, the Makati Police were manning a checkpoint at the
corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway (SLEX).They
were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious,
and imposing merely a running stop on the others.
At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493. The
policemen saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger
seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified
as Escaño, to open the door. The police seized the long firearm, an M-1 US
Carbine, from Usana. They were ordered to park their car and the other
passengers were search for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber
firearm which they seized from Escaño.
The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station. (At this point,
it was the policeman who drove the car to the police station.)
At the police HQ, the investigating policeman became suspicious of the vehicle.
So, he requested Escaño to open the trunk. Escaño readily agreed and opened
the trunk. The police noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escaño to
open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, and found HASHHISH.
They were charged with and convicted for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
as well as Illegal Possession of Firearms.
Accused-appellants assail the manner by which the checkpoint in question was
conducted. They contend that the checkpoint manned by elements of the Makati
Police should have been announced. They also complain of its having been
conducted in an arbitrary and discriminatory manner.
SC: VALID SEARCH AND SEIZURE.
The checkpoint herein conducted was in pursuance of the gun ban enforced by the
COMELEC. The COMELEC would be hard put to implement the ban if its deputized
agents were limited to a visual search of pedestrians. It would also defeat the
purpose for which such ban was instituted. Those who intend to bring a gun during
said period would know that they only need a car to be able to easily perpetrate their
malicious designs.
PO3 Suba admitted that they were merely stopping cars they deemed suspicious,
such as those whose windows are heavily tinted just to see if the passengers thereof
were carrying guns. At best they would merely direct their flashlights inside the cars
they would stop, without opening the car's doors or subjecting its passengers to a
body search. There is nothing discriminatory in this as this is what the situation
demands.
We see no need for checkpoints to be announced, as the accused have invoked. Not
only would it be impractical, it would also forewarn those who intend to violate the
ban. Even so, badges of legitimacy of checkpoints may still be inferred from their
fixed location and the regularized manner in which they are operated.
Not all checkpoints are illegal. Those which are warranted by the exigencies of public
order and are conducted in a way least intrusive to motorists are allowed. For,
admittedly, routine checkpoints do intrude, to a certain extent, on motorists' right to
"free passage without interruption," but it cannot be denied that, as a rule, it
involves only a brief detention of travelers during which the vehicle's occupants are
56
required to answer a brief question or two. For as long as the vehicle is neither
searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the
vehicle is limited to a visual search, said routine checks cannot be regarded as
violative of an individual's right against unreasonable search. In fact, these routine
checks, when conducted in a fixed area, are even less intrusive.
(note: there must be an exigency which will justify the establishment of a
checkpoint. Such checkpoint should be limited only to a visual search. If it is going to
be beyond mere visual search, then the police must first establish probable cause).
ISSUE: Was there waiver of the right?
SC: YES. Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we
cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search
done on the car of Escaño was consented to by him. Both Lopez and Usana testified
that Escaño was with the police officers when they searched the car. There was no
apparent objection made by Escaño as he seemed to have freely accompanied the
police officers to the car. PO3 Suba, on the other hand, testified that "Escaño readily
agreed to open the trunk," upon request of SPO4 de los Santos.
ISSUE: Can they be convicted under the Dangerous Drugs Act?
SC: NO.
Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and
Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425. The following facts militate against a finding of
conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escaño; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened
soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the
car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police
station; (4) the car's trunk was opened, with the permission of Escaño, without the
presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the
opening of the car's trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police
authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the
trunk of the car. Their having been with Escaño in the latter's car before the "finding"
of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their
presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling,
distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that
Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they
saw the same before it was seized.
57
38. PEOPLE VS. SUSAN CANTON G.R. No. 148825
warrantless searches and seizure – incidental to arrest
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December 27, 2002
SUSAN CANTON was at the NAIA, being a departing passenger bound for Saigon,
Vietnam.2 When she passed through the metal detector booth, a beeping sound was
emitted. The airport official and frisker on duty called her attention, saying "Excuse me
ma’am, can I search you?"3 Upon frisking SUSAN, the frisker felt something bulging at her
abdominal area. She then inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN, pinched the
package several times and noticed that the package contained what felt like rice granules.4
When she passed her hand, she felt similar packages in front of SUSAN’s genital area and
thighs. She asked SUSAN to bring out the packages, but the latter refused and said:
"Money, money only." The frisker then reported the matter to the supervisor.
Customs officials brought SUSAN to the to a comfort room for a thorough physical
examination. Upon further frisking in the ladies’ room, the frisker touched something in
front of SUSAN’s sex organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her skirt, girdles and panty.
SUSAN obliged. The frisker and the customs officials discovered three packages
individually wrapped and sealed in gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN voluntarily
handed to them.6 The first was taken from SUSAN’s abdominal area; the second, from in
front of her genital area; and the third, from her right thigh.7 They were turned over to
the police on duty.8 Together with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic packs to the
customs examination table, opened the same and found that they contained white
crystalline substances9 which, when submitted for laboratory examination, yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
SUSAN was convicted under the Dangerous Drugs Act.
SUSAN however assailed the propriety of the search and seizure without warrant on the
ground that the seized items were not in plain view.
Here are her arguments:
o SUSAN asserts that the strip search conducted on her in the ladies’ room was
constitutionally infirmed because it was not "incidental to an arrest." The arrest
could not be said to have been made before the search because at the time of the
strip search, the arresting officers could not have known what was inside the
plastic containers hidden on her body, which were wrapped and sealed with gray
tape. At that point then, they could not have determined whether SUSAN was
actually committing a crime. The strip search was therefore nothing but a fishing
expedition. Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was caught flagrante delicto and
that the warrantless search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
o SUSAN maintains that, following the doctrine enunciated in Terry v. Ohio, 21 such
stop and frisk search should have been limited to the patting of her outer
garments in order to determine whether she was armed or dangerous and
therefore a threat to the security of the aircraft.
o SUSAN alleges that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a package at her
abdominal area, started inquiring about the contents thereof, detained her, and
decided to submit her to a strip search in the ladies’ room, she was under
custodial investigation without counsel,
o SUSAN questions the application of People v. Johnson22 because of its sweeping
statement allowing searches and seizures of departing passengers in airports in
view of the gravity of the safety interests involved. She stresses that the pertinent
case should have been Katz v. United States,23 which upholds the Fourth
Amendment of the United States of America that "protects people and not places."
The SOLGEN however contends that:
o the search was valid since was caught flagrante delicto and that the warrantless
search was incidental to a lawful arrest.
o Moreover, SUSAN voluntarily submitted herself to the search and seizure when she
allowed herself to be frisked and brought to the comfort room for further
inspection by airport security personnel.
o It likewise maintains that the methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from SUSAN
during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately pursuant to airport
security procedures.
58
SC: VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCH. VALID WARRANTLESS ARREST. CONVICTION AFFIRMED.
The interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are
(1) search of moving vehicles;
(2) seizure in plain view;
(3) customs searches;
(4) waiver or consented searches;
(5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search); and
(6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.
ISSUE: Was it a search incidental to lawful arrest?
SC: NO. We do not agree with the trial court and the OSG that the search and seizure
conducted in this case were incidental to a lawful arrest. SUSAN’s arrest did not precede the
search. When the metal detector alarmed while SUSAN was passing through it, the lady frisker
on duty forthwith made a pat down search on the former. In the process, the latter felt a
bulge on SUSAN’s abdomen. The strip search that followed was for the purpose of ascertaining
what were the packages concealed on SUSAN’s body. If ever at the time SUSAN was deprived
of her will and liberty, such restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule 113
of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking of a person into
custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an
offense."lawphi1.ñet
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the strip search in the ladies’ room, the
airport security personnel had no knowledge yet of what were hidden on SUSAN’s body;
hence, they did not know yet whether a crime was being committed. It was only after the strip
search upon the discovery by the police officers of the white crystalline substances inside the
packages, which they believed to be shabu, that SUSAN was arrested. The search cannot,
therefore, be said to have been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search incidental to a
lawful arrest, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made;
the process cannot be reversed.26
ISSUE: Was it a stop and frisk search?
SC: NO. The Terry search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers to a case where a police
officer approaches a person who is acting suspiciously, for purposes of investigating possibly
criminal behavior in line with the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection.
To assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used against him, he could validly conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such person to discover weapons which might be used
to assault him. The Terry Search is limited to WEAPONS.
ISSUE: Then what was it?
SC: A NEW EXCEPTION! – SEARCH PURSUANT TO ROUTINE AIRPORT SECURITY PROCEDURE
(RA 6235)
SEC. 9. Every ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or air carrier concerned shall contain
among others the following condition printed thereon: "Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for , and seizure of, prohibited materials or substances.
Holder refusing to be searched shall not be allowed to board the aircraft," which shall
constitute a part of the contract between the passenger and the air carrier.
This constitutes another exception to the proscription against warrantless searches and
seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-quoted
provision is stated in the "Notice to All Passengers" located at the final security checkpoint at
the departure lounge. From the said provision, it is clear that the search, unlike in the Terry
search, is not limited to weapons. Passengers are also subject to search for prohibited
materials or substances.
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed SUSAN consented to be frisked, which resulted
in the discovery of packages on her body. It was too late in the day for her to refuse to be
59
further searched because the discovery of the packages whose contents felt like rice granules,
coupled by her apprehensiveness and her obviously false statement that the packages
contained only money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker that SUSAN was hiding something
illegal. It must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235 authorizes search for prohibited materials or
substances. To limit the action of the airport security personnel to simply refusing her entry
into the aircraft and sending her home (as suggested by appellant), and thereby depriving
them of "the ability and facility to act accordingly, including to further search without warrant,
in light of such circumstances, would be to sanction impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society."28 Thus, the strip search in the ladies’ room was
justified under the circumstances.
This is related to the Johnson case.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons
or property to the public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy,
which expectation society is prepared to recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit
in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane hijacking and terrorism
has come increased security at the nation’s airports. Passengers attempting to board an
aircraft routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked
luggage are routinely subjected to x-ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence
of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness,
the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated
with airline travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems,
signs, and notices in their airline tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such would be subject to seizure. These announcements
place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
ISSUE: Was the arrest valid?
SC: YES. The appellant, having been caught flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested without a
warrant. (When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;). The search conducted on SUSAN resulted
in the discovery and recovery of three packages containing white crystalline substances, which
upon examination yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. As
discussed earlier, such warrantless search and seizure were legal. Armed with the knowledge
that SUSAN was committing a crime, the airport security personnel and police authorities were
duty-bound to arrest her. As held in People v. Johnson, her subsequent arrest without a
warrant was justified, since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her
person flagrante delicto.
CHAMP Page 60
2/15/2016
Other issues: Was her right to counsel violated? (but this is for Sec 12.)
SC: NO. The constitutional right to counsel afforded an accused under custodial investigation
was not violated. In this case, as testified to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome
Cause, no custodial investigation was conducted after SUSAN’s arrest. She affixed her
signature to the receipt of the articles seized from her, but before she did so, she was told
that she had the option to sign or not to sign it. In any event, her signature to the packages
was not relied upon by the prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no statement was taken
from her during her detention and used in evidence against her.36 Hence, her claim of violation
of her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
60
39. CAMARA VS. MUNCIPAL COURT SFO.
Administrative searches and seizures.
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Camara was charged with violating the San Francisco Housing Code Section 507.
He refused (3 times) to let the housing inspectors to allow a warrantless
inspection of his ground-floor headquarters which he leased.
He allegedly violated the apratment’s occupancy permit by using the rear of the
leasehold as a personal residence. (this was not allowed by the code).
He questioned the constitutionality of the Code, which authorizes municipal
officials to enter the private dwelling even without a search warrant, and without
probable cause to believe that there is a violation of the Housing Code.
He claimed that this was in violation of his 4 th Amendment rights (that is, to
safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasion of
government officials)
City officials rely on the Frank case, citing that administrative inspections are
allowed even without a warrant because they are merely designed to make the
lease possible demand on the individuals.
City officials also claim that warrantless administrative searches are in the
interest of the public since the health and safety of the public is dependent on
proper enforcement of housing codes. They claim that this is the only effective
means of enforcing such laws – by systematic inspection of physical structures.
SC: SEARCH INVALID.
Except in certain carefully defined classes of cases, a search of private property
without proper consent is unreasonable, unless it has been authorized by a valid
search warrant. The right of officers to thrust themselves into a home is also a grave
concern, not only to the individual but to a society which chooses to dwell in
reasonable security and freedom from surveillance. When the right of privacy must
reasonably yield to the right of search, it is as a rule, to be decided by a judicial
officer, not by a policeman or government enforcement agent.
FRANK VS. MARYLAND. A routine inspection of the physical condition of private
property is a less hostile intrusion than a typical policeman’s search for the fruits and
instrumentalities of a crime. That is why the court allowed the warrantless inspection
in the Frank vs. Maryland case. (this doctrine in that case was that: municipal fire,
health, and housing inspection programs touch at most upon the periphery of the
important interests safeguarded by the 4 th amendment’s protection against official
intrustion, because the inspections are merely to determine whether physical
conditions exists which do not comply with the standards prescribed by the local
ordinances. Also, the Frank case does not require the property owner to open his
doors for a search of evidence of criminal action which might be used for his
conviction. Thus, 4th amendment rights are not involved there, but only the less
intense “right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy.”)
NOW IN THIS CASE, the court does not agree that the interests at stake in these
inspection cases are merely peripheral of the 4th amendment rights. The court now
says it is surely anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are still
fully protected by the 4th Am., only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior. This is wrong.
The reason the court gave is that: like most regulatory laws, fire health and housing
codes are enforced by criminal processes!! Discovery of a violation by the inspector
61
leads to a criminal complaint. And as seen in Camara’s case, refusal to permit an
inspection is in itself a crime, punishable by fine or jail sentence.
Furthermore, under the present Housing Code, when the inspector demands entry,
the occupant has no way of knowing whether enforcement of the municipal code
involved requires the inspection of his premises, no way of knowing the lawful limits
of the inspector’s power to search, and no way of knowing whether the inspector
himself is acting under proper authorization. These are questions which should be
addressed to the JUDICIAL BODIES. Under this setup, it is only after refusing entry
and risking criminal conviction can the occupant be able to challenge the inspection
in court. He may never learn any more about the reason for the inspection than that
the law generally allows to gain entry for inspectors. The practical effect of this
system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion of the inspector. This is
precisely the discretion to invade private property.
The argument that the inspections are for the public interest misses the point. The
question is NOT whether the inspections may be made at all, but whether they may
be made without a warrant. The real question is whether the public interest demands
the creation of another exception to the general rule requiring warrants for searches.
The real question is whether the burden of obtaining a warrant would likely frustrate
the governmental purpose behind the search. Here, there was NO allegation that the
housing codes inspection program could NOT achieve their purpose if they complied
with search warrant requirements.
We hold that administrative searches of this kind are SIGNIFICANT INTRUSIONS
UPON THE 4TH AM. RIGHTS. Such searches when conducted without a warrant, lack
the traditional safeguards of the 4 th Am. The arguments raised in Frank vs. Maryland
are insufficient to justify a weakening of the 4th Am. Protection.
But the court does not entirely overturn the Frank case. That case gave recognition
to the unique character of such kinds of inspection programs because it did not
require search warrants. To reject that proposition does not justify ignoring the
question whether some other accommodation between public need and individual
rights is essential.
Nothing is intended to foreclose prompt inspections without a warrant. This is
because warrantless searches are traditionally upheld in emergency situations. It
seems likely that the warrants should be normally sought only after entry is refused
unless there are satisfactory reasons for securing immediate entry. (I think, what the
court is simply saying is that authorizing entry to inspect is allowed, provided it is
not done by force.)
Here, Camara was charged for refusing to allow inspectors to enter his property
without warrant. There was NO EMERGENCY DEMANDING IMMEDIATE ACCESS. In
fact, the officials made 3 trips to the building. Yet, no warrant was obtained and thus
Camara was unable to verify the need for or the appropriate limits of the inspection.
Thus, Camara had the constitutional right to insist that the inspectors obtain a
search warrant. He CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR REFUSING TO PERMIT
INSPECTION.
Note: Is there a legitimate expectation of privacy?
The more intrusive these searches are, the greater the need to obtain a SW.
62
40. GO VS. CA
warrantless arrests.
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This is the case of Eldon Maguan, who was shot by Rolito Go. (traffic altercation).
Eldon Maguan was driving his car along Wilson St., San Juan, heading towards P.
Guevarra St.. Rolito Go entered Wilson St., where it is a one-way street and
started travelling in the opposite or "wrong" direction. The 2 cars nearly bumped
each other. Rolito Go alighted from his car, walked over and shot Maguan inside
his car. Petitioner then boarded his car and left the scene.
6 days later, Rolito Go presented himself before the San Juan Police Station to
verify news reports that be was being hunted by the police. The police forthwith
detained him. An eyewitness to the shooting, who was at the police station at
that time, positively identified petitioner as the gunman.
He was later charged with murder. He assails the warrantless arrest claiming that
it was unlawful.
The prosecution argues that:
o The warrantless arrest was valid because the offense for which he was
arrested and charged had been 'freshly committed." His identity had been
established through investigation. At the time he showed up at the police
station, there had been an existing manhunt for him. During the
confrontation at the San Juan Police Station, one witness positively
identified petitioner as the culprit.
o Since Go’s identity as the gunman who had shot Eldon Maguan had been
sufficiently established by police work, he was validly arrested six (6) days
later at the San Juan Police Station.
Rolito Go however claims:
o that he was not lawfully arrested without warrant because he went to the
police station six (6) days after the shooting which he had allegedly
perpetrated. Thus, the crime had not been "just committed" at the time
that he was arrested. Moreover, none of the police officers who arrested
him had been an eyewitness to the shooting of Maguan and accordingly
none had the "personal knowledge" required for the lawfulness of a
warrantless arrest.
ISSUE: Was the warrantless arrest valid?
SC: NOT VALID.
First, there was no continuing crime. The offense for which petitioner was arrested
was murder, an offense which was obviously commenced and completed at one
definite location in time and space. The fatal shooting of Maguan was a not
"continuing crime."
Second, Go’s "arrest' took place six (6) days after the shooting of Maguan. The
"arresting" officers obviously were not present, within the meaning of Section 5(a),
at the time petitioner had allegedly shot Maguan. Neither could the "arrest" effected
six (6) days after the shooting be reasonably regarded as effected when [the
shooting had] in fact just been committed" within the meaning of Section 5(b).
Moreover, none of the "arresting" officers had any "personal knowledge" of facts
indicating that petitioner was the gunman who had shot Maguan. The information
upon which the police acted had been derived from statemints made by alleged
eyewitnesses to the shooting-one stated that Petitioner was the gunman; another
was able to take down the alleged gunman's car's plate number which turned out to
be registered in petitioner's wife's name. That information did not, however,
63
constitute "personal knowledge." It is thus clear to the Court that there was no
lawful warrantless arrest of petitioner within the meaning of Section 5 of Rule 113.
Go was not arrested at all. When he walked into the San Juan Police Station,
accompanied by two (2) lawyers, he in fact placed himself at the disposal of the
police authorities. He did not state that he was "surrendering' himself, in all
probability to avoid the implication he was admitting that he had slain Eldon Maguan
or that he was otherwise guilty of a crime. When the police filed a complaint for
frustrated homicide with the Prosecutor, the latter should have immediately
scheduled a preliminary investigation to determine whether there was probable
cause for charging petitioner in court for the killing of Eldon Maguan. Instead, as
noted earlier, the Prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section
7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary
investigation. This was substantive error, for petitioner was entitled to a preliminary
investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions.
Moreover, Since petitioner had not be been arreste,with or without a warrant, he was
also entitled to be released forthwith subject only to his appearing at the preliminary
investigation.
Note under Rule 113, warrantless arrests are allowed only for:
a) in flagrante delicto - When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who hap escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
64
41. PEOPLE VS. BURGOS
warrantless arrests
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Burgos was charged with illegal possession of firearms in furtherance of
subversion.
The police obtained information from former members (Masamlok) of the NPA
that it was Burgos who recruited them to join the NPA.
Thus the police arrested Burgos at his house, while he was plowing his field.
Then inside the house the police asked the accused about his firearm, as reported
by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied possession of said firearm but later,
the wife pointed to a place below their house where a gun was buried in the
ground. Subversive documents were also recovered (some notebooks, pamphlets
of the NPA).
He was thus arrested without a warrant.
ISSUES: Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful? Were the search of his house and
the subsequent confiscation of a firearm and documents allegedly found therein
conducted in a lawful and valid manner?
SC: ARREST NOT VALID.
Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within
his view. There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge
was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the
appellant's wife.
At the time of the appellant's arrest, he was not in actual possession of any firearm
or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be
described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time of the arrest.
What is sought to be guarded is a man's prerogative to choose who is allowed entry
to his residence. In that haven of refuge, his individuality can assert itself not only in
the choice of who shall be welcome but likewise in the kind of objects he wants
around him. There the state, however powerful, does not as such have access except
under the circumstances above noted, for in the traditional formulation, his house,
however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by
government, which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to
respect the privacies of his life. the belief that to value the privacy of home and
person and to afford its constitutional protection against the long reach of
government is no less than to value human dignity, and that his privacy must not be
disturbed except in case of overriding social need, and then only under stringent
procedural safeguards.'
ISSUE: Sol-gen claims that warrantless arrest was proper under Section 6(b) using
the test of reasonableness. He claims that the information given by Cesar Masamlok
was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and
that the accused is probably guilty thereof.
SC: ARREST NOT VALID.
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
65
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that
a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must
be undisputed. (there must be no question that a crime has actually been
committed.) The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the
perpetrator. (the only question remaining is the identity)
In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime.
They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent
recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a
frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
More important, we find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting
officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go
through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable
ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing
that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or
escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were
unknown.
The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by
Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was
no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal
prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search
warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused
while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and
seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being
mere incidents to a valid arrest.
ISSUE: WAS THERE A WAIVER?
SC: NO WAIVER.
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by
the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a
waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved
had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly,
that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right
Since arrest was illegal, then the search is also also illegal.
CHAMP
Page 66
2/15/2016
66
42. PADILLA VS. CA
warrantless arrest
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This is the case of Robin Padilla – charged with illegal possession of firearms.
Manarang and Perez were in a Manukan Restaurant in Angeles City. While inside
the restaurant, they notice a Mitsubishi Pajero (PMA-777), running fast in the
highway. Manarang remarked that the vehicle might get into an accident
considering the heavy rain. True enough, immediately after the Pajero passed the
restaurant, they heard a screeeeching sound and then a hard brake of a vehicle.
Manarang then reported the incident to the PNP. The Pajero however started to
move and leave the accident site. Manarang approached and found out that the
vehicle had hit somebody. He was able to get the plate number (PMA-777)
Manarang rode his motorcycle and chased the Pajero. The policemen also joined
him. After a long police chase, they were able to stop the Pajero.
When police approached the vehicle, the driver rolled down the window and put
his head out while raising both his hands. There was no one else inside the
vehicle. They recognized the driver as Robin Padilla (idol!!) wearing a short
leather jacket. When he alighted with both his hands raised, the police noticed a
gun in his left waist.
He was disarmed.
He was informed that he was being arrest for hit-and-run incident. The police
pointed out the fact that his plate number was dangling and the hood was
dented.
Padilla however denied the allegations and played with the crown by holding their
hands with one hand and pointing to one of the policemen with his right hand
saying, “iyan kinuha ang baril ko!”.
Because of this, another magazine of a armalite rifle was discovered in Padilla’s
right pocket. This was also confiscated.
Then when Padilla was going back to his car, the police saw a baby armalite at
the driver’s seat.
He was again informed that he will be arrested, this time for illegal possession of
firearms.
He was brought to the police headquarters.
Robin claims that his arrest was illegal, and consequently the searches and
seizures taken were inadmissible. (he also claims he was a confidential agent on
a secret mission order). He claims that the policemen who actually arrested him
were not at the scene of the hit and run.
SC: WARRANTLESS ARREST VALID. SUBSSEQUENT SEARCH VALID.
ARREST:A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.
Paragraph (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or
while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (ii) in
the presence of the arresting officer or private person. Both elements concurred
here, as it has been established that petitioner's vehicle figured in a hit and run - an
offense committed in the "presence" of Manarang, a private person, who then sought
to arrest petitioner. It must be stressed at this point that "presence" does not only
require that the arresting person sees the offense, but also when he "hears the
disturbance created thereby AND proceeds at once to the scene. " As testified to by
Manarang, he heard the screeching of tires followed by a thud, saw the sideswiped
victim (balut vendor), reported the incident to the police and thereafter gave chase
67
to the erring Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order to apprehend its driver.
After having sent a radio report to the PNP for assistance, Manarang proceeded to
the Abacan bridge where he found responding policemen SP02 Boda and SP02
Miranda already positioned near the bridge who effected the actual arrest of
petitioner.
That Manarang decided to seek the aid of the policemen (who admittedly were
nowhere in the vicinity of the hit and run) in effecting petitioner's arrest, did not in
any way affect the propriety of the apprehension. It was in fact the most prudent
action Manarang could have taken rather than collaring petitioner by himself,
inasmuch as policemen are unquestionably better trained and wellequipped in
effecting an arrest of a suspect (like herein petitioner) who, in all probability, could
have put up a degree of resistance which an untrained civilian may not be able to
contain without endangering his own life. Moreover. it is a reality that curbing
lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with
private citizens. It is precisely through this cooperation that the offense herein
involved fortunately did not become an additional entry to the long list of unreported
and unsolved crimes.
The exigent circumstances of - hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the
public place and the raining nighttime - all created a situation in which speed is
essential and delay improvident.
The Court acknowledges police authority, to make the forcible stop since they had
more than mere "reasonable and articulable" suspicion that the occupant of the
vehicle has been engaged in criminal activity.36 Moreover, when caught in flagrante
delicto With possession of an unlicensed firearm (Smith & Wesson) and ammunition
(M-1 6 magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest was proper as he was again
actually committing another offense (illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions)
and this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Also, the policemen's warrantless arrest of petitioner could likewise be justified under
paragraph (b) as he had in fact just committed an offense. There was no
supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the
actual apprehension. The policemen saw for themselves the fast approaching Pajero
of petitioner,38 its dangling plate number, and the dented hood and railings thereof .
These formed part of the arresting police officer's personal knowledge of the facts
indicating that petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle involved in the hit and run
incident. Verily then, the arresting police officers acted upon verified personal
knowledge and not on unreliable hearsay information .
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE: the authorities stumbled upon petitioners firearms and
ammunitions without even undertaking any active search which, as it is commonly
understood, is a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. The seizure of
the Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle magazine was justified for they came
within "plain view" of the policemen who inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and back pocket respectively, when he raised
his hands after alighting from his Pajero. The same justification applies to the
confiscation of the M-16 armalite rifle which was immediately apparent to the
poicemen as they took a casual glance at the Pajero and saw said rifle lying
horizontally near the driver's seat. Thus it has been held that: performing their
duties as police officers for the apprehension of the guilty person and the taking of
the corpus delicit."
68
"Objects whose possesion are prohibited by law inadvertently found in plain view are
subject to seizure even without a warrant."
With respect to the Berreta pistol and a black bag containing assorted magazines,
petitioner voluntarily surrendered them to the police. This latter gesture of petitioner
indicated a waiver of his right against the alleged search and seizure, and that his
failure to quash the information estopped him from assailing any purported defect.
Even assuming that the firearms and ammunitions were products of an active search
done by the authorities on the person and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure without
a search warrant nonetheless can still be Justified under a search incidental to a
lawful arrest (first instance). Once the lawful arrest was effected, the police may
undertake a protective search58 of the passenger compartment and containers in
the vehicle" which are within petitioner's grabbing distance regardless of the nature
of the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test of an incidental search:
(1) the item to be searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's custody or area of
immediate control" and
(2) the search was contemporaneous with the arrest.
The products of that search are admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule.
Another justification is a search of a moving vehicle (third instance). In connection
therewith, a warrantless search is constitutionally permissible when, as in this case,
the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe,
before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender (like herein petitioner
with respect to the hit and run) or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have
been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
CHAMP Page 69
2/15/2016
69
43. PEOPLE VS. MARTI
warrantless searches and seizures
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Marti and his common-law wife Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. They
were sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland.
The attendant at the booth asked if she could examine and inspect the packages.
Marti, however refused, assuring her that the packages simply contained books,
cigar&, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. Thus, the packages were
no longer inspected. It was marked and sealed, ready for shipment
However, bfore delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs and/ or Bureau of
Posts, the owner of the forwarding company, following standard operating
procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened it, a peculiar
odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity amused, he squeezed one of the bundles
allegedly containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening one of the
bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one
of the gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took
several grams of the contents thereof.
He reported the shipment to the NBI. He later went to the NBI with the box. In
the presence of the NBI agents, he opened the top flaps, removed the styro-foam
and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana
leaves were found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers.
NBI searched for Marti but to no avail. An information for violation of DDA was
filed against Marti.
Marti contends that the evidence had been obtained in violation of his
constitutional rights against unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication and therefore argues that the same should be held inadmissible
in evidence.
ISSUE: The case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be
excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by a private person, acting in a
private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities.
Under the circumstances, can accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional
right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated
otherwise, may an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's
constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
SC: NO. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the
Constitution cannot be invoked against the State. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE.
The Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and
as shown in previous cases, its protection applies to governmental action. Its origin
and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than
governmental agencies; as against such authority it was the purpose of the Fourth
Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his
dwelling and the possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process
duly served."
The fourth amendment does not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a
search by a private citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental
action. The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the
Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against unreasonable
70
search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be
admitted against him in the prosecution of the offense charged.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the
forwarding agency, who made search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection
was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a
precautionary measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Posts.
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took
samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents to his place of
business. Thereafter he opened the parcels containing the rest of the shipment and
entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI agents. Clearly, the NBI agents
made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of
accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search
effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a
search. Having observed that which is open, where no tresspass has been committed
in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited
by the constitution
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be
first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is
made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its
own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and without the intervention of
police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be
invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In
sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended
to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged
unlawful intrusion by the government.
71
44. MANALILI VS. CA
stop and frisk
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Police were conducting a surveillance near the Kalookan City Cemetery because
of information that drug addicts were roaming the area.
They chanced Upon a male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on
drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes and to be walking in
a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter
approached him and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then
asked the male person what he was holding in his hands. The male person tried
to resist. The police asked the male person if he could see what said male person
had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed the policeman to
examine the same. The policeman took the wallet and examined it. He found
Suspected Crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its
marijuana contents.
The male person (Manalili) was brought to the police station.
The trial court convicted petitioner of illegal possession of marijuana residue
largely on the strength of the arresting officers' testimony. The policemen were
"neutral and disinterested" witnesses, testifying only on what transpired during
the performance of their duties. Substantially, they asserted that the appellant
was found to be in possession of a substance which was later identified as
crushed marijuana residue.
Manalili assails the admissibility of the evidence seized, contending that they
were products of an illegal search.
SC: VALID SEARCH. EVIDENCE ADMISSIBLE.
The search was valid, being akin to a stop-and-frisk. Stop-and-frisk was defined as the right of
a police officer to stop a citizen on the street, interrogate him, and pat him for weapon(s).
According to the case of Terry vs. Ohio, where a police officer observes an unusual conduct
which leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently dangerous,
where in the course of investigating this behavior lie identified himself as a policeman and
makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he is entitled for the protection of
himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of
such persons in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a
search is a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, and any weapon seized may
properly be introduced in evidence against the person from whom they were taken.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule
against a search without a warrant. The interest of effective crime prevention and
detection allows a police officer to approach a person, in appropriate circumstances
and manner, for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even though
there is insufficient probable cause to make an actual arrest.
In the case at hand, the policemen observed during their surveillance that appellant
had red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery,
which according to police information was a popular hangout of drug addicts. From
his experience as a member of the AntiNarcotics Unit of the Caloocan City Police,
such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were "high." The
policemen therefore had sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was
actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found marijuana in
petitioner's possession.
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45. MALACAT VS. CA
stop and frisk
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Malacat was charged with illegal possession of firearms.
The police at Quiapo Manila, in response to bomb threats reported seven days
earlier, were on foot patrol near the Mercury Drug store at Plaza Miranda. They
chanced upon two groups of Muslim-looking men, with each group, comprised of
three to four men, posted at opposite sides of the corner These men were acting
suspiciously with "their eyes ... moving very fast."
After minutes of surveillance, the police approached one group of men, who then
fled in different directions. As the policemen gave chase, they were able to
apprehend Malacat. Upon searching him, police found a fragmentation grenade
tucked inside petitioner's "front waist line."
Police admitted that Malacat et. al were merely standing on the corner. Although
they were not creating a commotion, since they were supposedly acting
suspiciously, the police approached them.
The RTC ruled that the warrantless search and seizure of petitioner was akin to a
"stop and frisk," where a "warrant and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest" and "whose object is either to maintain
the status quo momentarily while the police officer seeks to obtain more
information." Probable cause was not required as it was not certain that a crime
had been committed, however, the situation called for an investigation, hence to
require probable cause would have been "premature." The RTC emphasized that
the police were "confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to
obtain a warrant, threatens the destruction of evidence. The officers "[h]ad to act
in haste," as petitioner and his companions were acting suspiciously, considering
the time, place and "reported cases of bombing." Further, petitioner's group
suddenly ran away in different directions as they saw the arresting officers
approach, thus "[i]t is reasonable for an officer to conduct a limited search, the
purpose of which is not necessarily to discover evidence of a crime, but to allow
the officer to pursue his investigation without fear of violence."
The RTC also held the grenade admissible since it was a search incidental to
lawful arrest.
SC: ARREST NOT VALID. SEARCH NOT VALID.
Here, there could have been no valid inflagrante delicto or hot pursuit arrest
preceding the search in light of the lack of personal knowledge on the part of Yu, the
arresting officer, or an overt physical act, on the part of petitioner, indicating that a
crime had just been committed, was being committed or was going to be committed.
Having thus shown the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this case, plainly, the
search conducted on petitioner could not have been one incidental to a lawful arrest.
Three (3) reasons why the "stop-and-frisk" was 'invalid:
1) We harbor grave doubts as to Yu's claim that petitioner was a member of the
group which attempted to bomb Plaza Miranda two days earlier. This claim is neither
supported by any police report or record nor corroborated by any other police officer
who allegedly chased that group. Aside from impairing Yu's credibility as a witness,
this likewise diminishes the probability that a genuine reason existed so as to arrest
and search petitioner.
2) There was nothing in petitioner's behavior or conduct which could have reasonably
elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast" - an
observation which leaves us incredulous since Yu and his teammates were nowhere
73
near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. Petitioner and
his companions were merely standing at the comer and were not creating any
commotion or trouble.
3) There was at all no ground, probable or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
armed with a deadly weapon. None was visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front waistline" of petitioner, and from all
indications as to the distance between Yu and petitioner, any telltale bulge, assuming
that petitioner was indeed hiding a grenade, could not have been visible to Yu. When
the policemen approached the accused and his companions, they were not yet aware
that a handgrenade was tucked inside his waistline. They did not see any bulging
object in [sic] his person.
ACQUITTED.
CHAMP
Page 74
2/15/2016
In a search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires that there first be a lawful
arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. Assuming a
valid arrest, the arresting officer may search the person of the arrestee and the area
within. which the latter may reach for a weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was used in the commission of the crime, or the
fruit of the crime, or that which may be used as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or committing violence.
Notes on Stop and Frisk:
The allowable scope of a "stopand-frisk" is a "limited protective search of outer
clothing for weapons,".
We merely hold today that where a police officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of his experience that criminal activity may
be afoot and that the persons with whom he is dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of investigating this behavior he identifies himself as
a policeman and makes reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in the initial stages
of the encounter serves to dispel his reasonable fear for his own or others' safety, he
is entitled for the protection of himself and others in the area to conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such persons in an attempt to discover
weapons which might be used to assault him. Such a search is a reasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment* * *
While probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless
holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk." A genuine
reason must exist, in light of the police officer's experience and surrounding
conditions, to warrant the belief that the person detained has weapons concealed
about him. Finally, a "stop and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest: (1) the general
interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which underlies the recognition
that a police officer may, under appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate
manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior
even without probable cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and selfpreservation which permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the
person with whom he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the police officer.
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46. ADIONG VS. COMELEC
freedom of speech and the electoral process - censorship
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Comelec promulgated Resolution 2347 which prohibited the posting of dcals and
stickers on “mobile” places, and limiting their location or publication to authorized
posting areas.
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It is unlawful: (f) To draw, paint, inscribe, post, display or publicly exhibit any election
propaganda in anyplace, whether public or private, mobile or stationary, except in the
COMELEC common posted areas and/or billboards, at the campaign headquarters of the
candidate or political party, organization or coalition, or at the candidate's own residential
house or one of his residential houses, if he has more than one: Provided, that such
posters or election propaganda shall not exceed two (2) feet by three (3) feet in size."
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Blo Umpar Adiong, a senatorial candidate 1992 elections now assails the
COMELEC's Resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
,'mobile" places like cars and other moving vehicles. According to him such
prohibition is violative of the Omnibus Election Code and Republic Act No. 6646.
In addition, the petitioner believes that there is already a ban on radio, television
and print political advertisements, he, being a neophyte in the field of politics
stands to suffer grave and irreparable injury with this prohibition. The posting of
decals and stickers on cars and other moving vehicles would be his last medium
campaigning.
ISSUE: Does it violate freedom of speech and expression?
SC: YES.
The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech
enshrined in the Constitution (Sec. 4, Article III). There is no public interest
substantial enough to warrant the kind of restriction involved in this case.
All of the protections expressed in the Bill of Rights are important but we have
accorded to free speech the status of a preferred freedom. We have adopted the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open
and that it may well include vehement, caustic and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people
the robust, uninhibited, and wide open debate, the generating of interest essential if
our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for
the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information
to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.
When faced with border line situations where freedom to speak by a candidate or
party and freedom to know on the part of the electorate are invoked against actions
intended for maintaining clean and free elections, the police, local officials and
COMELEC should lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate analysis, the freedom
of the citizen and the State's power to regulate are not antagonistic. There can be no
free and honest elections if in the efforts to maintain them, the freedom to speak
and the right, to know are undully curtailed.
The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving
vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. There is no clear
public interest threatened by such activity so as to justify the curtailment of the
cherished citizen's right of free speech and expression. Under the clear and present
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danger rule not only must the danger be patently clear and pressingly present but
the evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's
mouth or a writing instrument to be stilled.
The freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much
that of the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of
an individual to express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince
others to agree with him. A sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car
owner agrees to have it placed on his private vehicle, the expression becomes a
statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
Also, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is so broad
that it encompasses even the citizen's private property, which in this case is a
privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another cardinal rule
prescribed by the Constitution would be violated, Section 1, Article III of the Bill of
Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process
of law.
We have to consider the fact that in the posting of decals and stickers on cars and
other moving vehicles, the candidate needs the consent of the owner of the vehicle.
In such a case, the prohibition would not only deprive the owner who consents to
such posting of the decals and stickers the use of his property but more important, in
the process, it would deprive the citizen of his right to free speech and information.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the
posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or private,
except in the common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a
private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal poster on his own
front door or on a post in his yard. The provisions allowing regulations are so loosely
worded that they include the posting of decals or stickers in the privacy of one's
living room or bedroom. This is delegation running riot.
Finally, the constitutional objective to give a rich candidate and a poor candidate
equal opportunity to inform the electorate as regards their candidacies, is not
impaired by posting decals and stickers on cars and other private vehicles. Compared
to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any
financial considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance.
It is to be reiterated that the posting of decals and stickers on cars, calesas,
tricycles, pedicabs and other moving vehicles needs the consent of the owner of the
vehicle. Hence, the preference of the citizen becomes crucial in this kind of election
propaganda not the financial resources of the candidate. Whether the candidate is
rich and, therefore, can afford to doleout more decals and stickers or poor and
without the means to spread out the number of decals and stickers is not as
important as the right of the owner to freely express his choice and exercise his right
of free speech. The owner can even prepare his own decals or stickers for posting on
his personal property. To strike down this right and enjoin it is impermissible
encroachment of his liberties.
The prohibition becomes CENSORSHIP.
76
47. NEAR VS. MINNESOTA
freedom of expression – prior restraint
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
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The Session Laws of Minnesota provides for the abatement, as a public nuisance,
of a malicious, scandalous and defamatory newspaper, magazine or periodical.
The law provided that any person who is engaged in the business of producing
publishing or circulating, selling or possessing obscene lewd magazines, etc, or
malicious, scandalous or defamatory newspaper etc., will be deemed nuisance.
The Attorney General sought to enjoin one publication, known as the SATURDAY
PRESS, which allegedly comes under the Session Laws
The malicious articles mentioned that a Jewish gangster was in control of
gambling, bootlegging and racketeering, and that law enforcers were not
energetically performing their duties. Most of the charges were directed against
the Chief of Police for being grossly negligent of his duties, having illicit relations
with the gangsters, and graft. It also accused the Mayor of dereliction. In short,
the articles made serious accusations against the public officers named in
connection with the prevalence of crimes and the failure to expose and punish
them.
Near, the defendant and owner of the publication, denied that the articles were
malicious, scandalous and defamatory. He also assails the legality of the statute
as violative of freedom of expression.
SC: STATUTE INVALID. CENSORSHIP. Infringes the liberty of the press (14th Am.)
The liberty of the Press and of Speech is within the liberty protected by the due
process clause. The statute in question must be tested based on its OPERATION AND
ITS EFFECTS, as follows:
1) The statute is not aimed at the redress of individual or private wrongs. The
remedies for libel remain available and unaffected. The statute is directed at the
DISTRIBUTION of scandalous matter, detrimental to public morals and general
welfare. In order to suppress publication of a newspaper, it is not necessary to prove
the falsity of the charges. In this case, there was no allegation that the matter
published was false. What the statute requires is that the publication be malicious.
Here, the statute still permits the defense of TRUTH, but also that the TRUTH WAS
PUBLISHED WITH GOOD MOTIVES AND FOR JUSTIFIABLE ENDS.
2) The Statute directed not simply at the circulation of scandalous or defamatory
statements, but at the CONTINUED PUBLICATION of such articles.
3) The object of the statute is not punishment but suppression of the offending
newspaper. It is the continued publication of the article that constitutes the business
and the declared nuisance. Under the statute, a publisher faces not simply a
possibility of verdict against him in a suit for libel, but goes further to declare the
business as a nuisance, unless the publisher is able to put up a defense to prove the
truth of the charges, and that it was published with good motives and justifiable
ends. Otherwise, if he fails to do these, his business is abated.
Thus, suppression is accomplished by enjoining the publication and that restraint is
the object and effect of the statute.
77
4) The statute not only operates to suppress the offending newspaper, but to put the
publisher under effective censorship. This is because when a malicious or scandalous
newspaper which has been declared as a nuisance resumes business, it will be
punished again as a contempt of court, by fine or imprisonment.
Note also that the law does not give any definition of the words scandalous,
malicious and defamatory.
 gathering from these 4 points, the OPERATION AND EFFECT of the statute is that
public authorities may bring the owner or publisher of a newspaper before a judge
upon a charge of publishing scandalous and defamatory material (such as the
charges against the public officers) and unless he is able to bring evidence to prove
that the charges are true and that they are publish with good motives and for
justifiable ends, his newspaper will be suppressed, and further publication is made
punishable as contempt. THIS IS THE ESSENCE OF CENSORSHIP.
The security of freedom of the press (and expression) requires that it should be
exempt not only from prior restraint from the executive, but also from legislative
restraint.
The purpose of the constitutional provision is to prevent all such prior restraints upon
publication. For whatever wrong the appellant has committed or may commit by his
publications, there is still redress with libel laws. As has been noted, the statute in
question does not deal with punishments, as it provides for no punishments (except
in case of contempt) but the statute provides for the suppression and injunction, and
ultimately, restraint, upon publication.
The statute in question cannot be justified by the reason that the publisher is
permitted to show anyway, that the material is true and published with good
motives. If it were so, then the legislature could provide that any time the publisher
can bring his proof of the truth and his good motives. Then the legislature can also
provide for a machinery of determining in the complete exercise of its discretion
what would be justifiable ends and restrain publication accordingly. THIS IS A STEP
TO A COMPLETE SYSTEM OF CENSORSHIP.
CHAMP Page 78
2/15/2016
78
48. TOLENTINO VS. SEC OF FINANCE
freedom of press
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This is the E-VAT case. The Philippine Press Institute assails the constitutionality
of the EVAT law insofar as it repeals the tax exemption of publishers of
newspapers and magazines. Under the EVAT, they are also required to register.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from
the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."

SC: VALID LAW.
The press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the
constitutional guarantee of free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or
target a group belonging to the press for special treatment or which in any way
discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the publication, and R.A.
No. 7716 is none of these.
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted
the press a privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense
to the Constitution. The reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does
not forever waive the exercise of its, sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the
same tax burden to which other businesses have long ago been subject.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise
of a privilege, much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter,
lease or exchange of goods or properties or the sale or exchange of services and the
lease of properties purely for revenue purposes. To subject the press to its payment
is not to burden the exercise of its night any more than to make the press pay
income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under the
Constitution. (in short the VAT is not regulatory but for revenue purposes!)
Other issue: Freedom of Religion
The Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds
derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of pointing copies which are
given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to
increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale. Granting that to be the case,
the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so incidental as to make
it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might make the
right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's
argument, to increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an
impermissible burden on the right of the preacher to make a sermon.
The registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by § 107 of the NIRC, as amended by 7 of
R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount is really just to pay for the expenses of
registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in §
108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to
pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this fee because it also sells
same copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must be decided in
concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
79
49. SWS VS. COMELEC
freedom of speech
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

Sec 5.4 of the Fair Election Act prohibited the publication of surveys affecting
national elections 15 days prior to the elections, and 7 days for surveys affecting
local elections.
The SWS argued that said restriction is an abridgment of freedom of speech.
They argue that the restriction on the publication of election survey results
constitutes a prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any
clear and present danger to justify such restraint. They claim that SWS and other
pollsters conducted and published the results of surveys prior to the 1992, 1995,
and 1998 elections up to as close as two days before the election day without
causing confusion among the voters and that there is neither empirical nor
historical evidence to support the conclusion that there is an immediate and
inevitable danger to tile voting process posed by election surveys. They point out
that no similar restriction is imposed on politicians from explaining their opinion
or on newspapers or broadcast media from writing and publishing articles
concerning political issues up to the day of the election. Consequently, they
contend that there is no reason for ordinary voters to be denied access to the
results of election surveys, which are relatively objective.
On the other hand, COMELEC contends: that the provision is necessary to
prevent the manipulation and corruption of the electoral process by unscrupulous
and erroneous surveys just before the election. It contends that (1) the
prohibition on the publication of election survey results during the period
proscribed by law bears a rational connection to the objective of the law, i.e., the
prevention of the debasement of the electoral process resulting from manipulated
surveys, bandwagon effect, and absence of reply; and (2) the impairment of
freedom of expression is minimal, the restriction being limited both in duration,
i.e., the last 15 days before the national election and the last 7 days before a
local election, and in scope as it does not prohibit election survey results but only
require timeliness.
SC: PROVISION INVALID.
There is no showing that the following considerations outweigh freedom of
expression:
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to prevent last-minute pressure on voters,
the creation of bandwagon effect to favor candidates,
misinformation,
the junking" of weak and "losing" candidates by their parties, and
the form of election cheating called "dagdag-bawas" and
invoking the State's power to supervise media of information during the
election period
What test should then be employed to determine the constitutional validity of §5.4?
The O’Brien Test. (United States v. O 'Brien)
Content-Based Government regulation is sufficiently justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government;
[2] if it furthers an important or substantial compelling governmental interest;
[3] if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression;
and
[4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms [of speech,
expression and press] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.8
80
Here, the 3RD CRITERION WAS NOT MET.
Sec. 5.4 fails to meet criterion [3] of the O 'Brien test because the causal connection of
expression to the asserted governmental interest makes such interest "not related to the
suppression of free expression." By prohibiting the publication of election survey results
because of the possibility that such publication might undermine the integrity of the election,
§5.4 actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and TV commentators,
armchair theorists, and other opinion takers. In effect, §5.4 shows a bias for a particular
subject matter, if not viewpoint, by referring personal opinion to statistical results. The
constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression means that "the government has no power
to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.
Also, the 4th CRITERION WAS NOT MET.
It fails to meet criterion [4] of the O 'Brien test, namely, that the restriction be not greater
than is necessary to further the governmental interest. As already stated, §5.4 aims at the
prevention of last-minute pressure on voters, the creation of bandwagon effect, "junking" of
weak or "losing" candidates, and resort to the form of election cheating called "dagdagbawas." Praiseworthy as these aims of the regulation might be, they cannot be attained at the
sacrifice of the fundamental right of expression, when such aim can be more narrowly pursued
by punishing unlawful acts, rather than speech because of apprehension that such speech
creates the danger of such evils.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the COMELEC is given the power: To stop any illegal
activity, or confiscate, tear down, and stop any unlawful, libelous, misleading or false election
propaganda, after due notice and hearing.
This is surely a less restrictive means than the prohibition contained in §5.4.
Pursuant to this power of the COMELEC, it can confiscate bogus survey results
calculated to mislead voters. Candidates can have their own surveys conducted. No
right of reply can be invoked by others. No principle of equality is involved. It is a
free market to which each candidate brings his ideas. As for the purpose of the law
to prevent bandwagon effects, it is doubtful whether the Government can deal with
this natural-enough tendency of some voters. Some voters want to be identified with
the "winners." Some are susceptible to the herd mentality.
Also, , contrary to the claim of the Solicitor General, the prohibition imposed by §5.4
cannot be justified on the ground that it is only for a limited period and is only
incidental. The prohibition may be for a limited time, but the curtailment of the right
of expression is direct, absolute, and substantial. It constitutes a total suppression of
a category of speech and is not made less so because it is only for a period of fifteen
(15) days immediately before a national election and seven (7) days immediately
before a local election. ..
We hold that §5.4 is invalid because (1) it imposes a prior restraint on the freedom
of expression, (2) it is a direct and total suppression of a category of expression
even though such suppression is only for a limited period, and (3) the governmental
interest sought to be promoted can be achieved by means other than suppression of
freedom of expression.
81
50. PRIMICIAS VS. FUGOSO
assembly and petition
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
Cipriano Primicias, a campaign manager of the Coalesced Minority Parties, filed a
Mandamus against Valeriano Fugoso, as Mayor Manila, to compel the latter to
issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda for the
purpose of petitioning the government for redress to grievances.
Earlier, the Municipal Board of Manila, several ordinances which prohibit as an
offense against public peace, and penalizes as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any
public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the peace or excite a riot;
or collect with other persons in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in any lawful assembly.
It also provided that, The streets and public places of the city shall be kept free
and clear for the use of the public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as
provided by ordinance or regulation, and that the holding of any parade or
procession in any streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is
first secured from the Mayor.
The Mayor refused to issue the permit on the ground that that there is a
reasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact
that passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high,
that similar speeches will be delivered tending to undermine the faith and
confidence of the people in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the peace and a disruption of public
order."
ISSUE: Said provision is susceptible of two constructions:
1) one is that the Mayor of the City of Manila is vested with unregulated discretion to
grant or refuse to grant permit for the holding of a lawful assembly or meeting,
parade, or procession in the streets and other public places of the City of Manila; and
2) the other is that the applicant has the right to a permit which shall be granted by
the Mayor, subject only to the latter's reasonable discretion to determine, or specify
the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, with a view to prevent
confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public places
by others, and to provide adequate and proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder.
SC: 2ND VIEW IS ADOPTED.
It does not confer upon the Mayor the power to refuse to grant the permit, but only
the discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public
places where the parade or procession may pass or the meeting may be held.
A statute requiring persons using the public streets for a parade or procession to
procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional
abridgment of the rights of assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance of licenses, to a consideration
of the time, place, and manner of the parade or procession, with a view to
conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provide proper
policing, and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license.
As the Municipal Board is empowered only to regulate the use of streets, parks, and
other public places, and the word "regulate," as used in section 2444 of the Revised
82
Administrative Code, means and includes the power to control, to govern, and to
restrain, but can not be construed as synonymous with "suppress" or "prohibit".
The privilege of a citizen of the to use the streets may be regulated in the interest of
all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in subordination to the
general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but
it must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.'
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to assure the safety
and convenience of the people in the use of public highways has never been
regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of the means of
safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.
Section 2434 of the Administrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila,
which provides that the Mayor shall have the power to grant and refuse municipal
licenses or permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to
deny the application of the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general power
is predicated upon the ordinances enacted by the Municipal Board requiring licenses
or permits to be issued by the Mayor. It is not a specific or substantive power
independent from the corresponding municipal ordinances which the Mayor, as Chief
Executive of the City, is required to enforce under the same section 2434.
Finally, the request for the permit was "to hold a peaceful public meeting," and there
is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it was to be a lawful assemblage, the
reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be given any consideration. The
Ordinance enables the Mayor to refuse the permit on his mere opinion that such
refusal will prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage. It can thus, be
made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of views on national
affairs, for the prohibition of all speaking will undoubtedly 'prevent' such
eventualities.
Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly.
Men feared witches and burned women. It is the function of speech to free men from
the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced.
There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is
imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented
is a serious one * * *.
"Those who won our independence by revolution were not cowards. They did not fear
political change. They did not exalt order at the cost of liberty. * * *
Moreover, even imminent danger cannot justify resort to prohibition of these
functions essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively
serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it
would be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a
society. * * * The fact that speech is likely to result in some violence or in
destruction of property is not enough to justify its suppression. There must be the
probability of serious injury to the state. Among freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to
be applied to prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the law,
not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.
MANDAMUS GRANTED.
83
51. NAVARRO VS. VILLEGAS
assembly and petition
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


Navarro, who was part of the movement for democratic Philippines, an
association of students and workers and peasants, wrote a letter to the Mayor of
Manila, Villegas, applying for a permit to hold a rally at the Plaza Miranda.
The Mayor denied the request, because a month ago, during the opening of the
session of Congress, there was a series of demonstrations and rallies, which
ended in destruction of private and public property, loss of lives and injuries to
others. Schools, offices and stores were forced to close then. The Mayor thought
that a rally at Plaza Miranda poses a clearer and more imminent danger of public
disorder.
The Mayor instead suggested that that the group of Navarro use the Sunken
Garden near Intramuros instead. He also said he can grant the rally at Plaza
Miranda during Saturdays, Sundays and Holidays so as not to cause great
disruption of the normal activities of the community.
Navarro filed a suit contesting the Mayor’s denial, on the ground that it is
violative of right to peaceably assemble and petition the gov’t for redress of
grievances.
He claimed that the right to peaceful assembly cannot be fully enjoyed if they
cannot be allowed to use public places. He contends that for the complete
enjoyment of the right, a particular public place may be used for greater publicity
and effectiveness. He claims that Plaza Miranda is the most convenient place for
rallies and it has acquired a certain significance in the national life as the
Congress of the People, Court of Last Resort, Forum of the Masses. Navarro
claims that the denial by the mayor was designed to minimize the effectiveness
of the rally.
SC: The petition is denied because Navarro failed to show a clear specific legal duty
on the part of the Mayor to grant their application for permit unconditionally.
Justice Fernando dissented and voted to granted the petition. The right of freedom of
assembly is to be accorded the utmost deference and respect. The reasons given by
the mayor do not satisfy the standards in the Primicias case. The effect is one of
prior restraint! This is not allowed.
ANNOTATIONS: read orig kasi puro doctrines:
Free Speech and Right to Assembly complement each other. – They are inseparable
and cognate rights. A republican form of government implies the right of citizens to
meet peaceably for consultation and to express protest.
Right to Assembly is NOT ABOSLUTE. It is subject to regulation under the police
power of the state. It may be regulated in order that it may not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having an equal right not injurious to the rights of
community. It must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience and in consonance with peach and good order. However, the regulation
must not be in the guise of abridgment or denial of said right.
The statute authorizing municipalities to impose regulations to insure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public places is consistent with civil liberties
and is one of the means of safeguarding peace and good order upon which they
ultimately depend.
84
The holding of meetings for peaceful political action cannot be proscribed. Those who
assist such meetings cannot be branded as criminals. The rights of free speech and
peaceful assembly are preserved not as to the auspices under which the meeting is
held but as to its purpose; not as to the relation of the speakers, but whether their
utterances transcend the bounds of freedom of speech.
Freedom of expression cannot be denied except on a showing of a clear and present
danger of a substantive evil that Congress has the right to prevent. There should be
no prior restraint on the communication of views nor subsequent punishment
unless there is clear and present danger.
other matters:
Right to peaceful assembly is an attribute of citizenship. It is found wherever
civilization exists. It was not a right granted to the people by the Constitution. It was
there long before the adoption of the constitution (of the US).
Guide to Interpretation – the trend is to recognize the broadest scope and the widest
latitude in public parades and demonstrations, whether religious or political. Only the
those which endangers paramount public interest will give occasion for permissible
limitation of the right. (widest room for discussion, narrowest range for restriction 
both for freedom of speech and peaceful assembly)
Limitations: Criticism should be specific and constructive, specifying particular
objectionable actuations of the government. It must be reasoned, tempered, not
contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up (in which case the
intention would be seditious).
Criterion for possible limitation: Standards:
1. Dangerous tendency
2. Clear and Present Danger
3. Balancing of Interests
85
52. IN RE VALMONTE:
assembly and petition
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Valmonte applied for a Mayor’s permit to hold a rally in front of the Justice Hall of
Las Pinas to protest the delay in the cases of his clients pending in the RTC.
The Office of the Mayor refused to issue the permit on the ground that a rally is
prohibited under an SC En Banc Resolution.
He assails the validity of the SC Resolution, claiming that the SC acted in gadalej
in promulgating the guidelines. The SC resolution prohibits rallies within 200
meter radius from every courthouse.
He argues that the resolution violates the Public Assembly Act, and violates the
freedom of speech, expression and people’s right to peaceful assembly and
petition the government for redress of grievances.
SC:
Freedom of speech and expression has its limitations. It has never been understood as the
absolute right to speech whenever, however, and wherever one pleases, for the manner, time
and place of public discussion can be constitutionally controlled. Justice Cruz says, the better
policy is not liberty untamed, but liberty regulated by law, where every freedom is exercised in
accordance with law and with due regard for the rights of others.
The Court reiterates that judicial independence and the fair and orderly administration of
justice constitute paramount governmental interest that can justify the regulation of the
public’s right to free speech and peacefully assembly in the vicinity of court houses. Freedom
of expression needs to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally
important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antimony
between free expression and the integrity of the justice system.
Judicial independence is undermined by the irascible demonstrations outside the courthouses.
They wittingly or unwittingly spoil the ideal of sober, non-partisan proceedings before an cold
and neutral judge. A state may thus adopt safeguards necessary to assure that the
administration of justice is at all stages, free from outside control and influence.
It is of course true that most judges will be influence only b what they sea and hear in court.
However, JUDGES ARE HUMAN, and the will be consciously or unconsciously influenced by
demonstrations in or near their courtrooms. A state must thus protect the judicial process
from being misjudged in the minds of the public.
The administration of justice must not only be fair but must also appear to be fair and it is the
duty of this court to eliminate everything that will diminish or destroy this judicial
desideratum.
WAS IT JUDICIAL LEGISLATION? NO.
The Public Assembly Act does not preclude the court from promulgating rules regulating the
conduct of demonstrations within the vicinity of courts. While the BP 880 imposes general
restrictions as to the time place and manner of conducting concerted actions, the SC
resolution on the other hand merely adds specific restrictions as they involve judicial
independence and orderly administration of justice. There is no discrepancy between the 2
sets of regulatory measures.
Courts have full plenary power to control their proceedings to effectuate fair and impartial
administration of justice. Such authority is essential to the court’s existence, dignity and
functions. This Court is vested by the Constitution to adopt measures to ensure orderly
administration of justce.
86
53. GONZALES VS. KALAWA KATIGBAK
obscenity –
Justice Fernando ulit.
 The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only."
 Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, President of the Malaya Films, assailed the
classification by the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television. He claims
the classification was without basis. He claims that such classification "is without
legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic
expression. The film is an integral whole and all its portions. including those to
which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of
the film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations
advanced by the Board as basis for its classifiestion.
 The objectionable parts showed some contents of Kapit are not fit for the young.
Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good
portion of the film shots concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked,
or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage. Another scene on that stage
depicted the women kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the
picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence attending the battle between a
group of robbers and the police.
SC: THE BOARD ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION. BUT IT WAS NOT GRAVE.
Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and
the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on the perception by our people
of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is
considerable.
Emphasis should rightly be on freedom from censorship. It is the opinion of this
Court, therefore, that to avoid an unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of
respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other
constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage
and what may require either parental guidance or be limited to adults only. That is to
abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the
exemption. The power to exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the
presumption is against its validity.
The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of expression may be limited is
the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive character that the State has
a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There
should be no doubt that what is feared may be traced to the expression complained
of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable
apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it
suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the requirement of its being wellnigh inevitable. The basic postulate, therefore, as noted earlier, is that where the
movies, theatrical productions, radio scripts, television programs, and other such
media of expression are concerned-included as they are in freedom of expressioncensorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under
the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil to public safety,
public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest.
The law, however, frowns on obscenity-and rightly so. All ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even
ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the
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guaranties, unless excludable bemuse they encroach upon the limited area of more
important interests. But implicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection
of obscenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.
The early leading standard of obscenity was the HICKLIN TEST: whether to the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme
of the material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest.
Sex and obscenity are not synonymous." Further: "Obscene material is material
which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex
e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny
material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great
and mysterious motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of
absorbing interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern."
EO 876 creating the board was tasked to "apply contemporary Filipino cultural values
as standard,. As far as the question of sex and obscenity are concerned, it cannot be
stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the
State."27 That is a constitutional mandate. It will be less than true to its function it
any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist
enjoys. There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the
artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to be forgotten
that art and belles lettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in
a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by an artist is entitled to respect, unless
there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered
obscene. As so well put by Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion, "the widest
scope of freedom is to be given to the adventurous and imaginative exercise of the
human spirit" a in this sensitive area of a man's personality.
The question before the Court is whether or not there was a grave abuse of
discretion. That there was an abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in
the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim
was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its
perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive.
This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there
are not enough votes to maintain that such an abuse can be considered grave.
Accordingly, certiorari does not lie.
The ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures.
It is the consensus of this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal
approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where the
patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set.
Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers of the programs therein
shown.
CHAMP Page 88
2/15/2016
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55. BORJAL VS. CA
libel
PERPETUALLY HAGRIDDEN as the public is about losing one of the most basic yet oft hotly contested
freedoms of man, the issue of the right of free expression bestirs and presents itself time and again, in
cyclic occurrence, to inveigle, nay, challenge the courts to re-survey its ever shifting terrain, explore and
furrow its heretofore uncharted moors and valleys and finally redefine the metes and bounds of its
controversial domain.
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Borjal and Soliven were charged with libel following a series of articles in the
Philippine Star regarding alleged anomalous activities of a self-proclaimed hero of
the EDSA. Without expressly referring to Wensceslao, the articles mentioned that
the transportation conference was merely a money-making gimmick of the
organizer. The conference allegedly solicits funds from the public.
Wency was the director of the First National Conference on Land Tranpo (which
was taksed to draft bills embodying long-term transportation policies of the
government).
Wency felt that he was the one being alluded to and thus sued for damages.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Wency citing that although Wency was not
named in the articles, he was sufficiently identifiable. The court also ruled that
the articles defamed Wency because Borjal described him as self-proclaimed
hero, one with shady deals, thick face, and person with dubious ways.
SC: NOT LIBELOUS.
In order to maintain a libel suit, it is essential that the victim be identifiable although
it is not necessary that he be named. It is also not sufficient, that the offended party
recognized himself as the person attacked or defamed, but it must be shown that at
least a third person could identify him as the object of the libelous publication.10
Regrettably, these requisites have not been complied with in the case at bar.
The questioned articles written by Borjal do not identify private respondent
Wenceslao as the organizer of the conference. Surely, there were millions of "heroes"
of the EDSA Revolution and anyone of them could be "self-proclaimed" or an
"organizer of seminars and conferences." Also, the organizers of the conference were
not identified, the article only enumerated Wency as one of the Executive Director
and Spokesman, and not as, a conference organizer.
Even Wency himself entertained doubt that he was the person spoken of in Borjal's
columns. The former even called up columnist Borjal to inquire if he (Wenceslao) was
the one referred to in the subject articles. Identification is grossly inadequate when
even the alleged offended party is himself unsure that he was the object of the
verbal attack. It is well to note that the revelation of the identity of the person
alluded to came not from Borjal but from Wency himself when he supplied the
information through his 4 June 1989 letter to the editor. Had private respondent not
revealed that he was the "organizer" of the FNCLT referred to in the Borjal articles,
the public would have remained in blissful ignorance of his identity. It is therefore
clear that on the element of identifiability alone the case falls.
Art. 354 of The Revised Penal Code which stateArt. 354. Requirement for publicity. - Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making
it is shown, except in the following cases:
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1) A private communication, made by any person to another in the performance of
any legal, moral or social duty; and,
2) A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions.
A privileged communication may be either absolutely privileged, or qualifiedly privileged.
Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not, actionable even if the author
has acted in bad faith. An example is found in Sec. 11, Art. VI, of the 1987 Constitution which
exempts a member of Congress from liability for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any Committee thereof. Upon the other hand, qualifiedly privileged communications containing
defamatory amputations are not actionable unless found to have been made without good
intention or justifiable motive. To this genre belong "private communications" and "fair and
true report without any comments or remarks."
Indisputably, petitioner Borjal's questioned writings are not within the exceptions of Art. 354
of The Revised Penal Code for they are neither private communications nor fair and true report
without any comments or remarks. However this does not necessarily mean that they are not
privileged. To be sure, the enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualifiedly
privileged communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
likewise privileged. The concept of privileged communications is implicit in the freedom of
the press.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every, discreditable imputation
publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the
discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public capacity, it is not
necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must, either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false
supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is
immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred
from the facts. To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
There is no denying that the questioned articles dealt with matters of public interest.. The
nature and functions of his position which included solicitation of funds, dissemination of
information about the FNCLT in order to generate interest in the conference, and the
management and coordination of the various activities of the conference demanded from him
utmost honesty, integrity and competence. These are matters about which the public has the
right to be informed, taking into account the very public character of the conference itself.
While, generally, malice can be presumed from defamatory words, the privileged character of
a communication destroys the presumption of malice. The onus of proving actual malice then
lies on plaintiff, Wenceslao. He must bring home to the defendant, Borjal, the existence of
malice as the true motive of his conduct. Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in
response to duty but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed, and implies an
intention to do ulterior and unjustifiable harm.34 Malice is bad faith or bad motive.35 It is the
essence of the crime of libel.
Wency failed to substantiate that Borjal was animated by a desire to inflict unjustifiable harm
on his reputation, or that the articles were written and published without good motives or
justifiable ends. On the other hand, we find Borjal to have acted in good faith. Moved by a
sense of civic duty and prodded by his responsibility as a newspaperman, he proceeded to
expose and denounce what he perceived to be a public deception.
JACK’S COMMENTS: fair comment is not derogatory as it expresses not a fact but an
opinion. Fair comments do not attack the person, but only his policies.
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56. WISCONSIN VS. YODER
freedom of religion
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Wisconsin enacted a Compulsory School Attendance Law, which required the
families to send their children to public or private school until age 16.
The Yoders are members of the Old Amish Religion. They refuse to send their
children to school after age 14 (8th grade).
The School District Administrator complained, and charged the Amish families.
They were later convicted.
The defense of the Amish families was that the attendance of their children to
high school was contrary to Amish religion and Amish way of life. They believed
that sending their children to high school would expose them to the danger of the
censure of their church, and would endanger their own salvation.
The main contention was that the Amish religion has the fundamental belief that
salvation requires life in a church community separate and apart from the world
or worldly influence. They are devoted to a life in harmony with nature and the
soil, making their living by farming or closely related activities.
They contend that high school education has a worldly influence because it tends
to emphasize intellection and scientific accomplishments, competitiveness,
success, social life with other students. Amish people emphasize informal
learning through doing, a life of goodness rather than life of intellect. Wisdom
rather than technical knowledge, community welfare rather than competition,
separation rather than integration with worldly society.
Their belief is that once a child has learned basic reading, writing and math,
these are better learned through doing rather than in a classroom.
The contention of the state was that the law was a reasonable exercise of
governmental power, where the State has a high responsibility for education of
its citizens.
ISSUE: A state’s interest in universal education however is not totally free from a
BALANCING PROCESS., when it infringes on other fundamental rights and interests
such as those protected by the FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE. There is also the
TRADITIONAL INTERESTS OF PARENTS with respect t the religious upbringing of the
children. Thus the test must be:
 Whether there is a denial of the free exercise of religious belief, or
 Whether there is a state interest of sufficient magnitude to override
the interest under the free exercise clause.
SC: FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE UPHELD. STATE CANNOT COMPEL THE AMISH FAMILIES
TO SEND THEIR CHILDREN TO FORMAL HIGH SCHOOL AT AGE 16.
A way of life may not be interposed as a barrier to reasonable regulation of
education if it is based on purely secular considerations. To have the protection of
the Religion Clause, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. The traditional way
of life of the Amish people is not merely a matter of personal preference, but one of
deep religious conviction shared by an organized group and intimately related to
daily living.
The impact of the compulsory attendance law on Amish religion is not only severe
but inescapable because the law COMPELS THEM UNDER THREAT OF CRIMINAL
SANCTION, to perform act undeniably at odds with their fundamental religious
beliefs.
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It carries with it an objective danger to the free exercise of religion. It creates a very
real threat of undermining the Amish community and religious practice. They must
either abandon the belief and be assimilated into society, or be forced to migrate to
some other place.
The state argues tat while religious “beliefs” are absolutely free from state control,
“actions” are not protected such that activities of individuals, even religiously based,
can be regulated.
SC: There are still certain “acts” which are under the protection of free exercise
clause. The protection does not cover only beliefs. A regulation may in its
application, still infringe the free exercise clause, if it unduly burdens the free
exercise of religion.
The state argues that this formal education is to enable the Amish to participate in a
democratic process.
SC: The Amish alternative has already enabled them to function effectively in their
day to day lives. They have survived for more than 200 years in this country. (They
are self-sufficient and able to survive).
The state invokes Parens Patriae role.
SC: The duty to prepare the child for additional obligations includes the inculcation of
moral standards, religious beliefs and elements of good citizenship. Thus, this case
involves a more fundamental interest of the parents, as contrasted from that of the
state, to guide the religious future and education of their children.
The power of the parent may be limited only if it appears that their decisions
jeopardize the health and safety of the child or home. But in the case of the Amish
people, they have not. The parent’s decision not to send the child to school does NOT
impair the physical nor mental health of the child, nor result in the inability to be
self-supporting. (in short, the claim of paren patriae is too broad and sweeping.)
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57. AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY (ABS) VS. CITY OF MANILA.
Freedom of religion
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The ABS is a non-stock non-profit religious and missionary corporation in the
Phils. It is engaged in selling bibles and gospel portions as well as translating
them into local dialects.
The City treasurer of Manila informed them that they were conduction the
business of general merchandise without the necessary mayor’s permit (making
them subject to prosecution), in violation of local ordinances. The treasurer also
required them to get a permit and pay the fees pursuant to another ordinance.
The ABS contends that the ordinances are unconstitutional because they provide
for religious censorship and restraint on free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession, (that is, the distribution and sale of bibles).
ISSUE: whether the ordinances are constitutional?
SC: NO. The constitutional guaranty of free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship carries with it the RIGHT TO DISSEMINATE RELIGIOUS
INFORMATION. Any restraint of such right can only be justified on the ground that
there is a clear and present danger of any substantive evil which the state has the
right to prevent. RIGHT TO PROPAGE RELIGIOUS BELIEF
In the Murdock vs. Pennsylvannia case, the tax imposed there is a flat license tax, payment of
which is a condition of the exercise of the constitutional privileges. The power to tax the
exercise of a privilege is the power to control or suppress its enjoyment. This power to impose
a license tax on the exericise of freedoms iis as potent as the power of censorship, which the
court has struck down repeatedly. The power to tax the exercise of religious practice can make
its exercise so costly that it would effectively deprive it of the resources necessary for its
maintenances.
ISSUE: The City claims that ABS is already engaged in business because the price
charged is a bit higher than the actual costs, hence no longer exempt from the
permit.
SC: ABS is not engaged in the business of selling merchandise for profit. (Its purpose
was to distribute bibles, not to engage in profit-making business). Thus, the
ordinance cannot be applied to ABS for in doing so it would impair its free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, as well as the right to
disseminate religious belief.
HOWEVER, the ordinance requiring that they obtain a mayor’s permit, IS VALID.
We do not find that it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by
the Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.
Since ABS is not engaged in a business (not covered by ordinance 2529), then
ordinance 3000 is also not applicable to ABS, since a permit is required only for
those engaged in business.
CHAMP
Page 93
2/15/2016
(Here the tax is invalid but the permit is valid, although the requirement of permit
would not be applicable.)
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58. TOLENTINO VS. SEC OF FINANCE
freedom of religion
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This is the E-VAT case. The Philippine Press Institute assails the constitutionality
of the EVAT law insofar as it repeals the tax exemption of publishers of
newspapers and magazines. Under the EVAT, they are also required to register.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from
the VAT while maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against
the press. At any rate, it is averred, "even nondiscriminatory taxation of
constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
The Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds
derived from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of pointing copies which are
given free to those who cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to
increase the price, while reducing the volume of sale.
They claim that the EVAT law violates freedom of religion.
SC: LAW VALID.
 Freedom of religion does not prohibit the imposition of a tax on the sale of
religious materials by a religious organization which is GENERALLY APPLICABLE.
 Also, the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so INCIDENTAL
as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that
might make the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly.
 In short, the EVAT is a non-discriminatory tax.
 The registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by § 107 of the NIRC, as amended by
7 of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount is really just to pay for the
expenses of registration and enforcement of provisions such as those relating to
accounting in § 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS distributes free bibles and
therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment of this
fee because it also sells same copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the
VAT must be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Note: compare this with the American Bible Society case with respect to the
registration free. In the ABS case, it was a form of regulation, in this Tolentino case,
it is a form or revenue.
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59. EBRALINAG VS. SUPERINTENDENT
freedom of religion
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The petitioners are members of Jehovah’s Witnesses, who were expelled from
their classes by the public school authorities for refusing to salute the flag, sing
the national anthem, and recite the pledge, as required by RA 1265.
The state argues that under a previous case of Gerona vs. Secretary of
Education, the expulsion was upheld because the flag is not an image but a
symbol of the Republic, an emblem of national sovereignty and under a system of
complete separation of Church and State, the flag is utterly devoid of any
religious significance. Saluting the flag does not involve any religious ceremony,
and is simply similar to taking an oath. The state does not impose a religion or
religious belief or a religious test on students. The state merely carries out its
duty to supervise education and develop civic conscience on the students.
SC: It is time to re-examine the 30year old Gerona ruling.
Religious freedom is a fundamental right which is entitled to the highest priorty and
the amplest protection for it involves the relationship of man to his Creator. The right
to religious profession and worship has a 2-fold aspect: THE FREEDOM TO BELIEVE
AND THE FREEDOM TO ACT ON ONE’S BELIEF. The first is absolute, as long as the
belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation
where the belief is translated into external acts that affect public welfare.
Petitioners argue that they are not engaged in external acts for they simply quietly
stand at attention during the flag ceremony to show their respect to other students
who chose to participate. Thus, they do not engage in any disruptive behavior. There
is no warrant for their expulsion. Absent a threat to public safety (clear and present
danger of a substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent), expulsion is
unjustified. Any expulsion would violate religious freedom.
While the state has responsibility to inculcate patriotism in the youth, this interest is
not free from the balancing process when it intrudes into fundamental rights such as
freedom of religion.
Refusal to take part in the flag ceremony is not so offensive as to prompt legitimate
state intervention. Exempting the Jehovah’s witnesses from the flag ceremony, which
comprise a small portion of the school population, will NOT shake up this part of the
globe. It does not automatically produce a nation bereft of patriotism. These virtues
of patriotism may be taught in school. In fact, forcing a small religious group to
participate in a ceremony that will violate their belief will hardly be conducive to love
of country.
The essence of the guarantee of free exercise of religion is freedom from conformity
with religious dogma.
There is also a violation of right to receive education if they will be expelled.
Justice Cruz concurring:
The real issue is the interpretation of the bible. It is not for the courts to interpret. It
is the religion which provides its own interpretation of the bible.
CHAMP Page 95
2/15/2016
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60. ESTRADA VS. ESCRITOR
freedom of religion
these are the bare facts only.. pls read orig nalang. - champ
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Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in the Las Piñas regional trial court, was accused of
cohabiting with a certain Luciano Quilapio, while they were still married to other persons.
Their relationship of 23 years had borne a son.
The Complainant, Alejandro Estrada, alleged that this constituted disgraceful and immoral
conduct under existing laws and civil service rules. He filed the charge against Escritor as
he believes that she is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court,
thus she should not be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the
court condones her act.
In her defense, Escritor testified that when she entered the judiciary in 1999,she was
already a widow, her husband having died in 1998. She admitted that she has been living
with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage for twenty years and that they
have a son.
Escritor claimed that as members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, their living together had the
approval of their sect as proven by a DECLARATION OF PLEDGING FAITHFULNESS which
they executed in 1991. By virtue of this act, their union was legitimized by the Jehovah's
Witnesses and they were, therefore, to be regarded as husband and wife. Ergo, no
violation of any law or rule as this would be an unconstitutional violation of their religious
freedom. Escritor and Quilapio’s declarations are recorded in the Watch Tower Central
office. They were executed in the usual and approved form prescribed by the Watch
Tower Bible and Tract Society.
Estrada reiterates: that the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness recognizes the supremacy
of the “proper public authorities” such that she bound herself “to seek means to . . .
legalize their union.” It is binding only to her co-members in the congregation and serves
only the internal purpose of displaying to the rest of the congregation that she and her
mate are a respectable and morally upright couple. Their religious belief and practice,
however, cannot override the norms of conduct required by law for government
employees. To rule otherwise would create a dangerous precedent as those who cannot
legalize their live-in relationship can simply join the Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation and
use their religion as a defense against legal liability.
ISSUES:
1) whether or not the relationship between respondent Escritor and Quilapio is valid and
binding in their own religious congregation, the Jehovah’s Witnesses.
2) Whether or not Escritor should be found guilty of the administrative charge of “gross and
immoral conduct.”
3) whether or not respondent’s right to religious freedom should carve out an exception from
the prevailing jurisprudence on illicit relations for which government employees are held
administratively liable.
SC:
(there was a very loooong narration of the history of religious freedom. See orig.)
Escritor does not claim that there is error in the settled jurisprudence that an illicit relation
constitutes disgraceful and immoral conduct for which a government employee is held liable.
Nor is there an allegation that the norms of morality with respect to illicit relations have
shifted towards leniency from the time these precedent cases were decided. The Court finds
that there is no such error or shift, thus we find no reason to deviate from these rulings that
such illicit relationship constitutes “disgraceful and immoral conduct” punishable
under the Civil Service Law. Escritor having admitted the alleged immoral conduct,
she, could be held administratively liable.
HOWEVER, there is a distinguishing factor that sets the case at bar apart from the cited
precedents, i.e., as a defense, respondent invokes religious freedom since her religion, the
Jehovah’s Witnesses, has, after thorough investigation, allowed her conjugal arrangement with
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Quilapio based on the church’s religious beliefs and practices. This distinguishing factor
compels the Court to apply the religious clauses to the case at bar.
(and then there’s another loooong narration of what morality is. See orig.)
SC: When the law speaks of “immorality” in the Civil Service Law or “immoral” in the Code of
Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or “public morals” in the Revised Penal Code, or
“morals” in the New Civil Code, or “moral character” in the Constitution, the distinction
between public and secular morality on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other,
should be kept in mind., The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular,
not religious.
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals,
the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to
a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a “compelled religion,” anathema
to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would
tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or
non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result, government will not
provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore
requires that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance upon
religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as expressed in
criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is, the government
proscribes this conduct because it is “detrimental (or dangerous) to those conditions upon
which depend the existence and progress of human society” and not because the conduct is
proscribed by the beliefs of one religion or the other.
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence of religion in
society, however, the Philippine constitution’s religion clauses prescribe not a strict but a
benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality recognizes that government must pursue its
secular goals and interests but at the same time strives to uphold religious liberty to the
greatest extent possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests.
The distinction between public and secular morality as expressed - albeit not exclusively - in
the law, on the one hand, and religious morality, on the other, is important because the
jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Having distinguished between public and secular morality and religious morality, the more
difficult task is determining which immoral acts under this public and secular morality fall
under the phrase “disgraceful and immoral conduct” for which a government employee may be
held administratively liable.
Application of Benevolent Neutrality and the
Compelling State Interest Test to the Case at Bar
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether respondent’s right to religious
freedom has been burdened. There is no doubt that choosing between keeping her
employment and abandoning her religious belief and practice and family on the one hand, and
giving up her employment and keeping her religious practice and family on the other hand,
puts a burden on her free exercise of religion.
The second step is to ascertain respondent’s sincerity in her religious belief.
Respondent appears to be sincere in her religious belief and practice and is not merely using
the “Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness” to avoid punishment for immorality. She did not
97
secure the Declaration only after entering the judiciary where the moral standards are strict
and defined, much less only after an administrative case for immorality was filed against her.
The Declaration was issued to her by her congregation after ten years of living together with
her partner, Quilapio, and ten years before she entered the judiciary. Ministers from her
congregation testified on the authenticity of the Jehovah’s Witnesses’ practice of securing a
Declaration and their doctrinal or scriptural basis for such a practice. As the ministers
testified, the Declaration is not whimsically issued to avoid legal punishment for illicit conduct
but to make the “union” of their members under respondent’s circumstances “honorable
before God and men.”
In any event, even if the Court deems sufficient respondent’s evidence on the
sincerity of her religious belief and its centrality in her faith, the case at bar cannot
still be decided using the “compelling state interest” test. The case at bar is one of
first impression.
It is apparent from the OCA’s reliance upon this ruling that the state interest it upholds is
the preservation of the integrity of the judiciary by maintaining among its ranks a high
standard of morality and decency. However, there is nothing in the OCA’s memorandum to
the Court that demonstrates how this interest is so compelling that it should override
respondent’s plea of religious freedom nor is it shown that the means employed by the
government in pursuing its interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious exercise.
Indeed, it is inappropriate for the complainant, a private person, to present evidence on
the compelling interest of the state. The burden of evidence should be discharged by the
proper agency of the government which is the Office of the Solicitor General. To properly
settle the issue in the case at bar, the government should be given the opportunity to
demonstrate the compelling state interest it seeks to uphold in opposing the respondent’s
stance that her conjugal arrangement is not immoral and punishable as it comes within the
scope of free exercise protection. Should the Court prohibit and punish her conduct
where it is protected by the Free Exercise Clause, the Court’s action would be an
unconstitutional encroachment of her right to religious freedom
We cannot therefore simply take a passing look at respondent’s claim of religious
freedom, but must instead apply the “compelling state interest” test. The government must
be heard on the issue as it has not been given an opportunity to discharge its burden of
demonstrating the state’s compelling interest which can override respondent’s religious belief
and practice. To repeat, this is a case of first impression where we are applying the
“compelling state interest” test in a case involving purely religious conduct. The careful
application of the test is indispensable as how we will decide the case will make a decisive
difference in the life of the respondent who stands not only before the Court but before her
Jehovah God.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the case is REMANDED to the Office of the Court Administrator.
The Solicitor General is ordered to intervene in the case where it will be given the opportunity
(a) to examine the sincerity and centrality of respondent’s claimed religious belief and
practice; (b) to present evidence on the state’s “compelling interest” to override respondent’s
religious belief and practice; and (c) to show that the means the state adopts in pursuing its
interest is the least restrictive to respondent’s religious freedom.
(Note from SC Spokesperson Ismael Khan from the Inquirer: In other words, the decision
shows that the Supreme Court is prepared to adopt a policy of benevolent neutrality in its
interpretation of the establishment and free exercise of religion clauses of the Constitution,
unless it can be demonstrably proven that there is compelling state interest that would negate
such an accommodation, such as a clear and present danger to established institutions of
society and the law.)
CHAMP Page 98
please read orig..
2/15/2016
98
61. IGLESIA NI KRISTO VS. CA
freedom of religion.






Iglesia Ni Kristo (INK) has a tv program aired on Channel 2, every Saturday. It
presents and propagates religious beliefs, doctrines etc, and makes comparative
studies with other religions.
The MTRCB classified one program as X, not for public viewing because they
allegedly offend and attack another religion. (In that program, the INK criticizes
the Catholic Church for its veneration of the Virgin Mary. The INK suggests a very
literal translation of the Bible and nowhere in the Bible is there a veneration for
the Virgin Mary.)
The INK appealed to the Office of the President, which reversed the MTRCB
decision (allowed the showing of the program). A civil case was filed by the INK
against the MTRCB for gadalej in giving them an X-rating and requiring them to
submit VTR tapes.
MTRCB invoked their powers under PD1986.
The RTC ruled that INK should stop the program and refrain from attacking other
religions.
The CA reversed.
ISSUES:
Whether
Whether
Whether
Whether
Whether
the program is constitutionally protected exercise of religious expression.
it is subject of the police power of the state.
there was clear and present danger to stop the program.
MTRC has the power to censor religious programs.
the religious program is indecent and contrary to law and good customs.
SC: MTRCB WAS WRONG. INK IS CORRECT.
The law gives the Board the power to screen, review and examine all “television
programs.” By the clear terms of the law, the Board has the power to “approve, delete x x x
and/or prohibit the x x x exhibition and/or television broadcast of x x x television programs x x
x.” The law also directs the Board to apply “contemporary Filipino cultural values as standard”
to determine those which are objectionable for being “immoral, indecent, contrary to law
and/or good customs, injurious to the prestige of the Republic of the Philippines and its
people, or with a dangerous tendency to encourage the commission of violence or of a wrong
or crime.”
Freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
laws, past and present. We have affirmed this preferred status well aware that it is “designed
to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his
conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent
with the liberty of others and with the common good.
The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect, viz., freedom to believe
and freedom to act on one’s beliefs. The first is absolute as long as the belief is confined
within the realm of thought. The second is subject to regulation where the belief is
translated into external acts that affect the public welfare.
Its essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom from
conformity to law because of religious dogma.
We thus reject petitioner’s postulate that its religious program is per se beyond review by the
respondent Board. Its public broadcast on TV of its religious program brings it out of the
bosom of internal belief. Television is a medium that reaches even the eyes and ears of
99
children. For sure, we shall continue to subject any act pinching the space for the free
exercise of religion to a heightened scrutiny but we shall not leave its rational
exercise to the irrationality of man. For when religion divides and its exercise
destroys, the State should not stand still.
First. Deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is its hostility against all prior restraints on
speech, including religious speech. Hence, any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the
presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows. It is the burden of the
respondent Board to overthrow this presumption. If it fails to discharge this burden, its act of
censorship will be struck down. It failed in the case at bar.
(here the MTRCB violated the prohibition against prior restraint). Prior restraint includes
religious speech.
Second. The evidence shows that the Board x-rated the TV series for “attacking” other
religions, especially the Catholic church. An examination of the evidence, especially Exhibits
“A”, “A-1”, “B, “C”, and “D” will show that the so-called “attacks” are mere criticisms of
some of the deeply held dogmas and tenets of other religions. The CA also did not
review the VTR Tapes. The respondent Board may disagree with the criticisms of other
religions by petitioner but that gives it no excuse to interdict such criticisms, however, unclean
they may be. Under our constitutional scheme, it is not the task of the State to favor any
religion by protecting it against an attack by another religion. Religious dogmas and beliefs
are often at war and to preserve peace among their followers, especially the fanatics, the
establishment clause of freedom of religion prohibits the State from leaning towards any
religion. Vis-a-vis religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options. Neutrality
alone is its fixed and immovable stance. In fine, respondent board cannot squelch the speech
of petitioner Iglesia ni Cristo simply because it attacks other religions, even if said religion
happens to be the most numerous church in our country. In a State where there ought to be
no difference between the appearance and the reality of freedom of religion, the remedy
against bad theology is better theology. The bedrock of freedom of religion is freedom of
thought and it is best served by encouraging the marketplace of dueling ideas. When the
luxury of time permits, the marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by more
speech for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of colliding ideas that can fan the
embers of truth. (ESSENCE OF FREEDOM TO DIFFER).
Third. The respondents cannot also rely on the ground “attacks against another religion” in xrating the religious program of petitioner. Even a sideglance at Section 3 of PD 1986 will
reveal that it is not among the grounds to justify an order prohibiting the broadcast of
petitioner’s television program. The ground “attack against another religion” was merely
added by the respondent Board in its Rules.
Fourth. In x-rating the TV program of the petitioner, the respondents failed to apply the
clear and present danger rule. The records show that the decision of the respondent Board,
affirmed by the respondent appellate court, is completely bereft of findings of facts to
justify the conclusion that the subject video tapes constitute impermissible attacks against
another religion. There is no showing whatsoever of the type of harm the tapes will bring
about especially the gravity and imminence of the threatened harm. Prior restraint on
speech, including religious speech, cannot be justified by hypothetical fears but only
by the showing of a substantive and imminent evil which has taken the life of a
reality already on ground.
100
62. PAMIL VS. TELERON
freedom of religion



Fr. Gonzaga was elected and proclaimed as municipal mayor of Albuquerque,
Bohol.
Pamil, who was the losing candidate, filed a quo warranto against Fr. Gonzaga on
the ground that under the Administrative Code, ecclesiastics, soldiers in active
duty, persons receiving salaries from gov’t, cannot be elected into municipal
office.
Judge Teleron sustained Fr. Gonzaga. He ruled that the statutory prohibition was
impliedly repealed by the Election Code of 1971.
SC: The Court is divided. But since the majority of 8 votes was not reached, there is
a presumption of validity. The votes of the 7 would be inadequate to render the
challenged provision invalid. This means that the prohibition still applies and that Fr.
Gonzaga must vacate his office.
(5 justices) – DISQUALIFIED. (Makasiar, Barredo, etc)
Prohibition still applies because it is constitutional.
The provision in the Administrative Code is NOT a religious test but merely defines a
disqualification. It prohibits priests from running for public office. It does NOT
deprive such individuals of their political right of suffrage, to elect and to vote.
Furthermore, it does NOT inquire into the religion of any citizen. If it does, all citizens
would be disqualified for election and there would be no need to single them out in
the law. All these persons enumerated in the Adminstrative Code profess some
religion or religious belief. But one is disqualified under the Administrative Code not
by reason of his religion or lack of it, but because of his religious profession or
vocation. Fr. Gonzaga is disqualified not because of religion but because he is a
priest.
The prohibition means that a person may exercise civil or political rights without
being required to belong to a certain church or to hold a particular religious belief.
This is different from disqualifying ALL priests from holding municipal offices. It
applies to ALL regardless of religious belief.
To allow him to run would also permit an erosion of the separation between church
and state. The Administrative Code was designed to preserve that wall of separation.
The no-religious test clause however does not guarantee the right to run for public
office and thereafter to use such public office to compel the citizenry to conform to
his religious belief, thereby gaining for his Church dominance over the State.
Also, since a priest, once elected, enjoys salary pertaining to his office, this would be
direct violation of the prohibition that no money should be appropriated in favor of
priests or ministers.
Finally, the 1971 Election Code is NOT inconsistent with the prohibition in the
Administrative Code. It does NOT enumerate the disqualified but merely defines the
effect of filing a certificate of candidacy – that is, the cessation from public office).
101
(7 justices) - NOT DISQUALIFIED. (Teehankee, Fernando, etc.)
The judgment is affirmed because the provision is no longer operative either because
it was superseded by the 1935 constitution or repealed. The overriding principle of
the supremacy of the Constitution, or at the very least the repeal of such provision
bars a reversal.
They argue that under the present constitution, “no religious test shall be required
fro the exercise of civil and political rights.” The Administrative Code is on its face,
inconsistent with the religious freedom guaranteed by the Constitution. To so exclude
them would be to impose a religious test. There being an incompatibility between the
Administrative Code and an express constitutional mandate, the priest must be
allowed to hold office.
The no-religious test clause bars the state from disqualifying a non-believer from
voting or being voted for a public office because it is tantamount to a religious test
and compelling them to profess a belief in God and in religion. By the same token,
the same clause is equally applicable to those who are full believers. To disqualify
them from being voted for and elected into office under the Administrative Code is to
exact a religious test for the exercise of their political rights for its amounts to
compelling them to shed off their religious ministry or robe for the exercise of their
political right to run for public office.
The right of the citizen cannot be discriminated against simply because he is a priest.
There is also no violation of the separation of the church and state because it simply
seeks to achieve government neutrality in religious matters.
Finally, the prohibition under the Administrative Code has been repealed by the 1971
Election Code. In that Code, there is no more mention of ecclesiastics as among
those disqualified.
102
63. US. VS. BALLARD
freedom of religion



Ballard was indicted and convicted for using mails to defraud under the US
Criminal Code. He alleged employed a scheme to defraud by organizing the “I
AM” movement through the use of mails, distributing literature etc.
Ballard a.k.a. Saint Germain was represented as the divine messenger and that
his other cohorts were the ascertained masters. They claim that the words of the
alleged divine entity would be transmitted to mankind through Ballard.
They represented in their mails, that they had supernatural powers to heal
persons of all ailments. They also tried to solicit and obtain money or property
from their patients for their use and benefit by means of false and fraudulent
pretenses and promises.
ISSUE: It is immaterial what Ballard et al preached or wrote in their mails. Their
religious beliefs cannot be an issue in this court. The real issue is, did they honestly
and in good faith believe in those things? If they did they should be acquitted.
The jury would thus be called to decide only on the question of whether Ballard
believed the representations they made and that the benefits they promised would
flow from their belief to those who embrace and followed their teachings.
The Circuit Court of Appeals ruled however that the question of truth of the
representations concerning their beliefs should be submitted to the jury. Thus it
remanded the case for new trial.
SC: The lower court erred and we do not agree that the truth or verity of the
respondents’ beliefs should have been submitted to the jury.
The law knows no heresy and is committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect. The 1st Am. Has dual aspect. It not only forestalls
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of
worship, but also safeguards the free exercise of the chose form of religion. The 1st
Am., embraces 2 concepts, the freedom to believe and the freedom to act.
The first is absolute but the second is not.
Freedom of though includes freedom of religious belief. It embraces the right to
maintain theories of life and death. Heresy trials are foreign to our Constitution. Men
may believe what they cannot prove. They may not be put to the poof of
their religious beliefs. If one could be sent to jail because a jury found those
teachings false, then what would be left of religious freedom?
Man’s relation to his God is not a concern of the State. He is granted the right to
worship as he pleases and to answer to no man for the verity of his religious views.
The religious beliefs espoused by Ballard etc, might seem incredible and
preposterous, but if those doctrines are subject to trial, then the same can be done
with religious sects or beliefs. This a forbidden domain. The 1 st Am does not select
any one group or any one type of religion for preferred treatment. It puts them all in
that position.
CHAMP
Page 103
2/15/2016
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64. ABINGTON SCHOOL DISTRICT VS. SCHEMPP
freedom of religion
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There was a Pennsylvania law requiring that at least 10 verses of the Bible shall
be read at the opening of each public school on every school day. This was
followed by the recitation of the Lords Prayer over the school’s PA system. There
are no prefatory statements, no questions asked or solicited, no comments or
explanations made and no interpretations given at or during the exercises. To be
excused from such Bible reading, the student must preset a written request by
his parents.
The Schempp family sought to enjoin the enforcement of the statute, as violative
of the Non-establishment clause.
The Schempps are members of the Unitarian faith in Germantown.
In another case, the City of Baltimore adopted the same practice.
The Murrays however were atheists. They also sought the nullification of the
statute as it threatens their religious liberty by placing a premium of belief as
against non-belief.
SC:
Religious freedom is one of "absolute equality before the law, of all religious opinions
and sects. "Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another. It was to create a complete and permanent separation of the spheres of
religious activity and civil authority by comprehensively forbidding every form of
public aid or support for religion.
Freedom conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious organization or form of
worship as the individual may choose cannot be restricted by law. On the other
hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the chosen form of religion. Thus the
Amendment embraces two concepts, - freedom to believe and freedom to act. The
first is absolute but, in the nature of things, the second cannot be.
It requires the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious believers
and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their adversary. State power is
no more to be used so as to handicap religions than it is to favor them.
Separation is a requirement to abstain from fusing functions of Government and of
religious sects, not merely to treat them all equally. So far as interference with the
`free exercise' of religion and an `establishment' of religion are concerned, the
separation must be complete and unequivocal. The First Amendment within the
scope of its coverage permits no exception; the prohibition is absolute. The First
Amendment, however, does not say that in everyand all respects there shall be a
separation of Church and State. Rather, it studiously defines the manner, the specific
ways, in which there shall be no concert or union or dependency one on the other.
Neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person `to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.' Neither can constitutionally pass laws or
impose requirements which aid all religions as against non-believers, and neither can
aid those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those
religions founded on different beliefs.
104
The Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend upon
any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enactment of
laws which establish an official religion whether those laws operate directly to coerce
non-observing individuals or not. When the power, prestige and financial support of
government is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive
pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved
religion is plain.
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect
of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the
enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the
Constitution. To be valid
1) there must be a secular legislative purpose
2) the statute should not advance nor inhibit any religion
3) three must be no excessive entanglement between government and religion.
Applying the Establishment Clause principles to the cases at bar we find that the
States are requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of
verses from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer by the students in
unison. These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students
who are required by law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings under
the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools.
The conclusion follows that in both cases the laws require religious exercises and
such exercises are being conducted in direct violation of the rights of the appellees
and petitioners. It is no defense to urge that the religious practices here may be
relatively minor encroachments on the First Amendment.
It might well be said that one's education is not complete without a study of
comparative religion or the history of religion and its relationship to the advancement
of civilization. It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary
and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such study of the
Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of a secular program of
education, may not be effected consistently with the First Amendment. But the
exercises here do not fall into those categories. They are religious exercises,
required by the States in violation of the command of the First Amendment
that the Government maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing
religion.
Finally, we cannot accept that the concept of neutrality, which does not permit a
State to require a religious exercise even with the consent of the majority of those
affected, collides with the majority's right to free exercise of religion.While the Free
Exercise Clause clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny the rights of free
exercise to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of
the State to practice its beliefs.
It is not within the power of government to invade that citadel, whether its purpose
or effect be to aid or oppose, to advance or retard. In the relationship between man
and religion, the State is firmly committed to a position of neutrality.
CHAMP Page 105
2/15/2016
105
65. LEMON VS. KURTZMAN
freedom of religion
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
Pennsylvania and Rhode Island adopted a statute which provides financial
support to schools by way of reimbursement to the cost of teaching salaries,
textbooks, instructional materials in specified secular subjects. There is also a
15% annual subsidy to salaries of teachers.
The State relied upon the Everson case where the court upheld a statute which
reimbursed parents of parochial school children for their bus transpo expenses.
SC: UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The 3 evils which the non-establishment clause seeks to prevent are sponsorship,
financial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activities.
The criteria are as follows:
1) the statute must have a secular religious purpose
2) its principal or primary effect must be that it neither advances nor inhibits religion
3) it must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion.
1st: The secular and religious education are identifiable and separable in these
statutes. The have created statutory restrictions designed to guarantee the
separation between the secular and religious education functions and to ensure that
the State will financially support only the former.
2nd: Here, the legislative intent of the statutes was NOT to advance religion. The
statute themselves clearly state that they are intended to enhance the quality of
secular education. A state has legitimate concern for maintaining minimum
standards.
3rd: However, the cumulative impact of the entire relationship arising under the
statutes in each State is an excessive entanglement between government and
religion. In order to determine how excessive the entanglement is, we must examine
the character and purpose of the institutions which are benefited and the nature of
the aid that the state provides, and the resulting relationship between government
and religious authority.
RHODE ISLAND: Under the Rhode Island Statute, nuns have a teaching role, thus
enhancing the religious atmosphere in the parochial schools. There was also an
attempt to maintain a 1-to-1 ratio between nuns and lay teachers. Also, it was found
that the parochial schools are an integral part of the mission of the Catholic Church.
This makes it a power vehicle for transmitting Catholic faith to the next generation.
In short, parochial schools involve substantial religious activity and purpose.
We cannot ignore the dangers that a teacher under religious control poses to the
separation of the religious from the purely secular aspects of education.
Furthermore, the Rhode Island Schools are under the general supervision of the
Bishop of Providence and the Diocese Superintendent. The school principals are also
nuns appointed by either the Mother Provincial of the order whose members staff the
school. With respect to lay teachers, before they are accepted to teach, they are first
interviewed by the Superintendent and their contracts are co-signed by the parish
priest, who also has the discretion in negotiating salary levels. HENCE, RELIGIOUS
AUTHORITY PERVADES IN THE SCHOOL SYSTEM.
106
Unlike a book, a teacher cannot be inspected once so as to determine the extent and
intent of his personal beliefs. Thus a dedicated religious person teaching in a school
affiliated with his faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, cannot remain religious
neutral. Thus, there will be excessive and enduring entanglement between
church and state.
PENNSYLVANIA: Same. The very restrictions and surveillance necessary to ensure
that teachers play a strictly non-ideological role give rise to entanglements between
church and state. Here, reimbursements of expenses is not only limited to courses
offered in public schools, but also any subject matter expressing religious teaching or
the morals or forms of worship of any sect.
It also provides state financial aid DIRECTLY to church-related school. A DIRECT
MONEY SUBSIDY would be a relationship pregnant with entanglement and could
encompass sustained and detailed administrative relationship for enforcement of the
standards. A government post-audit power to inspect and evaluate a church-related
school’s financial records and to determine which expenditures are religious and
which are secular creates an intimate and continuing relationship between church
and state.
The constitution decrees that religion must be a private matter for the individual, the
family and the institutions of private choice.
107
66. AGLIPAY VS. RUIZ
freedom of religion



Gregorio Aglipay is the head of the Phil. Indep. Church. He filed a prohibition
against the Director of Posts to stop the issuance and sale of commemorative
postage stamps of the 33rd International Eucharistic Congress.
The stamps were issued during the celebration in Manila of said event, organized
by the Roman Catholic Church. The stamp had the design of a chalice with grape
vines and stalks of wheat.
Aglipay alleges that Act 4052, which authorizes the Director of Posts to dispose of
60,000 pesos in a manner it deems advantageous to the government, violates
the prohibition that no public money shall be appropriated for or in support of
any church, as well as the separation between church and state.
SC: VALID LAW.
Act 4052 does not contemplate any religious purpose in view. What it gives the
Director of Posts is merely the discretionary power to determine when the issuance
of the special postage stamps would be advantageous to the government. The
issuance of the postage stamp was NOT inspired by any sectarian feeling to favor a
particular church or religious domination. The stamps were not issued and sold for
the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor were money derived from that sale of
the stamps given to that church.
The only purpose of the selling of the stamps was to advertise the Philippines and to
attract more tourists to the country. The officials merely took advantage of an event
that has considerable international importance to give publicity to the Philippines.
Note also that instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice, as originally planned,
the stamp contains a map of the Philippines and City of Manila. What is therefore
emphasized in not the Eucharistic Congress itself but Manila, as the seat of that
congress.
Even if the event had religious character, the resulting propaganda was not the aim
and purpose of the Government. The government should not be embarrassed in its
activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious in character, if
the purpose in view could be undertaken by appropriate legislation. The main
purpose should not be frustrated by its subordination to mere incidental results not
contemplated.
108
67. VICTORIANO VS. ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS
freedom of religion
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Victoriano was a member of the INK and an employee of the Elizalde Rope
Factory. He was also a member of the Union which had a CBA containing a closed
shop provision.
Under their CBA, membership in the Union is required as a condition for
employment.
Being a member of the INK which prohibits the affiliation of its members with any
labor organization, Victoriano resigned from the Union.
The Union then asked the Company to terminate him for violating the CBA
condition, invoking the union security clause.
Under RA 875, the Company had liberty impose conditions as a requirement for
continued employment.
Later, RA 3350 was enacted amending RA 875 which exempted members of
religious sects from the affiliation with labor organizations.
Victoriano now questions his dismissal.
The Company and the Union however invoke the unconstitutionality of RA 3350
insofar as it impairs the obligation of contracts. This is because while the Union is
obliged to comply with its closed shop provision, the amendment relieves the
employer company from its reciprocal obligation of cooperation in the
maintenance of the union membership as a condition for employment. The Union
also averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious
sects. They also contend that Republic Act No. 3350 violates the constitutional
prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of a civil right or a
political right.
SC: RA 3350 VALID. VICTORIANO CANNOT BE DISMISSED.
Republic Act No. 3350 merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage
of the closed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which
prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization. What the exception
provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects cannot be compelled or
coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have closed shop agreements
with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said
religious sects cannot be refused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the
sole ground that they are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear,
therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutional provision on
freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does not prohibit the members
of said religious sects from affiliating with labor unions. It still leaves to said
members the liberty and the power to affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious wets prefer
to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them
to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining, and neither may the
employer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does
not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.
What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No. 3350? Its
purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and to promote the general
welfare by preventing discrimination against those members of religious sects which
prohibit their members from joining labor unions, confirming thereby their natural,
109
statutory and constitutional right to work. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is
legitimate.
It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on account of his
religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labor organization
although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This is tantamount to
punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a right under the law to
believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish to the detriment of
those whose religion discards membership in any labor organization. Likewise, the
law would not commned the deprivation of their right to work and pursue a modest
means of livelihood, without in any manner violating their religious faith and/or
belief."
It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achieve that
purpose - exempting the members of said religious sects from coverage of union
security agreements - is reasonable.
It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religious profession or
belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the latter must, therefore,
yield to the former.
The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal, not spiritual
or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve the secular purpose of
advancing the constitutional right to the free exercise of religion, by averting that
certain persons be refused work, or be dismissed from work. It acted merely to
relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that is imposed by
union security agreements.
It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed shop agreement does not
directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the
exemption may benefit those who are members of religious sects that prohibit their
members from joining labor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely
incidental and indirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban
regulation on conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide or
harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. The free exercise clause of the
Constitution has been interpreted to require that religious exercise be preferentially
aided.
The Act does not require as a qualification, or condition, for joining any lawful
association membership in any particular religion or in any religious sect; neither
does the Act require affiliation with a religious sect that prohibits its members from
joining a labor union as a condition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor
union. Joining or withdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act Republic Act
No. 3350 only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of
closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required to do
a positive act-to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union. He is
exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. A conscientious
religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise the right of resigning
from the labor union-he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop
agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How then can there be a
religious test required for the exercise of a right when no right need be exercised?
(read orig for other arguments and issues)
110
68. VILLAVECENCIO VS. LUKBAN
liberty of abode and travel
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One hundred and seventy women, who had lived in the segregated district for
women of ill repute in the city of Manila, were by orders of the Mayor of the city
of Manila and the chief of police of that city isolated from society and then at
night without their consent and without any opportunity to consult with friends or
to defend their rights, were forcibly hustled on board steamers for transportation
to regions unknown.
No law order, or regulation authorized the Mayor of the city of Manila or the chief
of the police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine Islands to change their
domicile from Manila to another locality.
The city authorities quietly perfected arrangements with the Bureau of Labor for
sending the women to Davao, Mindanao, as laborers.
The women were given no opportunity to collect their belongings, and apparently
were under the impression that they were being taken to a police station for an
investigation. They had no knowledge that they were destined for a life in
Mindanao. 'They had not been asked if they wished to depart from that region
and had neither directly nor indirectly given their consent to the deportation.
The vessels reached Davao, and they were receipted for as laborers by the
Governor.
The friends and relatives of the women filed for habeas corpus. But somehow the
Mayor refused to comply with the order of the court.
They argue that the habeas corpus is not proper because the women are not
restrained of their liberty. That they are under no restraint; the women were free
in Davao.
ISSUE: By authority of what law did the Mayor and the Chief of Police presume to act
in deporting by duress these persons from Manila to another distant locality within
the Philippine Islands?
SC:
The writ of habeas corpus was properly granted, and that the Mayor of the city of
Manila who was primarily responsible for the deportation, is in contempt of court for
his failure to comply with the order of the court.
There is no law, order, or regulation, which even hints at the right of the Mayor of
the city of Manila or the chief of police of that city to force citizens of the Philippine
Islands-and these women despite their being in a sense lepers of society are
nevertheless not chattels but Philippine citizens protected by the same constitutional
guaranties as are other citizens-to change their domicile from Manila to another
locality.
The privilege of domicile is deemed so important as to be found in the Bill of Rights
of the Constitution. Liberty of abode is a principle so deeply imbedded in
jurisprudence and considered so elementary in nature as not even to require a
constitutional sanction. Even the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands, even
the President of the United States, who has often been said to exercise more power
than any king or potentate has no such arbitrary prerogative, either inherent or
express. Much less, therefore, has the executive of a municipality who acts within a
sphere of delegated powers. If the mayor and the chief of police could at their mere
behest or even for the most praiseworthy of motives, render the liberty of the citizen
so insecure, then the presidents and chiefs of police of one thousand other
111
municipalities of the Philippines have the same privilege. If these officials can take to
themselves such power, then any other official can do the same. And if any official
can exercise the power, then all persons would have just as much right to do so. And
if a prostitute could be sent against her wishes and under no law from one locality to
another within the country, then officialdom can hold the same club over the head of
any citizen.
A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire
into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to
relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude
freedom of action is sufficient. The forcible taking of these women from Manila by
officials of that city who handed them over to other parties, who deposited them in a
distant region, deprived these women of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as
if they had been imprisoned. Placed in Davao without either money or personal
belongings, they were prevented from exercising the liberty of going when and
where they pleased. The restraint of liberty which began in Manila continued until the
aggrieved parties were returned to Manila and released or until they freely and truly
waived this right.
The court (Davao) ordered the Mayor to produce the bodies of the persons they did
not produce the bodies of the persons in whose behalf the writ was granted; they did
not show impossibility of performance; and they did not present writings that waived
the right to be present by those interested. Instead a few stereotyped affidavits
purporting to show that the women were contented with their life in Davao, some of
which have since been repudiated by the signers, were appended to the return.
Hence, the mayor is guilty of contempt of court.
112
69. MANOTOC VS. CA
liberty of abode and travel
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Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular
Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.
Following the "run" on stock brokerages, Manotoc, who was then in the United
States, came home, and together with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with
the SEC for the appointment of a management committee.
Six of the company’s clients filed criminal complaints against Manotoc for estafa
(because the TCT given by the company to its clients was fake). Bail was fixed at
P105,000.
Manotoc filed a motion for permission to leave the country, stating as ground his
desire to go to the United States, relative to his business transactions and
opportunities. He claims he is going to Louisiana, U.S.A. to obtain foreign
investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc.
The motion was denied in all cases.
He thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus seeking to annul the orders
denying his leave to travel abroad.
He contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail nor the SEC which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.
He claims that liberty is indivisible and that it operates without boundaries.
SC: MANOTOC CANNOT LEAVE THE COUNTRY.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail
bond.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times
whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right
to travel.
The obligation assumed by the bond surety was to hold the accused amenable at all
times to the orders and processes of the lower court. This was to prohibit said
accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the Philippines, because, otherwise, said
orders and processes will be nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts
from which they issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would
have no binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient
reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts. If the sureties have the
right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then has the court from
which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction over the person
of the principal remains un affected despite the grant of bail to the latter. In fact,
this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself, notwithstanding
his allegation that he is at all total liberty to leave the country, for he would not
have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were
otherwise.
A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will show that
it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United States where he
will, allegedly attend to some business transaction and search for business
opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's motion, no urgent or
113
compelling reason can be discerned to justify the grant of judicial imprimatur
thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown that there is absolute necessity for him
to travel abroad. Petitioner's motion bears no indication that the alleged business
transactions could not be undertaken by any other person in behalf. Neither is there
any hint that petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely preclude
him from taking advantage of the business opportunities therein, nor is there any
showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States would cause him
irreparable damage or prejudice." Petitioner has not specified the duration of the
proposed travel or shown that his surety has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges
that his surety has agreed to his plans as he had posted cash indemnities.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health."
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
114
70. SILVERIO VS. CA
liberty of abode and travel
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Silverio was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act
in a Criminal Case. He posted bail for his provisional liberty.
The records will show that the information was filed on October 14,1985. Until
this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled
arraignments were cancelled and react, mostly due to the failure of accused
Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to appear had
invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;
Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never
appeared in person before the Court.
The bond posted by Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had
been issued against him all for the same reason-failure to appear at scheduled
arraignments.
Later, more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent
People of the Philippines filed a motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a
hold departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone
abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in
postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.
He also assails the finding that the right to travel can be impaired. He claims that
while the Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of
abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of
the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or
public health.
SC:
The bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been
issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled
arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the
conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody.
The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all
times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his
right to travel. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from
leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return. So it is also that "An accused
released on bail may be rearrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts
to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is
pending.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the. same within the limits prescribed by law
shall not be prepaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel
be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may
be provided by law."
ISSUE: Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair
the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public
health."
SC: This is untenable. The last portion applies only to executive or administrative
officers. The Constitution however should be interpreted to mean that while the
liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate
executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary
115
discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national
security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law.
The Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power
of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them.
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the
conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for
his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory
if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the
territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the
reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be
considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in
accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of
the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their
course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.
In short, the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself
available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on the right to travel.
116
71. LEGASPI VS. CSC
right to information
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
Legaspi earlier requested for information on the civil service eligibilities of certain
persons employed as sanitarians at the Cebu City Health Department.
This was denied by the CSC. He filed a mandamus against the CSC, claiming his
right to be informed of the eligibilities of these sanitarians as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether
2.
Whether
3.
Whether
4.
Whether
the right to information is a self-executing provision.
Legaspi has standing.
the Government agency CSC has the duty to disclose information.
the information requested is covered by the right to information.
SC: YES. YES. YES. YES.
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official. records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall
be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
1) These constitutional provisions are self-executing. The fundamental right recognized may
be asserted by the people upon the ratification of the constitution without need for any
ancillary act of the Legislature. What may be provided for by the Legislature are reasonable
conditions and limitations upon the access to be afforded which must, of necessity, be
consistent with the declared State policy of full public disclosure of all transactions involving
public interest. However, it cannot be overemphasized that whatever limitation may be
prescribed by the Legislature, the right and the duty have become operative and enforceable
by virtue of the adoption of the New Charter. Therefore, the right may be properly invoked in
a Mandamus proceeding such as this one.
2) Petitioner has firmly anchored his case upon the right of the people to information an
matters of public concern, which, by its very nature, is a public right.The people are regarded
as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted
need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws. The requirement on
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore,
part of the general "public" which possesses the right.
3) Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a
policy of hill public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest. The law itself
makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind,
leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be in eluded or excluded
from such publication. There is the absence of discretion on the part of government agencies
in allowing the examination of public records. Except, perhaps when it is clear that the
purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not believe it is the duty
under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and
objects of the person seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the
information which the records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not
made of it. (Subject to the regulation of the manner and hours of examination to the end that
damage to or loss of, the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of
the custodian of the books and documents and other employees may be prevented, that the
right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured.)
117
Thus, while the manner of examining public records may be subject to reasonable regulation
by the government agency in custody thereof, the duty to disclose the information of public
concern, and to afford access to public records cannot be discretionary on the part of said
agencies. Certainly, its performance cannot be made contingent upon the discretion of such
agencies. Otherwise, the enjoyment of the constitutional right may be rendered nugatory by
any whimsical exercise of agency discretion. The constitutional duty, not being discretionary,
its performance may be compelled by a writ of Mandamus in a proper case.
4)
But the constitutional guarantee to information on matters of public concern is not
absolute. It does not open every door to any and all information. Access to official records,
papers, etc., are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law". The law may therefore
exempt certain types of information from public scrutiny, such as those affecting national
security. The access to a particular public record must be circumscribed by the nature of the
information sought, i.e., (a) being of public concern or one that involves public interest, and,
(b) not being exempted by law from the operation of the constitutional guarantee. The
threshold question is, therefore, whether or not the information sought is of public interest or
public concern.
Public concern" like "public interest" is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms
embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because
these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of
an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine in a case by case
basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the
public.
In case of denial of access, the government agency has the burden of showing that the
information requested is not of public concern, or, if it is of public concern, that the same has
been exempted by law from the operation of the guarantee.
Here, the information sought by the petitioner in this case is the truth of the claim of certain
government employees that they are civil service eligibles for the positions to which they were
appointed. Public office being a public trust. It is the legitimate concern of citizens to ensure
that government positions requiring civil service eligibility are occupied only by persons who
are eligibles. Public officers are at all times accountable to the people even as to their
eligibilities for their respective positions.
The CSC has failed to cite any provision in the Civil Service Law which would limit the
petitioner's right to know who are, and who are not, civil service eligibles. We take judicial
notice of the fact that the names of those who pass the civil service examinations, as in bar
examinations and licensure examinations for various professions, are released to the public.
Hence, there is nothing secret about one's civil service eligibility, if actually possessed.
Petitioner's request is,therefore ,neither unusual nor unreasonable- And when. as in this case,
the government employees concerned claim to be civil service eligibles, the public, through
any citizen, has a right to verify their professed eligibilities from the Civil Service Commission.
The civil service eligibility of a sanitarian being of public concern, and in the absence of
express limitations under the law upon access to the register of civil service eligibles for said
position, the duty of the respondent Commission to confirm or deny the civil service eligibility
of any person occupying the position becomes imperative. Mandamus, therefore lies.
CHAMP
Page 118
2/15/2016
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72. VALMONTE VS. BELMONTE
right to information
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Members of the print media invoke the right to information in a mandamus case
against the GSIS.
They are seeking the list of the names of the members of the Batasan who
belong to the PDPLaban who were able to secure clean loans of P2M each,
through the intercession and marginal notes and with the guarantee, of Former
First Lady Imelda Marcos.
The GSIS general manager Sonny Belmonte denied the request citing the
confidential relationship between GSIS and its borrowers, that GSIS had the duty
to its customers to preserve this confidentiality and that there is no court order
requiring them to divulge the identities of the borrowers. GSIS also invokes the
right to privacy, which is also fundamental right.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to access to the documents
evidencing loans granted by the GSIS.
SC:
An informed citizenry with access to the diverse currents in political, moral and
artistic thought and data relative to them, and the free exchange of ideas and
discussion of issues thereon, is vital to the democratic government envisioned under
our Constitution. The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the State. In this system, governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the authority conferred by the
people. Denied access to information on the inner workings of government, the
citizenry can become prey to the whims and caprices of those to whom the power
had been delegated.
Petitioners are practitioners in media. As such, they have both the right to gather
and the obligation to check the accuracy of information they disseminate. For them,
the freedom of the press and of speech is not only critical, but vital to the exercise of
their professions. The right of access to information ensures that these freedoms are
not rendered nugatory by the government's monopolizing pertinent information. For
an essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or
process of communication between the government and the people.
The right to information is an essential premise of a meaningful right to speech and
expression. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional
policies of full public disclosure ** and honesty in the public service. *** It is meant
to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as
well as in checking abuse in government.
In determining whether or not a particular information is of public concern there is
no rigid test which can be applied. "Public concern" like "public interest" is a terra
that eludes exact definition.
The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the government and its employees and
the administrator of various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. Considering the nature of its funds,
the GSIS is expected to manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent laws or rules and regulations. It must preserve at all
times the actuarial solvency of the funds administered by the System. It is therefore
119
the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that these funds are managed properly
with the end in view of maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured
government employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were Members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves appropriated funds for the GSIS and
were therefore expected to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks
with the greatest degree of fidelity and that all its transactions were above board.
In sum, the public nature of the loanable funds of the GSIS and the public office held
by the alleged borrowers make the information sought clearly a matter of public
interest and concern.
A second requisite must be met before the right to information may be enforced
through mandamus proceedings, that the information sought must not be among
those excluded by law.
GSIS has failed to cite any law granting them the privilege of confidentiality as
regards the documents subject of this petition. His position is apparently based
merely on considerations of policy.
When the information requested from the government intrudes into the privacy of a
citizen, a potential conflict between the rights to information and to privacy may
arise. However, the competing interests of these rights need not be resolved in this
case. The right to privacy belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and governmental agencies like the GSIS. Moreover, the right cannot be
invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A corporation has no right of privacy in its
name since the entire basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such ground for relief.
Neither can the GSIS through its General Manager, Belmonte, invoke the right to
privacy of its borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature.
HOWEVER, Although citizens are afforded the right to information and, pursuant
thereto, are entitled to "access to official records," the Constitution does not accord
them a right to compel custodians of official records to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like in their desire to acquire information on matters of public
concern. Hence, they must be allowed access to documents and records, as
petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to the time and manner
of inspection.
120
73. UNITED PEPSI VS. LAGUESMA
right to assembly –


Petitioner is a union of supervisory employees. The union filed a petition for
certification election on behalf of the route managers at Pepsi-Cola Products
Philippines, Inc. However, its petition was denied on the ground that the route
managers are managerial employees and, therefore, ineligible for union
membership under the first sentence of Art. 245 of the Labor Code. (Managerial
employees are not eligible to join, assist or form any labor organization.
Supervisory employees shall not be eligible for membership in a labor
organization of the rank-and-file employees but may join, assist or form separate
labor organizations of their own.)
The union assailed this decision contending that it impairs their right to selforganization.
ISSUE: Is Art 245 constitutional?
SC:YES.
(This is a labor case but the relevant part is on the right to join form and assist labor unions.
The distinctions between managerial and supervisory employees omitted. See original.)
Managerial employee" is one who is vested with powers or prerogatives to lay down and
execute management policies and/or to hire transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge,
assign or discipline employees. Supervisory employees are those who, in the interest of the
employer, effectively recommend such managerial actions if the exercise of such authority is
not merely routinary or clerical in nature but requires the use of independent judgment.
The guarantee of organizational right in Art. III, §8 is NOT infringed by a ban against
managerial employees forming a union. The right guaranteed in Art. III, §8 is subject to the
condition that its exercise should be for purposes "not contrary to law." In the case of Art.
245, there is a rational basis for prohibiting managerial employees from forming or joining
labor organizations. The rationale for this inhibition is, because if these managerial employees
would belong to or be affiliated with a Union, the latter might not be assured of their loyalty to
the Union in view of evident conflict of interests. The Union can also become companydominated with the presence of managerial employees in Union membership. After all, those
who qualify as top or middle managers are executives who receive from their employers
information that not only is confidential but also is not generally available to the public, or to
their competitors, or to other employees.
Relate to government employees  During the 1986 Constitutional Convention, Commissioner
Lerum proposed that the prohibition on security guards, government employees and
supervisory employees from forming unions be lifted. This is because the Labor Code denied
this right and there was a need to reinstate this right. The Commission accepted the proposal.
Lerum’s proposal to amend the Sec 8 of Art III of the Constitution by including labor union in
the guarantee of the right to organization should be taken in the context of statements that
his aim was the removal of the statutory ban against joining labor organization. The approval
of his proposal can only mean that the Commission intended the absolute right to organize of
government workers, supervisory employees and security guards to be constitutionally
guaranteed. By implication, NO similar absolute constitutional right to organize for labor
purposes should be deemed to have been granted to top-level and middle-managers. As to
them, the right to self-organization may be regulated and even abridged conformably to Art
III, Sec 8. (Thus the Lerum proposal was never intended to apply to managerial employees.
He simply meant to restore the right of supervisory employees to organize. )
121
74. VISAYAN REFINING VS. CAMUS AND PAREDES
eminent domain
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The Gov-Gen directed the Atty-Gen to cause the condemnation proceedings for
expropriation of the land known as Camp Thomas Claudio in P’que for military and aviation
purposes.
Among the defendants impleaded were Visayan Refining and Worcester Leas, who were
owners of the different portions of the property.
The gov’t filed a case to ask the court to give the government the possession of the land
after a DEPOSIT is made (so that there can be immediate possession). The Judge fixed a
provisional value and granted the gov’t petition.
The affected parties quested the validity of the proceedings on the ground that there is no
law authorizing the exercise of eminent domain just to acquire land ffor military or
aviation purposes. They also contend that the P600,000 deposit was made without
authority of law.
The gov’t argues that the money comes from an appropriation made by law, Act #2784 for
the use of the Militia Commission.
The gov’t further argues that the power of eminent domain is expressly conferred on the
Government by the Philippine Bill (which was the constitution then I think.), as well as the
Jones Act and the Administrative Code.
ISSUE: Can expropriation proceedings be maintained in the absence of a statute authorizing
the exercise of power of eminent domain? Must there be a special legislative act for every
parcel of land expropriated?
SC. NO NEED FOR SPECIAL LEGISLATION.
If land can be taken by the Government for a public use at all, the use intended to be made of
the land now in question, that is, for military and aviation purposes, is a public use. It is
undeniable that a military establishment is essential to the maintenance of organized society,
and the courts will take judicial notice of the recent progress of the military and naval arts
resulting from the development of aeronautics.
Expropriation proceedings may be maintained upon the exclusive initiative of the GovernorGeneral, without the aid of any special legislative authority other than that already on the
statute books. Furthermore, if the Government complies with the requirements of law relative
to the making of a deposit in court, provisional possession of the property may be at once
given to it, just as is permitted in the case of any other person or entity authorized by law to
exercise the power of eminent domain. Special legislative authority for the buying of a piece of
land by the Government is no more necessary than for buying a paper of pins; and in the case
of a forced taking of property against the will of the owner, all that can be required of the
government is that it should be able to comply with the conditions laid down by law as and
when those conditions arise.
It is recognized by all writers that the power of eminent domain is inseparable from
sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government even in
its most primitive forms. No law, therefore, is ever necessary to confer this right upon
sovereignty or upon any government exercising sovereign or quasi-sovereign powers.
The power of eminent domain does not depend for its existence on a specific grant in the
constitution. It is inherent in sovereignty and exists in a sovereign state without any
recognition of it in the constitution. The provisions found in most of the state constitutions
relating to the taking of property for the public use do not by implication grant the power to
the government of the state, but limit a power which would otherwise be without limit.
Once authority is given to exercise the power of eminent domain, the matter ceases to be
wholly legislative. The executive authorities may then decide whether the power will be
invoked and to what extent. The power of eminent domain, with respect to the conditions
under which the property is taken, must of course be exercised in subjection to all the
restraints imposed by constitutional or organic law. The two provisions by which the exercise
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of this power is chiefly limited in this jurisdiction are found in the third section of the Jones
Act, which among other things declares (1) that no law shall be enacted which shall deprive
any person of property without due process of law and (2) that private property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation. The whole problem of expropriation is
resolvable in its ultimate analysis into a constitutional question of due process of law.
The method of expropriation adopted in this jurisdiction is such as to afford absolute
assurance that no piece of land can be finally and irrevocably taken from an unwilling owner
until compensation is paid.
It will be noted that the title does not actually pass to the expropriator until a certified copy of
the record of the judgment is recorded in the office of the register of deeds. Before this stage
of the proceedings is reached the compensation is supposed to have been paid; and the court
is plainly directed to make such final order and judgment as shall secure to the defendant just
compensation for the land taken.
The idea is rather to protect the owner by requiring payment as a condition precedent to the
acquisition of the property by the other party. The owner is completely protected from the
possibility of losing his property without compensation.
In the eventuality that the expropriation shall not be consummated, the owners will be
protected by the deposit from any danger of loss resulting from the temporary occupation of
the land by the Government; for it is. obvious that this preliminary deposit serves the double
purpose of a prepayment upon the value of the property, if finally expropriated, and as an
indemnity against damage in the eventuality that the proceedings should fall of
consummation.
(the court also reiterated the fact that there was really money appropriated for the purposes
of the Militia Commission nder Act no 2826 and 2715.
123
75. CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE COMMUNITY
eminent domain
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The City of Manila filed a petition for the expropriation of certain lands in the district of
Binondo for the purpose of constructing the extension of Rizal Avenue in Manila.
The Comunidad de Chinos de Manila claimed that it was the owner of certain lands and
that there was NO necessity or expediency of expropriation for street purposes, and that
there were existing roads which sufficient, that there are other routes available for
expropriation which would not disturb the resting places of the dead (because the land is
being used as a cemetery).
They also claim that the land had become quasi-public property because it has been used
for the burial of the dead for many years and should not be converted to a street.
The lower court ruled in favor of the Chinese Community.
The City appealed and claim that under the law, it had authority to expropriate and it may
expropriate any land it may desire, and that the only function of the lower court should
have been to ascertain the value of the land, and neither can the court nor the owners
question the expropriation itself, and that the courts are mere appraisers of the land and
fix the value.
ISSUE: What is the function of the courts in expropriation? Is it limited to those above?
SC: The power of the court is not limited to that question. The right of expropriation is not an
inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can exercise the right some law must
exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to determine the question, they
must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law.
In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City
of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the
court, upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails,
certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law.
Whether the purpose for the exercise of the right of eminent domain is public, is a question of
fact. Whether the land is public or private is also a question of fact; and, in our opinion, when
the legislature conferred upon the courts of the Philippine Islands the right to ascertain upon
trial whether the right exists for the exercise of eminent domain, it intended that the courts
should inquire into, and hear proof upon, those questions.
The city of Manila is given authority to expropriate private lands for public purposes. The
legislature, in providing for the exercise of the power of eminent domain, may directly
determine the necessity for appropriating private property for a particular improvement for
public use, and it may select the exact location of the improvement. In such a case, it is well
settled that the utility of the proposed improvement, the extent of the public necessity for its
construction, the expediency of constructing it, the suitableness of the location selected and
the consequent necessity of taking the land selected for its site, are all questions exclusively
for the legislature to determine, and the courts have no power to interfere, or to substitute
their own views for those of the representatives of the people.
When the statute does not designate the property to be taken nor how much may be taken,
then the necessity of taking particular property is a question for the courts. Where the
application to condemn or appropriate is made directly to the court, the question (of
necessity) should be raised and decided in limine.
In this case, the law merely conferred -general authority to take land for public use when a
necessity exists therefor. Under such statute, the allegation of the necessity for the
appropriation is an issuable allegation which it is competent for the courts to decide.
Whether it was wise, advisable, or necessary to confer upon a municipality the power to
exercise the right of eminent domain, is a question with which the courts are not concerned.
But when that right or authority is exercised for the purpose of depriving citizens of their
property, the courts are authorized, in this jurisdiction, to make inquiry and to hear proof
upon the necessity in the particular, case, and not the general authority.
124
It is erroneous to suppose that the legislature is beyond the control of the courts in exercising
the power of eminent domain, either as to the nature of the use or the necessity to the use of
any particular property. For if the use be not public or no necessity for the taking exists, the
legislature cannot authorize the taking of private property against the will of the owner,
notwithstanding compensation may be required.
The taking of private property for any use which is not required by the necessities or
convenience of the inhabitants of the state, is an unreasonable exercise of the right of eminent
domain, and beyond the power of the legislature to delegate. The question whether any
particular use is a public one or not is ultimately, at least, a judicial question.
The Charter of the city of Manila authorizes the taking of private property for public use.
Suppose the owner of the property denies and successfully proves that the taking The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character The ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany, NOT FOLLOW, the taking of the land. If the courts can inquire
into whether a public use exists or not, then it follows that it can examine into the question of
necessity.
The general power to exercise the right of eminent domain must not be confused with the
right to exercise it in a particular case. The power of the legislature to confer, upon municipal
corporations and other entities within the State, general authority to exercise the right of
eminent domain cannot be questioned by the courts, but that general authority of
municipalities or entities must not be confused with the right to exercise it in particular
instances. The moment the municipal corporation or entity attempts to exercise the authority
conferred, it must comply with the conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for
conferring the authority upon a municipal corporation to exercise the right of eminent domain
is admittedly within the power of the legislature. But whether or not the municipal corporation
or entity is exercising the right in a particular case under the conditions imposed by the
general authority, is a question which the courts have the right to inquire into.
It is a well known fact that cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery
used by the general community, or neighborhood, or church, while the latter is used only by a
family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood. Where a cemetery is open to the
public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can be taken for other public uses under a
general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved and unoccupied parts which
are held in good faith for future use. The cemetery in question seems to have been established
under governmental authority.
APPROPRIATION SHOULD NOT BE MADE UNTIL IT IS FULLY ESTABLISHED THAT THERE IS A
GREAT NECESSITY THEREFOR. EXPROPRIATION DENIED.
In the general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, it would make the cemetery
in question public property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be
denied, for the reason that the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to
expropriate public property.
Even granting that a necessity exists for the opening of the street in question, there was no
proof of the necessity of opening the same through the cemetery. The record shows that
adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of charge, which will answer
every purpose of the plaintiff.
Note: if there is a law granting expropriation of specific land, for a specific public
purpose, then the court has no jurisdiction to inquire into purpose. But if it was a
general authority, then the court may inquire.
Note: Consummated sale before taking. Use land suitable at the time of taking.
125
76. DE KNECHT VS. BAUTISTA
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Cristina De Knecht claims that more than 10 years ago, the DPWH prepared a plan to
extent EDSA to Roxas Blvd.
Being an owner of a house (along Del Pan Street) that would be affected, she wrote
President Marcos to instead adopt the original plan of using Cuneta Avenue instead of the
Del Pan Street as the extension of Edsa. The matter was referred to Human Settlements.
The government still filed for expropriation along Del Pan (because the DPWH seemed to
insist on this).
The government made the required deposit with the PNB.
Cristina assailed the choice of the Del Pan Street claiming: The condemnor may not
choose any property it wants. Where the legislature has delegated a power of eminent
domain, the question of the necessity for taking a particular line for the intended
improvement rests in the discretion of the grantee power subject however to review by
the courts in case of fraud, bad faith or gross abuse of discretion. The choice of property
must be examined for bad faith, arbitrariness or capriciousness and due process requires
determination as to whether or not the proposed location was proper in terms of the public
interests. As envisioned by the government, the EDSA extension would be linked to the
Cavite Expressway. Logically then, the proposed extension must point to the south and
not detour to the north.
The government on the other hand claimed: the residents of Del Pan and Fernando Rein
Streets who were to be adversely affected were duly notified of such proposed project.,
that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del Pan - Fernando Rein Streets lines, meet
satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are both acceptable. In selecting
the Del Pan-Fernando Rein Streets lines the Government did not do so because it wanted
to save the motels located along Cuneta Avenue but because it wanted to minimize the
social impact factor or problem involved."
SC: DEL PAN ROUTE NOT ALLOWED.
it is a fact that the Department of Public Highways originally establish the extension of EDSA
along Cuneta Avenue. It is to be presumed that the Department of Public Highways made
studies before deciding on Cuneta Avenue. It is indeed odd why suddenly the proposed
extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard was changed to go through Fernando Rein-Del Pan
Streets which the Solicitor General concedes the Del Pan-Fernando Rein Streets line follows
northward and inward direction. While admitting "that both lines, Cuneta Avenue and Del PanFernando Rein Streets lines, meet satisfactorily planning and design criteria and therefore are
both acceptable x x x", the Solicitor General justifies the change to Del Pan-Fernando Rein
Streets on the ground that the government "wanted to minimize the social impact factor or
problem involved."
It is doubtful whether the extension of EDSA along Cuneta Avenue can be objected to on the
ground of social impact. The improvements and buildings along Cuneta Avenue to be affected
by the extension are mostly motels.
As found by the Human Settlements: From both engineering and traffic management
viewpoints, it is incontestable that the straighter and shorter alignment is preferable to one
which is not. Alignment 1 is definitely the contour conforming alignment to EDSA whereas
Alignment 2 affords a greater radius of unnatural curvature as it hooks slightly northward
before finally joining with Roxas Boulevard. It is clear that the choice of Fernando ReinDel Pan
Streets as the line through which the Epifanio de los Santos Avenue should be extended to
Roxas Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive judicial approval. The respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion in allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take
immediate possession of the properties sought to be expropriated.
(read original for the report of the Human Settlements)
126
77. CITY OF BAGUIO VS. NAWASA
eminent domain
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Baguio City operates the Baguio Waterworks System BWS under its charter.
Baguio City filed a complaint against Nawasa contending that the latter does not
include the Baguio Waterworks System. It assailed the constitutionality of RA
1383 (giving Nawasa the power over the BWS), claiming that the law deprives
Baguio City of ownership of the waterworks system without compensation.
The Nawasa on the other hand claims that RA 1383 is but an exercise of police
powers, and that the BWS is not a private property but a public works for a public
service.
Under RA 1383, Nawasa owns and or has jurisdiction, supervision and control
over all existing government-owned waterworks in the boundaries of cities,
municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines including those served by
the waterworks and wells and drills sections.
Furthermore, under said law, all existing government owned waterworks and
sewerage systems in cities, municipalities, and municipal districts, are transferred
to the Nawasa.
ISSUE: Is RA 1383 an exercise of police power (pp) or power of eminent domain
(ed)?
SC: ED.
The Act does not confiscate, nor destroy, nor appropriate property belonging to
appellee. It merely directs that all waterworks belonging to cities, municipalities and
municipal districts in the Philippines be transferred to the NAWASA for the purpose of
placing them under the control and supervision of one agency with a view to
promoting their efficient management, but in so doing it does not confiscate them
because it directs that they be paid with an equal value of the assets of the
NAWASA. Here, , its purpose is to effect a real transfer of the ownership of the
waterworks to the new agency and does not merely encompass a transfer of
administration.
ISSUE: Is BWS public property or patrimonial property of the city?
SC: PATRIMONIAL.
The BWS is not like any public road, park, street or other public property held in
trust by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public but it is rather a
property owned by the city in its proprietary character. While the cases may differ as
to the public or private character of waterworks, the weight of authority as far as the
legislature is concerned classes them as private affairs.
A waterworks system is patrimonial property of the city that has established it. Being
owned by a municipal corporation in a proprietary character, waterworks cannot be
taken away without observing the safeguards set by our Constitution for the
protection of private property.
ISSUE: Does RA 1383 comply with expropriation requirements?
SC: NO. Because there was no payment of just compensation. Although the law said
that the assets of Nawasa are to be used as payment, these assets have not been
specified. Also, no action was done by Nawasa to contract indebtedness or issue
bonds as payment. Nawasa has not complied with its commitment to pay.
CHAMP Page 127
2/15/2016
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78. CITY OF MANILA VS. ESTRADA
ED – just compensation
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The city of Manila sought to expropriate an entire parcel of land with its improvements for
use in connection with a new market at that time being erected in the district of Paco. The
land was bounded by Calle Herran, the Paco Estero, the market site, and Calle Looban.
The commissioners tasked to determine the compensation amount reported P20 per
square meter.
The lower court however, reduced this to P15 per square meter.
It appears that two disinterested witnesses for the city testified that the land was worth
P10 per square meter, their statements being based upon the prices obtained for land in
the open market in the vicinity. The defendant Estrada testified that it was worth P25 per
square meter, basing his statement on the price obtained three years previously by the
owner of the parcel on the opposite side of Calle Herran of P19.85 per square meter.
ISSUE: How much is just compensation?
SC: For the determination of the market value of land, which is that sum of money which a
person, desirous but not compelled to buy and an owner willing but not compelled to sell,
would agree on as a price to be given and received therefore. The market value of a piece of
land is attained by a consideration of all those facts which make it commercially valuable.
In determining the value of land appropriated for public purposes, the same considerations are
to be regarded as in a sale of property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must
be what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference to the uses to
which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the uses to which it is plainly adapted;
that is to say, what is it worth from its availability for valuable uses? It is to be estimated by
reference to the uses for which the property is suitable, having regard to the existing business
or wants of the community, or such as may be reasonably expected in the immediate future."
The market value of the property means its actual value, independent of the location of
plaintiff's road thereon, that is, the fair value of the property as between one who wants to
purchase and one who wants to sell it; not what could be obtained for it in peculiar
circumstances when greater than its fair price could be obtained; not its speculative value; not
the value obtained through the necessities of another. Nor, on the other hand, is it to be
limited to that price which the property would bring when forced off at aucti.on under the
hammer. The question is, if the defendant wanted to sell its property, what could be obtained
for it upon the market from parties who wanted to buy and Would give its full value."
The market value of property is the price which it will bring when it is offered for sale by one
who desires, but is not obliged to sell it, and is bought by one who is under no necessity of
having it. In estimating its value all the capabilities of the property, and all the uses to which it
may be applied or for which it is adapted, are to be considered, and not merely the condition it
is in at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. It is not a question of
the value of the property to the owner. Nor can the damages be enhanced by his unwillingness
to sell. On the other hand, the damages cannot be measured by the value of the property to
the party condemning it, nor by its need of the particular property. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, may be
shown and considered in estimating its value."
(read original for the specific objections on the presented evidence of just compensation)
SC: THERE WAS JUST COMPENSATION AS IT WAS BASED OF THE FAIR MARKET VALUE:
1) price paid for the adjoing lots
2) there were 2 real estate agents
3) tax assessments of the value of the land considered.
128
79. EPZA VS. DULAY
just compensation
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PD1811 reserved certain parcels of land in LapuLapu Mactan Cebu, for the establishment
of EPZA and the Mactan EPZ. It however encroached upon the property of Dulay.
The parties have agreed to the expropriation except for the just compensation.
EPZA contends that under PD1533, the basis of JC should be the fair and current market
value as declared by the owner, or the market value determined by the assessor,
whichever is lower. Thus, it claims that there is no more need to appoint commissioners
under the Rules of Court, to determine just compensation. It also claims that local
assessors and the owners themselves may fix the JC.
On the other hand, Dulay relies on the commissioner’s report fixing the JC at P15 per sqm.
ISSUE: What is the proper way to determine the JC?
SC:
JC means the equivalent for the value of the property at the time of its taking. Anything
beyond that is more and anything short of that is less, than just compensation. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the loss sustained, which is the measure of the indemnity, not whatever
gain would accrue to the expropriating entity.
Hence, in estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to
which it may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the
condition it is in the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as
to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may
be shown and considered in estimating its value.
PD1533 IS NOT VALID. The method of ascertaining just compensation under the aforecited
decrees constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives. It tends to render
this Court inutile in a matter which under the Constitution is reserved to it for final
determination.
Although in an expropriation proceeding the court technically would still have the power to
determine the just compensation for the property, if we follow the PD, then the court would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the owner or
the assessor. As a necessary consequence, it would be useless for the court to appoint
commissioners under Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the need to satisfy the due
process clause in the taking of private property is seemingly fulfilled since it cannot be said
that a judicial proceeding was not had before the actual taking. However, the strict application
of the decrees during the proceedings would be nothing short of a mere formality or charade
as the court has only to choose between the valuation of the owner and that of the assessor,
and its choice is always limited to the lower of the two. The court cannot exercise its discretion
or independence in determining what is just or fair. Even a grade school pupil could substitute
for the judge insofar as the determination of constitutional just compensation is concerned.
COURTS STILL HAVE THE POWER TO DETERMINE THE JC.
The owner of property expropriated is entitled to recover from expropriating authority the fair
and full value of the lot, as of the time when possession thereof was actually taken by the
province, plus consequential damages-including attorney's fees-from which the consequential
benefits, if any should be deducted, with interest at the legal rate, on the aggregate sum due
to the owner from and after the date of actual taking.' In fine, the decree only establishes a
uniform basis for determining just compensation which the Court may consider as one of the
factors in arriving at 'just compensation,' as envisage in the Constitution.
Indeed, where this Court simply follows PD 1533, thereby limiting the determination of just
compensation on the value declared by the owner or administrator or as determined by the
Assessor, whichever is lower, it may result in the deprivation of the landowner's right of due
process to enable it to prove its claim to just compensation, as mandated by the Constitution.
The valuation in the decree may only serve as a guiding principle or one of the factors in
129
determining just Compensation but it may not substitute the court's own judgment as to what
amount should be awarded and how to arrive at such amount.
THE COURT NOW ABANDONS THE NHA VS. REYES DOCTRINE.
The basic unfairness of the decrees is readily apparent.
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a fair
and full equivalent for the lose sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the property and
its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be considered.
In this particular case, the tax declarations presented by the petitioner as basis for just
compensation were made by the LapuLapu municipal, later city assessor long before martial
law, when land was not only much cheaper but when assessed values of properties were
stated in figures constituting only a fraction of their true market value. The private respondent
was not even the owner of the properties at the time. It purchased the lots for development
purposes. To peg the value of the lots on the basis of documents which are out of date and at
prices below the acquisition cost of present owners would be arbitrary and confiscatory.
Tthe values given by provincial assessors are usually uniform for very wide areas covering
several barrios or even an entire town with the exception of the poblacion. Individual
differences are never taken into account. The value of land is based on such generalities as its
possible cultivation for rice, corn, coconuts, or other crops.
To say that the owners are estopped to question the valuations made by assessors since they
had the opportunity to protest before the local board of appeals is illusory. The overwhelming
mass of land owners accept unquestioningly what is found in the tax declarations prepared by
local assessors or municipal clerks for them. They do not even look at, much less analyze, the
statements.
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function. The
executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but when a party
claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property may not be taken
for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or executive order can mandate
that its own determination shall prevail over the court's findings. Much less can the courts be
precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the decreed compensation.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which eliminates the court's discretion to appoint
commissioner a pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, is unconstitutional and void.
CHAMP Page 130
2/15/2016
130
80. VICENTE NOBLE VS. CITY OF MANILA
eminent domain
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Syquia entered into a contract with the City of Manila for the construction of a
school building on the land of the City in Tayuman, Tondo.
Under the contract, Syquia will lease the building to the City and after 3 years,
the City will buy the building from Syquia for P46000. But if after 3 years the City
is still unable to buy it, then the conrtact of lease will be extended, and so on
successively.
Syquia however conveyed his rights to the building to Sandoval, as well as the
lease contract.
Sandoval then conveyed his rights to Noble.
The City failed to pay the rent and Noble filed a case to compel the City to just
buy the building as per the lease contract.
The City however wanted the rescission of the lease contract and instead asked
for expropriation. (I think this was their strategy to avoid paying the fixed price
in the contract.) The city wanted the appointment of commissioners to determine
the JC for the building.
ISSUE: Was expropriation proper?
SC: NO. The city of Manila has no right to expropriate the building. It should comply
with the terms of the lease contract of paying P46,000 for the price of the building,
plus rent.
Under the contract, the city had to buy the building within 3 years. The purchase
constituted the principal consideration with respect to Syquia, the lease being merely
secondary because it subsists only while there was no purchase yet. If the purchase
is not made after the 3 years, then Syquia can demand the city to comply with its
obligation to buy the building.
When the rights were conveyed to other persons, there was only an amendment of
the period of lease (extension only). But the obligation itself of the city to buy the
building remains. Despite the amendment of the original contract, the obligation of
the city to purchase the building was kept alive, although not necessarily within the
first three years of its occupancy. The defendant itself has acknowledged this
obligation wherein it was stated that the lease was renewable from year to year until
the leased building is purchased pursuant to the original contract.
The city being bound to buy the building at an agreed price, under a valid and
subsisting contract, and the plaintiff being agreeable to its sale, the expropriation
thereof, as sought by the defendant, is baseless. Expropriation lies only when it is
made necessary by the opposition of the owner to the sale or by the lack of any
agreement as to the price. There being in the present case a valid and subsisting
contract, between the owner of the building and the city, for the purchase thereof at
an agreed price, there is no reason for the expropriation. Expropriation, as a
manifestation of the right of eminent domain of the state and as a limitation upon
private ownership, is based upon the consideration that it should not be an obstacle
to human progress and to the development of the general welfare of the community.
In the circumstances of the present case, however, the expropriation would depart
from its own purposes and turn out to be an instrument to repudiate compliance with
obligations legally and validly contracted.
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81. UNITED STATES VS. CAUSBY
eminent domain
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Respondents own 2.8 acres of land near the airport of North Carolina. They had a house
and other buildings for raising chickens.
Near them was the path of the runway, used by the US government under a lease
contract. (this was during WW2, so US fighter planes and bombers use the airport).
Sometimes, the fighter planes would come close enough to miss the top of the trees. The
noise is startling. At night, the glare from the planes would brighten the place. As a result
the respondents had to give up their chicken business.
150 chickens were lost. 
Thus the property depreciated in value and.
The US relies on the Air Commerce Act of 1926, claiming that the US has complete and
exclusive national sovereignty over the air space in the country. It claims that navigable
air space is the airspace above the minimum space altitudes of flight prescribed by the
Civil Aeronautics Authority.
It is argued that such navigable airspace is subject to right of interstate and foreign air
navigation. Now the US claims that these flights were an exercise of this right to travel in
airspace. The US claims that the flight are made within the navigable airspace without any
physical invasion of the property of landowners. There has been no taking of property but
merely incidental damage resulting from authorized air navigation. It is also argued that
landowner does not own the airspace above.
SC: The flights over the property rendered it inhabitable, thus there is compensable taking of
private property under the 5th Am.
It is the owner’s loss, not the taker’s gain, which is the measure of the value of the property
taken.
Because of the frequency and altitude of the flights, the respondents could not use their land
for any purpose, therefore, their loss would be complete. It is as complete as if the US had
entered upon the surface of the land and taken exclusive possession thereof. The land is
appropriated as if it were used for the runways themselves.
THUS there would be taking. Though it would only be an easement of flight which was taken,
that easement, if permanent and not merely temporary normally would be equivalent to a fee.
It would be a definite exercise of complete dominion and control over the surface of the land.
The fact that the planes never touched the land would be irrelevant because the owner’s right
to possess and exploit the land (his beneficial ownership) would be destroyed.
If the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the
immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. Otherwise, buildings could not be erected,
trees could not be planted, and fences could not be run. The fact that he does not occupy it
ina a physical sense (by the erection of buildings) is not material. The flight of the airplanes,
which skims the surface although not touch it, is as much as an appropriation of the use of the
land as a more conventional entry upon it.
There is an intrusion so immediate and so direct as to subtract from the owner’s full
enjoyment of the property. Thus, the adjacent airspace at this low altitude is so close to the
land that invasions of it affects the use of the land itself. This invasion is the same as the
invasion of the surface. It is the character of the invasion, and not the amount of damage
resulting, so long as the damage is substantial, that determines whether there is a taking.
In short, flights over private lands are generally not a taking, unless they are so low and so
frequent as to be a direct and immediate interference to the enjoyment and use of land.
(But since it is not clear yet whether the taking is permanent or temporary, then the case is
remanded to the lower court before the amount of JC is determined.)
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132
82. REPUBLIC VS. CASTELLVI
eminent domain – elements of taking.
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Republic filed for eminent domain against Castellvi, over a parcel of land Floridablanca,
Pampanga.
Republic alleged, that the fair market value according to the Committee on Appraisal for
the Province of Pampanga, was not more than P2,000 per hectare, or a total market value
of P259,669.10.
Castellvi alleged, that being a residential land, it had a fair market value of P15.00 per
square meter, so it had a total market value of P11,389,485.00; that the Republic,
through the Armed Forces of the Philippines, particularly the Philippine Air Force, had
been, despite repeated demands, illegally occupying her property, preventing her from
using and disposing of it, thus causing her damages by way of unrealized profits.
Republic argues that the "taking" should be reckoned from the year 1947 when by virtue
of a special lease agreement between the Republic and Castellvi, the former was granted
the "right and privilege" to buy the property should the lessor wish to terminate the lease,
and that in the event of such sale, it was stipulated that the fair market value should be as
of the time of occupancy; and that the permanent improvements amounting to more than
half a million pesos constructed during a period of twelve years on the land, subject of
expropriation, were indicative of an agreed pattern of permanency and stability of
occupancy by the Philippine Air Force in the interest of national security.
Castellvi, on the other hand, maintains that the 'taking" of property under the power of
eminent domain requires two essential elements, to wit: (1) entrance and occupation by
condemnor upon the private property for more than a momentary or limited period, and
(2) devoting it to a public use in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all
beneficial enjoyment of the property. This appellee argues that the first element is
wanting, for the contract of lease relied upon provides for a lease from year to year; that
the second element is also wanting, because the Republic was paying the lessor Castellvi a
monthly rental of P445.58; and that the contract of lease does not grant the Republic the
"right and privilege" to buy the premises "at the value at the time of occupancy.
SC:
'Taking' under the power of eminent domain may be defined generally as
1) entering upon private property for
2) more than a momentary period, and,
3) under the warrant or color of legal authority,
4) devoting it to a public use, or otherwise informally appropriating or injuriously affecting it
5) substantially to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
1) YES. This element is present in this case when by virtue of the lease, the Republic (AFP),
took possession of the Castellvi property.
2) NO. Momentary should be construed to mean a limited period, not indefinite or permanent.
Here, there was a lease contract for 1 year, renewable. The entry on the property under lease
is temporary and transitory. The fact the Republic constructed some installations does not
alter the fact that the entry into the land was only momentary or transitory, intended to last
only a year, even if renewable. Even if there was a “seeming intention to be permanent” such
cannot prevail over the clear and express terms of the lease contract. If it was really intended
to be more than momentary, then why would the contract of lease be from year to year basis?
3) YES. There was entry under the warrant or color of legal authority since it was the republic
who entered the property as a lessee.
4) YES. Property was devoted to public use because it was used by the AFP-Air Force
5) NO. The entry of the republic into the property does NOT oust Castellvi or deprive him of
the use of the property. Castellvi remained the owner and was continuously recognized as the
owner, as shown by the yearly lease contract. Republic has also been paying its monthly
rentals until the time when it filed for eminent domain.
133
It is thus clear that the taking of the Castellvi property for purposes of eminent domain cannot
be considered to have taken place in 1947, when the Republic merely commenced to occupy
the property as lessee. Thus the JC should be determined as of the date of filing of petition
for ED, not as of 1947 when the Republic first occupied it as lessee.
ISSUE: The Republic claims that there was a right to buy the property at the value it had at
the time of first occupation as lessee in 1947.
SC: NO. What was expressly agreed in the lease agreement is that should the lessor require
the lessee to return the premises, then the lessee would have the right and privilege of paying
the lessor what it would fairly cost to put the premises in the same condition as it was at the
commencement of the lease. The "fair value" at the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease
agreement, does not refer to the value of the property if bought by the lessee, but refers to
the cost of restoring the property in the same condition as of the time when the lessee took
possession of the property.
Just compensation" is to be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint. This Court
has ruled that when the taking of the property sought to be expropriated coincides with the
commencement of the expropriation proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the filing of
the complaint for eminent domain, the just compensation should be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint. In the instant case, it is undisputed that the Republic was placed
in possession of the Castellvi property, by authority of the court, on August 10, 1959. The
"taking" of the Castellvi property for the purposes of determining the just compensation to be
paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of June 26, 1959 when the complaint for eminent
domain was filed.
134
83. HEIRS OF ARDONA VS. REYES
eminent domain
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The Phil Tourism Authority filed 4 complaints for the expropriation of land in Cebu City for
the development of a resort complex for tourism
The PTA has already deposit 10% of the amount and so it wanted immediate possession of
the land.
The main contention was that the expropriation is constitutionally infirm because nowhere
in the constitution can a provision be found which allows the taking of private property for
the promotion of tourism. They argue that it would disregard the land reform nature of the
property being expropriated.
They invoke a strict construction that "public use" means literally use by the public and
that "public use" is not synonymous with "public interest", "public benefit", or "public
welfare" and much less "public convenience."
They contend that the promotion of tourism is not "public use" because private
concessioners would be allowed to maintain various facilities such as restaurants, hotels,
stores, etc. inside the tourist complex.
Finally, they also rely on the Land Reform Program that the properties subject of
expropriation may not be taken since they are within the coverage of "operation land
transfer" under the land reform program and that the agrarian reform program occupies a
higher level in the order of priorities than other State policies like those relating to the
health and physical well-being of the people
ISSUE: Is expropriation for tourism public use?
SC: YES. Expropriation valid.
The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the Constitution. Understandably the search
would be in vain. The policy objectives of the framers can be expressed only in general terms
such as social justice, local autonomy, conservation and development of the national
patrimony, public interest, and general welfare, among others. The particular mention in the
Constitution of agrarian reform and the transfer of utilities and other private enterprises to
public ownership merely underscores the magnitude of the problems sought to be remedied by
these programs. They do not preclude nor limit the exercise of the power of eminent domain
for such purposes like tourism and other development programs.
The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation. First, their contention
which is rather sweeping in its call for a retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly
restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than the lawmaker has made a policy determination
that the power of eminent domain may be exercised in the promotion and development of
Philippine tourism.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such traditional purposes as the construction of
roads, bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and telecommunications systems,
hydroelectric power plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks, hospitals, government office
buildings, and flood control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the concept of public use is
not limited to traditional purposes. Here as elsewhere the idea that "public use" is strictly
limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been discarded.
Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside restaurants, and other private businesses using
public streets and highways do not diminish in the least bit the public character of
expropriations for roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in underpasses of streets built
on expropriated land does not make the taking for a private purpose. Airports and piers
catering exclusively to private airlines and shipping companies are still for public use. The
expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public purpose
even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other private concerns.
The petitioners also have failed to show that the area being developed is indeed a land reform
area and that the affected persons have emancipation patents and certificates of land transfer.
135
84. MANOTOK VS. NHA
eminent domain
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The president instituted a nationwide slum improvement and resettlement program. One
such program under the Zonal Improvement Program was the Tambunting Estate in
Manila.
However, a fire razed almost the entire estate. Following this calamity, the President made
an announcement that the national government would acquire the property for the benefit
of the fire victims.
The President issued PD 1669 declaring the Tambunting Estate expropriated, directing the
NHA to administer the land
Manotok, one of the owners of the Tambunting Estate questioned the PD. Although there
was already a deposit of P5M, she did not yet withdraw the amount nor surrender her
titles over the property.
She contends that the Presidential Decrees providing for the direct expropriation of the
properties in question violate their constitutional right to due process and equal protection
of the law because by the mere passage of the said decrees their properties were
automatically expropriated and they were immediately deprived of the ownership and
possession thereof without being given the chance to oppose such expropriation or to
contest the just compensation to which they are entitled.
They argue that the government must first have filed a complaint with the proper court
under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court in order to fulfill the requirements of due
process. They contend that the determination of just compensation should not have been
vested solely with the City Assessor and that a maximum or fixed amount of compensation
should not have been imposed by the said decrees. Petitioners likewise state that by
providing for the maximum amount of just compensation and by directing the City
Assessor to take into consideration the alleged existing conditions of the properties in
question, namely: that no "improvement has been undertaken on the land and that the
land is squatted upon by resident families which should considerably depress the
expropriation costs," the City Assessor is forced to accept, as actual and existing
conditions of the property, the foregoing statements in the decrees when in fact the
Sunog-Apog area has been subdivided into subdivision lots and leased to the occupants
thereof under contracts of lease, making them lessees and not squatters as assumed by
Presidential Decree No. 1670.
The government on the other hand argued, that the power of eminent domain is inherent
in the State and when the legislature itself or the President through his lawmaking
prerogatives exercises this power, the public use and public necessity of the expropriation,
and the fixing of the just compensation become political in nature, and the courts must
respect the decision of the law-making body, unless the legislative decision is clearly and
evidently arbitrary, unreasonable, and devoid of logic and reason; and that all that is
required is that just compensation be determined with due process of law which does not
necessarily entail judicial process. (the government argues that it was a political question)
The government also argued that the PD supersedes the Rules of Court insofar as the
procedure for expropriation is concerned.
SC: PD UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
The Tambunting subdivision is summarily proclaimed a blighted area and directly expropriated
by decree without the slightest semblance of a hearing or any proceeding whatsoever. The
expropriation is instant and automatic to take effect immediately upon the signing of the
decree. No deposit before taking is required under the decree. The P3,400,000.00
appropriated from the general fund is not a deposit but constitutes an installment payment for
the property, the maximum price of which is fixed so as not to exceed P17,000,000.00. There
is no provision for any interests to be paid on the unpaid installments spread out over a period
of five years. Not only are the owners given absolutely no opportunity to contest the
expropriation, plead their side, or question the amount of payments fixed by decree, but the
decisions, rulings, orders, or resolutions of the NHA are expressly declared as beyond the
reach of judicial review. An appeal may be made to the Office of the President but the courts
are completely enjoined from any inquiry or participation whatsoever in the expropriation of
the subdivision or its incidents.
136
Constitutionally suspect methods or authoritarian procedures cannot be the basis for social
justice. A program to alleviate problems of the urban poor which is well studied, adequately
funded, genuinely sincere, and more solidly grounded on basic rights and democratic
procedures is needed.
The due process clause cannot be rendered nugatory everytime a specific decree or law orders
the expropriation of somebody's property and provides its own peculiar manner of taking the
same. Neither should the courts adopt a hands-off policy just because the public use has been
ordained as existing by the decree or the just compensation has been fixed and determined
beforehand by a statute.
Although due process does not always necessarily demand that a proceeding be had before a
court of law, it still mandates some form of proceeding wherein notice and reasonable
opportunity to be heard are given to the owner to protect his property rights. We agree with
the public respondents that there are exceptional situations when, in the exercise of the power
of eminent domain, the requirement of due process may not necessarily entail judicial process.
But where it is alleged that in the taking of a person's property, his right to due process of law
has been violated, the courts will have to step in and probe into such an alleged violation.
There is no showing whatsoever as to why the properties involved were singled out for
expropriation through decrees or what necessity impelled the particular choices or selections.
The Tambunting estate or at least the western half of the subdivision fronting Rizal Avenue
Extension is valuable commercial property. It is located at the junction where three main city
streets Converge-Rizal Avenue from downtown Manila, Jose Abad Santos Street from Binondo,
and Aurora Boulevard leading to Retiro Street and other points in Quezon City. The Libiran
Furniture Company, alone, which fronts the entrance to Jose Abad Santos Street is clearly a
multi-million peso enterprise. It is a foregone conclusion that the favored squatters allowed to
buy these choice lots would lose no time, once it is possible to do so, to either lease out or sell
their lots to wealthy merchants even as they seek other places where they can set up new
squatter colonies. The public use and social justice ends stated in the whereas clauses of P.D.
1669 and P.D. 1670 would not be served thereby.
The principle of non-appropriation of private property for private purposes, however, remains.
There is no showing how the President arrived at the conclusion that the Sunog-Apog area is a
blighted community. The many pictures submitted as exhibits by the petitioners show a welldeveloped area subdivided into residential lots with either middle-income or upper class
homes. There are no squatters. The provisions of the decree on the relocation of qualified
squatter families and on the re-blocking and re-alignment of existing structures to allow the
introduction of basic facilities and services have no basis in fact. The area is well-developed.
The decrees, do not by themselves, provide for any form of hearing or procedure by which the
petitioners can question the propriety of the expropriation of their properties or the
reasonableness of the just compensation. Having failed to provide for a hearing, the
Government should have filed an expropriation case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court but it did not do so.
Another infirmity from which the questioned decrees suffer is the determination of just
compensation. The maximum amount of compensation was imposed by the decrees and these
amounts were only a little more than the assessed value of the properties in 1978 when,
according to the government, it decided to acquire said properties. The 1978 values would
deprive the petitioner of the opportunity to prove a higher value because, the actual or
symbolic taking of such properties occurred only in 1980 when the questioned decrees were
promulgated. The rule is the determination of just compensation is reckoned either at the time
of the actual taking of the government or at the time of the judgment by the court, whichever
came first.
In estimating the market value, all the capabilities of the property and all the uses to which it
may be applied or for which it is adapted are to be considered and not merely the condition it
137
is in at the time and the use to which it is then applied by the owner. All the facts as to the
condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities may be
shown and considered in estimating its value.
The market value stated by the city assessor alone cannot substitute for the court's judgment
in expropriation proceedings. It is violative of the due process and the eminent domain
provisions of the Constitution to deny to a property owner the opportunity to prove that the
valuation made by a local assessor is wrong or prejudiced. The statements made in tax
documents by the assessor may serve as one of the factors to be considered but they cannot
exclude or prevail over a court determination made after expert commissioners have
examined the property and all partinent circumstances are taken into account and after the
parties have had the opportunity to fully plead their cases before a competent and unbiased
tribunal. To enjoin this Court by decree from looking into alleged violations of the due process,
equal protection, and eminent domain clauses of the Constitution is impermissible
encroachment on its independence and prerogatives.
138
85. FAMILARA VS. JM TUASON
eminent domain
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The Barrio captain of Barrio Tatalon, in behalf on 1,500 other occupants of the Tatalon
Estate, sought to enjoin the JM Tuason Corporation from bulldozing and fencing any
portion of the Estate.
They claim that the Land Tenure Administration was already directed to commence the
expropriation proceedings of the Estate.
They rely on RA 2616, which provided that after expropriation proceedings have been
initiated, no ejectment proceedings can be made.
The corporation however argued that there is no expropriation proceeding actually
instituted before the courts yet.
SC: CORPORATION IS CORRECT.
In the absence of any proceeding for expropriation instituted before the courts, petitioner has
clearly no cause of action. it is true that Republic Act No. 2616, insofar as it expropriated
singularly a particular private property, had survived the challenge of being discriminatory,
and was declared free from constitutional infirmity. Nevertheless, this Court has also ruled
that the provision which places a restraint upon the exercise and enjoyment by the owner of
certain rights over its property, is justifiable only if the government takes possession of the
land and is in a position to make a coetaneous payment of just compensation to its owner.
To hold that the mere declaration of an intention to expropriate, without instituting the
corresponding proceeding therefor before the courts, with assurance of just compensation,
would already preclude the exercise by the owner of his rights of ownership over the land, or
bar the enforcement of any final ejectment order that the owner may have obtained against
any intruder into the land, is to sanction an act which is indeed confiscatory arid therefore
offensive to the Constitution. For it must be realized that in a condemnation case, it is from
the condemnor's taking possession of the property that the owner is deprived of the benefits
of ownership such as possession, management and disposition thereof. Before that time, the
proprietary right of the owner over his property must be recognized.
The mere filing of the condemnation proceedings for the benefit of tenants can not by itself
alone, lawfully suspend the condemnee's dominical rights, whether of possession, enjoyment
or disposition. And this is especially the case where final and executory judgments of
ejectment have been obtained against the occupants of the property."
Here, there was no proof that expropriation proceedings have actually be instituted and being
pursued by the government. There is also no proof that the supposed amount of P10M has
been available for the alleged expropriation. Thus, the corporation retains its rights over their
property.
139
86. MERALCO VS. PROVINCE OF LAGUNA
non-impairment of contracts
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The different municipalities in Laguna granted a franchise in favor of Meralco.
Subsequently, the Local Government Code was enacted giving the LGU’s the
power to create their own sources of revenue.
Thus, the Laguna Province enacted an ordinance 01-92 taxing businesses that
are under a franchise, of ½ of 1%.
Then the provincial treasurer sent demand letters to Meralco for tax payment.
Meralco paid under protest and claimed for a refund.
Meralco argues that the franchise tax already paid to the National Government
already includes that imposed by the Provincial Tax Ordinance. Meralco also
contended that the tax under the Provincial Ordinance violates PD 551 (which
already puts the tax at 2%).
The claim for refund was denied, citing that this PD 551 was repealed by the new
Local Government Code.
ISSUE: Whether the imposition of the tax under the Provincial Ordinance violates the
non-impairment clause of the Constitution and of PD551? Does the LGC repeal
PD551?
Are franchises contracts?
SC:
The LGC explicitly authorizes the provincial governments, notwithstanding any
exemption granted by an other law, to impose a tax on businesses under a franchise.
Thus, the legislative intent was to carry out the constitutional mandate of vesting
braod tax powers to LGUs. As such the LGC has effectively withdraw tax exemptions
or incentives previously enjoyed by certain entities.
The phrase “in lieu of all taxes” in the original franchise, has to give way to the
peremptory language of the LGC specifically withdrawing such exemptions and
privileges. Thus, upon the effectivity of the LGC, all exemptions can no longer be
invoked by Meralco.
While the Court may have frequently referred to tax exemptions contained in special
franchises as being in the nature of contracts, (because they are part of the
inducements for carrying on the franchise), THESE EXEMPTIONS ARE FAR FROM
BEING CONTRACTUAL IN NATURE. Contractual tax exemptions, (to be considered
within the coverage of the non-impairment clause) are those agreed to by the taxing
authority in contracts, such as those in government bonds and debentures, lawfully
entered into by them under enabling laws which the government acting in its private
capacity, sheds its cloak of authority and waives governmental immunity. It is only
these kinds of tax exemptions that the exemptions cannot be revoked because it
would violate the non-impairment clause. THIS IS DIFFERENT FROM TAX
EXEMPTIONS UNDER A FRANCHISE.
A franchise partakes the nature of a grant which is beyond the purview of the nonimpairment clause. No franchise for the operation of a public utility shall be granted
except under the condition that such privilege shall be subject to amendment,
alteration, repeal by Congress and when the common good requires.
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87. TOLENTINO VS. SEC OF FINANCE
non-impairment clause
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This is again the EVAT case.
The Creba or Chamber of Real Estate and Builders Association assails the validity of the
EVAT. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts.
They claim that the application of the tax to existing contracts (those entered into before
the effectivity of the EVAT) of the sale of real property by installment or on deferred
payment basis would result in substantial increases in the monthly amortizations to be
paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it is pointed out, is something that
the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.
SC: LAW VALID. NO IMPAIRMENT OF CONTRACTS.
A lawful tax on a new subject, or an increased tax on an old one, interferes with a contract or
impairs its obligation, within the meaning of the Constitution. Even though such taxation may
affect particular contracts, as it may increase the debt of one person and lessen the security of
another, or may impose additional burdens upon one class and release the burdens of
another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the Constitution, nor can it be said that
it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal sense.
Indeed not only existing laws but also "the reservation of the essential attributes of
sovereignty, is read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order." Contracts must be
understood as having been made in reference to the possible exercise of the rightful authority
of the government and no obligation of contract can extend to the defeat of that authority.
141
88. HOME BUILDING VS. BLAISDELL
non-impairment clause
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There was a Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law providing that during times
emergencies, relief may be had through judicial proceedings with respect to foreclosure
mortgages and execution sales, such that these may be postponed and the periods
redemption may be extended. The Law remains in effect only during the times
emergency and in no case beyond May 1, 1935.
of
of
of
of
There was a severe financial and economic depression has existed for several years, resulting in
extremely low prices for the products of farms and factories, in much unemployment, in almost
complete lack of credit for farmers, business men and property owners, and in extreme stagnation of
business, agriculture and industry; that many owners of real property, by reason of these conditions,
are unable and, it is believed, for some time will be unable, to meet all payments as they come due, of
taxes, interest and principal of mortgages, and are, therefore, threatened with the loss of their property
through foreclosure sale; that much property has been bid in on foreclosure for prices much below
what it is believed was its real value, and often for much less than the mortgage indebtedness, resulting
in deficiency judgments; that, under the existing conditions, foreclosure of many real estate mortgages
by advertisement would prevent fair, open and competitive bidding in the manner contemplated by
law.
(there was also a man and a woman whose house was foreclosed by the Home and Building Loan
Association as mortgagor)
The appellant assails the validity of said law as being repugnant to the non-impairment
clause.
The lower court of Minnesota upheld the validity of the law, conceding that although the
obligations of the mortgage contract were impaired, the impairment was still within the
police powers of the state, because it was called into exercise in times of public economic
emergency.
They appealed.
SC: LAW VALID.
In determining whether the relief provided exceeds the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution, we must consider the relation of the emergency to the constitutional power.
Emergency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted power or remove or
diminish the restrictions imposed upon the power granted or reserved.
The purpose of the non-impairment clause is that the power of changing the relative situation
of the debtor and creditor, of interfering with contracts, touches the interest of all, and
controls the conduct of every individual in those things, had been so much abused by state
legislatures, as to break into the ordinary intercourse of society and destroy the confidence
between man and man. This mischief has become so great and alarming as to impair
commercial intercourse, threaten the existence of credit, as well as sap the moral out of
people and destroy the sanctity of private faith. Thus, the non-impairment clause was
constituted to guard against this evil.
The obligation of a contract is the law which binds the parties to perform their agreement. This
Court has said that 'the laws which subsist at the time and place of the making of a contract,
and where it is to be performed, enter into and form a part of it, as if they were expressly
referred to or incorporated in its terms. This principle embraces alike those which affect its
validity, construction, discharge, and enforcement. Nothing can be more material to the
obligation than the means of enforcement.
The distinction between the obligation of a contract, and the remedy given by the legislature
to enforce that obligation, has been taken at the bar, and exists in the nature of things.
Without impairing the obligation of the contract, the remedy may certainly be modified as the
wisdom of the nation shall direct. 'it is competent for the States to change the form of the
remedy, or to modify it otherwise, as they may see fit, provided no substantial right secured
by the contract is thereby impaired.
142
The obligations of a contract are impaired by a law which renders them invalid, or releases or
extinguishes and impairment, has been predicated of laws which without destroying contracts
derogate from substantial contractual rights.
In view of the conditions with which the Minnesota statute seeks to safeguard the interests of
the mortgagee-purchaser during the extended period, not only is the constitutional provision
qualified by the measure of control which the state retains over remedial processes, but the
state also continues to possess authority to safeguard the vital interests of its people.
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between the
parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order. The government retains authority to secure the
peace and good order of society.But into all contracts, there are conditions which arise, not
out of the literal terms of the contract itself. They are superinduced by the pre- existing and
higher authority of the laws of nature, of nations, or of the community to which the parties
belong. They are always presumed, and must be presumed, to be known and recognized by
all, are binding upon all, and need never, therefore, be carried into express stipulation, for this
could add nothing to their force. Every contract is made in subordination to them, and must
yield to their control, as conditions inherent and paramount, wherever a necessity for their
execution shall occur.'
The Legislature cannot 'bargain away the public health or the public morals. Whatever doubt
there may have been that the protective power of the state, its police power, may be
exercised-without violating the true intent of the provision of the Federal Constitution-in
directly preventing the immediate and literal enforcement of contractual obligations by a
temporary and conditional restraint, where vital public interests would otherwise suffer.
AFTER ESTABLISHING THESE CRITERIA, THE COURT RULED THAT:
1. An emergency existed in Minnesota which furnished a proper occasion for the exercise of
the reserved power of the state to protect the vital interests of the community. The
declarations of the existence of this emergency by the Legislature and by the Supreme Court
of Minnesota cannot be regarded as a subterfuge or as lacking in adequate basis. the
economic emergency which threatened 'the loss of homes and lands which furnish those in
possession the necessary shelter and means of subsistence' was a 'potent cause' for the
enactment of the statute.
2. The legislation was addressed to a legitimate end; that is, the legislation was not for the
mere advantage of particular individuals but for the protection of a basic interest of society.
3. In view of the nature of the contracts in question-mortgages of unquestionable validity-the
relief afforded and justified by the emergency, in order not to contravene the constitutional
provision, could only be of a character appropriate to that emergency, and could be granted
only upon reasonable conditions.
4. The conditions upon which the period of redemption is extended do not appear to be
unreasonable. The initial extension of the time of redemption for thirty days from the approval
of the act was obviously to give a reasonable opportunity for the authorized application to the
court. As already noted, the integrity of the mortgage indebtedness is not impaired; interest
continues to run; the validity of the sale and the right of a mortgagee-purchaser to title or to
obtain a deficiency judgment, if the mortgagor fails to redeem within the extended period, are
maintained; and the conditions of redemption, if redemption there be, stand as they were
under the prior law. The mortgagor during the extended period is not ousted from possession,
but he must pay the rental value of the premises as ascertained in judicial proceedings and
this amount is applied to the carrying of the property and to interest upon the indebtedness.
The mortgagee-purchaser during the time that he cannot obtain possession thus is not left
without compensation for the withholding of possession.
5. The legislation is temporary in operation.
CHAMP Page 143
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143
89. RUTTER VS. ESTEBAN
non-impairment clause
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Rutter was the seller. Esteban was the buyer of the 2 parcels of land. There was still an
unpaid balance of P4800.
To secure payment of the balance, a mortgage was constituted over the land.
Estaben defaulted. Rutter filed an action to recover the balance.
Esteban invokes RA342, the Moratorium Law. He claims that this obligation was contracted
before the War, and that he is a war sufferer, such that his obligation cannot be enforced
until after the lapse of 8 years from the settlement of his claim by the Philippine War
Damage Commission.
Rutter assails the validity of the Moratorium Law, for being violative of the non-impairment
clause.
SC:
The moratorium is a postponement of fulfilment of obligations decreed by the state through
the medium of the courts or the legislature. Its essence is the application of the sovereign
power. Such moratorium laws "were passed by many state legislatures at the time of the civil
war suspending the rights of creditors for a definite and reasonable time, whether they
suspend the right of action or make dilatory the remedy.
The true test, therefore, of the constitutionality of a moratorium statute lies in the
determination of the period of suspension of the remedy. It is required that such suspension
be definite and reasonable, otherwise it would be violative of the constitution.
One of the arguments advanced against the validity of the moratorium law is the fact that it
impairs the obligation of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. This argument,
howevor, does not now hold water. While this may be conceded, it is however justified as a
valid exercise by the State of its police power.
(the previous case of Home Builders vs. Blaisdell was quoted…see doctrines) This decision
elicited several comments.
Laws altering existing contracts constitute an impairment within the meaning of the contract
clause only if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their
enactment. Application of this 'rule of reason' was justified on the theory that all contracts are
made subject to an implied reservation of the protective power of the state, and that therefore
statutes which validly exercise this reserved power, rather than impairing the obligations of an
existing contract, are comprehended within them.
There are however limitations. It must be noted that the application of the reserved power of
the State to protect the integrity of the government and the security of the people should be
limited to its proper bounds and must be addressed to a legitimate purpose.
One of them is that the impairment should only refer to the remedy and not to a substantive
right. The State may postpone the enforcement of the obligation but cannot destroy it by
making the remedy futile. Another limitation refers to the propriety of the remedy. The rule
requires that the alteration or change that the new legislation desires to write into an existing
contract must not be burdened with restrictions and conditions that would make the remedy
hardly pursuing.
The Blaisdell case postulates that the protective power of the State, the police power, may
only be invoked and justified by an emergency, temporary in nature, and can only be
exercised upon reasonable conditions in order that it may not infringe the constitutional
provision against impairment of contracts. It is predicated on the ground that the laws altering
existing contracts will constitute an impairment of the contract clause of the Constitution only
if they are unreasonable in the light of the circumstances occasioning their enactment.
144
ISSUE: Is the period of eight (8) years under RA 342 reasonable under the present
circumstances?
SC: UNREASONABLE. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to
rehabilitate themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar
debts so as to prevent them from being victimized by their creditors.
BUT, we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945
as a result of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their
enforcement is still inhibited because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would
continue to be unenforceable during the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford
them an opportunity to rehabilitate themselves, which in plain language means that the
creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least twelve (12) years before they could effect a
liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941. This period seems to us
unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible, and should be
commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at the
mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if
the credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is
not even required to pay interest during the operation of the relief.
Such an exemption, applied in the case of debts owing before the exemption
the legislature, constitutes an unwarranted interference with the obligation
violation of the constitutional provision", and cannot be sustained even
legislation, because it contains no limitation as to time, amount, circumstances
was created by
of contracts in
as emergency
or need.
RA 342 NULL AND VOID. (Note this case was decided in 1953).
The court also noted that the economic and financial conditions of the country has improved
and returned to normal.
CHAMP Page 145
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145
90. DEL ROSARIO VS. DE LOS SANTOS
non-impairment clause
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Del Rosario was land owner. De Los Santos was a tenant.
Santos filed a petition before the Court of Agrarian Relations, manifesting their desire to
take advantage of the Agricultural Tenancy Act, which gives them the power to change the
tenancy contract from one of share tenancy to leasehold tenancy.
Del Rosario assailed the statute but the CAR ruled in favor of De Los Santos. The CAR
declared the relationship to be of leasehold tenancy.
Del Rosario appealed, claiming that it impaired the obligation of contracts.
SC: LAW VALID.
Tenancy legislation is a manifestation of a deep and earnest concern to solve an age-old
problem of Philippine society. The framers of the Constitution mindful of the growing feeling of
dissatisfaction with the government's ability to cope with poverty and misery of the vast
majority of the people inserted the provisions of the protection to labor and social justice in
the Constitution, thus, leaving no doubt about the validity of remedial legislation intended to
minimize if not abolish the oppressive condition usually associated with agricultural labor.
The attribute of police power, reinforced by the constitutional provisions giving protection to
labor and on social justice justifies the enactment of statutory provisions. The provisions of the
Agricultural Tenancy Act, particularly of Sec. 14 thereof is not an unconstitutional impairment
of the obligation of an existing contract. Obligations of contracts must yield to a proper
exercise of the police power when such power is exercised to preserve the security of the state
and the means adopted are reasonably adapted to the accomplishment of that end and are
not arbitrary or oppressive. Neither is the law a transgression on the freedom of contract
embraced in the liberty safeguarded by the due process clause.
That public interest would be served by governmental measures intended to aid the
economically underpriviledged is apparent to all. Nor is the means relied upon to attain such a
valid objective unreasonable or oppressive, Considering that in the adjustment or
reconciliation of the conflicting claims to property and state authority, it suffices that there be
a rational basis for the legislative act, it is easily understandable why, from the enactment of
the Constitution with its avowed concern for those who have less in life, the constitutionality of
such legislation has been repeatedly upheld.
With its unqualified approval of the power of Congress to abolish share tenancy, as reflected in
the latest legislation on the subject, as against the contention that with the limitation on the
freedom of contract there is a deprivation of property without due process of law, evinces
unmistakably the firmness with which it adheres to the view that the police power is of
sufficient amplitude and scope to- free from the taint of constitutional infirmity legislation
intended to ameliorate the sad plight of Filipino tenants and agricultural workers.
146
91. NDC VS. PVB
non-impairment clause
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Agrix Marketing had executed a REM in favor of PVB, over 3 parcels of land. Agrix however
became bankrupt and unable to pay.
President Marcos issued PD 1717 ordering the rehabilitation of Agrix Group of Companies,
to be administered by the NDC. It provided for the procedure for filing claims against the
Agrix companies, and created a Claims Committee.
The law provides further that all mortgages and other liens presently attaching to the
assets of the dissolved corporations are extinguished.
PVB thus filed a claim with Agrix.
The New Agrix (under the NDC) however invoked the PD 1717. They argue that this is an
exercise of police power for the promotion of the common welfare.
PVB however claims that it was an impairment of the obligations of contracts and a denial
of due process.
SC: LAW NULL AND VOID. IMPAIRS OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS
The court is especially disturbed by Sec 4 of PD1717 which extinguishes all mortgages upon
the assets of Agrix. The was also a provision that unsecured obligations shall bear no interest.
It fails the lawful subject and lawful means test of the exercise of police powers. The interests
of the public are not sufficiently involved to warrant the interference of the government with
the private contracts of Agrix. The decree speaks vaguely of the public, particularly small
investors. However there is no record of how many such investors are, and who they are, and
why they are being preferred over PVB and other creditors of Agrix.
It is also unduly oppressive. The right to property in all mortgages, liens and interests owing
to the creditors of Agrix like PVB, has been arbitrarily destroyed. No consideration is paid for
the extinction of the mortgage rights. The accrued interests and other charges are simply
rejected. The right to property is dissolved by legislative fiat without regard to the private
interests violated, and worse, in favor of another private interest.
A mortgage lien is a property right derived from contract. Thus, it comes under the protection
of the Bill of Rights. So are interests, penalties and charges which become vested rights once
they accrue.
There is also AN IMPARIMENT OF OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS between Agrix and PVB. While
it is true that the police power is superior to the non-impairment clause, the principle will
apply only where the contract is so related to the public welfare that it will be considered
congenitally susceptible to change by the legislature in the interest of the greater number. But
the contracts of loan and mortgage executed between Agrix and PVB are PURELY PRIVATE
TRANSACTIONS, and are not affected with public interest. There is no warrant to amend their
provisions and deprive PVB of its vested property rights.
CHAMP Page 147
2/15/2016
Summary:
1) invalid exercise of police power – fails the lawful subject, lawful means test
2) taking without due process – extinguishes the mortgage and liens arbitrarily.
3) violates equal protection – puts secured and unsecured creditors to the same level
4) violates non-impairment – interferes with purely private agreement, no connection to public
interests
147
92. PHILCONSA VS. ENRIQUEZ
non-impairment clause
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House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed
and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget
previously submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose
and identify projects in the "pork barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective
operating budgets.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed
the special provision on “Use of Fund," which requires the prior approval of the Congress
for the release of the corresponding modernization funds.
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate
the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed,
"shall effectively alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all
military equipment deemed necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines"
The president vetoed it since they were already contracted for.
ISSUE: Was the Presidential Veto valid?
SC: YES. VALID VETO.
Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for payment of the
trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of
contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
A provision cannot prohibit payment, because to do so would impair the perfect contracts.
148
93. FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK VS. CA
non-impairment clause
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The Bank had 6 parcels of land.
Janolo wanted to purchase the property and thus made a formal purchase offer at P3.5M.
The Bank made a counter-offer at P5.5M
Janolo made another offer of P4.25M.
There was no more counter-offer but a meeting took place among the Bank officials.
Janolo allegedly accepted the counter-offer of P5.5M
However the conservator of the bank informed Janolo that the proposal to buy the
property is under study yet as of this time because there has been a newly created
committed for the Conservator of the bank.
Janolo however demanded that there was already a perfected contract of sale.
The bank still refused. The bank did not accept the payment. Worse, the bank advertised
the lot to other persons.
Janolo made a second tender of payment this time through the Acting Conservator.
Since the bank still refused, Janolo filed a suit for specific performance, on the ground that
there has already been a perfected contract of sale.
The Bank claimed that Rivera, the Property Department Manager, had no authority to sell.
They claim that it should be the Conservator.
It will be noted that the Bank was placed under Conservatorship under the Central Bank
during the time that there was negotiation and perfection of the contract of sale.
The Bank contends that the conservator has the power to revoke or overrule the actions
of the management of the bank under RA 265 or Central Bank Act.
ISSUE: Was the contract perfected? YES.
SC: Rivera had apparent or implied authority to act for the Bank in the matter of selling its
assets. Rivera was the one in charge of the assets, and it was Rivera who met with the buyers
and made counter-offers. He was also the one who signed the letters to the buyers.
The Bank’s repudiation of Rivera’s authority, through the Conservator, came only 7 months
after there was acceptance by Janolo. Such delay, clearly characterizes the repudiation as
nothing more than a last-minute attempt by the Bank to et out of its binding contractual
obligation.
ISSUE: May the Conservator Revoke the Perfected and Enforceable Contract?
Under the Central Bank Act, when a bank is in a state of inability to maintain a state of
liquidity, the Monetary Board may appoint a conservator to take charge of its assets. The
Conservator has the power to overrule and revoke the actions of the management.
SC: There is absolutely no evidence that the Conservator, at the time the contract was
perfected, actually repudiated or overruled the contract of sale. The Bank’s acting Conservator
at that time, Mr. Romey, never objected to the sale of the property to Janolo. It was the
subsequent Conservator, Mr. Encarnacion, who took over AFTER the sale was perfected, who
unilaterally repudiated, NOT THE CONTRACT, but the authority of Rivera to make a binding
offer.
Also, it must be pointed that the powers of the conservator must be related to the
preservation of the bank’s assets and restoration of its viability. Such powers however cannot
extend to POST FACTO REPUDIATION of perfected transactions, otherwise they would infringe
on the non-impairment clause. If the legislature itself cannot revoke an existing valid contract,
how can it delegate such non-existent powers to the conservator under the Central Bank Act?
Thus the Central Bank Act merely gives the conservator power to revoke contracts
that are, deemed to defective – void, voidable, unenforceable, rescissible . Hence the
conservator merely takes place of a bank’s board of directors. Whatever the board cannot do –
such as repudiating a contract validly entered into under the doctrine of implied authority –
neither can the conservator do. His power is not unilateral and he cannot simply repudiate
valid obligations of the Bank.
To rule otherwise would be to enable a failing bank to become solvent, at the expense
of third parties, simply by getting the conservator to unilaterally revoke all previous dealings
which had become unfavorable to the Bank, yielding nothing to perfected contractual rights,
nor vested interests of third parties who have dealt with the Bank.
149
94. GANZON VS. INSERTO
non-impairment clause
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Ganzon wanted to foreclose the REM executed by Tajanglangit for its obligation under a
P/N of P40,000.
The REM covered a residential lot.
A day before the scheduled auction, Tajanglangit filed for injunction, and sought to declare
the extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings as null and void.
They claim that Ganzon had executed a Deed of Absolute Sale of the land in favor of
Tajanglangit, and that there was a proviso to the effect that Ganzon guaranteed to have
the occupants of the land to vacate the premises. It was claimed that Ganzon failed to
discharge this obligation, since there as still occupants in the land. Hence, the extrajudicial foreclosure should be nullified since Ganzon committed breach of his warranty.
They also claim that the REM did not contain any stipulation authorizing extrajudicial
foreclosure.
ON the other hand, Ganzon’s defense was that the REM was an entirely different
transaction from the sale of the lot.
Later, the Tajanglangit filed a motion for the release of the REM, in exchange for putting
up a surety bond worth P80,000.
The court allowed this.
ISSUE: may the court order the cancellation of the REM annotated in the TCT to secure the
payment of a PN and allow a substitution of the REM with a surety bond to secure the same?
SC: NO.
The REM cannot be substituted by a surety bond. The REM in favor of Ganzon is inseparable
from the property. It is a right in rem, a lien on the property. To substitute the REM with a
surety bond would convert such lien from a right in rem to a right in personam. This
conversion cannot be ordered for it would abridge the rights of the M’gee under the REM.
The court order violated the non-impairment of contracts clause. Substitution of the REM with
a surety bond to secure the payment of P40,000 would in effect change the terms and
conditions of the REM contract. Even before the trial on the very issues affecting the contact,
the lower court has directed a deviation from its terms, diminished its efficiency, and
dispensed with a primary condition.
It should also be noted that GANZON DENIED THAT the P40,000 under the PN which resulted
in the execution of the REM to secure its payment was CONNECTED with the sale of lot.
Ganzon insisted that the REM is entirely different from the sale, and it arose from another
transaction.
150
95. PHILAMLIFE VS. AUDITOR GENERAL
non-impairment clause
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Philamlife entered into a reinsurance treaty with other insurance companies abroad
AIRCO.
The Central Bank collected Forex margin on Philamlife’s remittances to Airco amounting to
P268,000. This was pursuant to the Margin Law.
Philamlife however claimed refund on the ground that reinsurance premiums remitted wre
already paid when the reinsurance treaty was perfected, and that pre-existing obligations
were expressly exempt from the margin fee.
Philamlife claimed that even the Monetary Board ruled that reinsurance contracts entered
into and approved before 1959 were exempt from the forex margin fees, even if the
remittances were made only after 1959 because such remittances are made only in the
implementation of the mother contract, a continuing contract which is the reinsurance
treaty.
Still the Auditor General denied the refund. It claimed that the even if the reinsurance
treaty came about way back in 1950, the reinsurance premiums remitted after the
approval of the Margin Law in 1959, would still be covered by the Margin Fees.
Philamlife argues that the Margin Law impairs the obligation of contracts. It claims that
under the said law, it would have paid much more to have the continuing benefit of
reinsurance of its risk than it has been required to do so by the reinsurance treaty in
question. And that the theoretical equality between the conrtacting parties would be
disturbed and one of them would be placed at a distinct disadvantage in relation to the
other.
ISSUE: Does the margin law violate the non-impairment clause?
SC: NO. MARGIN LAW VALID.
This pose at once loses potency on the face of the rule long recognized that existing laws form
part of the contract "as the measure of the obligation to perform them by the one party and
the right acquired by the other." Stated otherwise, "the obligation does not inhere, and.
subsist in the contract itself, propio vigore, but in the law applicable to the contract." Indeed,
Article 1315 of the Civil Code gives out the precept that parties to a perfected contract "are
bound ... to all the consequences which, according to their nature, may be in keeping with
law.
Accordingly, when petitioner entered into the reinsurance treaty of January 1, 1950 with Airco,
it did so with the understanding that the municipal laws of the Philippines at the time said
treaty was executed, became an unwritten condition thereof. Such municipal laws constitute
part of the obligation of contract. It is in this context that we say that Republic Act 265, the
Central Bank Act, enacted on June 15, 1948 - previous to the date of the reinsurance treaty became a part of the obligation of contract created by the latter. And under Republic Act 265,
reasonable restrictions may be imposed by the State through the Central Bank on all foreign
exchange transactions "in order to protect the international reserve of the Central Bank during
an exchange crisis." The Margin Law is nothing more than a supplement to the Central Bank
Act; it is a reasonable restriction on transactions in foreign exchange.
The Margin Law, is a remedial currency measure. It was thus passed to reduce as far as is
practicable the excessive demand for foreign exchange. There cannot be an impairment of the
obligation of contracts. For, the State may, through its police power, adopt whatever economic
policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by
legislation adapted to its purpose. The freedom of contract, under our system of government,
is not meant to be absolute. The same is understood to be subject to reasonable legislative
regulation aimed at the promotion of public health, morals, safety and welfare. In other words,
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limited by the
exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, morals and
general welfare."
151
The economic interests of the State may justify the exercise of its continuing and dominant
protective power notwithstanding interference with contracts." It bears repetition to state at
this point that the Margin Law is part of the economic "Stabilization Program" of the country.
Neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the
citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of
contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to
regulate it in the common interest. "Contracts, however express, cannot fetter the
constitutional authority of the Congress. Contracts may create rights of property, but when
contracts deal with a' subject matter which lies within the control of the Congress, they have a
congenital infirmity. Parties cannot remove their transactions from the reach of dominant
constitutional power by making contracts about them."
Not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as between
the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also
read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order.
Refund denied.
CHAMP Page 152
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152
96. PEOPLE VS. TAMPUS
rights of the accused – custodial investigation
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Tampus, who was a member of the OXO Gang, was convicted of murder for avenging the
stabbing of his friend Rosales (also an OXO member), by a member of the rival gang, the
Batang Mindanao Gang.
Tampus is a TB patient and a prisioner at the national penitentiary. He stabbed the victim
as he was emerging from the toilet. He later surrendered to the prison guards with the
knife used.
TWO days later, he made an extrajudicial confession before this prison guard. At
arraignment, he pleaded guilty to the charge of murder.
At the arraignment, the trial court inform them the gravity of the charge and that the
death penalty might be imposed. He reiterated his plea of guilt. The judge required the
prosecution to present evidence. At the witness stand, he still affirmed his confession.
Upon appeal, Tampus’ lawyer contended that he was denied the right to a public trial
because the arraignment and hearing were held at the state penitentiary.
The New Bilbilid Prison was the venue of the arraignment and the hearing (not at the
Makati Court) because one of the co-accused refused, for security reasons, to be brought
to Makati. That is why the Court allowed arraignment and trial of Tampus to be held at
Muntinlupa.
Also upon appeal, Tampus’ lawyer also argues that the extrajudicial confession was taken
in violation of their constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Right to public trial
SC: The record does not show that the public was actually excluded from the place where the
trial was held or that the accused was prejudiced by the holding of the trial at the national
penitentiary. The fact that for the convenience of the witnesses a case is tried in Bilibid
without any objection on the part of the accused is not a ground for the reversal of a
conviction.
The accused may waive his right to have a public trial as shown in the rule that the trial court
may motu-proprio exclude the public from the courtroom when the evidence to be offered is
offensive to decency or public morals.
ISSUE: Extrajudicial confession. The lawyer argued that before the confession was taken,
Tampus had been interrogated 2 days before, that is on the day of the killing, and that during
such custodial investigation, Tampus was not informed of his right to counsel and to remain
silent.
SC: As to the extrajudicial confession, there is no doubt that the confession was voluntarily
made. The truth is that even before the custodial investigation on the day of the killing,
Tampus had already admitted it, when after coming out of the toilet, they surrendered to the
first jail guard whom they encountered. That was a spontaneous statement, elicited without
any interrogation, and part of the res gestae, at the same time a voluntary confession of guilt.
The accused gave the confession or statement at the spur of the moment, without any urging.
Thus, they waived their right tot remain silent and to have counsel. That admission was
confirmed by their extrajudicial confession, plead of guilty and testimony in open court.
Furthermore, the crime was proven beyond reasonable doubt by the evidence of the
prosecution. The court during the trial is not duty-bound to apprise the accused that he has
the right to remain silent. It is his counsel who should claim that right for him. If he does not
claim it and he calls the accused to the witness stand, then he waives that right.
Teehankee dissents: it should be the trial court’s duty to inform the accused of his right to
remain silent.
153
97. GAMBOA VS. CRUZ
rights of the accused – custodial investigation
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Gamboa was arrested for vagrancy without a warrant. He was brought to the HQ.
During the police lineup of 5 detainees, the complainant Bernal, pointed and identified
Gamboa as the one who was the companion of the real culprit.
While Bernal was being interviewed by the police, Gamboa was also there seated.
Gamboa was later charged with robbery.
He filed a demurrer to evidence, claiming that the police lineup, was done without prior
notice, and in the absence of his counsel, a clear violation of the constitutional rights.
ISSUE: Was the right to counsel violated?
SC: NO.
The right to counsel attaches upon the start of an investigation, i.e. when the investigating
officer starts to ask questions to elicit information and for confessions or admissions from the
respondent/accused. At such point or stage, the person being interrogated must be assisted
by counsel to avoid the pernicious practice of extorting false or coerced admissions or
confessions from the lips of the person undergoing interrogation, for the commission of an
offense.
Any person under investigation must, among other things, be assisted by counsel. The abovecited provisions of the Constitution are clear. They leave no room for equivocation.
Accordingly, in several cases, this Court has consistently held that no custodial investigation
shall be conducted unless it be in the presence of counsel, engaged by the person arrested, or
by any person in his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee
himself, or by anyone in his behalf, and that, while the right may be waived, the waiver shall
not be valid unless made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The police line-up was not part of the custodial inquest, hence, petitioner was not
yet entitled, at such stage, to counsel.
When petitioner was identified by the complainant at the police line-up, he had not been hold
yet to answer for a criminal offense. Thus, it was held that when the process had not yet
shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory as when police investigation does not elicit a
confession the accused may not yet avail of the services of his lawyer. Since petitioner in the
course of his identification in the police line-up had not yet been held to answer for a criminal
offense, he was, therefore, not deprived of his right to be assisted by counsel because the
accusatory process had not yet set in. The police could not have violated petitioner's right to
counsel and due process as the confrontation between the State and him had not begun. In
fact, when he was identified in the police line-up by complainant he did not give any statement
to the police. He was, therefore, not interrogated at all as he was not facing a criminal charge.
Far from what he professes, the police did not, at that stage, exact a confession to be used
against him. For it was not he but the complainant who was being investigated at that time.
He was ordered to sit down in front of the complainant while the latter was being investigated"
Petitioner's right to counsel had not accrued.
The 6th and 14th Am. to counsel attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial
proceedings have been initiated against him. In our 1987 Constitution, this was expanded,
such that the right to counsel attaches at the start of investigation against a respondent and,
therefore, even before adversary judicial proceedings against the accused have begun.
While the Court finds no real need to afford a suspect the services of counsel during a police
line-up, the moment there is a move or even an urge of said investigators to elicit admissions
or confessions or even plain information which may appear innocent or innocuous at the time,
from said suspect, he should then and there be assisted by counsel, unless he waives the
right, but the waiver shall be made in writing and in the presence of counsel.
YAP dissents: the investigatory proceeding has already started when the accused was singled
out and ordered to sit down with the complainant. Thus, custodial investigation has begun.
154
98. ESCOBEDO VS. ILLINOIS
custodial investigation rights
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Escobedo was convicted of murder in Illinois.
Escobedo apparently shot his brother-in-law. He was thereafter arrested without
a warrant. He made no statements at the police HQ, and was released
subsequently.
Benedict, the co-accused was the one in custody of the police. Benedict told the
police that it was really Escobedo who fired the shot. Escobedo was re-arrested.
He was handcuffed and taken to the HQ again. The detectives told him he might
as well admit the crime, because he was in custody and couldn’t walk out the
door.
His lawyer arrived later but was told that he could not see Escobedo unless he
first gets a writ of habeas corpus. Escobedo also requested for his lawyer but was
denied.
Escobedo and his lawyer were afforded no opportunity to consult during the
course of the entire interrogation. It was also established that no one during the
course of the interrogation advised Escobedo of his rights.
Escobedo was eventually convicted.
SC: The interrogation here was conducted before Escobedo was event formally
indicted. When he requested but was denied an opportunity to consult his lawyer,
the investigation had ceased o be a general investigation of an unsolved crime.
Petitioner had become the accused, and the purpose of the interrogation was to get
him to confess his guilty despite his constitutional right not to do so. Without
informing his of his absolute right to remain silent in the face of this accusation, the
police urged him to make a Statement.
The result was to produce upon his mind the fear that if he remained silent it would
considered an admission of guilt, and therefore render certain his being committed
as the guilty person. He was a layman, he was undoubtedly unaware that under
Illinois law, an admission of mere complicity in the murder plot was legally as
damaging as admission of firing the fatal shots. A counsel should have been essential
to advise him of his right in such delicate situation. This was the stage when the
legal aid and advice were most critical to the accused.
The investigation here was no longer a general inquiry into a crime but has begun to
focus on a particular suspect, the suspect being taken into police custody, and the
police carrying out the process of interrogations for the purpose of eliciting
incriminating statements. He has requested and and has been denied an opportunity
to consult with his lawyer, and the police have not effectively warned him of his right
to remain silent. When the process shifts from investigatory to accusatory, when its
focus is on the accused and its purpose is to elicity a confession, the adversary
proceeding begins to operate, and the accused must be allowed to consult with his
lawyer.
As such, no statement elicited by the police during the interrogation may be used
against him in a criminal trial.
155
99. MIRANDA VS. ARIZONA
rights of the accused
On March 13, 1963, $8.00 in cash was stolen from a Phoenix, Arizona bank worker. Police
suspected and arrested Ernesto Miranda for committing the theft.
During two-hours of questioning, Mr. Miranda, who was never offered a lawyer, confessed not
only to the $8.00 theft, but also to kidnapping and raping an 18-year-old woman 11 days
earlier.
Based largely on his confession, Miranda was convicted and sentenced to twenty years in jail.
Miranda's attorneys appealed. First unsuccessfully to the Arizona Supreme Court, and next to
the U.S. Supreme Court.
In each of these cases the defendant while in police custody was questioned by police officers,
detectives, or a prosecuting attorney in a room in which he was cut off from the outside world.
None of the defendants was given a full and effective warning of his rights at the outset of the
interrogation process. In all four cases the questioning elicited oral admissions, and in three of
them signed statements as well, which were admitted at their trials. All defendants were
convicted and all convictions.
The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements
obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of
action in any significant way. They all share salient features - incommunicado interrogation of
individuals in a police-dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating statements
without full warnings of constitutional rights.
(the case is about the origin and rationale behind Sec 12)
SC: The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming
from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination.
By custodial interrogation, we mean questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to
remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and
that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant
may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner and at any stage of the process that he
wishes to consult with an attorney before speaking there can be no questioning. Likewise, if
the individual is alone and indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated,
the police may not question him.
History of Right to Remain Silent and Right to Counsel: the famous Wickersham Report
to Congress by a Presidential Commission, where it was stated that police violence and the
"third degree" flourished at that time. The police resorted to physical brutality - beating,
hanging, whipping - and to sustained and protracted questioning incommunicado in order
to extort confessions.
In-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than physically oriented. Coercion can be
mental as well as physical, and that the blood of the accused is not the only hallmark of an
unconstitutional inquisition." Interrogation still takes place in privacy.
There were manuals given to the police. The officers are told by the manuals that the
"principal psychological factor contributing to a successful interrogation is privacy - being
alone with the person under interrogation. the manuals instruct the police to display an air of
confidence in the suspect's guilt and from outward appearance to maintain only an interest in
confirming certain details. The manuals suggest that the suspect be offered legal excuses for
his actions in order to obtain an initial admission of guilt.
156
When the techniques described above prove unavailing, the texts recommend they be
alternated with a show of some hostility. One ploy often used has been termed the "friendlyunfriendly" or the "Mutt and Jeff" act. Mutt, the relentless investigator, who knows the
subject is guilty and is not going to waste any time. Jeff, on the other hand, is obviously a
kindhearted man. The technique is applied by having both investigators present while Mutt
acts out his role. Jeff may stand by quietly and demur at some of Mutt's tactics. When Jeff
makes his plea for cooperation, Mutt is not present in the room."
Then there is the reverse line up. The accused is placed in a line-up, but this time he is
identified by several fictitious witnesses or victims who associated him with different offenses.
It is expected that the subject will become desperate and confess to the offense under
investigation in order to escape from the false accusations."
There are but samples of interrogation techniques, the setting prescribed by the manuals and
observed in practice becomes clear. In essence, it is this: To be alone with the subject is
essential to prevent distraction and to deprive him of any outside support. The aura of
confidence in his guilt undermines his will to resist. He merely confirms the preconceived story
the police seek to have him describe.
(then the court cites several cases.. blah blah blah..)
In each of the cases, the defendant was thrust into an unfamiliar atmosphere and run through
menacing police interrogation procedures. The potentiality for compulsion is forcefully
apparent, for example, in Miranda, where the indigent Mexican defendant was a seriously
disturbed individual with pronounced sexual fantasies. The fact remains that in none of these
cases did the officers undertake to afford appropriate safeguards at the outset of the
interrogation to insure that the statements were truly the product of free choice.
It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose other than to
subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own badge of
intimidation. The current practice of incommunicado interrogation is at odds with one of our
Nation's most cherished principles - that the individual may not be compelled to
incriminate himself.
History of the Right Against Self-Incrimination: the trial of one John Lilburn, a vocal antiStuart Leveller, who was made to take the Star Chamber Oath in 1637. The oath would have
bound him to answer to all questions posed to him on any subject. If he does not answer, he
will be killed. Later, the Parliament abolished the inquisitorial Court of Star Chamber. In sum,
the privilege is fulfilled only when the person is guaranteed the right "to remain silent unless
he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own will. (Note: The right to remain
silent and the right to counsel assures that the right to self-incrimination is protected – Sec
17. But Section 12 and Section 17 are separate and distinct constitutional rights under the
Philippine Constitution).
ISSUE: The question in these cases is whether the privilege is fully applicable during a period
of custodial interrogation.
SC: There can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal
court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in which their freedom of action
is curtailed in any significant way from being compelled to incriminate themselves.
If a person in custody is to be subjected to interrogation, he must first be informed in clear
and unequivocal terms that he has the right to remain silent. The warning of the right to
remain silent must be accompanied by the explanation that anything said can and will be used
against the individual in court. This warning is needed in order to make him aware not only of
the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of
these consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent
exercise of the privilege.
157
The circumstances surrounding in-custody interrogation can operate very quickly to overbear
the will of one merely made aware of his privilege by his interrogators. Therefore, the right to
have counsel present at the interrogation is indispensable to the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege under the system we delineate today. Our aim is to assure that the
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains unfettered throughout the
interrogation process. A mere warning given by the interrogators is not alone sufficient to
accomplish that end. the need for counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege
comprehends not merely a right to consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have
counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.
If the accused decides to talk to his interrogators, the assistance of counsel can mitigate the
dangers of untrustworthiness. With a lawyer present the likelihood that the police will practice
coercion is reduced, and if coercion is nevertheless exercised the lawyer can testify to it in
court. The presence of a lawyer can also help to guarantee that the accused gives a fully
accurate statement to the police and that the statement is rightly reported by the prosecution
at trial.
The failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver. No effective waiver of the right to
counsel during interrogation can be recognized unless specifically made after the warnings we
here delineate have been given. The defendant who does not ask for counsel is the very
defendant who most needs counsel. Where the assistance of counsel is a constitutional
requisite, the right to be furnished counsel does not depend on a request.
Accordingly we hold that an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he
has the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation
under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today. As with the warnings of the
right to remain silent and that anything stated can be used in evidence against him, this
warning is an absolute prerequisite to interrogation.
If an individual indicates that he wishes the assistance of counsel before any interrogation
occurs, the authorities cannot rationally ignore or deny his request on the basis that the
individual does not have or cannot afford a retained attorney. The financial ability of the
individual has no relationship to the scope of the rights involved here. The privilege against
self-incrimination secured by the Constitution applies to all individuals. The need for counsel in
order to protect the privilege exists for the indigent as well as the affluent.
In order fully to apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this system
then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with an attorney,
but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to represent him. Without this
additional warning, the admonition of the right to consult with counsel would often be
understood as meaning only that he can consult with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds
to obtain one.
Once warnings have been given, the subsequent procedure is clear. If the individual indicates
in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the
interrogation must cease. If the individual cannot obtain an attorney and he indicates that he
wants one before speaking to police, they must respect his decision to remain silent.
If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a statement is taken, a
heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and
intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained or
appointed counsel. An express statement that the individual is willing to make a statement
and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could constitute a waiver. But
a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are
given or simply from the fact that a confession was in fact eventually obtained.
Where in-custody interrogation is involved, there is no room for the contention that the
privilege is waived if the individual answers some questions or gives some information on his
own prior to invoking his right to remain silent when interrogated. Moreover, any evidence
158
that the accused was threatened, tricked, or cajoled into a waiver will, of course, show that
the defendant did not voluntarily waive his privilege.
The principles announced today deal with the protection which must be given to the privilege
against self-incrimination when the individual is first subjected to police interrogation while in
custody at the station or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.
To summarize, we hold that when an individual is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom by the authorities in any significant way and is subjected to questioning, the
privilege against self-incrimination is jeopardized. Procedural safeguards must be employed
to protect the privilege, and unless other fully effective means are adopted to notify the
person of his right of silence and to assure that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously
honored, the following measures are required. He must be warned prior to any questioning
that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a
court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford
an attorney one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires. Opportunity
to exercise these rights must be afforded to him throughout the interrogation. After such
warnings have been given, and such opportunity afforded him, the individual may knowingly
and intelligently waive these rights and agree to answer questions or make a statement. But
unless and until such warnings and waiver are demonstrated by the prosecution at trial, no
evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against him.
Thus, the case is remanded. But the confession cannot be admitted.
CHAMP Page 159
2/15/2016
Trivia: Ernesto Miranda was given a second trial at which his confession was not presented. Based on the evidence,
Miranda was again convicted of kidnapping and rape. He was paroled from prison in 1972 having served 11 years. In
1976, Ernesto Miranda, age 34, was stabbed to death in a fight.
Summary:
1. You are under arrest.
2. You have the right to remain silent.
3. Anything you say can and will be used against you in a court of law.
4. You have the right to an attorney present now, or any future questioning.
159
100. PEOPLE VS. TAN
custodial investigation rights
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Tan was charged with highway robbery and murder for stealing a Honda motorcycle and
killing its owner Saavedra.
He pleaded not guilty.
It was established that Tan and his co-accsued were invited by the police officers in
connection with two other robbery cases reported in Lucena City. Tan allegedly gave an
explicit account of what really happened. He allegedly told the police that they admitted
responsibility for the loss of the motorcycle and death of Saavedra. It was also averred
that they sold the motorcycle to Teves.
The police testified that when they invited Tan to the HQ, there was no warrant of arrest
yet. The police merely informed Tan that he was a suspect for this robbery of motorcycle,
as well as the 2 other robbery cases in Lucena. The police claims that they were merely
conversing with Tan inside the police station, that is why they did not bother to inform Tan
of his rights.
Tan’s defense was that his constitutional rights were violated, hence he cannot be
convicted.
ISSUE: May the confession of an accused, given before a police investigator upon invitation
and without the benefit of counsel, be admissible in evidence against him?
SC: ACQUITTED. The records of this case do not indicate that appellant was assisted by
counsel when he made such waiver.
The Constitution abhors an uncounselled confession or admission and whatever information is
derived therefrom shall be regarded as inadmissible in evidence against the confessant. R.A.
No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate protecting the rights of persons under
custodial investigation. Under said law, custodial investigation' shall include the practice of
issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is investigated in connection with an offense he is
suspected to have committed, without prejudice to the liability of the 'inviting' officer for any
violation of law."
Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after
a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
manner. The rules on custodial investigation begin to operate as soon as the investigation
ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus a particular suspect,
the suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that
tends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. Furthermore,
not only does the fundamental law impose, as a requisite function of the investigating officer,
the duty to explain those rights to the accused but also that there must correspondingly be a
meaningful communication to and understanding thereof by the accused. A mere perfunctory
reading by the constable of such rights to the accused would thus not suffice.
A confession to be admissible must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) it must be voluntary;
(2) it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
(3) it must be express; and
(4) it must be in writing.
While the Constitution sanctions the waiver of the right to counsel, it must, however, be
"voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and must be made in the presence and with the
assistance of counsel." Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without
the assistance of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of
coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given.
(here, it was shown that the police invited Tan to the HQ merely out of curiosity.) The
constitutional rights of appellant, particularly the right to remain silent and to counsel, are
impregnable from the moment he is investigated in connection with an offense he is suspected
to have committed, even if the same be initiated by mere invitation. "
160
101. PEOPLE VS. LABTAN
custodial investigation rights
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Feliciano (co-accused) was convicted of highway robbery and robbery with homicide, on
the basis of a sworn statement which he later repudiated during trial.

Feliciano was brought to the HQ where he executed a sworn statement. In that statement,
he was assisted by a de officio lawyer, Atty Pepito Chavez. The portions of the statement
are as follows:
Q:Will you get a lawyer of your own to defend you in this investigation?
A:No, sir. I can't (sic) pay the services of lawyer.
Q:Since you will not get your own lawyer, will you agree that I'll (sic) give you Atty. Pepito
Chavez as your counsel de officio in this investigation?
A:Yes, sir. I agree that Atty. Pepito Chavez will be my lawyer for the ascertainment of the
truth.
Q: What have you done, if any?
A:On March 1993, I participated in a hold-up of a certain driver Mr. Mercado who owned a
jeep and we got a car stereo including the jeep. We brought the jeep to Buntong, Camamanan and the driver, however, we freed the driver later.

Feliciano during trial, repudiated his sworn statement contending that he was questioned
for over an hour by the police, who hit him in the fact, in the chest, etc, and thereafter
locked him up in jail. Later, he was forced by the police to sign a piece of paper. Then he
was brought to the office of Atty. Chavez. He did know what was happening. Atty. Chavez
then signed the papers also and did not even talk to him whatsoever.
ISSUE: Was confession in the sworn statement admissible in evidence? Did the extrajudicial
confession violate his right to counsel? Was Atty Chavez an effective Counsel?
SC: It must be a right to an effective and vigilant counsel.
As the result of the changes in the patterns of police investigation, today's accused confronts
both expert adversaries and the judicial system well before his trial begins. It is therefore
appropriate to extend the counsel guarantee to critical stages of prosecution even before the
trial. The law enforcement machinery at present involves critical confrontations of the accused
by the prosecution at pre-trial proceedings 'where the result might well settle the accused's
fate and reduce the trial itself to a mere formality.
We find that accused Feliciano had been denied of his right to have a competent and
independent counsel when he was questioned in the Police Station. The police admitted that
he started questioning Felciiano regarding his involvement in the killing of jeepney driver
Florentino Bolasito, notwithstanding the fact that he had not been apprised of his right to
counsel.
At that point, accused-appellant had been subjected to custodial investigation without a
counsel. A person is deemed under custodial investigation where the police investigation is no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has began to focus on a particular suspect
who had been taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that
lends itself to elicit incriminating statements.
When SPO1 Cuarez investigated accused-appellant Feliciano, the latter was already a suspect
in the killing of jeepney driver Bolasito as shown by the joint affidavit of SPO4 Johny Salcedo
and SPO1 Florencio Bagaipo who were the ones who arrested Feliciano.
The prosecution tried to establish that Atty. Pepito Chavez provided effective and independent
counselling to accused-appellant Feliciano which cured the initial lack of counsel. However, this
is belied by the very testimony of Atty. Chavez showing he performed his duty in a
lackadaisical fashion. Atty. Chavez admitted that, he told the accused, that he will just follow
later because at that time when the accused came to the office he (Atty Chavez) was working
on some paper works.” Atty. Chavez also admitted that, “I started my investigation or
confrontation with Henry Feliciano informing him, appraising him of his constitutional right to
counsel, that he has a right to remain silent and appraise him if it is his desire that I be his
161
lawyer because I told him if he has no desire that I will be his lawyer, then he can look for
another.”
(see original for full transcript)
The right to counsel is a fundamental right and contemplates not a mere presence of the
lawyer beside the accused. The term "effective and vigilant counsel" was explained thus:
"necessarily and logically [requires] that the lawyer be present and able to advise and assist
his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the investigating
officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain
that the confession is made voluntarily and that the person under investigation fully
understands the nature and the consequence of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights. A contrary rule would undoubtedly be antagonistic to the constitutional
rights to remain silent, to counsel and to be presumed innocent.
An effective counsel is one who can be made to act in protection of his [accused's] rights, and
not by merely going through the motions of providing him with anyone who possesses a law
degree.
Atty. Chavez did not provide the kind of counselling required by the Constitution. He did not
explain to accused- the consequences of his action - that the sworn statement can be used
against him and that it is possible that he could be found guilty and sent to jail.
We also find that Atty. Chavez's independence as counsel is suspect - he is regularly engaged
by the Cagayan de Oro City Police as counsel de officio for suspects who cannot avail the
services of counsel. He even received money from the police as payment for his services.
We also find that Atty. Chavez himself notarized the sworn statement seriously compromised
his independence. By doing so, he vouched for the regularity of the circumstances surrounding
the taking of the sworn statement by the police. He cannot serve as counsel of the accused
and the police at the same time. There was a serious conflict of interest on his part.
An independent counsel cannot be a special counsel, public or private prosecutor, counsel of
the police, or a municipal attorney whose interest is admittedly adverse to the accused.
We have examined the three-page sworn statement allegedly executed by Feliciano and we
failed to see any badge of spontaneity and credibility to it.
It was a stereotyped 'advice' appearing in practically all extrajudicial confessions which are
later repudiated has assumed the nature of 'legal form' or mode. Police investigators either
automatically type it together with the curt 'Opo' as the answer or ask the accused to sign it or
even copy it in their handwriting. Its tired, punctilious, fixed and artificially stately style does
not create an impression of voluntariness or even understanding on the part of the accused.
The showing of a spontaneous, free and unconstrained giving up of a right is missing
Note: RA 7438 also provides for the rights of persons under custodial investigation.
Sworn Statement Inadmissible. ACQUITTED.
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102. CAMARA VS. ENAGE
right to bail
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Camara, a municipal mayor in Misamis, was arrested for the alleged participation
in the killing of laborers. He applied for bail.
The RTC judge Enage granted the bail citing that the prosecution failed to prove
that Camara would flee if he had the opportunity. However, the bail amount was
P1,195,200.
The Secretary of Justice, Abad Santos, requested the judge to lower the bond to
P40,000, so as to make it reasonable. However, the Judge remained adamant.
The Judge contended that the basis for the bond imposed was that Camara had
in the meantime, escaped from the provincial jail, and had since remain at large.
(thus making the case moot and academic).
ISSUE: Was the bail bond excessive?
SC: YES.
Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses
when the evidence of guilt is strong. Such a right flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom, unless his guilt be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
A bail is intended as a guarantee, a mode short of confinement, which would with
reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the accused for the subsequent trial.
Nor is there anything unreasonable in denying this right to one charged with a capital
offense, when the evidence of guilt is strong, as the likelihood is, rather than await
the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death sentence, an ever-present
threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to be resisted. (Justice
Fernando)
Where the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by requiring a sum
that is excessive. If it would be excessive, then the right to bail becomes
meaninigless. The sole function of the bail is to assure the accused’s presence at
trial, any amount or figure higher than an amount reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose is excessive.
Here, the P840,000 bail for multiple murder (14 counts), and P355,200 for multiple
frustrated murder (12 counts), is unconstitutional. It should be P50,000 for the
murder and P25,000 for the frustrated murder because there are only 2 offenses
charged. Even the DOJ recommended a total of P40,000 bail for the 2 offenses.
The Guidelines for Bail Fixing:
1) ability of the accused
2) nature of offense
3) penalty for offense
4) character and reputation - accused
5) health
6) character and strength – evidence
7) probability of appearing
8) forfeiture of other bonds
9) whether fugitive
10) whether under other bond for other cases
163
103. OBOSA VS. CA
right to bail




Obosa, charged with 2 counts of murder for the ambush killing of Secretary of
ILG, Ferrer and his driver, Calderon.
He was convicted only of homicide. He applied for bail pending appeal.
Granted at P20,000 for each case. = P40,000
He was thus released from prison although at the time of the double murder, HE
WAS ALREADY SERVING TERM FOR ANOTHER CRIME, ROBBERY.
ISSUE: Considering he has a pending case (on appeal) for murder, and a strong
evidence of guilt actually exists based on the CA’s own determination, is Obosa
entitled to bail as a matter of right pending appeal of his conviction for homicide?
The Solgen argues that the fact that an appeal throws the whole case open for
review, it reverts him back to his original situation as a person charged with a capital
offense of murder, and it was initially found by the RTC during the bail hearings that
a the evidence of guilt is strong. Hence, the Solgen argues that now, pending appeal,
he should not be given bail.
Obosa on the other hand, argues that although he was charged for murder, he was
convicted of a lesser offense of homicide, which is not punishable by death or RP.
Hence, he is still entitled to bail as a matter off right because the evidence of guilt is
NOT STRONG because he was convicted of a lesser offense.
SC:
The constitutional guarantee applies with equal force to one who has been convicted
of an offense not punishable by death or RP, even if originally charged with a capital
offense. In the ordinary course of things, there is a substantial likelihood of his
conviction being affirmed on appeal, or worse, that he can instead be found guilty of
the capital offense originally charged. In such an instance, APPELLANT CANNOT BUT
BE TEMPTED TO FLEE.
Here, bail cannot be granted as a matter of right even after an accused, who is
charged with a capital offense, appeals his conviction for a non-capital crime. Courts
must exercise utmost caution in deciding applications for bail considering that the
accused on appeal may still be convicted of the original capital offense charged and
that thus the risk attendant to jumping bail still subsists. In fact, trial courts would
be well advised to leave the matter of bail, after conviction for a lesser crime than
the capital offense originally charged, to the appellate court's sound discretion.
The importance attached to conviction is due to the underlying principle that bail
should be granted only where it is uncertain whether the accused is guilty or
innocent, and therefore, where that uncertainty is removed by conviction it would,
generally speaking, be absurd to admit to bail. After a person has been tried and
convicted the presumption of innocence which may be relied upon in prior
applications is rebutted, and the burden is upon the accused to show error in the
conviction. From another point of view it may be properly argued that the probability
of ultimate punishment is so enhanced by the conviction that the accused is much
more likely to attempt to escape if liberated on bail than before conviction. – Justice
Francisco
164
Note also under the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure (which was promulgated
AFTER the bail was filed) - the presence of any of which could preclude the grant of
bail - are as follows:
That the accused is
1) a recidivist, quasi- recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration
2) accused is found to have previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded
sentence, or has violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
3) accused committed the offense while on probation, parole, or under conditional
pardon-,
4) circumstances of the accused or his case indicate the probability of flight if
released on bail; or
5) undue risk that during the pendency of the appeal, the accused may commit
another crime."
It will be readily noted that, pursuant not only does the conviction of petitioner for
two counts of homicide disqualify him from being admitted to bail as a matter of
right and subject his bail application to the sound discretion of the court.
The court found him to be disqualified because of
1) the conviction of 2 counts
2) he was a recidivist, escapee, risk of flight, undue risk to commit another crime
Summary:
1) MATTER OF RIGHT – at any stage, offense not punishable by death, RP,
2) MATTER OF DISCRETION – upon conviction even if offense not punishable by
death, RP.
3) DENIED AUTOMATICALLY – at any stage, if charged with a capital offense AND the
evidence of guilt strong
4) MATTER OF DISCRETION – if charged with a capital offense BUT evidence of guilt
NOT strong
- if charged with capital offense BUT there are grounds
that his continued confinement would endanger
his life or health
CHAMP Page 165
2/15/2016
165
104. SCOTY’S DEPARTMENT STORE VS. MICALER
due process of law

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Micaller is employed as a Salesgirl at the Scoty’s Department Store. She filed a
ULP case against the employers, following her dismissal because of her
membership in the National Labor Union.
Employers deny the charges. They claim that Micaller was dismissed because she
committed misconduct and serious disrespect to the management.
The CIR tried the case. The CIR imposed a fine against the manager of the store,
YUKI LAM. The CIR also fined other owners of the store, even if they are not
participating in its management.
These owners contend that RA875 is a penal law, and should therefore be
constructed in favor of the accused such that their guilt should have been
established not merely by presumptions but by clear and convicting evidence.
ISSUE: Was the Court of Industrial Relations correct? Under RA 875, any person who
violates said law shall be punished by a fine … in the discretion of the Court. Does
the word “Court” refer to the CIR? Can the CIR impose penalties?
SC: NO. The power to impose the penalties provided for under RA875 is lodged in
ordinary courts, and not in the Court of Industrial Relations, notwithstanding the
definition of the word "Court" contained in section 2 (a) of said Act. Hence, the
decision of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of P100 upon petitioners
is illegal and should be nullified.
No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law"
and that "In all criminal prosecutions the accused * * * shall enjoy the right to be
heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face
to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses in his
behalf"
The procedure laid down by law to be observed by the CIR in dealing with unfair
labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees to the accused. And this
is so because, among other things, the law provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit
and intention of this Act that the CIR shall use every and all reasonable means to
ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to
technicalities of law, or procedure." It is likewise enjoined that "the Court shall not
be bound solely by the evidence presented during the hearing but may avail itself of
all other means such as (but not limited to) ocular inspections and questioning of
well-informed persons which results must be made a part of the record" [section 5
(b), Republic Act No. 875]. All-this means that an accused may be tried without
the right "to meet the witnesses face to face" and may be convicted merely
on preponderance of evidence and not beyond reasonable doubt. This is
against the due process guaranteed by our Constitution. It may be contended that
this gap may be subserved by requiring the Court of Industrial Relations to observe
strictly the rules applicable to criminal cases to meet the requirements of the
Constitution, but this would be tantamount to amending the law which is not within
the province of the judicial branch of our Government.
166
105. MATEO VS. VILLALUZ
due process of law

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

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
Mateo was charged with robbery and the killing of an American serviceman in
Sangley Point, Cavite.
An extrajudicial statement was later executed by Reyes, a co-accused,
implicating Mateo et. al.,. This statement was was subscribed before respondent
Judge Villaluz.
When Reyes was called to testify for the prosecution, he however impugned his
written declaration stating that it was executed as a result of a threat by a
government agent.
Before deciding this issue, Mateo filed for the disqualification of the judge. It is
contended that such a repudiation would not sit well with respondent Judge, who
had thus placed himself in a position of being unable to pass on such question
with that degree of objectivity required by due process (because it was before
him that the statement was sworn to) , although admittedly, such a move did not
fall squarely within one of the specific grounds to inhibit judges.
The Judge denied the motion for his disqualification.
Mateo appealed on the ground that it was in violation of a constitutional right not
to be convicted of an offense without due process of law.
ISSUE: Did the judge commit gadalej in not inhibiting? Does the circumstance of a
party having subscribed before respondent Judge an extra-judicial statement
purporting to describe the manner in which an offense was committed, later on
repudiated by him as the product of intimidation in the course of his having been
asked to testify against petitioners, would suffice to negate a degree of objectivity?
SC: JUDGE WAS WRONG. HE SHOULD HAVE INHIBITED.
Due process cannot be satisfied in the absence of that degree of objectivity on the
part of a judge sufficient to reassure litigants of his being fair and being just.
Thereby there is the legitimate expectation that the decision arrived at would be the
application of the law to the facts as found by a judge who does not play favorites.
Due process of law requires a hearing before an impartial and disinterested tribunal,
and that every litigant is entitled to nothing less than the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge. Elementary due process requires a hearing before an impartial and
disinterested tribunal. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the
duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as
to his integrity.
A judge may not be legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation. But when
suggestion is made of record that he might be induced to act in favor of one party or
with bias or prejudice against a litigant arising out of circumstance reasonably
capable of inciting such a state of mind, he should conduct a careful selfexamination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the peoples faith in the
courts of justice is not impaired.
The invitation to judges to disqualify themselves is not always heeded. For that
matter, it is not always desirable that they should do so. It could amount in certain
cases to their being recreant to their trust. Justice Perfecto's warning is not to be
ignored; "to shirk the responsibility" entails "the risk of being called upon to account
167
for his dereliction." It could be an instrument whereby a party could inhibit a judge in
the hope of getting another more amenable to his persuasive skill.
Here, the Judge could not be totally immune to what apparently was asserted before
him in such extrajudicial statement. Moreover, it is unlikely that he was not in, the
slightest bit offended by the affiant's turnabout with his later declaration that there
was intimidation by a government agent exerted on him. His sense of fairness under
the circumstances could easily be blunted. The absence of the requisite due process
element is thus noticeable. There is this circumstance even more telling. It was he
who attested to its due execution on wherein Rolando Reyes admitted his
participation in the crime and in addition implicated petitioners. At that time, their
motion for dismissal of the charges against them was pending; its resolution was
deferred by respondent Judge until after the prosecution had presented and rested
its evidence against affiant, who was himself indicted and tried for the same offense,
but in a separate proceeding. It cannot be doubted then that respondent Judge in
effect ruled that such extra-judicial statement was executed freely. With its
repudiation on the ground that it was not so at all, coercion having come into the
picture, there is apparent the situation of a judge having to pass on a
question that by implication had already been answered by him. Respondent
Judge was called upon to review a matter on which he had previously given
his opinion. It is this inroad in one's objectivity that is sought to be avoided by the
law on disqualification. The misgivings then as to the requirement of due process for
"the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" not being met are more than justified.
*The court thus reminded lower court judges to limit themselves to the task of
adjudication and to leave to others the role of notarizing declarations.
168
106. PEOPLE VS. TEEHANKEE
due process of law

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
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This is the case of Maureen Hultman and Roland Chapman who were murdered
by CJ Teehankee’s son.
The relevant fact in this case is that the accused, on appeal, blames the press
and the media for his conviction, contended that the publicity given to his case
impaired his right to an impartial trial.
He cites that the RTC judge was pressured by high-ranking government officials
who avidly followed the case (VP Erap, DOJ Sec. Drilon, Pres Cory even visited
the victim while she was at the hospital)
He claims that the judge failed to protect him fro PREJUDICIAL PUBLICITY and
the disruptive influences which attended the case. He claims there were placards,
displayed during the hearing of the cases, spectators inside the court room,
converting the proceedings into a carnival. He was also given the “bad sign” by
several people in the courtroom.
In short, the publicity given the case was massive, overwhelming, and prejudicial
as to effectively deprive the accused of right to impartial trial.
SC: RIGHT TO IMPARTIAL TRIAL WAS NOT DENIED.
It is true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity,
just like all high profile and high stake criminal trials. But, the right of an accused to
a fair trial is not incompatible to a free press. Responsible reporting in fact, enhances
an accused's right to a fair trial. A responsible press has always been regarded as the
handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in the criminal field. The
press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the
miscarriage of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and Judicial processes to
extensive public scrutiny and criticism."
Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the night of an accused to fair trial.
The mere fact that the trial of appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel
coverage does not by itself prove that the publicity so permeated the mind of the
trial judge and impaired his impartiality. For one, it is impossible to seal the minds of
members of the bench from pre-trial and other off-court publicity of sensational
criminal cases. Also, our idea of a fair and impartial Judge is not that of a hermit who
is out of touch with the world.
The records do not show that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant
as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of the pre-trial and trial of his
case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial Judge
acquired a fixed opinion as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of
change even by evidence presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to
prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the burden.
As to the other accusations, the court found that when the placards were raised, the
trial judge immediately ordered the same to be hidden. Then only did he start the
arraignment. The judge also allowed the change of venue noting that the courtroom
was also too crowded. The judge also limited the video coverage to 2 mins and only
after that did he start with trial. Reporters were also told to keep quiet.
Note also that, appellant should be the last person to complain against the press for
prejudicial coverage of his trial. The records reveal he presented in court no less than
seven (7) newspaper reporters and relied heavily on selected portions of their
169
reports for his defense. The defense's documentary evidence consists mostly of
newspaper clippings relative to the investigation of the case at bar and which
appeared to cast doubt on his guilt. The press cannot be fair and unfair to appellant
at the same time.
Finally, it would not be amiss to stress the trial judge voluntarily inhibited himself
from further hearing the case to assuage appellant's suspicion of bias and partiality.
However, upon elevation of the trial Judge's voluntary Order of Inhibition to this
Court, we directed the trial judge to proceed with the trial to speed up the
administration of Justice. We found nothing in the conduct of the proceedings to stir
any suspicion of partiality against the trial judge.
170
107. PEOPLE VS. MINGOA
presumption of innocence

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

Mingoa was prosecuted for the crime of malversation of public funds, after he
failed to produce the missing amount of P3,938, as OIC of the municipal
treasurer.
He explained to the examining officer that some days before he had, by mistake,
put the money in a large envelope, which he took with him to a show and that he
forgot it on his seat and it was not there anymore when he returned.
Under RPC Art 217, there is a prima facie evidence of malversation when he fails
to produce the funds upon demand.
Mingoa claims that lacking direct evidence of actual misappropriation the trial
court convicted him on mere presumptions, that is, presumption of criminal
intent in losing the money under the circumstances alleged and presumption of
guilt from the mere fact that he failed, upon demand, to produce the sum
lacking.
ISSUE: Does this provision violate the constitutional right of an accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proven?
SC: VALID PROVISION. NO VIOLATION OF CONSTI RIGHTS.
He did not overcome the presumption of guilt arising from his inability to produce the
fund which was found missing. If the money was really lost without defendant's fault,
the most natural thing for him to do would be to so inform his superiors and apply
for release from liability. But this he did not do. Instead, he tried to borrow to cover
the shortage. And on the flimsy excuse that he preferred to do his own sleuthing, he
even did not report the loss to the police. Considering further, he had at first tried to
avoid meeting the auditor who wanted to examine his accounts, and that for
sometime before the alleged loss many teachers and other employees of the town
had not been paid their salaries, there is good ground to believe that defendant had
really malversed the fund in question and that his story about its loss was pure
invention.
There is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law providing that the
presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary presumption founded
upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what evidence shall be
sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence." The legislature may enact
that when certain facts have been proved they shall be prima facie evidence of the
existence of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be
a rational connection between the facts proved and the ultimate fact
presumed so that the inference of the one from proof of the others is not
unreasonable and arbitrary because of lack of connection between the two in
common experience.
In this case, the RPC provision creates a presumption of guilt once certain facts are
proved. The ultimate fact presumed is that the officer has malversed the funds or
property entrusted to his custody, and the presumption is made to arise from proof
that he has received them and yet he has failed to have them forthcoming upon
proper demand. Clearly, the fact presumed is but a natural inference from the fact
proved, so that it cannot be said that there is no rational connection between the
two. Furthermore, the statute establishes only a prima facie presumption, thus
giving the accused an opportunity to present evidence to rebut it. The presumption is
reasonable and will stand the test of validity laid down in the above citations.
171
108. PEOPLE VS. FRISCO HOLGADO
right to counsel




Holgado charged with slight illegal detention for kidnapping and detaining
Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for 8 hours.
During arraignment, he appeared without counsel and he pleaded guilty. He said,
“I PLEAD GUILTY BUT I WAS INSTRUCTED BY ONE MR. OCAMPO.”
The fiscal investigated but found that this Mr. Ocampo had nothing to do with the
case.
He was later sentenced.
ISSUE: Was the right to counsel violated?
SC: Under the Rules of Court, Rule 112,
1) If the defendant appears without an attorney, he must be informed by the court
that of his right to have an attorney before being arraigned, and
2) must be asked if he desires the aid of the attorney.
3) If he desires but is unable to employ one, the court must assign an attorney de
officio.
4) A reasonable time must be allowed if procures an attorney of his own.
NONE OF THESE WERE COMPLIED WITH BY THE RTC. The court did not inform the
accused of his right, neither was he asked if he desired the aid of one. The court also
did not inquire whether the accused was to employ an attorney, to grant him
reasonable time to procure one, or to assign an attorney de offico.
The question asked by the court was “DO YOU HAVE AN ATTORNEY OR ARE YOU
GOING TO PLEAD GUILTY?” This question was so framed that it could have been
construed by the accused as a suggestion from the court that he should just plead
guilty if he had no attorney. This is a denial of fair hearing.
There can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given the opportunity to be heard
by counsel. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due
process of law. He shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and by counsel. The
right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not include the right to be heard by
counsel.
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of law,
particularly in the rules of procedure, and without counsel, he may be convicted not
because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish his innocence.
This could happen more easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
CHAMP
Page 172
2/15/2016
172
109. PEOPLE VS. SIM BEN
right to counsel



Sim Ben was convicted for exhibiting cinematographic films of indecent or
immoral scenes in his restaurant in Cebu.
He pleaded guilty but without aid of counsel.
It was found out that when the case was called for trial, the appellant was
informed by the Court of his right to have counsel and asked if he desired the aid
of one. He replied that he did not. Then the Court asked if he was agreeable to
have the information read to him even without the assistance of counsel. His
answer was in the affirmative. The court interpreter translated the information to
him in the local dialect and after the translation he entered a plea of guilty. He
was asked whether he knew that because of the plea of guilty the punishment as
provided for by law would be imposed upon him and he answered "Yes, sir." The
Court asked him if he insisted on his plea of guilty and he answered "Yes, sir."
Thus, the Court sentenced him.
SC: RIGHT TO COUNSEL MAY BE WAIVED. IT NEED NOT BE IN WRITING. WAIVER
MAY BE ORAL. WAIVER MAY BE MADE EVEN WITHOUT THE PRESENCE OF COUNSEL.
WAIVER MUST BE COMPETENTLY AND INTELLIGENTLY MADE.
His rights were fully protected and safeguarded. The Court complied with its duty
when it informed the appellant that it was his right to have the aid of counsel. And
before pronouncing the sentence the Court took pains to ascertain whether he was
aware of the consequences of the plea he had entered. Notwithstanding this
precaution and warning, he waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a
plea of guilty to the information. Notwithstanding this precaution and warning, he
waived his right to have the aid of counsel and entered a plea of guilty to the
information.
Appellant claims that he entered the plea of guilty because the fiscal promised him
that only a fine would be imposed. The recommendation of the fiscal that only a fine
be imposed upon the appellant seems to bear out his claim; but such
recommendation or one of leniency does not mean that the appellant is not guilty of
the crime charged against him. A promise to recommend a specific penalty such as
fine does not render the sentence void if the Court ignores the recommendation and
metes out to the defendant a penalty which is provided by law.
173
110. PEOPLE VS. MALUNSING
right to counsel
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
Villegas was a co-accused for murder. His Atty Pajarito explicitly manifested that
his client Villegas had his own lawyer. Atty Pajarito appeared for him in the
preliminary investigation but only because there was no other counsel.
However Villegas changed his mind and so the Court gave him a lawyer,
appointing Atty. Pajarito as counsel de officio. The court ordered the case to
proceed to trial
During the trial, Atty Pajarito was asked whether he would like to confer with his
client. He said, I think I know the case. However, no evidence was presented for
and in behalf of Villegas. In fact, all other defendants took the witness stand
except for Villegas.
Villegas was a very old man, ignorant, unlettered, during the entire proceedings,
he did not know what was going on.
The trial court never apprised him of his right to be assisted by a lawyer, it never
bothered to inquire why he was the only one who did not take the witness stand.
The trial court proceeded with the case without knowing why Villegas did not
testify.
SC: RIGHT TO COUNSEL VIOLATED. NEW TRIAL ORDERED.
it is not enough that a counsel de oficio was appointed, , where the accused had
indicated that he wanted a lawyer of his choice, a decision prompted moreover by
the fact that be had lost confidence in the member of the bar thus designated. Nor is
it to manifest respect for this right if the counsel do oficio thus named, instead of
conferring with the accused, would just blithely inform the judge that he was already
fully prepared for his exacting responsibility. Inasmuch as it is intended to assure a
just and fair proceeding, he is entitled at the most to a new trial where he can be
duly represented either by a counsel of his choice or by one appointed de oficio, one
who would discharge his task in a much more diligent and conscientious manner and
would not readily assume that he need not bother himself unduly with familiarizing
himself further with all aspects of the case. For only in such a way may there be an
intelligent defense.
In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the accused be given an
opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be board would be of little avail if it
does not include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or
educated man may have no skill in the science of law, particularly in the rules of
procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not bemuse he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more
easily to persons who are ignorant or uneducated.
It is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid of an attorney, but it is essential that
the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or grant him a
reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own. What is more, it is one of the
worthwhile innovations of the present Constitution that even at the stage of custodial
interrogation when the police agencies are investigating a man's possible connection
with a crime, he is already entitled to counsel.
Note: Right to counsel is violated when the court appoints a counsel de officio for an accused
who manifested his desire to have his own counsel de parte and thereafter ordered the case to
proceed for trial.
The DENIAL OF EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION applies to both counsel de offcio and counsel of
the accused’s choice.
174
111. DELGADO VS. CA
right to counsel
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
Delgado was charged with estafa thru falsification of public documents. (in
connection with arranging travel documents of Erlinda).
Delgado pleaded not guilty. She was assisted by her counsel de parte, Atty. Yco.
On the date set for the continuation of the defense evidence, the lawyer failed to
appear despite prior notice. Instead, the lawyer sent a telegram requesting for
the postponement on the ground that he was allegedly SICK. No medical
certificate however was submitted.
The fiscal objected, claiming it was dilatory.
The RTC ruled against Delgado and ordered the case to proceed. Delgado was
deemed to have waived presentation of evidence, and the case was submitted for
decision. She was convicted. There was an entry of final judgment.
Delgado now filed a motion to set aside entry of judgment on the ground that
there was irregularity in the sending of notices and copy of the decision to her
lawyer.
This was denied. She was ordered arrested.
She further appealed, and filed a MR, on the ground of newly discovered
evidence, that she only knew then that Atty Yco was not in fact a member of the
Bar. She prayed for a new trial because she was deprived of the right to be
defended by a competent counsel.
SC: NEW TRIAL GRANTED.
An accused is entitled to be represented by a MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR in a
criminal case filed against her. Unless she is represented by a lawyer, there is a
great danger that any defense presented in her behalf would be inadequate
considering the legal pre-requisites and skills needed in court proceedings. This is
certainly a DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS.
CHAMP
Page 175
2/15/2016
175
112. PEOPLE VS. REGALA
right to be informed of the nature and causes of accusation




Regala and Flores were both charged with the crime of MURDER WITH ASSAULT
upon an agent of a person in authority, for attacking and stabbing with a knife, a
member of the Philippine Constabulary who was performing his official duty.
The RTC found them guilty for the killing and qualified as murder under the
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, they were convicted
of COMPLEX CRIME OF MURDER WITH ASSAULT upon an agent of a person in
authority.
They appealed the conviction contending that they cannot be convicted of a
complex crime because the information filed against them did not allege the
essential elements of assault, that the accused then knew that the victim was an
agent of a person in authority.
There was only a bare allegation of the fact that the accused deliberately, and
with intent to kill, with evident premed and treachery and further taking
advantage of nighttime, attacked and stabbed Desilos, while he was performing
his official duty.
ISSUE: Is the information sufficient to charge a complex crime?
SC: NO. Such an allegation cannot be an adequate substitute for the essential
averment to justify a conviction for a complex crime. There were NO ALLEGATION OF
FACTS from which it can be implied that the accused then knew that before or at the
time of the assault, the victim was an agent of a person in authority. There was no
allegation of the facts from which the elements may be implied.
Moreover, the fact that the crime of assault was established by evidence on the part
of the prosecution without objection on the part of the accused cannot likewise cure
the defective information because to do so would be convicting the accused of a
crime not properly alleged in the body of the information, in violation of his
constitutional right to be informed o f the nature and the cause of the accusation
against him.
176
113. PEOPLE VS. ORTEGA
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
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Ortega and Garcia were found guilty of murder of Masangkay.
On appeal Garcia contends that he cannot be convicted of murder because of the
defective information.
The information accused him of attacking, assaulting, and stabbing with a pointed
weapon, the victim Masangkay. However, the prosecution’s evidence itself shows
that Garcia had nothing to do with the stabbing, which was solely perpetrated by
Ortega. Garcia’s responsibility relates only to the attempted concealment of the
crime and the resulting drowning of Masangkay.
The RTC found him liable as co-conspirator.
SC: The hornbook doctrine in our jurisdiction is that an accused cannot be convicted
of an offense, unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information.
Constitutionally, he has the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. To convict him of an offense other than that charged in the
compliant or information would be a violation of this constitutional right.
Thus, Garcia cannot be convicted of homicide through drowning, when the
information charges murder through stabbing.
Garcia merely assisted in concealing the body of the victim. At the autopsy, it was
showed that the victim at that time was still alive, and that he died only
subsequently of drowning. Drowning was the immediate cause of death, as medically
demonstrated by the muddy particles found in the victim’s lungs.
In assisting Ortega in carrying the body of Masangkay to the well, Garcia was
committing a felony, of concealing the body of the crime to prevent its discovery. He
is thus only an accessory to the crime of homicide.
CHAMP
Page 177
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177
114. CONDE VS. RIVERA
right to speedy trial
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Aurelia Conde, was a midwife who is an accused in 5 different informations for
various crimes and misdemeanors.
He has appeared with her witnesses and counsel at the hearing no less than on 8
different occasions, only to see the cause postponed.
She has also 2x been required to come to the SC for aid.
Now, after the passage of more than 1 year from the time when the first
information was filed, there is yet no resolution of the cases because the
prosecutor has filed for postponement again.
SC: In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to have a speedy
trial. Aurelia Conde, like all other accused persons, has a right to a speedy trial in
order that if innocent she may go free, and she has been deprived of that right in
defiance of law. Dismissed from her humble position, and compelled to dance
attendance on courts while investigations and trials are arbitrarily postponed without
her consent, is palpably and openly unjust to her and a detriment to the public. By
the use of reasonable diligence, the prosecution could have settled upon the
appropriate information, could have attended to the formal preliminary examination,
and could have prepared the case for a trial free from vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays.
On the one hand has been the petitioner, of humble station, without resources, but
fortunately assisted by a persistent lawyer, while on the other hand has been the
Government of the Philippine Islands which should be the last to set an example of
delay and oppression in the administration of justice. The Court is thus under a
moral and legal obligation to see that these proceedings come to an end and that the
accused is discharged from the custody of the law.
Where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial
of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this
instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief by a proceeding in
mandamus to compel a dismissal of the information, or if he be restrained of his
liberty, by habeas corpus to obtain his freedom.
The writ prayed for shall issue and the Provincial Fiscal of Tayabas shall abstain from
further attempts to prosecute the accused pursuant to informations growing out of
the facts set forth in previous informations, and the charges now pending before the
justice of the peace of Lucena, Tayabas, are ordered dismissed, with costs against
the respondent fiscal.
178
115. GARCIA VS. DOMINGO
right to public trial
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Several informations were filed against Calo and Carbonell for slight physical
injuries.
The trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused
and their counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia."
Later, they filed an injunction for the deferment of the promulgation of the
judgment citing that their constitutional and statutory rights had been violated,
adversely affecting their - right to a free and impartial trial, ' [noting] that the
trial of these cases lasting several weeks were held exclusively in chambers and
not in the court room open to the public.
ISSUE: Was there a public trial?
SC: YES. (justice Fernando)
Trial should be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and unjust
manner.
The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The Constitution
guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify? Offhand it does seem
fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be given a literal application. The
trial must be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the
manner a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban
on such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship to
the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief that
thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be conducted with
regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is thus understandable why such a right is
deemed embraced in procedural due process. Where a trial takes place, as is quite usual, in
the courtroom and a calendar of what cases arc to be heard is posted, no problem arises. It is
the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present are free to do so. There is
the well recognized exception though that warrants the exclusion of the public where the
evidence may be characterized as "offensive to decency or public morals.
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and of the
city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was held. Did
that suffice to vitiate the proceedings as violative of this right? The answer must be in the
negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby excluded. It is to be admitted that
the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce the number of those who could be
present. Such a fact though is not indicative of any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are
not of uniform dimensions. Some are smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice
Black in his masterly In re Oliver opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being
public if the accused could "have his friends, relatives and counsel present no matter with
what offense he may be charged."
The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record that the accused offered
no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was held, his right is deemed waived."
An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts shows a crowded daily calendar,
the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural
rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the
attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome.
Summary: 1. Right was waived. 2. Public means, anyone interested in observing the
trial may do so, even a stranger. 3. Relationship to litigants immaterial. 4. Size of
courtroom not indicative of violation of right.
Exceptions (When there can be no public trial: a) sensitive rape cases, b) military
secrets, national security issues.
179
116. PEOPLE VS. ORTIZ-MIYAKE
right to compulsory process – confrontation
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Ortiz was charged with large scale illegal recruitment as well as estafa by means
of false pretenses.
She allegedly promised Marasigan a job as a factory worker in Taiwan. After
paying however, she was never issued a visa. She found out later that she was
also not booked by Ortiz for the flight to Taiwan, and also that none of the staff
in the recruitment agency knew Ortiz.
There were 2 other victims, however it was only Marasigan who testified at the
trial, since the other 2 were abroad.
The prosecution insisted that even if 2 out of 3 complainants in the illegal
recruitment case were unable to testify because they were abroad, Ortiz should
still be guilty of the offense against all 3 complainants, and should be convicted
for large scale illegal recruitment.
On the other hand, Ortiz claims that she is not guilty of large scale illegal
recruitment because she did not recruit the 3 victims, but merely purchased for
their plane tickets. She also argues that in the prosecution for large scale illegal
recruitment, there must be at least 3 complainants who should appear as
witnesses in the trial. Since it was only Marasigan who testified, the conviction is
groundless.
The RTC of Makati convicted her of large scale illegal recruitment, by adopting
the decision of the Paranaque court (in another case) to show that illegal
recruitment was also committed by Ortiz against the 2 other complainants.
SC: Illegal recruitment is deemed large scale if committed against 3 or more persons
individually or as a group. It is evident in illegal recruitment cases, the number of
persons victimized is determinative. Where illegal recruitment is committed against a
lone victim, the accused maybe convicted only of simple illegal recruitment, which
has a lower penalty.
It was argued by the prosecution that there was an earlier conviction in the MTC of
Paranaque where Ortiz was found guilty of estafa against the 2 other complainants.
SC: The court cannot validly adopt the facts embodied in the Paranaque case to
show that illegal recruitment was also committed against the 2 other complainants.
It is erroneous to base the conviction for large scale illegal recruitment on the facts
of a previous decision by the Paranaque court. It is a violation of the right of Ortiz to
confront the witnesses, that is the 2 other complainants, during the trial before it.
Here, illegal recruitment was proven tohave been committed against only one
person, Marasigan. Thus, Ortiz may be liable only for simple illegal recruitment.
The accused in a criminal case is guaranteed the right to confrontation. It has 2
purposes:
1) to secure the opportunity for cross-exam
2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment/conduct of the witness while
testifying
This right however is not absolute as it is sometimes impossible to produce a witness
who has already testified in a previous proceeding. In such case, his previous
testimony is made admissible as a distinct piece of evidence, by way of exception to
the hearsay rule. The previous testimony is made admissible because it makes the
administration of justice orderly and more expeditious.
180
The adoption by the Makati RTC of the facts in the Paranaque court decision does not
fall under the exception to the right of confrontation. The law covers only the use of
testimonies of absent witnesses made in previous proceedings, and does not
include the utilization of the previous decisions or judgments.
In this case, the prosecution never offered the prior testimonies of the 2 other
complainants in the Paranaque court case. Instead, what the prosecution offered was
the decision itself, as the basis for large scale illegal recruitment.
This is wrong. A previous decision or judgment, while admissible in evidence, may
only prove that an accused was previously convicted of a crime. It may not be used
to prove that the accused is guilty of a crime charged in a subsequent case, in lieu of
the requisite evidence proving the commission of the crime, as said previous decision
is hearsay. To sanction its being used as a basis for conviction in a subsequent case
would constitute a violation of the right of the accused to confront the witnesses
against him.
The Makati court's utilization of and reliance on the previous decision of the
Parañaque court must be rejected. Every conviction must be based on the findings of
fact made by a trial court according to its appreciation of the evidence before it. A
conviction may not be based merely on the findings of fact of another court.
In illegal recruitment in large scale, while the law does not require that at least three
victims testify at the trial, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving
that the offense was committed against three or more persons. This Court agrees
with the trial court that the evidence presented sufficiently proves that illegal
recruitment was committed by appellant against Marasigan, but the same conclusion
cannot be made as regards Generillo and Del Rosario as well.
181
117. PEOPLE VS. SENERIS
right to compulsory process – confrontation
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The wife, Pilar Angeles, induces and offered a sum of money to co-accused
Nemenio, to kill her husband.
Nemenio pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. He later testified against the
wife, Pilar Angeles, as prosecution’s witness.
When the direct exam was completed, the defense moved to hold the cross-exam
in abeyance for April 19.
Come April 19, Nemenio did not appear because he was not served a subpoena.
It was reset to June 7 where cross-exam began but was not finished.
However on June 21, Nemenio was shot dead by the police for allegedly escaping
prison.
This made cross examination incomplete.
The judge then ordered that the whole testimony inadmissible since the crossexam was incomplete.
ISSUE: Should the testimony be rendered inadmissible?
SC: YES. INADMISSIBLE.
The constitutional right of confrontation, which guarantees to the accused the right
to cross-examine the witnesses for the prosecution, is one of the most basic rights of
an accused person under our system of justice. It is a fundamental right which is
part of due process not only in criminal proceedings but also in civil proceedings as
well as in Proceedings in administrative tribunals with quasi-judicial Powers.
The right to confrontation has 2 purposes:
1) to secure the opportunity for cross-exam
2) to allow the judge to observe the deportment/conduct of the witness while
testifying
It ensures that the witness will give his testimony in open court under oath, thus
deterring lying b the threat of perjury. If forces the witness to submit to cross-exam,
a valuable instrument in exposing falsehood and bringing out the truth.
While the right to confrontation and to cross-exam are fundamental rights, the same
can be waived expressly or impliedly by conducting amounting to renunciation of the
right. There is waiver when the party was given opportunity to confront and crossexamine an opposing witness, but failed to take advantage of it for reasons
attributable to him alone.
Until such cross-exam has been finished, the testimony of the witness cannot be
considered as complete. In short, where the right to cross-exam is lost wholly or in
part through the fault of the cross-examiner, then the testimony of direct due to
exam may be recognized, but when the cross-exam is not and cannot be done or
completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness then the
uncompleted testimony becomes incompetent and inadmissible.
The direct testimony of the witness who dies before the completion of the
cross-exam can thus be stricken only insofar as not covered by the cross.
Where the death or illness prevents cross-examination under such
circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be attributed to either
the witness of his party, it seems harsh measure to strike out all that has
been obtained on the direct examination.
182
The Lufthansa case were it was held that when cross-examination is not and cannot
be done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness,
the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent As clear as day, the
Lufthansa ruling therefore applies only if there is a finding that the cause for noncompletion of the cross-examination of a witness was attributable to the very party
offering the said witness.
That is not applicable in this case because the cause of the non-completion of the
cross-exam was A FORTUITOIUS EVENT. (death)
ISSUE: Was there a wavier of right to cross-exam when the defense failed to avail of
cross-examine Nemenio right after there was direct exam? Was there a waiver
because the defense moved for abeyance?
SC: NO WAIVER.
It will be noted that the defense moved for abeyance because in order to have the
opportunity to make preparations, for an effective exercise thereof considering the
nature of the case a capital one and the length of the direct examination. The
deferment of the cross –exam requested by the defense was approved by the judge
without any objection on the part of the prosecution. And on the date for the crossexamination of the witness Nemenio, defense failure to cross-examine the said
witness not of his own design but because said witness failed to appear on that date
for the reason that due to the oversight of the court a personnel the subpoena for
said witness was not served on him.
No fault can be imputed to the defense for the length of time that elapsed before her
counsel was able to commence his cross-examination of the witness.
BUT in this case, the cross-examination made by the defense of the deceased
witness Nemenio was extensive and already covered the subject matter of his direct
testimony as state witness relating to the essential elements of the crime of
parricide, and what remained for further cross-examination is the matter of price or
reward allegedly paid by Angeles for the commission of the crime, which is merely an
aggravating circumstance and does not affect the existence of the offense charged,
the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in declaring as entirely
inadmissible the testimony of the state witness who died through no fault of any of
the parties before his cross-examination could be finished.
CHAMP Page 183
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183
118. PEOPLE VS. NARCA
right to compulsory process –confrontation
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Narca was charged with murder for killing and hacking with the use of a bolo, of
Reglos.
On bail hearings, the victim’s wife, Elizabeth Reglos, testified on direct
examination.
The defense however moved that the cross-exam be conducted on the next
hearing day.
However, Elizabeth was never cross-examined by the defense because she and
her son were bludgeoned to death.
Narca was still convicted.
On appeal, Narca claims that the testimony of the wife in the bail hearings should
not be given weight since she was not cross-examined.
ISSUE: Is Elizabeth’s testimony admissible?
SC: YES.
The defense's failure to cross-examine Elizabeth Reglos was occasioned by her
supervening death. Lack of cross-examination due to the death of the witness does not
necessarily render the deceased's previous testimony expungible. Where death prevents
cross-examination under such circumstances that no responsibility of any sort can be ascribed
to the plaintiff or the witness, it seems a harsh measure to strike out all that has obtained in
the direct examination."
The wholesale exclusion of testimonies was too inflexible a solution to the procedural impasse
because it prejudiced the party whose only fault was to die before he could be crossexamined. The prudent alternative should have been to admit the direct examination so far as
the loss of cross-examination could have been shown to be not in that instance a material
loss. And more compelling so in the instant case where it has become evident that the adverse
party was afforded a reasonable chance for cross-examination but through his own fault failed
to cross-examine the witness.
ISSUE: Was there waiver when the defense sought postponement of the crossexamination for the next hearing day?
SC: YES. WAIVER.
Besides, mere opportunity and not actual cross-examination is the essence of the right to
cross-examine. Appellants lost such opportunity when they sought the deferment of their
cross-examination of Elizabeth, and they only have themselves to blame in forever losing that
right by reason of Elizabeth's demise. This Court held that the right to cross-examination "is a
personal one which may be waived expressly or impliedly by conduct amounting to a
renunciation of the right of cross-examination. Thus, where a party has had the opportunity to
Gross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits the right to
crossexamine and the testimony given on direct examination of the witness will be received
or allowed to remain in the record.
ISSUE: Can the testimony given in bail hearings be recognized at the trial proper?
SC: YES.
Evidence presented during the bail hearings,like the testimony of deceased witness Elizabeth,
are "considered automatically reproduced at the trial" subject only to the possible recall of the
"witness for additional examination unless the witness is dead, outside the Philippines or
otherwise unable to testify."
Rule 115 provides that "either party may utilize as part of its evidence the testimony of a
witness who is deceased given in another case or proceeding,"
CHAMP Page 184
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119. TATAD VS. SB
speedy disposition of cases
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Tatad was charged with violation of the AGCP (bribery, giving benefits to
relatives, see below) when he was still secretary and head of the dept of public
information.
2 months after Tatad’s resignation, Antonio delos Reyes filed a complaint with the
Tanodbayan. This was referred to the Criminal Investigation Service.
Tatad moved to dismiss the case claiming immunity from prosecution. DENIED.
So the case was filed before the Sandiganbayan (SB).
Tatad now filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that he was
deprived of due process, and the right to speedy disposition of cases, amounting
to loss of jurisdiction to file the information. DENIED.
Later, an amended information was filed against him, changing the date of the
commission of the offense.
Tatad filed a motion to quash again. DENIED AGAIN.
He now assails the denial of the motion to quash.
ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s long delay in filing the cases with the SB had
deprived Tatad of the right to due process and speedy disposition of cases.
Tatad claims that the Tanodbayan violated the constitutional mandate of "due
process" and "speedy disposition of cases" in unduly prolonging the termination of
the preliminary investigation and in filing the informations only after more than a
decade from the commission of the offenses, which amounted to loss of jurisdiction
and authority to file the informations.
SC: These were the findings of fact by the SC.
 1974 - Reyes originally filed a “report” with the PSG concerning the charges
against Tatad.
 1979 - This report was made to sleep in the office of the PSG until 1979. In 1979,
the 1974 complaint was resurrected by a formal complaint with the
Tanodbayan because Tatad resigned from the Marcos cabinet.
 1980 - Tanodbayan acted on the complaint only in 1980.
 1985 – Tanodbayan approved the resolution, recommending the filing of the
information with the SB. 5 informations were filed.
SC: THERE WAS DENIAL OF DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY DISPOSITION.
Firstly, the complaint came to life, only after Tatad had a falling out with President
Marcos. Secondly, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint to the Presidential Security
Command for fact-finding investigation and report, instead of the established
procedures prescribed by law for preliminary investigation, which require the
submission of affidavits and counter-affidavits by the complainant and the
respondent and their witnesses. The prosecution was politically motivated.
Also, the long delay in resolving the case under preliminary investigation can not be
justified on the basis of the facts on record. The law (P.D. No. 911) prescribes a tenday period for the prosecutor to resolve a case under preliminary investigation by
him from its termination. While this period fixed by law is merely "directory," yet, on
the other hand, it can not be disregarded or ignored completely, with absolute
impunity.
185
We find the long delay in the termination of the preliminary investigation by the
Tanodbayan in the instant case to be violative of the constitutional right of the
accused to due process.
A delay of close to three (3) years can not be deemed reasonable or justifiable in the
light of the circumstance obtaining in the case at bar. We are not impressed by the
attempt of the Sandiganbayan to sanitize the long delay by indulging in the
speculative assumption that "the delay may be due to a painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny by the Tanodbayan as to whether the evidence presented during the
preliminary investigation merited prosecution of a former high-ranking government
official." In the first place, such a statement suggests a double standard of
treatment, which must be emphatically rejected. Secondly, three out of the five
charges against the petitioner were for his alleged failure to file his sworn statement
of assets and liabilities required by RA 3019, which certainly did not involve
complicated legal and factual issues necessitating such "painstaking and gruelling
scrutiny" as would justify a delay of almost three years in terminating the
preliminary investigation. The other two charges relating to alleged bribery and
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to a relative, while presenting more
substantial legal and factual issues, certainly do not warrant or justify the period of
three years, which it took the Tanodbayan to resolve the case.
It has been suggested that the long delay in terminating the preliminary
investigation should not be deemed fatal, for even the complete absence of a
preliminary investigation does not warrant dismissal of the information. True-but the
absence of a preliminary investigation can be corrected by giving the accused such
investigation. But an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary investigation can
not be corrected, for until now, man has not yet invented a device for setting back
time.
CASES AGAINST TATAD DISMISSED.
186
120. GONZALES VS. SB
speedy disposition of cases
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Gonzales was a former director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources.
He entered into an agreement with Palanca for the use of Otoshi- Ami Net, or
Lambaklad, for an experimental test fishing.
Later, a complaint was filed before the Fiscal of Manila for malversation of public
funds.
Another complaint was filed by with the Tanodbayan for illegal use of vessel and
loss of the Lumbaklad. Gonzales filed his counter-affidavit answer.
However, The TB ruled that a PI should be conducted for the loss of the
Lumbaklad only.
Still later however, the TB also ordered that a PI be conducted for the charge of
illegal use of government vessels (which was previously dismissed).
There was protracted litigation, until in the case reached the SB.
Gonzales argues that when he filed his counter-affidavit at the TB, as of that
date, the case should have been considered submitted for resolution. He claims
that there was long delay and that the case should be dismissed already.
The Solgen contends that there was no delay since from the filing of the
complaint with the TB up to the filing of the information with the SB, there had
been numerous incidents in between, which required resolution during the PI.
The Solgen claims the long period was not due to inaction, but precisely due to
investigations conducted.
SC: NO DELAY. While there may seem to have been a delay in the termination of the
preliminary investigation involved in the case at bar, the same cannot be imputed
solely to the prosecution.
The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed
violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and
oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and
secured, or when without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed
to elapse without the party having his case tried. The balancing test used to
determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a speedy trial, or a
speedy disposition of a case for that matter, is measured by factors such as
1) length of the delay,
2) reason for the delay,
3) the defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right, and
4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.
In the present case, it will be noted that it was only on August 22, 1988 when the
complaint was filed. The original information was filed on May 6, 1989. After the
filing of said information, Gonzales himself filed several motions seeking
reconsideration and re-evaluation of the case and praying for the suspension of the
proceedings during the pendency of the resolution of these motions. Thereafter, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the conduct of a preliminary investigation and,
subsequently, the amended information was filed. It is, therefore, apparent and
irremissible that the delay is equally chargeable to Gonzales. Hence, he cannot now
seek the protection of the law to cover up for his own actuations or benefit from
what he now considers the adverse effects of his own conduct in the case.
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121. US VS. NAVARRO
right against self-incrimination
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Article 481 of the Penal Code provides that a private person who shall lock up or
detain another, or in any way deprive him of his liberty shall be punished with
the penalty of prision mayor.
The second paragraph of article 483 provides that one who illegally detains
another and fails to give information concerning his whereabouts, or does not
prove that he set him at liberty, shall be punished with cadena temporal in its
maximum degree to life imprisonment.
The punishment for the crime mentioned in, article 483 of the Penal Code is the
penalty of cadena temporal in its maximum degree to cadena perpetua, or in
other words one convicted of simply depriving a person of his liberty may be
imprisoned for a term of from six to twelve years and one convicted of depriving
a person of his liberty and who shall not state his whereabouts or prove that he
had set said person at liberty may be punished by imprisonment for a term of
seventeen years four months and one day, to life, as in this case. In other words,
for failure on the part of the defendant to testify regarding the whereabouts of
the person deprived of his liberty, or to prove that he was set at liberty, the
punishment may be increased from imprisonment for a term of six years to life
imprisonment.
This provision of the law has the effect of forcing a defendant to become a
witness in his own behalf or to take a much severer punishment. The burden is
put upon him of giving evidence if he desires to lessen the penalty, or, in other
words, of criminating himself, for the very statement of the whereabouts of the
victim or the proof that the defendant set him at liberty amounts to a confession
that the defendant unlawfully detained the person.
So the evidence necessary to clear the defendant, under article 483 of the Penal
Code, would have the effect of convicting him under article 481.
Navarro, the accused claims that the provisions are illegal since no person shall
be compelled to be a witness against himself.
SC:
The evidence shows that some one has been taken away from home and has not
been heard of again, and the facts point to the prisoner as the presumptive criminal.
He is told to state what he knows of the matter. If he does so, and proves that the
person detained was liberated by him, or that such person is living in such and such
a place, then the prosecuting attorney will know that he must draw a charge under
the first or following sections of article 481, according to whether the facts elicited by
the preliminary or summary investigation show only a detention in general, or for the
specific periods of time indicated in the latter part of the section. But if the prisoner
fails to prove the whereabouts of the person whom he is accused of making away
with, or that he liberated him, then the prosecuting attorney has a case falling within
the last paragraph of article 483.
It follows, therefore, from an examination of the old law that no prosecution under
this article would have ever been possible without a concomitant provision of the
procedural law which made it the duty of the accused to testify and permitted the
prosecution to draw an unfavorable deduction from his refusal to do so.
Origins of the right against self-incrimination:
It was established on the grounds, of public policy and humanity-of policy, because if
the party were required to testify, it would place the witness under the
strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury, and of humanity,
188
because it would prevent the extorting of confessions by duress. The very
object of adopting this provision of law was to wipe out such practices as formerly
prevailed in these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial
examinations, and to give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were
charged.
In Emery's case it was said that the principle applies equally to any compulsory
disclosure of the guilt of the offender himself, whether sought directly as the object
of the inquiry, or indirectly and incidentally for the purpose of establishing facts
involved in an issue between the parties.
If the disclosure thus made would be capable of being used against him as a
confession of crime, or an admission of facts tending to prove the commission of an
offense, such disclosure would be an accusation against himself.
In the present case, if the defendant, as said before, disclosed the whereabouts of
the person taken, or shows that he was given his liberty, this disclosure may be used
to obtain a conviction under article 481 of the Penal Code.
In this case, if the defendant does not do certain things, if he does not make certain
statements or proofs, he is severely punished.
If it be urged that the defendant is not compelled to testify, that he may remain
mute, the answer is that, the illegal detention only being proved by the prosecution,
if he does not make certain proof, if he remains mute, then not only the presumption
but the fact of guilt follows as a consequence of his silence, and such a conclusion is
not permitted under American law.
A law which, while permitting a person accused of a crime to be a witness s in his
own behalf, should at the same time authorize a presumption of guilt from his
omission to testify would be a law adjudging guilt without evidence, and while it
might not be obnoxious to the constitutional provision against compelling a party in a
criminal case to give evidence against himself, would be a law reversing the
presumption of innocence, and would violate the fundamental principles binding alike
upon the legislature and the courts."
It is the duty of the prosecution, in order to convict one of a crime, to produce
evidence showing guilt beyond a reasonable doubt; and the accused can not be
called upon, either by express words or acts to assist in the production of such
evidence; nor should his silence be taken as proof against him. He has a right to rely
on the presumption of innocence until the prosecution proves him guilty of every
element of the crime with which he is charged.
Summary: The provision has the effect of forcing the defendant to punishment. It
places the burden on him to give evidence if he wants a lesser penalty. The
information charged amounts to a confession that he voluntarily detained the
victim!! This would convict him under Art 481.
189
122. CABAL VS. KAPUNAN
right against self incrimination






Maristella of the Phil. Army filed a complaint with the DND charging Chief of Staff
Cabal, with graft and corruption, unexplained wealth, dictatorial tendencies.
The President created a committee to investigate.
The Committee ordered Cabal to take the witness stand.
Cabal objected, invoking his right against self incrimination.
The Committee insisted that he take the wtiness stand and be sworn to, subject
only to his right to refuse to answer any question that may be incriminatory.
The Committee claimed however that the investigation is merely administrative
and not criminal in nature. They also claimed that under the constitution, what
can be refused in merely to answer an incriminatory question, but cannot refuse
to take the witness stand altogether.
ISSUE: At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may
refuse, not only to answer incriminatory questions, but, also, to take the witness
stand. Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings
before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
SC: Although said Committee was created to investigate the administrative charge
of unexplained wealth, there seems to be no question that Col. Maristela does not
seek the removal of petitioner herein as Chief of Staff of the AFP. As a matter of fact
he no longer holds such office. The real purpose of the charge against petitioner is to
apply the Anti-Graft Law, which authorizes the forfeiture to the State of property of a
public officer or employee which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer or employee and his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property. Such forfeiture has been held, however, to
partake of the nature of a penalty.
A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of punishment not by the mere
convention of the parties, but by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course
of conduct. The effect of such a forfeiture is to transfer the title to the specific thing
from the owner to the sovereign power. Thus, proceedings for forfeiture of
property are deemed criminal or penal, and, hence, the exemption of
defendants in criminal case from the obligation to be witnesses against
themselves are applicable thereto. Such proceedings are criminal in nature to the
extent that where the person using the res illegally is the owner of rightful possessor
of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a punishment.
A witness or party called as a witness cannot be made to testify against himself as to
matters which would subject his property to forfeiture. No person could be compelled
to testify against himself or to answer any question which would have had a
tendency to expose his property to a forfeiture, or to form a link in a chain of
evidence for that purpose, as well as to incriminate him.
The rule protecting a person from being compelled to furnish evidence
which would incriminate him exists not only when he is liable criminally to
prosecution and punishment, but also when his answer would tend to
expose him to a forfeiture.
No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. This prohibition against compelling a person to take the stand as a
190
witness against himself applies only to criminal, quasi-criminal, and penal
proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for forfeiture of property
by reason of the commission of an offense, but not a proceeding in which
the penalty recoverable is civil or remedial in nature.
The privilege of a witness not to incriminate himself is not infringed by merely asking
the witness a question which he refuses to answer. The privilege is simply an option
of refusal, and not a prohibition of inquiry. However, where the position of the
witness is virtually that of an accused on trial, it would appear that he may invoke
the privilege in support of a blanket refusal to answer any and all questions."
In short, in this case, Cabal even in an administrative proceeding under the Anti
Graft Law, CANNOT BE REQUIRED TO TAKE THE WITNESS STAND. A person
may not be compelled to testify in an action against him for a penalty or to answer
any question as a witness which would subject him to a penalty or forfeiture, where
the penalty or forfeiture is imposed as a vindication of the public justice of the state.
CHAMP Page 191
2/15/2016
Right Against Self-Incrimination = available:
1) criminal cases
2) civil cases
3) administrative cases
 as long as the penalty is penal in nature.
191
123. PASCUAL VS. MEDICAL BOARD
right against self incrimination








This is the case of Doctorney Pascual ng Formed.
There was an administrative case before the Board of Medical Examiners, for
alleged medical malpractice against him.
The complainants wanted to present Doctorney Pascual himself as their first
witness.
Doctorney objected, citing that he was the respondent in the malpractice case.
He claims that if he testified for the complainants, it would violate his
constitutional right to be exempt from being a witness against himself.
The Board however ruled against him. He was ordered to testify.
He filed an action for prohibition/ injnunction.
He argued that in compelling him to take the witness stand, the Board was guilty,
of grave abuse of discretion for failure to respect the constitutional right against
self-incrimination, the administrative proceeding against him, which could result
in forfeiture or loss of a privilege, being quasi-criminal in character.
The Board on the other hand contended that, the right against self-incrimination
being available only when a question calling for an incriminating answer is asked
of a witness. They likewise alleged that the right against self- incrimination
cannot be availed of in an administrative hearing.
ISSUE: Can he be ordered to testify?
SC: NO. DOCTORNEY PASCUAL WINS.
We conclude that the right against self incrimination is not available only to lawyers,
but such a principle is equally applicable to a proceeding that could possibly result in
the loss of the privilege to practice the medical profession.
The proceeding for forfeiture while administrative in character thus possesses a
criminal or penal aspect. In this case, petitioner would be similarly disadvantaged.
He could suffer not the forfeiture of property but the revocation of his license as
medical practitioner. (deprivation of livelihood)
The right is not limited to just refusing to answer incriminating questions.
The constitutional guarantee protects as well the right to silence. The
accused has a perfect right to remain silent and his silence cannot be used as a
presumption of his guilt." It is the right of a defendant "to forego testimony, to
remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness stand-with undiluted, unfettered
exercise of his own free genuine will."
The principle of humanity on which this right is predicated, precludes all resort to
force or compulsion, whether physical or mental. Current judicial opinion places
equal emphasis on its identification with the right to privacy. The Fifth Amendment
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not force to
surrender to his detriment."
We hold that in an administrative hearing against a medical practitioner for alleged
malpractice, respondent Board of Medical Examiners cannot, consistently with the
self-incrimination clause, compel the person proceeded against to take the witness
stand without his consent.
192
124. ALMONTE VS. VASQUEZ
right against self-incrimination





Almonte was the Commissioner of the EIIB, while Perez was the Budget Chief of
the EIIB.
There was an anonymous letter alleging illegal disbursements of funds from
unfilled positions in the plantilla of EIIB. The letter mentioned a syndicate headed
by Perez who is manipulating funds for ghost agents.
The OMB issued a subpoena duces tecum requiring the Chief Accountant of EIIB,
Mr. Rogado, to produce all documents relating to the Funds of the EIIB, such as
salary vouchers.
Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena. DENIED because the subpoena
was not directed to them but to the Chief Accountant Rogado.
Still Almonte and Perez insisted on the quashal arguing that the Chief Accountant
is a person under their supervision, and that the OMB was doing indirectly what
he could not do directly (ie, compelling them Almonte and Perez, to produce
evidence against themselves).
ISSUE: Can the OMB subpoena the documents?
SC: YES. ALMONTE AND PEREZ CANNOT
INCRIMINATION.
CLAIM
RIGHT
AGAINST
SELF-
It is enough to state that the documents being required to be produced are PUBLIC
RECORDS and those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS who are in possession and custody of the documents.
Moreover, since they claim that the disbursements have already been audited and
cleared by COA, then there is no reason why they should object to the examination
of the documents.
Court directed that the inspection of the subpoenaed documents be made personally
in camera by the OMB. (that is, the public excluded).
193
125. PEOPLE VS. MALIMIT
right against self-incrimination



Accused killed the owner of the store. He took the wallet of the victim containing
his residence certificate, ID, and a bunch of keys. These items were recovered
from the accused.
He was then charged with robbery with homicide.
He argued the admissibility of the wallet and its contents as evidence, claiming it
violates the right against self-incrimination.
SC: We are not persuaded. The night against self-incrimination guaranteed under
our fundamental law finds no application in this case.
The right against self incrimination is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral
compulsion, to extort communications from him. It is simply a prohibition against
legal process to extract from the [accused]'s own lips, against his will, admission of
his guilt. It does not apply to the instant case where the evidence sought to
be excluded is not an incriminating statement but an object evidence.
"If, in other words (the rule) created inviolability not only for his [physical control of
his] own vocal utterances, but also for his physical control in whatever form exercise,
then, it would be possible for a guilty person to shut himself up in his house, with all
the tools and indicia of his crime, and defy the authority of the law to employ in
evidence anything that might be obtained by forcibly overthrowing his possession
and compelling the surrender of the evidential articles a clear reduction ad
absurdum. In other words, it is not merely compulsion that is the kernel of the
privilege, but testimonial compulsion."
Wallet and its contents admissible.
(there was an issue on Sec 12 – rights in custodial investigation – The court said that
the violation of the Miranda rights only makes inadmissible only extrajudicial
confession or admission made during custodial investigation. It does not affect the
admissibility of OTHER KINDS OF EVIDENCE. The admissibility of other evidence,
provided they are relevant to the issue and is not otherwise excluded by law or rules,
is not affected even if obtained or taken in the course of custodial investigation. 
This supports the conclusion that the wallet and its contents are admissible. )
The admissibility of Malaki's wallet, identification card, residence certificate and keys
are for the purpose of establishing other facts relevant to the crime. The wallet is
admissible to establish the fact that it was the very wallet taken from Malaki on the
night of the roberry. The identification card, residence certificate and keys found
inside the wallet, on the other hand, are admissible to prove that the wallet really
belongs to Malaki.
CHAMP
Page 194
2/15/2016
194
126. US. vs. TAN TENG
right against self-incrimination
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

Tan Teng was accused of raping a 7 year old girl.
He was arrested and taken to the police station and stripped of his clothing and
examined. The policeman who examined the defendant swore that his body bore
every sign that he was suffering from the venereal disease known as gonorrhea.
The policeman took a portion of the substance emitting from his body and turned
it over to the Bureau of Science for the purpose of having a scientific analysis
made of the same. The result of the examination showed that the he was
suffering from gonorrhea.
The prosecution relied on the fact that the victim contracted the same disease.
Defendant contended that the result of the scientific examination made by the
Bureau of Science of the substance taken from his body, at or about the time he
was arrested, was not admissible in evidence as proof of the fact that he was
suffering from gonorrhea. The defendant objected to the admissibility of such
evidence upon the ground that it was requiring him to give testimony against
himself.
The objection was overruled upon the ground that "the accused was not
compelled to make any admission or answer any questions, and the mere fact
that an object found upon his person was examined seems no more to infringe
the rule invoked, than would the introduction of stolen property taken from the
person of a thief."
SC: ADMISSIBLE.
The prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against
himself, is a prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion, to extort
communications from him, not an exclusion, of his body as evidence, when it may be
material. The prohibition is simply a prohibition against legal process to extract from
the defendant's own lips, against his will, an admission of his guilt.
Such an inspection of the bodily features by the court or by witnesses, can not
violate the privilege granted under the Philippine Bill, because it does not call upon
the accused as a witness-it does not call upon the defendant for his testimonial
responsibility. Mr. Wigmore says that evidence obtained in this way from the
accused, is not testimony by his body but his body itself.
Also, the substance was taken from the body of the defendant without his objection.
The examination of the substance was made by competent medical authority and the
result showed that the defendant was suffering from said disease. Such evidence
was clearly admissible.
(see original for other examples of bodily inspections)

observing wound on the hands of the accused.

Comparing the hand of the accused with the bloody prints of a hand upon a wall

Causing the prints of the shoes to be made in the sand for comparison.
195
127. BELTRAN VS. SAMSON
right against self-incrimination


The fiscal filed a petition before the court for the purpose of comparing the
petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified.
Petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the
provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own handwriting from the latter.
ISSUE: whether the writing from the fiscal's dictation by the petitioner for the
purpose of comparing the latter's handwriting and determining whether he wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified, constitutes evidence against himself
within the scope and meaning of the constitutional right against self-incrimination.
SC: NOT ALLOWED.
Note in this case, there is no information filed yet, much less a trial. This is only an
investigation prior to the information and with a view to filing it.
While it is true that Professor Wigmore,(of Evidence), says that:
"Measuring or photographing the party is not within the privilege. Nor is the removal
or replacement of his garments or shoes. Nor is the requirement that the Party
move his body to enable the foregoing things to be done. Requiring him to make
specimens of handwriting is no more than requiring him to move his body,
In the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the
hand, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar
writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly
states.
We say that, for the purposes of the constitutional privilege, there is a similarity
between one who is compelled to produce a document, and one who is compelled to
furnish a specimen of his handwriting, for in both cases, the witness is required to
furnish evidence against himself.
Furthermore, the present ease is more serious than that of compelling the production
of documents or chattels, because here the witness is compelled to write and create,
by means of the act of writing, evidence which does not exist, and which may
identify him as the falsifier.
For though the disclosure thus sought be not oral in form, and though the documents
or chattels be already in existence and not desired to be first written and created by
a testimonial act or utterance of the person in response to the process, still no line
can be drawn short of any process which treats him as a witness; because in virtue
of it he would be at any time liable to make oath to the identity or authenticity or
origin of the articles produced."
Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, it should
not be a difficult matter for the fiscal to obtain OTHER genuine specimens of his
handwriting.
(see original)
196
128. PEOPLE VS. ECHEGARAY
right against cruel and unusual punishment

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

Echegaray charged and convicted with raping his 10 year old daughter. He was
sentenced to death pursuant to RA7659, which was the law at the time of
commission of crime.
In appealing the conviction, it raised the constitutionality of the Death Penalty
Law as being severe and excessive, cruel and unusual in violation of the
constitution.
He invokes the ruling in Furman vs. Georgia wherein the US Supreme Court
categorically ruled that death penalty is cruel and degrading.
He also argues that death is an excessive and cruel punishment for a crime of
rape because there is no taking of life in rape. He invokes the ruling in Coker vs.
Georgia which said that while rape deserves serious punishment, it should not
involve the taking of human life. In rape, life is not over for the victim. Death
penalty should only be imposed where the crime was murder.
ISSUE: Is the death penalty cruel and unusual punishment?
SC: NO. VALID LAW.
The penalty is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In the US case of Kemmler, it was
held that punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death. It
implies there something inhuman, barbarous, something more than the
extinguishment of life. It is degrading if it involves public humiliation. The severity is
not sufficient, but must be disproportionate to the crime committed. Excessiveness is
measured by 1) seriousness of the crime, 2) policy of the legislative, 3) perversity of
the accused.
The issue in Furman vs. Georgia is not so much the death penalty itself, but the
arbitrariness pervading the procedures by which the death penalty was imposed by
the jury. The Furman case did not outlaw death penalty because it was cruel and
unusual per se. It was nullified because the discretion in which the statute vested in
trial judges and sentencing juries was uncontrolled and without any parameters,
guidelines, or standards. (There was apparently a discrimination against the accused
who was black.)
With regard to the case of Coker vs. Georgia, the SC held that this case has no
bearing on Philippine experience and culture. Such a premise is in fact an ennobling
of the biblical notion of retributive justice of "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth".
But, the forfeiture of life simply because life was taken, never was a defining essence
of the death penalty in the context of our legal history and cultural experience;
rather, the death penalty is imposed in heinous crimes because the perpetrators
thereof have committed unforgivably execrable acts that have so deeply
dehumanized a person or criminal acts with severely destructive effects, and
because they have so caused irreparable and substantial injury to both their victim
and the society and a repetition of their acts would pose actual threat to the safety
of individuals and the survival of government, they must be permanently prevented
from doing so.
The court also emphasized that under the Constitution, the Congress has the power
to reimpose the death penalty for compelling reasons, involving heinous crimes.
Congress can define or describe what is meant by the word heinous crimes, and can
specify which crimes would qualify as heinous. Thus, the court should not be the
197
venue for debates regarding the morality or propriety of the death sentence because
the law itself already provided for specific and well defined criminal acts.
RA 7659 already sufficiently defined what are heinous crimes – crimes punished with
death are those that are grievous, odious, and hateful by reason of inherent
viciousness, atrocity and perversity, those that are repugnant and outrageous to
common standards of norms and decency and morality in a just, civilized and
ordered society. They also include crimes which are despicable because life is
callously taken, or the victim is treated as an animal or dehumanized.
There is also another concept of the degree of punishment:  that you may NOT
punish a person for what he is, but punish only what he has done. (ex. drug addicts)
See original and bernas primer.
198
129. LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ
non-imprisonment for debt / non-payment of poll tax (cedula)



The petitioners, being charged with BP 22, assail the statute’s constitutionality.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account
or for value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon
presentment, The penalty prescribed is imprisonment of not less than 30 days
nor more than one year or a fine or not less than the amount of the check nor
more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed P200,000.00, or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
Petitioners insist that since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon
the dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee
bank, the statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it
punishes is the non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it
is claimed, is nothing more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt
under the threat of penal sanction.
SC: LAW VALID.
The constitutional prohibition against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that
evolved gradually during the early part of the nineteenth century which permitted
creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It
is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is
not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is
to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an offense
against property, but an offense against public order.
It may be unconstitutional for the legislature to penalize a person for non-payment
of a debt ex contractu. But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. BP
22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making
and issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be abated by the
imposition of penal sanctions. (valid exercise of police power) It had been reported
that the approximate value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million
pesos, and thereafter when overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged
between 50 million to 80 million pesos a day. 26
Checks have the element of certainty or assurance that the instrument will be paid
upon presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a
medium of payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have
come to be perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and
financial transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If
such confidence is haken, the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be
greatly diminished or may become nil. Any practice therefore tending to destroy that
confidence should be deterred, for the proliferation of worthless checks can only
create havoc in trade circles and the banking community.
199
130. CUISON VS. CA
dj
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



The trial court convicted the accused of double murder and ordered him to pay
P30,000 to the heirs of the victim.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction, but increased the indemnity to
P50,000.
The case was remanded to the trial court for the promulgation of the CA decision.
The trial court however promulgated the decision only with respect to the civil
liability. Its dispositive portion only mentioned the civil liability but not the
criminal liability.
The CA ordered the RTC to promulgate the decision anew to include the
affirmance of the conviction.
The accused now invoked DJ that the first promulgation of the CA decision
already terminated the criminal cases.
ISSUE: Can the accused invoke DJ as a defense?
SC: NO.
The promulgation of the decision is not merely incomplete, but also VOID. This is
because the RTC promulgated the decision only with respect to the civil liability.
Thus, it did not effectively terminate the criminal case against the accused.
To claim DJ:
1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
a. upon a valid indictment
b. before a competent court
c. after arraignment
d. after valid plea
e. case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused.
2) first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
3) second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the it includes or is necessarily
included in the first offense charged, or an attempt of frustration thereof
The rule is that a criminal prosecution includes a civil action for the recovery of
indemnity. Thus, a decision in such cases should dispose of both the criminal as well
as the civil liabilities of the accused. In this case however, the RTC promulgated only
the civil aspect of the case, but not the criminal.
Since criminal cases have not been terminated, the first jeopardy has not yet
attached. Hence, DJ cannot propser as a defense.
The promulgation of only one part of the decision (civil liability) is not a bar to the
subsequent promulgation of the other part, the imposition of criminal liability. Double
jeopardy is not violated.
CHAMP Page 200
2/15/2016
200
131. PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA
DJ - termination





Accused was indicted for rape with robbery.
Later. the Asst. Provincial Fiscal filed an information for RAPE with additional
averment that the offense was committed WITH LEWD DESIGNS
Accused pleaded not guilty and filed a MTD contending that the complaint was
fatally defective for failure to allege lewd designs in the original complaint. He
claims that the failure of the complaint filed by the complainant to allege that the
acts committed were with lewd designs did not give the court jurisdiction to try
the case. The subsequent information which contained the averment did not cure
this jurisdictional infirmity.
The court granted the MTD and dismissed the action.
The Fiscal now appealed.
In a complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or "unchaste
motive," for to require such averment is to demand a patent superfluity. It is clear
that the complaint here satisfies the requirements of legal sufficiency of an
indictment for rape as it unmistakably alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge
of the complainant by means of violence and intimidation. As such the court had
already acquired jurisdiction over the case, on the first information filed.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a
quo was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows
that the accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment.
ISSUE: whether the dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the
accused. ISSUE: Does the fiscal’s appeal place the accused in DJ?
SC: NO DJ.
The accused admits that the dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon his
motion to dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that an erroneous dismissal of
a criminal action, even upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or
dismiss, does not bar him from pleading the defense of double jeopardy in a
subsequent appeal by the Government or in a new prosecution for the same offense.
The accused suggests that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the
previous ruling of this Court to the effect that when a case is dismissed, other than
on the merits, upon motion of the accused personally or through counsel, such
dismissal is to be regarded as with the express consent of' the accused and
consequently he is deemed to have waived his right to plead double jeopardy and/or
he is estopped5 from claiming Such defense on appeal by the Government or in
another indictment for the same offense.
The Doctrine of Waiver of DJ provides that when the case is dismissed with the
express consent of the accused, the dismissal will NOT be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because his action in having the case dismissed
CONSTITUTES A WAIVER OF HIS RIGHT, for the reason that he thereby prevents the
court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment against
him. [salico doctrine]
Had the dismissal of the case been anchored on a Motion To Dismiss, the accused
will not be entitled o the protection against double jeopardy.
201
There is also a Doctrine of Estoppel which held that when the trial court dismisses
the case on a disclaimer of jurisdiction upon the instigation of the accused, he is
estopped on appeal from asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in invoking
second jeopardy. The doctrine of estoppel is the same as the doctrine of waiver: the
thrust of both is that A DISMISSAL, OTHER THAN ON THE MERITS, SOUGHT BY THE
ACCUSED IN A MTD, IS DEEMED TO BE WITH HIS EXPRESS CONSENT AND BARS
HIM FROM SUBSEQUENTLY INTERPOSING THE DEFENSE OF DJ ON APPEAL OR IN A
NEW PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE.
There was a lengthy discussion on the different cases of Bangalao, Ferrer and
Labatete which the accused argued abandoned the Salico Doctrine. [see original] but
the point is that the dismissals in those cases cited by the accused were different
from his case since they were all considered acquittals because they were predicated
on the right to speedy trial and the failure of the government to prosecute. Thus,
even if they motion to dismiss was sought by the accused, there is still no waiver or
estoppel. In those cases, the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because of the
failure of government to prosecute the accused, who is presumed innocent.
Thus, the Salico Doctrine remains valid and it presupposes a dismissal not amounting
to an acquittal. Here, the dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of
the accused that the complaint was defective by failure of averments, and such
infirmity affected the jurisdiction of the trial court. But as stated earlier, the dismissal
in this case did not terminate the case on the merits.
2 doctrines of Waiver and Estoppel requires 2 conditions:
1) Dismissal must be sought by the accused personally or through his counsel
2) Such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not amount to an acquittal.
202
132. CUDIA VS. CA
DJ- attachment
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Cudia was arrested in Mabalacat, Pampanga for illegal possession of unlicensed
revolver
The City prosecutor of Angeles City filed in the RTC of Angeles an information for
illegal possession committed in Angeles City.
He pleaded not guilty.
During trial it was shown that the crime was really committed in Mabalacat, not
in Angeles.
Thus the case was re-assigned to another RTC branch (because there was an
internal arrangement among the judges that crimes committed outside Angeles
City can be tried only by certain branches of the RTC).
The Provincial prosecutor now filed a new information charging Cudia with illegal
possession and file a motion to withdraw the first information. Thus, there were
2 separate informations for the same offense filed against Cudia.
Cudia filed a motion to quash the new information on the ground of DJ.
SC:To claim DJ:
1) first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
a. before a competent court
b. upon a valid indictment
c. after arraignment
d. after valid plea
e. case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
2) first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
3) second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the it includes or is necessarily included
in the first offense charged, or an attempt of frustration thereof
ISSUE: Was there a court of competent jurisdiction?
SC: YES. The RTC of Angeles covers the municipality of Angeles City and Mabalacat.
It is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for jurisdiction to try
the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had
jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned. Consequently,
notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City RTCs,
Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in law books is
the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative
policy of any trial court.
ISSUE: Was there a valid complaint or indictment?
SC: NO. It is plainly apparent that the City Prosecutor of Angeles City had no
authority to file the first information, the offense having been committed in the
Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction. It is thus the Provincial
Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should prepare informations
for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles City. An information,
when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be filed by another.
It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or someone
authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction. An infirmity in
the information, such as lack of authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by
silence, acquiescence, or even by express consent.
Therefore, the first jeopardy has not attached yet because of a defective complaint.
He cannot claim DJ.
203
In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the
former prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient
because it was so defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not
have been sustained, its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be
pleaded. As the fiscal had no authority to file the information, the dismissal of the
first information would not be a bar to petitioner's subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy
does not attach where a defendant pleads guilty to a defective indictment that is
voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.
The dismissal of the first defective information does not bar a subsequent
prosecution.
ISSUE: The accused claims that it was the error of the City prosecutor, and this
should not be used to prejudice him.
SC: No. The State is not bound by the mistakes of its officials.
CHAMP Page 204
2/15/2016
Note: If the dismissal occurred during the preliminary investigation, then there is NO
DOUBLE JEOPARDY.
204
133. GUERRERO VS. CA
DJ
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Guerrero was charged with triple homicide through reckless imprudence
Accused was a pilot flying a non-commercial plane which crashed in Nueva Ecija
When the case was submitted for decision, it was raffled to a new judge. (judge
Aquino)
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Judge Aquino ordered the parties to follow-up and complete the transcript of
stenographic notes within 30 days considering that the same was found to be
incomplete. since the parties were not able to complete the transcript of stenographic
notes, the court ordered the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.
petitioner claims that he is entitled to a dismissal of the criminal case equivalent to an
acquittal on the merits based on the violation of his right to speedy trial resulting from
the failure to render a prompt disposition of judgment.”
He also claims, that through no fault of his, seven of the ten witnesses who testified
for the accused will no longer be able to testify anew. So too, three witnesses for the
prosecution have died and thus would not be able to appear during the re-hearing.
And even if all witnesses would be able to testify again, "the passage of a long period
of time spanning more than two decades since the incident complained of will tend to
confuse or hinder than aid the accurate recall of the facts and circumstances of the
case,
Finally he contends that that the re-hearing would place him in double jeopardy
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SC: NO DJ.
In this case, there has been no termination of the criminal prosecution - i.e. of that
"first jeopardy."
In the present case, there has not even been a first jeopardy, since the fourth element dismissal or termination of the case without the express consent of the accused - is not
present. (The case was merely re-raffled). Moreover, measured against the aforequoted
standard, the retaking of testimonies cannot in any wise be deemed a second jeopardy.
Hence, it is beyond dispute that petitioner's claim of double jeopardy is utterly without
basis
To claim DJ:
1. first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
a. before a competent court
b. upon a valid indictment
c. after arraignment
d. after valid plea
e. case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused.
2. first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
3. second jeopardy must be for the same offense, or the it includes or is necessarily included
in the first offense charged, or an attempt of frustration thereof
205
134. TUPAS VS ULEP.
DJ - termination
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2 identical informations were filed against Tupaz in the RTC for nonpayment of
deficiency income tax in 1997
The cases were assigned to different branches. Tupaz was arraigned in the
branch where the second case was filed. He pleaded not guilty there.
The information was amended to change the date of commission. But she was
not re-arraigned on this amended information.
She thus filed a motion for reinvestigation.
Erroneously thinking that the 2nd information was for non-payment of deficiency
contractor’s tax, the prosecution filed a motion to withdraw the case (since the
accused is exempted from paying contractor’s tax). This motion was granted and
the case was dismissed (they thought that the 2 informations were identical).
Later, realizing the mistake, the prosecution filed a motion to reinstate the case.
The accused invoked DJ. She contends that by reinstating the information, the
trial court exposed her to double jeopardy. Neither the prosecution nor the trial
court obtained her permission before the case was dismissed. She was placed in
jeopardy for the first time after she pleaded to a valid complaint filed before a
competent court and the case was dismissed without her express consent.
The Solgen however, argues that reinstating the information does not violate
petitioner's right against double jeopardy. He asserts that petitioner induced the
dismissal of the complaint when she sought the reinvestigation of her tax
liabilities. By such inducement, petitioner waived or was estopped from claiming
her right against double jeopardy. Solicitor General further contends that,
assuming arguendo that the case was dismissed without petitioner's consent,
there was no valid dismissal of the case since Prosecutor Agcaoili was under a
mistaken assumption that it was a charge of nonpayment of contractor's tax.
SC: DOUBLE JEOPARDY!!
The reinstatement of the information would expose her to double jeopardy. An
accused is placed in double jeopardy if he is again tried for an offense for which he
has been convicted, acquitted or in another manner in which the indictment against
him was dismissed without his consent. In the instant case, there was a valid
complaint filed against petitioner to which she pleaded not guilty. The court
dismissed the case at the instance of the prosecution, without asking for accusedpetitioner's consent. This consent cannot be implied or presumed. Such
consent must be expressed as to have no doubt as to the accused's conformity.
As petitioner's consent was not expressly given, the dismissal of the case must be
regarded as final and with prejudice to the re-filing of the case.
Davide dissents:
Not having been re-arraigned on the amended information, which validly supplanted the
original information, the erroneous withdrawal of the information and its subsequent
reinstatement cannot place the petitioner in double jeopardy. Firstly, the withdrawal had no
legal effect since the information was amended. Secondly, petitioner was not arraigned on the
amended information. And, thirdly, petitioner is estopped on the matter since she had asked
for a reinvestigation on the basis of the amended information.
CHAMP
Page 206
2/15/2016
206
135. PEOPLE VS. VELASCO
DJ –
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Mayor Honorato Galvez was charged with murder of Vinculado.
He was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence.
The State now wants the reversal of the acquittal, claiming that the exculpation
of the accused from all criminal liability by Judge Velasco constitutes gadalej. It
is claimed that the Judge deliberately and wrongfully disregarded certain facts,
and exercised gross judicial indiscretion and arbitrariness.
The State claims that there would be no double jeopardy since under US cases,
the double jeopardy clause permits a review of acquittals where there would be
no retrial required should the judgment be overturned.
SC: NOT ALLOWED. (there was a lengthy discussion on the origins of the right and
the different US cases)
This petition for certiorari actually seeks the review of the judgment of acquittal. In
the requisites for DJ, the rules do not distinguish whether it occurs at the level of the
trial court or on appeal. This establishes the FINALITY OF ACQUITTAL RULE. An
acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of DJ, whether it happens at the
trial court or before the appellate court.
The remand to a trial court a judgment of acquittal brought before the Supreme
Court on certiorari cannot be allowed unless there is a finding of mistrial [GALMAN
CASE].
 In the Galman case, DJ cannot be invoked when the SC sets aside the
judgment of acquittal because there was a denial of due process. There was a
sham trial where the President ordered the courts to rig the trial and
predetermine the final outcome of acquittal. A dictated coerced and scripted
verdict of acquittal is a void judgment.
On the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to
the right of repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal. The
philosophy underlying this rule establishing the absolute nature of acquittals if part
of the paramount importance criminal justice system attaches to the protection of
the innocent against wrongful conviction. The finality of acquittal rule is a need for
repose, a desire to know the exact extent of one’s liability.
Also, errors of judgment are not to be confused with errors of jurisdiction. The judge
really considered the evidence received at trial. (testimonies of the relative positions
of victims, trajectory, location of gunshot wounds, etc). While the appreciation
thereof may have resulted in possible lapses in evidence evaluation, it nevertheless
does not detract from the fact that the evidence was considered and passed
upon. Thus, there was no error of jurisdiction. No gadalej. Certiorari does not lie for
mere error in judgment.
Panganiban, separate opinion:
While certiorari may be used to correct an abusive acquittal, it must be shown in that
extraordinary proceeding that the lower court blatantly abused its authority to a
point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to dispense justice. But if the
petition merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the lower court, then
the right against DJ would be violated. Such a recourse is tantamount to converting
the petition for certiorari into an appeal.
207
136. GALMAN VS. SB
DJ
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This is the case of the Ninoy Aquino assassination. The accused were charged
with the killing of Ninoy and Galman. Among the accused were AFP Chief of Staff
General Fabian Ver.
They were acquitted by the Sandiganbayan.
The mother and son of Galman filed this petition alleging that there was mistrial
because the SB committed serious irregularities during the trial, resulting in the
miscarriage of justice. They assert that the Tanodbayan did not represent the
interest of the people, because he failed to exert genuine efforts to present vital
and important evidence for the prosecution.
They also claim that the SB justices were biased, prejudiced and partial in favor
of the accused.
The accused however argue that a re-trial would be placing them double
jeopardy.
SC: It was established, in the Vazquez Commission, that President Marcos (code
name Olympus), stage-managed in and from Malacanang, a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the Aquino-Galman murder case,
and that the prosecution of the case and the Justices who tried and decided the
same, acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their
capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its
position, and to offer all evidence it could have presented, but also predetermined
the final outcome of the case of total absolution of the 26 respondents of all
criminal and civil liability.
President Marcos from beginning to end, misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the
judicial process in the case. There was a secret Malacanang conference at which the
President called the Presiding Justice of the SB, and the entire prosecution panel and
told them how to handle and rig the trial and the close monitoring of the entire
proceedings to assure the pre-determined ignominous final outcome are without
parallel and precedent in our annals and jurisprudence. This is the evil of one man
rule at its very worst.
These cast illegality to the entire trial from the very beginning. No court whose
Presiding Justice received orders or suggestions from a President whose decree made
it possible to refer a case to his court can be an impartial court.
Consequently, DJ does not attach where a criminal trial was a sham. 1) the
proceedings were closely monitored by the President, 2) evidence was suppressed,
3) witnesses were threatened, to secure recantation of testimony 4) trial was
finished only in 6 mos pursuant to a scripted scenario, 5) Presiding Justice’s hostile
attitude against the prosecution.
A dictated and coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal is a void judgment. It is no
judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. It is a lawless thing which can be
treated as an outlaw. Thus the first jeopardy was never terminated.
See original
208
137. MELO VS. PEOPLE
rule on supervening fact – DJ
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Melo was charged with frustrated homicide, for injuring Obillo with a kitchen knife. The
accused suffered serious wounds requiring medical attention for more than 30 days.
He pleaded not guilty.
Subsequently, the victim died from the wounds.
An amended information was filed charging him with consummated homicide.
Melo filed a MTD alleging DJ.
ISSUE: Is the defense of DJ proper?
SC: NO.
The amended information should stand. It was proper for the court to dismiss the first
information and order the filing of a new one for the reason that the proper offense was not
charged in the first and that the second did not place the accused in second jeopardy for the
same or identical offense.
When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction, or in any other matter without the consent of the accused, he cannot again be
charged with the same or identical offense. It must be noticd that the protection for this
constitutional prohibition is against a SECOND JEOPARDY FOR THE SAME OFFENSE, the only
exception being, when the act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal
under either shall constitute a pbar to another prosecution for the SAME ACT. The phrase
SAME OFFENSE means not only that the second offense is exactly the same as the one alleged
in the first information, but also that the 2 offenses are identical. There is identity between the
two offenses when the evidence to support a victim for one offense would be sufficient to
warrant a conviction for the other. THIS IS THE SAME-EVIDENCE TEST.
Under the Rules, there is identity between 2 offense not only when the second offense is
exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the
first, or frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information. An offense is said to be necessarily included in
another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information
constitute the latter, and vice versa. Thus, one who has been charged with an offense cannot
again charged with the same or identical offense through the latter be lesser or greater than
the former.
BUT, this rule of identity DOES NOT APPLY when the second offense was not in existence at
the time of the first prosecution. This is because in such case there is no possibility for the
accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent.
Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy. The rule is that "where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which
the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with
the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense" the accused cannot be
said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense .
Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in
another offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both
offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the
second offense was then inexistent, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first
prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second
jeopardy.
Note also, when a person who has already suffered his penalty for an offense, is charged with
a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein reiterated, said penalty may be
credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.
209
138. PEOPLE VS. CITY COURT MANILA
same offense – ordinance and statutes
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Gonzales was charged with violation of Art 201 of the RPC (exhibition of indecent
and immoral motion pictures).
Later, he was charged with violation of RA3060 (exhibition of motion pictures not
duly passed/ approved by the Board of Censors).
Pleaded not guilty to both. But he later withdrew plea on the RPC case.
He filed a MTQ both informations in the 2 cases on the ground of DJ. He claims
that there is a pending criminal case (RA 3060) where the information allegedly
contains the same allegations as the information in the criminal case (RPC).
The City Court dismissed the RPC case, stating that considering that the basis of
the allegations in the informations were identical, he will be exposed to DJ
because the allegations are not only similar but identical.
The prosecution appealed, arguing that he accused could not invoke the
constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy, when there had been no
conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of criminal proceedings in another
case for the same offense.
Gonzales however, argues that conviction or acquittal in, or dismissal or
termination of a first case is not necessary, so long as he had been put in
jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted in the first case of the same offense.
SC: NO DJ.
The two (2) informations with which the accused was charged, do not make out only one
offense, contrary to private respondent's allegations. In other words, the offense defined in
section 7 of Rep. Act No. 3060 punishing the exhibition of motion pictures not duly passed by
the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures does not include or is not included in the offense
defined in Article 201 (3) of the Revised Penal Code punishing the exhibition of indecent and
immoral motion pictures. The two (2) offenses do not constitute a jeopardy to each other. A
scrutiny of the two (2) laws involved would show that the two (2) offenses are different and
distinct from each other.
The crime punished in RA. 3060 is a malum prohibitum in which criminal intent need not be
proved because it is presumed, while the offense punished in Article 201 (3) of the Revised
Penal Code is malum in se, in which criminal intent is an indispensable ingredient. The
gravamen of the offense defined in RA 3060 is the public exhibition of any motion picture
which has not been previously passed by the Board of Censors for Motion Pictures. The motion
picture may not be indecent or immoral, but if it has not been previously approved by the
Board, its public showing constitutes a criminal offense. On the other hand, the offense
punished in Article 201 (3) of the RPC is the public showing of indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts, or shows, not just motion pictures.Considering these differences in elements and
nature, there is no identity of the offenses here involved for which legal jeopardy in one may
be invoked in the other. Evidence required to prove one offense is not the same evidence
required to prove the other. The defense of double jeopardy cannot prosper.
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be invoked only for the
same offense or identical offenses. A single act may offend against two (or more) entirely
distinct and unrelated provisions of law, and if one provision requires proof of an additional
fact or element which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the
information under one does not bar prosecution under the other. Where two different laws (or
articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle
to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime
involves some important act which is not an essential element of the other.
CHAMP Page 210
2/15/2016
210
139. PEOPLE VS. RELOVA
2 kinds of DJ
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For installing in his iceplant, electrical devices to reduce the reading of electric
current consumption, the accused Opulencia was charged with violation of
Ordinance #1, of Batangas City.
The ordinance penalizes unauthorized installation of devices to decrease
consumption of electricity.
Opulencia pleaded not guilty.
The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription because light felonies
prescribe in 2 months.
A new case was thereafter filed for Theft of Electricity under Art 308 RPC, filed 14
days after the dismissal of the previous case.
He filed a MTQ, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense
charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.
The first information filed was one for unlawful or unauthorized installation of
electrical wiring and devices, acts which were in violation of an ordinance. The
principal purpose for (sic) such a provision is to ensure that electrical installations
on residences or buildings be done by persons duly authorized or adept in the
matter, to avoid fires and accidents due to faulty electrical wirings. it is primarily
a regulatory measure and not intended to punish or curb theft of electric fluid
which is already covered by the Revised Penal Code."
The unauthorized installation punished by the ordinance [of Batangas City] is not
the same as theft of electricity [under the Revised Penal Code]; that the second
offense is not an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof and that the
second offense is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information."
SC:
The rule is that, the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available
although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense
charged subsequently under a national statute such as the RPC, provided that both
offenses spring from the some act or set of acts.
There are two (2) kinds of double jeopardy. The first sentence prohibits double
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, whereas the second contemplates
double jeopardy of punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one may
be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act, provided that he is charged
with different offenses, or the offense charged in one case is not included in, or does
not include, the crime charged in the other case. The second sentence applies, even
if the offenses charged are not the same, owing to the fact that one constitutes a
violation of an ordinance and the other a violation of a statute. If the two charges are
based on one and the same act, conviction or acquittal under either the law or the
ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or
acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double jeopardy of punishment
for the same offense. So long as jeopardy has attached under one of the
informations charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the other case
involving the same offense, even if there has been neither conviction nor acquittal in
either case.
211
Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is
penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the
accused is said to have committed. and which are alleged to have given rise to the
two offenses. The constitutional protection against DJ is available so long as the acts
which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance
are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a
statute.
IN THIS CASE, the accused conceded that he effected or permitted such
unauthorized installation for the very purpose of reducing his electric power bill. This
corrupt intent was thus present from the very moment that such unauthorized
installation began. The immediate physical effect of the unauthorized installation was
the inward flow of electric current into Opulencia's ice plant without the
corresponding recording thereof in his electric meter. In other words, the
"taking" of electric current was integral with the unauthorized installation
of electric wiring and devices.
The identity of offenses that must be shown need not be absolute identity: the first
and second offenses may be regarded as the "same offense" where the second
offense necessarily includes the first offense or is necessarily included in such first
offense or where the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration
thereof. Thus, for the constitutional plea of double jeopardy to be available, not all
the technical elements constituting the first offense need be present in the technical
definition of the second offense. The law here seeks to prevent harrassment of an
accused person by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set or overlapping
sets of technical elements.
When the acts of a person which physically occur on the same occasion and are
infused by a common intent or design or negligence and therefore form a moral
unity, it should not be segmented and sliced, to produce as many different acts as
there are offenses under municipal ordinances or statutes that an enterprising
prosecutor can find.
CHAMP Page 212
2/15/2016
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140. PEOPLE VS. JABINAL
ex post facto law
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Jabinal was a secret agent who was found guilty of illegal possession of firearms
(unlicensed revolver).
On appeal he relied on the case of Macarandang, which cleared Secret Agents
from liability because at the time he was found to possess a certain firearm
without a license, he had nevertheless been appointed from the Governor as
Secret Agent, to assist in the peace and order, with authority to carry said
firearm. In this Macarandang case, the court ruled that the Revised Admin Code
exempts “peace officers” from the requirement of license to possess firearms.
Because Macarandang was then an appointed secret agent, he was also deemed
as a peace officer.
However, in the case of Mapa, this doctrine was abandoned. There, it was stated
that there is no provision for secret agents, hence he is not exempt.
1959 – Macarandang Case.
1962 – Jabinal was appointed as secret agent
1967 – Mapa Case.
1968 – time when Jabinal’s case was decided (convicted)
Jabinal argues that he should be acquitted because was should be applied is the
Macarandang case. He claims that the RTC erred when it retroactively applied the
Mapa case to his case.
SC: ACQUITTED.
The doctrine laid down in Lucero and Macarandang was part of the jurisprudence,
hence, of the law, of the land, at the time appellant was found in possession of the
firearm in question and when he was arraigned by the trial court. It is true that the
doctrine was overruled in the Mapa case in 1967, but when a doctrine of this Court is
overruled and a different view is adopted, the new doctrine should be applied
prospectively, and should not apply to parties who had relied on the old doctrine and
acted on the faith thereof. This is especially true in the construction and application
of criminal laws, where it is necessary that the punishability of an act be reasonably
foreseen for the guidance of society.
Considering that appellant was conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and
Confidential Agent and authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing
doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero, under which no criminal liability
would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a license and
permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be
punished for an act which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.
Note: New doctrines should be applied prospectively and should not apply to parties
who relied on the old doctrine in good faith.
CHAMP
Page 213
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ARTICLE IV AND V – CITIZENSHIP AND SUFFRAGE
141. TECSON VS. COMLEC
citizenship


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
This is the FPJ case. FPJ filed his certificate of candidacy for President. In his
certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his
date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila.
Atty Fornier, filed a disqualification case against FPJ before the Comelec, claiming
that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, his parents were
foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan
Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject.
Atty Fornier, also said that granting, Allan F. Poe Sr. was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an
illegitimate child of an alien mother. He claims FPJ is illegitimate because, first,
Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his
marriage to Bessie Kelley, making his subsequent marriage to Bessie Kelley
bigamous and FPJ an illegitimate child. and, second, even if no such prior
marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the
birth of respondent. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the
citizenship of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen.
Defense: FPJ presented a certification issued by the National Archives that there
appeared to be no available information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the
registry of births, a certification that no available information about the marriage
of Allan F. Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, a certificate of birth of Ronald
Allan Poe, a copy of the purported marriage contract between Fernando Pou and
Bessie Kelley, among many other documents.
SC: Under the Consti, a President can be elected only if he is a natural-born citizen
of the Philippines. The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire
or perfect their Philippine citizenship."
The only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the
documents would be that 1.
The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2.
FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3.
Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4.
The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5.
At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
old.
6.
Allan Poe was a Filipino because his father, Lorenzo Poe, albeit a Spanish
subject, was not shown to have declared his allegiance to Spain by virtue
of the Treaty of Paris and the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship
of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality
for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the
mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support
214
her illegitimate child.
against him.
It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the
1935 Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of
birth of respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither
conditions nor distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of
the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.”
There utterly is no cogent justification to prescribe conditions or distinctions where
there clearly are none provided.
The issue of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have
himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of
his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could
only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old,
Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was
under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his
death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place
of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from
the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine bill had effected in 1902.
That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his
son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during
which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such
children are legitimate or illegitimate.
But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still
would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of
having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation
of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code.
FPJ ALLOWED TO RUN.
CHAMP
Page 215
2/15/2016
DAVIDE, CONCURRING.
For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and
whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to
follow the citizenship of his putative father, pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section 1 of
Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads:
Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: …
(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
I agree with the amici curiae that this provision makes no distinction between
legitimate and illegitimate children of Filipino fathers. It is enough that filiation is
established or that the child is acknowledged or recognized by the father.
OTHERS, CONCURRING:
(They all agree with the amici curiae – the illegitimacy of respondent Poe is
inconsequential in determining whether he is a natural born Filipino citizen.)
215
“For there is really no difference in principle between, on the one hand, the
illegitimate child of a Filipino mother and an alien father, and, on the other hand, the
illegitimate child of a Filipino father and an alien mother. As long as the child’s
filiation to his supposed father is established, it does not matter whether he
is legitimate or an illegitimate child.”
Fr. B says, when the Constitution says: ‘The following are citizens of the Philippines:
… ‘Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines,’ the Constitution means just
that without invidious distinction. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere
debemus, especially if the distinction has no textual foundation in the Constitution,
serves no state interest, and even imposes an injustice on an innocent child. What
flow from legitimacy are civil rights; citizenship is a political right which flows not
from legitimacy but from paternity. And paternity begins when the ovum is fertilized
nine months before birth and not upon marriage or legitimation.”
(Then there are still those who said that the petition is premature since FPJ has not
yet won the election. The disqualification case should be filed only after the
elections.)
CARPIO, DISSENTING.
FPJ is not a natural-born Philippine citizen since there is no showing that his
alleged Filipino father Allan F. Poe acknowledged him at birth.
The Constitution
defines a natural-born citizen as a Philippine citizen “from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect” his Philippine citizenship. Private respondent
Fernando Poe, Jr. does not meet this citizenship qualification.
CARPIO-MORALES, DISSENTING: (she gave the longest dissent of 117-pages)
I am adopting the rule that an illegitimate child of an alien-mother who claims
to be an offspring of a Filipino father may be considered a natural-born citizen if he
was duly acknowledged by the latter at birth, thus leaving the illegitimate child with
nothing more to do to acquire or perfect his citizenship.
(I think that there was still an issue on the citizenship of FPJ’s father. Parang hindi
yata sya Filipino. See original)
Assuming arguendo, therefore, that Allan F. Poe, the putative father of FPJ,
was indeed a Filipino citizen at the time of his birth, no evidence has been submitted
to show that Allan F. Poe did indeed acknowledge FPJ as his own son at birth. In
fact, as emphasized by petitioner Fornier, in the course of the proceedings before the
COMELEC, both parties verified that there was no such acknowledgment by Allan F.
Poe on the dorsal portion of FPJ’s Birth Certificate.
Since FPJ then was born out of wedlock and was not acknowledged
by his father, the only possible Filipino parent, at the time of his birth, the
inescapable conclusion is that he is not a natural-born Philippine citizen.
216
142. MOY YAO VS. COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION
citizenship

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

Yao = husband, aka Edilberto Lim. Yeung = wife.
Earlier, Yeung applied for visa to enter the Philippines as non-immigrant. She was
Chinese resident from Kowloon HKG.
When she was here in the RP, he contracted a marriage with Yao, an alleged
Filipino Citizen.
Because she was overstaying (expired temporary visa), she was ordered arrested
and deported. She filed an injunction against the Immigration to prevent her
arrest.
She claims, under the Revised Naturalization Law, Any woman who is now or
may hereafter be married to a citizen of the Philippines, and who might herself be
lawfully naturalized shall be deemed a citizen of the Philippines." Thus she claims
that she is a Filipino citizen by virtue of her marriage to Yao alias Edilberto Lim
under the Naturalization Laws of the Philippines."
The CID argued that the provision 'who might herself be lawfully naturalized'
incontestably implies that an alien woman may be deemed a citizen of the
Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only, if she possesses all
the qualifications and none of the disqualifications specified in the law, because
these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized.
Yeung while claiming not to be disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she
possesses all the qualifications to be naturalized, naturally because, having been
admitted as a temporary visitor, it is obvious at once that she lacks, at least, the
requisite length of residence in the Philippines. Also, her authorized stay in the RP
was to expire just a little over one month before the expiry date of her stay, it is
evident that said marriage was effected merely for convenience to defeat or avoid
her then impending compulsory departure, not to say deportation. This cannot be
permitted.
SC:
Under the Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a FILIPINA, provided she is not disqualified to be a
citizen of the Philippines under Sec 4 of that law. Likewise, an alien woman married
to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of
her husband the moment he takes his oath as a Filipino citizen, provided that SHE
does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under Sec 4.
The Constitution itself recognizes as Philippine citizens "Those who are naturalized in
accordance with law". Citizens by naturalization, under this provision, include not
only those whose are naturalized in accordance with legal proceedings for the
acquisition of citizenship, but also those who acquire citizenship by "derivative
naturalization" or by operation of law, as, for example, the "naturalization" of an
alien wife through the naturalization of her husband, or by marriage of an alien
woman to a citizen.
The leading idea or purpose of Section 15 was to confer Philippine citizenship by
operation of law upon certain classes of aliens as a legal consequence of their
relationship, by blood or by affinity, to persons who are already citizens of the
Philippines. Whenever the fact of relationship of the persons enumerated in the
provisions concurs with the fact of citizenship of the person to who they are related,
the effect is for said person to become ipso facto citizens of the Philippines.
217
The legislature could not have intended that an alien wife should not be deemed a
Philippine citizen unless and until she proves that she might herself be lawfully
naturalized. Far from it, the law states in plain terms that she shall be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines if she is one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized." The
proviso that she must be one "who might herself be lawfully naturalized" is not a
condition precedent to the vesting or acquisition of citizenship; it is only a condition
or a state of fact necessary to establish her citizenship as a factum probandun, i.e.,
as a fact established and proved in evidence. The word "might," as used in that
phrase, precisely implies that at the time of her marriage to Philippine citizen, the
alien woman "had (the) power" to become such a citizen herself under the laws then
in force.
JBL Reyes dissents:
Our naturalization law separates qualifications from disqualifications; the positive
quatifications under Section 3 thereof express a policy of restriction as to candidates
for naturalization as much as the disqualifications under Section 4. (JBL Reyes seems
to agree with the Commissioner on Immigration here.)
Please see original.
218
143. CO VS. HRET
citizenship – NBC




Ong was proclaimed as the duly elected congressman of Samar (2d).
Co, the losing candidate, filed an election protests on that ground that Ong is not
a natural born citizen of the Philippines.
Ong’s grandfather was from China. He was able to get a certificate of residence
during the Spanish times. Ong’s father was also born in China but was brought to
Samar by the grandfather.
The father grew up and met a natural born Filipina, Lao (mother). They got
married, and Ong was one of the offspring.
SC:
Under the Philippine Bill of 1902, those who were inhabitants of the Philippines who
were Spanish subjects in 1899, and were residing in the Philippines and their
children born subsequently were conferred the status of Filipino citizen.
Here, the grandfather became a permanent resident of the Philippines in 1895
because certificate of residence was issued to him. His grandfather qualified as a
Filipino. His father applied for naturalization and was also declared a Filipino citizen,
only that when he (the father) took his oath of allegiance, Ong (the Congressman)
was only a minor then. His mother was also a natural born citizen.
Thus, it would be unnatural to expect Ong (the Congressman) to still formally elect
Philippine Citizenship when he became of age, since he was already a Filipino citizen
because of the naturalization of his father when he (Ong, the Congressman) was still
a minor. Election of citizenship presupposes that one is an alien. Any election of
Philippine citizenship by Ong would not only be superfluous but also absurd
considering that the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him.
The filing of a sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement only for those
who still have to elect citizenship. But for those like Ong who are ALREADY
FILIPINOS when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. These acts are:, Ong previously passed the CPA
exams, which profession requires Philippine citizenship. He also worked as examiner
in the Central Bank. He is a registered voter, voting during elections. He has
considered himself as a Filipino. These are formal manifestations of his choice of
Philippine citizenship.
He could not have foreseen that the 1987 Constitution would still require him to file a
sworn statement electing Philippine Citizenship. Sec 1, Par 3, should be applied only
to those who elected Philippine citizenship before February 2, 1987. It is curative in
character. Its purpose is to remedy the inequitable situation that would arise if those
born of Filipino fathers and alien mothers would be considered natural-born citizens
and those born of Filipino mothers and alien fathers would not be considered the
same.
219
144. IN RE CHING.
Citizenship

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
Ching was the legitimate son of a Chinese and a Filipino. Ching was born in the
Philippines and has resided here since his birth.
He took up law at SLU, Baguio City, and in 1998, took the Bar.
As proof of his citizenship, he presented the certification from the PRC that he
was already a CPA. He also presented a voter’s certification, and a certification
that he was previously elected as Board member.
Sometime in 1999, he made a formal Affidavit of Election.
The Solgen argued that being a child of a Chinese Father and a Filipino Mother
born under the 1935 Constitution, he was still a Chinese Citizen unless upon
reaching the age of majority, he elected Philippine citizenship. Solgen argued
further that his Philippine citizenship can be perfected only upon election upon
reaching the age of majority. Thus, the argument is that Ching has not yet
formally elected Philippine Citizenship and that assuming he already did, it was
too late.
ISSUE: Was the election of Philippine citizenship taken within reasonable time?
SC: NO.
The opinion of the DOJ interpreted the reasonable time for election as 3 years from
reaching the age of majority, or at 21 years old. Here, he made the election more
than 14 years after reaching the age of majority – beyond the allowable period.
The claim that he has continuously stayed in the Philippines and his being a CPA, a
registered voter, a former public official, CANNOT VEST IN HIM PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of
Philippine citizenship by election.
Under CA 625, the procedure for valid election of Philippine citizenship:
1) statement signed and sworn to by the party, filed with the LCR
2) oath of allegiance
The limit of 3 years can be deduced from the fact that the CA 625 and the 1935
Constitution did not provide for the time within which to elect. It only provided that
election should be made upon reaching the age of majority. At that time, the age of
majority was 21. This is the basis of the DOJ opinion.
220
145. BENGSON VS. HRET
citizenship
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
Cruz was a natural-born citizen. However later, he enlisted in the US Marine
Corps USMC and without consent of the RP, took an oath of allegiance to the US.
He thus lost his Filipino citizenship because under CA43, he loses Filipino
citizenship by rendering service to or accepting commission to the armed forces
of another country.
Subsequently, he was naturalized as US citizen.
Later, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under
RA2630. He ran and won as Congressman of Pangasinan (2d).
His opponent Bengson filed this disqualification case against Cruz. Bengson
claims that Cruz is no longer a NBC, because he has since lost his Philippine
citizenship when he swore allegiance to the US. NBC are those who are citizens
from birth without having to perform any act of acquire or perfect such
citizenship.
Cruz on the other hand, claims that he re-acquired his NBC status when he was
repatriated, since the phrase “from birth” refers to the innate, inherent and
inborn characteristic of being a NBC.
ISSUE: Can Cruz, a natural born citizen, who later became an American citizen, can
still be considered a natural born citizen, after his reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship? YES.
SC: There are 2 ways of acquiring citizenship:
1) by birth – a natural born citizen – a citizen of the country at the time of his birth
2) by naturalization – a naturalized citizen
NBC are those citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to
acquire or perfect his citizenship. Naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino
citizens through naturalization, under the Naturalization Act. To be naturalized he has to prove
that he has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law.
Filipinos who have lost their citizenship may re-acquire the same by:
1) by naturalization
2) by repatriation
3) by direct act of Congress
So, naturalization is both a mode of acquisition and re-acquisition of Philippine citizenship.
Under our law, a former Filipino citizen who wants to re-acquire his Philippine citizenship must
also possess all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided for by law.
Repatriation – simply consists in taking an oath of allegiance, as distinguished from the
lengthy process of naturalization. Repatriation results in the recovery of the original
nationality. This means that if he was originally a natural born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural born citizen.
Here, Cruz lost citizenship when he rendered service to the USMC. He however re-acquired
citizenship under the repatriation law. Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance, Cruz
is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth. THE ACT OF REPATRIATION ALLOWS HIM TO RECOVER
OR RETURN TO HIS ORIGINAL STATUS BEFORE HE LOST HIS PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP.
221
146. MERCADO VS. MANZANO
citizenship



Edu Manzano won as Vice Mayor of Makati. His proclamation was suspended
because a disqualification case was filed against him alleging that he is not a
Filipino citizen but a US citizen.
Edu admitted that his is registered as a foreigner with the BID under and ACR. He
also admits that he was born in SFO and thus considered an American citizen.
However, he also admits that his parents were both Filipinos. Thus,
notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen, he did not lose his
Filipino citizenship. (dual citizen)
Under the Local Gov’t Code, dual citizens are disqualified from running.
ISSUE: is dual citizenship a ground for disqualification?
SC: NO. IT MUST BE UNDERSTOOD AS REFERRING TO DUAL ALLEGIANCE.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The first arises when as a result of
the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states. The second however, refers
to the situation where a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty
to two or more states. Dual allegiance is the result of an individual’s volition, and is
not involuntary.
Clearly, what the constitution refers to is not dual citizens per se, but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance to their countries of origin even
after their naturalization. Thus, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall
under the disqualification under the LGC. As Fr. B pointed out, dual citizenship
is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws of citizenship
of other countries.
Note also that by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for vice mayor, Edu
elected Philippine citizenship and effectively renounced his American
citizenship, thus removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.
The oath of allegiance contained in the certificate of candidacy is sufficient to
constitute renunciation of American citizenship.
How about the fact that he is registered with the BID with an ACR and that he holds
a blue passport (US)? There is no merit in this. Before filing his certificate of
candidacy he really had dual citizenship. These are merely assertions of his
American nationality before the termination of his American citizenship.
Note also that there is no law requiring the election of Philippine citizenship to be
made upon majority age. Considering also the fact that he has spent his youth and
adulthood, got his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and voted in the
past elections here, it leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.
CHAMP
Page 222
2/15/2016
222
147. MAKALINTAL VS. COMELEC
suffrage


Atty.Makalintal assails the constitutionality of the Overseas Absentee Voting Act
of 2003. RA 9189.
Section 5(d) provides:
Sec. 5. Disqualifications. – The following shall be disqualified from
voting under this Act: d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is
recognized as such in the host country, unless he/she executes, upon
registration, an affidavit prepared for the purpose by the Commission
declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical permanent residence in
the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval of his/her
registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has not
applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be cause for
the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification
to vote in absentia.
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


It was argued that Section 5(d) is unconstitutional because it violates Section 1,
Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter must be a
resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election.
Also, he argues that Section 1, does not allow provisional registration or a
promise by a voter to perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political
exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed to circumvent the
requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by providing a condition
thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid residence requirement to
qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right of suffrage should not
be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does not possess the
qualifications
Section 1, Article V of the Constitution specifically provides that suffrage may be
exercised by (1) all citizens of the Philippines, (2) not otherwise disqualified by
law, (3) at least eighteen years of age, (4) who are residents in the Philippines
for at least one year and in the place where they propose to vote for at least six
months immediately preceding the election.
Petitioner questions the rightness of the mere act of execution of an affidavit to
qualify the Filipinos abroad who are immigrants or permanent residents, to vote.
ISSUE: Does Section 5(d) of Rep. Act No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters
who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries by their mere act of
executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violate
the residency requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution?
SC:LAW VALID.
The essence of R.A. No. 9189 is to enfranchise overseas qualified Filipinos. The right
of absentee and disabled voters to cast their ballots at an election is purely
statutory.
Ordinarily, an absentee is not a resident and vice versa; a person cannot be at the
same time, both a resident and an absentee. However, under our election laws and
the countless pronouncements of the Court pertaining to elections, an absentee
remains attached to his residence in the Philippines as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. For political purposes the concepts of
223
residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these
concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for greener
pastures, , to improve his lot and that, of course, includes study in
other places, practice of his vocation, reengaging in business. When
an election is to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve
his lot may decide to return to his native town, to cast his ballot, but
for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may
not absent himself from the place of his professional or business
activities.
So, they are here registered as voters as he has the
qualifications to be one, and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government
especially in national elections.
Despite such registration, the
animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin
has not forsaken him.
This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place
other than his residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to consider
abandonment or loss of such residence of origin.
In other words, “residence” in this provision refers to two residence
qualifications: “residence” in the Philippines and “residence” in the place
where he will vote. As far as residence in the Philippines is concerned, the
word “residence” means domicile, but as far as residence in the place where
he will actually cast his ballot is concerned, the meaning seems to be
different. He could have a domicile somewhere else and yet he is a resident
of a place for six months and he is allowed to vote there. So that there may
be serious constitutional obstacles to absentee voting, unless the vote of
the person who is absent is a vote which will be considered as cast
in the place of his domicile.
The Constitutional Commission recognized the fact that while millions of Filipinos
reside abroad principally for economic reasons and hence they contribute in no small
measure to the economic uplift of this country, their voices are marginal insofar as
the choice of this country’s leaders is concerned. It is clear from these that they
intended to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin.
The fact that a Filipino may have been physically absent from the
Philippines and may be physically a resident of the United States, for
example, but has a clear intent to return to the Philippines, will make him
qualified as a resident of the Philippines under this law.
The execution of the affidavit itself is not the enabling or enfranchising act. The
affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only proof of the intention of the immigrant
or permanent resident to go back and resume residency in the Philippines, but more
significantly, it serves as an explicit expression that he had not in fact abandoned his
domicile of origin. To repeat, the affidavit is required of immigrants and permanent
residents abroad because by their status in their host countries, they are presumed
to have relinquished their intent to return to this country; thus, without the affidavit,
224
the presumption of abandonment of Philippine domicile shall remain.
The rationale for this, is that we want to be expansive and all-inclusive in
this law. That as long as he is a Filipino, no matter whether he is a greencard holder in the U.S. or not, he will be authorized to vote. But if he is
already a green-card holder, that means he has acquired permanent
residency in the United States, then he must indicate an intention to return.
This is what makes for the definition of “domicile.”
Section 5(d) does not only require an affidavit or a promise to “resume actual
physical permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three years from
approval of his/her registration,” the Filipinos abroad must also declare that they
have not applied for citizenship in another country. Thus, they must return to the
Philippines; otherwise, their failure to return “shall be cause for the removal” of their
names “from the National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent
disqualification to vote in absentia.”
He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this
country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country
does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile
of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity
to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by
executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law.
ISSUE: What happens to the votes cast by the qualified voters abroad who were not
able to return within three years as promised? What is the effect on the votes cast
by the non-returnees in favor of the winning candidates?
SC: The votes cast by qualified Filipinos abroad who failed to return within three
years shall not be invalidated because they were qualified to vote on the date of the
elections, but their failure to return shall be cause for the removal of the names of
the immigrants or permanent residents from the National Registry of Absentee
Voters and their permanent disqualification to vote in absentia.
See original.
CHAMP Page 225
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