JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY
Fall, 2010
SYLLABUS
Political Science 190.673: Institutional Analysis
Professor Joseph Cooper
I. Introduction
A. This seminar explores what may be seen as two primary research traditions in
political science in order to understand and analyze the role and impacts of institutions in
political life. Though individual authors vary in their degree of adherence to the basic
epistemological and methodological assumptions that define their research position and
can apply them in divergent ways, these traditions can nonetheless be distinguished by
the differences in their assumptions on the character and possibility of “scientific”
knowledge, the priority to be given to distinct levels of analysis, and the forms of analysis
that should underlie explanation. The seminar defines one research tradition, primarily
represented by various approaches that emphasize individual intent and instrumental
action, as a micro or rational actor approach. It defines the other, primarily represented by
a variety of analysts who emphasize the impacts of context, beliefs, and/or institutions, as
a macro or structural approach. Each tradition understands that its approach to analysis
needs to deal with and integrate the aspects of social reality its primary assumptions make
problematic, the macro level for rational actor approaches, and the micro level for
contextual and structural approaches. Over time this joint recognition has promoted
learning and accommodation among many, though not all, adherents of these two
research traditions. Nonetheless, due to underlying epistemological and methodological
commitments, researchers in each tradition still desire to solve problems in terms of the
canons of their own tradition. Thus, differences remain critical and the elements of
overlap and accommodation that have developed over time do not mean that important
differences of view and approach and ultimately understanding and explanation do not
persist. It is the assumption of the seminar that students need to understand these features
and differences both to understand the field of political science and to make informed and
intelligent research decisions of their own. Given the importance of institutions in
political life, the aim of the seminar is thus to provide a roadmap to understanding
different approaches to understanding and explaining politics.
B. Seminar participants are required to take responsibility for reporting on x
weeks of the reading. You will be asked to choose which x weeks you prefer. In addition,
students will have the option of a final paper or a final exam. If chosen, the paper should
be on the order of 18-20 pages and analyze a theme or topic treated in the readings or
related to the concerns of the seminar. A brief outline of the final paper that you discuss
with me and I approve is required before October 22. If you miss this deadline, you must
take the final exam. As for the final paper itself, no extensions will be granted past xxxx.
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Grading will be based on class participation, including performance as seminar reporter
(40%) and exam or paper (60%).
C. My email is jcooper@jhu.edu. My office hours are Friday from 1:30-3:00pm.
D. There are six books recommended for purchase at the bookstore. These include
the Laver, Bueno De Mesquita, Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, Pierson, and Knoke books
listed below. All other readings are on electronic reserve. These can be accessed at
http://reserves.library.jhu.edu, There will also be print copies of the books recommended
for purchase on regular reserve. Note that the code to access the readings on the Library’s
web page is COO673.
II. Reading Assignments
Part One
Rational Actor Approaches
A. Fundamentals of Rational Choice (Sept. 10)
1. S.M. Amadae and Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, “The Rochester School: The Origins of
Positive Political Theory”, 2 Annual Review of Political Science 269-95 (1999).
2. James Alt and Kenneth Shepsle, eds., Perspectives on Positive Political Economy.
pp.163-182 (Riker Chapter).
3. Charles Stewart, Analyzing Congress, pp. 3-49 (Chapter on spatial analysis).
4. Herbert Weisberg, ed., Political Science: The Science of Politics, pp. 51-82 (Shepsle
Chapter).
5. Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory, pp. 13-32.
B. The Problem of Collective Action (Sept. 17)
1. Kenneth Shepsle and Mark Bonchek, Analyzing Politics: Rationality,
Behavior and Institutions, pp. 197-296.
2. Michael Laver, Private Desires, Political Action, pp. 18-67
C. Explaining Politics: Transaction Costs, Agency, and Credible Commitment (Sept. 24)
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1. Jay Barney and William Hesterly, “Organizational Economics: Understanding the
Relationships Between Organizations and Economic Analysis” in Stewart Clegg and
Cynthia Hardy, eds., Handbook of Organization Studies, pp.115-130.
2. James Alt, Margaret Levi, and Elinor Ostrom, eds., Competition and Cooperation:
Conversations with Nobelists about Economics and Political Science, pp. 197-253.
3. Charles Perrow, Complex Organizations. pp. 219-258.
4. Douglass North et al , “Order, Disorder, and Economic Change”, in Bruce Bueno De
Mesquita and Hilton Root, eds., Governing for Prosperity, pp. 17-59 (Chapter 2).
D. Explaining Party Politics: Ambition and Agency (Oct. 1)
1. Steven Smith, Party Influence in Congress, pp, 114-177.
2. David Brady and Mathew McCubbins, eds., Party, Process, and Political Change in
Congress, Stanford University Press, 2002, pp. 107-146.
3. Laver, pp. 68-88 and 110-159
E. Explaining Persistence and Change: (Oct. 8)
1. Avner Grief and and David Laitin, “A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change”,
American Political Science Review 98:633-653 (Nov., 2004).
2. Robert Bates, et al, ed., Analytic Narratives, pp.148-194 (Weingast Chapter).
3. Ira Katznelson and Barry Weingast, eds. References and Situations, pp. 161-185
(Weingast Chapter).
4. Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, eds, Ideas and Foreign Policy, pp.173-207.
(Garrett and Weingast Chapter).
5. Robert Bates et al, “The Politics of Interpretation: Rationality, Culture, and Transition”,
Politics and Society, Vol. 26, pp. 603-642 (December, 1998).
F. Perfecting Rational Choice Analysis: Alternative Strategies (Oct. 15)
1. Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of
Collective Action”, 92 American Political Science Review 1-22 (March, 1998).
2. Bates et al, Analytic Narratives, pp. 4-19 and 231-241.
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3. Bruce Bueno De Mesquita, The Predictioner’s Game, pp. 29-66 and 86-140.
4. Ian Shapiro, Stephen Skowronek, and Daniel Galvin, eds., Rethinking Political
Institutions, pp.32-72 (Moe Chapter).
Part Two
Structural and Cognitive Approaches
A. Problems and Issues in Institutional Analysis (Oct. 22)
1. Sven Steinmo, et al, Structuring Politics, Historical Institutionalism in Historical
Perspective, pp. 1-32.
2. Peter Hall and Rosemary Taylor, “Political Science and Three New Institutionalism”,
Political Studies, Vol. 44, pp. 936-957 (1996).
3. R.A.W. Rhodes et al, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, pp. XII-XVII,
3-23 and 36-75 (Preface and Chapters 1 and 3-4).
4. W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations, 3rd Edition. pp. 47-91 (Chapters 3-4)
B. Historical Institutionalism: State and Society (Oct. 29)
1. Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds., Political Science: State of the Discipline, pp.
693-722. (Pierson and Skocpol Chapter)
2. James Mahoney and Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in
the Social Sciences, pp. 3-91 (Chapters 1-2).
3. Peter Hall and David Soskice, Varieties of Capitalism, pp. 1-68.
C. Historical Institutionalism: Institutional Change and Development (Nov. 5)
1. Paul Pierson, Politics in Time, pp. 17-103 and 133-166.
2. Shapiro, Skowronek, and Galvin, eds., Rethinking Political Institutions, pp. 135-171
(Thelen Chapter).
3. Katznelson and Milner, eds., Political Science: State of the Discipline, pp.. 737-754
(part of Orren and Skowronek Selection).
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D. Reframing Analysis: Mechanisms, Organizational Networks, and Power (Nov. 12)
1. Rhodes et al, eds., Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions pp. 75-90.
2. David Knoke, Political Networks, pp. pp.1-85 and 175-241
3. Tulia G. Falleti and Julia F. Lynch, “ Context and Causal Mechanisms in Political Analysis”,
Comparative Political Studies 42:1143-1163 ( 2009).
E. Constructivist Institutionalism (Nov. 19).
1. Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist Research
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics”, 4 Annual Review of
Political Science 391-416, 2001.
2. Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture,
and Structure. 2nd Edition, pp. 193-220 (Blyth Chapter).
3. Robert Lieberman, “Ideas, Institutions and Political Order: Explaining Political
Change”, American Political Science Review 96:697-713 (Dec., 2002).
4. Shapiro, Skowronek, and Galvin, eds., Rethinking Political Institutions, pp. 91-113
(Smith Chapter)
F. Perfecting Institutional Analysis: Explanation and Method (Dec. 3).
1 Mahoney and Rueschemeyer, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences,
pp. 373-404 (Hall Chapter).
2. Henry Brady and David Collier, eds., Rethinking Social Inquiry, pp. 3-21 and 229-266.
3. Lichbach and Zuckerman, eds., Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure.
2nd Edition, pp. 72-96 (Zukerman Chapter).
4. Katznelson and Weingast, eds. References and Situations, pp. 129 -161 (Hall Chapter).
5. Shapiro, Smith, and Masoud, eds, Problems and Methods in the Study of Politics, pp.
42-67 (Smith Chapter).
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