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Culture and the Self: Implications for Social Identity Theory
Background:
During the late 1960’s and the early 1970, meta-theoretical debates and conflicts within social
psychology were highly salient. Many worried that social psychology was reductionism,
unsophisticated and blind to the role of language, history and culture. This is referred to as the
crisis in social psychology (Hogg & Williams, 2000). The arrival of Social identity theory
(SIT) developed by the late Henry Tajfel was seen as one of the solutions to this crisis. The
SIT sought to deindividualize explanations of group phenomena by specifying individual
cognitive processes and wider social processes, and the way they interrelate to give group and
inter-group behaviour its characteristic form as well as its contextually specific expression
(Hogg & Williams, 2000). However, it can be argued that the SIT in-fact did not represent so
much a solution to the crisis mentioned above. The theory is collectivistic in nature, in that it
focuses on collective phenomena such as prejudice and inter-group conflict, but its
motivational assumptions about the self is problematic. This problem becomes evident in
cross-cultural studies on self and group-enhancement tendencies. Before I take this critique
further, I will outline the basic rationale of social identity theory.
The theory can be said to contain three basic components: Social categorisation, social
comparison, and a need for a positive social identity. These processes are underpinned by an
individual self-enhancement motive in the service of self-esteem (Hogg & Williams, 2000).
All three components of the theory have generated massive empirical support. Extensive
reviews of these different processes are far beyond the scope of this paper. However the aim
here is to question the motivational aspect of the theory, and its relation to culture. Shortly
described, SIT says that we are generally motivated to see ourselves positively rather than
negatively, and since part of our self-image is defined in terms of our group memberships,
there will be a preference for seeing the in-group in a positive light in relation to any outgroup. This tendency to make biased inter-group comparisons is the motivational core of the
theory (Brown, 2002a). Furthermore, it assumes a direct causal relationship between selfesteem and inter-group discrimination. The Self-esteem hypothesis within the theory was
encapsulated by Abrams and Hogg in the form of two corollaries (Abrams & Hogg, 1988):
The first, positive inter-group differentiation result in elevated self-esteem (e.g. People feel
better about themselves having judged the in-group more favourable than the out-group). And
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second, people with initially depressed self-esteem will show more differentiation in order to
raise it to normal levels.
Social Identity, Motivation, and Self-Esteem
The theory as described above has been object for criticism. For instance, Turner & Reynolds
(2000), argue that the self-esteem hypothesis is in-fact not a part of the original theory. They
argue that the need for positive self-evaluation does not equate with an individual level
motive. The self-esteem hypothesis has indeed generated mixed results (Brown, 2000). Selfesteem and positive distinctiveness represent different levels of analysis, and they are
therefore not necessarily mechanically connected. Social identity processes are expected to
come into play where social identity is salient, and under such conditions people act in terms
of their shared social identity, not in terms of their personal self-esteem (Turner & Reynolds,
2000).
As mentioned earlier, the aim in this paper is to question the motivational aspect of the theory.
This doesn’t necessarily mean the self-esteem hypothesis. Even if we leave the self-esteem
hypothesis out of the equation, the need for positive distinctiveness remains motivational in
nature. This is because a consequence of the motive for positive distinctiveness, according to
SIT, is the tendency to make inter-group comparisons that favours the in-group. In this way
the theory with or without the self-esteem hypotheses, implies that the process of making
inter-group comparisons that are evaluative in nature, a motivational process that emerges
from the self.
In-Group Bias and Self-Enhancement
The heavily documented phenomenon of in-group bias is often explained in terms of social
identity processes, from Tajfel’s minimal group paradigm (Tajfel et. al., 1971), to in-group
bias in more realistic contexts (e.g., Bourhis & Giles, 1977; Breakwell, 1978). In the typical
experiment, a threat to social identity in a group in which the members identify is
hypothesised to facilitate the motive for positive distinctiveness. The typical result is that the
“threat” group shows more in-group bias on a range of dimensions compared to a non-threat
control group.
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However, cross-cultural studies have shown that group serving biases are not that common in
collectivist cultures (e.g., Kitayama, Marcus, Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Two
studies are illustrative:
Heine & Lehman (1997) conducted two studies in which the aim was to see if there were any
differences in self-serving and group-serving biases between Canadians and Japanese
students. They found support for their hypotheses that the Japanese would show less selfserving bias and less group serving bias than Canadians. They even found evidence for a
group-effacing bias. The lower-status university students actually rated the higher-status
university students more positively than the higher-status university students rated
themselves. In addition, they found support for the idea that differences in self-serving biases
are paralleled by differences in group-serving biases. This suggests that motivations for
enhancing one’s self and for enhancing one’s group are similar.
In another study, Kitayama et al. (2003) found cross-cultural differences in in-group bias
between Americans and Japanese students. The strength of this study is that the hypothesis
was tested in the openly competitive, emotionally charged contexts that are known to
exacerbate in-group bias. They compared amount of in-group bias among students before and
after a university football match between two Japanese teams and between two American
teams. The results revealed that both American teams showed in-group bias through
evaluations of their universities. Japanese ratings on the other hand, reflected the universities
status in the larger society. One important note however, is that time (Before versus after the
game) did not affect amount of in-group bias among American students. Americans students
did not restore their self-images by derogating the winners after losing, as social identity
theory might predict. The authors suggest that this null-effect might be due to small sample
size and that there were no upset in the game’s outcome. The team that was predicted to loose
did lose, whereas the teams that were expected to win did win.
These studies suggest that motivations for self-enhancement vary across cultures. The authors
of these studies attribute the observed difference in amount of in-group bias to different
construals of the self.
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Culture and the Self
Markus & Kitayama (1991) distinguish between two types of self-construals, namely the
independent and interdependent self. They argue that these differences have implications for
cognition, emotion and motivation. According to the independent model, the self is
understood and experienced as bounded, autonomous entity made up of unique, stable and
internal attributes. Because self-image is derived from stable traits, it is important that the
individual feel positive about them. Moreover, it is the individual’s responsibility to express
them (Heine & Lehman, 1997). In this way the independent model of self give rise to
processes like “self-actualisation”, “realizing oneself” and expressing ones unique
configuration of capacities. So according to this, self-enhancement is observed because
western culture encourages people to think positively about themselves as a mean to approach
the culturally defined ideals of independence and autonomy (Heine & Lehman, 1997).
The interdependent self on the other hand is understood as relational, contextual, and socially
situated. This model is not made up of stable traits, but of tangible relationships with other
people in given situations. These relationships are affirmed and maintained by harmonizing
with and meeting expectations of relevant others (Heine & Lehman, 1997). The goal is to fit
themselves into meaningful relationships. In this way an evaluation of one’s self that is
separate from the social context, may not be the primary concern (Kitayama, Marcus,
Matsumoto, & Norasakkunkit, 1997). Thus in some cultures, Self-criticism rather than selfenhancement may be more culturally valued.
However, it could be that self-enhancement is an attribute of both models, only that there are
different aspects of the self that is being enhanced. This is referred to as the difference in
content view (Heine & Lehman, 1997). Because of the strong group orientation in the
interdependent model, one could perhaps predict even stronger in-group bias effects in
cultures that foster the interdependent model of the self. The studies cited above however, do
not support that assumption. In explaining their results Heine & Lehman (1997) argue that
because there is so little emphasis on feeling positively about the self in Japan, both self and
group serving biases are attenuated and even sometimes even reversed. Kitayama et al. (2003)
explains their results in a similar way. Westerner’s may be compelled to view their own ingroups superlative across all measures and contexts (stable trait based self). Because of the
more malleable, relationship-based and situationally variable model of the self, Japanese
participants may be more likely to vary the relative rankings of in-groups and out groups
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across measures and contexts, thereby acknowledging the dimensions on which their in group
need improvement.
Implications for Social Identity Theory
The idea that we become motivated to discriminate the in-group positively from the out-group
when the group becomes a part of our self-definition, relies heavily on Festinger’s (1954)
social comparison theory, which says that our group evaluations are relative in nature. We
assess our own groups worth by comparing it with other groups (Brown, 2002b). Within
social identity theory, the goal of this comparison process is not accuracy, but selfenhancement (Hogg & Williams, 2000). The motivational engine which gives direction to the
process of social categorisation can thus be argued to be located in the individual self. In other
words, the motive can be seen as an individual need that is extended to in-group boundaries.
In this way the theory holds important presumptions about the nature of the self, in that it
contains a need for self-enhancement or positive distinctiveness. In several publications this
need has been referred to as a motive (e.g., Brown, 2002a; Houston & Andreopoulou, 2003;
Hogg & Williams, 2000). From this it follows that the tendency to make biased inter-group
comparisons should be a universal phenomenon. However, as illustrated above, the need for
self-enhancement varies across cultures. The results from the cross-cultural studies indicate
that the need for self-enhancement is for the most part absent in the Japanese motivational
repertoire, as the cultural mandated task of achieving interdependence is not aided by selfenhancement. On the contrary, Japanese culture encourages people to have a self critical view
of themselves (Heine & Lehman, 1997). The study by Heine & Lehman suggests that this
habitual self-critical orientation may extend to encompass one’s group, thereby showing less
in-group bias.
So, it may be that the purpose of social comparison in Japan is not self-enhancement, but self
criticism (Kitayama et. al, 2003). This suggests that the motive for self enhancement is
restricted to the independent model of the self. Social identity theory postulates that we have a
need for achieving positive distinctiveness for our group, which some argue parallels the need
for positive self-esteem. The question is whether this process is a reflection of the selfenhancement motive that Heine & Lehman argue is connected to the independent model of
the self.
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On the basis of this, the research question is then: Is the motivational core of social identity
theory dependent on culture? A plausible way of answering this is to do experiments in
different cultures in situations where SIT would predict inter-group bias. It is important to
note that SIT does not assume a direct causal connection between in-group identification and
in-group bias. Some group do in-fact look at themselves as inferior to other groups. The point
is that, according to SIT, in-group bias is only one of the possible strategies that can be
pursued to achieve positive distinctiveness (other being “individual mobility” and “social
creativity”) (Turner & Reynolds, 2000). Mediating factors are the relative status position of
the groups, the perceived impermeability of group boundaries, and the nature of the perceived
status differences on the relevant dimension. For example low status groups tend to be
discriminatory when their position is unstable and illegitimate but not when it was secure
(Turner & Reynolds, 2000).
Controlling for these variables one could determine whether SIT’s predictions are mediated
by culture. The question is whether the cultural differences in self and group-enhancement
reported in the different studies above (e.g., Heine & Lehman, 1997), would influence social
identity processes. Markus & Kitayama (1991) argues, as mentioned, that different construals
of the self, namely the interdependent and independent model, give rise to differences in
cognition, emotion and motivation. One of the assumed differences in motivation is that
independent selves are motivated to enhance one’s self, while interdependent selves are more
self-critical to one’s self. The results from the cross-cultural studies above (Heine & Lehman,
1997; Kitayama et al., 2003) indicate that these differences in self-serving biases are
paralleled by differences in group-serving biases. In particular, if one could show that these
differences also are evident in experiments where SIT would predict inter-group bias
(controlling for the appropriate variables), the universality claim of the motive will be
falsified. The motive for positive distinctiveness within SIT may thus be restricted to cultures
that foster the independent model of the self. The motive for positive distinctiveness may
accordingly be better described and understood as a reflection of cultural values and beliefs
which are embedded in westerner’s self-construals.
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