Jānis Taurens
THEORIES OF LINGUISTIC MEANING IN THE SEMANTICS OF
ARCHITECTURE
Summary
1. THE SUBJECT OF THE WORK
1.1. The place and significance of the subject in contemporary philosophy
The philosophical interpretation of architecture is one of the themes of aesthetics
which is not in the centre of consideration for philosophers. Of minor interest the
aesthetics of architecture is in the analytical tradition of philosophy. The investigation
proposes a new approach in the aesthetics of architecture based on its semantical
interpretation and on the assumption of its essential similarity with verbal language. The
interpretation of architecture using its similarity with verbal language, in other words, the
question of whether architecture can be regarded as a language, whether it is possible to
use the term "architectural meaning" non-metaphorically is a controversial issue for
which different answers can be found. To solve the problem demands the assumption of a
certain interpretation of verbal language and the semantics of architecture. The claim of
this research is that it is possible to form a semantics of architecture based on the
analytical philosophy of language. The work is based on a certain understanding of the
main tendencies in the analytical philosophy of language, which is reflected in the choice
of authors and works for analysis and therefore this understanding has a particular place
among the interpretations of both architecture and the philosophy of language.
The multiplicity of the various opinions on whether architecture may be
interpreted as a language is depending on what we understand by language. We can point
out several ideas of language found in 20 century philosophy that may also serve as the
basis for the interpretation of architecture: (1) the logical model for language that began
with the work of Frege, (2) theories of language based more upon the actual users (Austin
and Wittgenstein), (3) the double articulation of language in the semiology and
linguistics, (4) the Chomskian conception of generative grammar, (5) the dichotomy
between langue and parole or code and message, (6) the behaviouristic nature of
linguistic understanding and (7) language as a symbol system (Goodman). 14 Of the
preceding list of models of understanding language, the first two agree partly with what
has been analysed in more depth in this work; however, the "logical model for language"
and the approach "based more upon the actual users" are not seen as two separate ideas
about language but a direction of development of a particular tradition of analysis of the
philosophy of language. The possibility to apply the above mentioned direction and its
conceptual apparatus in the interpretation of architecture is very little investigated,
therefore it is assumed essential to create the semantical aesthetics of architecture or, in
other words, to create models of architectural meaning based on the particular
understanding of verbal language.
Various reasons may be given for the existence of different opinions on the use of
the conceptual apparatus of verbal language theory in the interpretation of architecture.
Firstly, there are different approaches and theories in the analytical tradition itself
including the issue of such an important term in the philosophy of language as
"meaning". Secondly, theoreticians of architecture have mainly relied on the semiotic
tradition and its central notion of the symbol; this is tied to the relationship of the
signifier and the signified in which, on closer examination, the question of the syntactic
structure of linguistic expressions and the semantic roles of the respective expressions is
secondary. Thirdly, and this relates to the critical attitude towards the notion of the
language of architecture, in the analytical tradition the analysis of verbal language has
been dominated by truth-conditional semantics for which it has been apparently difficult
to find an equivalent in the interpretation of architecture.
This work attempts to update the use of the relatively little developed conceptual
apparatus of the analytical philosophy of language for the modelling of the questions of
the semantics of architecture. It presents a particular view and the essential aspects of the
tendencies in the development of the philosophy of language understanding individual
14
This is the way how Martin Donougho, in his article The Language of Architecture, attempts to systemise
different approaches in which we may speak of architecture as a language. Although the article was
published in 1987, it nevertheless characterises the wider context of the problem sufficiently well. See
Donougho, M. "The Language of Architecture"// Journal of Aesthetic Education, 1987, 21:3, pp. 57-58.
27
philosophical theories of language as models whose use and justification depends on the
concrete questions these models are intended to answer.
j
1. 2. The subject in the context of Latvian philosophy
In Latvia there have been relatively few publications dealing with the analytical
philosophy of language. Up till now these have mainly been articles by Jānis Vējš, Jurģis
Šķilters and Jānis Taurens for the magazine Kentaurs XXI, the almanac Filosofija and for
other collections of articles and conference materials. 15 There are, of course, the books by
Jānis Vējš Lingvistiskā filozofija (Linguistic Philosophy) and Versija par Vitgenšteinu (A
Version of Wittgenstein). 16 The interpretation of architecture using the conceptual
apparatus of the philosophy of language can only be found in the publications of the
current author.17 Therefore this work is especially topical as it fills a definite niche in the
space of Latvian philosophy and creates a base for further research on language and
architecture.
1.3. Aim and method
1. 3. 1. Aim of the work
The aim of this work is to show that it is possible to use analytical philosophical
research on the semantics and pragmatics of language or, to be more precise, the
conceptual apparatus of various theories of language philosophy to model the
understanding of architecture. Thus the assumption is defended that architecture is
language in the non-metaphorical sense of the word by making its meaning concrete in a
specific way in the context of the interpreted analytical philosophy of language. Using
this approach, a negative answer to the question of whether architectural meanings are
analogous to linguistic meanings is also logically possible. In the case of a positive
15
All the main publications as well as the fragments from the basic texts on the analytical philosophy of
language translated into Latvian are mentioned in the bibliography of this work.
16
Vējš, J, Lingvistiskā filozofija, Riga: Avots, 1981; Vējš, J., Versija par Vitgenšteinu, Riga: Pētergailis,
1997.
17
See the list of the author's publications in the appendix to the summary.
28
answer, one of the aims of this work, the differences between verbal language and
architecture should be conceptualised within the limits that must be imposed on the use of
the semantic terms of verbal language in the interpretation of architecture.
The complementary nature of semantics and pragmatics that we can see in the
development of philosophical models of language in analytical philosophy offers the
opportunity, by using the conceptual apparatus of philosophy, to include manifold,
architecturally important instances (though unconnected with specific buildings) in the
analysis of architectural meaning. On the other hand, the "classical semantics" as the
basis of this tradition whose origins may be found in the writings of Frege and early
Wittgenstein, permits the opportunity of a narrower interpretation of archi tectural
meaning - as being tied only to concrete architectural expressions. The possibility of
these two models and the examination of their mutual relationships in the semantics of
architecture is another task of this investigation.
An indirect aim of this work could be considered to be the justification of its
assumption and interpretation of the theory of the meaning of notions by showing the
paths of construction of the semantics of architecture in the conceptual apparatus based
on these assumptions and philosophical interpretation. Thus the investigation itself may
be regarded as belonging to the philosophy of language broadening its field of reflection.
In its future development there could also be more precise insights into the various
philosophical models of verbal language and the possibilities for their use.
1. 3. 2. Method of investigation
In the literature that compares various artistic means of expression, cultural
phenomena and verbal language we do not encounter a comprehensive methodological
reflection on the conditions for these comparisons. Perhaps the only methodological
notion is Douglas Hofstadter's term "isomorphism", which he uses to explain Bach's
music, Escher' graphics and Gödel's Theorem. Hofstadter borrows this notion from
mathematics and gives it a simple definition at the beginning of his work: "The word
"isomorphism" applies when two complex structures can be mapped onto each other, in
such a way that to each part of one structure there is a corresponding part in the other
29
structure, where "corresponding" means that the two parts play similar roles in their
respective structures."18 By using this notion, we may speak of the isomorphism of the
verbal and architectural languages, or more precisely, the isomorphism of particular
models of their interpretation. Differences in the models will determine the restrictions on
the notions used in their conceptual apparatus. To understand these restrictions we must
define our approach to the notion of the language of architecture - either its purely
metaphorical or its strict usage.
It is not possible when constructing models of understanding architecture to cover
all the characteristic situations in the perception of architecture or to form a single
universal model. Therefore, for this investigation we have selected specific paradigmatic
models in the belief that in most cases of sufficiently complicated architectural situations,
it nevertheless possible to obtain simpler models relating to other situations.19
Interpretations of the philosophy of language may also be regarded as specific
constructions and therefore in this investigation, the various attempts of analytical
philosophy to conceptualise the workings of language are not understood as the search
for a single correct theory of meaning that would give an insight into the essence of
language. The various approaches and theories should not be seen as contradictory rivals,
even though their conceptual premises and instruments are often best revealed in their
mutual polemic. They should rather be seen simply as different models of the
conceptualisation of language that mark out the logical space of possible solutions. These
models are the material that philosophical reflection can use in the theory of architecture.
It is therefore important to define the tendencies in the development of the theory of
linguistic meaning in order to evaluate which aspect of the wide area of philosophical
discussion deserves more detailed examination. The setting out of these tendencies in the
first part of this investigation has been influenced by the aim of the investigation, the
reason why it has been undertaken, that is, there is feedback between the interpretation of
architecture and the language of philosophy.
18
Hofstadter, D. R_, Godel Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid, Penguin Books, 1980, p. 49.
19
We could say: to attain models with less logical multiplicity, where the logical multiplicity of the model
must comply with the logical multiplicity of the situation to be interpreted.
Stemming from the use of the term "architecture", understood in this investigation
as the architecture that actually exists and may be seen in the urban environment, is also
the attitude towards the role of empirical architectural material in forming a theory of
architectural meaning. The empirical observation of architecture may serve as the basis
for architectural intuition but this cannot be a decisive argument. Empirical material is the
starting point for models of interpretation of architecture but even there selection is
determined by the assumptions in the construction of the concrete model. The concrete
architectural objects mentioned in the text of this investigation have been used as the
material for models for the interpretation of architecture. However, a verbal description (a
picture too) of a building itself works as a model of interpretation of architecture.
Analysing the meaning of it is not possible to avoid referring, directly or indirectly, to
descriptions or images of the object of architecture and thus the interpretations will
already be determined by one particular view of these objects. In this sense, the material
of philosophical reflection is not only "pure" empirical material but also previously
interpreted material - a component of a different model. However, the "non-interpreted"
or "pure" material is itself only a theoretical construct because even everyday
conversations about architecture, as a component of some "naive" model of architecture,
are already interpreted. Actual contact with architecture is necessary (as is also a certain
degree of its variety). If this is the case and it would be difficult to imagine someone
writing about architecture, were it not so, then the interpreted material of literature on
architecture is also to be used in philosophical reflection.
1. 4. Examination of the literature
The analytical philosophy of language is a much broader notion than the theory of
architecture that attempts to interpret architecture using the tools of linguistic analysis.
Adopting an analytical approach in the investigation of language, a clear separation of
problem areas and concepts is possible in philosophy, in other words, the logical space of
the question determined by the conceptual apparatus of the specific philosophical model.
This, in general lines, has determined the position of this work in the selection of literary
sources - firstly it is based on the tradition of the philosophy of language begun by Frege
31
and Wittgenstein and referred to in this work as "classical semantics" and secondly, the
turn of the philosophy of language in the direction of pragmatics. 20 This investigation
also examines various interpretations of the language of architecture including those
based on a semiotic approach. Although the nature of this work does not assume the
conditions of semiotics to analyse architecture, semiotic investigations may serve as
pointers to individual aspects of phenomena and as material for the modelling of a theory
of architecture.
As this is not an investigation into the history of philosophy, the choice of
literature relating to the philosophy of language in the analytical tradition corresponds
with the structure of the first part of the work that has formed through thinking about the
problems that need to be solved by models of the interpretation of architecture. An
important challenge to the interpretation of architecture within the assumptions of this
work is linked to the name of Roger Scruton. In The Aesthetics of Architecture, Scruton
criticises the direct analogy between verbal language and architecture. His main argument
is one of the traditions of semantics: the understanding of meaning as truth conditions.
Scruton is categorical and he repeats the following claim in various forms: "there can be
20
Apart from the works of Frege, Wittgenstein and Russell - see Frege, G., Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung,
fünf logische Studien (hrsg. von G. Patzig), Gottingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1962; Frege, G.,
Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (ed. and trans, by P. Geach and M. Black),
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1980; Wittgenstein, L., Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung (Kritische Edition),
Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989; Wittgenstein, L., Philosophische Untersuchungenl Philosophical
Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963; Russell, B., Logic and Knowlwdge: Essays 1901-1950 (ed.
by R. C. Marsh), London: George Allen & Unwin, 1964 - other important sources to mention are the works
by Camap, Ayer, Quine, Dummett, Davidson, Grice, Austin un Searle - see Schleichert, H. (Hrsg.),
Logischer Empirismus - Der Wiener Kreis, Munchen: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1975; Camap, R, Meaning
and Necessity, The University of Chicago Press, 1994; Ayer, A L., Language, Truth and Logic, Penguin
Books, 1990; Dummett, M., Frege: Philosophy of Language, London: Duckworth, 1973; Dummett, M.,
The Seas of Language, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996, Davidson, D., Inquiries into Truth and Meaning,
Clarendon Press, 1984; Quine, W. O., Word and Object, Cambridge (MA): The MIT Press, 1973; Austin, J.
L., How to Do Things with Words (ed. by S. O. Urmson), Oxford University Press, 1973; Searle, J. R.,
Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, 1994; Searle, J. R, Intentionality, Cambridge University Press,
1984. (This list contains only some of the main authors and works examined in order to give a general
overview.)
32
no explanation of linguistic meaning which does not show its relation to truth". 21 This is
accompanied by a special analysis of the line of philosophical semantics that leads to the
truth-conditional theory of meaning.
For the consistent pursuit of clarity, the list of literature on architectural theory
would include quite few works. However, the selection of literature related to the
interpretation of architecture is based on a different principle. This investigation attempts
to cover those approaches that in the understanding of architecture use its similarity to
language and that in one way or another speak of architectural meaning. From the outset
it must be said that there are not that many of these works and it is possible to examine
the main tendencies and secondly, they are works in which the reflection has been on a
particular type of architecture, on specific buildings and it would not be correct to assume
because there might be some erroneous methodological positions all the conclusions are
wrong.22
2. STRUCTURE AND CONTENT
The tenor of this investigation has also been determined by its structure - the first
part deals with theories of meaning in philosophy and the second part with attempts to
construct a conceptual apparatus for the analysis of architecture that follows the layout of
21
Scruton, R., The Aesthetics of Architecture, Princeton (NJ): Princeton University Press, 1979, p. 164.
22
The main works with a predominantly semiotic approach - Jencks, Ch, and Baird, G. (eds.), Meaning in
Architecture, London: Barrie & Jenkins, 1970; Broadbent, G., Bunt, R., and Llorens, T. (eds), Meaning
and Behaviour in the Built Enviroment, Chichester, New York, Brisbane, Toronto: John Willey and Sons,
1980; Broadbent, G., Bunt, R., and Jencks, Ch. (eds), Signs, Symbols, and Architecture, Chichester, New
York, Brisbane, Toronto: John Willey and Sons, 1980. Apart from Goodman's Languages of Art,
Indianopolis: Hacket Publishing Company, 1988, another important work in analytical aesthetics is his
"How Buildings Mean"// Alperson, P. (ed.) The Philosophy of the Visual Arts, New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1992, pp. 368-375. Clarity of analysis can also be found in Mitchell, W. J., The Logic of
Architecture, Cambridge (MS), London: The MIT Press, 1992. The most important collections of writings
on architectural theory used were - Hays, K. M. (ed.) Architecture Theory since 1968, Cambridge (MS),
London: The MIT Press, 2000; Sola-Morales, I. and Costa, X. (eds.) 1996, Present and Futures:
Architecture in Cities, Barcelona: Comite d'Organitzacio del Congres UIA Barcelona 96, Collegi
d'Arquitectes de Catalunya, Centre de Culture Contemporania de Barcelona and ACTAR.
33
the chapters and paragraphs of the first part. In turn the selection of the notions and
theories described in the first part has been influenced by thoughts on architecture. The
notion of linguistic meaning in the first part is analysed in two chapters; the first
examines the understanding of meaning in classical semantics and the notions and
problems associated with this understanding. The second chapter looks at the turn in the
understanding of language in the direction of pragmatics and its influence on the
interpretation of the notion of meaning.
The paragraphs of the first chapter deal with the basic principles of classical
semantics and the systems of semantic categories based on the semantics of Frege and
Wittgenstein's Tractatus. We then turn our attention to the relationships between
complete and incomplete expressions in the classical semantics model, to such complete
expressions as proper names (including the semantic theories of fictional proper names).
The last paragraph concentrates on the concept of truth important in these semantic
models, a description of the principle of verification and the associated problem of
protocol sentences in logical positivism, as well as the development of truth-conditional
semantics in the writings of Davidson and Dummett, which is based on Alfred Tarski's
semantical conception of truth as applied to natural languages. The direction of this
development takes us beyond the assumptions of classical semantics.
The second chapter begins with a description of the understanding of the notion of
meaning within Wittgenstein's later reflections on language and Austin's speech act
theory, the hypothesis on the holism of language arrived at by Quine through the
criticism of the principles and assumptions of logical positivism (second paragraph) and
the role of extralingustic elements in semantics (third paragraph).
Developing Quine's principle of radical translation, Davidson introduces his
model of radical interpretation. By separating the roles of speaker and interpreter in the
communication process, Davidson in his philosophy comes to reject a theory of meaning
that would correspond to the notion of the linguistic competence of the user of language
as understood in the majority of semantic theories. Together with an interpretation of
communication in situation semantics with new and important notions of situation and
information, this is the theme of the chapter's final paragraph.
Following the structure of the first part of the work, the second part examines first
the model of classical semantics in the interpretation of architecture (first chapter) and
then the understanding of architecture based on the notion of context (second chapter).
The initial paragraph of the first chapter sequentially looks at the use of semantic terms in
various interpretations and descriptions of architecture, in the interpretation of the visual
image as well as the justification of the usage of the notion of meaning itself in the body
of assumptions in this investigation. The subsequent paragraphs examine the question of
the structure of the language of architecture and its basic elements. The last paragraph
looks at how it is possible to interpret the notion of truth in the semantics of architecture.
The second chapter deals with the aspects of pragmatics in architectural meaning
firstly in speaking about architecture in the city. Then we analyse the understanding of
the holism hypothesis in architecture and the role of non-architectural elements (the
interpretation of the notion of context in architecture). The final paragraph of the chapter
models patterns of the communication of architecture as a version of the notion of
architectural meaning as understood in the wider context. The work concludes by
summarising the results of the investigation indicating the complementary nature of
models of classical semantics and those dealing with the aspects of the actual use of
language in the semantics of architecture and the limitations in the use of the terminology
of verbal language in the semantics of architecture.
If the parallelism between the ontological theses and claims about language
encountered in Wittgenstein's Tractatus is justified by the picture theory of meaning,
then in this work it is the hypothesis of the partial isomorphism of the theoretical
apparatus of language and architecture that justifies the structural parallelism in the first
and second parts of the investigation. This isomorphism is constructed on the basis of
certain architectural intuitions and a particular understanding of the main moments in the
development of the analytical philosophy of language.
3. CONCLUSIONS
3.1. Justification of the assumptions made in the investigation
The investigation is based on several assumptions that constitute the field of
investigation and in this sense there is no need to justify them in the investigation itself.
Answers are only required to those questions arising from the investigation but the
answers to these questions - in a wider sense the whole investigation - may be regarded
as an indirect justification for the assumptions. Thus we may say that this investigation
(1) justifies the view that architecture is a language and that the term "architectural
meaning" may be used in relation to architectural expressions just as in the semantics of
verbal language we may speak of the meaning of linguistic expressions. (2) For the
explication of the term "architectural meaning" in models of architectural semantics we
may use the conceptual apparatus of philosophical semantics (3) found in the tradition of
analytical philosophy. (4) The theory of meaning in both the philosophy of language and
the semantics of architecture is the theory of understanding, that is, in both cases, models
of the interpretation of the notion of meaning explain the mechanism of understanding
verbal language and architectural expressions. (5) Justifiable too is the assumption that by
architecture we understand architecture that has been built and actually exists —
architecture that can be seen by anybody.
3. 2. Conclusions for the philosophy of language
3. 2. 1. Classical semantics - its assumptions and constraints
In this investigation the philosophy of language is seen as the creation of specific models
for the understanding of language. Within the framework of the analytical tradition we
may, to a degree, separate out "classical semantics" whose models are characterised by
several common assumptions. Firstly, semantics is based on the principle of the certainty
of meaning, that is, the assumption that a linguistic expression must have a definite
meaning.23 Secondly, in semantics the central role is played by the sentence - semantic
descriptions of other expressions depend on the role they play in forming a sentence. The
23
This means that every expression may be described as being a meaningful or nonsensical expression.
affirmative sentence, which may be said to be true or false, is used as an example for
language models. Thirdly, the role of proper names (complete expressions in Frege's
philosophy of language) in semantics and the problems it is caused by fictional proper
names is also tied to the place of the affirmative sentence in the hierarchy of linguistic
expressions. Following on from Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, this may
also be called the dominant role of the "Augustinian picture of language" — the ties
between names and objects - in classical semantics. Fourthly, it is essential for language
theories to have an explication of the hidden structure of language. This hidden structure
has been conceptualised by, for example, Russell's theory of descriptions, Frege's stepby-step sentence construction, and his differentiation between the complete and
incomplete linguistic expressions that form sentences, and the general form of a
proposition as the truth-function of sentences in Wittgenstein's Tractatus. The notion of
truth has a special place in classical semantics. This is determined by the fact that the
affirmative sentence is used as a pattern. However, attempts to explain the notion of
meaning within the framework of the concept of truth conditions reveals the limits of the
assumptions of classical semantics.
All the above can be summed up in a trait of classical semantics theory, that is,
attention is mainly paid to language as a closed system and its expressions - its syntactic
relations - within the framework of a system. Consequent use of the conceptual apparatus
of classical semantics itself leads us out of the assumptions of classical semantics models.
We could also say that the problem is in the phenomenon itself - in language and in the
actual use of language — that our utterances in relation to reality are only one aspect of the
use of language.
Nevertheless, classical semantics offers in-depth analysis that conceptualises the
horizontal or syntactic structure of language (types of linguistic expression) and its
24
One line of development using the notion of truth in semantic models leads to a partial admission of the
principle of holism. This is related to the verification principle and the question of the relationship between
protocol statements and the other (theory) statements, as well as the problem of interpreting the protocol
statement itself. Another direction is related to Tarski's concept of semantic truth and the attempt to relate
it to natural languages, which also leads to the principle of holism and the admission of the semantic
importance of extralinguistic elements. (For example, the connection between meaning and beliefs for
Davidson).
vertical structure - which semantical units are correlated with each linguistic expression.
Mastering these models we can further analyse the use of expressions, the context of
extralinguistic elements and the situational aspects of language, that is, we can expand
the conceptual apparatus of the models.
3. 2. 2. The turn of philosophical semantics in the direction of pragmatics
The first part of the investigation shows the general tendency in the forming of the
theory of linguistic meaning. It is a specific interpretation of the direction of development
of language philosophy. This direction that follows the models of classical semantics is
characterised by the rejection of understanding meaning as a special unit, which has an
ontological status or as a unit that would have a constant semantic size related to a
specific linguistic expression, independent of the situational aspects of its use.
In Wittgenstein's later philosophy, the methodological suggestions or maxims for
the analysis of meaning — for example, to see how expressions are used, how we learn
various words - might be summed up in the thesis that meaning as a theoretical notion of
semantics is substituted by its various explanations. If meaning is that which we
understand, then philosophy must show the criteria for this understanding in various
cases. The content of the notion of meaning is transferred to explanatory models and to
the criteria for understanding linguistic expressions. Because language is highly varied it
is difficult to imagine a unified theory of meaning. In this way meaning is not a notion
that would have an extension - for example, some ideal objects - its (the meaning's)
meaning is the use of the term in a theory that constructs models forming certain
categories or the conceptual apparatus of the theory. Semantics is no longer separated
from pragmatics or, in other words, aspects of pragmatics become important in
philosophical semantics. The new approach to the notions of meaning and understanding
enlarges the conceptual toolbox of philosophical semantics including such terms that are
related to the situational aspects of verbal communication and their relevant background
moments of the beliefs of the user of the language.
Davidson's model of language malapropism may be regarded as one of the most
important and radical approaches within the framework of the development of this
tendency; along with the semantic roles of the speaker and the hearer, he introduces the
notions of prior and passing theory. For the interpreter (hearer) prior theory expresses that
the hearer is prepared to hear the speaker's utterance in advance, while passing theory
deals with how the hearer actually interprets the utterance. In turn, for the speaker, prior
theory is that which he believes the interpreter's prior theory to be (this of course may
differ where the hearer really has prepared himself to perceive what has been uttered), but
passing theory is the theory which he anticipates the hearer should use, in other words,
what the speaker intends the interpreter to use. This model allows Davidson to reject an
understanding of linguistic meaning when it could be described by a language theory
previously known to the users of a language, independent of the concrete communication
situation and the role of the participants. The processes of meaning and understanding are
essentially tied to the prior beliefs (theories) of the language users and their changes
during the communication process.
3. 3. Conclusions for the classical semantics model of architecture
There are two possible models in the semantics of architecture - one based on the
assumptions of classical semantics and the second where the context of the architectural
object becomes important, where the dimensions and the structure of the context are
determined by the prior theory of the interpreter. The notion of meaning in classical
semantics is primarily related to the sentence. It is related to the expressions that make up
the sentence only through the roles they play in the sentence. (If we are interested in
affirmative sentences with truth-values, then it is better to explicate these semantic roles
using the notion of reference). This model is also possible in architecture but in a much
narrower number of cases, for example when we are speaking of the involvement of
architecture in the surrounding buildings. In this case we may speak of the structure of
architectural expressions, their division into complete and incomplete expressions. We
25
See Davidson, D., "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"// LePore, E. (ed.) Truth and Interpretation:
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, Basil Blackwell, 1989, p. 442.
cannot, however, claim that architecture, when interpreted semantically, will have only
one absolute structure and there is only one way of analysing its elements.
Classical semantics offers an important element of the semantic model related to
the notion of expression — the notion of a variable corresponding to the expression. The
notion of the architectural variable holds that each architectural element is one value of
the variable, which we can only understand if there are other possible variable values.
Depending on how these possible worlds of other variables are understood, various
meanings of architectural expressions are possible and, in certain cases, also the
descriptions of their truth-values.
3. 3. 1. The notion of the meaning of architecture
In the semantics of architecture the term "architectural meaning" or the "meaning
of architectural expression" attains its justification if we accept a definite type of
complete expression to which the meaning refers. Intuitively, the most suitable candidate
for this is the architectural object - an individual building. Nelson Goodman has
attempted in the analytical tradition to see architectural meaning as a special instance of
reference, which he calls exemplification. By this is meant reference as it functions in the
verbal language, only it works in the opposite direction.
However, for architectural semantics another variety of architectural meaning is
more important. It is difficult to describe in that architectural expressions cannot be
translated into verbal expressions. Architectural meaning in this sense is a category that
denotes something that corresponds with an architectural expression as its semantic
correlate. Thus an architectural expression may, primarily, be either meaningful or
nonsensical and secondly, we may speak of its meaning as the meaning of a complete
expression as opposed to the meanings of the incomplete expressions it consists of. First
of all it is the architectural object that has a meaning and the meaning of its constituent
element may only be seen in its context.
Architectural meaning understood in this way may be called the minimal variety
of architectural semantics. Like the relationship between sense and reference in Frege's
philosophy, it may be characterised by the thesis on the ties between the meaning of the
40
whole and its parts and the thesis on the examination of the meaning of an incomplete
expression in the wider context of a complete expression. However, to understand a
sentence it is necessary not only to understand the meanings of its parts but also to
understand the way the parts are connected. Therefore this minimal semantic model
cannot circumvent the question of the syntax of architectural expressions.
3. 3. 2. Syntactic structure and architectural expressions
Regardless of the obvious articulation of architecture, the determination of its
semantically relevant elements and, if we accept that there exist several types, the
explication of the syntax of these elements is a question to which there is not one single
answer. The minimal structure we can speak about are the categories of the complete
expression and its constituent (incomplete) expressions. There are several ways of
determining which architectural elements correspond to these categories. However, in
every concrete case of architectural analysis, we may speak of the structure of this or that
architecture in terms of architectural expressions.
The many attempts to classify various architectural expressions fail because of the
lack of those elements of architectural theory that in the semantics of verbal language
conceptualise the correlations of linguistic expressions with something that exists outside
them. Furthermore, they explicate this correlation in maximally simple terms ("true" and
"false") in relation to the chief type of expression - the sentence. It is possible to preserve
the notion of syntactic structure in the semantics of architecture if we accept that the
results are judgements on the meaningful or nonsensical status of an architectural object
(which in a specific case is assumed to be a complete expression), depending on the
meanings of its constituent expressions or, to put it another way, judgements on the truthvalue of architectural expressions.
3. 3. 3. The concept of truth in the semantics of architecture
The concept of truth can be used in a restricted field of interpretation of
architecture. This is related to one of the differences between architecture and verbal
language. We could call this the historical nature of architecture. The selection of a
specific architectural context for an architectural expression determines the semantic role,
which, if fulfilled, the expression will be true. The easiest way to model this is to analyse
a particular building in the city in the context of the surrounding buildings in the street
Frege's predicate and its corresponding reference (Frege calls them "concept")
categories provide the key to the selected model of architecture and the characterisation
of the architectural expressions within its framework. The values set by the architectural
variable - one of them is an actually existing building - make the architectural expression
or the architecture of the street it contains true or false. This is similar to how the notion
or extension of a term corresponding with the predicate determines which proper names,
together with this predicate will form a true and which will form a false statement. It
could be said that this is the way the set of possible worlds is determined. In general, any
object that could perceived (understood) as an object of architecture in a given place
among the other buildings in a street will, together with those other buildings, form
meaningful street architecture in one of the possible worlds but only some of them can be
described as true street architecture. We may also say that a street's architecture speaks of
the architectural reality which belongs to the sphere of the reference of architectural
expressions but can only be characterised as the semantic correlate of the corresponding
expressions - similar to the reference or concept corresponding to the predicate, or the
corresponding relation of the expression of relation in Frege's semantics.
One of the problems that this model must solve is related to the description of the
semantical role of a specific building. That is, how do we determine if a street's
architecture, thanks to a specific building, can be called true or false? This requires an
analysis of every individual architectural situation; moreover, the building itself is most
often to be regarded as a complex expression. In a sufficiently complicated case, which
most architectural situations in a city tend to be, we cannot speak of buildings or
incomplete architectural expressions as the conjunction of predicates - these or other
42
buildings (as incomplete expressions) could determine different possible true worlds and
the characterisation of a street's architecture in terms of truth will require us to choose the
specific buildings that will be assumed to be the characteristic predicates of a street's
architecture.
The truth-values model only works if we as the observers of architecture have this
historical interest, if we choose a specific historical context that fixes other specific
possibilities as architectural reality. In other words, the existing (historical) architecture
determines the specific logical space of possibilities which, when being filled by actual
architecture, creates a meaningful architectural expression. Within the framework of this
kind of model we may speak only of meaningful or nonsensical, not true or false
architecture. But how to choose between these models - if there is no independently
observable reality of which architecture speaks - depends both on the understanding of
the structure of architecture and practical motivation that may differ from person to
person. This requires the involvement of the viewer of architecture or the concept of a
user in the model of semantics and that takes us beyond the boundaries of the
assumptions of classical semantics.
3.4. The basic model of architectural semantics
The most suitable model of semantics for the variety of architectural situations
can be constructed using Davidson's concepts of prior and passing theories. Thus we may
say about architecture, like Davidson about verbal language, that there is no language of
architecture, as some theoreticians of architecture have attempted to argue. That is, there
is no language that satisfies the requirements of being systematic, shared and needing
prior knowledge of architectural meanings. The example used in Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations where workers are making a pile of simple building blocks
could be transformed into a model where, in a similar way, builders were to create
architecture from simply formed building blocks and understand too the meanings of the
architectural expressions formed in this way. It must be said that the principles, which
require that meaning be systematic, shared, and prepared as criticised by Davidson would
only relate to architectural meanings in this world of the ideal model because they would
43
be formed in the builders' common forms of life determined by the assumptions of the
model. The actual complexity of forms of life compared to the limited world of a model
creates the possibility of different prior theories.
Prior architectural theories, based on the examples examined in this investigation,
may be described as follows: firstly, the prior theory determines the general instances
essential for the understanding of an architectural expression. This is not directly tied to
the specifics of the perception of architecture. One might think so if one were only to
imagine some ideal model in which, as we approach a building from a great distance, we
make it out from the surrounding context; then we notice its individual parts, then the
smaller details and so on. However, the essential context for is broader than just the
spatial context and primarily the context that will determine the status of an architectural
element as an architectural expression. Various methods of evaluating or selecting a
context will determine different understandings of the architectural object in question.
Secondly, an individual building or a complicated architectural object is the basic
architectural expression (as the sentence is in verbal language). However, here too it
differs from the verbal language in which the categories of expression that make up a
sentence can be related to the role of specific types of expression in determining the
truth-value of a statement. In turn, the concept of the truth-value functions in the analysis
of both the largest structures consisting of statements as is the case with propositional
logic, as well as in the requirement for systematism of meaning. (Thus, for example, there
are not many possibilities in the formation of elementary proposition.) In architecture the
relationship between a building and its elements may offer one understanding of an
architectural meaning but a wider context may offer another, also one that recognises an
architectural object (expression) to be a false or nonsensical expression.
Thirdly, when speaking of a prior theory, it must be emphasised that conscious
selection has a far greater function here than in verbal language. We can list several
instances that determine this - firstly the very attitude towards buildings as architecture,
which has meaning, is not as "natural" as that towards specific acoustic formations that
we perceive as linguistic expressions. We should also mention the possibility of a specific
architectural expression, a building for example, being understood as a meaningful
expression or, where a different prior theory has been assumed, as a nonsensical
44
expression. And the choice in the characterisation (understanding) of a building in terms
of a meaningful/nonsensical or true/false expression itself requires certain conscious
reflection.
Fourthly, an important role played in the understanding of architecture is
experience, which forms the "naive" semantics of architecture. Where architecture is
concerned, people's opinions and beliefs may differ more than the systems of beliefs
important for the meaning of verbal language. In the case of architecture they will not be
so closely tied to the common surrounding world. (However, according to the concept of
radical translation and ontological relativity in Quine's language theory, in the
interpretation of verbal language too we cannot find an absolutely safe common basis in
the ontology of the external world.) A common basis in architecture could firstly be tied
to certain forms of human life and their corresponding functions but they do not
determine the form of architecture unequivocally because functions are not architectural
expressions or correlated semantic values.
Fifthly, the model of partial understanding, characteristic of architectural
semantics, has, to a certain degree been marginal in the philosophical semantics of verbal
language. If Frege saw meaning as certain, as being invariable - he only accepted the
possibility of speaking about a different meaning tied to a specific expression, not its
change - then in the model where the conceptual centre of gravity is transferred from the
concept of architectural meaning to the corresponding prior and passing theories of the
interpreter, the possibility arises to speak of partial understanding. This is especially so
when it is not possible to co-ordinate the viewer's theories and those "recommended" by
architecture at the passing theory level. Architecture as actually existing architecture
always carries with it a new possibility of understanding its meaning, although this is
only a radical model of a situation of architectural understanding and not the limitlessness
of the variety of meanings or the arbitrariness of interpretation,
If the convergence of the speaker's and hearer's passing theories in the verbal
communication process ensures understanding, then the architectural meaning is also
correlated with those theories that are involved in the understanding of architecture. The
theory in this case is an explanation or a way to describe or categorise various moments
connected with architecture that are relevant for its understanding. Of this theory we
45
cannot say that we know it because we understand architecture but without it we cannot
explain our attitude towards architecture whose practical consequences are, in turn, a
criterion for its understanding. And so, the justification for this kind of criterion for
understanding architecture — the way we react to architecture, speak about it, live in it — is
the explanation of architectural meaning whose categories are given to us by architectural
semantics.
That the explication of the concept of architectural meaning in a particular model
leads to theories of interpretation - how they are initially and how they become changed
in order to understand a given architecture - allow us to accent an essential trait of
architectural perception, that is its ties to the system of beliefs people have in relation to
architecture. All of us who live in artificially created surroundings in which architecture
is a part, have these beliefs in an unexplicated form. The interpreter's choice for the
understanding of architecture is important in the uncomfortable situation when we are not
able to accept a building or an element of it fully. This is a choice between, for example,
the characterisation of architecture in terms of truth or meaning, in a wider sense,
between characterisations of architectural understanding and not understanding; the
choice of seeing it as architecture or only as a functionally useful spatial formation. It is
important to note that this choice, when it involves the concept of theory in the model of
architectural understanding, turns the interpretation of architecture into not only a
separate activity related to the given architectural situation but also into an activity that
has certain consequences for other architectural situations. We may say that this is the
responsibility for choosing a particular attitude towards architecture in each concrete
instance.
3. 5. Architectural language and architectural meaning — conceptual constraints on
their use
The isomorphism of the architectural and verbal languages becomes concretised
through the isomorphism of theories and models. The differences between the
architectural and verbal languages prevent us from claiming this isomorphism in the
strict, mathematical sense. It is rather the isomorphism when we speak of certain
46
tendencies in the development of the theory of linguistic meaning and the possibilities of
using a certain system of models of language philosophy for the interpretation of
architecture where, in every concrete case as regards architecture, there are constraints on
the use of concepts tied to verbal language models.
Constraints apply first of all to the classical semantics of architecture whose
conditions allow us to speak only of a minimal model of semantics. This means that,
regardless of the various, even finely detailed classifications of architectural elements
within the confines of a particular architectural style, the only syntactical structural
categories of architectural expressions are the concepts of complete and incomplete
expressions as well as the principles that make us look at the meaning of an expression
within the context of a broader expression. However, in certain instances of interpretation
of historical architecture, this minimal structure allows us to use the notion of truth.
Looking at historical architecture as the group of incomplete expressions in relation to a
place that has been envisaged as a new architectural expression - this could be a new
building or a new element in the context of an existing building - this new expression
may be understood as one value of architectural variable where only a few of the values
allow us to speak of true architecture. Of course this is only a scheme; real architectural
situations are more complicated. They require from the interpreter a certain, conscious
attitude and a choice between various preconceptions of architecture.
On the other hand, we may say that the constraints on the classical semantics of
architecture - we could similarly of the constraints on particular models of verbal
language - reveal architecture's situational aspect, its users' and viewers' or interpreters'
essential role in models of architectural understanding. Thus we can reply to Scruton's
arguments because they turn out to be constraints on the terminology of particular
architectural models - in Scruton's case they force him to say that architecture cannot be
regarded as a language - that should also be applied in a similar way to models of verbal
language on which Scruton bases his notion of language.
Constraints should also be applied to the category of the speaker's role in
Davidson's model of malapropism in adapting it to architecture. In architectural
semantics the role of the speaker and the associated roles of prior and passing theories
should be understood as particular theories of understanding architectural expressions or
47
meanings, which may be related to one architecture or another. But only the interpreter
can guarantee this relation. It is not the case that an architect, for example, could not have
the intention for the building he has designed to be perceived in a particular way or that
there couldn't be assumptions that people will primarily try to understand the building
within the framework of one or another system of beliefs. Precisely because people
connected to the creation of architecture may have many intentions and that they are
more complex than the intention and theory of the speaker in Davidson's model of
language malapropism, it follows that only a specific building (regardless of how much
activity was involved in reaching the end result) can be tied to particular theories if it is
observed by an understanding interpreter of architecture.
The aforementioned constraints and other differences not detailed here between
the models of interpretation of understanding of the architectural and verbal languages
justify the use of the terms "language of architecture" and "architectural meaning". At the
same time it points to the uncertainty of the term "language" itself in philosophical
semantics if it is seen as a universal concept without taking into account concrete
instances of understanding or communication situations.
3. 6. The semantics and aesthetics of architecture
In this work architectural interpretation allows us to define more precisely the
semantic orientation of this investigation with regard to architectural aesthetics. One of
the most important questions in architectural aesthetics is about what distinguishes
buildings from architecture. Architecture, in recognising the role of the aesthetic
experience in its perception, is understood as art and must be separated from buildings
that are a result of construction. However, the semantic approach — as opposed to
aesthetics theory - in this case does not claim to distinguish between buildings as merely
specific objects from those considered to be works of architecture or art. Even if we
recognise the legitimacy of the aesthetic approach, we could question whether a clear
distinction is always possible between what we might call outstanding architecture or
architecture as art and, for example, humble, everyday buildings.
48
The conceptual tools of verbal language we have examined offer another
possibility for interpreting outstanding architecture in semantic terms. 26 This of course
will depend on the theory of the interpreter, his attitude in how an architectural object or
element is understood and in this case, the concept of the interpreter's choice is
important. The semantic category, which may be used for the inclusion of outstanding
architecture in the model of architectural understanding, is the concept of paradigm or
grammar as used by Wittgenstein. An object of outstanding architecture would thus be a
sample or a grammatical rule that fixes the possibilities of new architectural expressions.
The concept of outstanding architecture itself deserves more detailed examination.
For example, in replying to questions of whether in architectural semantics a different
usage of the concept of outstanding architecture is possible apart from its role as a
grammatical example and can architecture be outstanding if it adheres strictly to the
already existing rules of architecture? This however, has not been the task of this
investigation. Here it will suffice to point out that for the understanding of architecture,
the aesthetic qualities of architecture - even if it is claimed that every edifice or building
has them - are not important; they may be "components" of architectural meaning if they
are taken into account in the interpreter's theories. On the other hand, the concept of
outstanding architecture here has been substituted by the concept of the grammatical
sample, which does not rely on its aesthetic evaluation (although it may itself be the basis
of an architectural evaluation in the most diverse of terms).
This implies the priority of the semantic approach to architecture compared to
architectural aesthetics. Although this permits the interpretation of any kind of
architecture, a shortcoming in the semantic model is the difference in the evaluation of a
building in the interpretations of approved architectural history and its role in the
interpreter's prior or passing theory in a situation where architecture is to be understood.
The history and theory of architecture that are concerned with the elaboration of various
concepts and classifications important for the profession of the architect do not lose their
importance and place, they may even influence the interpreter's theories, but they are not
24
The concept of outstanding architecture, which appears to be intuitively clear in sufficiently many cases,
here seems to be more fitting than the notion of the art of architecture, especially if we take into account the
problems in defining what is art
49
a precondition for the understanding of architecture. (Assuming the opposite would make
the understanding of architecture elitist by definition.)
3. 7. Architectural semantics — consequences for architectural theory and
philosophy of language
The notion of meaning requires to be tied to some semantic theory in a particular
tradition and stage of development. Examining the development of the theory of meaning
we may come across different results and even contradictory conclusions. Nevertheless,
they have a common basis in the theoretical and methodological assumpti ons of
philosophical analysis. The recognition of the linguistic nature of architecture implies
first of all the use of the conceptual apparatus of language theories in the
conceptualisation of architectural understanding. In turn, this approach is evidenc e of a
certain understanding of language that can assist in the interpretation of verbal
communication. In other words: the answer to the question of the linguistic nature of
architecture is, at the same time, indirectly the answer to the question, what is language?
Thus we may say that the use of language philosophy models for the
interpretation of architecture also creates a reverse link. That is, it has consequences for
the philosophy of language. The classical semantics and pragmatics aspects in the
formation of language theories are two mutually complementary approaches to
architectural interpretation. The explication of architectural understanding in theoretical
terms requires the selection of certain models. This demonstrates that we cannot speak of
one "correct" or "true" universal theory but of models that in a specific situation are more
or less suitable for the interpretation of architecture. Thus architectural interpretation is
the formation of models. The consequence for language philosophy that follows from
such an understanding of architectural semantics would be such that the various theories
of linguistic meaning in language philosophy should also be regarded as models, which
are more or less adequate for the interpretation of language depending on the specific
objectives set out for philosophical reflection. The task of philosophy is to explicate the
assumptions and commitments of its models imposed by the conceptual apparatus of one
or another model. However, philosophy does not have to provide a final judgement of it,
50
which is not subject to "appeal". Nevertheless, taking into account the complexity of the
phenomenon of what is being analysed - both architecture and language — priority should
be given to those models whose conceptual apparatus demonstrate greater logical
multiplicity.
PIELIKUMI
1. Promocijas darba autora publikāciju saraksts
I. 1. Starptautiski recenzējamos izdevumos un starptautiski recenzējamiem izdevumiem
pielīdzinātos izdevumos
Taurens, J. 2000, "Īpašvārdu semantika literatūrā"// Filosofija, 2000, nr. 2, Rīga: LU
Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 158.-172. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2004a, "Semantikas elementi Adorno jaunās mūzikas interpretācijā"//
Filosofija, 2004, nr. 4, Rīga: LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 137.-147.
lpp.
Taurens, J. 2004b, "Bezgalības jēdziens Kanta tīrā prāta antinomijās"// Filosofs starp
tradīciju un pieredzi: Veltījums profesoram Pēterim Laizānam, 2004, Rīga:
Latvijas Universitāte, Zinātne, 187.-199. lpp.
1. 2. Izdošanai pieņemtas publikācijas
Taurens, J. [paredzēts izdot 2005. gada otrajā pusē], "Meaning and Context in the
Language of Architecture"// Sarapik, V. et al. (eds.), 2005, Locations IV,
Tallinn: Proceedings of the Estonian Academy of Arts.
1. 3. Konferenču rakstu krājumos
Taurens, J. 1998, "Mājas: Arhitektūras valoda"//Mājas: Pagātnes atmiņas — nākotnes
vīzijas (konferences materiāli), 1998, Rīga: LU Praktiskās filozofijas katedra,
136.-146. lpp.
Taurens, J. 1999, 'The Semantics of Proper Names in Literature and Ordinary
Language"// Homo Aestheticus: From Philosophy of Art to Aesthetics of Everyday
Life (konferences materiāli), 1999, Rīga, pp. 74-82.
Taurens, J. 2001a, "Konteksta jēdziens arhitektūras semantikā"// Mākslas darbs un
komentārs, 2001, Rīga: LEA, 20.-22. lpp.
52
Taurens, J. 2001 b "Identity inthe Sphere of Verbal, Architectural and Musical
Language"// Globalisation and Identity (European Conference for Music
Education), 2001, Rīga: Musica Baltica, pp. 51-54.
Taurens, J. 2001c, "Dažas piezīmes par vizuālā attēla semantiku"// Homo Aestheticus: No
mākslas filosofijas līdz ikdienas dzīves estētikai, 2001, Rīga: Tapals, 235.-245.
lpp.
1. 4. Citas ar promocijas darba tēmu saistītas publikācijas
Taurens, J. 2000, "Filosofijas paradoksi"// Demakova, H. (sast), 2000, Sarunas, Rīga:
Jaunā akadēmija, 153.-158. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2001d, "Iespējamo pasauļu jēdziens literāro darbu semantiskajā analīzē"//
Demakova, H. (sast.), 2001, Sarunas II, Rīga: Jaunā akadēmija, 353.-360. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2001 e,"Eiropas pilsētu valoda(s)"// Šuvajevs, I. (sast.), 2001, Eiropas dialogi,
Rīga: Eiropas Komisijas delegācija Latvijā, 38.-39. lpp.
Taurens, J. 200lf, "Rīgas valoda"/ 'The Language of Riga"// Rīgas astoņsimtgades
burvju flautai Riga 800 Magic Flute, 2001 (Latvijas izstādes 49. Venēcijas
biennālē katalogs), Rīga: Latvijas Laikmetīgās mākslas centrs, 35.-71. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2001g, "Kad krāsas zaudē spožumu, acs ies skatīties uz ausi: Sirreālisma
gramatika"// Studija, 2001, nr. 21 (decembris/ janvāris), 29.-32. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2002, "Arhitektūras semantika"// Demakova, H. (sast.), 2003, Sarunas III,
Rīga: Jaunā akadēmija, 354.-360. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2003a, "Laiks un telpa Bresona fotogrāfijās"// Studija, 2003, nr. 28 (februāris/
marts), 24.-26. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2003b, "Loģika kultūras kontekstā. Propozīcijas vispārīgā forma Vitgenšteina
Traktātā"// Demakova, H. (sast.), 2003, Sarunas V, Rīga: Jaunā akadēmija, 233. 241. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2004c, "Piezīmes par mākslas kritiku"// Karogs, 2004, nr. 1, 142.-145. lpp.
Taurens, J. 2005, " Mažors un minors: valodas modeļi filosofijā"// Demakova, H. (sast.),
2005, Sarunas VI, Rīga: Jaunā akadēmija, 130.-137. lpp.
53
Тауренс, Я. 2000, "Несколько заметок об утопии идеального города"// Аванпорт,
2000, 1, с. 6-10.
Тауренс, Я. 2001, "Язык Риги"// Даугава, 2001, 4 (228), с. 104-125.
1. 5. Ar promocijas darba tēmu saistīti tulkojumi
Vitgenšteins, L. 1997, Filosofiskie pētījumi, Rīga: Minerva (1. daļa 316.-693. §§., 2.
daļa; pēcvārds un komentāri kopā ar J. Vēju).
Vitgenšteins, L. 2000, "Lekcija par ētiku"// Demakova, H. (sast.), 2000, Sarunas, Rīga:
Jaunā akadēmija, 120.-126. lpp.
Vitgenšteins, L. 1999, "Dzeltenā grāmata"// Kentaurs XXI, 1999, nr. 20, 61.-73. lpp.
Vitgenšteins, L. [paredzēts izdot 2005. gada septembrī], Loģiski filosofiskais traktāts,
Rīga: Liepnieks un Rītups (tulkotāja komentāri un pēcvārds).
2. Konferences
17-18. 04. 1997
Mājas. Pagātnes atmiņas - nākotnes vīzijas (Rīga: LU Praktiskās
filozofijas katedra); referāts: "Māja: arhitektūras valoda".
23-25. 09. 1999
Homo Aestheticus. No mākslas filozofijas līdz ikdienas estētikai
(Rīga: LU Praktiskās filozofijas katedra); referāts: "The Semantics
of Proper Names in Literature and Ordinary Language".
11-13. 01. 2001
Mākslas darbs un komentārs (Rīga: Latvijas Estētikas asociācija);
referāts: "Konteksta jēdziens arhitektūras semantikā".
10—13. 05. 2001
Globalisation and Identity (Rīga: European Association for Music
in Schools); referāts: "Identity in the Sphere of Verbal,
Architectural and Musical Language".
5-6.11.2003
Adorno 100 dzimšanas dienai veltītā konference (Rīga: Gētes
institūts Rīgā, LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts); referāts:
"Semantikas elementi Adorno jaunās mūzikas interpretācijā".
22-23.04.2004
Imanuelam Kantam 280 (Rīga: LU Vēstures un filozofijas
fakultāte, LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts); referāts: "Kanta
lieta par sevi kā filosofēšanas modelis".
23-26. 09. 2004
Culture, Nature, Semiotics: Locatins IV (Tallina-Tartu, Igaunija:
Estonian Literary Museum, Estonian Academy of Arts, University
of Tartu, Estonian Semiotics Association); referāts: "Meaning and
Context inthe Language of Architecture".
02-03. 05. 2005
Baltic states between East and West (Viļņa, Lietuva: Culture,
Philosophy and Arts Research Institute); referāts: "Concept of
Truth in the Semantics of Architecture".