Sample Essay – Do Not Copy, Cite, or Use
Union Learning Representatives and the New Bargaining Agenda:
The Role of Unions in Workplace Training Initiatives
For MHRM 6700
By
MHRM Student
1
Introduction
In an unstable economic environment where some unions find themselves less able to
bargain the significant wage increases and job security provisions that they were once able to
secure, the international labour movement appears to have recognized the need for unions
pursue more innovative, long-term solutions to the mounting problems they are facing in an
increasingly knowledge-based economy (Stuart, 1996; Heyes & Stuart, 1998; Dundon & Eva,
1998). As employers continue to pursue business initiatives that maximize competitiveness
and flexibility in volatile markets, the need for high-skilled workers has brought the issue of
employee training to the forefront (Dundon & Eva, 1998). Throughout Western Europe and
the United Kingdom in particular, the result has been a strong push from the labour movement
for unions to begin negotiating agreements with employers whereby they can exercise some
influence or control over workplace training. In the United Kingdom, legislation passed by
the New Labour government in 2002 brought about a statutory requirement for employers to
recognize the role of unions in employee training initiatives, through the formalization of the
role of “union learning representatives”. Seven years following the introduction of this
unique solution, researchers continue to question whether or not unions in the United
Kingdom are able to involve themselves in employee training initiatives in any meaningful
way. The purpose of this paper is to analyze and evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of the
British model and to evaluate whether union representatives taking an active role in
workplace learning initiatives adequately addresses the issues that unions hope to resolve.
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Industrial Relations Theory and Training
An abundance of research has uncovered that British firms, in comparison to their
German, French and Japanese competitors, tend to invest significantly less in employee
training (Finegold & Soskice, cited by Dundon & Eva, 1998; Claydon & Green 1994).
Having recognized the importance of training to remaining globally competitive, the British
labour movement has become largely supportive of unions bargaining for increased
investments in employee training (Stuart, 1996). In 1990, the British Trades Union Congress
(TUC) published its strategic manifesto, Collective Bargaining Strategy for the 1990s, in
which it called on unions to adopt a “new bargaining agenda”, a new, modernized approach to
collective bargaining. This new strategic direction emphasized the need for unions to move
away from “the traditional, often adversarial approach” to labour relations, and rather to
embrace a more “constructive… developmental” approach to bargaining with employers on
issues of mutual concern to both workers and employers (Trades Union Congress, cited by
Claydon & Green, 1994, p. 41). Among the new, emerging issues on this “new bargaining
agenda” was pursuing a more “integrative”, positive-sum approach to promoting training in
workplaces (Heyes & Stuart, 2007, p. 459). Through joint union-management partnerships
devoted to facilitating these training arrangements, employers would presumably benefit from
increased worker productivity, brought about as a direct result of improved training outcomes
(Claydon & Green 1994). At the same time, employees would benefit from learning new
skills that improve their employability, making them better able to adapt to changing market
conditions (Claydon & Green, 1994).
Industrial relations theorists have both supported and challenged the notion that union
involvement can have a positive impact on training. In decentralized labour markets like
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Canada, the United States and (to a lesser extent) the United Kingdom, increased training
tends to lead to increased wages (Green & Lemieux, 2006), and some theorists argue that
because of this wage premium, employers are less able or willing to make investments in
employee training (Claydon & Green, 1994; Hoque & Bacon, 2008). According to Becker’s
human capital theory (cited by Hoque & Bacon, 2008), paying employees premium wages
and making high investments in training is economically inefficient for the employer.
Furthermore, Mincer (cited by Hoque & Bacon, 2008) argued that in unionized environments,
employees may be less willing to undertake training to secure pay increases or promotional
opportunities, because these benefits are typically tied to seniority. These arguments outline
the reasons many theorists object to the notion that training is more successful in unionized
settings than non-unionized ones.
Critics of this perspective, however, assert that there are many ways in which
unionization creates an optimal setting in which to train employees. Firstly, as a counter to the
notion that high training investments and wage premiums paid to unionized employees is
economically inefficient, it has been argued that both of these factors lead to increased
productivity, which enables the employer to earn a significant return on these investments
(Booth & Chatterji, 1998). Also, given lower voluntary turnover rates in unionized
workplaces, employers tend to have a longer time to achieve a return on training investments
(Claydon & Green, 1994; Booth & Chatterji, 1998; Green & Lemieux, 2006). In unionized
environments, well-trained workers are also compensated fairly for their skills and are not
exploited or mistreated by employers (Claydon & Green, 1994). It has also been argued that
the value of training in terms of its ability to increase employee morale, particularly in a
unionized setting, is also deserving of consideration. Some have argued that in unionized
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workplaces, employees are provided with a “voice”, which enables them to lobby employers
through the union to gain better access to training, or to improve the quality of training
programs (Hoque & Bacon, 2008). It could be argued that through unionization, the
recipients of training are better able to express their concerns to management through their
representatives. Employers who engage unions in assessing an organization’s training needs,
developing and delivering training programs, and providing employees with access to greater
learning opportunities have the potential to reap the benefits of an engaged workforce.
According to Leisink (cited by Stuart 1996), unions who pursue a more progressive
bargaining agenda by focusing on training, lifelong learning, employee recognition and
participation programs, will gain the support of the union membership, who, as a result of
these improved working conditions, will become more productive. Therefore, as a result of
these initiatives, both parties will benefit.
Some theorists, however, have rebuked the assumption that unions and employers can
develop mutually beneficial training agreements without resorting to the zero-sum approach
to bargaining that tends to characterize traditional bargaining (such as negotiations over
wages increases and job security provisions, for example). Firstly, one argument forwarded
by Stuart (1996), is that this “joint interest” approach to training (Claydon & Green, 1994, p.
38) understates the significance of the industrial relations context in which unions and
management tend to function, noting that the success of any organizational change (such as a
new training initiative) “will be shaped by the historical interplay of patterns of control and
resistance, conflict and accommodation” (Stuart, 1996, p. 256). These sentiments are echoed
by Munro and Rainbird (cited by Wallis et al, 2005), who state that “the workplace is a
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problematic site for learning… Rather than representing a neutral intervention, training must
be viewed in the broader context of the employment relationship” (p. 287).
While in principle, the notion of unions and management collaborating with oneanother for mutual gain ought to appeal to both parties, in reality, most relationships between
employers and unions are characterized by conflict and resistance to change (Stuart, 1996). In
most organizations, unions are typically not involved in training policy outside of the realm of
normal bargaining, and thus instituting or formalizing a new role for unions would require
employers to consent to changing how they adninister and implement training. In
environments where training plays a crucial strategic role in a firm's ability to advance its
business interests, management is likely to be hesitant to involve unions in matters that are
typically considered to be at the discretion of management. To have management abdicate
total control over training and create a participatpory role for unions in the decision-making
process presents significant economic and political risks for the employer, who may fear that
such changes could strengthen the influence of unions at the expense of management
prerogative (Stuart, 1996). Employers may also be concerned that this would result in a
“slippery slope” effect, and lead unions to demand that they be consulted or involved in other
matters that were previously exclusively under the control of management (Claydon & Green,
1994, p. 42). At the same time, union supporters might argue that the nature of the unionemployer relationships is evolving, and that a new approach to industrial relations whereby
unions have a more participatory role is long overdue (Wallis et al, 2005). Given these issues,
the success of such collaborative efforts would depend highly on the nature of the unionmanagement relationship. For these reasons, some industrial relations theorists, including
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Stuart (1996), are skeptical about the success of joint union-management training
partnerships.
Furthermore, as in any relationship based on opposing interests, while both unions and
employers may agree that in principle, training is important to both firms and employees,
there is likely to be enormous disagreement over the over-arching goals of joint managementunion training programs (Leisink, cited by Stuart, 1996; Wallis et al, 2005). Unions’
approaches to training tend to be rooted in the ideals espoused by the broader labour
movement. Unions tend to focus primarily on the more distributive aspects of training, such
as securing equitable access to training for all union members, in order to prevent
management from using training as a tool to propagate elitism in the workplace (Heyes,
2007). In some cases, unions may prioritize the provision of training programs to
marginalized groups, including unskilled or immigrant workers (Hoque & Bacon, 2008).
From the employer’s standpoint, where there is no economic incentive to undertake such
measures, there is likely to be opposition to these approaches. For employers, training is a
tool that ought to be used to maximize efficiency and overall organizational effectiveness,
through the development of skills that lead to positive on-the-job performance outcomes.
A separate issue that needs to be resolved is what kind of training managers and
employers agree should be provided. Typically, firms tend to prefer firm- or job-specific
training, which can be applied immediately to one’s current position within the organization
(Dundon & Eva, 1998). Unions, on the other hand, are more likely to promote generalized
training, more based on the principles of “lifelong learning” and targeted to improve general
employability (Wallis et al, 2005). Once again, the interests of unions and employers may be
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at odds, as employers are less likely to sponsor training that is of greater value to other
organizations than one’s own.
One last issue that is of particular importance to this discussion is the question of what
specific role unions should have in influencing training programs, policies and provisions. In
theory, training, like any other issue, can be addressed through collective bargaining (Stuart,
1996). In settings where training issues generally do not make their way to the bargaining
table, training has been addressed through formal or informal negotiated agreements with
employers that often limit bargaining agent involvement (Stuart, 1996; Claydon & Green
1994). In recent decades in Western Europe and Britain, state intervention has played a
crucial role in allowing unions to participate in discussions about employee training. Of
particular interest is the British model, which will be discussed in the following section.
Union Learning Representatives in the United Kingdom
Since the 1980’s, the European labour movement in particular has been increasingly
vocal about the need for governments to intervene and regulate workplace training (Perrett &
Lucio, 2008). Throughout Europe and the U.K., the labour movement began to lobby
governments for increased government regulation of Vocational and Educational Training
(VET), and campaigned in favour of the establishment of government- standardized training
requirements and nationally recognized vocational qualifications (Stuart, 1996; Dundon &
Eva, 1998). In the early 1990’s, the European labour movement recognized that the
promotion of training issues as an integral component of the “new unionism” movement
(Forrester, 2001).
At the same time, in Britain, the labour movement's role in training policy initiatives
at a national level was reduced dramatically, as a result of several changes to national labour
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relations policy introduced by the Thatcher Conservative government (Wallis et al, 2005;
Stuart, 1996; Hoque & Bacon, 2008). In the 1980’s and 1990’s, the tripartite training
institutions that existed to address training issues at a national level, such as the Manpower
Services Commission and the Industrial Training Boards, were shut down, and replaced by
employer-dominated bodies (called the Training and Enterprise Councils), in which unions
had a very limited, nominal role (Stuart, 1996; Heyes & Stuart, 1998; Dundon & Eva, 1998).
With the country suffering from the economic and political effects of a major recession and
the near-collapse of certain industries including the manufacturing sector, union density and
influence began its steady decline (Stuart, 1996; Claydon & Green, 1994). Unable to
influence training policy at a national level, unions began to lobby for changes at a local level
(Wallis et al, 2005). In the early 1990’s, the TUC’s “Bargaining for Skills” campaign called
upon unions to attempt to set up joint union-management committees in local workplaces to
discuss training issues (Claydon & Green 1994). While the ultimate goal was to formalize
these committees in legislation the way that joint union-management health and safety
committees were made a statutory requirement, without government support for such an
initiative, these had to be established on a purely voluntary basis (Claydon & Green, 1994).
The TUC continued to lobby the government for changes to the country’s regulation of VET,
calling upon the government to establish nationally recognized training standards (Dundon &
Eva, 1998; Forrester, 2001).
With the election of the pro-union New Labour government in 1997, the government
began to introduce drastic changes to the country’s labour relations framework (Forrester,
2001). The importance of educating Britain’s workforce to remain globally competitive was
reflected in a number of government initiaves, such as the establishment of the Union
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Learning Fund in 1998, which provided unions with access to funds to support union-driven
skill development programs (Wallis et al, 2005). Large UK unions launched campaigns in
support of training and development, including UNISON (the largest union in the UK), who
launched a training initiative called Return to Learn (Wallis et al, 2005).
Towards the end of the 1990’s, the TUC began to promote the concept of union
learning representatives in workplaces (Wallis et al, 2005). In the absence of any formal
mechanism through which unions could directly control training provisions, the role allowed
unions to engage their membership and increase interest in workplace learning among
workers. The TUC undertook the task of training workplace representatives, whose
responsibilities included “promoting the benefits of learning, giving “front line” advice and
guidance, assessing learning needs, helping colleagues to attend courses, accessing funding
for courses,” and other related duties (Cowen et al, cited by Forrester, 2001.)
In 2002, the passing of the amended Employment Act formalized the creation of union
learning representatives in unionized workplaces across the United Kingdom (Wallis et al,
2005). Under section 43 of the Act, ULRs were provided with a statutory right to recognition
and paid time off to perform duties related to “analyzing training needs, providing
information and advice on training, arranging training, promoting the value of training, and
consulting the employer over these activities” (Hoque & Bacon 2008, p. 703). The legislation
was significant because it affirmed the notion that training is of considrable significance to
sustaining the competitiveness of firms, and that the issue was so crucial that it necessitated
state intervention (Wallis et al, 2005). It implies that in order for organizations to remain
competitive internationally, there is a need to invest in the development of workers.
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Furthermore, the Act is an indication of the government’s recognition that unions have a
legitimate, vital role to play in involving training (Wallis et al, 2005).
At the same time, the legislation has many weaknesses. Firstly, unlike the act to
which it is most often compared, the Health and Safety at Work Act (introduced in 1972), the
provisions in the Employment Act that address the rights of ULRs are not supported by any
“broader regulatory and policy frameworks” (Wallis et al, 2005, p. 286). Health and safety
legislation is backed by government regulations and enforcement mechanisms, administered
by government bodies, which monitor compliance with the legislation and prescribe specific
remedies for violations (Wallis et al, 2005). However, the legislation requiring employers to
acknowledge the role of union learning representatives is limited to requiring employer
recognition of the role. There is no statutory obligation placed upon employers to negotiate or
consult with these representatives, or even to meet with them. Rather, they simply need to be
provided with paid time off to perform the duties outlined under Section 43 of the Act.
Whether or not the employer works with the ULR is the decision of management.
The second weakness of the Act is that fails to extend statutory rights to unions with
respect to collective bargaining over training (Hoque & Bacon, 2008; Wallis et al, 2005).
Collective bargaining is the most effective procedural mechanism available to unions in
bringing about change at the local level, and yet prior to the passing of the Act, few unions
were ever able to successfully bargain formalized training agreements with employers
(Claydon & Green, 1994; Wallis et al, 2005). Given the government’s support for the labour
movement’s learning agenda, it seemed strange that in the midst of passing the most
significant changes to labour relations policy in recent years, that the government would stop
short of giving unions the procedural mechanism needed to execute changes to workplace
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training policies. While unions do have more rights they did without the Act, the question
that remains is whether or not these new statutory rights adequately address the concerns that
brought about these changes in the first place.
Discussion
Many studies in recent years have attempted to identify whether or not a relationship
exists between unionization and training (Kennedy et al, 1994; Heyes, 2007; Green &
Lemieux, 2006). The results of these studies have been varied, with evidence from Australia
showing that unions can actually have a negative impact on training (Kennedy et al, 1994),
while studies of North American workplaces have found no significant relationship between
the presence of unions and workplace training incidence (Green & Lemieux, 2006). In
Europe and the United Kingdom, studies have shown that in general, workers in unionized
workplaces are slightly more likely to receive training (Dustmann & Shonberg, 2009; Heyes
& Stuart, 1998; Green et al, cited by Wallis et al, 2005), particularly in smaller organizations
(Green, cited by Green & Lemieux, 2006). However more recent studies have indicated that
this relationship is much weaker now than it was before (Hoque & Bacon, 2008). Overall,
evidence from studies in the UK has indicated that union presence tends to have a largely
indirect influence on training, with very few UK unions able to successfully bargain any new
provisions related to training or skill development (Claydon & Green, 1994), and with few
collective agreements even addressing issues related to learning, skill development, or
training (Dundon & Eva, 1998).
Research on the effectiveness of the ULR initiative since its official launch in 2002
has yielded mixed results. As of 2005, 6500 ULRs had undergone training for this role, and
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by 2010, it is expected that there will be 22,000 active ULRs in workplaces across the United
Kingdom (Wallis et al, 2005). In a comprehensive recent study by Hoque and Bacon (2008),
no direct correlation between ULR presence and training was found, however, ULRs did
appear to have an influence on the distribution of training (Hoque & Bacon, 2008). With
more employees at different levels reporting greater access to training, ULRs appear to be
achieving at least one of their intended objectives. At this point, however, researchers are
hesitant to draw too many conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the ULR initiative,
given that there are a number of factors that must be taken into consideration when reviewing
these results. For example, the placement of the first ULRs in workplaces across the country
by national unions was likely not done at random. In fact, it is more likely that ULRs would
be found in environments where the probability of ULRs reporting positive results was
highest, given the need for unions to establish the credibility of this new role from the onset
(Hoque & Bacon, 2008). This inference is supported by the results showing that in the early
years, ULRs were most likely to be found in workplaces with higher union density (Hoque &
Bacon, 2008). Considering all of these factors, it is perhaps too early to assess the success of
the ULR initiative on a national scale quantitatively.
Qualitative studies on the representatives themselves indicate that in some respects,
the labour movement’s objective of changing the way employers perceive unions may in fact
be addressed through the introduction of ULRs. What is particularly unique about ULR is
that they are essentially a “cadre of union activists” (Wallis et al 2005, p. 285), in the sense
that the majority tend to be new to union activity (Moore & Wood, cited by Wallis et al,
2005). They are also more likely to be women, and more likely to be members of a minority
group, than most standard union representatives (Moore & Wood, cited by Wallis et al, 2005).
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This appears to be consistent with the labour movement’s mission to improve accessibility to
training among disadvantaged and marginalized groups. While some employers may perceive
their unions to be self-serving and only benefitting those who are already considerably well
off, the fact that ULRs are more likely to be members of these minority groups may be
indicative of the labour movement’s fairly recent change in priorities.
Union learning representatives are also unique in the sense that they tend to have
unique relationships with their unions. As mentioned previously, few have prior union
experience, and according to Forrester (2001), the majority of ULRs cite their “enthusiasm for
learning” as their primary motivation for volunteering for their positions. Before the role of
the ULR was written into law, in some cases, ULRs had no previous interest in union activity,
and some were not even union members before taking on the role (Forrester, 2001). Given
the newness of the role, there is some evidence which indicates that ULRs experience some
confusion over their roles, and in some cases report experiencing conflict with other union
representatives (Hoque & Bacon, 2008). Certain studies have affirmed that ULRs often
disagree with other union representatives on how to engage the employer on training issues
(Wallis et al, 2005). In some cases, ULRs reported strained relationships with or inadequate
support from other union officials at either the local or national level (Wallis et al, 2005).
Additionally, these studies show that there is great variability in terms of the relationships that
ULRs have with their employers as well, which is important, because it illustrates the
important role that the industrial relations context plays in these situations (Wallis et al,
2005). In the end, these studies suggest that not all union learning representatives have the
same type of relationship with their employer, or the same type of relationship with their
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union for that matter. These contextual factors make it very difficult to evaluate the success
of ULR initiatives on the whole.
Another important consideration is that not only are ULRs are not only a new breed of
union representative, but they are also reaching out to a new breed of union members. In
many cases, they are reaching out to what Cassel and Lee (2006) refer to as “reluctant
learners” (p. 784) – employees who, because of their position or status in the organization, are
typically excluded from training and learning initiatives. Given the mission of the British
labour movement to increase training accessibility for all workers (particularly unskilled or
semi-skilled workers), this is significant because for the first time, these groups are being
supported by front-line union representatives.
Perhaps most reliable criteria which we can use to assess the success of ULRs in UK
workplaces are the responses and reactions from employers. Studies indicate that employers,
for the most part, are in compliance with the new legislation. According to Wallis and
colleagues (2005), 45% of ULRs indicate that their employers were at least somewhat
supportive of their efforts (Wallis et al, 2005). A further 45% indicating that their employers
were completely indifferent to them, with the remainder citing that their employers were
unsupportive and even disruptive of their efforts (Wallis et al, 2005). The fact that such over
half of employers are neutral to or dismissive of ULRs is suggestive of the fact that without a
statutory obligation to engage unions on matters related to training through collective
bargaining, the employer is simply under no obligation to consult with ULRs.
However, to accuse employers of acting in bad faith for not embracing the
introduction of ULRs is not completely fair. Prior to the creation of ULRs, unions in the
United Kingdom in particular generally demonstrated little interest in training (Forrester,
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2001). Unions, for the most part, recognized that this was typically a function controlled
exclusively by management, and therefore unions rarely bargained over training provisions
(Claydon & Green, 1994). Generally speaking, unions were rarely involved in decisionmaking processes related to training (Claydon & Green, 1994). Furthermore, it has been
argued that the labour movement failed to anticipate the importance of the role that skill
development would play in the coming years, and failed to recognize the trends occurring in
the external environment that indicated the need for unions to adopt modernized policies with
respect to training (Perrett & Lucio, 2008). Now that the need for improved training is
apparent to the unions and their members, there is a major push from the labour movement to
provide unions with a participatory role in training initiatives.
Furthermore, employers recognize that this fairly recent shift by the labour movement
in support of skill development and training initiatives is not entirely motivated by unions’
concerns for the competitiveness of British firms or the welfare of union members. As in any
political campaign, the parties involved are influenced by self-serving motives, and for the
union movement, this campaign is as much about finding “a path to membership renewal” as
it is improving working conditions for members (Heyes & Stuart, 1998, p. 459). It is no
secret that the labour movement recognizes that the ultimate goal of the “New Bargaining
Agenda” is the revitalization of unionism in the U.K. (Wallis et al, 2005; Hoque & Bacon,
2008). Since the 1980’s, shrinking union density and declining influence at a national level
has left the labour movement in search of a long-term renewal strategy (Claydon & Green,
1994). In the early 1990’s, the TUC saw its “New Bargaining Agenda” as a way of “shaking
off outdated practices and transforming the TUC into a modern, progressive organization
which campaigns on behalf of trade unions and working people” (TUC, cited by Forrester,
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2001, p. 318). The TUC began to embrace this more “integrative” approach to bargaining
that placed greater emphasis on issues that were increasingly attractive to members (Green et
al, 1999; Claydon & Green, 1994, p. 42). Perhaps fearing the loss of their jobs and having
lost faith in the union’s ability to keep them secure, union members in the 1990’s began to
recognize the value of training, and in some cases, considered it as a fair trade-off for
bargained job security provisions (Fagiano, 1993). For many unions, the ability to bargain
additional training provisions and influence training decisions was one way in which they
could justify their existence to their dues-paying membership (Claydon & Green, 1994). At
the same time, union learning representatives operating in low-density environments could
increase the attractiveness of union membership, through the promotion of the benefits
associated with training to non-members, in an effort to increase union member numbers in
the workplace (Stuart, 1996). In the end, what remains to be seen is whether, on a macro
level, the introduction of ULRs has helped the labour movement to achieve its ultimate goal
of union revitalization.
Another issue worth noting is that at the same time that unions are grappling with the
issue of involving themselves in training and development programs in a manner that is to
their advantage, employers are also in a position where now, more than ever, talent and skill
development are increasingly a source of competitive advantage. Without innovative
strategies for maximizing productivity and optimizing organizational flexibility, organizations
are likely to face significant challenges in this cutthroat, twenty-first century global
marketplace. The fact that unions are willing to participate in collaborative training efforts
puts employers in a position where the onus is on them to decide whether or not they will
leverage the resources made available through unions. Under the current ULR model,
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employers are not required to consult or collaborate with learning representatives, nor are they
required to share privileged information with them (Claydon & Green, 1994). As a result,
ULRs in most workplaces lack the information they need access to in order to add any value
for the employer (Claydon & Green, 1994). Therefore, without the support of the employer,
ULRs are powerless to bring about any significant improvements to training quality, and their
efforts will contribute little to the bottom line. Conversely, if a collaborative approach was
adopted, information was shared and resources were pooled, there is potential for positive
outcomes to result for both employers and unions. However, as discussed earlier, the threat
that unions will use this opportunity to advance their own agendas presents a considerable risk
for the employer.
This dilemma is at the heart of this issue. While rhetoric on both sides of the issue
speaks to the need to build “social partnerships” between employers and unions (Heyes &
Stuart, 1998), the question of whether or not joint union-management training arrangements
can be established in a manner that suits both parties remains unanswered. Recognizing the
challenges that this model presents, in recent years the European labour movement has
acknowledged the role of the state in regulating these partnerships. In 2000, a communication
on this subject from the International Labour Organization stated that “the social partners
should strengthen social dialogue on training, share responsibility in formulating education
and training policies, and engage in partnerships with each other and with governments for
investing in, planning and implementing training” (ILO, cited by Heyes, 2007, p. 240).
Today, training is a significant part of the European Employment Strategy, with many EU
member countries developing different labour policies to address training issues (Heyes,
2007). In some Western European countries with centralized labour makets, such as
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Germany, for example, government training regulation is used to “level the playing field”, by
imposing certain training investment requirements on employers, regardless of their union or
non-union status (Stuart, 1996; Claydon & Green 1994). Throughout Western Europe in
particular, workforce training and lifelong learning are recognized as essential components of
any sustainable economic policy, and while there remain several questions about the roles of
government, unions and employers in these partnerships, there is agreement that without state
intervention, the voluntary nature of joint union-management training arrangements may
reduce the likelihood of unions and employers effectively collaborating on these initiatives in
any meaningful way.
In the United Kingdom, the government, in consultation with the labour movement,
has developed a model whereby unions have a formal role in workplace learning and
development programs and initiatives. While it is an innovative approach that addresses
many of the issues troubling the union movement at this time, at this point there is insufficient
evidence indicating that it will lead to the revitalization of the trade union movement, or that it
will bring about a long-term solution to Britain’s skill deficit. While the issue of workplace
training is currently a high-profile topic in workplaces across the United Kingdom, it may
only be a matter of time before the very same debate takes place in countries with similarly
decentralized labour markets, such as Canada. Given time, a more fulsome evaluation of this
model may provide policy-makers, unions and employers with some insight into how the use
innovative solutions like these to address the significant obstacles that both unions and
employers face in these challenging economic times.
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