How to Prove that some Acts are Wrong (without using substantive moral assumptions)
You drive down Main Street near the town auditorium. Inside, the local charity
network will hold a seminar on how to contribute to local and global causes.
Everyone is on their way there; dozens line the street heading towards the meeting.
An approaching traffic light turns red; and the crowd streams across the crosswalk
ahead. If you punch the gas, you would take out 10, seriously injure 25, and topple
that 1000-year-old Spruce you swore to protect. You abhor the prospects of harming
others and of repairing your car. Punching the gas also furthers no one’s interests or
well-being; but is it wrong?
This somewhat silly example illustrates that there are acts, acts that could be performed in
the actual world, which all plausible normative theories condemn as wrong. These examples
abound, even if they are somewhat contrived. I argue that these cases allow us to construct proofs
for the existence of some moral facts; in this case, the fact that it is wrong to punch the gas. Most
importantly, these proofs employ plausible premises that most moral skeptics and error theorists can
and do accept.
The first section explains why we might want such proofs. After all, some will claim that
they do not prove anything that needs proving—we don’t need to vindicate uncontroversial moral
claims such as punching the gas in these circumstances is wrong or it is wrong to kick children when it would not
benefit anyone. Here, I will briefly rehearse and motivate some arguments for moral skepticism and
error theory, and why we seem pressed to address these positions.
The second section outlines the argument, and provides a general recipe for arguing from
non-substantive moral claims to substantive moral conclusions.1 Nevertheless, some will worry that
By “substantial moral claims” I mean claims that 1) can be denied without immediate contradiction, and 2) attribute
valenced moral properties (i.e. being right, being wrong, being what you morally ought (or ought not) to do, being good, being bad, being
supererogatory, being evil, being just) to actual objects or object-types non-normatively described. Non-valenced attributions
of moral predicates like “x is morally permissible” or “x is not right” are excluded their truth fully depends on the falsity
of some substantive claim. For example, acts are permissible only when and because they are not wrong. Conditional
1
1
this is a moral philosopher’s “cold fusion”—sound arguments for substantial moral conclusions
require a substantive moral premise.2 I show that this is not so. However, I do not derive any moral
“ought” from an “is” Instead, my argument is of a different form—I argue from the metaphysical
possibility of particular moral facts to their actuality. Specifically, I explain that x would be morally
required, if anything is ensures that x actually is morally required.
The third section diagnoses why my arguments work. Here, I offer an explanation for the
supervenience of the moral on the non-moral that helps to reveal that my strategy is not a
sophisticated trick. The final section considers two objections to the strategy. In replying to these
objections, I explain why my strategy may allow us to demonstrate more than “obvious” moral
truths, and why it may also address a stronger version of error theory, according to which, moral
truths are not possible.
Obviously, this paper is ambitious. I cannot hope to fully develop and defend my strategy
here. My purpose is merely to introduce and motivate a potentially powerful technique for
addressing the moral skeptic and error theorist.
The Problem
Common sense tells us it is wrong to punch the gas in case above. And our particular normative
theories each tell us the same thing. And so, we appear to have a “no-brainer”—we can confidently
conclude that this act is wrong. But application of a little more brain can make us unsure. The
moral claims like “Sex without consent is wrong, if anything is” are also not substantive, for they are (by themselves)
consistent with nihilism –the thesis that no actual objects are right or wrong.
For a nice overview and defense of this thesis, see Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) 135-167. The idea’s origin is often
attributed to Hume, (Treatise, 3.1.1.27), whose position is often unfairly encapsulated in the slogan “you cannot derive
an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’.”
2
2
uncertainty will not stem from the possibility that some unforeseen and counter-intuitive normative
theory is correct. We will not worry, for instance, that punching the gas will turn out to be morally
right. Instead doubt can creep in when we reflect on how we could know any moral claims, and
whether there are any moral facts at all.
First, it is doubtful that our moral beliefs could be justified a posteriori.3 We don’t directly
detect actual instances of right and wrong in our experience. If we could, we would have the
incredible ability to tell when we were being lied to, or swindled. In addition, it seems like a category
error to claim that facts about what we ought to do somehow explain or cause particular events that
happen in the world. And unlike mathematics, morality is not indispensible to developing scientific
theories. Consequently, it is unlikely that moral facts best explain any other facts, including the fact
that we have the moral beliefs that we do.4 If this is right, we should be especially concerned—how
could our moral beliefs track moral facts if the moral facts cannot cause or explain our moral
beliefs?
While the nature and extent of our a priori knowledge is contested, on traditional accounts, a
priori knowledge of moral facts is also dubious. By definition, no substantive moral claim can be
justified as an analytic truth. And moral concept possession does not, by itself, support any
particular substantive moral claims—nihilists are needn’t be conceptually confused.5
For a unique defense of this claim, plus a powerful argument that our moral beliefs cannot be explained by the actual
instantiation of moral properties, see Zangwill (2005).
3
4
The locus classicus for these concerns is Harman (1977) 3-10. In my estimation, most accept Harman’s view (on this
issue) though it remains controversial, for example, see Sturgeon (1984), Zimmerman (1984) 83-88, Brink (1989) 193-97,
and Cuneo(2006), among others.
5
See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006): 53-60 for a thorough defense. Furthermore, even if we could vindicate a substantive
moral claim in this way, doing so may be a pyrrhic victory. As Rawls suggests, even if our moral concepts entail
substantive moral conclusion, we can still ask whether alternative concepts might be preferable Rawls (1971) 51. Thus,
perhaps these arguments could (at best) tell us something about our concepts while ignoring the crucial normative issue
–what is to be done?
3
These sorts of worries do not merely cast doubt on moral knowledge—they also make error
theory attractive. According to error theory, there are no moral facts: moral claims are truth-apt but
never true. If moral facts cannot explain (or best explain) any other non-normative facts, why should
we countenance their existence at all? In general, we postulate the unobserved to explain the
observed. Arguably, synthetic claims that do not “pull their explanatory weight” ought to be
considered false. These worries are further compounded by the allegedly “queer” and “non-natural”
nature of these would-be facts.6
Furthermore, once error theory becomes a live option, there is seemingly no way out. If
sound arguments for substantial moral conclusions require substantial moral premises, and error
theorists deny all substantive moral claims, then error theory forestalls any refutation. You cannot
rebut it without question-begging. This makes moral skepticism even more plausible, because error
theory can function as an irrefutable and independently-motivated skeptical hypothesis. Indeed,
Walter Sinnott-Armstrong uses this consideration as a crucial premise in his case for moral
skepticism.7
Notice that the problem is deeper than merely being unable to refute error theory. If sound
arguments with moral conclusions must employ moral premises, then we also cannot rationally
address a neutral party to the debate—an agnostic about moral facts. We can imagine an agnostic who
sincerely wants to share our non-parsimonious, explanatorily impotent, and mysterious view; yet all
6
Here the classic work is Mackie (1977) 30-42. Admittedly, a plausible naturalism may make many of the above worries
moot. But while there are powerful arguments for the broad naturalist project, these arguments cannot allay skeptical
concerns without an account of which particular natural properties moral properties are. No such account has enjoyed
much favor; and there is doubt that any could be forthcoming, see for example, Horgan and Timmons (1992) for
specific concerns about “synthetic” naturalism, and Yablo (2000) for concerns about Frank Jackson’s (1998) alternative.
See Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) 135-52 and Shafer-Landau (2003) 58-65 for more general concerns.
7
Sinnott-Armstrong (2006) 112-130
4
we can muster are question-begging arguments. Perhaps we should worry that we are the mistaken
ones.
These concerns may move us towards a “faith-based” or externalist attitude towards moral
knowledge. Perhaps we cannot be aware or demonstrate that acts are morally required, but they may be
morally required nonetheless. And perhaps there are reliable processes for forming moral beliefs,
even though we cannot discern that they are reliable. This response is plausible in other contexts—
some facts are true or known without our being able to demonstrate that they are—but it is dubious
thing to say about morality. Moral facts are supposed to guide our actions; indeed, we are justifiably
subject to blame when we fail to conform to moral norms. Yet if the moral facts are (rationally)
beyond our ken, how can they appropriately guide us? Consider again agnostics about morality.
They are equally subject to moral requirements. But, if the forgoing is correct, they cannot rationally
come to see that they’re bound by them. And, as with an unpublicized law, it seems patently
unjustified to hold people to standards they cannot detect. But moral requirements, by their very
nature, are supposed to be justified. Thus, the retreat to faith or externalism may be further recipe
for error theory.
These concerns can move us towards moral skepticism and error theories. They can shake
our confidence even when common sense and all plausible ethical theories reach a common verdict.
Can we save common sense from these philosophical doubts? Or perhaps, more accurately, can we
save philosophical reflection from its conflict with common sense? I think we can, but only with
some more abstruse philosophy.
5
The Argument
Instead of defensively resisting the arguments of agnostics, skeptics, and error-theorists, I will try to
positively refute their views. Specifically, I explain how common views about the nature of
morality—views that agnostics, skeptics, and error-theorists can and do accept—allow us to prove
that punching the gas is wrong. We will see that the traditional skeptical and error-theoretic worries
give us no reason to doubt our “conditional” normative verdicts and theories—our beliefs about
what would be morally required if anything is. These verdicts, as it turns out, are the fulcrum required
to dislodge skepticism and the error theory.
The basic argument involves three steps. First, I argue that some widespread assumptions
allow us to infer that there is a metaphysically possible world, like ours, where error theory is false. Next, I argue
that we can infer that there is a metaphysically possible world like ours where punching the gas is morally wrong.
Finally, I argue that if there is a metaphysically possible world like ours where it is morally wrong, then punching
the gas actually is morally wrong.
Step 1: There is a possible world, like ours, where error theory is false.
While I cannot defend this claim to everyone’s satisfaction here, support for it comes from the
conjunction of three common metaethical positions. These positions are undefended assumptions
of my argument. To my knowledge, only one notable skeptic or error theorist denies any of these
positions—Richard Joyce. First, I assume that moral claims are truth-apt—they are the sort of thing
that could be either true or false. Second, I assume that moral claims are coherent and that we
cannot rule out a priori that they can be true. Consequently, my argument cannot directly address
6
Joyce’s error theory.8 On his view, no substantive moral claim could be true because such claims are
committed to the existence of a kind of reason that cannot exist. Later, I will say more about Joyce’s
view, and why my strategy also threatens his version of error theory. Third, I assume that no nonmoral features of the actual world preclude the instantiation of moral properties. Thus, I ignore the
potential worry that moral facts are possible, but not in a world like ours.9
The first assumption allows moral claims to exhibit truth values. The second assumption
supports the further conclusion that there is a possible world where some substantive moral claim is
true. The third assumption allows us to then conclude that substantive moral claims can be true in a
world like ours. It follows that that error theory is false in some world like ours. By “world like
ours” I mean a metaphysically possible world that is non-morally identical to ours.
Most importantly, none of the skeptical concerns mentioned undermine the possibility that
moral properties are instantiated in some world like ours. Recall, they were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Our moral beliefs are not explained by the actual instantiation of moral properties
Our moral beliefs cannot be justified by inferences to the best explanation.
One cannot be directly sensitive to the moral facts.
Our substantive moral beliefs cannot be justified as analytic truths
The possession of moral concepts does not, by itself, justify any substantive moral claim.
One cannot refute error theory without begging the question.
Error theory is more parsimonious than moral realism.
Moral realism is committed to queer properties “unlike anything else in the universe”
Skepticism entails error theory: “Moral facts” without epistemic access cannot play
morality’s essential action-guiding function.
1-3 challenge our a posteriori sensitivity to the actual instantiation of moral properties; 4-5 undermine
traditional routes of a priori access to substantive moral claims; and 6 lends further support to moral
8
Joyce (2001) 77.
This sort of skepticism is rare, but it is not outlandish. For example, imagine someone who argues that there are no
moral requirements because no actual being has the cognitive capacities required for agency, and, there are no moral
requirements if no agent is bound by them.
9
7
skepticism because error theory appears to be a relevant alternative that cannot be ruled-out. Given
the epistemic concerns in 1-6, then 7-9 may each provide positive reasons for error theory. But,
strikingly, these claims do not individually or collectively challenge the metaphysical possibility of
right and wrong.
Step 2: There is a possible world like ours where punching the gas is morally wrong
Consider, again, the case that opened the paper. You wonder if it really is wrong to punch the gas.
Your confidence is shaken not because you worry that the correct normative theory may yield a
different moral verdict—all plausible normative theories would prohibit punching the gas. It’s not
the content of the normative theories that you question; rather, you worry that there are no facts for
these theories to be about. Thus, your worries do not threaten your belief that if anything is actually
morally wrong, then this is. Now, given step 1, you know that there is a world like yours—complete
with your counterpart—and moral facts. And. of course, at that world, it’s also true that if anything is
actually morally wrong, then punching the gas is. Consequently, you now have one further bit of
information: there is a world, non-morally identical to yours, where punching the gas is wrong.
Some might object that our insensitivity to the actual instantiation of moral properties
(asserted in 1-3) undermines our justification for believing if anything is actually morally wrong, then this is.
Specifically, one might claim that we cannot begin to determine which non-moral properties are
potential right- and wrong-makers unless we can first “calibrate” our normative theories with
independent access to which actual acts are right or wrong. By analogy, we cannot know which
colors supervene on which molecular structures without knowing what color any object is.
8
This objection should worry you only if your reason for believing punching that gas is wrong
is your tendency to detect wrongness in actual acts non-morally similar to it. But that is nobody’s
reason for accepting particular moral verdicts. Building normative theories does not require serious
field work. We need not, and should not, mount expeditions in search of specimens of right and
wrong, which we can then use to discover the non-moral correlates of moral properties. Instead,
the order of priority is usually reversed: we infer actual rightness and wrongness from particular
normative theories, though these theories are typically latent and incomplete. Even testing theory
against brute “intuition” is not theory selection based on an assumed sensitivity to actual moral facts,
i.e. actual moral property instantiations. The crudest “intuitionist” who simply thinks about cases,
eschews theory, and goes with his moral gut, assumes access only to what would be wrong in such
cases. His claim to intuit that lying is wrong is in no way a report that he apprehends wrongness
when he witnesses someone lying—otherwise he would be an excellent extra-sensory lie detector.
Still one might ask “how then do we determine which features are right-makers and wrongmakers without sensitivity to actual instances of right and wrong?” That question has no single
answer; there are as many answers as there are possible arguments for particular normative theories.
The important point is that no method for delivering moral verdicts—from brute intuition to the
most complicated normative theory—assumes that we infer right and wrong from our sensitivity to
actual instances of moral properties. Consequently, the skeptical worries outlined above give us no
reason to doubt our “conditional” normative verdicts and theories—our beliefs about what would
be morally required if anything is.
Step 3: If there is a world like ours where punching the gas is morally wrong, then it is actually morally wrong.
9
This final step appears to be the most controversial, as it involves an inference from possibility to
actuality. But inferences from possibility to actuality are not always mysterious or problematic. For
instance, one may infer that the surface area of an actual sphere is 12 square ft. provided one knows
that there is a possible sphere of the same volume whose surface area is 12 square ft. The inference is
unproblematic because the surface area of spheres strongly supervenes on the volume of spheres.
The strong supervenience of moral properties on non-moral properties is also a “widely
held” and “overarching a priori framework principle governing our moral thought”:10 According to
this principle, for any possible worlds W1 and W2 and any objects x and y, if x in W1 is non-morally
indiscernible from y in W2, then x in W1 is morally-indiscernible from y in W2. The even less
controversial view that moral properties globally supervene on non-moral properties permits the same
inference.11 On this view, for any worlds W1 and W2, if W1 and W2 have the same world-wide
pattern of distribution of non-moral properties, then they have the same world-wide distribution of
moral properties. The platitude that moral requirements are non-arbitrary also licenses Step 3. If
morality could require you to do one thing in a particular situation and something else in a
qualitatively identical situation, there could be no facts that explain why the moral demands are what
they are in the respective cases. Consequently, the instantiation of moral properties could be
random and unprincipled. This seems impossible, and not merely odd, because it implies that
correlative demands of morality are arbitrary.
Thus, given any of these principles, plus your intermediate conclusion that there is a nonmorally identical world where punching the gas is wrong, we can demonstrate that punching the gas
10
The quotes are from Zangwill (2008).
See Kim (1987) Petrie (1987) and Chalmers (1996) for the idea that global supervenience is weaker than strong
supervenience, and perhaps weaker than “weak” supervenience [A-properties weakly supervene on B-properties if and only
if for any possible world w and any individuals x and y in w, if x and y are B-indiscernible in w, then they are Aindiscernible in w].
11
10
actually is wrong. And, in general, the same technique demonstrates the actual rightness and
wrongness of any act either prescribed or prohibited by all plausible normative theories.
Consequently, we also know there are some substantial moral truths.12
Why supervenience, and why the argument works
Few deny the supervenience of the moral on the non-moral. In fact, many hold that accepting it is a
condition of competence with moral concepts.13 The puzzle has been explaining why this relation holds
between particular moral properties and particular non-moral properties.14 But we do not need to know
how the supervenience works to use it as a premise. Nevertheless, allow me to provide an explanation
for supervenience and the non-arbitrariness constraints: denying them is incompatible with the
“normative authority” of morality. The explanation, I hope, will also help reveal that the argument
is not a sophisticated trick.
Morality’s normative authority can be roughly summarized as follows: we ought, or have
normative reason, to do what is right; and that we ought not, or have normative reason not to, do
Some may object that my argument would “prove too much.” To illustrate, consider the following puzzle: Act
Utilitarianism and the Kantian Deontology cannot both be actually true. But, it seems that they are each possibly true.
But if the relevant possibility is metaphysical, and no non-normative features of our world preclude either of these
theories, then we can infer that there are possible worlds like ours where Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology are
true. Thus, using the inference I used before, Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology are both actually true!
Something must go, but the only available culprits are supervenience or the claim that both of these views are
metaphysically possible. I will not reject supervenience. And anyone who reflects on the implications of
supervenience/non-arbitrariness constraints on morality will think twice about casually pronouncing on the metaphysical
possibility of particular normative theories. For, given supervenience, the metaphysical possibility of a normative theory
excludes the possibility of any other normative theory (more carefully, it would exclude the possibility of any normative
theory that entailed a different distribution of moral properties at the relevant world) Because the supervenience
constraint is thought to be a conceptual truth, the premise that generated the puzzle – Act Utilitarianism and the Kantian
Deontology are both possibly true—is either a conceptual falsehood or must be interpreted as invoking a different
modality, presumably epistemic possibility.
12
13
See Jackson (1998) 130-1 and Zangwill (1996) for a defense.
14
See Mackie (1977):41, and Blackburn (1971), (1984):182-87 and (1985).
11
what is wrong. To illustrate why we need the supervenience and non-arbitrariness constraints to
preserve the morality’s authority, suppose that those constraints are false and yet the normative
authority of morality persists. Thus, there can be two counterpart worlds, W1 and W2, with identical
non-normative histories, with an act that is wrong in W1, but not wrong in W2. In this case, being
wrong must independently explain why you ought not to perform the act in W1. But this seems
absurd.
Whatever grounds there are for or against acting some way are provided by the non-moral
features (extrinsic and intrinsic) of the acts themselves, not by the moral properties. Otherwise, we
could have reason to do the most heinous and ridiculous things if they turned out to be right.
Insisting that “those things could never turn out to be right” is no reply, because that insistence is
justified only by the assumption that the moral status of acts depends on their non-normative
features. The only reason “those things could never turn out to be right” is that their nonnormative features provide no grounds for acting these ways! Indeed, if moral properties provided
grounds for action (and not merely indicated such grounds), the supervenience constraint would not
be justified. But given that supervenience is a conceptual truth, we learn something interesting
about the nature and function of moral concepts: they are applied when a particular kind of
justification for action is already thought to be present.
These observations explain why so many think that the “why be moral?” question is
unintelligible. They also corroborate something Christine Korsgaard more cryptically noted in the
Sources of Normativity:15
“…concepts like right, good, obligation, reason, are our names for the solution of normative
problems…And if we sometimes succeed in solving those problems, then there will be
normative truths...the assumption of a realm of inherently normative entities or objective
15
Korsgaard: (1996) pg. 47.
12
values is not needed to explain the existence of normative concepts, or the resulting
existence of a category of normative truths.”
Korsgaard’s point, when applied to punching the gas, is that you do not need to independently
detect that your proposed act has wrongness in order to determine what that is not to be done or that
doing it would be wrong. Yes, trivially, an act is wrong only when it has wrongness, but our access is
not to wrongness in the actual world, which is epiphenomenal. Instead, our access is to the non-moral
features that explain why it is wrong. Which features are those? Again, it depends on the correct
normative theory. In this case we do not have to worry, because they all yield the same verdict –
every proposed “solution to your normative question” gives the same answer.
Two objections and two prospects for a wider application of the strategy
Some might worry about the assumption that some conditional normative theory may be correct.
And while the foregoing skeptical concerns do not indict that assumption; many doubt that any
particular normative theory will stand alone as the “correct” theory. Perhaps even after fully
idealized normative inquiry has run its course, two or more theories will remain. But that outcome
would not re-introduce the threat of error theory or skepticism. On the contrary, I submit that we
would have everything required for a compelling and conclusive normative theory. Suppose that
only Theory A and Theory B survive idealized normative inquiry. When the verdicts of the two
theories overlap, you can be confident that you must abide by their shared verdict. But what about
cases where the verdicts of A and B conflict? For instance, if A tells you to do x, and B tells you to
do y in some circumstance. In that case, I offer that you must conclude that you should do x or y
(and not z or v, or w,)—not everything would be permitted. As Korsgaard might put it, the fact that
13
there is no unique solution to a normative problem, does not entail there is no solution to that
problem!
This would not be a theory of the “second best” or theory of merely moral prudent action.
Asking “which one, x or y, really has rightness?” would be pointless and confused. All facts relevant
to that determination have been brought to bear, without a determination. If the indeterminacy is
not founded on non-moral ignorance, then worrying that “one really is right; we just cannot ever tell
which” is unintelligible. For if you say x may be right, but y is not, and all normatively relevant
considerations have been brought to bear, then there must be a normative difference without a
normatively relevant difference. “Morality” would be arbitrary, and thus robbed it of its normative
authority. If “too many” normative theories survive, then there is nothing to conclude but that
morality is more permissive than we thought. Thus, there is hope that my type of argument, when
supplemented by the progress of normative theories, will yield less “obvious” results than it is wrong
to kick children when no one would benefit. And more importantly, the traditional skeptical concerns
noted above, pose no threat to progress in normative theory.
Others might complain that my argumentative strategy cannot address the most credible
form of error theory, one that asserts that moral facts are impossible. I reply that there is no need to
rule out the skeptical hypothesis that moral facts are impossible unless some argument can be given for
it. And there is one, Richard Joyce’s. For Joyce, “the why be moral?” question is closed, morality is
conceptually authoritative—one always has reason to do what is morally required. But it is this
authority that causes trouble for moral truth. For Joyce, the only “real” reasons—reasons that
cannot be legitimately ignored—are the reasons of practical rationality.
Morality is not presented as something that may be legitimately ignored or begged-off. So
the question is: what sense can be made of reasons that cannot be evaded, of “real” reasons?
14
The answer I gave is that practical rationality yields [such] reasons, for to question practical
rationality is self-undermining.16
How does this challenge the possibility of moral requirements? The trouble is that the reasons of
practical rationality are agent-relative: they are “subjective reasons” that depend on the attitudes of the
agent in question. And Joyce believes there is “no evidence that there must be a convergence in
agents’ practical reasons,” and hence there are no particular acts that all agents have a practical
reason to perform. Consequently, there can be no particular acts that all agents have a “real reason”
to perform and, hence, no moral requirements.
Rather than rehash the extant objections to Joyce’s view, let me explain how my arguments
above can challenge his position on its own terms.17 In order to mount his case against the
possibility of moral requirements, Joyce must assume my arguments cannot work. For if we can
demonstrate that certain acts are morally required, then there will be a convergence in agents’ practical
reasons. Each person susceptible to the demonstration has a practical reason to abide by the
requirement. After all, one’s susceptibility reveals commitment to the moral requirement, even if
one does not antecedently accept or believe it. Moral commitments paradigmatically generate
practical reasons; failure to adhere to one’s moral commitments is irrational.18 And given his
assumption that moral requirements are conceptually authoritative, Joyce especially cannot deny that
our moral commitments provide us with practical reasons. So while Joyce’s final conclusion
threatens my argument; he cannot reach that conclusion without an independent case against my
arguments. My position poses a greater threat to his than his to mine.
16
Joyce (2002): 100.
Rather than call attention to specific responses to Joyce, I’d like to point the reader to some powerful arguments that
suggest the reverse of Joyce’s thesis: the reasons of practical rationality can be normative only if there are the agentneutral reasons Joyce rejects. See Kolody (2005), Parfit (1997).
17
Failure to abide by your moral commitments is a failure to abide by the requirement of practical rationality first called
“Enkrasia” by Aristotle, and echoed in contemporary work on practical rationality, it is the requirement which akrasia
violates.
18
15
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16
Rawls, John 1971. A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
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