SOCIOLOGY 15
2009
HANDOUT FIVE: MAX WEBER
Max Weber was preoccupied with three issues: the role of ideas in
history, the nature of power, and the methodology of the social sciences. We
shall first examine his analysis of ideas by looking at his classic work on the
"Protestant Ethic," a work that is but one part of a multi-volume study of religion.
We shall then turn to selected writings on power--on how it is organized as
authority and how it is distributed among various social groups. Finally we shall
examine an essay in which Weber attempts to determine the proper role of
factual claims and value judgments in the study of human beings.
Unlike Marx, Weber identifies capitalism not as the central feature of
modern western societies but as one aspect of a larger process of
rationalization. His discussion of these trends can be found in his work on both
ideas and power. Bureaucracy, capitalism, and Protestantism are all phenomena
of rationalization.
Weber never really defines "rationalization," so we will have to puzzle it
out for ourselves. You may start with the following preliminary definition: An
activity or enterprise is "rational" in Weber's sense to the extent that it is
systematically and self-consciously organized around the pursuit of an explicit
goal. Or more simply, "rational" life is life organized as a means to an end. The
antithesis of "rational" in this sense would probably be "traditional," not
“irrational.”
Weber did not use “rational” and “rationalization” as terms of praise. He
was quite ambivalent about rationally organized action and a totally rationalized
society. Consequently, his account of the uniquely rational features of western
societies at the beginning of The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism
does not imply that western societies are better than non-western ones, only
different.
A warning from the start: Weber is often very hard to read. His mind
was full of ideas that he wanted to get on paper as quickly as possible, and he
often paid scant attention to such niceties as coherent presentation or lucid
sentence structure. Some of his essays on power are models of how not to write
a paper. I have gotten so frustrated with Weber’s writing that at one point I
actually graded “Science as a Vocation” as if it were a paper for this course.
By the way, you might tuck the following quote from Weber away in the
back of your mind:
One can measure the honesty of a contemporary scholar, and above all, a
contemporary philosopher, in his posture toward Nietzsche and Marx....
Our intellectual world has to a great extent been shaped by Marx and
Nietzsche.
IDEAS AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (PESC) was originally
published in two parts in 1904-05. Weber revised and re-published it in 1920 as
part of his broad comparative study, Economic Ethics of the World Religions.
The “Author’s Introduction” in the standard English translation was not part of the
original book. Rather, it was the preface to the longer EEWR. If Weber seems
to start his argument twice, that is why.
PESC is only tangentially a theory of the rise of capitalism. As Weber
says it is more about the role of religion in economic life, which addresses only
one part of the rise of capitalism. Weber’s full account of capitalism, as laid out
in his General Economic History toward the end of his life, was much more
complex. (See Randall Collins, “Weber’s Last Theory of Capitalism,” American
Sociological Review, 1980, Vol. 45 (December) 925-942.)
Marx argued that social existence shapes consciousness, not vice versa.
Weber's position is more complicated: He argued that ideas play neither a wholly
autonomous nor a purely passive role in history. Ponder the following passage
and its applicability to his argument in The Protestant Ethic:
Not ideas, but material and ideal interests, directly govern men's conduct.
Yet very frequently the "world images" that have been created by ideas
have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been
pushed by the dynamic of interest.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism is important on several
levels, and you should keep in mind a general question or two in exploring each.
(1)The Protestant Ethic is about rationalization. For Weber, capitalism is
a rational way of organizing economic life (compared to pre-capitalist forms), just
as Calvinism and related kinds of Protestantism are a rational way of organizing
religious life (compared to Catholicism). In what sense are capitalism and
Protestantism rational?
(2) The book is also about the relationship between social existence and
consciousness generally. How does Weber's analysis of this relationship
differ from Marx's? How would Marx have written this book?
(3) Finally, on the most specific level, the book asks where do the ideas
that justify capitalism come from. Weber finds the answer in the three-sided
relationship between modern capitalism (a way of organizing economic life), the
spirit of capitalism (the set of ideas that justifies modern capitalism), and the
Protestant Ethic (a religious attitude toward this world and the next). What are
these things and what precisely is the relationship between them?
In addition, keep the following questions in mind as springboards for class
discussion:
(1) Why did Weber have to write a whole book to explain how the
ideas justifying modern capitalism develop? Does not the spirit of capitalism
appeal simply to natural human greed? Alternatively, doesn't capitalism itself
produce the ideas that justify it; that is, doesn't the mode of production shape
consciousness? Why does Weber answer no to these questions?
(2) What were the fundamental beliefs about salvation among
Calvinists and related early Protestant sects? How did these beliefs about
distinctly other-worldly things end up affecting the very worldly life of
capitalism?
Steps in Weber’s Argument
PESC presents a systematic argument. The key to reading it is figuring
out where you are in that argument at each point in the text. You might find the
following outline helpful in working through Weber’s argument. Page numbers
are to the Dover edition.
1. Distinctive features of western capitalism. Pp. 13-24
2. Focus on one key part of western capitalism, the ethos or spirit, the
“willingness to engage in rational conduct.” Pp. 26-27 (see also 90-92)
3. The spirit of capitalism: hard work and success as a moral duty;
acquisitiveness or striving for success based on self-denial. Pp. 48-54
Why does Weber focus on Ben Franklin? As he describes himself in his
Autobiography, Franklin was by no means a religious man. He didn’t
attend religious services. He espoused a generic religion that selfconsciously steered away from the dogmas of any specific religion. At the
same time, however, he set out to pursue moral perfection in a systematic
way. He created a list of 13 virtues and a weekly grid for keeping track of
how well he did regarding each. He rationalizes his moral life.
4. Why the emergence of the spirit of capitalism is problematic. Pp. 55-75
5. Calvinist views of salvation. Pp. 99-105
6. Their implications for practical conduct. Pp. 103-122
7. The views of salvation of Protestant sects generally, the elimination of magic
from the world, and their implications for personal conduct. pp. 147, 153-54 (also
117)
8. Summary of ascetic Protestant view of work and wealth. pp.155-169
9. How this ethic encourages a capitalist way of life. Pp. 170-179
Not just a set of work habits, but a whole way of life (p. 173)
Birth of “economic man.”
10. This ethic gets secularized and embedded in capitalism, which becomes an
“iron cage.” Pp. 175-182
POWER
Weber was concerned with how the nature and organization of power was
changing in modern western societies. It was becoming "rationalized," of course,
but there is more to it than that. His often abstract efforts to conceptualize power
are aimed at this issue. Basically, Weber distinguishes authority from other kinds
of power. He then looks at different kinds of authority and at different bases of
non-authoritative power.
Because Weber’s writings on power are especially obtuse, I am providing
a fairly detailed run through his analysis.
WEBER ON POWER
1. Power
2. Two general forms of domination
3. The state
4. Three ways of legitimating political power
5. Bureaucracy
6. Classes and status groups
7. Trends in the organization of power
8. Rationalization
1. Power or domination in the broad sense of the term is at work in most social
relationships, Weber argued. That is, in most relationships someone has the
capacity to get others to obey commands or otherwise act in certain ways even when
they (the others) may not want to. (selection from Economy and Society, p. 942, in
course reader)
2. Broadly speaking, Weber identifies two forms of power: domination based on a
“constellation of interests” and domination by “virtue of authority.” (see pp. 941-948)
The first kind of power refers to any situation in which a power relationship is based
on one party controlling a resource that others need. Weber’s examples are mostly
economic, though this kind of power occurs in other situations as well: A central
bank that monopolized credit could dictate the terms of loans to businesses, who
would accept these terms because it would be in their interests to do so. Or, a
cartel of brewers could dictate the terms on which tavern owners bought beer and
resold it to the public. The second kind of power refers to any situation in which
someone has the right to command and others, the duty to obey. (But note that the
motivation for obedience is not the issue.) If the central bank were able to put its
directors on the board of the debtor corporation, it would then exercise authority over
that corporation. If the brewer cartel bought all the taverns and then hired the former
owners as managers, it would then exercise authority over them. We live most of
our lives in relationships in which someone has authority (families, schools,
workplaces, the state, etc.) pp. 943-944, 946-947
--The examples Weber gives suggest that he sees a historical trend in modern
western societies from power based on a constellation of interests to power based
on authority. Indeed what Marx describes as proletarianization, the transformation
of independent craftspersons into paid workers, and what Weber describes as the
rationalization of the textile industry (Protestant Ethic, pp. 66-67) involve this kind of
shift in power.
3.
The State.
--While Weber is concerned with power in every part of social life, he often
focuses on political power.
-- He argues that political power in modern western societies and the
contemporary world generally takes a specific form he calls the state: A state is
a political organization that “(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate
use of physical force within a given territory.” (Gerth and Mills, p. 78, 82-83)
This is government in the form that we take for granted. We assume that one
and only one entity has this kind of power in a specific territory. Places in the
world that have no state usually register in our minds as anomalies. We talk
about civil war, revolutions, failed states.
--Weber is not saying that states always use violence. Some may use it a lot;
others not all. His points are that a monopoly of the right to use force in a
territory is what distinguishes the state from any other social institution, and that
states are the typical form political power takes in the contemporary world.
--Weber’s definition says nothing about how the state is organized or its leaders
chosen. A state may be democratic or dictatorial. Such terms refer to how
leaders are chosen.
--In the contemporary world, most political struggles are over who controls a
state
--States don’t just happen; they are built. Part of the process of statemaking is
centralization of control over what Weber calls the “means of administration,
warfare, and financial organization.” (p. 82) Put another way, this means that
officials, soldiers, and tax collectors become direct employees of the state, rather
than acting as independent contractors. Note that Weber sees a direct parallel
between this process and what Marx described as the proletarianization of
independent producer. (again, p. 82)
4. Weber argues that all political power seeks legitimacy and that there are three
ways of legitimating such power: charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational.(7879) The last of these is most important, because it leads Weber into a discussion
of bureaucracy.
5. Weber argues that states and all large organizations, private or public, tend to
take a bureaucratic form. Bureaucracy is a complex concept, but at the least it
includes the following features:
--all activities are carried out according to formal laws
--there is a clear hierarchy of command and a clear division of labor
--the offices or jobs of a bureaucracy are separated from the person who
occupies them. This means that ideally how the job is done is determined
by impersonal rules. It also means that the official is paid a salary rather
than being allowed to profit directly from his position
--officeholders are generally hired based on formal criteria such as
educational credentials and exams.
--Most intriguing perhaps, Weber argues that bureaucracy encourages a
“rationalist way of life.” (p. 240) This means that it encourages a “rational
matter-of-factness” and the “personality type of the expert.” More
important, it encourages a kind of education that “produces a system of
special examinations and the trained expertness that is increasingly
indispensable for modern bureaucracy.”
[Keep in mind that “bureaucracy” carries a different meaning for Weber
than for us. To us, it implies inefficiency and unnecessary “red tape.”
Weber sees bureaucracy as the most efficient way to carry out routine,
everyday tasks, which is why large organizations tend to become
bureaucratic.]
6. Classes and Status Groups
There is a lot going on in “Class, Status, and Party,” which as well is a
spectacularly poorly written piece. Weber is attempting at least three things:
(1) He wants to decompose Marx’s notion of social class. Marx saw social
classes simultaneously as an economic group (defined by relation to the means
of production), the primary basis for community and group identity, and the
primary basis for organized political action. Weber pulls these three elements
away from each other in the form of class, status, or party. (2) Weber identifies
three levels of social action: mass, communal and societal. (3) Weber separates
out three power hierarchies: economic (based on class), social (based on
status), and political. The class/status/party distinction is meant to carry out all
three of these projects.
[A note on mass, communal, and societal forms of action: Imagine you
go to a football game. It starts raining, and everyone puts up umbrellas.
That is mass action: A number of individuals responding at the same
time to the same condition. Then, you look around you and see a large
number of people wearing t-shirts saying “Williams sucks.” That would
be communal action, based on a common identity and consciousness (in
this case as Amherst students). Finally, at half time the band comes out
(well, maybe there isn’t a band at Amherst games, I don’t know) and
marches around the field, playing rousing tunes. That is societal action,
because it is organized.]
Let’s focus on his analysis of class and status groups.
Class
Weber’s notion of class seems a lot like Marx’s in that he roots it in
property relations. Class is defined by common life chances based on what one
has to sell in a market of some kind. The basic distinction is between having
property and not having it.
Note, however, that he immediately distinguishes different forms of
property and different kinds of labor, immediately complicating Marx’s concept.
(182)
Note too that he also distinguishes several forms of class struggle based
on markets for commodities, credit, and labor. (184-186) He sees a historical
trend to struggles over the price of labor, though, and hence Marxian-type
conflicts between employers and workers.
Finally he argues that classes are not always the basis for group identity
or organized group action. They are not necessarily “communities,” Weber says.
(183-184) The “concept of class interest is ambiguous” in this respect. (183)
If Weber complicates Marx’s notion of class, he also narrows it, because
he defines it only with regard to markets. Master-slave or lord-serf relations
therefore do not qualify as class relations in Weber’s lexicon.
Status Group
The term status group refers to groups that share a common claim on
social prestige, a common lifestyle, and a common identity. In a fully developed
status group, individuals would marry and live within their group. Status groups
are inherently “communities.”
Such groups may be rooted in any shared social characteristic: class,
race, ethnicity, religion, occupation, etc.
Societies are usually stratified into hierarchies of status: Some groups
get more prestige and social honor than others. However, status groups may
simply form separate social worlds. Weber’s discussion of caste and ethnicity
make the point. Ethnic group distinctions can be horizontal. (Perhaps the
French and English in Canada would be an example?) But often they are
hierarchically arranged. Castes, often based on ethnic distinctions are the
extreme form of a status hierarchy.
The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism on one level is the story
of the development of the bourgeoisie as a status group as well as a class.
“Status group” is Weber’s way of saying that inequality, group identity,
and collective action may have multiple bases in society.
7. Putting it all together, Weber identifies several related trends in the organization
of power and social relationships in modern western societies:
--the extension of authority into more and more areas of life
--centralization of power in the state and other major institutions
--the rise of bureaucracy as a rational way of organizing large-scale
activity
--the growing importance of educational credentials and professional
expertise in gaining and using power and in establishing status
distinction..
8. Together, the trends mentioned above imply rationalization, the systematic
organizing of life. Rationalization can be a good thing, because it may increase the
capacity of society to get important things done. It can also be a bad thing, because it
increases the capacities for the control of human lives, limits the amount of “free space,”
stifles innovation, and might contribute to the meaninglessness of life.
PROTESTANT ETHIC REVISITED AND WEBER ON “SCIENCE”
I’ve put together two very different readings for this class.
“The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism” (Gerth and Mills, ch.
12) may give you a very different perspective on Weber’s analysis of
Protestantism and capitalism. First of all, we are now armed with the notion of
“status group.” Second, Weber applies his argument to his experience in the
United States in the early 1900s. How does the relationship between
Protestantism and Capitalism play out in the United States?
"Science as a Vocation" is one of the many essays in which Weber is
preoccupied with the fundamental characteristics of the social or cultural
sciences. Recall that this was an important topic in Weber’s day and remains so.
As I said in an earlier class, the basic question is whether the social sciences
should or should not be like the natural sciences (a question that takes on
different meaning depending upon what one understands the natural sciences to
be).
Weber, by and large, sought to distinguish the goals and methods of the
social sciences from those of the natural sciences, but one issue he saw as
common to both was the distinction between factual claims and value judgments.
In "Science as a Vocation" Weber discusses two related, but somewhat
different issues: (1) the relation between statements of fact and statements of
value and (2) what ideas the professor should or should not profess in the
classroom. Both these issues speak to the general question of what kinds of
issues science can legitimately address. Weber in essence says that scholars as
scholars should not address questions of value. Why Not? (If you find this
essay especially confusing, see my comments at the end of the handout.)
Weber analysis of fact and value assumes certain trends in the
development of knowledge in the west. He refers to the “intellectualization” and
“rationalization” of the knowledge and the “disenchantment” of the world. (p.
139). What does he mean by this?
Finally, keep in mind that although Weber’s sets out to explain what is
science is good for (why it is a worthy “vocation”), he spends most of his lecture
telling us what it isn’t good for. So, what is science good for, according to
Professor Weber?
I find “Science as a Vocation” an especially frustrating, though illuminating,
essay. See the “imaginary letter” to Weber that follows.
It’s worth recalling at this point the various kinds of rationalization of which
Weber has spoken: modern capitalism, certain forms of Protestantism,
bureaucracy, and now rationalized knowledge or science. Modern western
society has grown from these multiple processes.
AN IMAGINARY LETTER FROM PROFESSOR HIMMELSTEIN TO HIS
STUDENT MAX WEBER.
[After struggling with Weber’s often ridiculously bad writing, I finally decided to do
something about it. In the imaginary letter below I treat “Science as a Vocation”
as a paper Weber wrote for this course. You might find it amusing. Failing that, it
is a pretty good summary of that essay.]
Dear Max,
You certainly present some very good ideas in your paper “Science as a
Vocation” and demonstrate a wealth of knowledge about your topic.
Furthermore, writing this paper as a lecture is quite creative. However, to be
frank, you don’t know how to write a paper, how to take an idea and develop it
systematically.
I will leave aside the fact that “science” as you use the term is a bit
confusing. You are not talking just about the natural sciences but about all
systematic intellectual inquiry. You bring in the social sciences, history, literary
criticism, etc. I think there are issues of translation here. The German term
wissenschaft has much in common with an earlier English use of “science” as an
organized body of knowledge acquired through a course of study. Since the 19 th
century, however, “science” has come to refer to study of the natural world and to
practices involving observation and experiment. The important thing is to use
the term consistently, and I am not sure that you do this!
First of all, what is the point or argument of this paper? You do not make
it all that clear. I think your paper addresses the question “what is science good
for?” or “why should anyone want to do science?” Toward the end of the paper
(p. 150) you state this question clearly and concisely and provide some
thoughtful, passionate answers. Would that the rest of your paper was so clear,
concise, and organized.
Do you realize how much time you spend not answering your question or
even talking about what science can’t do? Of course, identifying what science
can’t do can help clarify what it can do, but you simply spend too much time on
the former and too little on the latter.
The first five or so pages of your paper are, on your own terms, a total
loss. Of course, your comparison of American and German universities is
insightful, but it is beside the point. You admit as much on p. 134, when you say
to your imagined audience, “but I believe you wish to hear of something else.”
You then get more to the point. I found your discussion of what science
involves on pp. 134-137 quite intriguing. I agree that science involves both
passionate commitment to hard work in a specialized area and a certain kind of
inspiration. I especially liked your criticism of how we wrongly turn intellectuals
into “culture heroes.”
On p. 138, you do a nice job (finally) stating your central question: What is
science good for? It simply shouldn’t have taken 12 pages to do.
You then announce that answering these questions “require a few general
considerations.” This is certainly a valid thing to do, and your insights about the
“intellectualist rationalization” of the world (139) are good, even brilliant. I’m not
sure, however, that moving to this higher level of generalization works best here.
These ideas frame your whole argument and deserve more prominent
placement.
You then argue that because of the intellectualist rationalization of the
world, science cannot tell us the meaning of life, that it can answer questions of
fact, but not of value.
While your discussion here is quite good, the reader ends up another six
pages into the paper without a clear answer to your basic question. Again, I
need to note, that you continue to tell us a lot about what science cannot do, little
about what it can do. Doesn’t this defeat the purpose of your essay???
At this point (p. 145) without realizing it, you launch into a different, though
related issue: What the professor should or should not do in the classroom. You
argue that professors should not take political or moral stands in the classroom.
A professor of politics should be free to express his opinions at a political
meeting, you say, but in the classroom he should not lecture students about what
kind of government is best. Instead, he should talk about how various kinds of
governments work. He might also identify different value frameworks within
which one might evaluate these kinds of government.
You give several reasons for this. All of them are thoughtful (though I’m
not sure I agree), but I wish you had presented them more systematically.
First, the most important is that because we live in a world of competing
goods and gods, it is misleading at best for a professor to make definitive
statements about what is good and valuable. This argument seems connected
to your earlier discussion of the intellectualist rationalization of the world, but I am
still unclear about the connection. You seem to be saying that questions of value
simply have no definitive answers.
Your second answer is that professors are simply not equipped to be
“prophets” or “demagogues.” Being trained in a specialized field does not equip
one to pronounce judgment on the big moral issues. That is a good point, but it
does seem to imply that there are people, your prophets and demagogues, who
are equipped to do this. This seems to run counter to your first argument,
because it seems to imply that there are definitive answers to these big
questions.
Your third answer is that the lecture room confers on the professor a
special kind of power. There is no one of comparable stature to challenge his
moral proclamations.
Finally, you point out that once questions of value are raised in a
classroom, more mundane questions of fact fall by the wayside. That is, once
the professor addresses questions he can’t answer, he tends to drop the
questions he can answer.
Again, these are intriguing, thoughtful arguments. I wonder, however, how
a professor can avoid making value judgments. Recall that in your previous
paper for this course you argued at length that all human inquiry is inherently
value-laden. How do you reconcile these two claims?
More important, we are now more than 20 pages into this essay without
an answer to your basic question: What is science good for?
On pp. 150-152, you finally give your answers: First, science contributes
to “the technology of controlling life.” Second, it contributes “methods of
thinking, the tools, and the training for thought.” Third, most important, science
can provide “clarity.” It can help us think more systematically about the nature of
various goals in life and about the relations between ends and goals. It can help
the student “give himself an account of the ultimate meaning of his own conduct.”
Put more simply, as you say, the scholar/teacher can help bring about “selfclarification and a sense of responsibility.” (152)
I agree with you that these are not trifling things and that the teacher who
accomplishes these goals stands in the “service of moral forces.”
Finally, on the bottom of p. 152, you provide a cogent summary of your
overall argument. This should have come much sooner as a way of framing
your argument.
Again, Max, this is a thoughtful, even brilliant paper. You are clearly an
exceptionally bright student. Your poor writing skills do not do you justice. I’d be
happy to work with you on them.
B+
Sincerely,
Professor Himmelstein