National Ideology and IR Theory: Three Incarnations of the “Russian Idea”
By Andrei P. Tsygankov and Pavel A. Tsygankov
Abstract
In an attempt to broaden our perspective on IR theory formation, this paper seeks to
highlight the significance of ideology. Consistent with the recently revived sociology of
knowledge tradition in international studies, we view IR scholarship as grounded in
certain social and ideological conditions. Although some scholars have studied the
political, ideological, and epistemological biases of Western, particularly American,
civilization, in order to achieve a better understanding of global patterns of knowledge
formation, it is important to look at cases beyond the West. We therefore look at the
formation of IR knowledge in Russia, and we argue that the development of a Russian
theory of international relations responds to the old debate on the “Russian idea,” and
three distinct ideological traditions that had been introduced to the national discourse in
the mid-19th century. Focusing on theories and concepts of the international system,
regional order and foreign policy, as developed by Russian scholars, we attempt to
demonstrate how they are shaped by ideological and therefore pre-theoretical
assumptions about social reality.
An earlier version of the paper was delivered at the 49th Annual International Studies
Association Convention, San Francisco, USA, March 27, 2008. The authors are grateful
to the editors of the European Journal of International Relations and the anonymous
reviewers of the article for critical comments and encouragements. Usual disclaimers
apply.
Word count: around 11,400
National Ideology and IR Theory:
Three Incarnations of the “Russian Idea”
“There are spheres of thought in which it is impossible to
conceive of absolute truth existing independently of the values
and position of the subject."
(Mannheim [1936] 1968, 79)
1. Introduction
The recent revival of the sociology of knowledge tradition1 in international
studies has drawn scholarly attention to the fact that IR scholarship is grounded in certain
social conditions and may reflect ideological and cultural premises. In particular, some
scholars (Hoffmann 1977; Crawford and Jarvis 2001; Inayatullah and Blaney 2004; Jones
2006; Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007) have come to view international relations as a
branch of research that often reflects political, ideological, and epistemological biases of
Western, particularly American, culture. Implicit in the argument is the importance of
ideology, especially national ideology, in shaping the foundations of social science. In the
case of the United States, an essentially national ideology claims to have universal status,
and the positivist methodology then serves to shape knowledge in accordance with the
standards of the particular local community – in part, for the purpose of shaping the
world politically. As E. H. Carr observed in 1977, the “study of international relations in
English-speaking countries is simply a study of the best way to run the world from
positions of strength” (Carr 2001, xiii).
If we are to move further down the path of analyzing the social and ideological
foundations of knowledge, it is important to look beyond the already explored case of the
United States. If ideology remains an ever-powerful influence on knowledge in the world
of states, scholars ought to research the relationship between ideology and IR theory
formation outside of the United States. Continuing with the above-quoted observation,
Carr suggests that “The study of international relations in African and Asian universities,
if it ever got going, would be a study of the exploitation of the weaker by the stronger”
(Barkawi and Laffey 2006, 349). Recently, scholars from across the globe have attempted
to understand IR from the perspective of various peripheries – Asian (Callahan 2004b,
2008; Acharya and Buzan 2007; Shani 2008), East European (Guzzini 2007), Latin
American (Tickner 2003, 2008) and Russian (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007;
Tsygankov 2008) – suggesting emergence of the new sub-discipline of comparative IR
theory (Callahan 2004a).
In an attempt to further broaden our perspective on IR theory formation and
highlight the significance of ideology, this paper takes up the case of Russia. Defining
ideology as a systematic presentation of Self, Other and their relationships, we argue that
the Russian theory of international relations is grounded in three main ideological
traditions. We refer to these traditions as Westernism, Statism and Civilizationism; each
emphasizes a category of, respectively, the West, the independent state and a distinct
1
Historically the tradition is rooted in work by Karl Mannheim [1936] (1968) and
Max Weber, among others. For contemporary scholarship focusing on social foundations
of knowledge, see especially, Hoffmann 1977; Waever 1998; Crawford and Jarvis 2001.
2
civilization as the desired identification of the Russian Self. Although these ideologies
have recovered their currency after the Soviet disintegration, they have their roots in the
history of Russia’s relations with Europe and the 19th century debates about the “Russian
idea.” Those scholars who believe in the importance of studying local knowledge in order
to move away from intellectual hegemony and ethnocentrism will benefit from analyzing
potential “non-Western” roots of these phenomena. To make our case, we first
hypothesize relationships between national ideology and IR theory. We then describe the
nature of Russia’s ideological disagreements and debates about the “Russian idea.” In the
second half of the paper we attempt to match the ideologies of Westernism, Statism and
Civilizationism to the new Russian IR focusing on, arguably, the better developed
theories and concepts of the international system, regional order and foreign policy.
Following Hayward Alker and other scholars (Alker 1981; Alker and Biersteker 1984;
Alker, Amin, Biersteker and Inoguchi 1998) we do not make a sharp distinction between
IR theory as an academic/social institution and foreign policy discussions -- instead, we
adopt a broad definition of international relations theory, viewing it as a systematically
developed and culturally grounded image of the world. The conclusion discusses the
implications of our argument for international relations theory.
2. National Ideology and IR Theory
The end of the Cold War produced new theoretical expectations of an increasing
economic and political convergence across nations. The concepts of globalization and
democratic peace anticipated that nations would redefine their interests to fit the
standards of the newly emerging and West-defined openness in the world.2 Rooted in the
mainstream tradition of modernization theory, the vision of the worldwide ascendancy of
liberal capitalism is based on assumptions of the West’s moral and institutional
superiority.3 The vision assumes the relative homogeneity and uniformity of the West
relative to the rest of the world. It also implies that countries outside the West have no
distinct social and ideological roots and therefore are unable to make their own
contribution to world development; at this post-historical point, all that is left to the nonWestern world is to patiently and passively wait to be absorbed by West-defined
globalization.
Many scholars have justifiably criticized such assumptions as vastly unrealistic
and propose to move beyond the existing cannon of theorizing international relations
from the perspective of the currently dominant Western civilization in general and the
United States in particular. They point to the empirical problems with such theorizing by
drawing scholarly attention to new geographic regionalization (Stalling 1995; Mansfield
and Millner 1997), social and economic inequality (Murphy 2001), political polarization,
violence and lawlessness (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). No less importantly, they also
2
For a work emphasizing global spread of Western political and economic
institutions, see Friedman 1999; Mandelbaum 2002. For earlier works of a similar
ideological spin, see especially Fukuyama 1989.
3
The theory was known precisely for projecting Western views and values across
the globe and for offering an ethnocentric, context-insensitive policy advice to nonWestern societies. For some critiques of modernization theory as ethnocentric, see
Wiarda 1971; Badie 2000 and Oren 2000.
3
highlight the need to study how, instead of relying on the benefits of Western hegemony,
to re-adjust to new international conditions nations often seek refuge by reformulating
their interests in a way which is consistent with their historical pasts and local
environments (Crane 1999; Tsygankov 2004; Helleiner and Pickel 2005). Furthermore,
scholars have demonstrated the importance of studying patterns of local knowledge and
its implications for IR theory (Waever 1998; Callahan 2004a, b; Tickner 2003; Inayatulla
and Blaney 2004; Guzzini 2007; Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007).
In making sense of this persisting diversity of national policies and patterns of
knowledge, it is essential that we treat “nation” and “national interest” as open to various
meanings and interpretations, rather than something determined by the structure of the
international system. Several influential schools of thought suggest themselves as a
framework for such treatment. The sociology of knowledge (See especially Mannheim
[1936] (1968); Berger and Luckmann 1967; and Harding 1998) examines the social
conditions of the emergence, development, and decline of national ideas, arguing that
such ideas only function meaningfully in and respond to particular social circumstances.
The Aristotelian practical reasoning (Haan et al 1992; Alker 1997) views a theorist or
ideas-producer as ethically involved with, rather than neutral toward, social
developments. The Frankfurt school (Habermas 1973) more forcefully places theory in
the center of social and political transformation. And post-colonial theory (Said 1993;
Chakrabarti 2000) argues that scholarship may reflect the desire to culturally dominate
the Other, treating it as a dependent subject and consumer of the already developed
knowledge. Borrowing from these schools, scholars of international relations (Inayatulla
and Blaney 2004; Barkawi and Laffey 2006; Jones 2006; Shani 2008) recently
highlighted the West’s intellectual hegemony and inability to come to terms with the
problem of difference or recognition of the Other.
One way to gain a better understanding of the described diversity in national
policies and patterns of knowledge is to study social science as a form of social action
shaped by locally meaningful ideological debates. As presentations of relationships
between Self and Other,4 ideologies may be consciously held or “unconscious” (Weber
2005, 5). Some ideologies offer no reciprocal engagement with the Other, merely
expecting it to follow the Self’s lead, while others take the Other more seriously and
assume the importance of engaging it in a dialogue (Inayatulla and Blaney 2004;
Tsygankov 2004). Ideologies develop in response to various historical developments and
have a built-in capacity to influence national cohesiveness by connecting across time and
space. The time connection refers to the reproduction of the existing mental constructions
by mobilizing inter-generational memory. The spatial dimension means that ideologies
are able to successfully disseminate their values across their socially defined space. Due
to conducive institutional arrangements, repetitive historical practices, and the activities
of intellectual entrepreneurs, the ideological meanings become consolidated within a
certain discursive area, thereby confirming their status relative to more particularistic
values. As with other cultural entities, ideologies are not always stable. More stable
cultural communities are characterized by dominance of some ideologies over others, but
no discourse is homogeneous or entirely hegemonic; instead it is always composed of
4
See Gerring 1997 and Freeden 2006 for a recent theoretical discussion of
ideology.
4
both hegemonic and recessive trends (Alker, Biersteker, and Inoguchi 1989; Wight
1992). For instance, while some social forces favor a radical cultural renovation and the
borrowing from other societies, others prefer a more gradual change and greater reliance
on their own social experience. To the extent that the choice is controlled by elites, the
role played by policy actors and intellectuals in reshaping their nation’s identity and
ideology is critical.5
By offering a developed and coherent picture of how Self fits with its
environment, ideology introduces a series of clearly articulated and hidden assumptions
that may then find their way into social science scholarship. What often matters here are
certain concepts, rather than fully developed theories and propositions, that help to define
the nature of social reality on a broader level of abstraction before such a definition
becomes accepted in scholarly work. Examples of such concepts abound, and in the
context of Western scholarship include those of “democracy” and the “market economy.”
To illustrate the point of ideological biases hidden in international relations theories, let
us briefly consider the “democratic peace” debate in the discipline (the list can certainly
be continued and extended beyond Western International Relations). Advocates of the
democratic peace6 thesis proclaim that it closely resembles a “law” in international
relations (Levy 1994, 452), yet they shy away from discussing social conditions that
define notions of democracy and peace. Critics point out that the democratic peace claim
is ahistorical and reflects American values of what is “democratic,” and that those values
themselves have been shaped by the United States’ perception of external threats (Oren
1995, 2002). Critics also argue that social structures, in which democratic orders take
root, may vary considerably. In some cases, such social structures are far from conducive
to promoting peace and stability. For example, in the postcommunist context,
democratization may be accompanied by state weakness, thereby becoming a permissive
condition allowing for the re-emergence and rise of a previously dormant militant ethnic
nationalism. As a result, not only do some of the newly established democracies go to
war against each other, but they also may do so in part as a result of their moving away
from authoritarianism (Mansfield and Snyder 2007). Therefore some principally
important assumptions about reality found their way into the theory of democratic peace
without being critically examined. By insisting on its universal applicability, the theory –
as commonly practiced – bears an excessive imprint of Western culture.
Some efforts have already been made to understand the development of IR theory
in response to nations’ ideological imperatives. Stanley Hoffmann (1977) famously
exposed the hegemonic nature of the American theory of international relations by
linking it to the nation’s universalist ideas, power and institutions. Since then other
scholars have analyzed international relations as a discipline that is ethnocentric,
reflecting American/Western ideational and political biases (Alker and Biersteker 1984;
Holsti 1985; Inayatullah and Blaney 1996; Crawford and Jarvis 2001; Jones 2006). Ole
Waever (1998) includes “ideologies” or traditions of political thought in his survey of
5
The literature on ideas and intellectual influences in shaping cultural identities is
large. See, for instance, Mannheim 1936; Habermas 1973; Wolfe 1989; Said 1993;
Neumann 1996; Suny and Kennedy 1999; English 2000; Oren 2002; Tsygankov 2004.
6
For a summary of the debate, see, for example, Brown et al., 1996; Ray 2003;
Chernoff 2004.
5
sociology of international relations in the United States, Germany, France, and Britain.
William Callahan (2004a, b) discusses how ideas of International Society, Democratic
Peace and Harmony in British, American, and Chinese international studies, respectively,
reflected these nations historical perceptions and ideological agendas in the world.
Tsygankov and Tsygankov (2004, 2006) added to this discussion the case of Russia,
arguing that a wide-ranging pluralization within the new post-Soviet Russian IR is a
result of the country’s transitional ideological uncertainly after the fall of Soviet
Marxism’s dominance.
Within nations, an ideology’s impact is different, yet also noticeable. Although
national IR theory is a product of intense competition and contestation, the debates in the
field are often informed by larger ideological assumptions and yield themselves to
ideological classifications. Some well-known and still widely practiced classifications of
IR theory in the West, such as realism, liberalism and critical theory or constructivism
(Viotti and Kauppi 1998; Weber 2005; Nau 2006), are shaped by theorists’ ideological
preferences. As they each emphasize concepts of balance of power, international
institutions, and human exploitation/emancipation in their research, these theories reflect
broader ideological concerns about Self/Other relationships. Realists, for example, tend
to perceive the rise of alternative communities or the Other as a threat, and recommend
that the Self prepare to defend its security. On the other hand, many Western liberals,
while recognizing the increasingly globalized character of world politics, maintain the
image of a progressive assertion of the Self’s values and overlook the forces of identity
and diversity associated with the Other. Some critical theorists too have a tendency to
oversimplify the Self/Other relationships (Shani 2008).
Building on the above-made observations by Hoffmann (1977) and others, the
impact of ideology on international relations knowledge can be summarized in the
following way. As a state-related institution, national ideology influences knowledge
formation through a proposed interpretation of historical events, institutional
arrangements, and funding. As a systematic presentation of Self/Other relationships, each
ideology may get either strengthened or weakened by local conditions and contemporary
behavior of the outside world. On the level of social, or pre-theoretical assumptions, an
ideology may signal to IR theorists which international norms and influences to
emphasize – those that require autonomy and strength as recognized by realists or those
that value cooperation and democracy as promoted by liberal IR scholars. If and when the
state appropriates a particular ideological vision as a guide in policy making (national
interest), it may further reinforce the formational of IR knowledge by soliciting and
funding scholarly research.
3. The “Russian Idea”: Three Schools of Thinking about Self and Other
Although Russia’s thinking and policy respond to various international contexts,
it has also displayed a remarkable degree of historical continuity. Across the eras of
monarchy, Communism and liberalism, Russia’s engagement with the world has
followed several consistent patterns. As a borderland nation in an uncertain, often volatile
external environment, Russia has had to continuously respond to similar challenges to its
security. These challenges included unrest in neigbouring territories, threats of external
invasion, and the difficulties of preserving internal state integrity. Over time, the country
has developed three distinct ideologies or schools of thinking about the Self and Other—
6
Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist. This classification loosely fits Martin Wight’s
(1992) triple conceptualization, which includes those who emphasize international
anarchy and control (the realists), those who concentrate on international interactions as a
civilizing force in world politics (the rationalists) and those who focus on various
transformations of the international system (the revolutionists). Yet the classification is
also distinct, as Westernist, Statist and Civilizationist ideologies emerged out of Russia’s
historical interaction with the outside world, and in response to the Russian elites’
perception of this world’s challenges and opportunities. Having established their images
of Self and Other, throughout the centuries the three ideological traditions have sought to
present Russia’s international choices in ways consistent with their respective
worldviews.7 This section briefly describes the three ideologies and their historical roots,
and the rest of the paper spells out ways in which the described ideologies have
influenced Russian IR scholarship.
Westernizers saw the Russian idea as an essentially Western idea, and they placed
emphasis on Russia’s similarity with Western nations, viewing the West as the most
viable and progressive civilization in the world. At least since Peter the Great [date?], the
West played an especially prominent role in creating for Russia the system of meanings
in which to defend international choices. The early Westernizers sought to present Russia
as a loyal member in the family of European monarchies. Alexander I [date?], for
instance, championed the so called legitimist policies and established the “Holy Alliance”
with Germany and Austria in order to suppress revolutionary activities on the continent.
Since the mid-nineteenth century Westernizers, such as Alexander II, began to identify
with the West of constitutional freedoms and political equality. Westernizers within the
Soviet system saw Russia as not standing too far apart from European social-democratic
ideas. For instance, one of Mikhail Gorbachev’s favorite lines of thinking was that Soviet
Union had to “purify” itself of Stalinist “distortions” and become a democratic, or
“human,” version of socialism (gumannyi sotsializm). Finally, the post-Soviet liberal
Westernizers argued for the “natural” affinity of their country with the West based on
such shared values as democracy, human rights, and a free market. Sharing prejudices of
many in the West, liberal Westernizers, like Andrei Kozyrev and Boris Yelstin, were
fearful of the non-Western Other and warned against relations with former Soviet allies.
They insisted that only by building Western liberal institutions and integrating with the
coalition of what was frequently referred to as the community of “Western civilized
nations” would Russia be able to respond to its threats and overcome its economic and
political backwardness.
Statists have equated the Russian idea with that of a strong independent state,
emphasizing the state’s ability to govern and preserve the social and political order. They
too have expressed wariness of the Other, and have introduced the notion of external
threat as the central to Russia’s security. Depending on the situation, the threatening
Other has been presented as coming from either an eastern or western direction. Ever
since the two centuries-long conquest by Mongols, Russians has developed a
psychological complex of insecurity and a readiness to sacrifice everything for
7
This section relies on discussion in Tsygankov 2006, chap. 1, which provides a
more detailed description of the three ideological traditions. For other discussions, see
Neumann 1996; Prizel 1997; Ringmar 2002; Hopf 2002.
7
independence and sovereignty. For instance, when justifying the need for a rapid
industrialization, the leader of the Soviet state Josef Stalin famously framed his argument
in terms of responding to powerful external threats, “The history of the old Russia was
the continual beating she suffered because of her backwardness … We are fifty or a
hundred years behind the advanced countries. We must make good this distance in ten
years. Either we do it, or we shall be crushed” (Stalin 1947, 357-358).
The Statists are not inherently anti-Western; they merely seek the West’s
recognition by putting the emphasis on economic and military capabilities. The Statists of
the monarchical era valued Russia’s autocratic structure of power, partly because such
were the structures of European monarchies as well. The socialist Statists insisted on the
importance of the Communist Party’s firm control over society for the purpose of
maintaining political order and averting external “capitalist” threats. In foreign policy,
some Statists advocated relative accommodation with the West, while others favored
balancing strategies. Maxim Litvinov, for instance, supported a “collective security”
system in Europe in order to prevent the rise of Fascism. Nikita Khrushchev, too, wanted
to break taboos of isolationism and to bring Soviet Russia closer to Europe. On the other
hand, Stalin’s pact with Hitler, as well as Brezhnev’s “correlation of forces” strategy,
reflected the will to respond to perceived threats from the outside world. That dualism
survived the Soviet era. For instance, both Primakov and Putin viewed Russia’s greatness
and strength as key goals of their foreign policies, yet the former was trying to reintegrate
the former Soviet region and contain the United States through a strategic alliance with
China and India, whereas the latter emphasized bilateral relations in Russia’s periphery
and had the ambition to develop partnership with America to deter terrorism.
Finally, Civilizationists conceptualize the Self/Other relationship in terms of
cultural oppositions. This ideological tradition positions Russia and its values as
principally different from those of the West. Viewing Russia as a civilization in its own
right, many Civilizationists insisted on its “mission” in the world and on spreading
Russian values abroad (Duncan 2000). As a policy philosophy, Civilizationism dates
back to Ivan the Terrible’s “gathering of Russian lands” after the Mongol Yoke, and to
the dictum “Moscow is the Third Rome,” adopted under the same ruler. Some
representatives of this school advocate a firm commitment to the values of Orthodox
Christianity, while others view Russia as a synthesis of various religions. In the
nineteenth century, Civilizationists defended the notion of Slavic unity, and their
ideology of Pan-Slavism affected some of the csar’s foreign policy decisions. Born out of
the agony of autocratic and liberal Europe, Soviet Russia saw itself as superior to the
“decadent” and “rotten” Western capitalist civilization. The early socialist Civilizationists
challenged the West in a most direct fashion, defending at one point the doctrine of world
revolution. Other Soviet thinkers, however, advocated peaceful co-existence and a
limited cooperation with the world of “capitalism.” Yet another version of Civilizationist
thinking is the so-called Eurasianism that saw Russia as an organic unity distinctive from
both European and Asian cultures. Eurasianists view the world in terms of struggle
between land-based and sea-based powers and advocate the notion of geopolitical
expansion.8
8
On Eurasianism and its influence in the contemporary Russia, see Solovyev
2004; Bassin and Aksenov 2006; Shlapentokh 2007.
8
Not all Civilizationists have viewed Russia as in principal opposition to other
cultural entities. Although moving beyond viewing cultural interaction as something
mutually exclusive has been a challenge to Russian thinkers, some of them have found
ways to conceptualize the interaction of cultural entities as a dialogue within which to
learn from opposing perspectives (Tsygankov 2008). For example, some of Mikhail
Gorbachev’s supporters may be viewed as advocates of a cross-cultural dialogue, in
which Russia’s civilizational distinctiveness, defined in terms of association with
socialist values, would be preserved and respected, rather than eliminated or suppressed.
Table 1 summarizes the content of the three Russian ideologies.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
4. Westernism and Russian Liberal IR Theory
Russian IR theory largely conforms to the broad ideological visions that have
developed in the country over time. The country’s theoretical diversity after the Soviet
breakup (Lebedeva 2004a; Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2004) may be viewed as a
reflection of profound ideological divisions that go back centuries and have obtained a
new significance after the end of the USSR. The three IR currents we consider are
connected with the identified ideological visions in terms of the general assumptions they
each make about the world and about appropriate foreign policy actions. Our choice of
defining the Russian theoretical currents as liberal, realist, essentialist and constructivist
is also partly determined by their connections with Western theoretical concepts and
propositions, which may be found in the Russian authors’ occasional references to
Western authors, such as Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington or Robert Keohane. For
the purpose of illustrating the conformity of Russian new IR with the identified
ideologies, we focus on concepts of the international system, regional order and foreign
policy. These three remain the most developed in the Russian field of international
relations9 and are therefore representative of the overall sample of Russian IR theory.
Russian liberal scholarship of these issues is heavily shaped by Western, even
American approaches, and betrays the Westernist ideological preferences of its
advocates. Liberal concepts of the international system and regional order demonstrate
almost a religious belief in the triumph of the Western Self, fear of the non-Western
Other and a readiness to act toward the suspicious Other in a hegemonic fashion. Thus
many Russian scholars treat the world’s institutional development as predominantly
West-centered. One example of it is the conceptualization of the emerging world as a
“democratic unipolarity” (Kulagin 2002, 2008). The concept is Western in its origins,
because democracy is understood to be a West-centered universal phenomenon, rather
than developing out of local cultural, historic and political conditions. The supporters of
the concept contend that “[Francis] Fukuyama and [Robert] Heilbronner were basically
correct in arguing the ‘end of history’ thesis which implied the absence of a viable
alternative to Western liberalism” (Shevtsova 2001). The argument implies that Russia
too would do well to adopt standards of Western pluralistic democracy if it wants to be
9
For other overviews of the Russian discipline of international studies, see
Sergounin 2000; Bogaturov, Kosolapov, and Khrustalev 2002; Shakleyina 2002;
Lebedeva 2003, 2004a; Kokoshin and Bogaturov 2005; Torkunov 2004; Tsygankov and
Tsygankov 2004, 2006.
9
peaceful and “civilized,” even if this means to grant the right to use force to the only
superpower in the world, the United States (Kremenyuk 2004, 2006).
Other scholars envision a world in which non-state actors, movements and
networks are at least as powerful as states in shaping the contemporary world order
(Barabanov 2002, 45-46, 49-50; Barabanov 2008; Lebedeva 2008), which these scholars
view as a challenge to the very nature of great powers-based international system. During
2004-2005, Russia’s leading international relations journal Mezhdunarodnyye protsessy
(International Trends) organized a discussion which sought to clarify concepts of
international relations and world politics, the latter being reserved by some participants
for capturing the growing diversity of non-state actors.10 Consistent with the Westcentered view of the world, Russian liberals also argue that non-state ties and interactions
are especially developed within the area of Western economically developed and
democratic nations, and weak outside the area of Western democracies. This is why the
region of the most economically developed nations “remains the center of the global civil
society” (Baluyev 2007).
An example of conceptualizing regional order by Russian liberal scholars is the
notion of the end of Eurasia introduced by Deputy Director of Moscow Carnegie Center
Dmitri Trenin (2001) in one of his books. The concept is a liberal attempt to respond to
Russia’s conservative geopolitical projects of integrating the region around Moscow’s
vision, and its reflects the “no security without the West” thinking associated with
politicians like Yegor Gaidar and Andrei Kozyrev, who held key government positions
during the early stages of Russia’s post-communist transformation. The concept assumes
that the age of Russia as the center of gravity in the former Soviet region historically
associated with the Tsardom of Muscovy, the empire, and the Soviet Union is over.
Trenin maintains that, because of pervasive external influences, especially those from the
Western world and the West-initiated globalization, the region of Russia-centered Eurasia
no longer exists. Russia therefore must choose in favor of gradual geopolitical retreat
from the region.11
Liberal foreign policy concepts too clearly reflect the Westernist ideology. To
support this argument, we briefly discuss two foreign policy concepts, Atlanticism and
liberal empire. Introduced by leading liberal figures Andrei Kozyrev and Anatoli Chubais
during Russia’s respective decline and recovery, they illustrate the ideological connection
we seek to highlight. Kozyrev’s Atlanticism (1992, 1995) assumed a radical reorientation of Russia’s foreign policy toward Europe and the United States, and it
included radical economic reform, the so-called “shock therapy,” gaining a full-scale
status in transatlantic economic and security institutions, such as the European Union,
10
Such was the position of Marina Lebedeva (2004b), who initiated the
discussion. Lebedeva was then engaged by several other participants, whose
presentations have been published by the journal. The materials of the discussion can be
found at <http://www.intertrends.ru>
11
In another book, Dmitri Trenin (2006), while granting Russia a right to pursue a
distinct path, assumes that the country needs to “become” a part of Europe and the “new”
West. Russia, he says, has been historically European, yet it often “fell out of” Europe
(2006, 63, 167) as a result of failed reform efforts. If this is the case, then what Russia
really needs is to “return” to Europe, rather than preserve its identity and distinctiveness.
10
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, International Monetary Fund, and G-7, and
separating the new Russia from the former Soviet republics economically, politically, and
culturally. The Atlanicist vision shaped the new foreign policy concept prepared in late
1992 and signed into law in April 1993. The concept of liberal empire articulated by the
former Yeltsin’s privatization tsar Anatoli Chubais (2003) also had in mind Russia’s proWestern integration, but mostly by the means of free commerce and enterprise. Not
unlike the early prophets of globalization, such as Francis Fukuyama and Thomas
Friedman, Chubais argued for the inevitability of Russia’s successful economic
expansion within the former Soviet region and outside due to its successfully completed
market reform.
In addition to its historical influence, several institutional channels assisted
Westernist ideology in shaping liberal IR scholarship in Russia. Immediately following
the Soviet disintegration, Westernizers found themselves in a position of power and
signaled to the emerging IR community the importance of studying the world as
influenced by the West’s globalization. Just as some prominent policymakers in the
United States (Clinton 1994; Bush 2002) welcomed theories of interdependence and
democratic peace, Russia’s statesmen promoted these theories in their country.
Disappointed by their own experience, they were eager to borrow knowledge from those
more economically and politically advanced. Westernizers in power wanted to integrate
with the United States and other western nations through the rapid economic reforms and
pro-Western foreign policy as recommended by advisors in the International Monetary
Fund and the White House. In this highly politicized context, the domestic intellectual
capital was discredited by association with the old Soviet state, and the intellectual
vacuum was filled with liberal American ideas. Many IR concepts in Russia, such as
Atlanicism and interdependence, were first introduced to academia by policymakers.12 In
addition, a number of influential public servants of the Gorbachev and Yeltsin eras came
to the world of policy making from academia and maintained their relationships with the
“Ivory Tower.” For example, a number of known foreign policy advisors, such as
Vladimir Lukin, Sergei Karaganov and Sergei Stankevich, were formerly associated with
the Insitute of the United States and Canada, the Institute of Europe, and the Institute of
General History – all specialized government branches of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences.
Finally, it is difficult to understand the influence of Westernist ideology on
Russian scholarship of international relations without discussing the new financial
situation presented by the Soviet breakup. Under conditions of extremely painful
economic reform, the post-Soviet social scientists found themselves lacking even
elementary resources at home. Formerly state-supported, they scraped for funds, while
new private foundations barely existed. Many were forced out of the profession, while
12
Such practice was not exclusive to the post-Soviet era. For instance, before
coming to power Mikhail Gorbachev and his team, including Alexander Yakovlev, had
been influenced – through their advisors – by Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane’s
(1971) theories of trasnationalism and interdependence. Interestingly enough, after
Gorbachev came to power, Nye was one of the first non-Marxist international relations’
theorists to publish several of his articles in the leading Russia’s journal MEiMO
(Mirovaya Ekonomika i Mezhdunarodnyiye Otnosheniya).
11
others had to work several jobs simultaneously. Under these conditions, American liberal
agencies funding social science research, such as Ford, MacArthur and Soros, have
played a prominent role in shaping Russia’s young international relations discipline. In
attempting to meet their expectations, Russian scholarships has often reflected American,
rather than local, theoretical agendas (Tsygankov and Tsygankov 2007).
5. Statism, Derzhava and Russian Realist IR
Just as Russian liberal IR is shaped by Westernism, Russian realism conforms to
the main assumptions of Statist ideology. The notion of threat, particularly one from the
West as a potentially hegemonic center of power, is a product of Russia’s centuries-long
development, and it has continued to shape the nation’s thinking, this time expressed
through academic theories and concepts of international relations. Consistent with this
ideological vision, realists have developed their theories and concepts largely out of
expectations of external threats to Russia’s Self and the perceived necessity to preserve
internal stability. Although Russian realists borrow from the Western, particularly
American, IR many conceptual tools (Konyshev 2004, 2005), they are driven primarily
by Russian concerns and used these tools creatively.
In research on the international system's structure and polarity, realists have
developed a variety of concepts differentiating between various types of unipolar, bipolar
and multipolar system (Shakleyina 2003). One example of it is Aleksei Bogaturov’s
(1996, 1998, 2003) proposal to view the post-cold war international system as “pluralistic
unipolarity”, in which the unipolar center is a group of responsible states, rather than one
state (the United States). Bogaturov sees Russia as a member of the group and argues for
the consolidation of its position within the global center, as well as for discouraging the
formation of one state-unipolarity in the world. His approach to world order includes, not
unlike the British school tradition, the notions of norms and rules (Bogaturov 1999). It
also complicates the Self/Other ideological opposition, because the Russia’s Self was
expected to develop closer ties with the Other (West), while resisting the tendency of its
members (the U.S.) to become predominant in the system. Realists have been also critical
of the liberal notion of universal democratic ideas questioning the significance of internal
characteristics in international struggle for power and security. Many in Russia see
attempts to globally promote Western-style democracy as little more than ideology
covering a struggle for the world’s domination (Volodin 2006; Gadziyev 2008;
Karaganov 2008). Rather than recommending development of this kind of democracy,
realists propose that Russia concentrate on strengthening its international position by
consolidating regional ties and pursuing even-handed relations with Western and nonWestern nations.
In studying the regional order, realists too have sought to defend the position of
Russia’s independence and power. One example of it is the concept of the former Soviet
region as a post-imperial space first introduced in a series of reports by the Council on
Foreign and Defense Policy (1992, 1993, 1996), the influential non-governmental
organization that was launched and headed by Sergei Karaganov since the early 1990s.
The notion of post-imperial space served the ideological objectives of those social groups
– industrialists, businessmen, intellectuals, and mass opinion leaders— that saw
themselves as defenders of the region’s order and stability based on preservation of
Russia’s influence. Just like the notion of pluralistic unipolarity, post-imperial space was
12
a hybrid of hard-line and moderate influences because it sought to revive social,
economic, and political coherence of the former Soviet region, without reviving the
empire. While a departure from Kozyrev’s isolationism, the notion of post-imperial
space, as seen by its advocates, could not be likened to restoration of the empire or
revival of aggressive imperial nationalism. For instance, the 1996 report by the Council
on Foreign and Defense Policy referred to the idea of the Soviet restoration as a
“reactionary utopia.” At the same time, the report argued that a reasonable alternative to
post-Soviet integration was not available and that Russia should assume the role of a
leader of such integration.
Consistent with their defense of Russia as a relatively independent power center,
realists have pursued the notion of multi-vector foreign policy. A former senior academic,
and the second foreign minister of Russia, Yevgeni Primakov (1996, 1998), argued that if
Russia was to remain a sovereign state with capabilities to organize and secure the postSoviet space and resist hegemonic ambitions anywhere in the world, there was no
alternative to acting in all geopolitical directions. Primakov and his supporters warned
against Russia unequivocally siding with Europe or the United States at the expense of
relationships with other key international participants, such as China, India, and the
Islamic world. Realists have argued for flexible alliances in all geopolitical directions
(Gadziyev 2007), which too resonates with the official discourse. The country’s National
Security Concept of 1997 identified Russia as an “influential European and Asian
power,” and it recommended that Russia maintain equal distancing in relations to the
“global European and Asian economic and political actors” and presented a positive
program for the integration of the CIS efforts in the security area (Shakleyina 2002, 5190). The government’s official Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 referred to the Russian
Federation as “a great power … [with a] responsibility for maintaining security in the
world both on a global and on a regional level” and warned of a new threat of “a unipolar
structure of the world under the economic and military domination of the United States”
(Shakleyina 2002, 110-111).
The influence of Statist ideology in the post-Soviet era too has been assisted by
Russia’s institutional arrangements. As this was the case with Westernizers, a number of
prominent Statist policy makers have maintained close relations with academia.
Examples include academics-turned-policymakers, such as Presidential advisor Sergei
Stankevich and Foreign Minister and subsequently Prime Minister Yevgeni Primakov.
Whereas liberal IR gained strength in the context of the nation’s departure from the old
Soviet thinking, Russian realists drew their support from traditionally strong geopolitical
theories that emphasized values of order and security over those of freedom and
democracy. These theories revived their prominence due to growing disorder, corruption,
and poverty that had resulted from the Soviet disintegration and Yeltsin’s Westernist
reforms. Accompanied by new conflicts in the Russian periphery and the West’s decision
to expand NATO eastward by excluding Russia from the process, these changes
stimulated rise of IR theories with emphasis on geopolitics and security balancing. The
language of these theories soon filled academic and semi-academic conferences, as well
as national media. For example, at the 1992 conference “The Transformed Russia in the
New World,” Presidential advisor and former academic Sergei Stankevich (1992) took
issues with then the Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev and promoted the vision of Russia
as a great power and cultural bridge between Europe and Asia. Well-connected, Statists
13
soon found ways to exploit state resources and reestablished opportunities for funding
realist IR scholarship. Multiple research institutes and think tanks, such as the Institute of
Defense Studies and the Institute of Strategic Studies, devote themselves to studying
Russia’s national interests and security challenges.
6. Civilizationism and the Choice between Culturally Essentialist and Constructivist
IR
Finally, Russian culturally essentialist and constructivist IR theories have been
supported by varieties of the Civilizationist ideological vision. The two schools are
radically different in conceptualizing local cultures. Whereas cultural essentialists have
been inspired by visions of a self-sufficient and autarchic Eurasian or Orthodox empire,
constructivist scholars place the emphasis on cultural syntheses and cross-civilizational
dialogue. While essentialists tend to view culture as homogeneous and relatively closed
to outside influences, to constructivists cultures are subject to change and interaction with
other entities. Broadly defined, the constructivist movement includes theorists that are
both conventional and critical in their assumptions about world politics and the
appropriate tools to research it (Hopf 1998). While Russian constructivists are different in
their intellectual priorities and research tools, they share with their Western counterparts
the notion of culture as a socially constructed phenomenon. This section considers
Russian constructivists and essentialists together because the two schools share interest in
studying role of culture in international relations and proceed from the assumption of
Russia’s cultural or civilizational distinctiveness. It is important to stress, however, that
beyond this general interest the two do not have much in common, just as Samuel
Hungtington (1996) and some of his Western critics (Said 2001) agree on the significance
of studying the role played by civilizations in world politics, but radically differ in
methodological and ontological assumptions they make in their research.
Essentialists view the international system in terms of the irreconcilable struggle
of cultures, or a conflict of civilizations, not unlike the one described by Samuel
Huntington (1996). Some, similarly to Huntington, identify a multipolar civilizational
struggle (Nartov 1999; Zyuganov 1999, 2002), while others see an essentially bipolar
geocultural conflict. Alexander Dugin’s (2002) concept of a great war of continents is of
the latter kind. The bipolarity Dugin perceives is the result of a struggle for values and
power between the two competing rivals—the land-based Eurasianists and the seaoriented Athlanticists. The Eurasianist orientation is expressed most distinctly by Russia,
Germany, Iran, and to a lesser extent, Japan, while the Athlanticist posture is well
expressed by the United States and Britain. Similarly, a recent popular volume (Proyekt
Rossiya 2008, 42-45) identifies two cultural poles—the material profit-driven America,
and a Russia that is viewed as the last stronghold of Christianity.
From the constructivist perspective, the fact that the world is culturally pluralist
does not mean that cultures are doomed to conflict. Instead, they should strive to establish
a “unity in diversity” regime, under which Self and Other are be able to maintain an
intense dialogue and cooperation by observing certain globally acknowledged rules, yet
still follow their own internally developed sets of norms. In order to sustain the culturally
pluralist system, new ideas are necessary to challenge the dominance of US-centered
economic and political globalization (Batalov 2005; Alekseyeva 2007; Voytolovski
2007). Some constructivists have proposed the strengthening of the United Nations as a
14
prototype for future world government, with the General Assembly as parliament, the
Security Council as executive body, and the Secretary General as president of the world
state. For example, former Gorbachev advisor Georgi Shakhnazarov (2000) argued that
such a structure was necessary in order to address urgent global problems, such as
growing militarism, the depletion of world resources, overpopulation, and environmental
degradation, and to mitigate the selfish impulses of local civilizations. In his view, the
Huntington-proposed restructuring of the Security Council in accordance with the
civilizational representation would mean throwing away all the positive potential of the
United Nations and returning to the times of isolation and the rule of crude force in world
politics. Instead, and for the purpose of preserving and developing the central governing
structure of the world, he proposed a piecemeal development of the United Nations by
gradually incorporating into the Security Council those states that have acquired
indisputable world influence, including Germany, Japan, and possibly even India, Brazil,
and other states.
A similar divide between essentialists and constructivists concerns analysis of the
regional order. Eurasianists, like Dugin, view such order as a Russia-centered empire free
of any Atlanticist influences. Similarly, Russian religious nationalists have advanced the
notion of a Russian Orthodox empire. For instance, the recent influential volume
(Russkaya doktrina 2007) set out a regional order capable of resisting the West and
becoming self-sufficient. Projecting the United States’ retreat from the region between
2010 and 2015, nationalists call for “a full-fledged political, economic and – ideally –
military union in the manner of a Warsaw Pact” with China, India, Iran and other nonWestern nations (Russkaya doktrina 2007, 297, 313).
In their turn, more constructivist-oriented thinkers suggest concepts that transcend
the known dichotomy of the region as either pro-Western or Eurasian. Unlike proWestern liberals, who commonly see Russia as in need to “return” to Europe, some
scholars have assumed that Russia already is in Europe/The West. By their historical
accounts, Russia has been Western longer than some other nations, including the United
States. Therefore the challenge for Russia is not to be included, but to develop a deeper
awareness of itself as a legitimate member of Europe and of its special ties with the
world. Put differently, Russia has to intellectually absorb the world/West, rather than let
itself be absorbed by it. An example of such thinking is Gleb Pavlovski’s (2004) concept
of Euro-East, which conceptualizes the region as a part of Europe and distinct in its own
right. The Euro-East shares with Europe values of the market economy and growing
middle class, yet being mainly preoccupied with economic and social modernization, the
region is in special need of maintaining political stability.
Foreign policy too is viewed by cultural essentialists and constructivists in a
principally different light. Both Eurasianists and Russian Orthodox nationalists insist on
the toughest possible policy response as the means of restoring Russia’s geopolitical
status as the Eurasian Heartland (Bassin and Aksenov 2006) and of imperial selfsufficiency, as well as offering a new attractive idea for the world (Russkaya doktrina
2007, 11; Kholmogorov 2006; Маtveychev 2007). Constructivists see foreign policy
differently. More socialist-oriented thinkers (Tolstykh 2003) argue for a cultural dialogue
as a key humanistic principle that may set the world on the path of solving the above
identified global problems of militarism, poverty and environmental degradation. More
conservative thinkers inspired by Orthodox Christian values (Panarin 2002) advocate a
15
cross-religious synthesis of Western reason and Eastern myth. They see Russia as a
natural place for such a synthesis and, therefore, as a model for the world.
Similar to Westernism and Statism, Civilizationist ideology has been historically
influential and promoted by various political and social forces. Many of the above-cited
works works would have not appeared without support from these forces. For example,
Mikhail Gorbachev and his Gorbachev Foundation organized a number of wide-ranging
discussions on international relations and funded important constructivist research
promoting the idea of inter-cultural dialogue (Gorbachev 2003). Russia’s officials also
sympathized with the idea. For example, in March 2008 President Putin sent a message to
the Organization of the Islamic Conference meeting in Senegal in which he said that
"deeper relations of friendship and cooperation with the Islamic world are Russia's
strategic course,” and that "we share concerns about the danger of the world splitting
along religious and civilizational lines" (RFE/RL March 14, 2008). On the other hand,
concepts developed by essentialists are not infrequently supported by the Russian
Orthodox Church and nationalist political organizations, such as the Communist Party of
the Russian Federation. Thus, a number of Orthodox priests, such as Metropolit Kirill,
endorsed Russkaya doktrina. The Communist Party leader, Gennadi Zyuganov, has
regularly written on issues of geopolitics and national interests. Yet another Eurasianist
and prolific geopolitical writer, Alexander Dugin, has been politically and ideologically
involved, having founded the International Eurasian Movement.13
Table 2 offers a summary of the above-discussed concepts and their relations to
IR theories and ideologies of the Russian idea.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
7. Conclusion
Contrary to some old theories, ideology is neither a false consciousness (Marx
and Engels [1846] (1964); Mannheim [1936] 1968), nor a truly scientific (Lenin [1902]
(1969) representation of reality. Rather, it is a system of assumptions about reality.
Formed by a nation’s historical experience, these assumptions precede a theory formation
and therefore are pre-theoretical. Being a social science, IR theory can only meaningfully
function within a certain nationally-confined ideological context, and that dictates the
importance of carefully scrutinizing ideological assumptions. Ever since Stanley
Hoffmann (1977, 213) has written about “the rude intrusion of grand ideology” into the
realm of social science, the situation has not fundamentally changed.
Russian IR theory after the Soviet breakup is only new in the sense that it
represents a new form of framing reality, yet behind the new concepts, such as
democratic unipolarity or multi-vector foreign policy, one can recognize the same old
debate about the Russian idea that had been introduced by the Westernizer/Slavophile
polemics in the mid-19th century. The Russian idea has not disappeared from the public
discussion; rather, it has been reincarnated in the post-Soviet context, thanks to a
considerable extent to the debates among scholars of international relations. As our
analysis indicates, Russia’s distinct ideologies of Westernism, Statism and
Civilizationism have obtained new life by informing and inspiring IR concepts of the
For detailed analyses of Dugin’s writing and political activities, see Umland
2003 and Laruelle 2006.
13
16
international system, regional order and foreign policy. Not only in the United States, but
also (and perhaps especially) in Russia, national ideology has not been evicted from the
social sciences by the rational spirit of modernity. In some respects, theorists in Russia
are closer to and less ashamed of ideology, and it is more common among them to be
explicit about their ideological assumptions. For example, claiming the scientific status of
their theories does not preclude thinkers, such as Nikolai Nartov (1999, 305) and Gennadi
Zyuganov (1999, 2, 9-10), from openly stating their ideological beliefs – that Russia is
the Eurasia’s Heartland; that the United States is a hostile alien; and that a self-sufficient
empire is the natural state of the Russian political order. Pre-theoretical, these beliefs are
essential for the functioning of a theory, for in their absence a theory loses its meaning.
We have also argued that a society is never ideologically homogenous. At a given
time, not one, but several ideological traditions exist, overlap and compete for national
influence, informing and inspiring developments within the discipline of international
relations. These ideologies influence knowledge formation by offering a coherent
interpretation of historical events and utilizing available institutional channels.
Importantly, IR theories and concepts in Russia – of liberal, realist, constructivist and
essentialist orientation – have their ideological and political supporters outside academia.
Just as liberal scholars of international relations benefited from decline of Soviet
institutions, realists became strengthened in the context of the new consolidation of the
Russian state. Constructivists and essentialists too had to learn to exploit existing social
institutions and sources of support.
Because the social sciences respond to human needs and desires, it is important to
study the ideological foundations of IR theory. Although not in the literal sense, theory
follows politics, and when political changes bring a new form of ideological competition,
social science research agendas also get modified, with old concepts and theories giving
way to those that are more attuned to a new ideological agenda. As scholars of
international relations develop a better awareness of the cultural and ideological
assumptions behind their research, it is important to study the various roles played by
these assumptions, as well as ways in which one can move beyond the Self/Other
dichotomy in empirical research and policy recommendations. If we are to develop a
truly global understanding of IR theory formation, the examination of non-American and
non-Western ideological assumptions is just as important as those of America and the
West.
17
Table 1. Three Russian Ideologies
WESTERNISM
STATISM
CIVILIZATIONISM
SELF
Part of the West
Derzhava, or
independent state
Independent civilization
OTHER
Non-Western
world
States threatening
Russia’s independence
Western and non-Western
civilizations
ACTION
Integration with
the West
Building a normal
great power
Resisting Western pressures
OR
Promoting inter-civilizational
dialogue
18
Table 2. Ideologies, Theories and Concepts in Russian IR: Some Examples
IDEOLOGIES
Westernism
THEORIES
Liberalism
CONCEPTS
International System
Regional Order
Foreign Policy Objective
Democratic unipolarity
(Kulagin)
End of Eurasia
(Trenin)
Atlanticism and
integration with the West
(Kozyrev)
Liberal empire
(Chubais)
Statism
Realism
Pluralistic unipolarity
(Bogaturov)
Post-imperial space
(Karaganov')
A multi-vector
orientation
(Primakov)
Civilizationism
Cultural Essentialism
Great war of continents
(Dugin)
New Eurasia
(Dugin)
Heartland of Eurasia
(Dugin)
Orthodox empire
(Russkaya doktrina)
Self-sufficiency
(Russkaya doktrina)
Euro-East
(Pavlovski)
Humanistic globalism
and cultural dialogue
(Gorbachev)
Constructivism
Pluralism of civilizations
(Shakhnazarov)
Orthodox synthesis of
Western reason and
Eastern myth
(Panarin)
19
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