Domestic Spaces and Advocacy Groups: An Interface between IR theory and
Diplomatic Practice
(Paper Submitted to Millennium Conference, 2010, London School of Economics and
Political Science, 16-17 October, 2010)
Medha Bisht*
Abstract
Situated within the broader constructivist strand, this article explores
the role of leadership exercised by advocacy groups in influencing state
response in international negotiations. Through negotiation analysis of
two case studies, the dialectical relationship between agency and
structure is highlighted. The article underlines the relationship between
security complex (structure) and leadership (agency), and argues that
key attributes which determine the security complex of a given
negotiated agreement is the defining parameter of effective leadership
for domestic advocacy. Placing adequate emphasis on domestic spaces
to engender political will, the thrust of the paper is to underline the
trajectory of diplomatic practice adopted by advocacy groups in
contemporary international relations. Rather than focusing on a top –
down approach, the article situates the triggers for state behaviour
primarily through a bottom-up approach. It proposes that leadership by
advocacy groups at the domestic level can be an effective mediator
between the structure and the agency, thus determining the pattern of
state behaviour in international deliberations.
Key words: leadership, advocacy groups, security complex, socialization, contemporary
diplomacy
Introduction
Contemporary diplomacy takes place in a context where a purely state-centric approach has
been displaced by one that takes cognizance of political and economic interdependence and
interpenetration, emergence of multi-national corporations, non governmental organizations
and sub- national actors. Given these emerging actors in international relations, which have
highlighted new set of issues and concerns in contemporary international relations, the
meaning of diplomacy has taken new dimensions, whereby it has come to be employed
both by the state and the non-state (non-governmental) actors to frame issues and interests
at the international level. In this process of articulating/framing interests which in turn
*
Researcher, Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, India. medha.bisht@gmail.com
1
could influence the positions of various actors, often tools of engagement in varied forms
are exercised.
The paper, would probe into some of these aspects by highlighting the role of advocacy
groups in two issue areas of security and development. Through negotiation analyses of two
different but insightful case studies viz, the World Commission on Dams (development)
and
Anti-Personnel
Landmine
Treaty
(security),
the
politics
of
communication/engagement/negotiations in international relations would be highlighted.
The case studies would be studied under the broader discipline of international relations,
whereby insights would be drawn as to how a detailed study of negotiation processes and
diplomatic practice can inform international relations theory. This would be done by
underlining the importance of processes (explanation) in international relations- an aspect
which challenges the methodological tools often employed to explain realities in
international relations. This paper has been informed by the interviews of individuals, who
were personally present in the processes of negotiation and engagement in the concerned
case studies1.
The paper is thus divided into three sections. Section one focuses on the existing nature of
debate on the socialization of actors in international relations. Going beyond the traditional
state-centric understanding of international relations and analyzing units as “black boxes”,
this section draws insights from the agent-structure debate, which primarily stem from the
social interaction between actors at the international level. Section two focuses on the two
case studies (as mentioned above) and analyzes how the process of engagement shapes
outcome in international negotiations. Are actors other than states influential in shaping the
contours of international negotiations? As explanation is the key focus of this section, the
tools employed by advocacy groups would be the key highlight. Leadership by advocacy
groups would form a key component of the analysis. Section three focuses on the broader
relevance of the findings to international relations as a discipline. It highlights the interface
between diplomatic practice and international relations theory, thus responding to the key
theme—international relations in dialogue. The findings would primarily inform the
agency-structure debate- the theoretical construct for this paper. Thus the paper through
focusing on empirical findings of two case studies would reveal that a study of
contemporary diplomatic practice is insightful in understanding the dialogic strands in
international relations.
2
Section One: Concept of Socialisation in International Relations
Socialisation of actors at the international level has been deliberated upon by many
IR scholars. Though initially defined through the term- international system, which
implied a group of states with no perception of common interest, later the term
international society was coined to connote a group of states conscious of certain
common international values who conceived themselves to be bound by general set of
rules in their relationship with each other. Associated broadly with the English
School of International Relations, Martin Wight and Hedley Bull are the main
proponents defining the contours of this tradition. Where according to Wight the
origins of the society of states can be found in the Grotian approach2 , Hedley Bull
provided an elaborated version on the origins of international society linking it to
independent units who despite existing in an anarchical structure seek to maintain
‘order’ through the instrument of diplomacy. Bull delineated four functions of
diplomatic activity: (1) to facilitate communication, (2) to help negotiate agreements,
(3) to enable the gathering of intelligence and information and (4) to minimize the
effects of friction in international relations3 . Thus Bull viewed socialization partly as
a way to sustain statehood as an institution.4 However both Martin Wight and Hedley
Bull perceived socialization primarily as a domain of state actors and most of their
ideas can be broadly framed under Old5 and New6 Schools of Diplomacy.
Contemporary diplomacy, which can be called the third wave in diplomacy, can be
identified with the diplomatic practice of the twenty-first century. Contemporary
Diplomacy while taking recognition of the first two waves (Old and New Diplomacy)
underlines the role played by non-state actors, including the state actors at the
international level. As mentioned before, it takes place in a context where a purely
state-centric approach has been displaced by one that takes cognizance of political
and economic interdependence and interpenetration. The thrust of contemporary
diplomacy is therefore to include those other actors, who in the age of technology and
communication have tools, expertise and outreach to go beyond the territoriality
which defines the modern state. An important tool which is often exercised by nonstate actors to influence outcome at the international level is the use of ideas, to frame
relevant issues. The credit for underlining the role of ideas in international politics
goes to Alexander Wendt, who looks at the role of ideas primarily within a statist
paradigm, thus perceiving the state as a medium through which ideas translate into
3
action. However another school of ‘constructivist’ scholars have argued that nongovernmental actors too can use ideas effectively to shape state behaviour.
Thus, the point of departure in this paper is to focus on the latter ‘constructivist
understanding’ of world politics. It would be pertinent to note that though the neoliberals in international relations also give importance to the role of ideas, they
primarily argue that ideas matter only to the extent that they have effects beyond that
of power, interest and institutions. Where for the neo-liberals ideas are just another
variable in determining state behaviour; for the constructivists ideas form the
constitutive basis for these conspicuous causes defined in terms of power and national
interest. This distinction is important as constructivists especially Alexander Wendt
states that conspicuous causes are made up of ideas7 . Ideas are important for Wendt,
as they often gain power through socialization processes (interaction) that change the
identities and interests of the state actors at the international level.
Though neo-realists like Kenneth Waltz have also talked of socialization processes,
they have been generally confined to the way an (exogenous) structure relates to its
agents. For Waltz therefore the explanation of socialization is constrained as states
are governed by anarchy, which is inherent in the international structure. Waltz
writes:
Structures affect behavior within the system, but do so indirectly. The
effects are produced in two ways: through socialization of actors and
through competition among them8
However, Waltz elaborates it later that competition often outweighs socialization and actors
whose behaviour confirms with the incentives in a structure will prosper, while others will
not. Critiquing Waltz, Wendt argues:
…At first glance, the fact that Waltz discusses socialization is at all
surprising. There is little ‘social’ about his theory, least of all his
conceptualization of what states are presumably being socialized to is the
structure…9 .
Martha Finnemore has critiqued the reasoning behind Wendt’s, Waltz’s and Bull’s notion
of socialization and has asserted that their thesis for many reasons remains locked into a set
of “statist” presuppositions, as it reaffirms the prior distinction between the system and
society levels in world politics, as well as that of domestic societies. She argues though one
can assert that theoretically this analysis is consistent with the division of world politics
4
into jurisdictionally separate layers and is likely to play down the importance of “building
and diffusing prescriptions” which takes place beyond the immediate control of state
authorities. This often leads to an understanding that international relations is a domain of
intergovernmental contacts, in which agency resides almost exclusively with states thus
ignoring the role and potential of non-governmental actors. This argument of Finnemore,
also makes a strong case against structural realism as pioneered by Kenneth Waltz, who has
linked the concept of socialization with that of competition in the international system.
Though Waltz acknowledges that national governments reach decisions through their
domestic political systems, he however asserts that state action is always indirectly
conditioned by the existence of other states in an anarchical international system.
Thus as is seen from the above arguments though Wendt and Waltz differ in the conception
of understanding how states socialize, both undermine the role and influence of the agency
as a heterogeneous unit, which could include the potential influence of non-governmental
actors or transnational advocacy groups who both have the outreach and interest to change
the perception of state actors at the national and international level .Though Wendt’s
proposition of ideas was limited to the socialization of state actors, available literature on
ideas leading to norm change in terms of influencing state responses has gone beyond the
state centric understanding of international relations.
Focusing on norm influences in international politics, Martha Finnemore and Katherine
Sikkink have explored questions relating to the role that norms play in political change i.e.
both ways in which norms them-selves change and the ways in which they change other
features of the political landscapes. According to them what the states aim to do is to focus
on endogenous variable, not an exogenous given, and norms shape both the goals of the
states-their perceptions and their interests. The recurring puzzle is that why the variety of
norms available at any given time govern state behaviour and why does one rather than
another become a widely accepted standard of behaviour. Norms, thus in contrast to ideas
have been defined as standard of behaviour, which is defined in terms of rights and
obligations. 10
Martha Finnemore has described a norm as a set of inter-subjective understandings readily
apparent to actors that make behavioral claims on those actors11 . Finnemore elaborates that
because it is a shared understanding, it is not merely an individual idiosyncrasy and in fact
once these patterns are embedded in social institutions, they act like structures, shaping up
the states behaviour. It is with this line of argument that constructivists like Wendt has
5
argued that norms shape both the goals of the state, perceptions of their interest—and the
means they use to achieve their goals. Thus where the rationalists see norms as the
reflections of the fixed preferences of the most powerful states, the constructivist approach
believe that one of the roles the norms play is to help determine those preferences.
Ann Florini offers an explanation on norm change by tracing patterns that allows an
explanation of the changing role of the norms in the society. She identifies certain factors to
delineate an evolutionary approach to international norms.12 These are: norm entrepreneur,
which an organisation or an individual that sets out to change the behaviour of others,
coherence, which means that norms that are highly coherent within the international legal
framework will be far more resistant to change than those that are not so linked and
environment, which means that the population of the interest is the population of norms, not
the population of the states.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink on the other hand draw different conclusions to
determine the defining features of the norm. Three stages are outlined—norm entrepreneur,
norm cascade and norm internalization. The characteristic mechanism of the first stage is
norm emergence, which is defined as the persuasion by norm entrepreneur. During this
phase norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a critical mass of states (norm leaders to
embrace new norms). The second stage is characterized more by the dynamic of imitation
as the norm leaders attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers. This second
stage is important because it relates to their identities as members of international society.
During the third stage of internalization, which usually happens at the extreme end of the
norm cascade, norms become so widely accepted that they are internalized by the actors
and achieve a taken for granted quality that makes conformance with the norm almost
automatic.
Some other explanations see the potential role of norms through external and internal
approaches. External approaches through policing, monitoring or sanctions indirectly infer
the importance of norms, whereas internal approaches focus on the domestic processes,
which have the potential to indicate the direct connection between norms and behavior.13
The author in order to establish a direct correlation between norm—change and statebehavior argues for analyzing the conflict between a norm and self interest, i.e. when self
interest is high, the norms would be resisted and conversely, when self interest would be
low , or can be controlled through external and internal approaches, norm could change the
behaviour. In other words, where the former (external) is a top- down approach, the latter
6
(internal) is a bottom-up one. The present- study focuses on the bottom-up approach i.e. it
accounts for explanations at the domestic level, to effectively assess the impact of norm –
change. Amy Gurowitz, on assessing the impact of norm-change has focused on the
identity of the state and considers it as one of the essential elements in defining the success
and failure of a norm. She writes14:
The ability of actors to successfully mobilize international norms is
mediated by two aspects of identity. First, by how the role of the state is
defined, or by a state’s international identity. Second, by how secure or
insecure the state is at a given time about its own identity.
It is important to note that the actors that have been identified thus are both the state and the
non-state actors. One can say that where rationalists see norms as reflections of fixed
preferences of the most powerful states, the constructivist approach believes that one of the
roles that norms play is to help to determine those preferences. Ann Florini writes15:
…. because the ability of states to make correct choices of strategy is
constrained both by limited rationality and by great uncertainty, the
behavioral guidance provided by norms is crucial as a cognitive energy
saver and as a clue to successful strategies.
Thus idea shifts and the norm shifts are the main vehicles of interest transformation. In
other words norm shifts are to constructivists what changes in the power-shifts are to the
realists. The interplay between the agent- structure debates can be grasped by the way
norms trigger a change in the behavior of the state actors in international level. In other
words how ideas and norms, employed by non-governmental actors in contemporary
diplomacy impacts outcome is of primary interest to the paper.
This paper will therefore look at this dialectical relationship between the agency and
structure in international relations. Negotiation Analysis has been employed to study how
an agentic centered understanding can perhaps best explain the change of state behaviour
in international negotiations and how it in turn can explain the structure which determines
state behaviour.
Section –II: Negotiation Analysis
Negotiation analysis can be broadly defined as the process through which an optimal
outcome is arrived at the international negotiations. There are two types of outcome: the
integrative outcome, which connotes a win-win situation for all actors and a distributive
outcome which connotes a win-lose outcome for the concerned actors. Underlining an
7
inclusivist approach of engagement, the World Commission on Dams and Anti-personnel
landmines treaty are illustrative examples of how various processes inform the structureagency dialectics of a negotiated agreement. This is particularly relevant for emerging
discourses on security and development, which have questioned the understanding of a
state centric view of security and a very narrow view of development, which is often
equated primarily with economic growth. The analysis adopted to study the negotiated
agreement is inspired by these contending discourses on security and development in the
21st century. Keeping an inclusivist understanding in mind, which is an essential element
embedded in these emerging discourses, it aims to test the research question- stakeholder
engagement informed through effective leadership can lead to integrative outcome.
Stakeholder engagement is the independent variable—defined as the agency in this context;
effective leadership is the explanatory variable –identified as the mediatory link between
agency and the structure and integrative outcome is the dependent variable—identified with
the structure around which issues and actors are organized. Barry Buzan’s concept of
‘security complex’ can be useful in understanding how state perception and behaviour is
entwined with self-interest and norm change. In this context self interest and norm change
is primarily understood as being embedded in the security complex. Buzan defines security
complex as a group of states whose primary security concerns are linked together
sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot be considered apart from one
another.16 The boundary of the security complex in this context stems from the issues
defining the negotiated agreement. This provide us the essential entry point to observe the
pattern through which states organize them-selves towards issues which are being
deliberated at the international level. To apply this concept to the negotiations under study,
security complex in the case of Mine –Ban Treaty for various states was determined by
long borders, understanding of landmines as defensive weapons, national security, low
costs of landmines and security burdens of states. Meanwhile the security complex for
actors who participated in the World Commission on Dams, can be perceived as stemming
from riparian location of the states , food, energy, water and economic needs and notions of
sovereignty.
The Case Studies
Two case studies have been chosen for study- Convention on the Prohibition of the Use,
Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines signed at Ottawa on 1997,
alternatively known as Mine –Ban Convention and the World Commission on Dams set up
8
in 1998. Issues and linkages used by the Commission to produce a consensus report, Dams
and Development , released at London on November 2000, is also studied in order to
explore the processes employed to engage various stakeholders. To what extent have nonstate actors succeeded in negotiating trade-offs on issues of concern is one of the central
thesis of this article. Though both the case studies deal with two different issue areas, they
are however worth comparison.

Both of the cases are post cold war developments.

Both were initiated by non –state actors. Non-state actors in the study include
non-governmental organizations.

Negotiations for both the case studies were undertaken during the same timeperiod.

The interaction between state and non-state actors was consistent from beginning
to end in both the case studies.

Both the case studies had a security and a development inclination.
Before one undertakes negotiation analysis and explores the relationship between security
complexes with respect to leadership by advocacy groups, it is imperative that a key
assessment of the negotiation outcome is made. In the anti-personnel mine-ban treaty the
actors to the negotiated agreement can be divided into three key groups17: the coalition of
the like –minded states (Canada, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Mexico, Norway and
Switzerland); the blocking coalition of actors (Japan, United States of America, France
United Kingdom and South Africa) and the non-signatories.18 If one explores the
characteristics of the various groups of states in the defined categories, domestic activities
of the International Campaign to Ban landmines at the domestic level merit some attention.
The other non-governmental actor which played a lead role in lobbying activities was the
International Committee for Red Cross. However, though not limited, the outreach
activities by ICRC were more restricted to international and regional lobbying. With
respect to the first category (like minded groups), the responses of states have been
identified. See Table 1
Coalition of Like Minded Groups-The Mine Ban Treaty
Like
Minded Domestic Interaction
States
Canada
Representatives of Mine Action Canada (MAC) began frequent decisions with
9
members of the non- proliferation, arms control and Disarmament Division of
Foreign Affairs which was a lead negotiator with the Department of National
Defence in the Review Conferences.
A symbiotic relationship developed overtime whereby members of parliament
called MAC for information, advice and suggestions. MAC made
recommendation for MP proposals and resolutions.
Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy played an outstanding role and was a
significant actor in calling for an international weapon prohibition regime. He
reframed the debate in terms human security. Human security rather than state
security became the referent object.
Norway
Belgium
Austria
Ireland
Norway did not always support a total ban on APMs. Infact, during the expert
meetings of the CCW Review Conference, 1996,the official Norwegian view
was that a total ban position would be too radical and its aim was to strengthen
the CCW.
Norwegian Campaign to Ban Landmines was the main proponent of a
Norwegian ban on APMs and the campaign was active in lobbying various
political parties and parliamentary committees in 1995 to promote the ban issue
domestically.
This eventually led to a Parliamentary proposal by the Center Party to support a
total ban on the production, stockpiling, sale, purchase and use of APMs.
Consequently, the Parliament asked the Norwegian government to support a
total ban on APMs. Nevertheless, this did not seem to have a notable impact on
Norway’s stance in the ongoing CCW revisions.
The issue however gained momentum in 1996 as the CCW Review
Conference concluded with limited improvements to Protocol II. Norway’s
posture post CCW, was phenomenal and it actively participated in the ICBLsponsored meetings in Geneva to help forge a block of like-minded states that
would actively work toward a ban after the close of the review conference.
Norway soon emerged as one of the key allies for the ICBL in promoting a
comprehensive ban and infact was one of the protagonists in shaping the
Lyosen agreement with Canada, which emphasized on nine human security -landmines, the international criminal court, human rights, international
humanitarian law, gender dimensions in peace building, small arms
proliferation, children in armed conflict (including child soldiers), child labour,
and arctic and Northern cooperation).
Belgium was the first state in the world to declare de jure a complete ban of
antipersonnel mines.
Belgium played a decisive role in June 1993, when the Belgian government
established a moratorium on the export of antipersonnel mines. This modified
the law of 3 January 1933 relating to the manufacturing, trade and carrying of
firearms and the trade of ammunition. The law of 9 March 1995 which
henceforth included antipersonnel mines, booby traps or other devices of a
similar nature was amended by the law of 24 June 1996 which provided for a
complete ban concentrating on the use, stockpiling, manufacturing and the
transfer of antipersonnel mines.
Austria was responsible for drafting the working text for the Mine Ban Treaty.
In Austria, the public discussion on APMs started during the Review
Conference of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW), which took
place in Vienna in September of 1995. During that conference, Austria publicly
announced its support for an immediate and total ban. It was one of the first
countries to do so and in 1996; a campaign organized by the Austrian Red
Cross gained the support of 120,000 signatures in favor of a law banning
antipersonnel mines, which entered into force on 1999.
In Ireland there was close coordination between Irish NGOs and the
government. When the Irish Campaign to Ban Landmines was launched on
1994, the chairperson of the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee was at
the NGO’s press conference. He later invited the new Campaign to make a
presentation on the mine issue at the next meeting of his Committee.
10
Denmark
Switzerland
Mexico
Members of the Campaign were also in close contact with the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs to discuss landmines and the ban movement. The Irish
Campaign continued to work with the Foreign Affairs Committee on options for
action, both domestically and in the European Parliament. In fact the Campaign
vigorously lobbied the government and the political parties in the opposition for
a unilateral ban on antipersonnel landmines in Ireland.
This resulted in a private member’s bill being introduced in 1996 in the Dail for
a unilateral ban on landmines. Though at the beginning the government
opposed the bill as Irish public opinion was very high in support of a unilateral
ban, the government finally responded positively.
Denmark was an early supporter of a comprehensive ban. On 1996 Denmark
decided to renounce the use of AP mines and announced that it will unilaterally
refrain from using AP mines in the Danish defense. Denmark participated in all
the meetings of the Ottawa Process and endorsed the key UN General
Assembly resolutions in 1996, 1997, and 1998.
Switzerland had not always been in the front line of the battle against mines.
In May 1996, during the final session of the CCW review conference in
Geneva, it supported language regarding the continued use of “smart” mines
and long transition periods before new restrictions take effect. However
government policy changed and one of the main reasons for this was the
pressure generated by public opinion. Swiss Campaign to Ban Landmines
(SCBL) and also the ICRC whose headquarters are based in Geneva, played a
critical role.
These efforts helped convince the Swiss Parliament to pass legislation in favor
of a total ban on 6 December 1996, making it the third country in the world to
enact a domestic ban. Switzerland joined the leading group of countries fighting
against mines.
Mexico was one of the first nations to call for a total ban on antipersonnel
landmines and has been a diplomatic leader on the landmine issue since the
negotiations for the 1980 Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW). It lead
the non aligned countries in blocking the attempt to put the landmine issue on
the CD agenda mainly because to give a top priority to banning landmines and
also to save on time factor and unnecessary delay.
At the outset, the main states against the signing of the landmine treaty were the United
States, Japan, United Kingdom, France and South Africa. U.S.A, a non member state needs
to be mentioned because it was the U.S. which called first for a moratorium to ban
landmines, it was only later that its change its position. However the behavior of states such
as France and United Kingdom also merit attention as they had a pro landmine perspective
before the MBT was signed. Again domestic mobilization in some cases appears as a
necessary factor for shaping political will.
Table -2: Blocking Coalition of Actors-The Mine Ban Treaty
Countries
Domestic Interaction
Japan
The Japanese government initially planned not to sign the Ottawa Convention
because landmine producers, such as United States, Russia, China and India, had
11
United
America
France
States
of
not joined the treaty. The government also supported the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) over the Ottawa Process until the very last minute. Howver
the shift arrived with foreign minister Keizo Obuchi, who questioned the
government’s position when he asserted that it was “contradictory to contribute a
large sum of money for mine clearance in Cambodia.”19 This statement was a
turning point in Japan’s policy on landmines, and after three months of
consideration, the government decided to sign the treaty.
Were external pressures responsible? Death of Princess Diana and pressure from
the transnational civil society are cited as potential reasons as, Japan’s civil
society was absent.20 Its potential influence in shaping Japan’s domestic
consensus is also absent.
JCBL however did not have any access to official funds and was totally
dependent on membership dues and charitable contributions from individuals to
cover its project costs. Though JCBL raised over 10.9 million yen from July
1997-June 1998, this intake decreased in the following years due to the declining
public interest in the landmine issue.
However a noteworthy effort which brought the landmine issue back to the public
domain was the Association to Aid Refugees (AAR), one of the forerunners in
the landmine campaign in Japan which held a parallel NGO-sponsored landmine
conference at the time of the government conference on demining technology in
Tokyo in March 1997. This NGO conference depicted the suffering of mine
victims and helped to reinforce the need to eradicate landmines; it received
intensive media coverage. AAR’s commitment to the issue, thus contributed
greatly in raising public awareness in Japan.21 During the ratification campaign of
the Ottawa treaty the JCBL consciously began to work closely with the ICBL,
relying on it for information about the progress of ratification and the means of
costs of destroying stockpiled mines as mandated by the convention. This inflow
of information before even the government could access it enabled the JCBL to
pressure the government to take concrete action.
Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Lane Evans, introduced the legislation
that placed a one year export moratorium on APLs. This legislation gave
tremendous momentum to ban movement internationally.In 1994 President
Clinton, called for the eventual elimination of the APLs in a speech before the
United Nations General Assembly.22
The situation changed post 1996, when the amended protocol, an outcome of the
CCW Review Conference, which the U.S had ratified did not support the APL
ban. The U.S. emerged as the major promoter of so-called “smart” mines that
automatically self-destruct.
The next major U.S. policy announcement came on January 1997 when the
Clinton Administration announced that, instead of full support for the Ottawa
Process, the U.S. would seek negotiations on a worldwide mine ban treaty in the
Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, Switzerland. The decision was
criticized by the U.S. Campaign to Ban Landmines as an effort to avoid rapid
progress toward a ban, given the notoriously slow pace of the CD.
On the closing day of the negotiations, President Clinton announced from
Washington that the U.S. would not be signing the treaty, but stated that the U.S.
would unilaterally stop using antipersonnel mines everywhere but Korea by 2003
and in Korea by 2006. During 1998, the U.S. again focused its efforts on the
Conference on Disarmament, this time attempting to get agreement not to
negotiate a total ban, but rather a transfer ban. The ICBL opposed any effort to
negotiate a transfer ban, or any other AP mine-related measure in the CD,
believing that, it would undermine the establishment of the norm completely
banning the weapon.23
While France was not one of the first countries to fully embrace a ban and the
Ottawa Process, it was an early leader in taking steps to deal with the global
landmine crisis in requesting the United Nations to call for a review conference
for the CCW. During the review conference in Vienna in September of 1995,
France announced that it would ban the production and trade but not use of
APMs.
The French Non Governmental Organizations (NGOs) were the catalyst to French
action and ultimately for the governments shift to a pro-ban policy. The French
Campaign immediately began to lobby for public debate of the policy, that it be
12
United Kingdom
South Africa
reinforced as law and for the establishment of a special commission to monitor
the destruction of stocks.24
While France attended the October 1996 ban strategy meeting in Ottawa as a full
participant, it did not take part in meetings organized by the ICBL during the final
sessions of the review conference to help forge a like-minded block of pro-ban
countries. In Ottawa, it announced new steps toward a ban that it would outlaw
the use of APMs, unless French soldiers are in danger. It also argued that ban
negotiations should take place in the Conference on Disarmament (CD).
France did not fully embrace the Ottawa Process until the Brussels Conference in
June of 1997. It continued to maintain the view that only the Conference on
Disarmament (CD) could negotiate a total ban on antipersonnel mines, but once
France came on board the Ottawa Process, it became a strong advocate of the
process and a member of the expanded core group .One of the main reason for the
changed stance of the French government was that APMs had become an
electoral issue in France.
Though not an early supporter of mine ban issue and was persuasive of dealing
with the ban on landmines in the conference of disarmament,
the electoral campaign in U.K had a decisive impact on the British government in
changing its stance on the issue. This linkage between electoral politics and the
issue of land mines provided a crucial entry point for converts to the ban to take
the Ottawa treaty forward.
The support for ban on mines was however not smooth as a South African
Defense Department document dated 20 May 1997, described the possibility of a
global ban as "a tall order" and stated that minefields can be used as an effective
defensive strategy.25
However the declaration of South Africa to ban landmines was significant
because South Africa’s support gave crucial legitimacy to the ban in Africa by
forestalling the movement from splitting into a north–south issue26.ICRC played a
key role in the African region.
If one reflects at the outcome of the Mine Ban treaty, the basic momentum was by those
states, where leadership by ICBL had successfully redefined the security complexes. The
non-signatories had a different interpretation of their security complexes. Thus, the linkage
between domestic interaction and the concerned security complexes appears to be the
essential conduit between state perception and state response on one hand and leadership
as the mediating agency between the agency and the structure on the other.
In the case of World Commission on Dams, the commission was the result of dialogue and
negotiation involving representatives of the public, private and civil society sectors. It
attracted substantial interest because of the unique way in which the different sides of the
debate were brought together in order to arrive at a model for resolving large dam related
contentious development issues. It was set up and financed by aid agencies, industry,
governments and NGOs. An Interim Working Group composed of participants of a
workshop facilitated by the World Bank and the IUCN in Gland, Switzerland was tasked
with establishing the World Commission on Dams (WCD). The mandate for the work of
the Commission was the result of agreements reached at the workshop in Gland, along with
13
the subsequent preparatory work and consultation process that followed. According to some
scholars the shape of any potential Commission– its scope and range – would have been
narrower without the ‘alternative stakeholder input’ at Gland. The report primarily
emphasized a rights and a risk approach thus underlining the rights violated and long-term
risks borne by the affected people. The Commission proposed using United Nations
instruments, specifically, the Universal Declaration on the Rights to Development adopted
by UN General Assembly (1986) and the Rio principles at the UN Conference on
Environment and Development (1992). The link to UN instruments was highly strategic, as
it helped underlining values set forth by formal representatives of the people- the member
states. Further in order to get the process right to ensure legitimacy, the Commission
committed to a set of guiding principles for its work program. These included transparency,
inclusiveness, independence and accountability- factors which are embedded in the politics
of decision-making with respect to dam building.
The responses of various actors, in this case can again be divided into two categories: the
optimists, and the pessimists. While the pessimists were states (government agency and
utilities) and private sector, the optimists were the advocacy groups.
Though unlike Case one, a tabulated version of domestic interaction is difficult due to the
different nature of leadership exercised (which was primarily limited to the international
level), the responses of states and private sector can broadly illuminate the key question on
agency-structure dialectics. Given the nature of the political role that Narmada Bachao
Andolan has played in internationalizing the dam issue and the fact that one of the lead
agencies in shaping the WCD came from India, official response of India can be used as the
illustrative case example to prove the relationship between leadership and security
complexes. Thus, while the responses of key actors had similar undertones, the Indian
response in particular has received detailed attention in negotiation analysis. See Table 3
Responses of Actors - World Commission on Dams.
Actors
India
Responses
India stated that “The guidelines for development suggested by WCD were wholly
incompatible with the Indian development imperatives. It would therefore continue
with its programme of dam construction to create another 200 Billion Cu. Metres of
storage in the next 25 years so as to ensure continued self-sufficiency in food grain
production and to meet the energy and drinking water needs of a growing
population”27
The Indian government also rejected the report on the ground that it lacked a
balanced perspective . It stated, “On a detailed perusal of the final report it is seen
that WCD has leaned heavily on the Consultants Country Report, totally ignoring
14
Nepal
Electricity
Board
Government's views and data on the successful projects completed in India. It
therefore claimed, the references relating to India in the Report are not based on
factual and authentic information.28
The Indian government critiqued the Commission over representation failures. The
Ministry of Water Resources (MOWR) questioned the composition of the
commission, its procedures, the adequacy and representatives of the sample studies.
Thus it overturned, the knowledge base behind the report and the manner in which
report was finalized. The Indian water resources establishment tended to react with
dismay to the very idea of the setting up of a World Commission on Dams, which
seemed to them a sinister anti- dam move. Particularly, the establishments’
suspicion and hostility were particularly aroused by the membership of the
commission, which include Medha Patkar (whom it regarded as their enemy) and
L.C Jain (whom it considered to be her friend and sympathizer) is worth
mentioning.29
Nepal Electricity Board noted “It should be recognized that the procedures for
developing any project, more so a dam project with multi-dimensional aspects, are
specific to each country. Each country needs to consider its specific conditions,
laws and priorities”30On public participation, the Nepal Electricity Authority stated
that “the procedures proposed to achieve this objective are not practicable. To
achieve complete public consensus is a mirage, especially in countries, where, using
poverty of the population, vested group starts manipulating the largely illiterate
population. The creation of a stakeholders forum and intervention by Dispute
Review Board/Panel of Experts in case of disagreement with developers to follow
the development of a project continuously will lead to interminable discussions and
could delay a project to the extent of cancellation .How can the proposal for free,
prior and informed consent by indigenous peoples and tribal groups be implemented
in a country such as Nepal, where they live cheek by bowl with "ordinary people"
How can it be weighted against the preference of other people in the affected
areas?”.31
Canada
Canadian stance was "irrigation dams have typically failed to recover their costs" is
a generalization . It further noted half of the world's dams are built exclusively for
irrigation... and that the marked tendency towards schedule delays and cost
overruns is surely not specific to dams.The statements on dam safety and integrated
flood management are not, as implied, the results shortcomings related to the
effectiveness of dams, but concerns that have appeared or evolved through time. It
also stated that many of the criticism towards dams could be applied to almost every
large infrastructure project: roads, airports, channels, including urban planning and
housing development.
South Africa
The African Steering Committee similarly talked about contextualizing the report in
the South African context. The General Directorate of State Hydraulic Work stated
that “It is clear that the overall approach is negative concerning the role of dams,
generalizing adverse aspects, unsatisfactory social and economic benefits.”32
that if all of the guidelines and recommendations on the report were implemented
they would essentially take decision away from the local government, thus
hindering their ability to implemented the needed water resources project.33
The International Hydropower Association stated that defacto veto rights for a small
minority would be politically unreasonable and would undermine the power of the
government and elected authorities34
Similarly International Committee on Large Dams noted that the decision-making
process was unrealistic, impractical and hence unacceptable to any democratic setup
The Industry
Group
International
Hydropower
Association
Norway
Turkey
China
Norway stated that the report gave little weight to the socio-economic advantages
of the dams.35
Turkey stated that alternatives to large dams recommended by the report were not
realistic on an adequate scale to meet the needs. Dams and Development Project.36
The Commissioner from China’s Ministry of Water Resources withdrew midway
through the process, because the Chinese government was becoming uneasy with
15
range of views on the commission.
While the Chinese government did not make any formal statement of disagreement
regarding the substance of Commission work at the time of its representative’s
departure, a later memo from the Chinese government to the World Bank indicated
that it disagreed with the positions of most commission members.37
The above responses to the WCD shows that there was an evident lack on the meeting of
minds between the pro and anti dam views. Lack of participation/engagement at the
domestic levels appears to be the key reason. Effective mobilization by the bureaucracy and
parliamentary support appears to be another explanation. While the study is insightful in
engaging actors at the international levels, the lack of engagement with domestic political
structures
is a pointer to the functional element provided by leadership at the domestic
level. As mentioned the security complexes which in the case of dams, were riparian
location, food, energy and water security needs were also not addressed by the leadership
effectively. Perceptions towards sovereignty also played a key role in shaping responses.
The following pages, which focus on different phases of negotiations, would bring out
these points more clearly.
The Process of Negotiations: Formula and Procedural Phase
Negotiation Processes for both case studies can be divided into two phases—the formula
phase and the procedural phase. While the space limits an individual elaboration on both
case studies, similarities and differences however can be extrapolated from both. However
it needs to be emphasized that leadership by advocacy groups played a key role in both
negotiations. While leadership in MBT was provided by ICRC and ICBL, leadership in
WCD was provided by Narmada Bachao Andolan and Berne Declaration.38
In both case studies in the formula phase for instance mobilization appeared as the
dominant strategy .Also framing appeared as the most appropriate method which guided the
negotiations in the procedural phase. For instance in the case of antipersonnel landmines,
the issue was framed as humanitarian disarmament, which gave meaning to the various
actors who later got associated with the pro-ban lobby. The resolutions passed by the
United Nations and the initial domestic ban in states like U.S, Belgium provided the needed
framework and legitimacy for framing landmines as an offensive weapon in terms of its
potential effects vis a vis its understanding as a purely defensive weapon. In the World
16
Commission of Dams, the adopted framework emphasized the social and environmental
costs of the dams. This framework got accepted visibility in the Gland Workshop, which
was a collaborative initiative of the World Bank and the IUCN. Also while presence of
World Bank as the primary funding agency of dams proved decisive in legitimizing the
issue in assessing the effectiveness of dams, in purely economic terms and the role of IUCN
was important in highlighting the issue in social and environmental terms. Thus framework
played an important role in giving meaning to various actors and was quite successful in
engaging actors. In Shripad Dharmakidary’s own words who then formed a part of
Narmada Bachao Andolan39, “Where World Bank launched the process; there the IUCN
played the role of the mediator to associate the affected people’s group to the process. Over
all both of these institutions held the process together till the formation of the WCD
(Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard and Shripad Dharamadhikary, 2007).
However both cases differed in ways they mobilized themselves and this really is the point
of departure in explaining actor behaviour. For instance while in the case of MBT,
mobilization primarily happened at the national level, in the case of WCD, mobilization
happened at the international level. It can also be said that mobilization in the MBT broadly
followed a bottom-up approach. This is best expressed in Yeshua Moser’s40 own words,
when he says,
The process was a decentralized campaign and ICBL just brought them
together. The onus really lay on national campaigns and the drive therefore
came from the bottom. This was in fact the main reason for generating the
political will and as more countries joined the issue the more receptive the
issue became in the public domain (Personal Communication with Yeshua
Moser, 2008).
Thus while the strategies adopted in the formula stage for both case studies were similar
(framing and mobilization), they primarily differed in the approaches they followed. The
WCD focused on mobilizing actors at the international level. Key nongovernmental
organization who played an essential role in the process were: Berne Declaration (Peter
Bosshard), Patrick Mc Cully (International River Network) and Shripad Dharmadhikary
(Narmada Bachao Andolan). Shripad Dharamadikary points out “we did not focus on any
particular actor, rather we focuses on the issues and gathering and presenting evidence. If at
all there was a focus, it was in making efforts to get the voices of the affected people, those
who had been heard only minimally, to be heard.” At the international level deliberations
he points out, “there wasn’t a consensus between all players… I think there was a better
17
appreciation to the issues concerned.” Also though all the countries agreed on the
normative frameworks prescribed by the Dams and Development report, they differed on
the detailed interpretation of these. In some cases the agreement on the core values also
seemed superficial (Personal Communication with Shripad Dharamadhikary, 2007).
Though national dialogues did take place after the report was published, little effort was
made to hold simultaneous public consultations at the domestic level, by advocacy groups,
when the report by the WCD was being prepared. Another shortcoming of the commission
was that the deliberations of the commission and the protocols of their meetings were not
made accessible to the public. Thus in the following process to shape and define the work
programme, the commission erred towards providing opportunities for public comment, a
serious weakness which affected in generating tenor the pressure on the state
actors41.Shripad Dharamadhikary points out that the reason for the lack of domestic
engagement was the misbalance of power (political, economic etc) between the players.
Also Bosshard’s views complimenting Dharamadhikary’s view on varied interpretations of
the goals and the definition and participation in development activities seem to be a
possible reason for this.
In the MBT, mobilization primarily started with national campaigns and once the process
was initiated at the domestic level, it was organized under the broader umbrella of
International Campaign to Ban Landmines. The role played by ICBL in achieving the
Ottawa treaty is significant because in less than one decade, it helped create and sustain a
profound and rapid change in the state perception towards the landmine issue. An
outstanding feature of this campaign was that the organizations were specializing on
multiple issues related to mines, thus having the leverage of producing facts and
information related to their field, most of the work of these NGOs related to the impact of
landmines in the developing countries.
Meanwhile in the case of World Commission on
Dams, the leadership, as mentioned was provided by three organization, which in the
process weakened the credibility of organizations at the domestic level.
In the second phase i.e. the procedural phase, information sharing and communication and
dissemination of information at domestic and international level, appeared to be the
dominant strategy. Coordination of actors on issues as well as collaboration of information
to key political circles where it made the most strategic impact was the defining moment for
success. Information sharing therefore in the procedural phase is understood as not only
18
being restricted to the international level, but primarily also at the domestic level. It also
needs to be pointed out that though in both the key cases studies information sharing tools
were used, approaches followed by them indicate a different political trajectory. In the case
of WCD perse information sharing primarily happened at the international level, while in
the case of MBT, it took place both at the national and international level.
One of the key strategy employed by the non- governmental organsations in this phase was
a focus on clear goals, thus highlighting the needs and risks of affected population. Risks,
threats and vulnerablities were complimented by facts, figures and narratives, which on the
process also legitimized, the grass-root expertise of the non-governmental organizations,
thus helping them gain leverage in negotiations on which states had limited expertise,
information and experience.
It was observed in the case of MBT that the articulation of the costs incurred by the
vulnerable groups and minimizing security benefits of landmines, through expert advice
and opinion was the main determinant in changing the responses of state actors.
Dissemination of information in informal sessions and regional and national level advocacy
forums were a key to the success of Ottawa Treaty. In Louis Meresca’s words, who has a
first hand insight of negotiations shared that:
We were able to bring a personal feeling amongst the parties, and this is
what proved to be the key. A strategic linkage was made through
humanitarian assistance programmes, where we argued rationally that
assistance meant to be for the victims failed to reach its goal due to active
minefields in the region and therefore much of the efficiency was lost in due
process. This helped us getting many UN agencies and the donors of
humanitarian assistance on our side (Personal Communication with Louis
Meresca, 2008).
Similarly in the case of World Commission of Dams, Peter Bosshard who was closely
involved in the frontline of the formation of the Commission pointed out that information
sharing greatly influenced the framework of engagement as thematic reviews and regional
consultations, held in due process were the main outreach channels, through which the
social and environmental costs were emphasized. A remarkable strategy used in the
process, he stated were the presentations through the affected people themselves who
narrated their own life histories. Also good contact and trust of the grass root activities that
19
went to the regional consultations was the main reason according to Bosshard for
broadening the debate on dams (Personal Communication with Peter Bosshard, 2007).
However in the case of World Commission on Dams, it was observed that though at the
international level, there was growing sense of engagement and appreciation towards the
costs and consequences of dams, a major shortcoming at the domestic level was the
conflicting interpretations which could be seen in terms of target population accruing the
benefit of development. Also, right to food, right to housing, right to resettlement was
dismissed by the World Bank as being affected solely by large dams construction perse.
Further though a linkage to social-economic rights was employed at the international level,
an effort to politicize this discourse at the domestic level was missing. Peter Bosshard
pointed out that: limited time, lack of funds was the main reasons which constrained the
outreach activities of the non-governmental actors (Personal Communication with Peter
Bosshard, 2007). Also how these rights could be operationalised through a moratorium on
large dams was perhaps left unanswered. Thus a subtle ambiguity therefore existed between
rights of the target groups and duties of the state.
Therefore, as far as the distribution of information is concerned it can be concluded from
the case studies that while a focus on external process (international level) can help
building a general understanding on issues and highlight the humanitarian obligations of
states under international law; there internal approaches (domestic level) can mobilize
opinion through public advocacy, domestic legislation, which was achieved through
stakeholder involvement by media campaigns, political leadership, public education and
awareness at multiple levels. The basis of this argument stems from the responses of nonsignatories in the MBT perse who
point to a different explanation. The key to the
explanation lies in the absence/presence of domestic campaigns and the response of
leadership to security complexes through which actors interpreted and translated the
meaning and value of landmines to their security concerns. India and the United States
indicate that though they agreed with the normative aspects associated with landmines., a
total ban on landmines was inconceivable considering their security concerns. For India it
was and still has been long borders. While India condemns landmines on ethical terms and
employs the normative argument that it does not use landmine within the country, the
United States has always argued that its “ security burdens” seem to be the major reason the
U.S shying away form the treaty. The role of Pentagon in justifying the utility of landmines
and the lack of substantive public debate on the issue seems to be the major factor in
20
determining the U.S policy. This again points towards the role of domestic consensus in
key political circles in shaping international agreements.
Meanwhile, in the World Commission on Dams, the lack of will on part of most
governments can be explained on account of the differentiated political consensus on the
issue of dams perse. The lack of outreach at the domestic level while negotiations were
going on perhaps can best explain the response of state actors. However this is not to state
that domestic mobilization never happened in India. Infact, the success story of the
Narmada Bachao Andolan in India in the 70 and 80s is a pointer to the fact that when the
campaign primarily relied on domestic mobilization it was more successful in influencing
state response. This can be stated by observing the contours of the security complex, which
determined the responses of the various Indian states.42 The key shift is diagnosed through
the process of engagement employed by the NBA, which responded to the security complex
through tools of public advocacy and mobilization.
Table four and five summarize the relationship between security complex in two case
studies and the response of leadership43 and concerned actors.
Case One : Mine Ban Treaty
Security Complex:
Elements defining
positions
Leadership
Vertical (ICBL)
Horizontal (ICRC)
Actor Response
Like Minded
Blocking
Non
States
Coalition
Signatories
Long Borders
Effective
Effective
Positive
Positive
Negative
Offensive Weapons
Effective
Effective
Positive
Positive
Neutral
Cost&Consequences
Effective
Effective
Positive
Positive
Neutral
Security Burdens
Ineffective
Ineffective
Positive
Positive
Neutral
National Security
Effective
Effective
Positive
Positive
Negative
Alternatives
Ineffective
Ineffective
Positive
Positive
Negative
Case Two: World Commission on Dams
Security Complex
Vertical
Elements
positions
Leadership
Horizontal
States
Actor Response
Industry
defining
Riparian Structures
(Berne Declaration
and NBA)
Ineffective
(Berne Declaration and
NBA)
Ineffective
Negative
Negative
Sovereignty
Ineffective
Ineffective
Negative
Negative
Food, Energy, Water
Ineffective
Ineffective
Negative
Negative
21
Security
Rights and Risks
Ineffective
Effective
Negative
Negative
Social Impact
Ineffective
Effective
Negative
Negative
Economic Impact
Ineffective
Effective
Negative
Negative
Environmental
Impact
Ineffective
Effective
Negative
Negative
The above tables show that the responses of actors in both the cases were greatly
determined by the exercise of vertical leadership. Also ineffective domestic mobilization
over key elements of security complexes (alternatives and long borders) in case of
landmines and (riparian structures, food, energy, water security and sovereignty) in case of
dams had a strong impact in shaping actor responses. It is pertinent to note that only two
countries Greece and Turkey, both with long borders and hostile relations have signed the
Mine-Ban Treaty. Greece and Turkey ratified the Mine Ban Treaty on September 25, 2003,
in accordance with an April 2001 agreement, which both countries had signed44. Changed
security complex and domestic mobilization by NGOs was primarily responsible for this
key shift.
Section Three: Agency-structure debate: from theoretical to applied perspective
As can be concluded from aforementioned analysis, leadership role played by
nongovernmental organizations at the national and international level does lead to
influencing perceptions of state actors. However the leadership is effective when it
responds to the security complexes, which determine the beliefs and responses of the state
actor. Security complexes are thus structures on which actors base their belief systems. The
nature of issue greatly determines the defining elements of the complex. The agencystructure debate thus can be understood at two levels. First at the domestic level, how nongovernmental actors use advocacy tools to frame issues and mobilize opinion through
instruments of public advocacy and second, how at the international level, the critical mass
of states not only gives legitimacy to the issue, but also endows a new meaning to the
object/issue under negotiations thus influencing the perceptions of the state actors. This
paper has argued that the agency-leadership by non-governmental organizations is effective
in mobilizing opinion at the domestic level and this primarily plays a critical role in shaping
the interest and identity of actors at the international level. Hence it concludes that while
international approaches play a key role in making issue visible, political will can only be
generated by engaging with domestic political structures. An essential reference point to do
so is to situate the security complexes of the state in various issue areas.
22
The agency-structure debate, thus in the present context alludes to how stake holder
engagement in international negotiations can potentially change/transform state response.
In other words, the behaviour of state actors is not shaped so much so by the structure under
which it operates, as it is by the role played by advocacy groups (agents) who through
employing different modes of engagement change the belief system or perceptions of state
actors (towards the structure or security complex). According to Walter Carlsnaes the
agency-structure debate can be defined appropriately in terms of ontological and
epistemological assumptions regarding the nature of social and individual action. He
proposes that though the American debate is often discussed in terms of micro-macro
linkage, the European debate is largely focused on the relationship between agency and
structure. While the first, according to him can be subsumed under the broader rubric of
Level of Analysis, the latter, according to him is primarily concerned with the link between
purposive behaviour i.e. the defining characteristic of agents and actors and social
structures on any level of social analysis.45 It can be said therefore that the agency-structure
debate can be studied at two levels. First, how the agents change the behaviour of states at
the domestic level and second how after the first stage the, states them-selves influence the
structure of the international system. Martin Hollis and Steve Smith have defined such an
approach in terms of explaining the state behaviour from outside and understanding the
state behaviour from inside. Questioning David Singer, who proposed to investigate the
agency-structure dialectics in 1961 they argue that at each stage the unit of the higher layer
becomes the system of the lower layer.46 Alexander Wendt has argued that there are two
ways through which a theory can be called systemic. First, when it makes the international
system a dependent variable and second, when it makes the international system an
independent variable.47When exploring the interaction of agency and structure in context to
the mentioned negotiations one can argue that domestic interaction between different
players within a state can lead to a learning, perceptual and an adaptive exercise, whereby
the meaning or the perceptions of key decision-makers towards the object of negotiations
might change in the process. The primary driving agent responsible for this change can be
explained through leadership which responds to the security complexes effectively. The
outreach of horizontal and vertical leadership then determines the success of negotiations at
the international level. Once a critical mass of states witnesses a perception shift, a norm
shift in terms of the structure of international system might well be underway.
A post-facto analysis of both the case studies can perhaps be insightful. In 1999 15 states in
total were using landmines, in 2007, the number shot down to just 2 states ( Russia and
23
Myanmar). Only 39 countries are yet to join Mine Ban Treaty and more than three quarters
of the state are party to the Treaty. With regards to the debate on dams and development , it
can be said that though a consensus on development and dam building is far from a
common understanding, the security complexes, so embedded in riparian locations, food,
water and energy security can only be adequately addressed by nation states through
bilateral or multi-lateral cooperation on water resources.
Negotiation success is largely defined in terms of the norm change in the behaviour of state
actors at the international level. Rather than focusing on a top bottom approach, the paper
has looked at the triggers for state behaviour more through a bottom-up approach. It argues
how effective leadership at the domestic level can be a mediator between the structure and
the agency, thus changing the meaning that the objects/issues have for state actors. This
explanation is perhaps a potent way to understand the role of non-governmental actors in
contemporary diplomatic practice. Especially, so when non-governmental organizations are
assuming new role as transnational actors in contemporary international relations, the
dimension of exploring domestic spaces is most important. It can be said therefore that
states understood through the concept of black boxes, often limit the scope of domestic
spaces at work. While the overarching role of structure in shaping state responses is not
disputed, what is perhaps underlined is the need to locate the role of leadership in endowing
meaning to the existing security complexes, the essential reference point, through which
states derive meaning for their respective actions.
1
The interviews that have been cited in specific for this article were held between 2007-2008. The concerned
individuals are: Shripad Dharmadhikary, Gujarat, India, Peter Bosshard, California, USA, Yeshua Moser,
Montreal, Canada and Louis Meresca, Geneva, Switzerland, Bikash Pande, Islamabad, Pakistan. The author is
grateful to them for sharing their views on the subject.
2
The Grotian tradition believed that though international politics is anarchical, it is mitigated by an
international intercourse, a relationship between states characterized not only by conflict but also through
cooperation.
3
Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, (London: Macmillan Press, 1977),
170-172.
4
Ibid., 315
Old Diplomacy which was a synonym for secret diplomacy was used to emphasize the diplomacy of the
seventeenth and eighteen century. During this era only the great powers possessed the common responsibility
for the conduct of international relations and the small states and public opinion played a negligible role.
Harold Nicholson, Diplomacy,( New York: Oxford University Press, 1953); Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy,
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); K. Hamilton and R. Langhorne , The Practice of Diplomacy: Its
Evolution, Theory and Administration, (Routledge: London and New York, 1995).
5
6
New Diplomacy, a synonym for open diplomacy was the diplomacy of the twentieth century and the
protagonist of this term was the President of the U.S.A., Woodrow Wilson. Wilson coined the term by laying
down his famous fourteen points after the Treaty of Versailles took place. One of the most important
24
characteristics of New Diplomacy was the appreciation of public opinion and the rapid increase of
communications, which modified many of the practices of old diplomacy. G.V.G. Krishnamurthy, Dynamics
of Diplomacy, (Delhi: National Public House, 1968)Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy, (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1994); K. Hamilton and R. Langhorne , The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and
Administration, (Routledge: London and New York, 1995) .
7
Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics,(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999),
94.
8
Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics, (New York: Reading & Mass, Addison-Wesley, 1979), 74.
9
Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 101.
Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes, (Ithaca ,Cornell University Press, 1983), 3.
11
Finnemore cited in Ann Florini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms,’ International Studies Quarterly,
40 (3), 364
12
Ann Florini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms,’ International Studies Quarterly, 366
13
Diehl and Goertz, ‘Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some Conceptual and Measurement Issues,’
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 36(4), 1992, 643
10
Amy Gurowitz, ‘The Diffusion of International Norms: Why Identity Matters.’ International Politics, 43,
2006, 305–341.
15
Florini, ‘The Evolution of International Norms,’ 366
14
16
Barry Buzan, People, States & Fear: The National Security Problem in International, Relations (London:
Wheatsheaf Books, 1983 ),106.
17
The mentioned countries are illustrative of those key states, which played a defining role in generating
consensus and defining the tenor of negotiations.
18
There were eighty-seven non-signatories to the Mine-Ban Treaty in 1997. For details please see:
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Universal/CCM/Non-Signatories.
19
Motoko Mekata, “Building Partnerships Toward a Common Goal: Experiences of the International
Campaign to Ban Landmines“, in Ann M. Florini (ed.), The Third Force: The Rise of Transnational Civil
Society, Washington and Tokyo: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Japan Centre for
International Exchange, 2000, 168 .
20
Ibid, 168
21
Landmine Monitor Report (1999), Japan, International Campaign to Ban Landmines.
22
Daniel Keegan, ‘The Problem of Landmines: The United States and the Ottawa Convention,’ International
Affairs Review,2003, 70
23
Landmine Monitor Report , United States of America, International Campaign to Ban Landmines, 1999.
24
Statement by Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation, 1995.
25
Landmine Monitor Report, South Africa, International Campaign to Ban Landmines. 1999.
26
Richard Price, ‘Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil-Society Target Landmines,’ International
Organization, 52(3), 1998, 411-441.
27
Government of India , Ministry of Water Resources, WCD Press Statement, 2001,
28
Ibid
29
Ramaswamy Iyer, ‘WCD and India Analysis of a Relationship,’ Economic & Political Weekly, 38(23):,
2001, 2275.
30
Nepal Electricity Authority , ‘World Commission of Dams, ‘Press Statement, 2000
31
Ibid.
32
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works , ‘WCD Press Statement,’ Ankara, Turkey,2000.
33
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, 2000; Harza Engineering Company ,“WCD Press Statement,
2000; Hydro Review World Wide ,’WCD Press Statement, 2000.
34
International Hydropower Association, 2000.
35
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs , ‘World Commission of Dams, Press Statement,’ 2000.
36
General Directorate of State Hydraulic Works, 2000.
F Kahrl, “Under the Shadow of the Three Gorges Dam: The World Commission on Dams and China.”
Background paper prepared for the WCD Assessment, 2001, Quoted in Navroz, Dubash, Dupas, Mairi and
Kothari, S, A Watershed in Global Governance? An Independent Assessment of World Commission on Dams,
Washington D.C: World Resource Institute, 2001
37
25
38
International Rivers Network, led by Patrick Mc Cully also played an important role. Peter Bosshard,
though presently associated with International River Network led the Berne Declaration during WCD
negotiations.
39
Narmada Bachao Anolan, played a lead role in the formation of World Commission of Dams, and was
represented by Shripad Dharamadhikary. He now lead a research centre called Manthan, Gujarat, India.
40
Landmine Coordinator for Non-state Armed Group, Mine Action Canada, International Campaign to Ban
Landmines, Montreal, Canada.
41
Navroz eyal, A Watershed in Global Governance? An Independent Assessment of World Commission on
Dams,2001; Klaus, Dingwerth, “The Democratic Legitimacy Of Public-Private Rule Making: What Can We
Learn From The World Commission on Dams,” Global Governance, 11, 2005, 75.
42
NBA during the 70s and 80s advocated the cause of dams through various protest marches, campaigns and
political pressures against the state governments; much earlier before dams and displacement has become an
international issue. In the 1980s a collective movement against large dams started taking shape in India. For
instance in 1983, Kalpvriksha published a report on costs imposed by dams. Meanwhile social activists in
Gujarat raised the issue of tribal rights and also bureaucrats involved in negotiations with the World Bank
questioned the viability of dams. In late 1980s, other nongovernmental organisations such as SETU, MARG
and ARCH Vahini joined hands against the struggle. Post 1985, mass mobilisation by NBA at the grass root
level, created awareness against the costs imposed by large dams. The movement took an activist stand
against displacement, submergence, resettlement and dams. The movement generated mass support
questioning the government for providing more information on the dams. Mobilisation through padayatras,
village level meetings and ground surveys of the project affected people were undertaken, in order to counter
the pro dam arguments of the government. Meanwhile legislative instruments were also employed for
challenging the information curtailed by the state on such issues. Many government functionaries also
opposed the feasibility of large dams. Important ones included, Chief Secretary KCS Acharya, Chief Engineer
Matin Ahmed, former irrigation Secretary R.L Gupta and former Irrigation Minister Ramchandra Singh Deo.
For instance Gandhians and Socialists, especially the intellectuals opposed the building of dams on the basis
of social and political analyses. (See: Sanjay Sangvi, The River and the Life: People’s Struggle in the
Narmada Valley, New Delhi: Earthscan, 2002, 244-48) Some of the important personalities included Aruna
Asaf Ali, P.N Haskar, C Subramaniam, Mrilnalini Sarabai. IK Gujral, Romilla Thappar, Irphan Habib. Rajni
Kothari, Deepak Nayar , Shripad Dharmadhikary Himanshu Thakkar etc. Moreover the support of the
movement itself had spread to Mumbai, Delhi, Pune, Indore, Bhopal, Ahmedabad, Baroda, Bengal,
Karnataka, Kerela, Tamilnadu, Bihar, Rajasthan. The fact that all of them opposed the feasibility of dams, the
debate was thus broadened from mere displacement and riparian claims to the consequences of development.
The key stakeholders to the dispute-Gujarat, Madhaya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Maharashtra had taken
positional stand on the NBA, given their riparian stakes in the issue. This so to say, was the security complex
for them, which was successfully targeted by arousing public opinion. Based on this observation it can be
argued that political will which is the main criterion for assessing the outcome of negotiation success is
embedded in domestic political structures of the country.
43
Leadership has been defined in contrast to formal power and often has been related to informal intervention
by high officials of international organizations to influence the outcome of international negotiations. Calling
them informal political entrepreneurs, Moravcsik, ( Andrew Moravcsik, ‘A New Statecraft? Supranational
Entrepreneurs and International Cooperation’, International Organization 53(2), 1999, 268) ,writes that they
influence international negotiations through the persuasive manipulation of ideas and information. However
the role of leadership in international negotiations is highly contested. There are two major schools of
thoughts that try to look at the role of leaders in an active/ passive manner. The first is represented by scholars
like Andrew Moravcsik, Peter B Evans and Robert Putnam, who emphasize the role of efficient leaders in
managing the state—society relationship, in other words underlining the role a two level game in international
diplomacy This kind of leadership is generally termed as two- level network manager (Peter, Evans, B. (ed.) ,
International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press. 1993). The other
set of scholars like Sandholtz, Zysman and Oran Young, focus more on different forms of behavorial
leadership, which manifests itself in structural, entrepreneurial and intellectual, forms to make the bargaining
strategies on cooperation more effective.(Wayne and John Zysman , ‘1992: Recasting the European Bargain’,
World Politics, 42(1), 1989, 95-101); Oran Young, ‘Political Leadership and Regime Formation: On the
Development of Institutions in International Society,’ International Organization 45 (3), 1991, 281-308).The
research suggests, the significance of leadership solutions by advocacy groups to shape and inform the
understanding of international negotiations has to be understood in context to the management of state-society
relationship. Two main observations were that both horizontal and vertical advocacy were used by advocacy
groups, where vertical leadership implies a two-level leadership theory with leaders being active at the
national level, there horizontal leadership implies the distribution of information at the transnational and
international level to gain broad consensus amongst various actors.
26
44
Arguments
for
a
Ban,
International
Campaign
to
Ban
Landmines,
at:
http://www.icbl.org/index.php/icbl/Problem/Landmines/Arguments-for-a-Ban
45
Walter Carlsnaes, ‘The agency-structure problem in foreign policy analysis,’ International Studies
Quarterly, 36 (3), 1992,
46
Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, Explaining and Understanding International Relations, (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1990), 8.
47
Alexander Wendt , Social Theory of International Politics, 11
27