Defining critically reflective work behaviour

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DEFINING CRITICALLY REFLECTIVE WORK BEHAVIOUR
Marianne van Woerkom
University of Tilburg, Department of Human Resources Studies
m.vanwoerkom@uvt.nl
Abstract
Critical reflection is an import concept for improving the effectiveness of workrelated learning. However, there is not much consistency in definitions of
critical reflection and the concept has not been developed operationally. This
article describes a literature search, in order to define critically reflective work
behaviour, a specific way of work-related learning. After an introduction on
problems related to learning from experience, the article starts with a
discussion of the concept of reflection as first defined by Dewey. Since the
concepts of reflection and critical reflection are often confused, the next section
describes the differences between them. Next, critical reflection is placed in the
context of the workplace and the organisation. The article discusses
respectively reflection as individual and social behaviour aimed at problemsolving, critical reflection on organisational values in a conflict model and a
harmonious model, and critical self-reflection. Finally, the article discusses a
way of making critically reflective work behaviour operational.
Key words: Critical reflection, work-related learning.
Introduction
Daily experiences are an important source of work-related learning. Many of these learning
processes will be implicit. We learn from our experiences without being aware of doing so,
for example, from observing and imitating others, or from repetition. However, there are
several problems related to implicit learning from experience. Much of this learning results in
tacit knowledge, which is personal, context-specific, and therefore hard to formalise and
communicate. Since tacit knowledge is beyond our perception, it is hard to change, even if
we realise that the knowledge is not useful or no longer correct (Bolhuis, 1995). When tacit
knowledge remains unexamined, it may lead to the reinforcement of misconceptions and
prejudices, thus to the learning of errors, or no learning at all (Marsick & Watkins, 1990).
Garrick (1998) also points out the danger of experiential learning leading to the reproduction
of existing practices. Further, experiential learning can only be powerful when we see the
consequences of our action, and then take a new and different action (Senge, 1990).
However, this necessary feedback on our actions is often lacking, because the consequences
of our actions will be observable only in the distant future, or in a distant part of the larger
system in which we operate. When our actions have consequences beyond our perception, it
becomes impossible to learn from direct experience. Further, although experience can be a
source of learning, it can also impede learning when it leads to routine and fear of the
unknown (Klarus & Van den Dool, 1988). Moreover, learning from experience is in a way
suboptimal, because it is not directed towards learning goals (Simons, 1999).
Boud, Keogh and Walker (1985) suggest that reflection is the key to learning from
experience, and that we should sharpen our consciousness of what reflection in learning can
involve, and how it can be influenced in order to improve our own practice of learning.
However, there is not much consistency in the definitions of the concept of reflection
(Brooks, 1999; Calderhead, 1989; Van Bolhuis-Poortvliet & Snoek, 1996). Some speak about
reflection, while others speak of critical reflection, or critical thinking. It is often not clear
what the difference is, or even if there is a difference between these terms. Since the concept
of critical reflection has been developed within the context of theory or practice, rather than
research, it has not been developed operationally, and no instrument exists to identify
individuals capable of critical reflection (Brooks, 1999). This article discusses respectively
the concept of reflection, the difference between reflection and critical reflection and critical
reflection in the context of the workplace in order to come to an operational definition of
critically reflective work behaviour.
Reflection - the key to learning from experience?
Many authors perceive Dewey (1933) as the founder of the concept of reflection. Dewey
warned educators that mere ‘doing’ or activity was not enough to produce learning. Doing
should become ‘trying’ - an experiment with the world, to find out what it is like (Raelin,
2000). Reflective thought is an “active, persistent, and careful consideration of any belief or
supposed form of knowledge in the light of the grounds that support it, and the further
conclusions to which it tends” (Dewey, 1933, p.9). It involves not simply a sequence of ideas,
but a con-sequence - a consecutive ordering, in such a way that each idea determines the next
as its proper outcome, while each outcome, in turn, leans back on, or refers to, its
predecessors (1933 p.4). Dewey (1933) distinguishes between five phases in reflective
thinking (adjusted according to Van Bolhuis-Poortvliet & Snoek, 1996):
1. Although it is a natural reaction to immediately go into action, instead, an idea occurs
about how to do this.
2. The person is confused by the situation, things do not turn out as expected; a problem
has come up.
3. The first suggestion about how to solve the problem comes to mind in this phase.
After this, the suggestion can be confronted with available information, in order to
formulate a more definitive hypothesis, which serves to make further observation;
4. One reasons on the basis of earlier experiences or theoretical knowledge.
5. The hypothesis is tested in overt or imaginative action.
6. The hypothesis should not always be confirmed. In that case adjustments are made,
after which the hypothesis is tested again.
Many authors have defined reflection or related concepts inspired by Dewey. King and
Kitchener’s (1994) theory on reflective judgement in a seven-stage model is inspired by
Dewey, and especially by the idea that uncertainty is a characteristic of the search for
knowledge. Marsick and Watkins (1990) define incidental learning in the workplace as part
of an eight-phase model for a problem-solving model, based on Dewey’s theories. Boyd and
Fayles (1983, in Brookfield, 1987) define reflection as the process of internally examining
and exploring an issue of concern, triggered by an experience, which creates and clarifies
meaning in terms of self, and which results in a changed conceptual perspective. Argyris and
Schön (1996) define inquiry as the intertwining of thought and action that proceeds from
doubt to the resolution of doubt. Doubt is construed as the experience of a problematic
situation, triggered by the mismatch between the expected results of action and the results
actually achieved.
Many operationalisations of reflection or of related concepts inspired by Dewey, of
which some examples have been given above, also consist of a phase model like Dewey’s
(Boud, Keogh & Walker, 1985; Kemmis & McTaggart, 1988; Korthagen, 1985; Marsick &
Watkins, 1990). Many objections can be made to these phase models (Korthagen, 1992).
First, although such cyclical models clarify the process of reflection and the subsequent steps,
they appear to describe more an ideal reflective process than reality. Steps such as
observation and reflection are interwoven throughout various phases of the model. Further,
there are hardly any examples that connect these phase models to empirical findings, and one
might question if this is possible. There is not only the problem of reflective processes being
less systematic in reality, but mainly the methodological problem of knowing what takes
place in someone’s head. Another problem is that operationalisations are not aimed at
measuring reflection directly, but at verbal expressions of it.
Second, most phase models also share a common rationalistic bias (Ellström, 1999).
Reflection is mainly approached as a rational cognitive process, where one step logically
results from a previous step, and where emotions do not play a role. Boud, Keogh and Walker
(1985) do give emotions a place, and see reflection as a generic term for intellectual and
affective activities, in which individuals engage in exploring their experiences to come to a
new understanding and appreciation.
Third, most models approach reflection mainly as an individual and mental, instead of
an interactive, dialogical action, while we know that feedback from others is generally
considered to be necessary for learning to occur (Annett, 1969; Ellström, 1999; Frese &
Altman, 1989, Marsick & Watkins, 1990).
A fourth problem related to the concept of reflection is that it takes place within the
frame of reference of an individual who is an internalisation of societal and cultural norms
and values. This makes reflection a socially and historically embedded process, which is
political, and thus shaped by ideology (Kemmis, 1985, in Garrick, 1998). Thus, just as
implicit learning does not mean that this learning is ‘good’ or ‘true’, the same applies to
reflection. Critical reflection explores the personal and social framework within which one
works, rather than just working within it (Garrick, 1998). The next section will go more
deeply into the differences between reflection and critical reflection.
Reflection or critical reflection?
As already stated, there is not much consistency in the definitions of the concept of reflection
(Brooks, 1999; Calderhead, 1989; Van Bolhuis-Poortvliet & Snoek, 1996). Even Dewey
(1933, 1938) sometimes uses the terms ‘reflective thinking’ and ‘critical thinking’
interchangeably (King & Kitchener, 1994). Some of the confusion about terminology seems
to be caused by the different approaches that are involved. There seems to be a philosophical,
a psychological, and a critical-pedagogical approach to the subject (Ten Dam & Volman,
2002). The philosophical approach seems to be represented by theories on reflection, inspired
by Dewey, which are just discussed - approaching reflection as a norm for good, rational
thinking. The psychological approach seems to be represented by theories conceptualising
critical thinking mostly as a higher-order thinking skill (see Ennis, 1962).
The critical-pedagogical approach refers mainly to the emancipatory goal of what is
called critical reflection or critical thinking. It emphasises the identification and correction of
political and social factors that limit the learner’s development. Theorists within this
approach have all been influenced by the critical theory of the Frankfurt School. One
important theorist within this stream is Mezirow (1990). He defines reflection in the Deweyan
sense as instrumental learning; the assessment of assumptions implicit in beliefs about how to
solve problems. In this definition, reflection thus also includes an element of critique, but
refers more to instrumental thinking, which is concerned with how to solve a problem. In
contrast, he defines critical reflection as addressing the question of the justification for the
very premises on which problems are posed or defined in the first place, and examination of
their sources and consequences. Critical reflection cannot become an integral element in the
immediate action process, but requires a hiatus in which to reassess one’s meaning
perspectives and, if necessary, to transform them. Meaning perspectives involve criteria for
making value judgements and for belief systems, and are mostly uncritically acquired in
childhood through the process of socialisation. Critical self-reflection refers to the most
important learning experience. It means reassessing the way we have posed problems, our
own meaning perspectives, and reassessing our own orientation to perceiving, knowing,
believing, feeling, and acting.
Brookfield (1987) also places critical thinking in an emancipatory perspective. He
emphasises the ability of individuals to make their own judgements, choices, and decisions
concerning their individual and collective future, instead of letting others do this, who
presume to know what is in their best interest. Brookfield (1987) defines the process of
critical thinking as the process by which we detect and analyse the assumptions that underlie
the actions, decisions, and judgements in our lives. Brookfield emphasises that critical
thinking involves more than logical reasoning or scrutinising arguments for assertions
unsupported by empirical evidence. It also involves a reflective dimension, and means we can
give justifications for our ideas and actions, and try to judge the rationality of these
justifications.
Critical reflection in the workplace
In the previous sections, we have seen various theories about reflection and critical reflection.
Most of the theories that are discussed are not aimed at the context of the work, but rather
that of education or adult education. There are not many theories about critical reflection in
the workplace. One explanation for this might be that the workplace is not the easiest context
for critical reflection. Critical reflection is often considered soft and irrelevant to the resultsoriented and bottom-line world of business, and one might also question how critical critical
reflection in the workplace can be, because the primary purpose of organisation is
productivity (Marsick, 1988).
In the previous sections, we have also seen that theories on reflection and critical
reflection vary in their approach. Some emphasise the instrumental function of reflection in
relation to problem-solving, whereas others emphasise the emancipation of the individual, in
order to make free choices. Some emphasise critical reflection as an individual and cognitive
activity, while others emphasise the social interaction. When studying the literature on
reflection in the workplace, we recognise these different approaches in a few dimensions. The
first dimension is reflection as an individual activity, aimed at solving the problems one
encounters in one’s job (Mezirow’s reflection in instrumental learning). The second
dimension is reflection as a social interaction, aimed at making tacit knowledge explicit or at
problem-solving, as in continuous improvement or quality circles. The third dimension is
critical reflection on the values of the organisation (Mezirow’s critical reflection in the
communicative domain). Sometimes, this is approached in a conflict model by one individual
challenging groupthink. Sometimes, it is approached in a more institutionalised conflict
model - that of trade unions and workplace democracy. And sometimes, this is approached in
a harmonious, but very Utopian model as in ‘Model II behaviour’ (Argyris & Schön, 1996).
The fourth dimension refers to critical self-reflection, aimed at the emancipation of the
individual in relation to the organisation. These dimensions cannot be seen as separate
dichotomies, they are interrelated, and all touch upon each other. Individual reflection may
lead to collective reflection; instrumental reflection may lead to critical reflection, and critical
reflection on organisational values may lead to critical reflection on the self. One dimension
thus cannot be seen as more important than another. The dimensions are discussed below.
Reflection as individual behaviour aimed at problem-solving
The relevance of this individual and instrumental approach to reflection hardly needs
explanation; reflection is important to examine one’s experience, in order to assess its
effectiveness and to improve performance. A very influential theory about reflection in the
workplace in the instrumental problem-solving domain is the theory of Schön (1983) about
reflection-in-action and reflection-on-action. Schön (1983) has researched how professionals
think, and describes how thinking by problem-solving and reflection in practice develops. He
distinguishes different moments when reflection takes place. Knowing in action refers to the
knowledge, which is mostly tacit, that reveals itself from our actions. After we have learned
something, most of the time people are able to carry out the required tasks without thinking,
knowing in action is sufficient. However, sometimes, something unexpected will happen. We
can react to these unexpected events by neglecting them (not learning) or reflecting on them.
This may happen afterwards, by thinking back on what we have done. We then experiment in
our mind by formulating new hypotheses. Reflection can also take place in action (thinking
what you are doing while you are doing it), when there are still opportunities to experiment
with alternative approaches. When someone reflects in action he becomes a researcher in the
practical context. He is not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique,
but constructs a new theory of the unique case. Reflection can make implicit knowledge
explicit and criticised, and make room for new insights (reframing).
Reflection as social interaction aimed at problem-solving
We have seen that reflection as individual behaviour is often less effective than reflection in a
social interaction. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) state that, although human cognition is a
deductive process of individuals, it is never isolated from social interaction. In the concept of
‘externalisation’, they place reflection in a process of social interaction between individuals
devoted to the development of new explicit knowledge out of tacit knowledge.
Externalisation takes place when people attempt to conceptualise an image, expressing its
essence in language. These expressions, however, are often inadequate, inconsistent, and
insufficient. A process of collective reflection and interaction between individuals, driven by
metaphors and analogies when an adequate expression for an image by analytical methods of
deduction and induction cannot be found, results in a creative process leading to the new
explicit knowledge.
Another well-known example of collective reflection aimed at problem-solving, by
focusing on procedures and methods, is continuous improvement or quality management. The
‘plan-do check-act circle’ that Deming (1986) introduced in order to reach continuous
improvement resembles the reflection cycles that were discussed previously. First, the
improvement is planned and the problems identified. Next, the idea for improvement is tested
in practice on a small scale. Subsequently, the results of the experiments are gathered and,
last, the successful action is standardised and implemented. According to Senge (1990), many
initial attempts to establish quality circles failed ultimately in the U.S., despite making some
initial progress. In the beginning, it leads to more open communication and collaborative
problem-solving. However, the more successful the quality circles become, the more
threatening they become to the traditional distribution of political power in the firm. Workers
are afraid they are being manipulated by management, and that they might be shooting
themselves in the foot (their job might be the next to go). Managers are often not prepared to
share control with workers whom they have distrusted in the past. Frequently, the response of
the leader to disappointing results adds fuel to the flame: the more aggressively he promotes
the quality circle, the more people feel threatened.
The above is a good example of the difference between reflection as problem-solving
and critical reflection as problem-setting. Although reflection is useful for answering ‘how
to’ questions - how to raise production, and how to reduce costs, it is not useful for the ‘why’
question - why are we participating in this quality circle in the first place? This brings us to
the next section: critical reflection on organisational values. It also relates strongly to critical
self-reflection aimed at the emancipation of the individual, which are discussed
subsequentely.
Critical reflection on organisational values
Critical reflection on organisational values concerns conventional notions about work that are
taken for granted, its relationship to progress and development, the usefulness of the goods
being produced, the treatment of employees, and the uses (and abuses) of the natural
environment and resources (Garrick, 1998). This dimension is related to critical selfreflection, because it underpins employees’ adaptations to it, and the tensions between
‘learning for work’ and ‘work for learning’ (Garrick, 1998). Although people often have a
romantic view of communities of practice as learning communities and the locus of creative
achievements, Wenger (1998) stresses that they can also reproduce counterproductive
patterns, injustices, prejudices, etc., and can be the locus of inbred failures, resistance to
oppression, and reproduction of its conditions. Communities of practice are also the place for
espoused theories, general norms about what works that everybody agrees on (Schön, 1983).
Espoused theories stand in contrast to theories-in-use, which refer to personal ideas based on
intuition that professionals have about effective work strategies in relation to specific
contexts and a readiness to change this strategy if the circumstances change.
Critical reflection on organisational values in a conflict model
Reflecting on espoused theory demands deeper and more critical reflection on values. Many
people will keep theories-in-use private, because they contradict revered espoused theories.
Even if espoused theories do not work, people will be afraid to criticise them, for fear of
appearing incompetent, or being expelled from their professional group (Schön, 1983). Since
most people avoid the problems and uncertainty of conflicts that innovative learning
processes entail (Swieringa & Wierdsma, 1990), learning processes tend to be conservative,
and confirm existing frames of reference (Weggeman, 1997). Thus, just as the process of
critical reflection can be made possible through the assistance of facilitators, mentors,
colleagues, family, or friends, because their feedback opens the learner up to other points of
view (Marsick & Watkins, 1990), it also involves the ability to withstand social pressure.
People who dare to criticise espoused theories are perceived as saying ‘the emperor is
wearing no clothes’ or as ‘troublemakers’, as the participants in a company for
telecommunication expressed it (Brooks, 1999). Although this was not regarded as bad, it
was also often brushed aside, leaving the critically reflective worker alone. Brookfield (1987)
refers to this as challenging groupthink - a critical attitude towards the ideas that a group of
people consider sacrosanct.
Rebellion often reveals a greater commitment than passive conformity (Wenger, 1998).
The success rate of rebellion is limited by the organisational structure. Some organisations
might foster rebellion, by giving opportunities for employee participation, in order to make
the rebellion more collective and powerful, and also more institutionalised and harmonious
(see the next subsection). Marsick (1988) pleads for a redefinition of productivity and a reexamination of conditions within the organisation, in order to create more opportunities for
employee participation in the postindustrial era. Individuals are most productive when they
can participate fully in negotiating meaningful contributions to shared organisational goals
and norms. Brookfield (1987) also places critical thinking in the light of workplace
democracy by stating that, in past years, the creation of labour unions was one of the greatest
educational endeavours in which the American and British working class was involved, and
the most important forum for critical thinking for blue-collar workers. Through critical
participation, employees can hold those people in the organisation who take decisions
responsible for their actions (Brookfield, 1987).
Critical reflection on organisational values in a harmonious model
A well-known theory about critical reflection on organisational values in a more harmonious
model, aimed at organisational learning, is that of Argyris and Schön (1996). The difference
between collective reflection, as in quality management, and their theory of organisational
learning becomes clear from their critique of Total Quality Management focusing on
technical solutions. As individuals working in a Total Quality Management search out the
‘root causes’ of defects in a product or process, they may identify two different kinds of
problems. Inefficiencies in production represent one kind of problem; the other is illustrated
by a group of employees who stand passively by and watch inefficiencies develop and
persist. According to Argyris and Schön, Total Quality Management may produce the simple
learning necessary to effect a solution to the first problem, but is unlikely to prevent a
recurrence of the second.
Argyris and Schön distinguish between the concepts of single and double-loop learning,
which are used to characterise both individual learning and learning from organisations.
Single-loop learning refers to instrumental learning that changes strategies of action or the
assumptions underlying strategies in ways that leave the values of a theory of action
unchanged. Double-loop learning is closely related to critical reflection. By double-loop
learning they refer to learning that results in a change in the values of theories-in-use, as well
as in its strategies and actions. It enables workers to identify, question, and change the
assumptions underlying workplace organisation and patterns of interaction. Workers publicly
challenge workplace assumptions and learn to change underlying values. By confronting the
basic assumptions behind prevailing organisational norms, values, myths, hierarchies, and
expectations, workers help prevent stagnation and dysfunctional habits.
What is especially interesting for us about Argyris and Schön’s theory is that - in
contrast to other authors - they give a very plausible answer to the question of why doubleloop learning is so difficult, and how this is related to individual behaviour. According to
Argyris and Schön, double-loop learning is often prevented, because when people feel
threatened, they reason and behave in accordance with a theory of action called Model I
theories-in-use, enhancing conditions for error. Important features of issues become
undiscussable and their ‘undiscussability’ itself becomes undiscussable. People who operate
by Model I assumptions always seem to strive to satisfy four basic values that govern their
behaviour. They define in their own terms the purpose of the situation, instead of developing
a mutual definition of purposes with others. They want to maximise winning and minimise
losing; once they have decided their goals, changing them would be a sign of weakness. They
avoid eliciting negative feelings, because this would show ineptness, incompetence, or a lack
of diplomacy. And, finally, they always try to appear rational; their interactions should be
construed as objective discussions of the issues, whatever feelings may underlie them.
The alternative is Model II behaviour. Here we can see the difference between the
conflict model we saw in the theories of Brooks (1999) and Brookfield (1987) and the more
harmonious model of Argyris and Schön. The ‘governing’ variables of Model II are to
produce valid information, to make free and informed choices, to develop internal
commitment to those choices and constant monitoring of their implementation, and the
bilateral protection of others. Model II is not contradictory to Model I, and does not reject
advocating one’s own goals. It does, however, reject unilateral control. Model II couples
articulateness and advocacy with an invitation to others to confront the views and emotions of
self and other.
The pity is, however, that this harmonious model does not exist in practice, as appears
from the statement that “we are unlikely to find the new learning system by looking at the
world as it presently exists” (Argyris & Schön, 1996, p. 111). Organisations contain
organisational learning with inhibition of double-loop learning embedded in Model I
behaviour. They are highly unlikely to learn to alter its governing variables, norms, and
assumptions, because this would require organisational inquiry into double-loop issues,
which are militated by the learning system.
Critical self-reflection
Where Argyris and Schön’s (1996) theory is clearly devoted to promoting the organisational
goal of organisational learning, in critical self-reflection the interests of the individual are
central. Critical self-reflection in the context of the workplace means asking fundamental
questions about one’s own identity as a member of the community of practice and the need
for self-change (Marsick, 1988), aimed at self-realisation and development. This does not
mean that the organisation does not benefit from critical self-reflection. Both organisations
and the individuals working in them benefit from employees who reflect on themselves and
ask themselves if they really want to follow the changes in their job, or if they would not
prefer to look for another job.
Since learning transforms who we are and what we can do, it is an experience of
identity. It is not just an accumulation of skills, but a process of becoming – to become a
certain person or, conversely, to avoid becoming a certain person (Wenger, 1998). Apart
from a process of transforming knowledge, it thus also entails a context in which to define an
identity of participation. Wenger (1998) stresses that communities of practice are not
intrinsically benevolent for the individual: they are the cradle of the self, but also the potential
cage of the soul. Critical self-reflection refers to learning to participate critically in the
communities and social practices of which a person is a member, and creating an identity in
relation to this specific social practice (Ten Dam & Volman, 2002). The instrumental
approach to learning by reflection cannot be separated from critical self-reflection, because
job-related knowledge and skills cannot be separated from the rest of the worker’s life
(Marsick, 1988). Through critical self-reflection, people can better see the way in which taskrelated learning is often embedded in norms that also impact on their personal identity.
Making critically reflective work behaviour operational
This article has discussed various aspects of reflection and critical reflection. Let us now turn
back to the aim of this article: an operational definition of critical reflection in terms of
concrete individual behaviour with a high reality value for the process of work in
organisations. Since the concept of critical reflection has been developed within the context
of theory or practice, rather than research, it has not been developed operationally, and no
instrument exists to identify individuals capable of critical reflection (Brooks, 1999). Further,
definitions often seem to characterise a process, instead of visible behaviour, and many
definitions are focused rather on learning or thinking than on working in an organisation. In
order to overcome these problems case studies of seven organisations in both services and
industries that were earlier carried out to describe work-related learning (see Van Woerkom,
2003) were again analysed to look for identifiable, concrete, and practical examples of the
different dimensions of reflection identified in the previous section. In these organisations,
senior managers, line managers and shop-floor workers were interviewed. The analysis
resulted in seven dimensions of critically reflective work behaviour. These dimensions were
later also validated in a self-report instrument tested on 742 respondents working in various
sectors (Van Woerkom, 2003). Below the seven dimensions will be explained with examples
from theory and practice.
Reflection
The reflection dimension is a combination of an instrumental function in problem-solving and
a function in critical self-reflection with regard to one’s own identity in relation to the job.
Reflective workers attempt to understand how suggested solutions fit in with their own image
of themselves, and see the way task-related learning is often embedded in norms that also
impact on their personal identity (Marsick, 1988). In the case studies, the importance of
reflection was demonstrated by statements from respondents like “reflecting on the whys and
wherefores”; “Why are things organised like this?” “Can the work be done more efficiently?”
“Why do I work like this?” “Employees should be able to step back occasionally from their
daily routine and devote more attention to self and time management”. The more critical
dimension of reflection referred to reflecting on the work contributing to self-development.
Sometimes, managers referred to this because they were stuck with dissatisfied employees,
who did not want to look for another job because of their fear of the unknown, or attractive
employment conditions in their current job.
Critical opinion-sharing
Critical opinion-sharing is one of the observable activities caused by reflection. One
expresses the result of reflection by expressing one’s opinion, asking critical questions, or
suggesting improvements. The opinion may concern a view or an idea of a valued outcome,
which represents a higher-order goal and a motivating force at work (West, 1990). Making
your opinion public is one of the two central aspects of Model II behaviour (Argyris &
Schön, 1996). The respondents in the case studies stressed the importance of contributing
ideas and discussing them with others. “Good critical workers are not just being negative, but
make suggestions about a different way of working.”
Asking for feedback
The essence of the Model II behaviour of Argyris and Schön (1996) is the balance between
advocating and inviting others for feedback and opinion-sharing. Feedback is generally
considered to be necessary for learning to occur (Ellström, 1999; Annett, 1969; Frese &
Altman, 1989). The functions of feedback are assumed to be cognitive as well as
motivational. The importance of this dimension is demonstrated by statements from
respondents referring to a social dimension of critically reflective work behaviour. On the one
hand, social interaction is an important source of information for reflection. On the other,
‘being critical on your own’ is often perceived as not being constructive or effective.
Employees operate in a social context, and will have to get support for their ideas to make
things happen.
Challenging groupthink
Critically reflective work behaviour cannot always be based on harmony with the social
environment. Since communities of practice can reproduce false assumptions and
counterproductive practices, people are sometimes needed to criticise espoused theories, thus
risking a conflict. Brooks (1999) referred to this as ‘saying the emperor is wearing no
clothes’, or as being a ‘troublemaker’. Brookfield (1987) referred to this as ‘challenging
groupthink’ - that is, ideas that a group has accepted as sacrosanct. Although not many
respondents in the case studies mentioned ‘challenging groupthink’ based on the notions of
Brooks and Brookfield, it was decided to distinguish between ‘opinion-sharing’ and
‘challenging groupthink’ as two different categories of critically reflective work behaviour.
Learning from mistakes
Reflection leads to consciousness of undesirable matters (for example, work routines,
communication deficiencies, mistakes, problems, lack of motivation). Instead of denying
these undesirable matters, learning from mistakes means to interprete them as something
positive, namely as a source of improvement or learning. Negative feedback in the form of
errors, although potentially frustrating, is particularly useful for facilitating learning (Frese &
Altman, 1989, in Ellström, 1999). Errors may help to correct false assumptions, to break
down premature or inadequate ‘routinisation’, and stimulate exploration and new discoveries
(Ellström, 1999). Learning from mistakes involves not covering them up or reacting
defensively when confronted with an error (Argyris & Schön, 1996). Learning from mistakes
is thus both an individual activity and a social activity when it refers to hiding mistakes from
others, thus limiting possibilities for oneself and others to learn from them. Here it touches
upon the dimension of ‘asking for feedback’. Many respondents from the case studies
stressed the importance of ‘not being afraid to make mistakes or show one’s vulnerability’.
When managers were asked for their definition of ‘the learning organisation’, they often
mentioned the importance of learning from mistakes.
Experimentation
According to Dewey (1933), mere doing is not enough to produce learning: doing should
become trying, an experiment with the world to find out what it is like. Schön distinguishes
between reflection-on-action and reflection-in-action. Reflection-in-action is a kind of
experimentation. When someone reflects in action he becomes a researcher in the practical
context. He is not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique, but
constructs a new theory of the unique case. Experimentation is often mentioned as a last step
in a reflection cycle (for example Dewey (1933), Korthagen (1985), Van Bolhuis-Poortvliet
and Snoek (1997) or in the Deming circle. Although the term ‘experimentation’ was not
mentioned by respondents (it has a connotation of experimentation without any obligations),
what they did mention was the importance of putting ideas into practice. “Good teams don’t
need a suggestions box; they immediately turn ideas into improvements.”
Career awareness
Career awareness can be seen as a logical consequence of the more critical aspect of
‘reflection’, aimed at self-development. As a result of this, people become aware of their
motives and the extent to which work satisfies their motives. Career awareness refers to the
intention to match self-development with career development, and, if necessary, to orient
towards opportunities outside one’s current job or employer. It turned out from the case study
material that career awareness was stressed by many respondents. It is not only in the
interests of the employee, but also in those of the employer, if, for example, jobs change or
disappear, and employees are dissatisfied with their changed job but cannot be dismissed,
because they are protected by law. However, it turned out that many employees refuse to
focus on other opportunities outside their current job, even if they are unhappy in it.
Conclusion
This article describes a process of literature search and a second analysis of the case studies,
in order to come to an operational definition of critically reflective work behaviour. First, we
have seen that implicit learning from experience, resulting in tacit knowledge has several
disadvantages. Reflection when things do not go as we expected and experimentation with
alternatives seemed to be an escape from these problems. We have seen some disadvantages
of approaching reflection in the tradition of Dewey in a cyclical model. It is obvious that,
besides some individual reflection activities like experimentation, our definition of critically
reflective work behaviour must also include social interaction. The distinction between
reflection as being instrumental in problem-solving and critical reflection, emphasising the
assessment of underlying values (problem-solving versus problem-posing) made clear that we
need both dimensions in our definition. A literature review led to five dimensions of
reflection and critical reflection in the workplace, giving us some directions for
operationalisation. In our second analysis of the case studies, we recognise these dimensions
in seven aspects of critically reflective work behaviour. We can now define critically
reflective work behaviour as a set of connected activities carried out individually or in
interaction with others, aimed at optimising individual or collective practices, or critically
analysing and trying to change organisational or individual values.
Table 1 Eight dimensions of critically reflective work behaviour, ordered by level of
reflection and individual or social activity.
Reflection
Individual activity
- - Learning from mistakes
- - Experimentation
- - Reflection
Critical reflection
Critical
self-reflection
Social activity
- - Learning from mistakes.
- - Critical opinion-sharing
- - Asking for feedback
- - Challenging groupthink
- - Reflection
- - Career awareness
In Table 1 we see the seven dimensions of critically reflective work behaviour ordered by
level of reflection and by individual or social activity. Reflection, career awareness, and
experimentation are individual activities. Critical opinion-sharing, asking for feedback and
challenging groupthink are activities carried out in interaction with others. Learning from
mistakes is both an individual activity and a social activity when it refers to hiding mistakes
from others, and thereby limiting possibilities for oneself and others to learn from them. The
learning from mistakes and experimentation dimensions are dimensions that refer to
reflection as instrumental in relation to problem-solving. Critical opinion-sharing and asking
for feedback refer to critical reflection on the organisational values departing from a
harmonious model. Challenging groupthink refers to critical reflection on the organisational
values departing from a conflict model. The reflection dimension is a combination of an
instrumental function in problem-solving and a function in critical self-reflection with regard
to one’s own identity in relation to the job. The career awareness dimension refers to critical
self-reflection on the position of the individual in his current job.
In conclusion, this operational definition of critically reflective work behaviour might
help organisations and the individuals working there to learn more effectively from their
daily experiences. It also might help researchers in studying work-related learning and critical
reflection in the context of work.
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