Linguistic levels in cognitive linguistics
Abstract
What light does a cognitive perspective cast on one of the fundamental questions of
linguistic theory, the number of ‘levels’ or ‘strata’ into which linguistic patterns are
divided? Using purely cognitive evidence, such as the findings of psycholinguistics,
the paper argues that the relation between meaning and phonological form is mediated
by two levels: syntax and morphology. This conclusion conflicts not only with the
claim that all linguistic units are symbolic units which relate a meaning directly to a
phonological form, but also with the claim that they are constructions which provide a
single level that mediates between meaning and phonology. At least one other
cognitive theory, Word Grammar, does recognise both syntax and morphology as
distinct levels. The paper also discusses the relations among the levels, supporting the
traditional view that typically each level is related directly only to the levels adjacent
to it; but it also argues that in some cases a level may be related directly to a nonadjacent level. However, such exceptions can be accommodated by a four-level
architecture if the underlying logic is default inheritance.
1.
Syntax and morphology in cognitive linguistics
One of the issues that divides grammatical theories concerns the fundamental question
of how the patterning of language can be divided into ‘levels’ or ‘strata’, such as
phonology, grammar and semantics. The basic idea of recognising distinct levels is
uncontroversial: to take an extreme case, everyone accepts that a phonological
analysis is different from a semantic analysis. Each level is ‘autonomous’ in the sense
that it has its own units – consonants, vowels, syllables and so on for phonology, and
people, events and so on for semantics – and its own organisation; but of course they
are also closely related so that variation on one level can be related in detail to
variation on the other by ‘correspondence’ or ‘realization’ rules.
The question for the present paper is what other levels should be recognised.
Are sounds directly related to meanings, or is the relation mediated by words and
other units on an autonomous level of syntax? Similarly, we can ask whether words
are directly related to sounds, or whether that relation too is mediated by morphemes.
And if morphemes do exist, is there an autonomous level of morphology? The
question here is whether the morphological structure of a word is merely ‘syntax
inside the word’, or do syntactic and morphological structures represent different
levels of analysis? This was a hot topic for linguists in the 1960s, triggered by
Hockett’s article on Item-and-Arrangement or Item-and-Process analysis and
Robins’s reply recommending Word-and-Paradigm analysis as a superior alternative
to both (Hockett 1958, Robins 1959), and among morphologists it is still a matter of
debate; but it has been more or less ignored in cognitive linguistics. This is a pity,
because the ‘cognitivist’ assumptions of cognitive linguistics actually provide a new
source of evidence, and point reasonably clearly towards one answer. The aim of this
paper is to present the evidence, but also to argue that the conclusion requires some
serious rethinking in some cognitive theories of language.
What is at stake is the basic overall architecture of language. Does language
relate meanings directly to phonological (or perhaps even phonetic) ‘forms’, or is this
relation mediated by intervening levels? Leaving the debate about phonology and
phonetics on one side, we can recognise at least two levels: meaning and phonological
form (with written forms as an alternative to phonological/phonetic which, again, we
can ignore for present purposes). How many intermediate levels of structure do we
need to recognise?
Two answers dominate cognitive linguistics: none (Cognitive Grammar), and
one (the various theories other than Cognitive Grammar called ‘construction
grammar’, without capital letters, by Croft and Cruse 2004:225). Cognitive Grammar
recognises only phonology, semantics and the ‘symbolic’ links between them
(Langacker 2007:427), while construction grammar recognises only ‘constructions’,
which constitute a single continuum which includes all the units of syntax, the lexicon
and morphology (Evans and Green 2006:753, Croft and Cruse 2004:255). In contrast,
many theoretical linguists distinguish two intervening levels: morphology and syntax
(Aronoff 1994, Sadock 1991, Stump 2001); and even within cognitive linguistics this
view is represented by both Neurocognitive Linguistics (Lamb 1998) and Word
Grammar (Hudson 1984, Hudson 1990, Hudson 2007, Hudson 2010).
To make the debate more concrete, consider a very simple example:
(1)
Cows moo.
The question is how the word cows should be analysed, and Figure 1 offers three
alternatives.
cow, >1
cow, >1
cow, >1
COW, plural
/kaʊz/
COW, plural
{cow}
{z}
{{cow}{z}}
/kaʊ/
/z/
/kaʊz/
(A)
(B)
(C)
Figure 1: From two to four levels of analysis
In each case, the form is represented by the phonological structure /kaʊz/ and
the meaning by ‘cow, <1’, which is obviously not a complete analysis in itself but
at least distinguishes the meaning clearly from any other kind of analysis. The
first analysis labelled (A) is at least in the spirit of Cognitive Grammar, with a direct
link between the meaning and the form. Analysis (B) is again in the spirit of both
Fillmore/Kay ‘Construction Grammar’ (with capitals) and Lakoff/Goldberg
‘construction grammar’ (Croft and Cruse 2004:257); in both these main constructional
theories, constructions mediate between the meaning and form, with syntactic and
morphological constructions sharing a single level where phrases consist of words and
words consist of morphemes. In the case of cows, the whole word combines the
lexical properties of COW with the grammatical category ‘plural’, so for simplicity it
bears the label ‘COW, plural’; but it also contains the morphemes {cow} and {z}. (I
use the term ‘morpheme’ in very concrete sense where it is quite different from a
‘morphosyntactic feature’; a morpheme is primarily an audible unit which can be
mapped to some part of phonology.) Analysis (C) is in the spirit of those theories that
distinguish morphology as an autonomous level from the level of syntax (for words);
so crucially the morphological unit labelled ‘{{cow}{z}}’ exists on a different level
of analysis from the word labelled ‘COW, plural’. In Figure 1, therefore, vertical lines
indicate a relation between relatively abstract and relatively concrete (i.e. ‘meaning’
or ‘realization’), whereas diagonal lines indicate a part:whole relation.
These diagrams claim to be ‘in the spirit’ of the theories mentioned, but the
notation is different from their official notations and could be accused of
misrepresentation. The reason for preferring lines, rather than the more familiar
boxes, is partly to make the theories easier to compare, but partly to reconcile
linguistic structures with the cognitivist assumption that linguistic knowledge is just
like other kinds of conceptual knowledge. We know that other kinds of conceptual
knowledge form a network; there is a great deal of experimental and other evidence
that this is so. For example, we know that activation spills over randomly, through
‘spreading activation’, to network neighbours to produce the well-known priming
effects and other kinds of association (Reisberg 2007:252). If general knowledge
takes the form of a network, and if language structures are just examples of general
knowledge, then it ought to be possible to convert any linguistic structure, such as a
‘box’ structure, into a network. All the structures in Figure 1 are obviously very
simple parts of a network in which each box is a node and each line is a network link.
The most important effect of replacing boxes by lines is to move away from
the very simple part-whole relations that have dominated linguistics, including
cognitive linguistics. Instead of seeing a unit such as a construction as a larger whole
with smaller elements as its parts, we can analyse it as a node in a network with links
to other elements which may or may not be smaller. This is important because there is
a great deal of uncertainty in the literature about what a construction contains; so in a
standard textbook (Croft and Cruse 2004) we find constructions defined variously as
‘a syntactic configuration’ (p.247), ‘structures that combine syntactic, semantic and
even phonological information’ (ibid.) and ‘pairings of syntactic form (and
phonological form ...) and meaning’ (p. 255). Given the box notation, it is important
to decide exactly what is inside the box for a construction and what is outside; but
network notation allows a construction to be a syntactic pattern with links to other
levels, without raising the question of whether these other links are inside the
construction or outside it. Tidying up definitions is rarely a productive activity, so
these questions are best avoided.
It is important to remember that the labels in Figure 1 do not refer to complex
units. Each label belongs to an atomic node without any internal structure at all, which
could be indicated by a mere dot. The label is merely a matter of convenience for the
analyst, and simply hints at further links which a fuller analysis would show; once
those links are in place, the label could be removed without any loss of information
(Lamb 1966, Lamb 1998:59). For example, the label ‘/kaʊz/’ identifies a syllable
consisting of two consonants and (arguably) a diphthong; and ‘cow, >1’
identifies a concept which has links to other concepts called ‘cow’ and ‘>1’.
Consequently, diagram (A) in Figure 1 could be replaced by the expanded network
in Figure 2, in which the labels have been replaced by a dot and the links to other
nodes. Clearly the same process could be applied to each of these other nodes, to give
a hypothetical ‘complete’ map of conceptual structure, without labels but tethered in
places to non-conceptual elements of cognition such as percepts and motor programs.
>1
cow
•
•
/k/
/aʊ/
/z/
Figure 2: Concepts are defined by links to each other
The question, of course, is which of these three analyses is right? When a
typical speaker of English hears or says the word cows, do they build a concept for
‘the plural of COW’, as opposed to the concepts ‘cow, >1’ for its meaning and
‘/kaʊz/’ for its pronunciation? And, if they do, do they also build one for its
morphological structure ‘{{cow}{z}}’? Note that all the possible answers are
equally ‘cognitive’, in the sense that they are compatible with the basic
assumptions of cognitive linguistics. None of them requires anything one might
call a ‘module’ of syntax or of morphology which is informationally encapsulated
(Fodor 1983) – indeed, a network analysis more or less rules out modularity
because activation flows freely through the network. Nor do any of them require
special cognitive apparatus which is only found in language. After all, ordinary
cognition must be able to analyse objects at different ‘levels’ in much the same
sense of ‘level’ as we find in linguistics; for instance, we can analyse an artifact
such as a chair in terms of its function (for sitting on), in terms of its relations to
other chairs (how it stacks or is fixed to other chairs), in terms of its structure
(legs, seat, back and so on) and in terms of its composition (wood, metal, etc).
These ways of viewing a chair are directly comparable to the levels of semantics,
syntax, morphology and phonology in syntax, so any mind capable of thinking in
levels about a chair can do the same for words. In short, the question of how
many levels to recognise in linguistics is not a matter of ideology or basic
assumptions, but of fact. What we need is relevant evidence to guide us in
choosing among the alternative theories.
2.
Are words mentally real?
The first question is whether our minds contain units of grammar (including both
syntax and morphology) as well as units of meaning and pronunciation or writing: in
short, do they contain words, phrases and morphemes? The relevant evidence comes
from psycholinguistic priming experiments, which offer a tried and tested way to
explore mental network structures (Reisberg 2007:257). In a priming experiment, a
person (the experimental ‘subject’) sees or hears input from a computer and has to
make decisions of some kind about the input, such as whether or not it is a word of
English. The dependent variable is the time (measured in milliseconds) taken by the
subject to register these decisions; for example, as soon as the word doctor appears,
the subject presses one of two buttons. The independent variable is the immediately
preceding word, which may or may not be related to the current word; for instance,
doctor might follow nurse (related) or lorry (unrelated). What such experiments show
is that a related word ‘primes’ the current word by making its retrieval easier, and
therefore faster. It is experiments like these that give perhaps the clearest evidence for
the view that knowledge is stored as a gigantic network, because it is only in a
network that we could describe the concepts ‘doctor’ and ‘nurse’ as neighbours.
Crucially, however, priming experiments distinguish the effects of different
kinds of priming. Semantic priming such as doctor – nurse is evidence for relations
among meanings (Bolte and Coenen 2002, Hutchison 2003), and phonological
priming such as verse – nurse proves that we have phonological representations (Frost
and others 2003). Neither of these conclusions is controversial, of course, but we also
find priming evidence for syntactic objects such as words and the abstract patterns in
which they occur (Bock and others 2007, Branigan 2007). For instance, in one series
of experiments where subjects repeated a sentence before describing an unrelated
picture, grammatically passive verbs primed otherwise unrelated passive verbs and
actives primed actives; so in describing a picture of a church being struck by
lightning, subjects were more likely to say Lightning is striking the church after
repeating the active sentence One of the fans punched the referee than after its passive
equivalent The referee was punched by one of the fans, and vice versa. Similar effects
appeared with the choice between ‘bare datives’ like The man is reading the boy a
story and ‘to-datives’ like The man is reading a story to the boy. These results are
hard to interpret without assuming the mental reality not only of abstract patterns like
‘active’ and ‘bare dative’, but of the words and word categories in terms of which
these patterns are defined.
The evidence from priming looks like firm proof, if we need it, that both
words and their syntactic patterning are mentally real. This conclusion, if true, is
clearly at odds with the basic claim of Cognitive Grammar that language consists of
nothing but phonology, semantics and the links between them:
..., every linguistic unit has both a semantic and phonological pole... Semantic
units are those that only have a semantic pole ... phonological units ... have
only a phonological pole. A symbolic unit has both a semantic and a
phonological pole, consisting in the symbolic linkage between the two. These
three types of unit are the minimum needed for language to fulfill its symbolic
function. A central claim ... is that only these are necessary. Cognitive
Grammar maintains that a language is fully describable in terms of semantic
structures, phonological structures, and symbolic links between them.
(Langacker 2007:427)
In this view, every linguistic category (other than purely semantic and purely
phonological categories) is a ‘symbolic’ unit that can be defined either by its meaning
or by its phonology. However, even for Langacker the claim is actually heavily
qualified so that it applies only to the most general categories such as noun and verb.
At the other end of the scale [from basic grammatical classes] are idiosyncratic
classes reflecting a single language-specific phenomenon (e.g. the class of
verbs instantiating a particular minor pattern of past-tense formation).
Semantically the members of such a class may be totally arbitrary. (Langacker
2007:439)
Presumably such a class is a symbolic unit (albeit a schematic one), but how can a
symbolic unit have no semantic pole, given that a unit without a semantic pole is by
definition a phonological unit (ibid: 427)?
It seems, therefore, that the experimental evidence from structural priming
threatens one of the basic tenets of Cognitive Grammar. There remain two ways to
rescue the theory: either by demonstrating that categories such as ‘passive’ and ‘bare
dative’ are actually semantic, or by accepting that they are idiosyncratic. Whether or
not either of these escape routes is feasible remains to be seen.
Another way to link these questions to experimentation is to predict the
outcome of experiments that have not yet been carried out. So far as I know, this is
the case with the following experiment: subjects are presented with pairs of
contextualized words that belong to the same abstract lexeme, but which are different
in both meaning and form. For example, they see two sentences containing forms of
the verb KEEP, such as (2) and (3).
(2)
He kept talking.
(3)
Fred keeps pigeons.
If words are truly symbolic units which unite a single meaning with a single form,
then sentence (2) should have no more priming effect on (3) than any other sentence
containing a verb with a roughly similar meaning (such as holds) or roughly similar
pronunciation (such as cups). But if words exist in their own right, with the possibility
of linking ‘upwards’ to multiple meanings and ‘downwards’ to multiple
pronunciations, kept in (2) should prime keeps in (3).
Cognitivist assumptions also allow a more theoretical evaluation of this tenet
of Cognitive Grammar. Given what we know about concept formation in general, how
would we expect people to cope mentally with the patterns they find in language? In
general cognition, we can mentally record a direct linkage between any two nodes
A and B, which we can call [A – B]. But suppose we also need to record that [A –
B] coincides with a link to a third node C, meaning that when A and B are linked
to each other – and only then – they are also linked to C. This three-way linkage
cannot be shown simply by adding extra direct links such as [A – C] because this
would ignore the fact that A is not linked to C unless it is also linked to B. The
only solution is to create a ‘bridge concept’ D, which links to all the three other
nodes at the same time; in this structure, D is linked to A, B and C, thus
expressing the idea that A and B are only linked to C when they are also linked to
each other. This general principle applies to any concept, such as ‘bird’, which
brings together properties such as having wings, having a beak and laying eggs.
In a network, the only way to bring these three properties together is to create a
new entity node, the node for ‘bird’, which has all three properties. More
generally, the only way to link three nodes to each other as shared properties is
to create a fourth node that links directly to all three.
Turning now to language, take the link between the meaning ‘cow’ and the
pronunciation /kaʊ/. Clearly a direct link, as predicted by Cognitive Grammar, is
one possibility, so we can easily imagine the concept ‘cow’ having a number of
properties, one of which is that its name is /kaʊ/, and conversely for the sound
/kaʊ/, whose meaning is ‘cow’. But this linkage is not isolated. It coincides with
being able to follow the, with allowing plural s, and with a host of other
properties. According to Cognitive Grammar, these properties can be expressed
semantically in terms of a general category such as ‘thing’. But that cannot be
right, because again it misses the complex linkage. An example of ‘cow’ can’t
generally follow the or take plural s; the properties of ‘cow’ include mooing and
producing milk, but not grammatical properties. These are reserved for cases
where ‘cow’ is paired with /kaʊ/ - and in those cases, ‘cow’ does not imply
mooing or milk. In short, the only way to distinguish the ‘cow’ that mooes from
the one that follows the is to distinguish the two concepts by creating a new one,
the word cow. This immediately solves all the problems by linking the
grammatical properties to general word-like properties. It is the animal ‘cow’
that mooes and produces milk, but it is the word cow that follows the and takes
plural s, as well as meaning ‘cow’ and being pronounced /kaʊ/.
The trouble with reducing a word to a single link between two poles is
that it prevents us from recognising it as an entity in its own right, with its own
generalizations and other properties. Mental words can be classified (as nouns,
verbs and so on); they allow generalization (using general concepts such as
‘word’); they can be assigned to a language (such as English or French); they can
have an etymology or a source language (e.g. karaoke comes from Japanese);
they can have lexical relations to other words (e.g. height is related to high); and
so on. The theoretical conclusion is that a grammatical analysis requires the
word cow, but this is not a symbolic unit, in Langacker’s sense.
This conclusion also undermines the claim that grammatical word classes
can be replaced by semantically defined symbolic units:
Some classes are characterized on the basis of intrinsic semantic and/or
phonological content. In this event, a schematic unit is extracted to
represent the shared content, and class membership is indicated by
categorizing units reflecting the judgment that individual members
instantiate the schema. (Langacker 1990:19)
Langacker’s examples include the claim that the unit which links the meaning
‘pencil’ to the form pencil instantiates the schema whose meaning pole is ‘thing’
and which corresponds to the notion ‘noun’. But if ‘noun’ is nothing but a pairing
of a form and a meaning, how can it have grammatical properties such as being
part of a larger schema for ‘noun phrase’?
Langacker’s notation hides this problem by using boxes for symbolic
units, as in Figure 3 (Figure 7a in Langacker 1990:18, with minor changes to
notation). Each box contains a symbolic unit, which allows the unit to be treated
as a single object; so the relation between ‘thing’ and X is shown as having a
part:whole relation to a larger whole, and having pencil/pencil as an example.
But if a unit is really just a combination of two poles and a relation, what is it that
has these properties? For instance, what is it that combines with other nouns to
form compounds such as pencil sharpener? Certainly not the concept ‘thing’ or
‘pencil’ – a pencil is a piece of wood, not something that combines with nouns;
nor is it the phonology, because that is not the defining characteristic of a noun;
nor is it the relation between the meaning and the form, because a relation
cannot combine with anything. The obvious answer is that each box is itself a
bridge concept, as explained above. But in that case, each box stands for a word,
and we have a level of grammar.
thing
X
process
Y
er
-er
pencil
pencil
sharpen
sharpen
er
er
Figure 3: Cognitive Grammar notation for pencil sharpener
Whatever cognitive evidence we consider, we seem to arrive at the same
conclusion: words, and their grammar, are cognitively real. We really do have words
in our minds. This conclusion is comforting because it reinforces what most
grammarians have claimed through the ages without paying any attention to cognition
– and, indeed, it supports the common-sense view, supported by language itself, that
we have words which we can recognise, learn to write and talk about. This commonsense view explains why we can classify words according to their language (English,
French and so on) and according to their social characteristics (posh, technical,
naughty, ordinary), why we can talk about their etymology, and even why some of us
can spend our working lives studying them.
3.
Are morphemes mentally real?
If words are mentally real, what about morphemes? Are they mentally real too?
Outside cognitive linguistics, opinion is strongly divided among morphological
theorists, many of whom argue that morphological rules relate words and word
properties directly to phonological patterns, without any intermediate level of
analysis. The most influential supporter of this view is probably Anderson, who called
it ‘A-morphous morphology’ (Anderson 1992), though many other morphologists
(e.g. Stump 2006) also allow words to be directly realized by phonology, even if they
also countenance the existence of morphemes. On the other side we find equally
influential morphologists such as Aronoff (Aronoff 1994) who assert that morphemes
are essential linguistic units mediating between syntax and phonology. Once again,
cognitive linguists have not yet contributed to this debate as they might have done,
given the amount of relevant evidence which is now available from cognitive
psychology.
Priming experiments show that morphological priming can be separated from
semantic, lexical and phonological priming (Frost and others 2000). Morphologicallyrelated words prime one another, and this is found even when the words are
semantically unrelated as in pairs such as hardly/hard and even corner/corn (but not
scandal/scan, where –al is not a morpheme). This effect only appears where the
priming word is ‘masked’ – presented so fast that the subject is not aware of it
(Marslen-Wilson 2006, Fiorentino and Fund-Reznicek 2009) – but it is robust and
provides very strong evidence for the reality of morphemes.
The difference between morphological priming and both semantic and
phonological priming is even clearer in Semitic languages such as Arabic and Hebrew
where the word stem consists (typically) of just three consonants, to which
morphology adds various vowels and extra consonants interspersed among the
consonants. For instance, in Arabic, the root {dxl} is associated with the meaning
‘enter’, and is found not only in transparent forms such as / idxaalun/ (‘inserting’)
and /duxuulun/ (‘entering’), but also in the semantically opaque word /mudaaxalatun/
(‘interference’); but any of these words primes the others, regardless of whether or not
they are transparent and also regardless of whether the prime is masked or overt
(Marslen-Wilson 2006).
A very different kind of evidence for the mental reality of morphemes comes
from sociolinguistics. In this case the data come not from experiments but from taperecorded spontaneous conversations by English speakers in the USA. The crucial
parts of the recordings were words which potentially end in a consonant followed by
/t/ or /d/, such as act or walked, in which many speakers can omit the /t/ or /d/. This
‘t/d deletion’ was studied by Guy in a series of projects in which he found a consistent
difference between the figures for omission of t/d according to whether or not it
realized the suffix {ed}, with omission much more likely in monomorphemic words
such as act than in words containing {ed} such as walked (Guy 1980, Guy 1991a,
Guy 1991b, Guy 1994, Guy and Boyd 1990). Guy’s explanation for this difference
assumes that the omission rule has more opportunities for applying to act than to
walked because it can apply both before and after affixes are added; an alternative
explanation is that words like act may have no final /t/ even in their stored form
(Hudson 1997). But either way, the status of /t/ as a morpheme or not is crucial. Even
more interestingly, Guy also found that semi-regular forms such as kept varied with
the speaker’s age: younger people treated them like monomorphemic words such as
act while older speakers treated them like bimorphemeemic words such as walked.
The only plausible interpretation is that speakers reanalysed their stored forms by
recognising the morpheme {ed} in examples like kept. If this interpretation is correct,
it provides strong evidence against a-morphous morphology and in favour of a level
where morphemes are distinguished from phonological structures.
A further kind of evidence from spontaneous speech comes from speech
errors, where examples such as (4) and (5) have been reported (Stemberger 1998:434,
Harley 1995:352)
(4)
I can’t keep their name straights. (for: their names straight)
(5)
I randomed some samply. (for: sampled some randomly)
In (4), we must assume that the speaker planned to attach {s} to {name} but
accidentally attached it instead to {straight}. This cannot be a simple phonological
transfer because speech errors rarely, if ever, involve the transfer of a mere phoneme
from one word to another; nor can they be due to syntactic or semantic confusion,
because there is no syntactic or semantic feature that might be realized by {s} after
attaching mistakenly to an adjective such as straight. In (5), in contrast, the error can
only be explained by assuming that the speaker intended to include the morphemes
{sample} and {random} but used them in the wrong words, whose only similarity (in
contrast with the other available words) is that they both contained a clear suffix.
Once again, the only reasonable interpretation presupposes the mental reality of
morphemes.
Another kind of argument for morphemes is based on the well-known
psychological process of ‘chunking’. We understand experience by recognising
‘chunks’ and storing these in memory as distinct concepts (Reisberg 2007:173). This
effectively rules out reductionist analyses which reduce the units of analysis too far;
for instance, a reductionist analysis of the sequence ‘19452012’ recognises nothing
but the individual digits, ignoring the significant dates embedded in it (1945, 2012).
Psychological memory experiments have shown that human subjects are looking for
significant ‘higher’ units in their experience, and it is these units, rather than the
objective string, that they recognise in memory experiments. A chunk based on a
collection of ‘lower’ units is not evidence against the cognitive reality of these units,
but coexists with them in a hierarchy of increasingly abstract levels of representation;
so the individual digits of ‘1945’ are still part of the analysis, but the sequence is not
‘merely’ a sequence of digits.
Applying the principle of chunking to language, consider now the so-called
‘phonological pole’ of a symbolic unit in Cognitive Grammar, or, for that matter, the
phonological form which may define a construction. Just as dates ‘chunk’ digits into
groups, so do symbolic units; so if the symbolic unit happens to be a word such as
patients, then it will be chunked into /peiʃnt/ plus /s/. But the first of these chunks is
not a unit of phonology – it is a syllable and a part of a syllable. This example
illustrates the mismatches between morphemes and units of phonology which show
that the two must be different. Such examples are numerous and much discussed in
the literature on morphology; for example, in the word feeling the /l/ that belongs
symbolically to /fi:l/ must nevertheless belong phonologically to /lɪŋ/ because the /l/ is
pronounced as a clear [l], a pronunciation which is only found at the start of a syllable
(in contrast with the dark [ɫ] at the end of /fi:l/ as pronounced without a following
vowel). The general point is that the chunks which constitute the ‘phonological pole’
of a symbolic unit such as feel in feeling are not, in fact, phonological. Rather, they
are the meaning-linked sections of phonological structure that are otherwise known as
morphemes; so the cognitive theory of chunking supports morphemes as independent
units.
Yet another kind of evidence which supports the mental reality of morphemes
comes from ‘folk etymology’, where learners try to force a new form into an existing
pattern, regardless of evidence to the contrary. For instance, our word bridegroom
developed out of Old English bryd-guma, ‘bride man’ when the word guma ‘man’
(cognate with Latin homo) fell out of use, leaving the guma form isolated (Partridge
1966:293). The form groom had the wrong meaning as well as the wrong phonology,
but it had the great virtue of familiarity – i.e. it already existed in everybody’s mind as
an independent concept – and was somewhat similar in both meaning and form so it
was pressed into service (‘recycled’) for lack of a better alternative. The fact that folk
etymology has affected so much of our vocabulary, and continues to do so (Bauer
2006), is clear evidence of our enthusiasm for recycling existing forms so that every
word consists of familiar forms, regardless of whether this analysis helps to explain
their meaning. Indeed, one could argue that recycling of existing concepts is a basic
drive in all cognition, including semantics as well as morphology (Hudson and
Holmes 2000).
The idea of recycling combines with chunking to provide a further argument
for morphemes which is based on homonymy. When we first meet a homonym of a
word that we already know, we don’t treat it as a completely unfamiliar word because
we do know its form, even though we don’t know its meaning. For instance, if we
already know the adjective PATIENT, its form is already stored as a single chunk; so
when we hear The doctor examined a patient, we recognise this form, but find that the
expected grammar and meaning don’t fit the context. As a result, when creating a new
word-concept for the noun PATIENT we are not starting from scratch. All we have to
do is to link the existing form to a new word. But that means that the existing form
must be conceptually distinct from the words concerned – in other words, the
morpheme {patient} is different from the words that we might label PATIENTadj and
PATIENTnoun. Wherever homonymy occurs, the same argument must apply: the
normal processes of learning force us to start by recognising a familiar form, which
we must then map onto a new word, thereby reinforcing a structural distinction
between the two levels of morphology (for forms) and syntax (for words), both of
which are different from phonology and semantics. The proposed analysis for the
homonymy of patient is sketched in Figure 4.
‘sick person’
‘good at waiting’
PATIENTadj
PATIENTnoun
/ei/
/ʃ/
syntax
morphology
{patient}
/p/
semantics
/n/
/t/
phonology
Figure 4: Homonymy and the levels of language
The evidence reviewed here points unequivocally to a single conclusion:
morphemes are distinct from both words and phonological structures, so our stock of
linguistic units must include morphemes as well as words, meanings and sounds. In
short, we can reject ‘a-morphous morphology’. But it is still possible that we only
need three levels of analysis; this would be the case if morphemes and words were the
same kinds of object and inhabited the same level. This is the last question, to which
we now turn.
4.
Are morphemes parts or realizations?
What is at stake in this section is a claim which Croft describes as ‘one of the
fundamental hypotheses of construction grammar’ (Croft 2007:471), that
constructions comprise a single continuum which includes all the units of syntax, the
lexicon and morphology. The question is whether morphology and syntax share ‘a
uniform representation of all grammatical knowledge’ because ‘construction grammar
would analyze morphologically complex words as constructions whose parts are
morphologically bound’. Like other cognitive linguists I fully accept the idea of a
continuum of generality from very general ‘grammar’ to a very specific ‘lexicon’; but
the claim that syntax and morphology are part of the same continuum is a different
matter.
As an indication of the complexities and depth of the issues involved here,
consider the claims of Construction Morphology, the most fully developed application
of construction grammar in this area (Booij 2010). On page 11, we find the following:
... morphology is not a module of grammar on a par with the phonological or
the syntactic module that deal with one aspect of linguistic structure only.
Morphology is word grammar and similar to sentence grammar in its dealing
with the relationships between three kinds of information [viz. phonology,
syntax and semantics]. It is only with respect to the domain of linguistic
entities that morphology is different from sentence grammar since morphology
has the word domain as its focus.
This clear rejection of a level (‘module’) of morphology fits comfortably in the
American structuralist tradition rooted in Hockett’s ‘Item and Arrangement’ analysis
mentioned earlier, and continued more recently in the generative theory of Distributed
Morphology (Halle and Marantz 1993). In this ‘morpheme-based syntax’,
morphological structure is simply syntactic structure within the word, so for example
the relation of the morphemes {cow} and {s} to the word ‘COW, plural’ is an
example of the same part:whole relation as the word’s relation to the phrase Cows
moo.
On the other hand, on page 15 Booij criticizes Goldberg 2006 for including
morphemes in a list of linguistic objects that are constructions (and praises her for
excluding them in a later publication):
... the category ‘morpheme’ should not appear on this list because morphemes
are not linguistic signs, i.e. independent pairings of form and meaning. The
minimal linguistic sign is the word, ...
This word-based view is much more compatible with the other main tradition in
morphology dating from Robins’s ‘Word and Paradigm’ analysis, the analysis of
traditional grammar and of many modern theoretical linguists (Aronoff 1994, Sadock
1991, Stump 2001, Anderson 1992); and even within cognitive linguistics it is
represented by both Neurocognitive Linguistics (Lamb 1998) and Word Grammar
(Hudson 2007). But if the minimal sign (or construction) is the word, and morphemes
are not constructions, it is hard to see how morphology can be ‘similar to sentence
grammar’.
Clearly there is some uncertainty in construction grammar about the status of
morphemes and morphological structure. On the one hand, constructions are claimed
to include ‘all grammatical knowledge’, so morphemes must be constructions; but on
the other hand, morphemes are claimed not to be constructions at all because they
have no intrinsic meaning. The question is important, especially as it involves a
fundamental hypothesis of construction grammar, so it deserves a great deal more
attention than it has received so far in the literature.
To make the issue more concrete, we return to our example Cows moo. In
morpheme-based syntax, the morphemes {cow} and {z} are units of syntax, so they
are combined by the same phrase-structure principles as the words ‘COW, plural’ and
‘MOO, present’. The same unity of treatment is implied by treating the morphemes as
constructions; so the morphemes {cow} and {z} constitute the parts of the
construction ‘COW, plural’, which in turn is a part of the entire sentence. In contrast,
word-based syntax treats the morphemes differently from the words. The words are
combined by syntax, and at least in phrase-structure analyses they are parts of larger
wholes. The morphemes, however, are not parts of the word ‘COW, plural’, but its
realization; in other words, they exist on a different level of abstraction, the level of
morphology. In morpheme-based syntax, therefore, there is a single level which
recognises both morphemes and words as its units (along with phrases), and combines
them all in the same kind of part:whole pattern; but in word-based syntax, there is a
level of syntax whose basic units are words, and there may be a different level of
morphology whose units are morphemes. In morpheme-based syntax, both words and
morphemes have a meaning and a phonological realization; but in word-based syntax,
words have a meaning but are realized by either morphology or phonology, and where
morphemes are recognised they have no meaning but do have a phonological
realization.
Section 3 argued that morphemes are cognitively real, so the question now is
whether they are related to words as parts, or as realizations. This issue has, of course,
been discussed extensively in the more general theoretical literature, but it is worth
considering whether cognitive linguistics has any special contribution to make to the
discussion. The experimental methods of cognitive psychology probably cannot throw
any light on the precise nature of the relationship between words and morphemes
beyond showing that they are distinct (as explained in section 3). However, cognitive
evidence is still relevant if, as cognitive linguists maintain, we use just the same
cognitive machinery for language as for other kinds of thinking.
The first relevant point is that general cognition recognises both of the
relations that we are considering as possibilities: part and realization. The part:whole
relation is ubiquitous in partonomies such as finger:hand:arm:body (where a finger is
part of a hand, which is part of an arm, which is part of a body). As for the linguist’s
realization relation, this is a special case of the relation between different construals
which exist on different levels of abstraction, such as the relation between an abstract
book and the paper on which it is printed, or between a chair seen as a seat or as a
collection of pieces of wood. The term ‘realization’ evokes the chain of abstractions
which become more ‘real’ as they become less abstract, resulting from the wellknown process of ‘representational redescription’ (Karmiloff-Smith 1992) by which
children’s minds progressively ‘redescribe’ experiences in increasingly abstract, and
potentially explicit, terms. In the case of a book or a chair, the concrete analysis of the
object is paired with a more abstract analysis in terms of its function, so the paper or
wood ‘realizes’ the book or chair. In language, an unit’s realization links it (directly or
indirectly) to the concrete reality of speech sounds (and marks).
Since both ‘part’ and ‘realization’ are availabe in our general cognitive
apparatus we could use either of them to relate the word to its morphemes. The choice
presumably depends on which of these two general relations fits the language patterns
most closely, so we can be guided by the facts of usage both as linguists and also as
language learners and users. How, then, can we distinguish parts from realizations?
The main differences involve abstractness and size. Parts exist on the same level of
abstraction as their whole, and are always smaller (Croft and Cruse 2004:151),
whereas realizations exist on a different level of abstraction, which means that sizes
are incomparable. In other words, the concepts must be different in some way, and
this difference may involve either size, or abstractness, but not both. For instance, a
book, seen at the most abstract level, has parts (chapters, sections and so on) which
exist at the same level; but it is realized by the paper on which it is printed, which
exists on a less abstract level and is measured by completely different criteria from the
abstract book. The abstract book and the concrete book are distinct concepts, with
quite different properties, and although each has a length, it is meaningless to ask
which is longer.
The size criterion will be important in the following argument, so it is worth
exploring a little further. Could a part be the same size as its whole? For instance,
consider the case of a one-piece swimsuit, whose name suggests it is a swim-suit with
just one part (called a ‘piece’). If this is so, then presumably the part is just the same
size as the whole; but in that case, how is the part different from the whole? Surely the
one ‘piece’ that constitutes the swimsuit is the swimsuit? The only reason for calling
it a one-piece swimsuit is to contrast it with a bikini, where each of the two parts is
clearly smaller than the whole. Without this contrast, there would be no more reason
for talking about a ‘one-piece swimsuit’ than about a one-piece towel, shirt or car.
The point of this example is to suggest that even when language suggests the
opposite, we do not in fact recognise a single part of a whole that has no other parts.
In short, nothing can have fewer than two parts.
Turning now to language, what is the relation between words and morphemes?
The crucial case to consider is not a bi-morphemic word such as cows, but a
monomorpheme such as cow or patient. Taking the the latter example, we have
already established that the morpheme {patient} is different not only from its
phonological realization, but also from both the noun PATIENTnoun and the adjective
PATIENTadj, so what is the relation between either of these words and the morpheme?
If it is the part:whole relation, there should be a difference of size; but the whole is
exactly the same size as its part. In syntactic terms, this is a commonplace example of
‘unary branching’, so one might assume that a monomorpheme is a word that has just
one morpheme as its part.
The trouble with this argument is that unary branching, even in syntax, is in
fact deeply problematic because it does not sit at all comfortably with the preceding
account of general cognition. It is such a fundamental part of mainstream linguistic
theory that it may be hard to imagine any alternative; but it has been called into
question not only by mainstream linguists (e.g. Chomsky 1995:246) but also by those
who work in the tradition of dependency grammar, which rejects phrase structure and
its related ideas including unary branching (e.g. Bröker 2001, Dikovsky and Modina
2000, Eades 2010, Eroms 2000, Gerdes and Kahane 2001, Hajicová 2000, Heringer
1996, Hudson 1984, Joshi and Rambow 2003, Kahane 2004, Kunze 1975, Mel'cuk
1988, Osborne 2006, Rambow and Joshi 1994, Sgall and others 1986, Tesnière 1959,
Venneman 1977). Given these two conflicting traditions in syntax, we cannot take the
notion of unary branching for granted; and indeed we have every reason to be
suspicious of it if it conflicts with our definition of ‘part’. How can a syntactic unit
have just one part which is on the same level of abstraction?
Unary branching is always presented as an innocent extension of the
part:whole relations on which phrase-structure analysis are based; but this is only
possible because of the primitive notation used in such analyses, which in turn was
based on the equally primitive mathematical notion of a ‘rewrite rule’. For example,
Figure 5 shows a fairly standard pair of trees for a rather conservative analysis of
surface structure in the spirit of Chomsky 1957. In this notation, trees log the
application of rewrite rules, and rewrite rules could be used to show very different
relationships. In this tree, the same notation is used to show that {cow} is part of
‘COW, plural’, that the latter is an example of ‘N’, and that /kaʊ/ realizes {cow} –
three very different relations sharing the same notation. The single lines of
classification and realization clearly act as a model for single parts, against the
evidence of logic and ordinary usage. The diagram for Stop!, where all the parts are
single, makes the point even more dramatically.
S
S
NP
VP
VP
N
V
V
COW, plural
MOO, present
STOP, imperative
{cow}
{z}
{moo}
{stop}
/kaʊ/
/z/
/mu:/
/stɒp/
Figure 5: Tree notation obscures relations
xxx
One way round this problem would be to let the relation depend on the
geometry of branching, so that unary branching indicates ‘realization’ and binary (or
higher) branching indicates ‘part’. In that case, V would be a part of VP when it has a
complement (as in eat grass) but the realization of VP when it has no complement.
But that would mean that V exists on the same level of abstraction as VP in the
former case, but on a different one in the latter – an absurd conclusion, so the
argument must contain a fault. The most plausible fault lies in the assumption that
unary branching is merely an innocent extension of phrase-structure grammar,
because this assumption conflicts with the general cognitive principle (discussed
above) that nothing can have only one part.
Suppose, then, that we rule out unary branching altogether. In that case we can
be sure that the morpheme {cow} is not a part of the word ‘COW, singular’, but its
realization. But if that is so, the same must be true for all other morphemes in relation
to their words; so the combination {cow} + {z}, which we might represent as
{{cow}{z}}, is the realization of the word ‘COW, plural’, and not its part or parts.
And in that case, morphology cannot be merely syntax within the word. In short, the
cognitive evidence supports the word-based theory of syntax in which morphemes are
the realizations of words rather than their parts. And in relation to construction
grammar, that means that morphemes are neither constructions nor parts of
constructions; so contrary to Croft’s claim, constructions do not provide a single
unified structure for all grammatical units.
On the other hand, it would be reasonable to object to this conclusion on the
grounds that unary branching is in fact allowed in constituency-based approaches to
syntax, including construction grammar, so the morpheme {cow} can be the only part
of the word ‘COW, singular’ in just the same way that the word ‘STOP, imperative’
can be the only part of its verb-phrase or clause. This is truly syntax within the word,
or morpheme-based syntax. The weakness of this defence, of course, is that the
cognitive objections to unary branching still apply; but the issue is now a much bigger
one: how satisfactory is constituency-based syntax when viewed from a cognitive
perspective? Can syntax involve unary branching when we don’t find this in ordinary
cognition? This is an important debate which should engage cognitive linguists, but
this article cannot pursue it any further.
5.
Do levels leak?
The cognitive evidence reviewed so far seems to have established that language is
organised on four levels:
 semantic, with ordinary concepts such as people and events as units
 syntax, with words and phrases as units
 morphology, with morphemes (and, presumably, morpheme-clusters) as units
 phonology, with phonemes and syllables as units.
(We might increase the list by distinguishing phonetics from phonology and by
expanding the media of language to include written language and signed language,
but these expansions are irrelevant to our present concerns.) This view of language
structure contrasts with the two levels of Cognitive Grammar and the three levels of
construction grammar.
In order to complete the picture of how language is organised, we need to
explore the relations among these levels, bearing in mind their cognitive basis in
human experience – in other words, taking a ‘usage-based’ approach. The main point
of cognitive linguistics is that the architecture is not imposed by our genetic make-up,
which somehow forces us to analyse language events on these four levels. Instead, it
claims that, given our general cognitive apparatus, we will eventually discover the
levels for ourselves in the usage to which we are exposed. This will not happen in one
fell swoop, but gradually. Our first analyses of language presumably associate barelyanalysed sounds directly with meanings or social situations, without any mediating
structures, and it is only gradually, as we analyse and sort out our experience, that we
recognise the need for further levels of structure. But we presumably only introduce
extra levels of organisation where they are helpful, which means that some ‘leakage’
remains, where levels are mixed. There is good evidence, both cognitive and
linguistic, that this is in fact the case.
The words of syntax, and their properties, are typically realized by morphemes
and morpheme clusters, as when ‘COW, plural’ is realized by {{cow}{z}}, but this is
not the only possibility. Word properties may also be realized directly by
phonological patterns within morphemes. This seems to be the case with syntactic
gender in French, where some phonological patterns are strong predictors of a noun’s
gender. For example, the phonological pattern /ezɔ̃/ written aison, as in maison
‘house’ and raison ‘reason’, is a good clue to feminine gender. Thanks to a classic
research project (Tucker and others 1977), we can be sure that both native speakers
and foreign learners are aware of this clue, albeit unconsciously. This linkage cannot
reasonably be reinterpreted as an example of morphological realization, with {aison}
as a morpheme, because the residue {m} or {r} is not a plausible morpheme and is
tightly bound to {aison}. Rather, the noun seems to be realized by a single morpheme,
with feminine gender realized by part of this morpheme’s phonology. This indicates a
direct linkage from phonology to syntax.
Similarly, part of a word’s phonology may be more or less strongly linked to
some aspect of its meaning. Such cases are called ‘phonesthemes’, and have been
shown to be cognitively real (Bergen 2004). For example, English words that start
with /gl/ are often related semantically to the idea of light and vision – glow, glimmer,
glitter, glare, glance, glimpse, glamour. Once again, a morphological division into
{gl} plus a residue is most implausible, and could only be justified by a theoretical
desire to avoid direct linkage from phonology to semantics.
As Booij observes, phonesthemes are not alone in relating phonology directly
to meaning, as the same can be said of the whole area of prosodic phonology,
including intonation (Booij 2010:11). For example, it is hard to see how a rising
intonation pattern spread across a number of words could be reduced to a single
morpheme within one of them.
Similar arguments suggest that a word’s realization may be partly
morphological, partly phonological. The most famous example is the word cranberry,
which gave its name to the ‘cranberry morpheme’ of American structuralism (Spencer
1991:40). The salient feature of this word is that it clearly contains the morpheme
{berry}, which is also found in other nouns such as blackberry and strawberry, but
the residue is not a plausible morpheme because it is not found in any other word.
Once again, the only reason for recognising the residue as a morpheme would be the
theoretical ‘purity’ of an analysis in which only morphemes can realize words. So far
as I know there is no relevant cognitive evidence, but if a relevant experiment could
be designed to test the cognitive reality of {cran}, one would predict a negative
outcome. In the absence of positive evidence, the only reasonable conclusion is that
the word CRANBERRY is realized by the phonological pattern /kran/ followed by the
morpheme {berry}.
The evidence suggests, therefore, that we can ‘skip’ levels by relating
phonological patterns directly to syntax or even semantics. In such cases, syntactic
units are realized by a mixture of two levels, phonology and morphology. More
generally, the examples surveyed illustrate a wide variety of patterns suggesting that
levels can ‘leak’ in any way imaginable, given the right functional pressures. Another
imaginable leakage is for morphemes to link directly to meanings, without going
through words; this is as predicted for all morphemes in morpheme-based syntax,
which I have rejected, but can we rule it out altogether? General cognitive theory
suggests that this should be possible, on the grounds that ‘any two nodes that fire
together, wire together’. As soon as we recognise a morpheme, its linkage to
meanings becomes relevant and may persist in memory even if it is also recorded as a
linkage between the meaning and the word containing the morpheme. For instance, if
the morpheme {man} (as in POLICEMAN, CHAIRMAN, etc) is always associated
with maleness, this association may be expected to appear in cognitive structure as a
direct link between {man} and ‘male’, even when we know that the person concerned
is female. Equally, it is obvious that we use some such link in interpreting neologisms
containing {man} such as BREADMAN; we hardly need experimental evidence for
this, but such evidence is available for our ability to interpret blends such as SMOG
(built out of {smoke} and {fog} - Lehrer 2003).
The picture that emerges from this discussion is rather different from the
familiar neat level diagrams in which each level is related directly only to the levels
on either side of it. The levels can still be ordered hierarchically in terms of increasing
abstractness: phonology – morphology – syntax – semantics; and the neat diagrams
are still accurate descriptions of the typical arrangement. But we have seen that the
levels are in fact a great deal more interconnected than these diagrams allow. Instead
of a list of levels, we have a network, as shown in Figure 6. This is very much more
plausible as a model of a system which has evolved, both in the individual and in the
community, by abstracting patterns from millions of examples of interaction in usage.
meaning
syntax
morphology
phonology
Figure 6: Unconstrained links between levels
6.
Which theory?
If language really is organised into levels along the lines suggested in Figure 6, then
we should expect any theory of language structure not only to allow this kind of
organisation, but even to explain it. This concern with architecture is, of course, only
one part of any general theory of language, and cognitive theories of language include
a great many important insights which are not affected by their success or otherwise
in handling the architectural issues – ideas such as entrenchment, embodiment and
construal.
It is hard to evaluate other people’s theoretical packages in relation to an issue
which does not interest them, so I will not try to determine whether the well-known
cognitive theories such as Cognitive Grammar or the various versions of construction
grammar (Croft and Cruse 2004) are compatible with this view of language
architecture. The dangers became clear in section 2, where I argued against
Langacker’s claim that all units of language are symbolic units with a semantic and a
phonological pole, only to note later that he actually recognises symbolic units
without a semantic pole.
Similarly, I mentioned the claim which Croft describes as ‘one of the
fundamental hypotheses of construction grammar: there is a uniform representation of
all grammatical knowledge in the speakers’s mind in the form of generalized
constructions’ (Croft 2007:471). According to Croft, the ‘syntax-lexicon continuum’
includes syntax, idioms, morphology, syntactic categories and words. This
generalisation applies to Cognitive Grammar as well as construction grammar: ‘the
only difference between morphology and syntax resides in whether the composite
phonological structure ... is smaller or larger than a word.’ (Langacker 1990:293).
This claim appears to exclude the possibility of a division between syntax and
morphology, and yet I also noted that Booij’s Construction Morphology believes that
this view can be reconciled with the view that morphemes are not ‘linguistic signs, i.e.
independent pairings of form and meaning’. While the defenders of a theory show this
degree of uncertainty and openness it is neither fair nor useful for outsiders to
speculate about what the theory ‘really’ allows.
Unlike other cognitive theories, Word Grammar explicitly rejects the idea that
all language units are inherently and essentially symbolic, with direct links to both
meaning and form. This theory takes a much more traditional position on the levels of
language, with two levels (morphology and syntax) mediating between phonology
and semantics. In this theory, there are no constructions (if constructions are defined
as a pairing of a meaning with a phonological form) because typical words have a
meaning but no phonology, and morphemes have a phonological form but no
meaning. Moreover, the general theory of category-construction which is part of
Word Grammar predicts that both words and morphemes will emerge in the learner’s
mind because of the way in which categories are induced from experience (Hudson
2007:72-81).
However, published discussions of Word Grammar have also presented too
simple a picture of the relations between levels. So far Word Grammar has only
recognised links between adjacent levels, but section 5 showed that links may skip
levels. Fortunately, the default inheritance logic which is central to Word Grammar
allows the theory to accommodate these exceptions, and even to predict them, as I
now explain.
Word Grammar analyses language as a gigantic network, so I must first
explain how it distinguishes and relates levels. Each level is characterised by a
particular kind of unit: words and word-combinations in syntax, morphemes and
morpheme-combinations in morphology, and phonemes and phoneme-combinations
in phonology. This means that each level is built round a prototypical item (the
prototypical word, morpheme or phoneme) whose properties are inherited by all
examples – but only by default, so exceptions are possible. Among these properties
are the item’s relations to items on other levels, so the typical word has a meaning (on
the level of semantics) and is realized by the typical morpheme, which in turn is
realized by the typical phoneme (or, more probably, by the typical syllable). The
differences between levels are thus built into the definitions of the units concerned, as
also are the relations between levels.
This set of default linkages defines the typical inter-level links, but the logic of
default inheritance allows exceptions, and indeed, since exceptions are so prevalent in
language, it would be surprising if there were none in such an abstract area of the
mind. For example, even if typical morphemes have no meaning, nothing prevents
some morphemes from having meanings which may even differ from those of the
words they realize (as in the case of chairman). Similarly, even if words are typically
realized by morphemes, some may share the phonological realization of the
morphemes that realize them (as well as extra phonemes such as the cran of
cranberry).
7.
Conclusions
The very least that we can conclude from this discussion is that the assumptions of
cognitive linguistics are relevant to some of the major issues that theoretical linguists
confront concerning the overall architecture of language. If language really is an
ordinary part of general cognition, as cognitive linguists maintain, then we can expect
cognitive science to throw light on these big questions; or, putting it less
dogmatically, if we want to test the hypothesis that language is ordinary cognition,
then we must try hard to build architectural models that are compatible with the
findings of cognitive science. This project is very much in line with the goals of
cognitive linguistics, but the debate has hardly begun.
The main purpose of this article has been to present a cognitive case for a
rather conservative four-level analysis of language in which both morphology and
syntax mediate between phonology (or graphology) and meaning. It is comforting that
the cognitive evidence leads to much the same conclusion as more traditionally
‘linguistic’ arguments based on notions such as generality and simplicity. However, if
this conclusion is correct it seriously undermines the widespread assumption that the
principles of cognitive linguistics somehow lead inevitably to a view of language
architecture which is essentially symbolic, with phonological form directly linked to
meaning in every unit of analysis. In short, this article questions the central role that
most cognitive theories assign to the notion ‘symbolic unit’ or ‘construction’.
To be clear about what is at stake, there is no suggestion here that ‘rules’ form
a different level, less still a different module, from ‘the lexicon’. The lexicogrammatical continuum is not threatened by any of the evidence presented here, so
long as it is simply a matter of generality (with general ‘rules’ or schemas at one end
and specific items at the other). Nor do I doubt that our lexico-grammatical continuum
includes a vast amount of tiny detail based on observed usage, nor that different items
of knowledge have different degrees of entrenchment. And above all, I accept that
language is a declarative conceptual network, without modules or other extrinsically
imposed boundaries.
The discussion here defines some of the parameters for any theory of language
structure rather than the claims of any one theory. On the other hand, I have also
suggested that Word Grammar already fits most of these parameters, although it needs
some further work in the area of level-skipping.
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