1. INTRODUCTION
In its broadest definition, covert action would mean any action carried out covertly in
a manner that the identities of parties responsible for that action are undisclosed. In everyday
life, ordinary men and groups can undertake this definition of covert action for a variety of
reasons. But in the jargon of the US intelligence community, covert action is usually
understood as action undertaken covertly by the US government in foreign states or territories
for the purpose of accomplishing US foreign policy objectives without disclosing American
involvement.1 During the Cold War era, the US decision-makers made extensive use of
covert action to bring about regime change in Third World countries. Some of the more
famous cases of the US covert action during the Cold War era include: Operation AJAX in
Iran to topple Mossadeq regime (1952), Operation PBSUCESS in Guatemala (1953) to
unseat Arbenz regime (1953), and Operation FUBELT in Chile to overthrow Allende regime
(1973), etc.
The terms ‘covert action’ and ‘covert operation’ are used interchangeably in the US
intelligence lexicon, but covert action is differentiated from clandestine action. According to
the definition adopted by the US Defense Department, “a covert operation differs from a
clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather
than on concealment of the operation (US DOD 2001, 91).” At the time of American covert
actions in Iran, Guatemala, and Chile, the US was able to deny her involvements in those
actions, although actions to replace existing regimes were not carried out clandestinely. That
is, actions themselves were not clandestine, but American involvement was kept in the dark
for long. During the Cold War era, the US was able to deny its involvement in most of covert
operations that she carried out in other countries. This paper discusses the development of the
1
For definition of covert action, refer to Schumitt and Shulsky (2002) and Richelson (1999).
1
US covert action and its place in American intelligence activities and the impact that 911
terror incident had on transformation of US intelligence community and policies.
2. COVERT ACTION IN THE US INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
2.1 The US Intelligence Community and Intelligence Activity
Often times ordinary laymen tend to think the CIA is the only intelligence of the US
that single-handedly takes charge of entire gamut of US intelligence activities, but the CIA is
only one of 16 intelligence agencies that make up the US Intelligence Community. To
understand the nature and motivations of US covert action, it is important to assess
development of US Intelligence Community, the role of covert action in US intelligence
activity, and the CIA that is in charge of running US covert action.
According to Grady (2005) intelligence activities are, in the most general sense,
organized into four functional areas: Intelligence Collection, Analysis, Counterintelligence,
and Covert Action. In terms of the methods used for intelligence activities, intelligence
activities can also be divided into Technical Intelligence (TECHINT) and Human Intelligence
(HUMINT) activities. TECHINT relies on technologies such as super computers and
satellites, whereas human spies carry out HUMINT. The role of human spies is critical to
carry out effective HUMINT. Among the many intelligence agencies of the US, it is the CIA
that is in charge of running American covert action.
The CIA and US intelligence community
In order to understand the place of covert action in US foreign policy in general and
US intelligence activity in specific, it is important to trace the evolution of the CIA since the
CIA has been in charge of running US covert action programs. It is also important to place
2
the CIA in the big picture of US intelligence community to understand the roles that the CIA
plays for US intelligence activity.
Arguably, there exist sixteen US intelligence agencies that make up the US
Intelligence Community.2 It is true that the CIA has functioned as the lead intelligence
agency for the US, but it is one of sixteen intelligence agencies in the US. Among sixteen
intelligence agencies, the CIA is the only independent agency not affiliated with other
governmental departments or branches of the military.3 That is, except the CIA, other US
intelligence agencies are under the auspices of one of the following US governmental
departments: the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of State (DOS), the
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).
Although the CIA is the best known member of the US Intelligence Community, the
bulk of the nation’s intelligence effort is undertaken by the intelligence agencies of the DOD
(Best 2004, 2). The DOD oversees eight intelligence agencies: the National Security Agency
(NSA), the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency (NGA), the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the Intelligence and Security
Command (INSOCOM), the Office of Naval Intelligence Activity (ONI), the Air Intelligence
Agency (AIA), and the Marine Corps Intelligence (MCIA). Under the auspice of DOJ are the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA). The Bureau
of Intelligence and Research (INR) belongs to the Department of State. DHS, responsible for
safeguarding the territory of the US from terrorist attack and responding to natural disasters,
oversees two intelligence agencies: the Information Analysis and Infrastructure Protection
Directorate (IAIP) and the United States Coast Guard (USCG).
2
See United States Intelligence Community, http://www.intelligence.gov.
However, after the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence (ODNI) was established. If we count the ODNI as independent agency, the number of
independent US intelligence agencies amount to two, not one.
3
3
After the 911 incident, President Bush established the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC) in August 2004. The NCTC was to serve as the primary organization in the
US government for integrating and analyzing all intelligence pertaining to terrorism and
counterterrorism (CT) and to conduct strategic operational planning by integrating all
instruments of national power.4 Afterwards, the US Congress passed the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA) in order to reform the intelligence community
and the intelligence and intelligence-related activities of the US government.5 The most
remarkable change that was made in US intelligence after IRTPA was the creation of the
office of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI). The DNI replaced the Director of
Central Intelligence (DCI) as the leader of the US Intelligence community.6 The DNI plays
the role of the principal advisor to the President (particularly through daily brief to the
President), the National Security Council, and Homeland Security Council for matters related
to intelligence.7 Before the 2004 IRTPA the US intelligence community looked like <Figure
1>. <Figure 2> is how the US intelligence community is organized after 2004 IRTPA .
The origin and development of the CIA
The CIA, as lead intelligence agency of the US, plays an integral role for the US
4
See National Counterterrorism Center, http://www.nctc.gov.
The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 is divided into eight components: (1) Reform
of the intelligence community, (2) Federal Bureau of Investigation, (3) Security clearances, (4) Transportation
security, (5) Border protection, immigration, and visa matters, (6) Terrorism prevention, (7) Implementation of
911 Commission recommendations, (8) Other matters. From National Counterterrorism Center (December 17,
2004).
6
The DCI was the Director of the the CIA, but at the same time, the DCI was the leader of the US Intelligence
Community. As the leader of US intelligence community, the role of DCI was to coordinate and integrate
different intelligence activities of different US intelligence organization. But the DCI’s role as the head of the
CIA limited the role of DCI as leader of US Intelligence Community. Lack of coordination of integration of US
intelligence was considered one of the reasons for not being able to prevent 911. According to Tim Weiner of
New York Times, the CIA wrongfully assessed that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction
(WMD). When Tenet, the then DCI finally acknowledged what he reported was not true, White House, the DOD,
and DOS were highly infuriated. This led George W. Bush to decide to create office of DNI. (Chosun.com,
Interview with Tim Weiner, September 17, 2007). John Negroponte became the first DNI and then Mr. J. M.
McConnell became the second DNI of the US.
7
For further information, http:// www.intelligence.gov.
5
4
intelligence. How did the CIA come into existence? How did it evolve? To understand the
nature of covert action, it is important to explore more about the origin and the development
of the CIA, since the CIA is in charge of US covert action.
Before World War II, the level of US intelligence collection, analysis, and operations
were rudimentary at best. To make matters worse, the US before WWII, did not have an
independent intelligence agency. This made it difficult for the US government to control and
coordinate intelligence results collected and assessed by different agencies through various
routes. The attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, was an eye-opener for the US
policymakers. Although the US navy was running decryption program against the Japanese
navy, it was not able to predict the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Failure to predict the
Pearl Harbor attack was considered the most egregious intelligence failure in US history,
thereby leading the US government to conduct sweeping reforms on the US intelligence
system. First, it was critical to coordinate and control various US intelligence activities. As a
result, President Franklin D. Roosevelt created the Office of Coordinator of Information
(COI) to supervise the US intelligence community. William Donovan served as the first COI,
the responsibility of which included reporting the intelligence collected and analyzed to the
president. Later the COI reorganized into the Office of Strategic Service (OSS). The OSS
was created to replace the COI, but in addition to this, the OSS was granted with another
special mission.8 This “special mission” of OSS later evolved into US covert action.
After WWII, President Harry S. Truman dissolved the OSS in September of 1945. In
recognition of the need for new intelligence system, the Truman administration established
the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) and the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) at the
same time. And the National Security Act of 1947 created the CIA. To cope with the threats
8
Special mission of OSS during the WWII included secretly setting up the rebel troops and supporting countergovernment force in some enemy countries such as Germany, Japan, and Italy.
5
of the Soviet Unions, Truman concluded that the US should be able to launch covert action,
thereby creating the Office of Special Projects. This new office was incorporated into the
CIA, but this office was not placed under the control of the DCI; the Secretary of State, not
the DCI appointed the director of this office. In addition, both the DOS and the DOD sent
representatives to this office to keep the CIA in check. The structure of the CIA was
stabilized during Walter B. Smith’s tenure as the DCI. Smith restructured the existing
organizations and created the Directorate of Plans in 1952, which was in close cooperation
with US Army Special Forces that was also founded in the same year.
2.2 Development of the US Covert Action
So far this paper has assessed the nature of US intelligence, composition of US
intelligence community and development of the CIA. If we are to evaluate the motives of the
US decision makers to use covert action as a tool of the US foreign policy during the Cold
War, it is important to understand what covert action is. The pages that follow discuss what is
meant by covert action, types of covert action, and cases of US covert action during the Cold
War era.
The notion of covert action
Covert action has been used as an important foreign policy tool of the US since
WWII (Godson 1995). According to the definition of Schmitt and Shulsky (2002, 75),
“covert action refers to the attempt by one government to pursue its foreign policy
objectives by conducting some secret activity to influence the behavior of a foreign
government or political, military, economic, or societal events and circumstances in a
foreign country.” Richelson (1999, 349) points out that “a covert action includes any
6
operation designed to influence foreign governments, persons, or events in support of the
sponsoring government’s foreign policy objectives, while keeping the sponsoring
government’s support of the operation secret.” Covert action should be understood as “all
activities conducted pursuant to this directive which are so planned and executed that any
US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if
uncovered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them”(NSC
5412, quoted in Keane and Warner 2007).9 The term, “covert war” is used when US covert
operations or covert actions are conducted on a large scale.
During the Cold War, the US covert operations conducted by the CIA included: (1)
political advice and counsel; (2) subsidies to individuals; (3) financial support and technical
assistance to political parties or groups; (4) support to private organizations, including labor
unions and business firms; (5) covert propaganda; (6) training of individuals; (7) economic
operations; and (8) paramilitary or political action operation designed to overthrow or
support a regime; and up until the mid-1960s, (9) attempted assassination.10 These special
activities affect the actions of foreign governments or events in foreign countries with
political objectives. The objectives usually include the overthrow of a regime or defeat of
insurgent force through a civil war or a coup by supporting counter-government force
secretly.
The New York Time on April 18, 2002 reported that the Bush administration
attempted to overthrow President Hugo Chavez regime of Venezuela. 11 According to
International Herald Tribune (IHT) on May 30, 2007, the Bush administration was alleged
Keane and Warner (2007), “The Intelligence Community 1950-1955,”
available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/96778.pdf (Search date: October 15, 2008).
10
Available at http://www.answers.com/topic/central-intelligence-agency (Search date: October 20, 2008).
11
Jennifer Mccoy, “Chavez’s Second Chance,” New York Times, April 18, 2002.
9
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to have planned a covert operation to disturb Ahmadinejad regime of Iran.12 IHT on January
12, 2008 wrote: “President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan warned that any unilateral attacks
by the US against Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters in his country’s tribal areas would be
treated as an invasion.”13 The statement made by Musharraf suggests that the US was
suspected of planning covert action in Pakistan. Nonetheless, the Bush administration was
able to deny the allegations above that US was involved, and its denial seemed plausible. In
order for covert operations to be successful, it is imperative for the US to be able to deny
American involvement in such operations. That is, it is important to be able to maintain
“plausible deniability.” In other words, when a government carries out a covert action, the
operation must be done in such way that the government can claim that it knows nothing
about it (Grady 2005).
Covert operations that the US has conducted can be classified into three groups:
political action program, propaganda, and paramilitary activity. The US uses “political
action program” to counteract or overthrow a regime or influence the result of an election
for defeat of a particular candidate by secretly funding an opposition party. The US has used
propaganda to influence events in opposing states by manipulating media and public opinion.
This operation is sometimes called “black or unattributed propaganda.”14 For instance, the
CIA can employ a foreign reporter to write an article which is never true or fabricate the
mass media such as radio or a television. Through paramilitary activity the CIA supports
illegal insurgents or armed groups with US military equipments, training, and of course
Shirin Ebadi and Muhammad Sahimi, “The follies of Bush’s Iran policy,” International Herald Tribune, May
30, 2007.
13
Eric Schmitt, “Musharraf warns U.S. not to attack within Pakistan,” International Herald Tribune, January 12,
2008.
14
“Propaganda” did not have negative connotations before extensive use of it against enemy countries during
WWII. Propaganda denoted the US government activity to influence public opinion by providing correct
information. During World Wars, however, this term came to denote activity to diffuse “forged” information to
change public opinions and perceptions. Since then, “black (or unattributed)” propaganda and propaganda began
to be used interchangeably.
12
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money. These people or groups are expected to wage proxy wars for the US in the target
countries of US covert action.
Cases of US covert action during the Cold War era
The US has made extensive use of covert action during the Cold War era. The chart
in <Figure 3> is the list of “successful” covert action to assassinate state’s leader or to
overthrow state’s regime. Small scale covert operations are left out on this list. The list is by
no means complete, since truly successful US covert actions would not have been known to
the public. The list includes only the cases of US action that are generally accepted as
confirmed cases of US covert action.
3. THE US INTELLIGENCE AND COVERT ACTION IN THE POST-COLD
WAR ERA
The US intelligence apparatus, particularly those in charge of covert operations, played
vital roles to defend and promote US interests during the Cold War era. Nonetheless, as the
Cold War international order was drawing to a close, covert action was increasingly
becoming less attractive foreign policy means. But the 911 terror incidents brought back
covert action to the forefront of American War against Terror. The objective of this section of
the paper is to discuss the roles that US covert action has played for the American War on
Terror and to assess the major changes that the US intelligence policies have undergone since
the end of the Cold War. In so doing, the paper will briefly assess the new roles that US
covert action has played in the age of terror.
3.1 Crisis of Covert Action and the CIA toward the End of the Cold War
The US is inherently a liberal state. Before Cold War competition with the Soviet Union
9
justified heavy militarization of the country, American people in general never really felt
comfortable about possessing huge military institutions and large standing army in peace time.
Americans felt that the large military presence in the country would ultimately undermine
civil liberties at home and lead to militarization of society and culture. From the founding
days of the nation until the late 19th century US foreign policy stance was virtually
isolationist in nature. American elites and public believed that active foreign policy would
lead to strengthening of the power of the federal government at the sacrifice of individual
liberty and autonomy of local government. Outbreak of WWI justified active foreign policy
role of the US, but still the mass public of the US was not enthusiastic about entering what
they perceived as basically a European war. President Wilson had a hard time mobilizing
American public support for American participation in WWI, because many Americans did
not view any core national interests at stake in the war-torn continent of Europe that required
American military commitment. German indiscriminate submarine attack and subsequent
American casualties that it incurred provided rationales for Wilson to call for “war to save
democracy.” But after the WWI was over, the US quickly demobilized the military and sank
into isolationist foreign policy mood. Woodrow Wilson lost the presidential election to
Republican presidential candidate, Warren Harding who ran his campaign under the banner of
“return to normalcy.”15 Of course, “normalcy” was a liberal country with limited military
presence and isolationist foreign policy posture.
As with the outbreak of WWII, the US once again broke from the tradition of
isolationism and became an active participant of world affairs. After WWII the country was
about to revert to isolationist. However, ensuing competition with the Soviets and heightened
security threat of the Cold War justified heavy military buildup and strengthening security
“HARDING FOR WORLD COURT; Would Confer With Nations But Make No Advance Commitments,”
New York Times, March 5, 1921.
15
10
apparatuses. As discussed earlier, the US intelligence policies and apparatuses before WWII
were not that magnificent. The UK, not the US, was considered the leading country in
intelligence policies and activities before WWII. But the US restructured its intelligence
community, policies, and activities during and after the WWII, thereby coming to possess the
most advanced intelligence capabilities in the post WWII era. As mentioned earlier, the US
decision makers made extensive use of covert action during the Cold War as a middle option
between diplomacy and open military aggression. Still some Americans had qualms about
using covert action as a foreign policy tool of the ‘liberal democratic’ United States. One of
the key characteristics of democracy is the ability of mass public to hold decision making
elites accountable for the policy actions. In a liberal democracy, policy decisions are
supposed to be arrived at after open public discussion about the properness of suggested
policies. After the open public debates, the elites implement policies favored by the majority
of public. If elites decide policies that do not reflect the majoritarian will of the people, they
should be held accountable for those policies. But covert action intentionally obviates public
scrutiny over the policies; covert action allows elites to circumvent due process of checks and
balances and open public debate over the policies. How can people hold elites accountable
for the policies when they do not even know the existence of those policies? Here lies the
dilemma of covert action in democracy. If we take away “covert” part of covert action, it is
not covert action anymore. But if elites keep covertness of covert action, covert action
violates one of the cardinal norms of democracy: “accountability.” But by and large security
threats posed by Soviet communism rationalized the use of covert action in liberal democratic
US. For instance, General Doolittle and his committee concluded in their report to
Eisenhower on October 19, 1954:
“It is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is
world domination by whatever means and at whatever cost. There are no rules in
11
such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the United
State is to survive, long standing American concepts of “fair play” must be
reconsidered. We must develop effective espionage and counterespionage services
and must learn to subvert, sabotage and destroy enemies by more clever, more
sophisticated means than those used against us. It may become necessary that the
American people be made acquainted with, understand and support this
fundamentally repugnant philosophy.”16
With the demise of Cold War competition with the Soviet, covert action lost much of
its appeal as a legitimate foreign policy tool of the US. First of all, after its archenemy is gone,
the CIA was going through an identity crisis. Raison d’être of the CIA was to fight against
Soviet communism; therefore collapse of Soviet Union was indeed an event that disoriented
the CIA with regard to its future responsibilities. Second, as many covert wars that the CIA
had waged in foreign countries became public knowledge, Americans became disenchanted
with nature and methods that the CIA used to intervene in domestic affairs of other countries.
The US lost respect because of notorious dirty tricks (i.e., covert action) that the CIA played.
The CIA covert action, although it accomplished its short-term political objectives, sowed
seeds for anti-American sentiments in the longer run in many parts of the world. For these
reasons, the CIA earned a nickname, “rogue agency” in the US. Third, the technological
revolution, with the rising importance of TECHINT (i.e., SIGINT and IMINT, etc), has
degraded the status of the CIA as the lead intelligence agency of the US.
Indeed, the end of the Cold War was the major challenge not only to the CIA and
covert action but to the US intelligence community as a whole. The Clinton administration
reduced the military budget (hence intelligence budget) as Clinton promised during the
election campaign.17 American people felt that the burden for international peace as well as
the budget for intelligence community should be cut down (Hass 1994, 7). The the CIA and
16
Dwight D. Eisenhower, Secret To James Harold Doolittle, July 26, 1954, in The Papers of Dwight David
Eisenhower, ed. L. Galamobos and D. van Ee, doc 993, quoted in Leary, ed., (1984, 144).
17
For further information, William O. Studeman, “Remarks by Admiral William O. Studeman, Acting Director
of Central Intelligence at Marquette University,” available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speechestestimony/1995/dci_speech_42095.html (Search date: October 27. 2008).
12
other intelligence organizations were struggling to redefine the scope of their activities, size
and responsibilities. But after 911, the US foreign policy circle came to an understanding that
the most sensitive intelligence information can be retrieved and analyzed only by human
spies. As the 911 commission report points out, “A principal conclusion is that the US human
intelligence capability must be improved across the board.”18 And to infiltrate and subvert
terrorist networks and the regimes that harbor them, the US is once against beefing up
HUMINT to fight war against international terrorism and terrorists. Covert action, which had
become virtually obsolete after the Cold War (mainly because of its morally repugnant
nature), seems to have re-emerged as a necessary foreign policy tool to defend American
national interests from the enemies whose avowed objective is hurting the US by whatever
means and at whatever costs. The roles that American covert action had played both in
Afghanistan War and Iraq War testifies to the fact that covert action is back as legitimate
foreign policy tool of the US in this war against terrorism. The War against Terror once again
justified use of covert action as legitimate foreign policy tools of the US. Let us briefly
examine the roles that covert action played in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
3.2 War against Terrorism and the CIA Covert Action
Bush’s War on Terror first started against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan who
harbored Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda and unwilling to relinquish them to the US. The
American aerial bombing started on October 7, 2001 and it lasted for about 40 days. After
aerial bombing, the US kicked off the ground war. The US military operation on the ground
turned out to be a very swift and decisive victory for the US. Within a month, the US toppled
the Taliban regime and drove the Taliban out of Kabul, the Afghanistan Capital. Then the US
18
Eric Schmitt, “Pentagon Sends Its Spies to Join Fight on Terror,” New York Times, January 24, 2005.
13
army forces swept over fortified cities of Kunduz and Kandahar in less than two months.
Some claimed that the overwhelming superiority of air power basically won the war for the
US before the ground war kicked off. For instance, Loren Thompson, a military analyst at the
Lexington Institute in Arlington, said, “Air power has enabled us [United States] not only to
win quickly, but to do it humanely... We get the war over quickly and, generally speaking, we
don’t hit civilians.”19 Others claimed that American ground forces equipped with smart
weapons of surgical precision brought the swift triumph for the US. As John Pike, one of the
world’s leading experts on defense, space and intelligence policy, pointed out, “new US
“smart bombs” are much more accurate than those used in the Gulf War 10 years ago or even
in Kosovo two years ago. US surveillance technologies are more efficient at finding targets.
The time between spotting a target and dropping a bomb on it, which a decade ago took days,
is now a matter of minutes.”20
However, before the invasion, quite a few military experts anticipated a long and
drawn out warfare that would produce substantial American causalities. First, Talibans were
warriors for life time; fighting warfare has been an important part of their daily lives. More
importantly, Afghanistan has one of the world’s harshest geography with hillsides and valleys
of caves. This geography of the country makes it perfect setting for the Talibans to hide and
wage the kind of long and dreary guerrilla warfare. Aerial bombing had limited effect on
enemies – Talibans – who were hiding caves and valley. There is a limit to which air power
can destroy enemy forces when these enemy forces are in static defensive position, although
Nancy Benac, “War in Afghanistan demonstrates air power’s new ability,” The Associated Press, December
19, 2001, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/011219-attack02.htm (Search date:
December 10, 2008); More opinions of military experts are available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/011121-attack02.htm (Search date: December 10, 2008).
20
Fred Kaplan, “High-Tech US Arsenal Proves its Worth,” The Boston Globe, December 9, 2001, available at
http://www.globalsecurity.org/org/news/2001/011209-attack01.htm (Search date: December 10, 2008).
19
14
aerial bombing can be lethal against enemies on the move. 21 The Washington Post reported
on Nov 2, 2001 “the attacks have not eliminated any measurable number of Taliban troops….
a major chunk of the 50,000 Taliban army and much of its arsenal are pretty much intact after
three weeks of bombing.” State of the art weapons with surgical precision also have limited
effects in guerrilla warfare. Russians warned the US of the difficulty of the ground war in
Afghanistan because they experience humiliating defeat in Afghanistan in late 1980s, hence
the nickname of Afghanistan, “soviet graveyard.”22
The swift victory owes much to US covert action that initiated in Afghanistan months
before Bush declared War against the Taliban. Before the war was declared, the US sent
several hundred the CIA operatives to Afghanistan to launch covert action to topple Taliban
regime. President Bush signed a series of directives authorizing the CIA to conduct a covert
war against Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda network after the 911 attacks.23 With the authority
to kill or capture Al Qaeda leaders, the CIA agents infiltrated into Afghanistan and launched
covert operations. One of their missions was to set up a connection with Northern Alliances,
tribal militias and archrivals of Talibans in Afghanistan. Northern Alliances were very much
eager to retake power from the Taliban in Afghanistan. The the CIA operatives provided the
Northern Alliances monetary aids and military equipments. This covert action carried out in
Afghanistan was a typical case of paramilitary action, the kind of covert action undertaken in
Nicaragua by the Reagan administration in early 1980s. Logistical help provided by the
Northern Alliance proved to be critical for US military victory because they were familiar
21
Aerial bombing of coalition forces in Kosovo and during the first Gulf War had limited effects as well
because the enemies were in static defensive position.
22
In 1979, the Soviet Army carried out a conventional assault on Kabul in order to depose President Amin and
establish the new Afghan government of Babrak Karmal. But The Soviets finally failed to control over Afghan
because they knew neither their enemies nor the Afghan natural environment. Salin (2007), “The Soviet
Intervention in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989.”
23
“ The Struggle for Iraq: Detainees; Harsh C.I.A. Methods Cited In Top Qaeda Interrogations,” New York
Times, May 13, 2004.
15
with the maze-like geography in the region. American War in Afghanistan to topple Taliban
regime was in fact proxy war; the Northern Alliances were American proxy forces and they
took the lead in American ground operations in Afghanistan war. The CIA also confirmed that
they sent several hundred operatives to Afghanistan to collect information and to set up
connection with the Northern Alliances. In fact, the first American casualty in Afghanistan
was not a regular member of the US army, but a CIA operative, Johnny Spann. This attests
the depth and intensity of American covert action in Afghanistan.24
In March of 2003, military front of Bush’s War on Terror moved to Iraq. The
American invasion started with massive aerial bombing that lasted for about 3 days. After
Shock and Awe, massive aerial bombing, the US ground forces entered Iraqi territories. It was
anticipated that ground operations would produce sizeable American casualties and might
drag on for long period of time. Because unlike the 1st Gulf War where most of the battles
took place in open deserts, the 2nd Gulf War (or Iraq War) had to be fought in the streets of
Baghdad and other major cities of Iraq. During the 1st Gulf War, open desert was perfect
terrain that worked to the advantage of the American ground troops equipped with state of the
art weapons. The objective of the 1st Gulf War was to drive Iraqi soldiers out of Kuwait. The
objective of the 2nd Gulf War was to topple the Hussein regime. Resistance of Iraqis was
expected to be more desperate than the 1st Gulf War. More than anything else, the warfare
during the 2nd Gulf War was expected to take on the nature of bare-knuckle street fights
where state of the art weaponry of the US forces would have limited effects. But contrary to
the expectations of many, overthrowing Hussein regime and claiming Baghdad was much
24
But American ground operations to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and remnants of Al Qaeda and Talibans
was not successful. Northern Alliances, once overtaking power in Afghanistan, were more interested in
consolidating power in Afghanistan rather than helping Americans pursue additional objectives of rounding up
remnants of Al Qaeda and Talibans. The US did not commit enough ground troops to accomplish remaining
policy objective for fear of putting American soldiers in harm’s way. Also diversion to Iraq War forced the Bush
administration to withdraw American military commitments from Afghanistan prematurely.
16
less costly to the American military forces. Swift victory of the US should also be attributed
to the CIA covert action that initiated months before the war was declared. Without formal
agreement of the UN Security Council, Bush already began a broad range of the CIA covert
action at least three months before the war.25 Covert action is back at the forefront of US
foreign policy in this age of terror. After a great deal of debate, the Bush administration
decided that the CIA should retain responsibility for running covert action for the US.
3.3 The 911 and Creation of National Clandestine Service (NCS)
The 911 terrorist attack was the worst intelligence failure in American history.
Consequently, it worked as a catalyst to re-appreciate the importance of maintaining proper
intelligence capabilities and to restructure American intelligence community and policy. On
November 27, 2002, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States
(the 911 Commission) was set up at the request o f President Bush and the Congress in order
to find out the reasons for not preventing the attack and to fix the US intelligence community
and policy. According to the Commission’s final report issued on July of 2004, the chain of
intelligence and law enforcement failures were held responsible for not preventing the 911
attacks. The Commission suggested (a) creation of a Director of National Intelligence over
both the CIA and the FBI, (b) weakening the role of the CIA and DCI, (c) provision of
incentives for sharing intelligence, (d) proper funding for intelligence activities and public
accountability of intelligence policies, and (e) plan to place all the paramilitary capabilities of
the CIA under the authority of the Pentagon.26
However, leading White House advisory panel, led by the retired Air Force General
Duglas Jehl and Dexter Filkins, “AFTER THE WAR: COVERT OPERATIONS; U.S. Moved to Undermine
Iraqi Military Before War,” New York Times, August 10, 2003.
26
“THE 911 COMMISSION REPORT ONE YEAR LATER,” Congressional Briefing, July 22, 2005, p.84-88,
available at http://www.911truth.org/downloads/McKinney-911Commission-OneYearLater.pdf (Search date:
November 17. 2008).
25
17
Brent Scowcroft, was preparing an intelligence reform proposal which tried to strip several
intelligence agencies from the Pentagon and empower the CIA director. Under the proposal,
the NRO, NIMA, and NSA would each come under the control of the CIA director.27 In the
process, Scowcroft was in conflict with the Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld because
Rumsfeld wanted the DOD to be much more powerful than others. He was even opposed to
the idea of creating DNI because the creation of DNI could decrease his power as the
Secretary of Defense. In fact, Rumsfeld controlled nearly 80 percent of total intelligence
spending, but the control should be shared if the DNI was established.28 The end result of
the clash between Rumsfeld plan (or plan advocated by 911 Commission) and Scowcroft
plan was a compromise. It was decided that the DOD would retain the NRO, NIMA, and
NSA, hence American TECHINT capabilities, while the CIA would remain as the major
American HUMINT agency and agency in charge of American covert action.
Stepping up the intelligence agency reform, Negroponte, the first DNI, established
National Clandestine Service (NCS) in the CIA as a replacement of Directorate of
Operations (which was in charge of covert action in the CIA). This meant that the CIA
would restructure its covert action responsibilities. Initially, the NCS was supposed to be
created under the DNI, but in the end, it was established under the CIA. This decision was
critical to the CIA in that the CIA was able to remain as the lead agency running American
covert action. Rumsfeld attempted to take covert action responsibilities away from the CIA
and place it under the authority of the DOD. But President Bush sided with the CIA and
approved the place to create the NCS under the authority of the CIA. However, unlike its
predecessor, Directorate of Operations, the NCS enjoys a certain degree of autonomy from
the DCIA. <Figure 4> is the CIA organization chart before 2005 reform and <Figure 5> is
27
28
John LeBoutillier, “Rewarding the CIA’s Failure,” Newsmax.com, November 9, 2001.
Daniel Eisenberg, “Bush’s New Intelligence Czar,” Time, February 21, 2005.
18
the CIA organization chart after 2005 reform.
3.4 Implications for US Foreign Policy Making
American covert action to overthrow legitimate leader of Iran, Mohamed Mossadeq in
1953 was huge success within the American foreign policy circle. Operation AJAX (the code
name for American covert action in Iran) was the first attempt for American covert action to
unseat popularly supported regime. Operation AJAX set the mold for many more covert
actions that followed and instilled the confidence in American decision makers that the US
would be able to bring about regime changes with that same ease as Operation AJAX. But the
covert action poses an important challenge to democratic principles. In democracy, mass
public should be able to constrain decision making processes of elites. Public policies of
democracies, be it domestic or international, should be subject to open debates and public
scrutiny. If public policies fail to reflect majoritarian will of the population in democracies,
decision makers should be held accountable for those policies. But covert action is meant to
be hidden from open debates, public scrutiny, and checks and balances inherent in democratic
political institutions. Here lies the problem of covert action as legitimate foreign policy tool
of democratic state.
In the early Cold War era, American decision makers had been quite successful in
keeping the domestic as well as international audience in the dark about the nature and scope
of American illegal interventions in foreign states that brought about regime changes there.
Mass media in the US during the early Cold War period basically followed cues and facts
provided by the American government and accepted them without any reservations. For this
reason, the American decision makers were able to keep the secrets about American hands in
the covert plots toppling legitimate regimes in foreign states. But toward 1980s, the American
19
mass media was becoming increasingly government-challenging. In the wake of the Vietnam
War, the American mass media and public alike became skeptical about the credibility and
competence of governmental leadership. Hitherto government-friendly American mass media
started to investigate the American covert action and instantly blew the cover for the
American government. For instance, it was Newsweek that divulged the Reagan
administration’s covert action in Nicaragua to wage contra war. American covert action after
Reagan’s covert war – contra war – in Nicaragua took on a nature of “overt”-covert war.
Since American covert action is no longer “covert” from public scrutiny, American decision
makers resort to covert action tends to be limited to the cases where they can garner popular
consent for such action afterwards. After the CIA covert action in Afghanistan War, the
George W. Bush administration admitted that it did launch covert action in Afghanistan.
Public opinion at home and abroad did not denounce covert action in Afghanistan waged by
the Bush administration, because such action was not used as an avenue to circumvent public
relations risk. This is a testament to the fact that, as long as the objectives of covert action can
be justifiable, covert action can remain as legitimate and effective foreign policy tool of the
US in this age of international terrorism.
4. CONCLUSION
During the Cold War era the American decision makers made extensive use of covert
action to bring about regime changes in Third World countries. Covert action was an
attractive middle option on the part of the American decision makers when neither diplomacy
nor military option was deemed viable. One of the most important elements of covert action
is “plausible deniability.” When the Cold War temperature was at its height in the early 1950s,
it was suspected that the US was involved in coups overthrowing neutralist or pro-Socialist
regimes in many parts of the world. Nonetheless, the American decision makers were able to
20
deny American involvement in secret operations that toppled many legitimate regimes in
Third World countries. In fact, they took great pains to keep American involvement in those
plots secret even long after those missions ended. Why did they go such great lengths to
safeguard secrecy? What was the target of secrecy? Was it adverse international opinion that
the American decision makers try to outskirt by engaging in covert action? Or was it
domestic institutional constraints that they attempted outskirt? These questions should be
answered by detailed cases studies attempting to assess the motivations of American decision
makers for opting “covert action” as particular means of foreign policy.
Covert action is really an American invention, which entered the jargon of American
intelligence community circa 1940s. The objective of this paper was to place American covert
action in the context of larger roles that American intelligence community has played in the
post WWII era. Among 16 intelligence organizations that make up American intelligence
community, the CIA has been in charge of American covert action. American intelligence
activities can be divided into TECHINT and HUMINT, depending on the means that
activities rely on. Covert action is one particular type of HUMINT, and since the CIA is in
charge of running American HUMINT, it is also in charge of covert action as well. This paper
also discussed some of the changes that took place in American intelligence community and
listed notable cases of American covert action that brought about regime changes in foreign
states.
This paper also summarized some of the changes that the end of the Cold War has
brought about to American intelligence policies in general and the CIA and covert action in
specific. the CIA was going through identity crisis in the wake of sudden collapse of Cold
War international order. Covert action was no longer thought of as legitimate foreign policy
tool of the US, because it lost much of its raison d’être – exigency of coping with Soviet
21
communist threat. But 911 once again brought the CIA and covert action at the forefront of
US foreign policy making.
22
< Appendices >
President
National Security Council (NSC)
Director of Central Intelligence (DCI)
Central
Intelligence
Agency
(CIA)
Department
of State
(DOS)
Bureau of
Intelligence
and
Research
(INR)
Department
of the
Treasury
(DOT)
Department
of Energy
(DOE)
Department
of Defense
(DOD)
National Security
Agency (NSA)
National
Reconnaissance
Office (NRO)
National Imagery
and Mapping
Agency (NIMA)
Department
of Justice
(DOJ)
Federal
Bureau of
Investigation
(FBI)
Drug
Enforcement
Agency
(DEA)
Defense
Intelligence
Agency (DIA)
Intelligence and
Security
Command
(INSOCOM)
Office of Naval
Intelligence
Activity (ONI)
Air Intelligence
Agency (AIA)
Marine
Corps
Intelligence
(MCIA)
< Figure 1 > The US Intelligence Community (Before IRTPA of 2004)
23
President
National Security Council (NSC)
Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
Central
Intelligence
Agency
(CIA)
Department
of State
(DOS)
Bureau of
Intelligence
and
Research
(INR)
Department
of
Homeland
Security
(DHS)
Department
of the
Treasury
Information
Analysis and
Infrastructure
Protection
Directorate
(IAIP)
U.S. Coast
Guard
(USCG)
Department
of Energy
(DOE)
Office of the Director of
National
Intelligence
(ODNI)
Department
of Defense
(DOD)
National
Security
Agency (NSA)
National
Reconnaissance
Office (NRO)
National GeospatialIntelligence Agency
(NGA)
Department
of Justice
(DOJ)
Federal
Bureau of
Investigati
on (FBI)
Drug
Enforceme
nt Agency
(DEA)
Defense Intelligence
Agency (DIA)
Intelligence
and
Security Command
(INSOCOM)
Office of Naval
Intelligence Activity
(ONI)
Air
Intelligence
Agency (AIA)
Marine
Corps
Intelligence (MCIA)
< Figure 2 > The US Intelligence Community (After IRTPA of 2004)
24
Year
State
Achievements
1953
Iran
1954
Guatemala
1961
Ecuador
The regime change from Jose Belasco to Clarlos
Arosemana
1961
Congo (former Zaire)
The assassination of Lumumba and the support of
Mobutu regime
1963
Dominican Republic
The overthrow of Bosch
1964
Brazil
1945
Indonesia
The overturn of Sukarno and the support of Suharto
1970
Cambodia
The overthrow of Prince Sahounek and the help of
replacement of Lon Lol
1971
Bolivia
The change in regime from Juan Torres to Hogo
Banzer
1973
Chile
The overthrow of Allende and the support of
Pinochet
1980
Nicaragua
The change in regime from Mossadeq to Pahlavi
The overthrow of Arbenz
The transition in regime from Goulart to Branco
The regime change from Sandinista to Chamorro
< Figure 3 > The List of US covert action
25
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Agency (DCI)
Directorate
of
Intelligence
Directorate
of
Operation
Directorate
of Science &
Technology
Directorate
of
Support
< Figure 4> the CIA Organization Chart (Before 2005)
Director of
Central
Intelligence
Agency (DCI)
Directorate
of
Intelligence
Deputy
Director
NCS
National
Clandestine
Service (NCS)
Directorate
of Science &
Technology
Directorate
of
Support
Deputy
Director NCS
for Community
HUMINT
< Figure 5> the CIA Organization Chart (After 2005)
26