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Linguistic Intuitions and Linguistic Theory
Geoff Georgi
University of Southern California
April 2005
If knowing English is some kind of cognitive state, and the goal of linguistic theory is to
articulate the content of this state, then linguistics (in English, but the same holds of any natural
human language) is an investigation into our own cognitive endowment, a branch of psychology (or
cognitive science). Michael Devitt, in a series of papers and books, has challenged this view of
linguistics.1 Devitt argues that the study of linguistic structure ought to proceed independently of
the study of linguistic competence; while the latter is a branch of psychology, only the former is
properly linguistics. At the center of the debate is what Devitt calls The Representational Thesis: native
speakers of a language stand in some kind of cognitive relation to a grammar of the language. In his
paper “Intuitions in Linguistics” Devitt undertakes to respond to a pair of arguments in favor of the
Representational Thesis. Evaluating the arguments, and Devitt’s response, requires a careful
examination of the basic methodological revolution of contemporary linguistics: the appeal to the
intuitions of native speakers. I shall argue that both Devitt’s presentation of the arguments in favor
of the Representational Thesis and the view of linguistic intuitions he proposes in response fail to
capture the role of linguistic intuitions in linguistic theory. I shall then present a view of linguistic
intuitions and linguistic method (suggested by remarks of Jim Higginbotham) that supports the
Representational Thesis in the face of Devitt’s criticisms. On the resulting view, intuitions are not
about grammaticality, at least not as the claim that they are seems commonly to be understood. I
shall finally compare this view with another to which, I shall argue, it presents a better alternative.
(Devitt and Sterelny 1989; Devitt 1996) contain the main elements of Devitt’s concerns. (Devitt
forthcoming) contains the most recent discussion of the Representational Thesis.
1
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I
In the opening pages of Aspects of the Theory of Syntax, Chomsky characterizes a generative
grammar as “a system of rules that in some explicit and well-defined way assigns structural
descriptions to sentences” (Chomsky 1965, p. 8).2 He then immediately goes on to claim that “every
speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his
knowledge of his language.” The goal of linguistic theory, as it emerges from these remarks, is to
articulate the grammar that competent speakers of a language have internalized (Chomsky 1965, p.
4). Somewhat more carefully, a grammar of L is descriptively adequate insofar as it correctly
characterizes the competence of a(n idealized) native speaker of L, and a linguistic theory is
descriptively adequate just in case it can provide a descriptively adequate grammar for each natural
language (Chomsky 1965, p. 24). Chomsky also articulates a more refined (and plainly
psychological) goal: a linguistic theory is explanatorily adequate insofar as it can show how to
produce a descriptively adequate grammar for a natural language on the basis of what Chomsky calls
primary linguistic data, the examples of linguistic performance on the basis of which a child learns their
first language (Chomsky 1965, p. 25).
As Higginbotham (1982) has noted, the thesis that knowledge of language is a cognitive state is
necessary for further considerations of explanatory adequacy, but not sufficient. He identifies it as
the first core thesis of Chomsky’s linguistic theory. It is this thesis that Michael Devitt rejects under
the name The Representational Thesis. Devitt’s formulation is as follows:
Speakers of a language stand in a propositional attitude to the representations
of the rules of the language (Devitt forthcoming, p.1)
Structural descriptions are essential to Chomsky’s linguistic theory, but the details would distract us from
the argument of this paper. In brief, a structural description for a sentence is a sequence of phrase structure
representations of that sentence, each representation corresponding to a particular level of structural
interpretation. There are at least two levels: one to represent the phonetic structure of the sentence; the
other to represent the semantic structure of the sentence. What matters for our purposes is that these
representations are structural.
2
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Devitt himself advocates a view of linguistic theory according to which the study of linguistic
structure is independent of the study of linguistic competence. Only the former is linguistics
according to Devitt, the latter a branch of psychology. If, however, the Representational Thesis is
true, then any such distinction collapses; it is the essence of the Chomskian approach to linguistics
adumbrated above that the study of the grammar of a natural language L is the study of the
competence of a native speaker of L. If knowing English is some kind of cognitive state, and the
goal of linguistic theory is to articulate the content of this cognitive state, then linguistics is
ultimately a part of psychology.
In the paper “Intuitions in Linguistics” (forthcoming), Devitt undertakes to respond to a pair of
arguments in support of the Representational Thesis. The first of these arguments runs more or less
as follows: linguistic intuitions are the primary source of data for linguistic theory, and the
Representational Thesis affords the best explanation of the evidential status of linguistic intuitions.
Thus, since inference to the best explanation is a rational way to proceed in scientific investigation,
we ought to accept the Representational Thesis as true. To reduce repetition in the ensuing
discussion, let us call this the Intuition Argument.3 There is a great deal one can say about the
argument itself. I will note one variant here that is relevant to my later argument: the
methodological foundation of linguistic theory is the observation that there is an abundance of data
on the nature of the generative grammar (Chomsky 1965, pp.19-20). A linguistic theory based on
the Representational Thesis affords the best systematic explanation of the abundant data (it explains
both its existence and its structure). Thus, since inference to the best explanation is a rational way to
proceed in scientific investigation, we ought to adopt such a linguistic theory, and hence accept the
Representational Thesis.
3
The second argument is similar: since the Representational Thesis provides the best explanation of the
astonishing uniformity of linguistic intuitions across native speakers, we ought to accept it as true. Since
my primary concern is methodological, I will address this argument only indirectly at various points. I
think that it too is vindicated by the view that I propose in this paper.
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Devitt offers a reconstruction of the view of linguistic intuitions on which the Intuition
Argument relies. According to this reconstruction, intuitions are intuitive “judgments about
grammaticality, ambiguity, coreference, and the like” (Devitt forthcoming, p.2). Examples of such
intuitions are the judgment that the sentence
(1)
*Who did you speak to Damon and?
is ungrammatical.4 Grammaticality, so understood, is a theoretical concept of linguistics: a sentence
is grammatical when it is assigned a structural description by the rules of one’s generative grammar.
Speakers have the intuition that (1) is ungrammatical because they know the rules of the grammar,
and hence know (tacitly) that the rules do not generate a structural description for the sentence.
This tacit knowledge is expressed as a linguistic intuition.5 These intuitions are thus judgments
whose content involves the basic properties and concepts of linguistic theory.6 This gives the
following picture: prompted with a sentence S, a speaker’s tacit knowledge of the rules of the
grammar generates the theorem that S can be assigned no structural description, or that S is
ungrammatical. We experience this theorem-generation as a linguistic intuition. Following Devitt,
we can summarize the view that intuitions are “the voice of competence” thus: intuitions are
judgments about linguistic structure “derived by a causal and rational process from a representation
of the rules of the language”.7
This reconstructed view of linguistic intuitions seems to support the Intuition Argument.
Linguists consult their intuitions about various sentences, and the resulting judgments provide tests
4
Linguists represent the judgment that the sentence is ungrammatical with an asterisk. It is important to
note that the sentence is not made grammatical by replacing who with whom. The grammaticality with
which linguists are concerned is not the kind learned in grade school, which distinguishes proper from
improper use of English.
5
He calls such intuitions the “voice of competence”. I cannot see what else he might (reasonably) mean by
this.
6
This view of linguistic intuitions, or something like it, is common in both linguistics and the philosophy
of language. For a representative example from linguistics, see (Radford 1997); for a representative
example from the philosophy of language, see (Neale 1990).
7
I adopt the following convention: if I quote from the same page of the same text as the previous quotation,
and the previous quotation is already assigned a citation, then I do not repeat the citation.
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for linguistic theory. We reject any theory that pronounces a sentence grammatical if a native
speaker intuitively judges the sentence to be ungrammatical. The more systematically we can explain
the intuitions of native speakers, the closer we are to achieving the stated goal of linguistic theory, to
articulate the grammar that a competent speaker of the language possesses.8 We adopt the
Representational Thesis in order to systematically explain our linguistic intuitions.
Devitt notes a problem for this view of linguistic intuitions. If our intuitive judgments about
linguistic expressions are causally and rationally derived from our knowledge of the rules of our
language, why do we not have intuitions about the technical concepts of c-command, A′-positions,
and other concepts of our grammar? Why are our intuitions selective, i.e., why do they yield direct
access to only some theoretical concepts and not others? Devitt drives home this worry by citing a
passage in which Chomsky expresses skepticism about the appeal to intuition in philosophical
semantics:
A good part of contemporary philosophy of language is concerned with
analyzing alleged relations between expressions and things, often exploring
intuitions about the technical notions “denote”, “refer”, “true of”, etc., said
to hold between expressions and something else. But there can be no
intuitions about these notions, just as there can be none about “angular
velocity” or “protein”. These are technical terms of philosophical discourse
with a stipulated sense that has no counterpart in ordinary language.
(Chomsky 1995, p.24)
Whether Chomsky’s argument is ultimately successful against philosophical semantics it is not my
goal here to discuss (I’m inclined to think it isn’t). On Devitt’s reconstruction of the role of
intuitions in syntactic theory the problem of ordinary intuitions about theoretical notions is met by
8
This characterization of syntactic theory is found explicitly in (Neale 1990, p.79)
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positing a causal/rational process linking the intuitions with the speaker’s tacit knowledge of the
language. But if we admit this process, then we require some further explanation for its selectivity.
Another problem for the reconstructed view of intuitions is suggested by some early examples
from Aspects. Chomsky asks us to consider whether the following two sentences have the same
grammatical structure:
(2)
I persuaded John to leave
(3)
I expected John to leave
It is fairly natural for non-linguists to respond that (2) and (3) do have the same grammatical
structure. 9 In fact (2) and (3) have radically different structures. The expression John to leave is a
grammatical constituent of sentence (3): it is the object of the verb expect. In (2), John is the object of
the verb persuade, and the expression John to leave is not a grammatical constituent. (I discuss one
argument for these claims in a later part of the paper. The reader can also consult (Chomsky 1965,
pp.22-3).) If the non-linguists’ judgments here are false, then their intuitions cannot be the voice of
competence. This introduces a major complication into the reconstructed view of intuitions. One
of the reasons that the Representational Thesis affords a good explanation of the evidential status of
intuitions is that it is an explanation of the source of the intuitions (this comes out clearly in the
variant of the Intuition Argument). In the judgments of the non-linguists concerning (2) and (3), we
now have a fairly systematic intuition that does not admit this explanation. This raises the possibility
of systematic doubt about each data point of linguistic theory, for whatever explanation we give of
the folk intuition concerning (2) and (3), the question will arise whether that explanation (or a
variant of it) can apply to any judgment about linguistic expressions. If we can have false judgments,
then each judgment must be inspected for this possibility before it is epistemically suitable to be
used as data. The original abundance of data is not as rosy as it appeared.
9
There is room here for some experimentation. I make this claim based on informal surveys performed on
those unfortunate enough to ask me what I have been working on.
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II
In place of the theory of linguistic intuitions suggested above, Devitt proposes that linguistic
intuitions are just a species of intuitive judgments in general, and are not derived in any special way
from any proprietary body of knowledge. Devitt outlines a general theory of intuitions according to
which they are “empirical theory-laden responses to phenomena differing from other such
responses only in being immediate and unreflective” (Devitt forthcoming, p. 5). According to
Devitt, linguistic intuitions are like other intuitions in being judgments made on the basis of
empirical theory. What distinguishes intuitions from other judgments is that intuitions are largely
unreflective: an intuition is a spontaneous judgment unconstrained by careful reflection or
consideration. What distinguishes intuitions about linguistics from intuitions about echidnas is that
the principle theoretical considerations that come into play in the spontaneous judgment are
linguistic considerations, not echidna considerations. As examples of intuitions, Devitt offers simple
cases of identifying members of a kind: “This is an echidna but that isn’t,” as well as more complex
cases of judgments about members of a kind: “Echidnas look like porcupines.” Analogous
intuitions about linguistics might be “This is a word but that isn’t” (said, perhaps, while looking at a
labeled illustration of an echidna), and “The word ‘porcupine’ doesn’t look like a porcupine”. These
cases of intuitions involve a fairly simple folk theory of echidnas (or words), but Devitt also offers
the example of a paleontologist in the field who, upon seeing a bit of white stone in a bed of rock,
makes the snap judgment “that is a pig’s jawbone.” (Devitt forthcoming, p. 6) This judgment clearly
relies on the paleontologist’s training in the anatomy of various kinds of creatures, and on some
knowledge of the geological history of the terrain on which she is working. What makes it an
intuition is that the paleontologist makes it spontaneously, without reflecting on the reasons she
might have for making it. Devitt suggests that she might not even know the reasons that lead her to
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the judgment, yet feel certain about it nonetheless. Analogously, one might expect an accomplished
linguist to judge intuitively that sentences (2) and (3) have different grammatical structure, even if
they could not, at the time, reconstruct any argument for that conclusion.
Linguistic intuitions, on this picture, are just spontaneous judgments about linguistic
expressions, based on one’s knowledge of linguistic theory.10 Native speakers have the ability to
make intuitive grammaticality judgments insofar as they have acquired, in the course of their
experience as speakers of a language, some theory about grammaticality. On Devitt’s picture, the
difference between the linguists’ concept of grammaticality and the folk concept of grammaticality is
grounded in the obvious fact that some people have a very sketchy grasp of linguistic theory. For
most native speakers, their exposure to linguistic theory is minimal, and the resulting judgments
about grammaticality are at best rudimentary. Thus we should expect differences between the
intuitions of linguists and the intuitions of non-linguists, or folk, and Devitt cites studies suggesting
that there is such a difference.11
If this is the right account of linguistic intuitions, then their evidential status, as required for the
Intuition Argument, is clearly called into question. Linguistic intuitions, on this account, do not
involve any kind of causal or rational descent from a representation of the rules of a grammar.
Instead they reflect the speaker’s intuitive grasp of linguistic theory. This will vary from what is
largely a folk theory to a sophisticated theory, depending on whether the speaker in question has
studied any linguistics. We appear to be confronted with the following dilemma: folk intuitions are
based on an overly simplistic theory, and so are of no apparent value as evidence for linguistic
theory, while the intuitions of the linguists appear to be based on the very theories that the linguists
10
Devitt thus endorses the claim from the reconstructed view of intuitions that linguistic intuitions involve
theoretical linguistic concepts as part of the content of the intuitive judgments.
11
Some of the studies do challenge certain principles that have been accepted as part of linguistic theory.
In particular, the study by Gordon and Hendrick (1997)suggests that Principle C of Binding Theory is more
subtle than it is often assumed to be. It is not clear, however, that the differences are anything like what
one would expect on Devitt’s picture. The issue is related, I think, to the phenomenon of first introducing
someone to doing syntax (of which more in part III). It warrants further investigation.
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are attempting to construct. Thus the use of intuitions as data looks to be either of no use or
dangerously circular.
Devitt does not draw this final conclusion about the potential circularity of the reliance on the
intuitions of linguists. It is enough for his purposes that intuitions are not the primary source of
data for linguistics; this result is sufficient to reject the Intuition Argument. He is willing to accept
that such intuitions (at least those of the linguist) have some theoretical utility, on the grounds that
the linguists’ sophisticated theory affords linguists a measure of authority that the folk do not
possess:
the intuitions that linguistics should mostly rely on are those of the linguists
themselves because the linguists are the most expert…I have accepted that
these intuitions, particularly those of the linguists, are often good evidence.
(Devitt forthcoming, pp. 10-11)
This strikes me as a clear problem for his view of linguistic intuitions. I just do not see how he can
maintain both that intuitions are judgments based on one’s current empirical theory (even if those
judgments are unreflective or spontaneous) and that these intuitions can be evidence for that theory.
If a linguist judges that a certain sentence is ungrammatical, then on Devitt’s view there is good
reason to think that the sentence is ungrammatical. So far so good. But the following reasoning is
pretty clearly unacceptable: “It seems to me that this sentence is ungrammatical. Since I have a
pretty good grasp of current linguistic theory, my intuitive judgments on the matter ought to carry
some weight. So the sentence is ungrammatical. But this is just what current linguistic theory
predicts, so that theory is supported by my intuition.” Something seems to have gone very wrong.
In his response to the Intuition Argument, Devitt has proposed an account of linguistic intuitions
that renders them useless as data for linguistic theory. Far from setting linguistics on a firmer
ground, Devitt has put forward a view according to which the contemporary methodological appeal
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to intuitions is fundamentally misguided. We must either accept Devitt’s account of linguistic
intuitions and abandon the current methods of contemporary linguistics, or seek an alternative
account of linguistic intuitions that actually preserves their evidential status.
III
I shall now present such an account of linguistic intuitions. The only way to really understand
what linguistic intuitions are is to do some linguistics. Accordingly, I will present some examples of
arguments for linguistic claims, and examine the role that intuitions play in these arguments. The
resulting view of linguistic intuitions is by no means complete. Considerations of other kinds of
arguments within linguistics may afford modifications of the present account, but I suggest that the
direction I propose here is more fruitful overall than the one proposed by Devitt.
Let us begin by returning to some basic observations: (i) competent speakers of English assign
structural descriptions to sentences; (ii) this assignment of structural descriptions to sentences is
deeply involved in our ability to produce and understand sentences, and so to communicate with
one another; (iii) this assignment of structural descriptions to sentences proceeds subconsciously.
Chomsky (in Aspects) introduced the example above of sentences (2) and (3) in support of these
basic observations.12 To see that one assigns (2) and (3) radically different structural descriptions,
consider the following related sentences:
(4)
John expects to be examined by a specialist
(5)
*John persuades to be examined by a specialist
If (2) and (3) have the same structural description, then (4) and (5) should as well (or at least there
should be a reading of (5) on which it has the same structural description as (4)). If (4) and (5) have
the same structural description, then why should (4) be OK while (5) just sounds wrong to our ears?
The argument that follows is rough, and is not the one found in Chomsky. Chomsky’s original argument
involves an appeal to cognitive synonymy, which would only muddy the methodological waters of this
discussion.
12
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It seems that (4) and (5) do not, and cannot be understood to have, the same structural description.
Thus (2) and (3) do not have the same structural description.
The first thing to note in the argument concerning (4) and (5) is that the content of the intuition
about (5) is not obviously that the sentence is ungrammatical. The actual judgment elicited from a
native speaker about (5) is that it is odd, or not a good thing to say, or a bad sentence.13 That the
sentence is ungrammatical, in the sense of not being assigned a structural description, is a hypothesis
about the generative grammar of English.14 This hypothesis is represented by the initial asterisk.
The resulting view of the relation between linguistic intuitions and linguistic theory is markedly
different from either the reconstructed view above or Devitt’s own view. Intuitions, as we are now
understanding them, are not theorems of linguistic theory bubbling to the surface of our
consciousness. Their content does not derive from our knowledge of the rules of our language; they
do not involve the theoretical notions of linguistic theory. Linguistic intuitions are better thought of
as a byproduct of our ability to assign structural descriptions to sentences. When this assignment
breaks down, we “feel” that the sentence is unacceptable, or bad, or not OK. That a sentence like
(5) is ungrammatical is a hypothesis that we propose to explain this feeling, or intuition.15
The relation between linguistic intuitions and linguistic theory is further clarified by another
argument, one that is very important within linguistic theory.16 For speakers of English, certain
13
I have earlier cited Radford (Radford 1997) as an example of a linguist who appears to endorse the
reconstructed view of linguistic intuitions, but there is also evidence for the current proposal in the opening
of the same book:
Syntax is concerned with the says in which words can be combined together to form
phrases and sentences, and so addresses questions like ‘Why is it OK in English to say
Who did you see Mary with?, but not OK to say *Who did you see Mary and? (p. 1).
The questions are not about grammaticality, but about whether it is OK to say something in English. The
difference, in light of the considerations in parts I and II of this paper, is significant.
14
In discussion of Devitt’s paper, Higginbotham suggested that linguistic intuitions should be understood
as “data for the data” of linguistics. The present view is a result of my attempt to make sense of this
suggestion.
15
Other explanations are possible, and occasionally more compelling. A classic example of this is the
sentence The horse raced past the barn fell (citation?).
16
The following discussion relies heavily on (Radford 1997). See in particular sections 4.3, 4.4, 6.3, and
7.2.
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unstressed occurrences of the perfective auxiliary have can contract to the point that they lose any
independent vowel. Thus the initial expression in (6) rhymes with prove:
(6)
You’ve left your keys in the car.
There is also an unstressed form of have in You should have gone home that is often pronounced like of (I
have seen writers use of when they meant have). In the case of (6), we say that have has cliticized its
subject (in this case, you). One might conjecture that such cliticization can occur whenever the
subject of have ends in a vowel or diphthong. That this conjecture would be incorrect is shown by
the following examples:
(7)
He could have left and she have/*she’ve stayed.
(8)
Should I have/*I’ve called the police?
(9)
Would you have/*you’ve wanted to come with me?
A similar phenomenon occurs with the expression want to. In many contexts, this can contract to
wanna, so that I wanna go home is clearly acceptable as a variant of I want to go home. One might
conjecture here that such contraction can occur whenever want and to are adjacent to each other.
The following examples show that this conjecture is problematic:
(10)
Who do you want to/*wanna bring beer to the party?
(11)
Who would you want to/*wanna help you?
Examples such as (7-11) are taken by linguists to show that there is some unarticulated constituent
interposed between the pronouns and the auxiliaries in (7-9) and between the verb and the infinitival
to in (10-11). This is clearest in the cases of (10) and (11), where the interrogative who has clearly
moved from a position between want and to (consider the echo question version of (10): you want who
to bring beer to the party?). Such movement is also apparent in (8) and (9), where the auxiliaries should
and would originate between the pronoun and the auxiliary have. (A slightly different explanation is
required for (7), but we will not get into it here.) Thus examples (8-11) are taken to show that the
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various movements of expressions like who and would leave behind what linguists call traces, which in
turn prevent the various cliticizations and contractions.
Traces serve an important role in contemporary linguistics, but it is not out concern to pursue
them here. (See (Radford 1997), section 6.3 for a discussion of traces.) The significance of the above
discussion for our purpose is the role of the intuitions about (7-11) in the argument for the existence
of traces. In this argument we invoke a different hypothesis in order to explain the intuitions. We
do not assume that some sentence or other is not assigned a structural description, as we did in our
explanation of our intuitions about (1) and (5) above. Rather, we assume that sentences like who do
you want to bring beer to the party? are assigned structural descriptions with certain properties, such as
having a trace between want and to. This hypothesis has important ramifications for whatever
generative grammar we propose.
The picture of the relation between linguistic intuitions and linguistic theory that emerges from
these considerations involves two steps. On the basis of linguistic intuitions, we construct
hypotheses about the structural descriptions that we assign to sentences. We then attempt to
construct a generative grammar that explicitly captures all these hypotheses. The grammar must not
only fail to assign structural descriptions to sentences like (1) and (5), but it must also properly assign
structural descriptions to sentences like (8-11) that include traces in the relevant places. Our
linguistic intuitions are not judgments about the theoretical concepts of linguistics. They are
responses to sentences – responses that reveal details about the structural descriptions that we assign
to those sentences. Linguistic theory attempts to systematically explain these intuitions by positing
knowledge of a generative grammar. This view of linguistic intuitions and linguistic theory clearly
supports the Intuition Argument. Examples like (1), (5), and (7-11) are indeed abundant, once one
knows what to look for. In this regard it is worth noting that there is no reason to reject the kind of
intuitions that Devitt proposes. We do make intuitive judgments about grammaticality and other
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things, and these judgments are often largely based on what we have learned about English from
others and from observation. These intuitive judgments are precisely what students of linguistics are
first taught to ignore when they are introduced to syntax. The sentence *Who did you see Damon and?
is not ungrammatical because who is a nominative form and the sentence calls for the accusative
form whom. The sentence *Whom did you see Damon and? is no better.
IV
A further alternative view of linguistic intuitions attempts to strike the mean between the
reconstructed view of intuitions discussed in part I and the view proposed in III. On such a view,
the content of linguistic intuitions is as on the reconstructed view. Intuitions are judgments about
the various theoretical concepts of linguistics. Instead of simply accepting them as the voice of
competence, however, this alternative view suggests that the linguistic claim that a sentence like (5) is
ungrammatical is itself a hypothesis. In this regard the alternative view is like the view proposed in
part III; it sees the process of constructing a generative grammar as involving two distinct steps.
It is not clear how the examples (7-11) are supposed to work on this alternative view. If the
intuitive judgment is that the sentence *would you’ve wanted to come? is ungrammatical, in the sense of
not being assigned a structural description, then there is a problem. The sentence is assigned a
structural description, but not one that allows for the cliticization of have onto you. If instead the
intuitive judgment is that there is an empty category interposed between you and have, then the
suggestion seriously stretches the bounds of plausibility. What options are left for the defender of
the alternative view?17
Setting this problem aside, however, there is the further problem of Devitt’s worry, raised in part
I above, that on any such view we are in need of an explanation of the selectivity of linguistic
intuitions. Why do we have intuitions about some of the concepts of linguistic theory but not
17
On possibility is that the judgment is as follows: the sentence is grammatical as long as the have is
indicated. The problem of Devitt’s worry remains.
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others? Any attempt to develop the alternative view must confront this question. In contrast, the
view of linguistic intuitions proposed in part III of this paper avoids Devitt’s worry altogether, by
maintaining that such intuitions are not about the concepts of linguistic theory. This is major point
in favor of that view over the alternative.
The key to the positive account of linguistic intuitions in this paper lies in the concept of a
structural description. The study of structural descriptions is distinct from the study of well-formed
expressions (this difference is discussed by Chomsky under the labels “strong” vs. “weak” generative
capacity (Chomsky 1965, pp. 60-62)). The basic hypothesis under consideration is that there is a
kind of intuition that we possess which can only be explained by appeal to the structural descriptions
that we assign to sentences. And this in turn can only be explained on the assumption that we
cognitively possess some system of rules that recursively assigns structural descriptions to sentences.
This account raises several questions that are worth further investigation. Perhaps most important is
whether the relation between semantic intuitions and semantic theory can be reconstructed along
anything like the lines of the current proposal. While I have made cavalier use of the term linguistic,
the primary focus of this discussion has been syntactic intuitions and the theory of syntax, not
semantics. It is my hope that similar attention to methodology in semantics will yield a view of that
discipline consistent with the view of syntax outlined here.
References
Chomsky, N. (1965). Aspects of the theory of syntax. Cambridge, M. I. T. Press.
Chomsky, N. (1995). "Language and Nature." Mind 104: 1-61.
Devitt, M. (1996). Coming to our Senses. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
Devitt, M. (forthcoming). Intuitions in Linguistics.
Devitt, M. and K. Sterelny (1989). "Linguistics: What's Wrong with "The Right View"."
Philosophical Perspectives 3: 497-531.
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