Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 1
Summary of:
Wiessner, Polly (2005). Norm Enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen: A Case of Strong
Reciprocity? Human Nature, 16(2), 115-145.
Summary by Caitlin Rogers, Casey Dudley, Elizabeth Benton and Paul Ferraiolo
Dr. Mills, Psyc 452, Fall 2007
The author begins by recounting the current dominant theories for explaining the high level of
altruistic cooperation that is found in human societies. Wiessner suggests that the most widely
accepted theory is reciprocal altruism, “in which one partner in a dyad rewards or punishes the
other on a tit-for-tat basis” (Wiessner, 2005, p 1). She goes on to suggest that recently alternate
models have been proposed. One important model is strong reciprocity:
“Strong reciprocity occurs when individuals are willing to sacrifice resources for
rewarding fair and punishing unfair behavior, even if this is costly and provides neither
present nor future rewards for the reciprocator. Strong reciprocity requires high levels of
monitoring within the group and subsequent action to bring individual behavior in line
through reward and punishment. Numerous economic experiments in western and nonwestern societies have indicated that people behave altruistically by forfeiting personal
economic gain in order to punish” (Wiessner, 2005, p 2).
Strong reciprocity appears to be distinguished from reciprocal altruism because there is no
immediate reward for the reciprocator. The concept of a “collective conscience” of a community
that works to control members of the community has been central to anthropology since the work
of Durkheim. However, few studies have been carried out to actually discover the methods of
“norm enforcement.” This study uses data from 308 conversations among the Ju/'hoansi (!Kung)
Bushmen of northwest Botswana to examine the dynamics of reward and punishment to enforce
norms. The objectives of this study are threefold: The first is to look at the dynamics of
punishment among the Ju/'hoansi:
a. What are the respective roles of reward and punishment in norm enforcement?
b. Which behaviors elicit punishment by individuals and by groups?
c. Who punishes whom?
d. What different forms of punishment are applied, and what are their outcomes?
The second objective is to evaluate the costs of punishment in a forage society and see how they
are reduced. The third objective is to see if the Ju/'hoansi data provide evidence for strong
reciprocity or whether other hypotheses that center on individual self-interest provide sufficient
explanations.
Institutions and norms in foraging societies
The following three social institutions are found in most mobile foraging societies:
1. Foragers live in cooperative communities, share food and child-rearing and care for the
weaker ones. Parents are sometimes free to pursue subsistence activities. Norms
supporting cooperation include mutual obligations among close kin; willingness to share;
Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 2
respect of possession for material goods, mates, and relationships; and the maintenance of
harmony within residential groups.
2. Egalitarianism is maintained to facilitate cooperation. Equality applies to all adults and
there is an age hierarchy.
3. Most foragers have extensive social ties in order to serve as a safety net for backup
resources. These ties are made by kinship, exchange, or ceremony. Equality and respect
are emphasized.
The Ju/’hoansi
In the mid-70’s the Ju/’hoansi were primarily hunter-gatherers. They lived in small
dispersed groups depending on the season, yet also maintained distant relationships for
exchange. They have been in regular contact with pastoralists. After this period there was a time
of social strife, political turmoil and alcoholism, but social change has occurred to some extent
for the better recently when a cooperative was formed.
Methods
The conversations are taken from the field during the years 1974 and 1996-97. The
author did not have fluency in the Ju/’hoan language, but was able to decipher these
conversations. She recorded the following points for each conversation: topic(s), setting,
participants, and whether the conversation included praise or punishment.
Costs of punishing in foraging societies:
The costs of punishment include:
1. Loss of a valuable group member.
2. Severed social ties.
3. Escalation of disputes into violence.
4. Time and energy costs.
5. Damaged reputation for being too critical or mean to another.
The benefits of punishment include bringing violators back into line with the norm, expulsing
undesirable group members, and sometimes the strengthening of bonds.
Conversation and Punishment: Why Talk Hurts
Most punishment takes place in conversations, except when someone subtly withdraws
assistance to signal dissatisfaction. Two-thirds of criticisms took place in groups involving
community members and one-third in groups that involved visitors. Punishment was divided into
four categories (table adapted from Wiessner, P., p 130):
1. put-downs through joking or mocking
2. mild criticism and complaint
3. harsh criticism and complaint
4. criticism plus violent acts
Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 3
Analysis and Results
Of the conversations analyzed, only 7% included praise while 56% contained some form
of norm enforcement through criticism. The reasoning for this is that praise can be threatening
because it risks creating social inequalities or debts. Praise also implies that the act is out of the
ordinary. The most frequent behavior that elicited punishment for both years of study was
neglect of kinship obligations. In the 1990s complaints about fulfilling kinship obligations
declined when the government began to deliver relief food rations and old age pensions.
Criticism of drunkenness and reclusive behavior increased as Ju/'hoansi tried to adjust to more
permanent villages and the widespread availability of alcohol in town. Behaviors that are
disruptive to community harmony, cohesion, and flow of assistance together make up 53% of all
issues that elicited punishment: trouble making, reclusive behavior, inappropriate sexual
relations, drunkenness, and big-shot behavior. Overall, people did not often bother with those
who were generally lazy, stingy or greedy. Rather, the penalty for these people was low social
regard. Land occupation and politics accounted for 9% of all cases of punishment. 6% of all
criticisms were from jealousy and the complainers were essentially told to be quiet.
Who Punishes
Men and women punished for different issues. Men initiated criticisms 95% of the time
the issue involved politics and land and 67% of cases of troublemaking. Women initiated
criticism for 93% of the cases of expression of jealousy over possessions; 73% of cases of
stinginess, greediness, and failure to share; 69% of cases inappropriate sexual behavior; and 65%
of cases involving failure to meet kinship obligations. Men may avoid criticism where it might
incite conflict, but they still encourage female relatives to do so. People of all statuses, ages, and
of both sexes punished regularly, although women initiated complaints a little more often than
men and frequency also increased with age until old age when it declined.
Targets of Punishment
Men were much more often the targets of punishment by other men and women alike.
The reasoning for this is that 1) men were more likely to engage in disruptive behavior; 2) they
produced larger quantities of food and were faced with broader demands for sharing; and 3) men
were reluctant to target women because of fear or spousal retribution. Strong individuals were
criticized twice as often as average individuals.
How People are Punished
Complete consensus was not required, or desired, for group punishment. To reduce the
risk of the loss of the group member, some of the people refrained from criticism so the target
had enough support to stay in the community.
Outcomes of Punishment
The most common outcome of Ju/'hoansi verbal punishment was that the message was
heard by the target without visible response or apology. This outcome occurred in 63% of all
dyadic interactions. However, this does not mean that action was not taken later to appease the
complaint. The second most common outcome of verbal criticism was the rallying of group
opinion against the offender (26% of cases). See table 8, p 18. Apology was rare among the
Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 4
Ju/'hoan, as was direct self-defense against accusations. Criticism is commonplace, and, except
in adultery cases, the accused often prefers to keep quiet rather than enter into direct conflict that
might escalate into violence.
How high are the costs of punishment?
In summary, short and long-term consequences of punishment indicate that costs were
low on a daily basis. However, the effectiveness of their methods for norm enforcement might
not play out the same way in a larger-scale or less mobile society. Of the 124 cases of
punishment considered, 8% had some negative repercussions for the initiators and coalition
members and 15% involved visible reform or expressed intent to reform on the part of the
transgressor and (another 10% with the outcome "message heard" may have involved subsequent
reform). None of the cases with negative outcomes dealt with regulation of sharing or freeriding. Negative repercussions ranged from tense relations and temporary cessation of sharing to
severed relations to loss of a camp member through ostracism. There is little evidence that the
initiators incurred more costs than the others who joined in the punishment (p. 21).
Is there evidence for strong reciprocity?
Again, strong reciprocity is essentially the theory of reciprocal altruism EXCEPT the
punisher/rewarder sacrifices in order to carry out the punishment or reward of another’s
behavior. The risk of punishment as exhibited by the Ju/Hoansi in this study came out to mean
that about 8% of incidents of group punishment resulted in some negative repercussions and 3%
resulted in violent brawls. The questions posed is: Is strong reciprocity involved in Ju/Hoan
punishment by coalitions or can willingness to punish be explained by individual interest alone?
It is difficult to prove from a field study, but a few competing hypotheses can be offered to shed
light on why people bear the costs of punishment:
1) Regulating reciprocal altruism – the most probable explanation, that punishers are
engaging in tit-for-tat behavior. Of the 171 cases of punishment considered, 25%
involved dyadic relations. However, the remaining 75% involved group punishment that
cannot be so explained.
2) Second-order punishment – this is the idea that people join the punishers because they
would be punished if they did not. This theory is refuted by the author’s studies, she did
not observe any second-order punishment.
3) Nepotism – Is this a matter of close kin supporting their relatives? To examine this, the
researcher looked at the relation of the initiator, the target, and the coalition members.
Most group punishment did not appear to be a matter of close kin ganging up on distant
kin as both were targeted and both joined the initiator in punishment. Table 9 and 10.
4) Costly signaling – This is a relatively new theory that punishing for violation of social
norms is a way to signal to others that one is a quality mate, partner, or competitor. If
this is the case then a) punishing would occur at reproductive age; b) willingness to
punish would increase status make an individual a desirable group member; c)
punishment would be an honest sign of strength. Wiessner has found that this hypothesis
does not pan out with her research. First, there is little evidence to indicate that
punishing is an important source of status; second, punishing does not bear positive
social evaluation but is regarded as a “necessary evil”; third, individuals of mating age
are the least likely to punish.
Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 5
In summary, 25% of cases of punishment were aimed at regulating reciprocal altruism in
dyads. For the reaming cases, nepotism has some value. Second-order punishment and costly
signaling appeared to have no standing. Therefore, the willingness to incur costs in punishment
that provided no direct rewards for the reciprocator lends some support to the strong reciprocity
hypothesis.
Discussion
For some cases, punishing norm violators in the Ju/Hoan society appears to involve
strong reciprocity. However, it should be noted that the Ju/Hoan live in a stable, cooperative, and
harmonious groups which is a form of individual benefit. Punishment of norm violators is one of
the ways that the group is kept stable and curbed of antisocial and disruptive behavior. Norms
enforced through reward and punishment conformed closely to desires expressed by Ju/’Hoansi
hunters and healers who do more than their share to support the community. This aids in creating
conditions for what has been described as stable, cooperative breeding communities.
Mostly the goal of punishment was to bring transgressors back in line through punishing,
without losing valuable group members. The costs were reduced through an array of cultural
mechanisms that had been finely tuned and developed over centuries. Unfortunately, the rapid
political and social change that has occurred between 1993 and 2003 in the Ju/’Hoansi area has
resulted in an enormous increase in homicide, alcoholism, etc. and offenders often walk away
with little consequences. Today even strong reciprocators are unwilling to take the risk to punish.
There has been some positive action in response, namely, government-supported traditional
councils are being introduced to try to manage the outside forces that are creating social
deterioration.
Outline of Article:
A. Introduction
1. Definition of Strong reciprocity, contending theories
2. Dynamics of Punishment
3. Institutions and Norms in Foraging Societies
4. The Ju/’Hoansi
B. Methods
1. Costs of Punishing
2. Conversation and Punishment: Why Talk Hurts
C. Analysis and Results
1. Who Punishes
2. Targets of Punishment
3. How People Are Punished
4. Outcomes of Punishment
5. How high is the cost?
6. Evidence for Strong Reciprocity?
D. Discussion
1. Some Cases Involve Strong Reciprocity
2. Political and Social Factors
Main Points:
Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 6
1. Mostly the goal of punishment is to bring transgressors back in line through punishing,
without losing valuable group members.
2. The most common outcome of Ju/'hoansi verbal punishment was that the message was
heard by the target without visible response or apology. This outcome occurred in 63% of
all dyadic interactions.
3. Short and long-term consequences of punishment indicate that costs were low on a daily
basis.
4. Of the conversations analyzed, only 7% included praise while 56% contained some form
of norm enforcement through criticism. The reasoning for this is that praise can be
threatening because it risks creating social inequalities or debts.
5. Men and women punished for different issues.
6. Men were much more often the targets of punishment by other men and women alike.
7. For some cases, punishing norm violators in the Ju/Hoan society appears to involve
strong reciprocity.
Main Drawbacks:
1. Inconclusive evidence for strong reciprocity, open-ended
2. Researcher did not have fluency in native language
3. Insufficient analysis of findings
Test Questions:
1. Strong reciprocity requires low levels of monitoring within the group and subsequent action to
bring individual behavior in line through reward and punishment.
2. The author of the study was fluent in the native language
3. Women initiated conflicts involving politics and land more often then men.
4. Strong Reciprocity can be defined as:
a. One Reciprocal partner in a dyad rewards or punishes the other
b. The group rewards or punishes the individual on a tit-for-tat basis
c. Individuals sacrifice resources for rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair
behavior
d. The group sacrifices resources for rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair
behavior
5. Which of the following did NOT elicit punishment
a. trouble making
b. extraverted behavior
c. inappropriate sexual relations
d. drunkenness
6. Punishment was divided into ______ categories:
a. Two
Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 7
b. Three
c. Four
d. Seven
Answer Key:
1. F
2. F
3. F
4. C
5. B
6. C