Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 1 Summary of: Wiessner, Polly (2005). Norm Enforcement among the Ju/'hoansi Bushmen: A Case of Strong Reciprocity? Human Nature, 16(2), 115-145. Summary by Caitlin Rogers, Casey Dudley, Elizabeth Benton and Paul Ferraiolo Dr. Mills, Psyc 452, Fall 2007 The author begins by recounting the current dominant theories for explaining the high level of altruistic cooperation that is found in human societies. Wiessner suggests that the most widely accepted theory is reciprocal altruism, “in which one partner in a dyad rewards or punishes the other on a tit-for-tat basis” (Wiessner, 2005, p 1). She goes on to suggest that recently alternate models have been proposed. One important model is strong reciprocity: “Strong reciprocity occurs when individuals are willing to sacrifice resources for rewarding fair and punishing unfair behavior, even if this is costly and provides neither present nor future rewards for the reciprocator. Strong reciprocity requires high levels of monitoring within the group and subsequent action to bring individual behavior in line through reward and punishment. Numerous economic experiments in western and nonwestern societies have indicated that people behave altruistically by forfeiting personal economic gain in order to punish” (Wiessner, 2005, p 2). Strong reciprocity appears to be distinguished from reciprocal altruism because there is no immediate reward for the reciprocator. The concept of a “collective conscience” of a community that works to control members of the community has been central to anthropology since the work of Durkheim. However, few studies have been carried out to actually discover the methods of “norm enforcement.” This study uses data from 308 conversations among the Ju/'hoansi (!Kung) Bushmen of northwest Botswana to examine the dynamics of reward and punishment to enforce norms. The objectives of this study are threefold: The first is to look at the dynamics of punishment among the Ju/'hoansi: a. What are the respective roles of reward and punishment in norm enforcement? b. Which behaviors elicit punishment by individuals and by groups? c. Who punishes whom? d. What different forms of punishment are applied, and what are their outcomes? The second objective is to evaluate the costs of punishment in a forage society and see how they are reduced. The third objective is to see if the Ju/'hoansi data provide evidence for strong reciprocity or whether other hypotheses that center on individual self-interest provide sufficient explanations. Institutions and norms in foraging societies The following three social institutions are found in most mobile foraging societies: 1. Foragers live in cooperative communities, share food and child-rearing and care for the weaker ones. Parents are sometimes free to pursue subsistence activities. Norms supporting cooperation include mutual obligations among close kin; willingness to share; Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 2 respect of possession for material goods, mates, and relationships; and the maintenance of harmony within residential groups. 2. Egalitarianism is maintained to facilitate cooperation. Equality applies to all adults and there is an age hierarchy. 3. Most foragers have extensive social ties in order to serve as a safety net for backup resources. These ties are made by kinship, exchange, or ceremony. Equality and respect are emphasized. The Ju/’hoansi In the mid-70’s the Ju/’hoansi were primarily hunter-gatherers. They lived in small dispersed groups depending on the season, yet also maintained distant relationships for exchange. They have been in regular contact with pastoralists. After this period there was a time of social strife, political turmoil and alcoholism, but social change has occurred to some extent for the better recently when a cooperative was formed. Methods The conversations are taken from the field during the years 1974 and 1996-97. The author did not have fluency in the Ju/’hoan language, but was able to decipher these conversations. She recorded the following points for each conversation: topic(s), setting, participants, and whether the conversation included praise or punishment. Costs of punishing in foraging societies: The costs of punishment include: 1. Loss of a valuable group member. 2. Severed social ties. 3. Escalation of disputes into violence. 4. Time and energy costs. 5. Damaged reputation for being too critical or mean to another. The benefits of punishment include bringing violators back into line with the norm, expulsing undesirable group members, and sometimes the strengthening of bonds. Conversation and Punishment: Why Talk Hurts Most punishment takes place in conversations, except when someone subtly withdraws assistance to signal dissatisfaction. Two-thirds of criticisms took place in groups involving community members and one-third in groups that involved visitors. Punishment was divided into four categories (table adapted from Wiessner, P., p 130): 1. put-downs through joking or mocking 2. mild criticism and complaint 3. harsh criticism and complaint 4. criticism plus violent acts Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 3 Analysis and Results Of the conversations analyzed, only 7% included praise while 56% contained some form of norm enforcement through criticism. The reasoning for this is that praise can be threatening because it risks creating social inequalities or debts. Praise also implies that the act is out of the ordinary. The most frequent behavior that elicited punishment for both years of study was neglect of kinship obligations. In the 1990s complaints about fulfilling kinship obligations declined when the government began to deliver relief food rations and old age pensions. Criticism of drunkenness and reclusive behavior increased as Ju/'hoansi tried to adjust to more permanent villages and the widespread availability of alcohol in town. Behaviors that are disruptive to community harmony, cohesion, and flow of assistance together make up 53% of all issues that elicited punishment: trouble making, reclusive behavior, inappropriate sexual relations, drunkenness, and big-shot behavior. Overall, people did not often bother with those who were generally lazy, stingy or greedy. Rather, the penalty for these people was low social regard. Land occupation and politics accounted for 9% of all cases of punishment. 6% of all criticisms were from jealousy and the complainers were essentially told to be quiet. Who Punishes Men and women punished for different issues. Men initiated criticisms 95% of the time the issue involved politics and land and 67% of cases of troublemaking. Women initiated criticism for 93% of the cases of expression of jealousy over possessions; 73% of cases of stinginess, greediness, and failure to share; 69% of cases inappropriate sexual behavior; and 65% of cases involving failure to meet kinship obligations. Men may avoid criticism where it might incite conflict, but they still encourage female relatives to do so. People of all statuses, ages, and of both sexes punished regularly, although women initiated complaints a little more often than men and frequency also increased with age until old age when it declined. Targets of Punishment Men were much more often the targets of punishment by other men and women alike. The reasoning for this is that 1) men were more likely to engage in disruptive behavior; 2) they produced larger quantities of food and were faced with broader demands for sharing; and 3) men were reluctant to target women because of fear or spousal retribution. Strong individuals were criticized twice as often as average individuals. How People are Punished Complete consensus was not required, or desired, for group punishment. To reduce the risk of the loss of the group member, some of the people refrained from criticism so the target had enough support to stay in the community. Outcomes of Punishment The most common outcome of Ju/'hoansi verbal punishment was that the message was heard by the target without visible response or apology. This outcome occurred in 63% of all dyadic interactions. However, this does not mean that action was not taken later to appease the complaint. The second most common outcome of verbal criticism was the rallying of group opinion against the offender (26% of cases). See table 8, p 18. Apology was rare among the Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 4 Ju/'hoan, as was direct self-defense against accusations. Criticism is commonplace, and, except in adultery cases, the accused often prefers to keep quiet rather than enter into direct conflict that might escalate into violence. How high are the costs of punishment? In summary, short and long-term consequences of punishment indicate that costs were low on a daily basis. However, the effectiveness of their methods for norm enforcement might not play out the same way in a larger-scale or less mobile society. Of the 124 cases of punishment considered, 8% had some negative repercussions for the initiators and coalition members and 15% involved visible reform or expressed intent to reform on the part of the transgressor and (another 10% with the outcome "message heard" may have involved subsequent reform). None of the cases with negative outcomes dealt with regulation of sharing or freeriding. Negative repercussions ranged from tense relations and temporary cessation of sharing to severed relations to loss of a camp member through ostracism. There is little evidence that the initiators incurred more costs than the others who joined in the punishment (p. 21). Is there evidence for strong reciprocity? Again, strong reciprocity is essentially the theory of reciprocal altruism EXCEPT the punisher/rewarder sacrifices in order to carry out the punishment or reward of another’s behavior. The risk of punishment as exhibited by the Ju/Hoansi in this study came out to mean that about 8% of incidents of group punishment resulted in some negative repercussions and 3% resulted in violent brawls. The questions posed is: Is strong reciprocity involved in Ju/Hoan punishment by coalitions or can willingness to punish be explained by individual interest alone? It is difficult to prove from a field study, but a few competing hypotheses can be offered to shed light on why people bear the costs of punishment: 1) Regulating reciprocal altruism – the most probable explanation, that punishers are engaging in tit-for-tat behavior. Of the 171 cases of punishment considered, 25% involved dyadic relations. However, the remaining 75% involved group punishment that cannot be so explained. 2) Second-order punishment – this is the idea that people join the punishers because they would be punished if they did not. This theory is refuted by the author’s studies, she did not observe any second-order punishment. 3) Nepotism – Is this a matter of close kin supporting their relatives? To examine this, the researcher looked at the relation of the initiator, the target, and the coalition members. Most group punishment did not appear to be a matter of close kin ganging up on distant kin as both were targeted and both joined the initiator in punishment. Table 9 and 10. 4) Costly signaling – This is a relatively new theory that punishing for violation of social norms is a way to signal to others that one is a quality mate, partner, or competitor. If this is the case then a) punishing would occur at reproductive age; b) willingness to punish would increase status make an individual a desirable group member; c) punishment would be an honest sign of strength. Wiessner has found that this hypothesis does not pan out with her research. First, there is little evidence to indicate that punishing is an important source of status; second, punishing does not bear positive social evaluation but is regarded as a “necessary evil”; third, individuals of mating age are the least likely to punish. Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 5 In summary, 25% of cases of punishment were aimed at regulating reciprocal altruism in dyads. For the reaming cases, nepotism has some value. Second-order punishment and costly signaling appeared to have no standing. Therefore, the willingness to incur costs in punishment that provided no direct rewards for the reciprocator lends some support to the strong reciprocity hypothesis. Discussion For some cases, punishing norm violators in the Ju/Hoan society appears to involve strong reciprocity. However, it should be noted that the Ju/Hoan live in a stable, cooperative, and harmonious groups which is a form of individual benefit. Punishment of norm violators is one of the ways that the group is kept stable and curbed of antisocial and disruptive behavior. Norms enforced through reward and punishment conformed closely to desires expressed by Ju/’Hoansi hunters and healers who do more than their share to support the community. This aids in creating conditions for what has been described as stable, cooperative breeding communities. Mostly the goal of punishment was to bring transgressors back in line through punishing, without losing valuable group members. The costs were reduced through an array of cultural mechanisms that had been finely tuned and developed over centuries. Unfortunately, the rapid political and social change that has occurred between 1993 and 2003 in the Ju/’Hoansi area has resulted in an enormous increase in homicide, alcoholism, etc. and offenders often walk away with little consequences. Today even strong reciprocators are unwilling to take the risk to punish. There has been some positive action in response, namely, government-supported traditional councils are being introduced to try to manage the outside forces that are creating social deterioration. Outline of Article: A. Introduction 1. Definition of Strong reciprocity, contending theories 2. Dynamics of Punishment 3. Institutions and Norms in Foraging Societies 4. The Ju/’Hoansi B. Methods 1. Costs of Punishing 2. Conversation and Punishment: Why Talk Hurts C. Analysis and Results 1. Who Punishes 2. Targets of Punishment 3. How People Are Punished 4. Outcomes of Punishment 5. How high is the cost? 6. Evidence for Strong Reciprocity? D. Discussion 1. Some Cases Involve Strong Reciprocity 2. Political and Social Factors Main Points: Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 6 1. Mostly the goal of punishment is to bring transgressors back in line through punishing, without losing valuable group members. 2. The most common outcome of Ju/'hoansi verbal punishment was that the message was heard by the target without visible response or apology. This outcome occurred in 63% of all dyadic interactions. 3. Short and long-term consequences of punishment indicate that costs were low on a daily basis. 4. Of the conversations analyzed, only 7% included praise while 56% contained some form of norm enforcement through criticism. The reasoning for this is that praise can be threatening because it risks creating social inequalities or debts. 5. Men and women punished for different issues. 6. Men were much more often the targets of punishment by other men and women alike. 7. For some cases, punishing norm violators in the Ju/Hoan society appears to involve strong reciprocity. Main Drawbacks: 1. Inconclusive evidence for strong reciprocity, open-ended 2. Researcher did not have fluency in native language 3. Insufficient analysis of findings Test Questions: 1. Strong reciprocity requires low levels of monitoring within the group and subsequent action to bring individual behavior in line through reward and punishment. 2. The author of the study was fluent in the native language 3. Women initiated conflicts involving politics and land more often then men. 4. Strong Reciprocity can be defined as: a. One Reciprocal partner in a dyad rewards or punishes the other b. The group rewards or punishes the individual on a tit-for-tat basis c. Individuals sacrifice resources for rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behavior d. The group sacrifices resources for rewarding fair behavior and punishing unfair behavior 5. Which of the following did NOT elicit punishment a. trouble making b. extraverted behavior c. inappropriate sexual relations d. drunkenness 6. Punishment was divided into ______ categories: a. Two Norm Enforcement and Strong Reciprocity 7 b. Three c. Four d. Seven Answer Key: 1. F 2. F 3. F 4. C 5. B 6. C