1
October 15, 2012
Forthcoming in Analysis
Fischer against the Dilemma Defense: The Defense Prevails
Introduction
In "The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories,"1 John Fischer revisits the debate over the Principle
of Alternative Possibilities:
(PAP) An agent is morally responsible for choosing at time t to perform action A, only if he or
she could have chosen otherwise at t.
Fischer asks us to consider the following updated version of Harry Frankfurt's counterexample (FSC)
to that principle:
Because Black dares to hope that the Democrats finally have a good chance of winning the
White House, the benevolent but elderly neurosurgeon, Black, has come out of retirement to
participate in yet another philosophical example. . . . He has secretly inserted a chip in Jones’s
brain which enables Black to monitor and control Jones’s activities. Black can exercise this
control through a sophisticated computer that he has programmed so that, among other things,
it monitors Jones’s voting behavior. If Jones were to show any inclination to vote for McCain
(or, let us say, anyone other than Obama), then the computer through the chip in Jones’s brain,
would intervene to assure that he actually decides to vote for Obama and does so vote. But if
Jones decides on his own to vote for Obama (as Black, the old progressive, would prefer), the
computer does nothing but continue to monitor—without affecting—the goings-on in Jones’s
head.
Now suppose that Jones decides to vote for Obama on his own, just as he would have if Black
had not inserted the chip in his head. It seems, upon first thinking about this case, that Jones
can be held morally responsible for this choice and act of voting for Obama, although he could
not have chosen otherwise and he could not have done otherwise.2
Fischer argues that if this or another FSC is successful, it is good news for the compatibilist. It is good
news, because if an agent need not be free to do otherwise (need not have alternative possibilities) in
order to be morally responsible, then arguments about whether or not causal determinism excludes the
freedom to do otherwise, though perhaps interesting, become less important and even irrelevant to the
question of whether causal determinism excludes moral responsibility. Even if causal determinism
excludes the freedom to do otherwise, an agent might still be morally responsible because alternative
possibilities are not necessary for moral responsibility (PAP is false). What is left to debate is whether
2
causal determinism directly (without the need for PAP) excludes moral responsibility. Thus, says
Fischer, "here is what I take to be the basic insight of [FSCs]:
If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of
eliminating alternative possibilities." 3
Let us dub this supposed basic insight "Fischer's Compatibilist Thesis" or "FCT" for short.
One might ask whether by putting forward a thesis such as FCT, Fischer has presented us with
a new insight relevant to the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists. After all, if Frankfurt
and his supporters are right in thinking that PAP is false, that moral responsibility does not require
freedom to do otherwise, then Fischer's thesis FCT follows immediately. Furthermore, Fischer himself
has stressed the importance of FCT repeatedly.4 In our view, Fischer's innovative move in "The
Frankfurt Cases" consists not so much in drawing our attention to FCT, but rather in the way in which
he argues for it. Fischer is aware that the most potent objection to FCT comes from an argument called
"The Dilemma Defense." 5 His contribution consists in his purportedly new way of disarming the
Dilemma Defense, in particular its deterministic horn (to be spelled out below).
In this paper, we argue that Fischer's attempt to defeat the Dilemma Defense does not succeed.
In what follows, we first summarize Fischer’s presentation of the Dilemma Defense and his response to
it. Next, we argue that his response fails. Then, we examine two ways in which his response might be
improved, and argue that neither of them can be considered adequate.
1. Fischer's Description of the Dilemma Defense
With his updated Frankfurt-example as the backdrop, Fischer says the following about the
Dilemma Defense (henceforth also referred to as "DD"):
The Dilemma Defense is one of the most potent tools in the arsenal of . . . those who
deny that Frankfurt cases successfully impugn PAP. . . . Note, first, that often the
Frankfurt stories are told without an explicit assumption about whether causal
determinism holds. [The indeterministic horn of DD (Authors)] So let us be explicit
about this matter and first assume that causal determinism does not obtain . . . in the
sequence that leads to the choice and action. . . . [L]et us suppose that Jones decides
"on his own" at t2 to vote for Obama; and imagine that Jones involuntarily exhibits
some sign, such as (appropriately enough) a furrowed left brow, at an earlier time t1.
When Jones furrows his left brow at t1 in this sort of way, he typically chooses at t2
to vote for the Democrat. The problem for Black is that, although this may in general
be a reliable "prior sign," given indeterminism, it is possible that Jones begins to
decide to vote for McCain [our emphasis], even though he exhibited the relevant
sign—the furrowed left brow—at t1. . . . [Thus], we do not yet have a case in which
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an individual is morally responsible for something, although he has no alternative
possibilities. Arguably, it is the very existence of the possibility of beginning to
choose to vote for McCain that renders Jones morally responsible for his actual
choice and action [our emphasis].
[The deterministic horn of DD] Now assume that causal determinism obtains in
the example. On this horn of the dilemma, the Frankfurt skeptic will insist that we
cannot now baldly state that Jones is morally responsible for his choice to vote for
Obama and his act of voting for Obama. After all, it is precisely the issue under
debate whether causal determinism would rule out such moral responsibility; it would
be question-begging to assume that causal determinism is true in the example (quite
independently of the presence of Black's device) and also to hold that it is
uncontroversial that Jones is morally responsible for his choice and action. Thus,
again, we do not yet have a case in which we are entitled to say that an individual is
morally responsible for something and yet has no alternative possibilities.6
2. Fischer's Reply to the Indeterministic Horn of DD
Although the main focus of Fischer’s answer to DD is its deterministic horn, he first takes up the
indeterministic horn of DD. He favors, in this context, the reply to that horn given by David Hunt
and Derk Pereboom.7 They propose to neutralize the indeterministic horn of DD by means of a
Frankfurt-case in which an agent who chooses to A in the actual scenario cannot choose
otherwise, because Black's device can detect the existence of some prior necessary condition for
the agent's failing to choose to A, and then causes the agent to choose to A. In their Frankfurtcase, this condition takes the form of the agent thinking a certain thought, or of the agent's
displaying a certain psychological attitude. The idea here is that although the agent had an
alternative to his being blameworthy for choosing to A – e.g., displaying a certain thought
(e.g., thinking about Vienna) as a result of which he would be forced to choose to A by Black that alternative would not be a robust alternative; it would not be a robust (or a morally relevant)
alternative since it would be unreasonable to regard the agent as morally responsible for the
choice he made because he did not avail himself of that alternative possibility (because he did
not think about Vienna). Therefore, Fischer believes that the Frankfurt defender has an adequate
reply to the indeterministic horn of the Dilemma Defense.8
3. Fischer's Reply to the Deterministic Horn of DD
So much for Fischer’s discussion of the indeterministic horn of DD. However, Fischer presses ahead
and contends—and this is his alleged novel contribution to the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate—
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that he is also able to provide an adequate response to the deterministic horn of DD. He believes he
can do this by means of a Frankfurt-example that is similar to the example employed by Hunt and
Pereboom in their response to the indeterministic horn of DD, but that differs from theirs in two ways.
In Fischer's scenario,
(i)
what serves as a necessary condition for the agent's choice or decision to act otherwise is a
bodily event (Jones's furrowing his right eyebrow), rather than a certain mental state or
attitude;
(ii)
unlike in the Hunt-Pereboom scenario, Jones's (actual) act of choosing to vote for Obama is
deterministically caused by Jones's furrowing his left eyebrow.
It is the second condition that, according to Fischer, marks the crucial difference between his example
and that by Hunt and Pereboom. Fischer explains that he prefers a deterministic version of a Frankfurttype example, as then he can better defend the truth of the necessary-condition-specifying conditional
"If Jones were to choose at t2 to vote for McCain, he would have (say) furrowed his right brow by t1."
He points out that, in the absence of the said deterministic link, many philosophers would resist the
claim that it can be a necessary condition of an agent's performing a certain action that he displayed a
certain sign in the past, insisting that an agent's freedom cannot be constrained in this way. These
philosophers would insist that, if that link is indeterministic, it would be possible for Jones at least to
begin to choose to vote for McCain after raising his left eyebrow at t1, and this without raising his right
eyebrow first. It is hard to prove that this contention is false, says Fischer.9
Now how exactly does this new example provide an answer to the deterministic horn of DD?
Fischer's answer is contained in the following passage:
So we assume causal determinism obtains and . . . we make no assumption about the
relationship between causal determinism and access to alternative possibilities. Black checks
and sees the “prior sign” at t1 that is associated with a subsequent vote for the Democrat--say,
the furrowed left brow. Given that Black knows that causal determinism obtains, he can now
relax, as it were; under these circumstances, Black knows that Jones in fact will subsequently
choose to vote for Obama and carry out that choice. It is also true, given Black’s device and
dispositions, that if Jones were to show the sign at t1 associated with voting for a Republican
at t2 (appropriately enough, the furrowed right brow), Black’s device would swing into action
and stimulate Jones’s brain so as to ensure that he chooses at t2 to vote for Obama and does so
vote at t3. I claim that this additional fact, when added to the assumption of causal
determinism and the fact that Black can thus be sure that Jones’s showing the prior sign at t1
will in fact be followed by his choosing accordingly at t2, renders it true that Jones cannot at
t2 choose to vote for McCain (or subsequently vote for McCain). These two facts together
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make it the case that Jones cannot at t2 choose to vote for McCain or carry out such a
choice. (Our emphasis)10
In this argument, Fischer deliberately adopts an agnostic attitude with respect to the relation of
determinism and its ruling out the freedom to do otherwise. He does so for dialectical purposes. His
aim is to show that he can mount an argument for his main thesis (FCT) that does not rely on the
assumption that determinism rules out an agent's freedom to act otherwise. But, soon after, he relaxes
this assumption. He says:
Thus far I have insisted on agnosticism, but I shall now relax this assumption. So we make all
the same assumptions as above, but this time we also assume that causal determinism is
incompatible with genuine metaphysical access to alternative possibilities. I claim that exactly
the same core argument as employed above can be given, even in the context of the
incompatibilist assumption. In fact, nothing in the argument uses or exploits the assumption
that causal determinism is incompatible with alternative possibilities; thus, the argument can
proceed in exactly the same way as above.11
So the following two factors in Fischer's example guarantee that Jones lacks access to alternative
possibilities, and they do so quite independently of the assumption that determinism eliminates
alternative possibilities.
(1) The fact that Jones's furrowing his right eyebrow at t1 is a necessary condition of his
choosing at t2 to vote for McCain.
(2) The (epistemic) fact that, Black, since he knows that determinism obtains (at the
appropriate place), can be sure that Jones's showing at t1 the relevant prior sign (the
furrowed left brow) will be followed by his choosing at t2 to vote for Obama.
(1) rules out the possibility of Jones’s choosing to vote for McCain; (2) rules out the possibility of his
beginning to choose to vote for McCain.12
Fischer contends now that what his new Frankfurt-inspired example shows is that there
can be deterministic scenarios in which an agent's act is unavoidable, and in which there exist
two independent explanations of its unavoidability - an explanation based upon the
incompatibilist assumption that causal determinism eliminates alternative possibilities, and an
alternative explanation (based upon Black's dispositions and device, as well as certain other
facts) that does not make use of that assumption.
Given the above result, Fischer proceeds now to state the argument for his main thesis:
(FCT) If causal determinism rules out moral responsibility, it is not just in virtue of
eliminating alternative possibilities.13
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1F. Assume that there obtains a deterministic link between Jones's furrowing his left eyebrow
at t1 and his choosing at t2 to vote for Obama, and that the Frankfurt case of Jones and Black unfolds
as described earlier.
2F. Black’s device (and dispositions) together with the said deterministic link rule out Jones’s access
to (robust) alternative possibilities, without invoking the assumption that causal determinism rules out
alternative possibilities.
3F. Black’s device (and dispositions) together with the said deterministic link are irrelevant to Jones’s
moral responsibility.
Thus, it follows from 2F and 3F:
4F. Lack of alternative possibilities is in itself irrelevant to moral responsibility [which means that PAP
is false].
Thus:
5F. If causal determinism rules out Jones’s moral responsibility for his choice at t2, it is not just in
virtue of its eliminating alternative possibilities [which is Fischer's Compatibilist Thesis FCT].
Thus, what is novel about Fischer's argument against DD is that (unlike some well-known responses to
the indeterministic horn of DD)14 he does not try to rebut its deterministic horn by employing the
standard Frankfurtian counterexample strategy. His example (which is meant to convince an open
mined incompatibilist) is not intended as a typical counterexample to PAP, since in it the agent’s act is
causally determined, and therefore, an incompatibilist would not consider the agent morally responsible
for what he did. Rather, Fischer uses the example to defend premise 2F of his main argument, and then
employs its premises to derive the falsity of PAP and the truth of his Compatibilist Thesis (FCT). If
Fischer is right, he has provided a response to the deterministic horn of DD - a task that
incompatibilists have so far taken to be an impossible one.
4. The Refutation of Fischer's Response to the Deterministic Horn
Has Fischer succeeded in disarming the Dilemma Defense, in particular its deterministic horn? We do
not think so. Suppose that Jones furrows his left eyebrow at t1. Now consider
(3) The possible act of Jones's beginning (at t1+) to choose to vote for McCain,
which Fischer regards as a robust alternative possibility15 (t1 < t1+< t2). Note that in Fischer's
example, Black and his device (and his dispositions) do not rule out this possibility. This alternative is
supposed to be ruled out by the fact described in (2), without invoking the assumption that determinism
eliminates alternative possibilities. More specifically, it is supposed to be ruled out in that way by the
facts:
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(2a) There obtains a causally deterministic link between Jones's furrowing his
left eyebrow at t1 and Jones's choice at t2 to vote for Obama,
(2b) Jones has furrowed his left eyebrow at t1,
together with the fact of
(2c) Black's being sure that Jones will choose at t2 to vote for Obama based on his
knowledge of (2a) and (2b).
We shall now argue that (2a) - (2c) do not satisfy this requirement. Note first that the possibility of
Jones's beginning to choose to vote for McCain is not ruled out by (2a) and (2b). Absent the
assumption that determinism rules out alternative possibilities, the conjunction of (2a) and (2b) does
not entail that
(4a) It is unavoidable (relative to times later than t1) that Jones will choose at t2 to vote
for Obama,
and that,
(4b) It is not within Jones's power (at t1+) to begin to choose to vote for McCain.16
It just entails that
(5a) Jones will choose at t2 to vote for Obama,
and that
(5b) Jones will not begin (at t1+) to choose to vote for McCain.
However, both (5a) and (5b) are consistent with the possibility of Jones's beginning to choose to vote
for McCain.
To see this point more clearly, note that to stipulate that there exists a causally deterministic
link between Jones's furrowing his left eyebrow at t1 and Jones's choice at t2 to vote for Obama is to
assume the truth of
(2b) Jones has furrowed his left eyebrow at t1,
the truth of the laws of nature (L), and also that the conjunction of (2b) & L entails propositions such as
(i) Jones begins at t1+ to choose to vote for Obama.
(ii) Jones does not begin at t1+ to choose to vote for McCain.
(iii) Jones chooses at t2 to vote for Obama.
But one lesson we have learned from arguments employed by incompatibilists for the incompatibility
of determinism and one's freedom to avoid acting as one did is that these entailments together with (2b)
and L do not suffice to infer that
(4a) It is unavoidable (relative to times later than t1) that Jones will choose at t2 to
vote for Obama,
(4b) It is not within Jones's power (at times later than t1) to begin to choose to vote
for McCain.
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For this, the incompatibilist needs to appeal to stronger assumptions, i.e., that it is not within Jones's
(or anyone’s) power (at t1+) to bring about the non-obtaining of (hard) facts about the past, and
specifically a (hard) fact about the past such as (2b); that it is not within Jones's (or anyone’s) power to
falsify the laws of nature; and also to the assumption that certain modal principles such as van
Inwagen's Rule α and Rule β are valid.17 These assumptions, however, jointly imply that causal
determinism rules out alternative possibilities.
Thus (2a) and (2b) do not (jointly) imply (4a) and (4b), and hence cannot be said to rule out
(3) - the alternative possibility of Jones’s beginning to choose to vote for McCain. As a result, we are
left with the fact
(2c) Black's being sure that Jones will choose at t2 to vote for Obama based on his
knowledge of (2a) and (2b).
as the sole candidate for eliminating that possibility.18 However, (2c) does not fulfill this task either.
For (absent the assumption that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities) if the conjunction
of (2a) with (2b) fails to entail (4a), and hence fails to rule out (3), it is difficult to see how an epistemic
fact such as (2c) can do so. (2c), like (2a) &(2b), just entails (5a), i.e., that Jones will choose at t2 to
vote for Obama, and not that it is unavoidable that Jones will do so. Fischer may think otherwise. But
then it is incumbent upon him to show that!19/20
We conclude that Fischer has not succeeded in describing a deterministic scenario in which an
agent can be said to lack access to (robust) alternative possibilities, without invoking the
incompatibilist assumption that determinism eliminates access to alternative possibilities. Assuming
that in Fischer's scenario Jones shows the Democratic sign at t1, the scenario does not rule out the
alternative possibility of Jones's beginning to choose to vote for McCain, and hence it does not deprive
Jones from having the power not to choose at t2 to vote for Obama. Consequently, a crucial premise in
Fischer's argument against the deterministic horn of DD, namely 2F, turns out to be unjustified.
5. A Further Problem.
At this point, a Fischer-sympathizer might try to come to Fischer’s aid by modifying Fischer’s
example, and taking the furrowing of Jones’s right eyebrow to be a necessary condition not only of
Jones's choosing to vote for McCain at t2, but also of Jones's beginning to choose to vote for McCain.
Thus, were Black's device to detect the furrowing of Jones's right eyebrow at t1, it would intervene and
prevent Jones from beginning to choose to vote for McCain. However, we doubt the plausibility of this
argumentative move. In fact, the move enables us to highlight a further problem with Fischer's new
Frankfurt-style example - Fischer's assumption that Jones's beginning to choose to vote for Obama is a
robust alternative possibility. This assumption strikes us as implausible. The reason for this is that an
event such as a beginning to choose/decide to A is not something that an agent is mentally able to
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discern. It is too brief an occurrence to be properly regarded as an action, and hence cannot be viewed
as a robust alternative possibility. A simple way to see this is to note that we would not know how to
go about carrying out a command such as: "Immediately after beginning to choose (or to decide) to A,
stop and do something else instead." This shows that we don't have a clue about how to perform such
an action. In a nutshell, an event such as a beginning to choose to A (unlike a choosing to A) is not
something that an agent can be said to have control over, and hence it cannot be regarded as a robust
alternative possibility.21
Can Fischer’s example be improved by simply dropping the notion of an agent's
beginning to choose altogether? The problem with this proposal is that Fischer's position then
becomes argumentatively insignificant. Note that without invoking the alternative possibility of
Jones's beginning to choose to vote for McCain (which Fischer claimed the Hunt-Pereboom
example does not rule out) Fischer's example does not enjoy any advantage over the HuntPereboom example. If that example succeeds against the indeterministic horn of DD, and thereby
against PAP, then Fischer’s thesis (FCT) follows immediately, rendering Fischer's own argument
for it redundant. That is, if the Hunt-Pereboom example shows that moral responsibility does not
require alternative possibilities, then obviously, it is not the case that determinism rules out moral
responsibility just in virtue of eliminating alternative possibilities.22/ 23 Moreover, if Black's role
(and way) of ruling out Jones's freedom to choose otherwise in Fischer's example is exactly the
same as it is in the Hunt-Pereboom example, then Fischer's response to the deterministic horn of
DD is dialectically parasitic on the Hunt-Pereboom response to the indeterministic horn of DD.
Hence, nothing that is argumentatively important is gained by Fischer's move of embedding the
Hunt-Pereboom example in a deterministic context.
6. A Final problem
Having shown that Fischer’s deterministic Frankfurt-type example is problematic, we could rest our
case here. However, before concluding, we would like to draw attention to one further problem with
Fischer’s alleged rebuttal of DD, a problem that concerns specifically Fischer's overall argument for
FCT. In this argument, Fischer moves from
2F. Black’s device (and dispositions) together with the deterministic link that obtains between
Jones's furrowing his left eyebrow at t1 and his choosing at t2 to vote for Obama, rule out
Jones’s access to alternative possibilities, i.e., these two factors together entail Jones's lack of
robust alternative possibilities (with respect to Jones's act of choosing to vote for Obama),
without invoking the assumption that causal determinism rules out alternative possibilities,.
3F. Black’s device (and dispositions) together with the said deterministic link are irrelevant to
moral responsibility,
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to
4F. Lack of alternative possibilities is in itself irrelevant to moral responsibility [which means that PAP
is false].
Fischer assumes that this inference is valid. However, it is far from clear that this is so. Prima
facie, this inference is of the form:
p entails q.
p is (explanatorily) 24 irrelevant to r.
Therefore,
q is (explanatorily) irrelevant to r.
However, this inference form is invalid, since it has some clearly invalid arguments among its
substitution instances. Here are two examples.
Example 1
(True) That Richard Nixon had to resign in 1974 (p) entails that 2 ≠ 1 (q)
(True) That Richard Nixon had to resign in 1974 (p) is (explanatorily) irrelevant to 2 > 1 (r),
Therefore,
(False) That 2 ≠ 1 (q) is (explanatorily) irrelevant to 2 > 1 (r).
Example 2
(True) Z's knowing that X has an elderly mother (p) entails that X has an elderly mother (q);
(True) Z's knowing that X has an elderly mother (p) is (explanatorily) irrelevant to X's having a
prima facie obligation to care for her (r).25
Therefore,
(False) X's having an elderly mother (q) is irrelevant to X's having a (prima facie)
obligation to care for his elderly mother (r).
Since Fischer takes the inference from 2F and 3F to 4F to be valid, he owes us an explanation how that
inference differs from the invalid inferences mentioned above, which seem to have the same logical
form. Absent that explanation, we have no good reason to regard the inference as valid.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined Fischer's attempt to defeat the deterministic horn of the
Dilemma Defense, and in this way to establish the falsity of PAP, and the truth of his
Compatibilist Thesis (FCT). We have seen that his attempt to do so is problematic, and when
improved upon, it turns out to be dialectically parasitic on the response given by incompatibilists
to the indeterministic horn of the Dilemma Defense. Furthermore, we have seen that his
argument for FCT relies on an inference the validity of which is far from being convincing. We
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conclude, therefore, that "The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories," though it adds to the
voluminous literature on the compatibilist-incompatibilist debate about moral responsibility,
does not significantly advance that debate.26
12
NOTES
1
John Martin Fischer, "The Frankfurt Cases: The Moral of the Stories," in his Deep Control (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 33-52. This essay appeared originally in Philosophical Review
119 (2010): 315-36. All page references are to the reprinted version of Fischer’s essay.
2
Ibid., p.34.
3
Ibid., p.36.
4
See for example, his "Frankfurt-Style Compatibilism," in Contours of Agency: Essays on Themes
from Harry Frankfurt, ed. Sarah Buss and Lee Overton (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 2002), 1-26; and
his My Way: Essays on Moral Responsibility, ed. John Martin Fischer (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2006), 124-143.
5
Fischer, The Frankfurt Cases," p.36. For some well-known formulations of that objection, see Robert
Kane, Free Will and Values (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), 51; David Widerker,
"Libertarianism and Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities," Philosophical
Review 104 (1995); and Carl Ginet, "In Defense of the Principle of Alternative Possibilities: Why I
Don't Find Frankfurt's Argument Convincing," Philosophical Perspectives 10 (1996): 403-17.
6
Ibid., pp.36-37.
7
See Derk Pereboom, "Alternative Possibilities and Causal Histories," Philosophical Perspectives 14
(2000): 119-37 and Living Without Free Will (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp.1822; and David Hunt, "Moral Responsibility and Unavoidable Action," Philosophical Studies 97 (2000):
195-227 and "Moral Responsibility and Buffered Alternatives," Midwest Studies in Philosophy 29
(2005): 126-45.
8
See "The Frankfurt Cases," p.40. However, later on (p.44) he qualifies this contention, claiming that
many philosophers would not be convinced by the Hunt-Pereboom example, as it does not rule out the
alternative possibility of the agent's beginning to choose otherwise, which Fischer regards as robust
alternative possibility.
9
Ibid., p.44.
10
Ibid., pp.42-43.
11
Ibid., pp.47-48. Fischer also cites this argument in his contribution to Robert Kanes's 2-nd edition of
The Oxford Handbook of Free Will (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 252-257.
12
Ibid., p.45. Fischer says: "Without Black, there is nothing in the example that rules out Jones’s
power to choose and do otherwise; but with Black (together with causal determinism), we get the result
that Jones cannot choose at t2 to vote for McCain (and cannot so vote at t3). (Without the assumption
13
of causal determinism, as I pointed out above, even if Jones shows the Democratic sign at t1, Jones
might still begin to choose to vote for McCain at t2.)"
13
What follows is a condensed version of Fischer’s argument, the gist of which appears on pp.45-47 of
"The Frankfurt Cases."
14
For example, those by Alfred Mele and David Robb, "Rescuing Frankfurt-style Cases,"
Philosophical Review 107 (1998): 97–112, Eleonore Stump. "Alternative Possibilities and Moral
Responsibility: The Flicker of Freedom," The Journal of Ethics 3 (1999): 299–324, Pereboom op.cit.,
Hunt op.cit., and David Widerker, "Libertarianism and the Philosophical Significance of Frankfurt
Scenarios," The Journal of Philosophy 103 (2006): 163–187.
15
For textual evidence that this is how he treats the possibility of Jones's beginning to choose to vote
for McCain, see for example, p.37, p.38, and p.44.
16
By the locution "it is within an agent's S's power at time t to A at time t+", we mean that at time t,
the agent has both the knowledge how and the opportunity to make it the case that she/he A-s at t+.
17
Or to a modal principle such as: It is within someone's power at time t to do A at time t' only if there
is a possible world with the same past relative to t and the same natural laws as in the actual world, in
which S does A at t' (t' > t). For an illuminating discussion and defense of this principle and an
incompatibilist argument upon which it is based, see Fischer's The Metaphysics of Free Will. Oxford:
Blackwell 1994, pp.87-94.
18
Note that we can ignore the possibility that (2a), (2b), and (2c) together rule out (3), the possible act
of Jones's beginning (at t1+) to choose to vote for McCain, since (2c) entails (2a) and (2b).
19
Note that even if Black's certainty and knowledge regarding (2a) and (2b) were to derive from
Black's being essentially infallible (which he is not), it still would not follow that it is unavoidable that
Jones will so act. To establish unavoidability, one would also have to appeal to modal assumptions
such as that we have no power over the past, that we have no power over the laws of nature, as well as
to the validity of certain relevant Transfer Rules regarding unavoidability; assumptions which, as
mentioned earlier, imply that causal determinism eliminates alternative possibilities.
20
Fischer’s error seems to be traceable to the fact that, given that Jones has exhibited the Democratic
sign, Black can be sure that Jones will choose to vote for Obama, this implies that Jones will choose to
vote precisely in the way Black wants him to choose (to vote). But from this, so it seems, Fischer
mistakenly infers that Jones’s choice to vote for Obama is unavoidable.
21
A further drawback of allowing a beginning to choose to A to count as a robust alternative is that
Fischer would then have to regard a beginning to begin to A as a robust alternative as well, and so on
ad infinitum. Aside from being committed to a regress, Black, in his endeavor to rule out all alternative
possibilities to Jones's choosing to A, would always seem to be at a disadvantage vis-à-vis the
14
proponent of PAP: For given a certain alternative possibility of the form Jones's beginning to……to
choose to B that Black has successfully eliminated, there would always be a new robust alternative
(i.e., Jones's beginning to begin to…… to choose) that Black has not eliminated.
22
23
And if their example does not succeed, then neither does Fischer's.
Now, each of us has argued elsewhere that he has his doubts about the cogency of Pereboom-Hunt
example. See for example Stuart Gotz …., and David Widerker, op. cit., pp. 172-174. However, this
point is presently irrelevant. What is relevant now is the point that, if we are wrong and the PereboomHunt FSCs work, then PAP is false, FCT is sound, in which case, Fischer's argument becomes
argumentatively insignificant.
24
Although Fischer's argument trades heavily on talk of "irrelevance", Fischer does not explain what
exactly he means by that term. We shall assume that what he has in mind is explanatory irrelevance.
25
This premise is plausible, since X would have the obligation to care for his elderly mother whether Z
knew that X has an elderly mother or not.
26
We would like to thank Carl Ginet, Ira Schnall, Ori Beck, and a referee for Analysis for excellent
comments on earlier versions of this paper.