Mexico, Effectiveness of New Water Policy Schemes for Managing
Climate Change, and Water Scarcity and Quality
Patricia Romero Lankao
Department of Politics and Culture
Metropolitan Autonomous University, Xochimilco
e-mail: rolp7543@cueyatl.uam.mx
Prepared for presentation at the
Open Meeting of the Global environmental Change
Research Community
October 6-8, 2001
Keywords:
Water Management Reforms, Climate Change and Water Scarcity
1. Introduction
During the last ten years new schemes of water policy have been designed and
implemented in Mexico as part of the “structural change”,1 a broader and deeper
transformation in Mexican economy, society, policies and environment, which has
resulted in a new model of development characterised among others by an exportorientated economy and a segregated society (Romero, P. 2001). Water reforms
represented a shift from centralised policies, orientated to the supply side, to more
decentralised schemes. Although the "nation's”– common or public – original property
over water is maintained, individuals are allowed to exploit, use or profit by national
waters through concessions, allocations or licences granted by water authorities.
New policy schemes contemplate the privatisation of water resources and systems,
water rights trading, and changes in the mechanisms of water pricing. Last but not
least they include more involvement of users in the financing and management of
water systems.
Based on the revision of official documents, on secondary sources and on survey
data, the study presented here describes the main components of the new schemes
of water policy (Section 2). It assesses their outcomes and impacts using two kinds of
contexts – urban and rural – as examples, namely some Mexico cities and irrigation
systems (section 3). The study examines how water institutions do address current
climate variability2 and to what extent these institutions are able to scope with this
A key dimension of Mexican “structural change”, related to the “new public management” reforms,
comprises private participation in public –state– activities, selling of state assets and/or services, and
economic deregulation. Later includes land tenure reform, trade, technology, patents and foreign
investment. Hernandez, C. and Villagómez A. (2000, 357).
2 As other countries Mexico is likely to suffer the impacts of climate variability and change, such as
higher increase in temperatures and evaporation in the northern and central region, summer rainfall
decrease in most of the country and increase during winter in the northern region. All these impacts
might affect the amount and availability of water for agriculture and human consumption IPCC WGII
(2001).
1
1
phenomenon (section 4). It shows that the new schemes of water management
have reached only moderate results as tools to address water scarcity and quality as
well as climate variability. Other factors were not considered within the layout of new
Mexican public water policies schemes, although they can influence a more
successful management of these issues (section 5).
2. New Water Policy Schemes
Since the beginning of the 1990s Mexican water authorities have developed new
schemes of water management, which have not been consolidated yet. Water
authorities are convinced that federal government, represented by the National Water
Commission (CNA), should reduce its participation in the management of water
resources to a “regulative” and “consultative” one; local authorities and water users
are expected to play a more active role in the “construction and management of
water infrastructure” (CNA, 1997, 1999a and 2001b). In this sense water
management should be more decentralised. Authorities assume that market and
clear property rights are the most powerful drivers for an efficient use and allocation
of water. Based on these assumptions the following new water-management
strategies have been designed.
The laws, regulations and Mexican Official Norms (NOMS) allocating water resources
and regulating their quality have been modified in at least three domains. First,
although the constitutional principle of the nation’s original property over water has
been maintained, private rights and private schemes for water management were
promoted. Second, as mentioned, responsibility for water management was
transferred from a federal government agency (CNA in this case) to local water
utilities under the auspices of users such as state and municipal decentralised
organisms or farmers. This means that later undertake the administration of these
systems and – for the agriculture – water and land become privatised. Third, new
environmental principles were incorporated, like the watershed management; 3
polluter pays principle, environmental impact assessment, or the cost-benefit analysis
for the application of regulatory standards.
Within a parenthesis I would like to analyse Mexican environmental regulations
regarding water scarcity and quality (Table 1). Most water regulations were
introduced during the 1990s, what makes evident the huge efforts undertaken in this
area. Nevertheless environmental regulations suffer from some deficiencies. There
are no standards regulating patterns of water use/consumption, mostly driven by
governmental organisms. In most water-related fields under responsibility of water
authorities (like construction and management of urban water infrastructure, and
hydroelectricity plants) these utilities are judges and targets of water regulations,
what can limit compliance with the law. Under a simplification of environmental
instruments, all standards regarding water pollution by different economic sectors
were derogated in 1997 (Romero, P. 2001). And since 1996, water users are
responsible for monitoring their sewage waters and comply with environmental
standards. The danger of the last two regulative changes is that they can contribute
3
Basin-management approach is not that new in Mexico. At least since 1947 and deeply influenced by
the Tennessee Valley Authority approach, Mexican authorities – or better said, their powerful engineer
bodies – have tried to introduce it within water policies. See Aboites, L. (1998, 180-181) and Romero,
P. (1999, 108-113).
2
to weaken already faint environmental policies, since there are no external
mechanisms to warranty that all water users actually monitor their disposal waters,
and comply with environmental standards.
Table 1. Recent history of water regulation in Mexico
Kind and level of regulation
Decreed
in
Laws
–General Law for Ecological
Equilibrium and Environmental
Protection (LGEEPA)
Modified
in
Derogated Main compliance
in
mechanisms*
1988
--- -CC by G
1996
-National Waters Law (LAN)
1992
-Federal Law for Water Rights
Regulations/Ordinances
-LAN Regulation/Rule
1992
-LGEEPA regulation regarding
Environmental Impact Assessment
Mexican Official Norms (NOMS)
-Patterns of water use/consumption
-Operation of water infrastructure
and equipment (seven)
-Limits to regional emission of water
pollutants
1989
--- -Auto-monitoring,
EI, CC by G
--- -Auto-monitoring,
EI, CC by G
-EI, CC by G
1997
-Limits to emission of water
pollutants by sectors
NE*
19951996
1993
--- -Auto-monitoring,
EI, CC by G
--- -Auto-monitoring,
EI, CC by G
----- -Auto-monitoring
19971998
--- -Auto-monitoring,
EI, CC and autoMonitoring by G
1997- -EI, and CC by G
1998
19931994
Source: Environmental Official Magazine (1988-2000) and CNA (2001a). * CC by G means command
and control by the government, EI means economic instruments, and NE means not existent.
Table 2. Recent tendencies regarding
demographic dynamics and public investments
(Supply, waste and drainage systems)
Year
Federal
Mill.
Of P.
*
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
State and
municipal
% Mill.
Of
P.
Credits
% Mill.
Of
P.
998
729
836
1271 27.4 626 14.1 563
1569 23.4 906 44.7 578
1424 -9.2 427 -52.9 352
545 -61.7 672 57.3 595
1178 116.1 346 -48.5 50
1284
9.0 512 47.9 109
1708 33.0 453 -11.5 206
1621 -5.1 752 66.0 163
OPDS own Total
resources investments
% Mill.
Of
P.
-32.6
26.6
-39.1
69.0
-91.6
118.0
88.9
-20.9
**
**
102
127
432
171
505
243
205
% Mill.
Of P.
24.5
240.0
-60.0
195.0
-52.0
-16.0
Population
growth
% Mill.
2563
2460 -4.0
3155 28.0
2330 -26.0
2244 -4.0
1745 -22.0
2410 38.0
2610
8.0
2741
5.0
61.1
62.4
63.7
65.1
67.0
68.2
69.3
70.5
71.6
%
2.0
2.0
2.0
3.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
2.0
Source: CNA (1999b). * Millions of Mexican pesos. ** For these years the amounts are integrated in the column
of credits
3
Investment in water infrastructure by federal authorities is still a water-policy tool of
the new schemes of water management (CNA 1997, 1999a and 2001b). But in the
context of intense economic and fiscal crisis as well as of “new public management”
reforms (see footnote 1), water investments have not grown at the same pace as
water demand has. As can be seen in Table 2, population demanding water services
continuously grew, while public water investments were actually erratic and in some
years negative.
Demand management tools and new schemes of financing are designed, which
comprise three elements. First, water bills based on the user and/or polluter pays
principle are expected to become a powerful instrument and increasing source of
resources as historically water services had been subsidised in some sectors
(agriculture, industry, big domestic consumers) and in some cities. Although water is
still conceived as a common – that is to say nation’s – resource, users are supposed
to pay at least the cost of getting water from the source to their economic and
domestic units. With the establishment of permits/payments for the emission of
discharge waters authorities want to induce users to reduce the pollution of water
bodies. Other source of financing is a mixture of international and national credits
(WB, IBD, Banobras) as well as of federal budget administrated by decentralised
water organisms (OPD) under approval, supervision and assessment of CNA (Table
3). Second, programs are designed aimed at increasing the efficiency in the
consumption of water, such as renovation and maintenance of water infrastructure,
retrofitting of plumbing equipment, and tariffs. Third, private participation in the
financing, construction and administration of water services has been encouraged,4
not only as source of resources for the investment in water services, but also as
mechanism to improve the efficiency of water management.5 Last but not least first
steps have been undertaken to promote an “inclusive participatory approach” of
water users as well as to use watersheds as the fundamental unit for water
management. The most important actions in this direction are the creation of Basin
Councils, Technical Committees for Groundwater (COTAS), and decentralised water
organisms (OPD) as well as the transfer of irrigation districts/units and rain-fed
districts to farmers.
4
Four modalities of private participation have been approved by CNA, namely
 Financing, construction and delivery (FCD). The enterprise constructs the infrastructure and the
decentralised water organism (OPD) covers the investment according to an established contract.
 Financing, construction and operation (FCO). The enterprise finances, constructs and operates the
infrastructure. The OPD pays for such services based on a price per cubic meter of supply and/or
sewage water. The enterprise is not responsible for administrating water bills.
 Systems-operation services. Enterprises are paid for operating the system, which includes water
bills and direct relation to water users. The enterprise gets a previously established amount for his
services and administrates the collected funds.
 Concession. The enterprise operates and administrates the water system, charges customers
based on officially approved water tariffs and obtains reasonable utilities. The municipality
becomes in reward a percentage of the tariffs (Gonzalez, 1995).
5 Efficiency is defined as a “relation between production factors required for the elaboration of a unity
of product. The less resources are used to produce an additional unity of something the bigger is the
efficiency of the production /or exploitation/ unity”. The less is invested in achieving some standards of
water services and/or the better water-services levels are reached with the same investment levels,
the more efficient are water services. Zentella (2000, 60 and 61).
4
3. Water management reform, some outcomes in urban and rural areas
How have these new management schemes been implemented? What are their
impacts and outcomes? How are they addressing water scarcity and climate
variability and change? To answer these questions, some components of
implemented water reforms in urban and rural contexts will be shortly analysed,
namely actions aimed at
 Increasing incomes through water fees,
 Expediting participation of the private sector in the management of urban
water systems,
 Transferring irrigation systems to farmers, and
 Promoting a more participatory water management approach.
Actions aimed at increasing water-related governmental revenues
CNA has promoted the reform of urban-water laws in 26 of the 31 Mexican states;
three of them are based on “model laws” designed by the Commission (CNA, 1997).
Decentralised Water Organisms (OPDS) have been created and/or transformed,
under the reform of the Article 115 of the Constitution (1983). OPDS function as
quasi-autonomous organisations at state and municipal levels, in charge of
constructing and managing urban water systems under the APAZU programme,6
based on private and public sources of funding. The latter are supposed to decline
according to CNA’s expectations, and be substituted by water fees. Urban-water laws
of 19 Mexican states allow OPDS to establish the level of fees and to charge
consumers with water-bills for supply and sewage systems; 20 laws allow for the
implementation of a politically very ticklish action, namely to suspend water services
if users do not pay.
All these measures have resulted in increasing total resources for CNA and local
water authorities, which grew 96 and 19.4 percent respectively during 1995-1999
(Tables 3 and 4). A careful analyse of these data shows that fees for use of national
freshwater are the most important source of revenues, followed by CNA’s delivery of
water to urban and industrial centres; they make together an average of 70.1% and
16.4% respectively. Fees for freshwater consumption by urban sectors only
augmented during 1998-1999 (Table 4). While irrigation services and the use of
water bodies as receptors of pollutants still represent a very small share of
governmental water revenues (Table 3). Authorities hence have not yet been able to
increase their revenues from irrigation agriculture – which in 2000 consumed 83 per
cent of the national total amount of withdrawn freshwater (CNA, 2001a) – nor have
they implemented emission permits as polluter-pays principle (Table 3).
6
The Programme of Freshwater and Drainage for Urban Zones (APAZU) was created in 1992, under
the framework of the National Water Law. According to APAZU if the local authority seeks financing for
water facilities, it has to present CNA a project describing the works and mechanisms aimed at
recovering the investment. Only with the approval of CNA and the “support” of Federal and/or state
authorities can the project be financed. González (1996, 64-65).
5
Table 3. CNA: Revenues for Water Uses, Systems and Services
(Millions of pesos)
Concept
Use of national waters**
Use as receptor of water
discharges/pollutants
Materials mining in
national water bodies
Water-distribution to
urban/industrial centres
Irrigation services
Use of federal zones
Others (administration,
regularisation, fines)
Total
1994
1455
64.2*
52
2.3*
14
0.7*
306
13.5*
118
5.2*
5
0.2*
316
13.9*
2266
1995
1845
64.7
101
3.5
6
0.3
574
20.1
91
3.2
5
0.2
228
8.0
2850
% 1996
26.8 2231
72.6
94.2
134
4.4
-57.1
10
0.3
87.6
423
13.7
-22.8
109
3.5
0.0
3
0.1
-27.8
169
5.5
25.8 3079
% 1997
20.9 2998
73.6
32.7
91
2.2
66.6
12
0.3
-17.6 615
15.1
19.9 111
2.7
-40
6
0.1
-52.2 239
5.9
8.0 4072
%
1998
3.1 3090
70.5
-32.1
51
1.2
20.0
15
0.3
45.4
857
19.5
1.8
102
2.3
100.0
8
0.2
41.4
261
6.0
32.2 4384
% 1999 %
3.1 4217 36.5
75.2
-43.9
33 -35.3
0.6
25.0
27 80.0
0.5
39.3 930 8.5
16.6
-8.1 103 0.9
1.8
33.3
14 75.0
0.2
9.2 282 8.0
5.0
7.7 5606 27.9
Source: (CNA, 2001b). * Numbers in the first line of the column correspond to percentages of totals in the last line
of the column. ** Includes consumptive and non-consumptive uses like supply water, hydroelectricity,
aquaculture, and agriculture, although authorities have not yet charged farmers.
Contrary to governmental expectations, revenues from water bills are neither enough
for the Mexican water sector to become financially auto-sufficient, nor to induce more
efficient patterns of water use, and/or reduce highly regressive subsidies in some
cities. In 2000 for instance, 55 percent or CNA’s budget came from federal grants, 5
percent from borrowed funds and 40 percent from water fees (CNA, 2001a). The
situation is more striking at the state and local level. For instance, water bills only
represent 20 percent of the amount the Federal District has to invest during 2001 in
the administration of urban water systems (Reforma Newspaper, 02/0701).
Table 4. Revenues for water services in some and
all-Mexican cities
(Million of constant pesos)
City
Aguascalientes
Mexicali
Federal District
Monterrey
Oaxaca
Puebla
Queretaro
Total
1995
1996
%
1997
%
1998
83,560
59,771 -28.5
51,299 44.4
44,415
75,769
86,579 14.3
84,124 -2.8 100,891
769,487 782,708 1.7 648,949 -17.1 921,577
481,404 500,693 4.0 547,260 9.3 566,581
10,697
6,774 -36.7
7,665 13.2
6,889
48,070
48,825 1.6
49,417 1.2
38,316
57,751
63,389 9.8
57,943 -8.6
59,703
2,330,520 2,282,152 -2.1 2,156,288 -5.5 2,552,846
%
1999
44.4
50,210
19.9 120,470
42.0 978,274
3.5 585,097
-10.1
7,746
-22.5
40,536
3.0
83,289
18.4 2,783,082
%
13.0
19.4
6.2
3.3
0.2
5.8
39.5
9.0
Source: CNA (1999b).
Different obstacles impede tariffs to play a more decisive role as mechanism for the
implementation of the user and/or polluter pays principle, namely:

Water is a “political issue” in Mexican cities and water bills have been
politically and not technically defined and set, in at least two senses.
Politicians use water tariffs and provision as campaign slogan they fulfil
through “clientelistic” relations to their target groups, especially poor people
whose access to water services is conditioned to their support for the official
6
party. Big users “negotiate” with and small ones press local authorities to
receive water services, and avoid or at least contain increases in water
charges, since a “no payment” culture is quite extended within Mexican water
users, most of whom rightly argue about the low quality of water services
(Gonzalez, 1995; Pineda, 1999; Zentella, 2000).

In various cities, water authorities do lack legitimate, organised and total
control over artesian wells, pipes, taps and other hydraulic infrastructure
controlled in some cities by “industries”, vendors and “caciques” – petty
chieftains who informally dominate access to water.
This
has two
consequences: distribution systems are illegally opened or deviated by water
users, and inhabitants, industrial, commerce and service enterprises just throw
rubbish and hazardous wastes into collectors and open channels (Gonzalez,
1995, Pineda, 1999, Romero, 1999). As shown above, during last years water
and environmental authorities have loosened water-quality regulations. How
can authorities then meter and charge water consumption and/or oblige to pay
for water pollution when their institutional setting is so weak, illegality so
spread, and when environmental standards have been softened recently?
Private participation in the management of water
Some cases of private participation in water management will be shortly described for
the reader to see how new water policies have been implemented in Mexican urban
areas, whether they have been effective in addressing water scarcity and quality, and
whether or not private participation is related to a more efficient management of
water. The first three examples – Federal District, Aguascalientes and Puebla –
constitute different forms of private participation in the management of water
services. While the other – four cities of the state of Baja California – appear to be
cases of services still managed by public organisms, but under new – managerial –
schemes of administration (see the eight indicators in table 5).
Water reforms were introduced in the Federal District since 1989, when authorities
stated that supply-side strategies were no longer feasible, as water became scarce,
costs were not recovered, financing was difficult and water pollution turned into an
additional restriction. They introduced two kinds of demand management approaches
(increases in water charges, retrofitting of water equipment), and created an OPD,
the Water Commission of the Federal District (DDF-GEM, 1989, Romero, 1999a).
Within a extremely short and closed bidding process (November 1992 – March
1993), which lacked public participation of water users or their representatives, four
companies were granted general “service contracts” by the Government and the
Water Commission as private administrators of the water systems of the Federal
District,7 not of the whole Metropolitan Area of Mexico City and/or the Basin of
Mexico, as both have been historically managed by different state and municipal
7
In service contracts the responsibility for billing and charging is withheld by the government. The
winner companies are: a) Sistema de Agua Potable, a sister of the Mexican powerful construction
enterprise ICA, and the French company General des Eaux for the North area; b) Industrias de Agua
de la ciudad de México, Socios Ambientales de México, and the British company Seven Trent for the
East zone; c) Grupo Gutsa and North West Water International Ltd. for the West area; d) Bufete
Industrial, Bancomer, Lyonnaise des Eaux Dumez and Anglian Water Plc for the South zone.
Valencia (1996).
7
water authorities. Three stages were included in the contract. 1. Actualisation and
regularisation of users inventory, water taps and meters, and supply and drainage
network. 2. Construction of new taps and connections to the sewage system, and
billing of customers by metered usage (Nevertheless customers are still supposed to
pay to municipal water authorities not to the companies). 3. Maintenance and repair
of the distribution and drainage systems. As of 2000 only the first two phases had
been implemented, not the third one.
Table 5. Cases of New Water Management Schemes in Mexican cities,
some Indicators
Case
CNA as
promoter
and/or
supporter
O
P
D
Instituti Users
onal
particip
arrange ation
ments1
Water
bills 2
Basin
management3
Water
consumption/
quality4
Yes
Yes
Particip
ation
of
Private
sector
Yes
Yes
Federal District
Aguascalientes
Yes
Yes
No
No
No
No
No
No
No
N.D.
Yes
No
No
Yes
No5
No
Not for
users
Yes
Four cities, Baja
California
Puebla
No
No
Yes
Yes
Yes
No
During No
No
No
first
stages
1 They include: a) clear formal and informal regulations or rules around the design and implementation
of the privatisation contract; b) governments capacity to regulate and supervise compliance with the
contract, and c) accountability mechanisms i.e. design and implementation procedures open to the
public. 2 It refers to whether water bills have fulfilled two criteria namely efficiency and equity. 3 It is
related to how far water authorities actually apply a basin management approach. 4 It refers to whether
or not water reforms have resulted in decreasing amounts of consumed water and/or increasing
standards of water quality. 5 Only representatives of the private sector participate in the Administration
Board in charge of supervising the activities of the Public Services Commission of Tijuana.
According to an assessment of the efficiency-performance of these companies,
supply systems have slightly improved in installation of taps, meters, actualisation of
customers inventory, and water billings (Zentella, 2000). Private participation has not
necessarily resulted in financial auto-sufficiency of the Federal District, i.e. in a
reduction of its deficit, a historically feature of local water systems. It was in 1990,
when water bills were substantially increased, that the deficit reduced substantially
from 84% to 59.5%, and then again to 38.3% in 1993, the privatisation year, after
which the deficit continued growing and only in 1997 reduced again to 37.8%
(Zentella, 2000, Table 5). Regarding equity criteria, although progressive charges
have been introduced, a recent study has shown that an unequal access to water
services persists and is driven more by the quality and spatial distribution of water
services offered by the government (by the offer side) than by water bills. (Libreros,
1999).
Interviewed representatives of these companies argue that private management of
water has been confronted to at least four obstacles. Customers have no incentive to
pay their fees, since during their campaigns city politicians usually promise no
increases and even reduction of water charges. Users at almost all levels squander
the resource, and as a result of the overexploitation of groundwater, it becomes more
expensive to supply the city. Maintenance of drainage systems is very expensive and
8
not lasting, because citizens and enterprises usually throw rubbish and hazardous
wastes into the networks. The water system lacks clear and binding rules, which
establish the division of duties and responsibilities among authorities and companies
(weak institutions). Las but not least the Water Commission of the Federal District
has not been able to assume its co-ordination responsibilities (Hernandez and
Villagómez, 2000). According to current authorities, which belong to a national
opposition party (PRD), the privatisation has not improved water services of MexicoCity, nor did they benefit from the transfer of technologies and know-how of the
contractors.8
Additionally the water reform implemented in the Federal District has neither
contributed to reduce the total quantities of extracted water, nor to increase water
quality. Water pumping has lightly increased from 35.22 m 3/s in 1993 to 35.31 m3/s in
1999, notwithstanding private and governmental efforts aimed at maintaining
distribution systems and repairing their leakage (Zentella, 2000). Regarding water
quality, Basin of Mexico belongs to the 15 most contaminated water basins of
Mexico, since only 8.2 percent of sewage waters is treated by 18 plants (CNA,
1999b).
During an even shorter billing process (1st to 30th January 1993), which again lacked
public participation of the users, water services of the municipality of Aguascalientes,
not of its water basin area, were contracted to a sister of ICA, the already mentioned
powerful Mexican construction company in a concession modality. By doing so,
declared the major of Aguascalientes, costs would reduce and water services would
improve. CNA actively participated in the design of the contract project, and the
Commission of Supply and Drainage Water of the municipality of Aguascalientes was
transformed into the organism responsible for regulating the service (Pineda, 1999).
As of 1995, whereas the company had technically fulfilled its contract duties, Mexico
experienced a deep economic and finance crisis, elections were expected in
Aguascalientes, and customers resented the considerable increases of water bills by
the company. According to a poll 75 per cent of the citizens was against the
increases (Pineda, 1999, 60).
To fulfil its campaign promises, and after rude political confrontations with the
company, the elected government revised the concession in December of 1996,
agreed to extent it to 30 years, capitalise the company with 53 millions of pesos (40
came from CNA, the state government and the company, 13 from the municipality),
as well as to include other and more rhetoric than real modifications (Pineda, 1999,
62). According to Pineda fees levels, for instance, still lay in a static conception of
costs, in which cost reductions through a more efficient administration are not
translated into cheaper bills. Customers hence do not benefit from improvements in
the efficiency. There is in the case of Aguascalientes again a lack of strong
institutions i.e. of clear rules regarding duties, responsibilities and rights of all parties,
as well as of an independent organism in charge or supervising and warranting
compliance with the contact (Valencia, 1996).
Contrary to what happened with most Mexican states, the reform of the Article 115
and of water regulations has not resulted in the transference of urban water services
8
Interview to an evaluator working for the current government of the Federal District made by Isaac
Vazquez, a bachelor student.
9
to the municipalities of Baja California, nor in its management by the private sector,
but rather in a state – not water basin – administration of these services, on which
water policies of CNA exerted an influence. In 1991, under the policy programmes of
the new opposition government of Ernesto Ruffo, the State Commission of Public
Services (CESP) designed and implemented new “managerial” schemes of water
management. The goal was to improve public services through data organisation,
quality standards, and “accountability” i.e. a management of administrative
procedures more open to the public (Castro and Sanchez, 1999).
These reforms allowed state authorities to extent the supply and sanitation systems
of Mexicali, Ensenada, Tecate and Tijuana, from an average of 82.1 and 67.3
percent of the population served in 1990 by both services respectively to an average
of 92.1 and 76.6 percent served in 1995. The improvements occured although these
cities have experienced higher rates of demographic growth than other Mexican
urban areas (Peach and Williams, 1999). State government could increase the
efficiency of metering from 68.2 per cent in 1989 to 93.5 per cent in 1998 (Castro and
Sanchez, 1999). It was possible to improve the productivity by reducing the amount
of employee per one thousand taps from 11 in 1989 to 5.3 in 1998. Authorities
implemented following principles regarding water bills: later should reflect real costs,
contemplate equity issues through cross subsidies, and induce an efficient use of
water. Since 1989 hence water bills have been increased in a progressive way and
through cross subsidies.
Notwithstanding all these positive impacts, border cities are still confronted to water
scarcity related to overexploitation of local aquifers and availability of water for
domestic and urban uses affected by a big competitor, the agriculture. It has not yet
been possible to manage water quality, since only 3.7 m3/s of sewage waters is
treated by 13 treatment plants. Therefore water quality emerges as the most
significant environmental issue especially in “colonias” at the border of Baja
California.
In 1993 two events defined the new directions of water management in the city of
Puebla. CNA and the decentralised water organism (SOAPAP) elaborated a Master
Plan for Water and Drainage, and the new elected state government of Manuel
Barlett designed a water project as part of “Angelopolis”, a regional development
project for Puebla and twelve surrounding municipalities. None of both plans included
a basin management approach. Citizen participation was promoted during the design
of later – not during its implementation – by open hearings organised during Bartlett’s
campaign. The goals of both programmes were to improve the billing of customers by
metered usage, increase the amount of fresh water through the project “Nealtican”,
augment the percentage of population served by supply and sewage water, and
improve the quality of local water bodies through treatment plants constructed and
operated by private enterprises (Gonzalez, 1995). The projects were supposed to be
financed by means of APAZU (credits of WB and IADB), customers’ bills, and the
private sector.9
9
During 1995-1887 the investments were financed by credits (40%), private sector (35%), and
government (25%, González, 1995). According to this author, credits were given by World Bank/InterAmerican Development Bank (WB/IADB) at interest rates of 9% per year, while Banobras – the
Mexican development bank – translated them into annual interest rates of 70% for local water
authorities.
10
The new policies resulted in a bigger amount of fresh water through the construction
of water supply infrastructure by a private enterprise with governmental financing
under an assignation scheme. The construction of treatment plants was assigned to
a private enterprise (GMD) under a “key in hand scheme”. Water users did not
participate in both procedures, and the construction of treatment plants faced
difficulties. After the crisis of December 1994 the contract conditions were modified.
The enterprise would construct 4 and not 5 treatment facilities, operate the plants of 4
localities besides the previously accorded of Puebla, and administrate them during 30
and not 20 years. Notwithstanding these modifications, GDM could not finish the
works, which in 1998 were assigned to another enterprise, Tribarsa, and financed by
later (60%) and Banobras (40%, Gonzalez, 1995, Hernandez and Villagómez, 2000).
Different factors explain GMD´s inability to fulfil its contract. First, the high uncertain
economic environment provoked by the economic crises of 1994-1995. Second,
structural features of the Mexican finance sector, like high and volatile interest rates,
and low levels of inner savings, which did not allowed the private sector to get
adequate financing for such kind of projects. Third, the lack of clear, strong, stable
and binding rules regarding the contract as well as of organisms responsible for
regulating and warranting its fulfilment (weak institutions). Fourth, the political
conflicts for the control over the decentralised water organism (SOAPAP) and the
management of water among state and local governments controlled by different
parties (PRI and PAN). Last but not least, the municipality’s lack of financial and
human resources (Castillo, 1999, Hernandez and Villagómez, 2000).
The new schemes of water policy implemented in Puebla faced other difficulties. It
has not yet been possible for local authorities to increasingly rely on water bills (Table
4), because local authorities failed to improve the billing of customers by metered
usage. Water authorities have been confronted to structural limits (local powerful
interests) they could not – or did not want to – engage with . E.g. authorities could not
set limits to industrial use and pollution of water, as most of the groundwater is
controlled by industrial users – between 63% and 86% depending of the calculations
(Gonzalez, 1995, 89), and local enterprises have not fulfilled their agreement with
CNA of building and operating treatment plants. As a result of all this, not only
pollution of water bodies has not been reduced, but groundwater in Puebla is
overexploited in more than 100 percent, what has resulted in a decline in
groundwater levels and increasing subsidence in some areas (Gonzalez 1995 and
Castillo 1999).
Transfer of Irrigation Systems
The Programme for the Transfer of Irrigation Districts began in 1989 as part not only
of the Water Reform but also of the Land Reform, and decreased Federal
Investments, credits and technical assistance among other new institutions and
structures designed and implemented during the 1990s, and aimed at deeply
reshaping – modernise – rural Mexico (Romero, P. 1998). Although the reasons
given by water authorities to transfer the districts have changed during the last ten
years (Murillo, 2000), some arguments and diagnosis remain the same. Authorities
argue that irrigation infrastructure and technology is obsolete; agriculture systems are
inefficient in the consumption of water and electricity; they have resulted in soil
salinity, erosion and other water-quality related issues. The transfer of irrigation
11
systems appears as a policy instrument to “improve the efficiency” of irrigation
agriculture, reduce water prices, and modernise this water sector, by making it more
decentralised, democratic, “productive”, and “sustainable”10 (CNA 1996, 1997,
1999a). Under this scheme CNA is not any longer “developer” but “regulator” of
irrigation agriculture; it is only responsible for the maintenance of irrigation dams and
head-works. While farmers are in charge of administrating the districts, i.e.
maintaining secondary systems of water distribution and administrating water delivery
to individual parcels.
As of 2000, 88 percent of the Mexican irrigation districts and 95.3 percent of the
irrigated area have been totally transferred to farmers, while 9 percent of former and
11 percent of latter have been partially transferred. The whole amount of rain-fed
districts has been transferred (CNA, 2001a). According to the few assessment
studies the transfer has resulted in different outcomes since although irrigation
agriculture is the most productive within Mexico, it is a heterogeneous sector made
of production units with different economic, social, technical and environmental
characteristics, and ranging from large-scale diversified farmers to small-scale
commercial and even subsistence peasants (Vargas and Guzman, 2000).
It was impossible to implement the transfer in three districts because of different
reasons. First, the districts lack a well-organised board, which represents the
interests of most peasants, a big proportion of whom belong to ethnic groups.
Second, a high percentage of these areas (Tula, Alfajayucan and Chiconautla) are
irrigated with sewage water from Mexico City and farmers refuse to undertake the
non-profitable administration of such waters. In one case (DR-17 Colonias Yaquis),
as groundwater is overexploited there is nothing else to transfer (Vargas and
Guzman, 2000).
“In the Yaqui River valley, producers are generally satisfied /…/ and believe that /the
transference/ has increased the efficiency of the irrigation system /…/ However, there
is a persistent believe that there is a pervasive corruption in some modules /…/
Producers complain about being shorted on the amount of water they actually
receive, relative to the amount for which they are charged” (Liverman, D. et.al. 2001,
27).
According to a survey in two districts of the Lerma-Chapala Basin, farmers perceive
they have improved the districts administration with the transfer, and found new ways
of trading their products and buying cheaper inputs (Murillo, 2000). According to
another inquiry in the upper or Alto Lerma district, the bigger the farmers’ property the
better has been their ability of administrating their transferred irrigation systems
(Romero, R. 2000, 18-21).
These studies also found other impacts of water reform. In some districts such as the
Yaqui River, water is being privatised and land “concentrated in just few hands
(Liverman, D. et.al. 2001). Water charges have increased 1,306 per cent between
1989 and 1999 (Murillo, 2000). Instead of reducing water consumption, in districts
like the 11, Alto Lerma- Guanajuato, farmers have developed water markets, which
have resulted in an increasing exploitation of groundwater (Romero, R. 2000, 15). It
10
The programme is supported by projects of modernisation, administration and maintenance of
irrigation infrastructure as well as of improvement of water-consumption efficiency, financed by the
government (53%), and by farmers (47%. CNA, 1997).
12
has not been possible for water authorities and farmers to reduce the deterioration of
water bodies and ecosystems provoked by agricultural run off. Social and political
factors influencing water administration and management by farmers were not
considered by CNA. Transfer programmes were imposed to, not debated with
farmers; social participation hence was absent (Murillo, 2000). Although farmers have
tried to break with local clientelistic political relations and actors (parties, traditional
farmer unions), the later had tried to control the boards of irrigation districts (Romero,
R. 2000, 18-21).
Participatory water management approach
Another key component of agricultural water reforms, aimed at promoting a more
participatory management of water, is the creation of Watershed Councils (CC). CCs
are conceived as integrated water-management organisms in charge of co-ordinating
governmental activities at federal, state and municipal levels, as well as of
negotiating and representing the interests of all actors involved in water
management. They are supported by Watershed Commissions and Committees as
well as by Technical Groundwater Committees (COTAS11), operating at sub-basin,
micro-basin and aquifer levels respectively. These organisms are supposed to
replace centralised, and non participatory water management approaches by a
decentralised participatory one made of a complex and dynamic jigsaw of many
pieces – different actors and interest groups ranging from water users to different
levels of government.
As of September 2000, 25 councils, 6 commissions, 38 COTAS and no Committee
have been constituted all around the country – most of them during the last three
years (CNA, 2001). It seems that CNA has undergone a trial and error process by the
creation of these organisms. Only the councils were considered in the National Water
Law (1992), while the other three organisations were incorporated in 1997, when
CNA realised that water councils would not be that successful in bringing about users
participation. For instance, it was not clear for CNA during 1994-1997 what a kind of
structure, goals, responsibilities and financing COTAS would have. Therefore CNA
based itself on the few already existing experiences from Sonora, Queretaro and
Guanajuato (Marañón, B.2000).
There are very few studies assessing the outcomes of the new water organisations
since most of them have not yet been consolidated. We could only find surveys
analysing COTAS effectiveness in the watershed of Lerma-Chapala-Santiago
(Marañón, B. 2000). Seventeen COTAS belong to the state of Guanajuato, and 3 to
the state of Queretaro, which represent 71 percent and 7.9 percent respectively of
the national amount of already existing ones. According to CNA it has not been
possible to establish more COTAS, because water authorities lack accurate,
complete and actualised information regarding extraction levels, uses, structure, and
dynamics of Mexican aquifers.
11
In the state of Guanajuato COTAS are also called Technical Water Councils (Marañón, B. 2000).
13
Guanajuato’s COTAS are prominent for their avant-garde character in many regards.
They have been promoted not by CNA, but by professional state authorities, 12
engaged in the development of more decentralised policy schemes. These COTAS
are currently involved in a process of consolidation of their directive boards, projects
design and – in some cases – implemented actions aimed at recharging the aquifers
(Marañón, B. 2000). They are almost ready to implement their main goal, namely to
sign agreements aimed at reducing groundwater extractions and stabilising local
aquifers. They have promoted a scheme of limited water-users participation, since
only big consumers and prominent leaders are represented; moreover sectors, such
as public users (25.5%), industry (21.6%) and export-orientated farmers (23.5%)
have more delegates, while representatives of big farmers have been 6 of 10 times
elected presidents of the COTAS (Marañón 2000).
Notwithstanding Guanajuato’s COTAS are outstanding they still face problems.
Official data regarding water use by farmers are unreliable, because of governmental
incapacity and farmers unwillingness to inform. According to estimations, the irrigated
area and the amount of consumed water are 1.72 and 1.84 respectively higher than
the officially reported. Eighteen of the 19 aquifers are overexploited. Ecosystems
deterioration caused by agricultural run-off has not yet been publicly addressed. Few
agricultural sectors are able to comply with designed instruments aimed at reducing
groundwater extraction.13 All local farmers for instance consume two-fold more water
than the maximal level authorised by CNA. The introduction of more efficient
irrigation systems requires a substantial improvement of agricultural profitability, i.e.
better prices for local products and incomes for most of local farmers and peasants
(Marañón, B. 2000).
The COTAS of the state of Queretaro have been created in a relative top down
process, and the results being more modest than in Guanajuato. Only the COTA of
the city of Queretaro has an internal regulation, is working on becoming a civil
organisation, has officially published its groundwater diagnosis, and has got financing
from CNA and the World Bank to implement a pilot project aimed at stabilising the
aquifer (Marañón, B. 2000). Nevertheless Queretaro´s COTA still faces difficulties.
The city has a supply deficit of 47.1 percent, the aquifer is overexploited and
agricultural users have refused State Water Commission’s intentions of buying their
water rights (Marañón, B. 2000).
4. Managing the impacts of climate change on water
Mexican authorities have designed and implemented various programmes aimed at
managing flooding, droughts and other impacts of climate change on water quality,
quantity, and spatial distribution. The efforts of SEMARNAT, CNA and the National
Meteorological System – SMN, dependent of CNA – and other governmental
organisations are co-ordinated by the National Centre for Disasters Prevention
(CENAPRED) belonging to the Interior Ministry (CNA, 1999a and SEMARNAT,
2001).
12
A kind of state level Water Ministry (the Commission for Supply and Waste Water of the State of
Guanajuato, CEASG), with a permanent office and specialists in charge of managing water as well as
of regulating and supervising the agreements among all parties participating in COTAS.
13
Standards comprise maximal levels of water and electricity consumption, increasing electricity
tariffs, water fees, staples substitution, and technological modernisation of irrigation systems.
14
Designers of these programs are ambiguous in their perception of this issue. In some
official documents they recognise that Mexico’s vulnerability to climate variability and
change is not only “naturally” determined by factors such as our geographical
localisation within the fire belt or in areas affected by hurricanes, but accentuated by
human driven environmental impacts such as deforestation, erosion, fires, and
deterioration of water bodies and ecosystems (SEMARNAT, 2001a). While in other
documents, they state that such vulnerability is “naturally” driven (CAN, 2001a).
The idea that vulnerability is “naturally” driven exerts more influence on actions
implemented by Mexican government during floods, droughts and other critical
situations. Such actions share other features. They have been top-down or centrally
designed and implemented by CENAPRED, the Mexican army, CNA, SEDESOL and
other federal governmental organisations (Arellano, D. 2001).
As in other countries (Lemus, M.C. et.al. 1999), the designers of this programs
concentrate on engineering measures such as the establishment of adequate
equipment in regional emergency management centres; the construction and
maintenance of dams; the rectification of rivers; the modernisation of the National
Meteorological System through transfer of US weather forecast technology; the
mapping of water-availability risks related to droughts; and the development of an
accurate climatic data base (CNA, 1997, 1999a y 2001b). By doing so they seem to
be “fascinated” by state-of-the-art technologies and other scientific and technical
tools, by the legitimacy and “rationality” they award to the policymaking process; but
they seem to forget that other factors such as institutional constraints to policy choice
or social organisation do also drive the vulnerability to climate change. Last but not
least, there seems to be no real co-ordination between the programs aimed at
addressing the impacts of climate change on water resources and other public
policies exerting influence on water scarcity and quality.
5. Conclusions
It might be early to assess the outcomes of the water management reforms, to know
precisely whether they can address water scarcity and quantity, as well as climate
change – more empirical research has to be undertaken to evaluate them. The
results of this inquiry can nevertheless help us to advance some provisional
conclusions.
Water reforms have been implemented at different paces and with distinct outcomes.
The transfer of irrigation systems, the creation of decentralised organisms, and the
decrease in water investments prove that water management has been released
from centralised, state control structures to decentralised ones.
Most changes have been achieved in the economic field. Nevertheless economic
transformations are confronted with the following difficulties:

It has not yet been possible for water authorities to rely exclusively on water
bills and private funding as source for their financial operation.
15

The urban examples shortly described in this study show no clear and direct
linkages between private participation and a more efficient and/or sustainable
management of water. On the contrary it has been shown that private services
present an additional burden for the general water users without significant
improvement for water services. As with other privatisation of once public
services, Mexican urban water utilities function as an additional structure
between private clients and public water organizations without private
enterprises assuming liability for unjustified actions or any financial
responsibility for commercial failures. By this privatisation appears more as the
preferred treatment for capital accumulation by private entities, whose
principle shareholders had been hit by the construction crises of 1995.

The transfer of irrigation systems together with the constitutional reform on
land property and other policy changes has resulted in some regions in the
concentration of land and water in fewer hands than before. The inclusion of
agriculture into the system of water right licences has not let to the payment of
around 83 per cent of nationally consumed and polluted run-off water.
The reforms have not succeed in other areas of water management. Fundamental
issues of social equity, and environment have not been adequately addressed. In
some cases (Aguascalientes) water users resented the considerable increases of
water bills by private firms; in other cases (Federal District, Puebla), the unequal
access to water services persists. Contrary to what was expected by authorities, in
both urban and rural cases the amount of exploited water increased and water quality
got worse. Environmental planning approaches such as the application of watershed
management approaches tend to remain on paper without consequences about the
assignation of water amounts and water quality for different purposes or water users.
Furthermore authorities were not able to integrate the related issues of water scarcity
and climate change. Besides that recent environmental regulative changes may or
have already contributed to weaken already faint implementation of environmental
policies, as they lack external mechanisms to warrant that all water users do actually
comply with environmental standards.
Another weak component of water management reforms – the political one – relates
to the participatory water management approach and the decentralisation. With the
exception of the COTAS in Guanajuato (which by the way have met with moderate
success) participation of water users has been promoted in a relative top down
process. Decentralisation has been similarly centralised designed and implemented
by CNA, and has meant in many cases a transfer of responsibilities to state and local
authorities without financial and capable human resources, equipment and last but
not least decision-making power.
Water reforms have been insufficient to deal with related issues of climate change,
water scarcity and quality, because their promoters centred on economic issues such
as cost recovery, water markets, and privatisation. They did not consider other
factors, which are also decisive in explaining capabilities of water users to achieve
self-organisation, equity, efficiency and sustainability, such as markets working in
dynamic conditions and unequal access to them by economic sectors, social
institutions and regulations, other sector public policies, power relations and the
diversified socio-economic character of Mexican water systems.
16
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