Australia and the Asia Pacific
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Lecture 12:
Regionalism, Development and Peace?:
Future-Directed Policies for the Indo-Pacific Region
Topics: -
1. Australia and the Indo-Pacific Region
2. Regionalism, Regionalization and Diversity in the Wider Asia-Pacific
3. Key Problems for the Indo-Pacific Region
4. Bibliography and Further Resources
1. Australia and the Indo-Pacific Region
It is time to draw together some of the themes of the course by viewing the broad issues
of regional development. We will do this by looking at the regional as a whole and
asking if regional patterns of influence are shaping a stable, progressive future, and
assessing the key problems which could derail such developments (see weeks 4 & 11
for some of these issues). In such an incomplete but evolving network, what role should
countries such as Australia play, and what specific policies should they project in the
wider region?
The complexity of the region forms a map of intersecting, non-exclusive relations in
which certain opportunities are present (see lectures 1-3, 11; see Beeson 2004). Regional
processes focused on ASEAN have made serious progress through 2000-2007, even a
more complex security environment that has somewhat dominated great power relations
since 2001 (see lecture 4; see further Bell 2003). Although bilateral and security ties
may have become more important through 2001-2007, and no clear ‘concert of
cooperative powers’ has emerged beyond loose expectations based on the U.S. alliance
system, there has also been strong Asian agreement on the need to avoid or contain hot
conflicts in Northeast Asia, focused on North Korea, in the South China Sea (over
disputed claims), and over Taiwan-PRC tensions. Likewise, there has been gradual
recognition that nuclearisation of Indian and Pakistan has been managed without directly
boosting bilateral conflict but has not led to a stabilised South Asia (based on formal
nuclear deterrence). This has since been complicated by the issue of North Korea (now in
the process through mid-2007 of allowing inspections of key sites) and Iran as emerging
nuclear powers, as well as by ongoing concerns over nuclear weapons technology
proliferation (in part from Pakistan), leading to possibly unstable and evolving 'nuclear
club'.
Furthermore, we should not assume that Chinese, Indian and Pakistan's nuclear
capabilities will remain static. As noted through July 2006: Professor Desmond Ball, of the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence
Studies Centre, sees the Chinese augmenting their nuclear strike force, at present put at
450 to 500 weapons, to as many as 1000.
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Within that total, long-range nuclear missiles such as the upgraded Dongfang-31 could
number about 400, a tenfold increase, to guarantee penetration of the US missile
defences.
In turn, the expanding Chinese nuclear numbers are changing the nuclear deterrent
planning in India, since any of these DF-31s could hit Indian cities. Ball and others
estimate India to have about 120 nuclear weapons.
Only about 40 of these are needed against its regional rival Pakistan. "There are only
about five places with a population of more than a million in Pakistan," Ball says. "You
could basically get the whole of the population with 10 or 20 weapons."
The bulk of India's nuclear arsenal is set aside to deter China, and huge efforts are being
made to acquire delivery systems. In the short term, the Indians will rely on Tu-22 longrange bombers supplied by Russia and Ukraine. For the medium to longer term, they are
working on the 3500-kilometre-range Agni III missile. This solid-fuel missile was tested
last Sunday, with partial success. (McDonald 2006)
In this setting, India has emerged through 2000-2007 as a stronger partner with the
US in its regional engagements, and has sought to position itself as an emerging peer
with PRC from 2006-2007. In mid-2007, India for the first time has opened an overseas
military airbase in Kyrgyzstan (its first overseas base), has extended monitoring posts in
the India Ocean in Madagascar, and has clearly stated that these moves are designed to
enhance energy security, provide leverage on events in Afghanistan (and indirectly on
Pakistan), and to monitor Chinese naval capacities in the Indian Ocean (Loundon 2007a).
India has also emerged as a key competitor with China in future energy markets, as
well as an explicit geo-political balancer to India in the long term. India has also
continued trade with Myanmar, including the sale of attack helicopters, in spite of
condemnation by the EU and Amnesty International (Loudon 2007b). It has defended this
sale on explicit power balance concerns: Defending the arms sales, a senior official in the Indian capital said: "Amnesty can say
what it likes, but what we are dealing with is the reality - the realpolitik - of massively
increasing Chinese influence in Myanmar (Burma), which is in our backyard. If we do not
do something to dilute that growing Chinese influence with the junta, we will be cutting off
our noses to spite our faces." (Loudon 2007b).
In turn, it is possible that Pakistan is setting the ground to boost is nuclear weapons
capabilities: The United States has urged Pakistan not to use a powerful new atomic reactor that is
under construction to bolster its nuclear weapons capability amid warnings of a new South
Asia arms race.
Satellite images of the reactor at Pakistan's Khushab nuclear complex have been
released by the International Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS).
The ISIS says the heavy water reactor could produce more than 200 kilograms of
weapons grade plutonium a year.
This would be enough to make 40 to 50 nuclear weapons every year. (ABC News Online
2006a)
In general terms, there has been some accommodation of the growing power and needs of
India and PRC, as well as cautious support for specific US security concerns, e.g. the
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war on terror, though this has complicated relations with Malaysia, Thailand and the
Philippines. In the long run, however, competing visions of regionalism based on an
East Asian core verses a wider Asia-Pacific regionalism based on US power has
veered towards stronger competitive across some key relationships in the wider IndoPacific, e.g. among China and Japan, between India and China, and potentially between
China and the US as the PRC continued to grow economically and modernise its military
capabilities (see lectures 4, 10 &11). On this basis, the tiered multipolar system which
seems to be emerging, with the US as the hegemony operating above a group of
emerging great powers with selective interactions with the remaining superpower does not
lead to a secure power balance. In this setting, mistaken perceptions, overlapping but
often weak regional institutions and 'design faults' in the regional architecture could all
lead to serious future miscalculations (Gyngell 2007; Slingerland et al 2007; see lecture
11.).
This provides so-called medium powers (such as Australia) with a challenging
environment but one in which they can make serious contributions to regional order
and diplomacy. In particular, Australia, in spite of being a medium power with 'global
interests' in world terms, has had the opportunity of playing a significant role in
relation to the Asia-Pacific and now increasingly towards the wider Indo-Pacific. This is
partly through key bilateral relationships (US, China, Japan, Indonesia, and increasingly
India, including defence cooperation Dodd 2007), but also via a very active role in
multilateral organisations. Australia is member (in some cases a founding member) of
the primary organisations such as the ARF, the EAS, APEC, CSCAP, IOR-ARC, the
Pacific Forum, and a dialogue partner with ASEAN. Secondary organisations for the
region include ESCAP (the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific),
PECC (the Pacific Economic Corporation Council), SCAP (the Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific). From this perspective, Australia has moved well beyond the
humorous view once expressed by one Indonesian minister, 'the "appendix" of Asia, a
somewhat irritating organ, the purpose of which is poorly understood' (Hill 1993, p17). In
fact, Australia and New Zealand, by reason of their position as the southern 'border' of the
Asia-Pacific nexus and its trade flows, and due to cultural and economic
complementarities, are core players in APEC, and are a necessary part of the second
circle of engagement of ASEAN. The July 2005 decision to 'conditionally' sign the Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation, and its following invitation to the East Asian Summit
confirms this view of Australia as being deeply engaged in East Asian processes (see
lectures 7 & 11).
Australia has been active in building these links with Southeast Asia and nearby Pacific
nations over three decades. It has provided a useful lead in its early aid, trade and
investment programs in Vietnam, even though its economic volume in all these areas
were soon overtaken by U.S. involvement once relations normalised through the mid1990s. Australia has also played a constructive role in Cambodia, and was a founding
member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), a key former of APEC, and an active
player in the UN historically from its creation, with a possible renewed commitment to
the UN if Labor policy is followed through (for Australia’s early phase of activism under
H.V. Evatt, see Mandel 2003). Australia was also one of the first countries to offer
humanitarian aid and its diplomatic influence to help Indonesia from 1998, and played a
constructive aid in the financial package provided to Thailand through the late 1990s, and
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was a major partner in reconstruction in Aceh after the tsunami disaster through early
2005. Australia has also moved to built Free Trade Agreements with Singapore, Thailand
and the U.S., with future prospects for FTAs with PRC and Japan being negotiated
through 2005-2007. Humanitarian aid to East Timor was effective (1999-2006), and
backed up by both Australian financial and military capabilities, even if diplomatic
handling of the relationship with Indonesia during late 1999 can be criticised, as can the
divisive negotiations with East Timor over receiving a fair share of the energy
resources in the Timor Gap (controversial through 2003-2005). The crisis in East Timor
in 2006 should not be underestimated: 'violence killed at least 37 people and drove
155,000 more, 15 per cent of the population, from their homes to seek shelter in camps or
with host families' (UN News Service 2006a). Events through 2006-2007 suggest that
Australia will remain a major guarantor of East Timor's future, even if this does involve
both governments in considerable controversy over 'neo-colonial' regional roles. Likewise,
'permissive' intervention in the Solomon Islands had been initially successful, though
political stability in PNG, and democratic stabilisation of the Solomon Islands remains of
concern through mid 2006-2007. On this basis, Australia has found that even
engagement in its immediate area (the so-called arc of stability), has serious security
and financial costs, as well as impacting directly on perceptions of Australia in the wider
region.
One particular area where we can these diverse processes at work is in Australia's
relation to Indonesia. Due to their geographical proximity, Australia and Indonesia face
each other across a narrow sea gap, with past possible misunderstandings and
confrontations of interest in New Guinea (Wanandi 1992, p322) and in East Timor. Such
geographical proximity (a major cause of regional wars, see Vasquez 1995), combined
with widely differing cultural bases, provides a potential for security misunderstandings.
Yet, there have been no major confrontations between Australian and Indonesian
forces - the two potential occasions were Indonesia in its brief clash with Malaysia
between 1963-65, and again in the creation of an Independent East Timor. In the case of
Australia’s leadership of the first UN intervention in East Timor, clear understandings
were soon developed between the armed forces of Indonesia (TNI) and Australian forces.
The minor clashes that did occur were with anti-independence militia or their supporters,
often across the border-line with West Timor, plus some concern over Indonesian
surveillance of naval forces (contra the claims of Kingsbury 2003 that the two countries
were close to war). Australian relations with Indonesia, though often critical and
competitive in military terms, only briefly veered towards strong threat perceptions in the
1960s and early 1970s (Stewart 1994a, p1), and for a short time in 1999 over intervention
in East Timor. In spite of the usefulness of a postulated northern enemy in securing strong
military budgets and in galvanising war games in Australia's Northern Territory,
Australians are reluctant to believe that Indonesia is in fact a serious threat to their
security. Australian threat perceptions are dispersed and most citizens feel relatively
secure in the military sense. In return, only 3-4% of Indonesians surveyed saw Australia as
a primary threat (Byrnes 1994, p138; Wanandi 1992, pp324-5). Improved government
relations through 2003-2006 were confirmed in warmer relations between President
Yudhoyono and PM Howard from 2005, with Indonesia one of the main supporters of
Australia as active players in ASEAN-related dialogues. A phase of tension re-emerged
in early 2006 over Australia giving refugee right to groups of asylum seekers from West
Papua, but protests from Indonesia let to immediate efforts to accommodate Indonesia's
concerns over its sovereignty. Though discussion of a comprehensive security agreement
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has been delayed, the Australian government views a stable and friendly Indonesia as
a core element of its wider foreign and defence agenda.
The question we can ask is why Indonesia has been given this special emphasis, alongside
great economic powers such as Japan, PRC and the US. Australian government circles
have appreciated the real democratic reform and de-centralisation need to be
sustained within Indonesia, even as it is recognised that further progress is needed in
regions such as Aceh and West Papua (see lecture 3; McGibbon 2003). This remains true
of sustained dialogue on a number of transnational problems where Indonesian
cooperation remains essential, ranging from regulating flows of non-documented
migrants, reducing people-smugglers' operations, reducing transnational terrorist threats
through enhanced bilateral and regional cooperation, understanding of Australia's needs to
police its maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and fisheries, through to reducing
patterns of piracy on the approaches to Malacca Straits and parts of the South China Sea.
These factors give Indonesia a special place beyond the relatively strong trade
relations with Australia. Thus in trade terms Indonesia tends to rank between 11th and
13th as Australia major trading partner in recent years, with total trade reaching $7.2
billion in 2005 (DFAT 2006a). Likewise, as we have seen (lectures 2 & 3), Australia had
managed to negotiate a Comprehensive Partnership with Indonesia, and this has begun
to address shared security cooperation: The fight against transnational crime is a priority for Australia and Indonesia. Foremost is
the challenge of combating terrorism. Both countries have suffered as a result of terrorist
attacks. We are determined to do everything possible individually and jointly to eradicate
terrorism and extremism and its roots and causes and to bring those who engage in
violent criminal acts to justice. The two countries condemn those responsible for the wave
of bombings in Indonesia since 2002-the October 2002 Bali bombings, the August 2003
Marriott Hotel bombing and the September 2004 bombing targeting the Australian
Embassy in Jakarta. The Jakarta Centre for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC)
established in 2004 as a bilateral initiative of Australia and Indonesia will have a vital role
to play in this effort. We appreciate the contribution of countries in the region and beyond
to the Centre.
We want to increase our cooperation in combating other forms of transnational crime and
non-traditional security threats, especially in areas such as people smuggling, narcotics,
outbreaks of disease and money laundering. To better pursue this and the struggle
against terrorism, we will forge closer partnerships between our police forces, immigration
and customs officials and security and intelligence agencies. We will strengthen
intelligence and other exchanges between us. We will work together to improve our
capacity to confront these problems when they arise. Practical cooperation in the areas of
aviation and maritime security are a priority. . . . (DFAT 2005)
In 2006 this agreement was extended into the Agreement Between The Republic of
Indonesia and Australia on the Framework for Security Cooperation. This included a
wide range of areas of cooperation and consultation, as well as anti-terrorism
cooperation and intelligence sharing: Defence Cooperation
...
1. Regular consultation on defence and security issues of common concern; and on their
respective defence policies;
2. Promotion of development and capacity building of defence institutions and armed
forces of both Parties including through military education and training, exercises, study
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visits and exchanges, application of scientific methods to support capacity building and
management and other related mutually beneficial activities;
3. Facilitating cooperation in the field of mutually beneficial defence technologies and
capabilities, including joint design, development, production, marketing and transfer of
technology as well as developing mutually agreed joint projects. (DFAT 2006d)
Law Enforcement Cooperation included: In recognition of the importance of effective cooperation to combat transnational crime
that
7. Cooperation between relevant institutions and agencies, including prosecuting
authorities, in preventing and combating transnational crimes, in particular crimes related
to:
a. People smuggling and trafficking in persons;
b. Money laundering;
c. Financing of terrorism;
d. Corruption;
e. Illegal fishing;
f. Cyber-crimes;
g. Illicit trafficking in narcotics drugs and psychotropic substances and its
precursors;
h. Illicit trafficking in arms, ammunition, explosives and other dangerous materials
and the illegal production thereof . . . (DFAT 2006d).
The questions remains open as to whether this agenda will move forward through
2007-2008, and if Australia and Indonesia will find that certain trade-offs in this strong
cooperation will become problematic for domestic audiences.
It is also possible that further Indian-Australian cooperation will emerge, a trend
which has already begun at the economic and military level (e.g. Indo-Australian naval
exercises occurred as early as December 1991). Certain complexities of course remain,
including India's nuclear policy, which was strongly condemned by the Australian
government through 1998-1999, and with Australia still unwilling to export uranium for
nuclear power plants being further developed in India through mid-2007 due to concern as
to whether sufficient nuclear safeguards exist for a country that has not signed the NPT,
though this decision is being reviewed by the Australian government again later in 2007
(UPI 2007; McDonald 2006). Australia in the past has not been sufficiently sensitive to
the complexity of South Asian affairs - the agreement to sell 50 of her old Mirage III
fighters to Pakistan (Thomas 1993, p57) was not taken as a friendly policy by India, and
was not adequately balanced by dialogue with the Indian government. It is also possible
than an Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), no
matter how tenuous at first, could begin to develop stronger dialogue between the nations
of the western part of the region (see lecture 10), with the organisation balancing APEC in
the east, and linked in by the centre by the BIMSTEC (see lecture 10). In turn, India has
continued to engage the ASEAN group via the India-ASEAN dialogue, by India’s signing
of the Treaty-of-Amity and Cooperation, TAC, by membership in the EAS, and by
through the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation (MGC) accords for regional cooperation
across mainland Southeast Asia and South Asia.
Through 2003-2007, Australia attempted to repair its rather weak relationship with
India, with ministerial and sector dialogue across a number of areas. e.g. agro-science
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and environmental protection cooperation. The relationship has been partly pushed
forward through the regular rounds of the Australia- Indian Foreign Ministers'
Framework Dialogue, with the 2003 meeting leading to the ‘Memorandum of
Understanding on Co-operation in Combating International Terrorism’ forging "closer
cooperation between our respective security, intelligence and law enforcement agencies"
(Minister Downer in Xinhua 2003a). There has also been some limited cooperation
between the countries on supporting the development agenda within the Doha
Development Agenda, including ‘their commitment to retaining special and differential
treatment for developing countries’, as well as agricultural reform and reduction of
subsidies by developed countries, though India remains highly critical of the WTO
process through 2007, with strong criticism of US farm and cotton subsidies, leading to a
stall in talks due to US, PRC and Indian differences (Mahapatra 2007; Xinhua 2003b;
Panitchpakdi 2003). Through 2003-2007 there have been extended opportunities for
tourism, scientific and technological cooperation, and cooperation in education.
However, it is not certain that Australia has yet been viewed as a key player within India's
vision of regional cooperation, though this may begin to change through shared
cooperation in the ARF and the EAS processes. It is perhaps in this context that Foreign
Minister Downer has sought to strengthen Australia's profile with India over the last
two years, as noted in one of his speeches: Moreover, Australia's exports of goods and services have grown in value terms on
average over 7 per cent per year over the last ten years since 1993-94.
In a difficult global environment, Australia's exports of goods and services were
valued at $143 billion last year, or about 18 per cent of our country's GDP.
And where to most of those exports go?
Our top six markets for goods and services in 2004 were Japan, the United
States, China, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea and India.
In other words, Australia is an integral part of the modern trading network linking
the major economies of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.
Our trade and investment links with India continue to grow and to grow
substantially.
In 2004, India overtook the United Kingdom to become the sixth largest market for
Australian merchandise exports.
The five-year trend in growth in exports is 24.6 per cent per annum, and in the
year to the end of 2004, total trade with India grew by over 62 per cent.
So the trade relationship between Australia and India is in good shape - and it's
poised to get better.
The natural complementarity between the Australian and the Indian economies
gives the economic relationship between the two countries substantial room to grow
further.
That's why the Australian Government launched the initiative of a Trade and
Economic Framework (TEF) with India. (Downer 2005)
For 2005 total trade with India was 8.1 billion with India ranking 6 th as an export
destination, with gold, coal, copper ores and wool being major exports (DFAT 2006b).
This trend continued through 2006, with trade up to $8.8 of exports leading to a rank
of 5th in exports, but in turn India only exported $1.2 billion to Australia (DFAT
2006b-2007). Through 2006-2007 this dialogue deepened in shared areas of security
concern, especially in the North-east Indian Ocean Region, NEIO, with navy-to-navy talks
now begun, based in part on a 2006 Memorandum of Defence Cooperation (Dodd
2007).
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Likewise, the expansion of ASEAN processes might help stabilise the region at the
international level, but only if ASEAN begins to take on the serious task of institutional
reform, can face the problem of 'enhanced interaction' within the organisation (Henderson
1999), as well as adapting to new global realities (see Funston 1999). Realistically, most
nations do expect a minium standard of conduct in relation to human rights, the
treatment of minorities, accountable government, and some gradual shift towards
dispute resolution mechanisms, an approach that has been accepted in the ASEAN
Charter of late 2005, but a trend which has not yet been ratified. Unless all member states
are encouraged to meet these standards, they will fail to be viewed as strong economic or
political players in the international system. ASEAN will also need to take on issues such
as minority rights, wealth distribution, human security (see Pitsuwan 2000), and the bad
relations created by authoritarian regimes, if it wishes to continue it leadership in Asian
diplomacy. In the long run this might lead towards a more inclusive and more
democratic ASEAN, conceived within local cultural norms (see Acharya 2003). A
renewed ASEAN could enhance Australian security as well so long as Australia maintains
a high level of involvement with the organisations and nations concerned. As we have
seen, ASEAN has responded both to the financial crisis and to the East Timor problem by
deepening relations with South Korea, PRC and Japan via the ASEAN-Plus-Three,
creating a new core of East Asian regionalism, and launched ASEAN Concord II to
deep integration through 2003-2020, signalled by the EAS and a new phase of Chinese
multilateral foreign policy (see lectures 6 & 11; see further Kuik 2005; Hew &
Soesastro 2003).
It must stressed that Australia's natural role in this Southeast Asian region does not
involve Australians becoming pseudo-Asians. The term 'Asian' itself is problematic,
and is at best based on vague geographical definitions. At worst, it is little more than a
form of stereotyping racism, developed out of a colonial and imperial mentality. It is not
at all certain that the Japanese would wish to be identified as Asians, nor that Chinese and
Indians, for example, would readily understand each other in the context of a shared Asian
identity (see lectures 4 & 11). The issue for Australia is not one of becoming 'Asians' or
'culturally-Chinese' or 'Confucians', but rather of understanding and engaging with the
distinctive and individual cultures of the Asian region. In doing so, attention must be
paid to individual characteristics without losing sight of the pattern of international
relations which is emerging. As we have seen, building regional groupings, especially
economic and security organisations, on narrow views of identity or a particular set of
values, may be problematic (see lecture 11). Although ‘Asian values’ and the ‘ASEAN
Way’ are part of ASEAN processes, they are not strong enough by themselves to
engage East and South Asia, nor to form the sole basis of diplomacy in the ASEAN
Regional Forum and the EAS (see Beeson 2004; He 2004; Dupont 1996). Rather, they are
a key part of a non-aggressive process that has influenced tools such as the Treaty of
Amity and Cooperation, but may not be enough for ASEAN to move forward to create
the three pillars of its projected ASEAN communities. In other words, identity and
culture can reinforce regional politics in ASEAN and the ASEAN+3, but is not
sufficient basis for the wider processes of APEC or even the EAS.
Effectiveness in the international arena can be augmented by engagement in regional
and international agencies. Australia has begun this process through constructive
involvement in the ASEAN Regional Forum, APEC, IOR-ARC, CSCAP, WTO and the
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UN, as well as being an active contributor to the IMF and the World Bank group, but has
also tilted towards a strong emphasis on bilateral relations (see lectures 2 and 4).
However, engagement in such organisations can also channel or entangle foreign policy.
We can probe these issues by setting up various tensions or decisions that Australia may
have to make in the future, e.g. can Australia revive confidence in the ARF or should it
invest in strengthening the EAS? Can Australia help moderate any possible increase of
tensions between the U.S. and PRC, and can Australia’s alliance and coalition
commitments alongside its TAC (Treaty of Amity and Cooperation) as a bridge rather
than a source of conflict? There may be in fact a number of domestic limits to how far
Australia is willing to commit itself to new regional roles. At present, the Howard
government is making a determined effort to balance key relations with PRC, the US,
Japan, India and ASEAN, but unless this is carefully managed if it wishes to retain real
leverage on East Asian regional and diplomatic processes.
Thus, once the rhetoric of pre-emption in Australian defence policy began to pass
through 2005, there were opportunities for Australia to confirm its 'good intent' as a
regional actor. However, even managing bilateral relations into complex countries
undergoing complex developmental problems is a difficult undertaking, as has been in
seen in delivery of support and Australian aid to the conflict-torn region of Aceh through
2005, its complex relations with East Timor through 1999-2007, Australia's ongoing
effort to maintain good relations with Indonesia, and effort to support stable outcomes for
the Solomon Islands. The real complexity of the Aceh process, for example, can be seen
both in the moderate pace for re-construction through 2005 (Xinhua 2005a), and in the
slow peace process between the Indonesian government and the GAM 'rebels' from
August 2005. Likewise, though the RAMSI mission to the Solomon Islands has been
successful in 'state building', support for government, and a degree of civilian
disarmament, but has only slowly led towards a unified civil society, e.g. problems in
paying teachers and concerns over stability in the parliament (The Age 2007). One survey
suggested that through early 2006: In 2005, Oxfam interviewed 776 men, women, youths, police, civil society and government
officials in Honiara, Malaita and Central Guadalcanal. It found:
• widespread dissatisfaction that government rhetoric on economic development had yet
to be translated into real action on livelihoods and human security
• little understanding of the rebuilding process among the general population
• a perception especially in rural areas where RAMSI has less of a presence that security
had not greatly improved
• a pervasive sense of exclusion from government decision making and a lack of linkages
and engagement between government and its citizens
A lack of Pacific Island staff in RAMSI also hinders the mission’s impact with Solomon
Islanders, according to Oxfam. As at end of May 2006, 94 per cent of civilian advisors in
the Solomon Islands came from Australia and New Zealand, with Pacific Island staff
largely confined to the role of foot soldiers. (Pacific Magazine 2006)
Through 2007 government has partly stabilised but not without tensions and
controversy: -
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MPs from Guadalcanal Province in the Solomon Islands have threatened to withdraw their
support for Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare unless he dumps fugitive Australian
lawyer Julian Moti from the attorney-general's job.
A recent meeting of Guadalcanal leaders drafted six demands for Sogavare, including that
he immediately remove Moti and new Police Commissioner Jahir Khan and drop plans to
re-arm units of the Solomons police force.
A spokesman for the meeting said Sogavare had two weeks to respond to their demands
or the five Guadalcanal members in his government would cross the floor and support an
opposition no-confidence motion in his leadership. (Age 2007)
Taken as a whole, Australian policy in these areas has been influential and wide
ranging, but has also strained foreign policy and defence capabilities, as well as
exposing Australia to major regional responsibilities.
2. Regionalism, Regionalization and Diversity in the Wider Asia-Pacific
As we have seen, no single organisation or group of organisations, covers the
governance of the entire Indo-Pacific region, with only relatively limited organisations
such as APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum covering different aspects of trade and
security cooperation. Even within Southeast Asia and South Asia, the construction of
regional organisations (ASEAN and SAARC, see weeks 6 and 10) has been a gradual
process with only limited integration and institutionalisation of these groups. The East
Asian Summit (EAS) process based on the ASEAN-Plus-Three (APT), has begun to
emerge through 2003-2007, but it remains to be seen how strong this will be in shaping
the wider region, especially since it suffers from tensions over membership, differences
between Chinese and Japanese viewpoints, and a circle of activity that tends to overlap
the ASEAN-Plus-Three and the ARF (Strategic Comments 2005.
A clear-cut definition of a region can no longer be given on narrow geographical
grounds, and is not merely based on physical proximity. Strong linkages and flows of
information, money, people, affiliation or shared concerns and threats are needed
form a region: The literature on new regionalism stresses several key linkage factors as necessary
conditions under which regionalism or regional integration can take place among a group
of states, including linkage by geographical proximity and by various forms of shared
political, economic, social, cultural, or institutional affinities. Regions are also defined by
combinations of geographical, psychological, and behavioural characteristics. (Kim 2004,
p40).
As we have seen, political regions are not ‘natural’: they are ‘socially constructed
and politically contested’ (Kim 2004, p45), they can be built up on historical experience
or destroyed by conflict and new trends. Just as modern nations and nationalism projects
are partly ‘imagined communities’ (see Anderson 1991), regional grouping are also
imagined and invested in by political leaders, domestic audiences, civil society,
corporations, and governments (He 2004, p119). Shared security concerns and
complexes can also drive regional processes to some degree (see Buzan & Waever
2003): this was partially the case of ASEAN and remains an important factor for the
ASEAN Regional Forum. Likewise, multilateral and regional groups may increase the
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security and ‘voice’ of small and medium powers (He 2004, p121), part of the
background ASEAN, APEC and to a lesser degree IOR-ARC. How far they can restrain
great powers, however, dependents upon relative power balances in the wider region and
whether the stronger powers need a 'concert' or alliance system to support their wider
needs and agenda.
In part, this slow progress has been driven by the great diversity of the region, as well
as by pressing national and sovereign needs by many Asian states still going through
national-building processes over the last fifty years. For Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia is arguably the most diverse region in the world. Whether it is measured in
terms of differences in economic development, divergent social and religious traditions or
differing political regimes, there are few places where such diversity is woven into the very
fabric of national life. Indeed, there are considerable grounds for questioning whether what
we think of as contemporary Southeast Asia constitutes a region at all. And yet, despite
this remarkable difference at the level of individual nations, Southeast Asia has also given
rise to some of the most enduring transnational and regional institutions in the developing
world. This paradox is at the heart of one of the most distinctive features of modern
Southeast Asia: despite the national diversity that is its defining feature, there are a
number of region-wide processes that have given Southeast Asia both a particular identity
and a set of additional political, economic, social and even environmental dynamics that
have in turn shaped national outcomes. (Beeson 2004, p1)
In turn, we can question how deep this integration as been, with limited supranational
aspects only slowly appearing in ASEAN via Concord II (from 2003) and the
ASEAN Charter (being debated through 2005-2007), with ASEAN largely working
through inter-governmental agreements, voluntary treaties with little formal enforcement,
and an ongoing dialogue process. This has in part been maintained by the non-interference
concept with the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), but in reality the region is
moving towards the understanding that shared action is needed on shared problems.
The diversity of Southeast Asia is complicated by its multi-ethnic and multi-religious
populations, even within one state, by diversity among nations as to wealth,
developmental level, governmental style and religion, as well as sub-regional diversity
among South Asia, Southeast Asia, Northeast Asia, the South Pacific, South American
states (within APEC and in intensified trade relations with China and North-east Asia),
and developed states with European cultural features such as Australia, New Zealand,
Canada and the United States.
11
Religious Diversity in Southeast Asia: Mosque in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam
(Photocopy copright R. James Ferguson 2002)
Some of this diversity can be seen in Table 1 below, where even states with dominant
religious groups also have significant religious minorities, e.g. Christians, Buddhists
and Hindus in Indonesia. Even in Vietnam there are Christian minorities, Chinese subcommunities, and a small Muslim community.
Table 1 (modified from Beeson 2004)
Country
Brunei
Population
million)
.344
Cambodia
12.6
Indonesia
Lao PDR
Malaysia
Myanmar
Philippines
208.9
5.4
23.8
48.3
78.3
Singapore
Thailand
4.1
61.1
Vietnam
79.5
(approx.
Government Type
Main Religion
[Constitutional]
Monarchy
Constitutional
Monarchy (from 1993)
Democratic Republic
Communist
Procedural Democracy
Military Junta
Democracy
Islam
Procedural Democracy
Constitutional
Monarch/Democracy or
Junta
Communist
Buddhism
Islam (plus others)
Buddhism
Islam (plus others)
Buddhism (plus others)
Christianity
(plus
Muslim minority)
Taoism (plus others)
Buddhism (plus others)
Buddhism (plus others)
One key point is that regional processes are not always driven by similarity and
convergence, though this may be required in the long term. Rather, complementarity
among economies, services and development level can also provide strong regional flows.
Furthermore, regional organisations can also be driven by crisis and the requirement for
12
crisis management and preventive diplomacy. Thus, the first phase of ASEAN
regionalism from 1967 was driven by the need to reduce political tensions among member
states, especially Indonesia and Malaysia, and the desire to reduce great power
interventions in local conflicts (see lecture 6). The second phase of ASEAN regionalism
after 1998 was driven in part by a reaction to the Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, and
that East Asian states could not rely on a supportive financial and economic environment
being generated by the U.S. and other Western states (for different phases of regionalism,
see Kim 1998, pp41-42). Likewise, a web of bilateral ties, including free trade
agreements under negotiation, have also begun to shape the region, e.g. Australian
negotiations with Singapore, Thailand, the U.S., China, and most recently Chile,
investment promotion and protection agreements with Mexico coming into force through
2007 with plans for future FTA talks in future, plus a range of proposed free trade
agreements focused on Singapore, Korea, and Japan (see Kim 2004, pp56-57; DFAT
2007a).
It is important to distinguish between regionalization and regionalism: To make sense of these differences, it is useful to make a widely employed initial
conceptual distinction between processes of regionalization on the one hand, in which the
private sector and economic forces are the principle drivers of regional integration, and
regionalism, in which self-consciously pursued political projects drive closer transnational
cooperation on the other. One of the most noteworthy comparative qualities of the
Southeast Asian experience in this regard is that regional integration has primarily been
uncoordinated and principally driven by multinational corporations and the evolving logic of
cross-border production strategies. (Beeson 2004, pp7-8)
Of course, there are strong interactions between regionalization and regionalism.
Transnational regionalization processes will make regionalism projects more
acceptable to political and economic elites. In turn, regionalism projects tend to
create a more transparent civil and economic space, and promote free trade and
other multilateral frameworks, e.g. AFTA, the AIA, plus ASEAN’s developing
agreements with China, Japan (ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership)
and India that are gradually making trade and standards more compatible through 20032012 (He 2004, p106), though the ASEAN-Chinese Free Trade Agreement (ACFTA)
seems most likely to lock into place first, perhaps causing some ‘angst’ in Tokyo (Kim
2004, p51). We should also note that the China-ASEAN FTA does not include Taiwan,
unlike APEC (He 2004, p115). The ‘whole idea is to establish a comprehensive and close
relationship between ASEAN and China involving an FTA, and cooperation in finance,
regional development, technological assistance, macroeconomic cooperation, and other
issues of common concern’ (Cai 2003). Individual agreements with ASEAN are likely
to come into play before any formal, wider East Asian Free Trade Area (EAFTA),
which has now been shifted into the group of medium-range projects by the ASEANPlus-Three (Kim 2004, p56). Likewise, the ASEAN-India efforts to build a free-trade
agreement will take time to move beyond a wide range of exceptions and limitations
(Gaur 2003), though some 'early fruits' of this process will result in some 105 products
having tariffs cut as early 2007 (Xinhua 2005b; see lectures 7 & 10).
Political elites have accepted that a conscious regionalism also helps countries to
cope with globalization, and give some economic and developmental support to regimes
(Beeson 2004, p10) with limited democratic credentials, e.g. in Malaysia, Singapore, and
13
Vietnam. Thus, ‘regionalization can be said to breed regionalism’ (Kim 2004, p40).
However, in turn, regionalization make it possible for governments to consider
developing shared values, norms, aspirations (Kim 2004, p40), and in cases of deep
integration over the long term, a certain layer of regional identity or at least shared
cultural processes may be developed. However, it may be dangerous to either to assume
or mandate some notion of a shared identity when cultural systems remain diverse,
as in East Asia. Some general aspirations for minimum standards in terms of treatment
of citizens and peaceful codes of conduct (e.g. in the South China Sea, the ASEAN
Charter) have also begun to emerge, but has had only a limited impact on countries such
as Myanmar. Likewise, pluralism and democratisation, though gaining regionally, e.g.
Indonesia's transition, remain problematic norms for countries such as Vietnam and PRC,
and have not yet become part of a more inclusive pattern of regional governance (see
lecture 6). At present, neither Australia nor the US, even with the earlier aid of Thailand,
the Philippines and Indonesia, seem able to insist on a democratic-led form of regionalism
in the Asia-Pacific (contra Terrill 2005). In turn, the stability of democracies in
Thailand and Philippines is limited, and even in Indonesia there are major concerns
about the delivery of basic rights in regions such as Aceh (slowly improving through
2005-2007) and especially West Papua (Strategic Comments 2006).
Australia has also been keen to develop epistemic and policy communities in the region
(Ravenhill 1998), with academic and expert exchanges that deepen person-to-person
diplomacy in the region, a trend that has also been followed by the ASEAN thinks tanks,
such as the ASEAN-ISIS (ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies) (see
lecture 7). In theory, this could lead to stronger Asian-based international civil society,
buttressed by INGOs and transnational trade and information flows that will make much
of the old conflict among nation states outdated (see Case 1998). However, linkages
between these second-track and civil society approaches to government and
government policy remains relatively weak, e.g. in Southeast Asia and China (see
lecture 7). As noted by Tan: Ostensibly, non-official diplomacy provides venues for "thinking the unthinkable", as it
were. Members of the ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP, for example, pride themselves on
dealing with issues deemed sensitive or even taboo by governments and consequently
excluded from the official diplomatic agenda. This is an equivocal claim at best, however.
On one hand, it is arguable whether political-security issues are particularly sensitive in
the light of the institutionalized and mostly bilateral security ties between ASEAN
(Association of Southeast Asian Nations) member states. Indeed, that ASEAN's very
formation had to do with political-security rather than economic reasons (as originally
mandated), has never been in doubt except for sceptics of ASEAN cooperation. On the
other, the issue of human rights (that is, civil and political rights and freedoms) for ASEAN
regimes (and, one suspects, for dominant sectors of civil society as well) clearly is; again,
it was non-official diplomatic agents who evidently took the lead in encouraging a security
dialogue on the matter, but arguably a "government-endorsed" dialogue. (Tan 2005)
Thus Forum Asia, for example, has set up from early 2007 a dialogue on human
rights that would maintain a yearly track record that would then report to UN agencies: The Second Regional Consultation on the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) is a FORUMASIA regional initiative as convener of the Solidarity for Asian People’s Advocacy (SAPA)
Working Group on UN Human Rights (SAPA WG on HR) It is a follow-up to the first
Regional Consultation on HRC held in Bangkok on 2-3 February 2007.
14
The main objectives of the Consultation include reviewing and assessing the HRC
outcomes on institution-building issues from an Asian NGO perspective and developing
common strategies and work plans with a focus on the Universal Periodic Review (UPR).
Consultation will focus on the preparation for the stakeholders’ report for UPR scheduled
to take place in 2008, particularly for the 10 member countries of the HRC: Bangladesh,
India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka from South Asia; Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines
from Southeast Asia; and China, Japan and South Korea from Northeast Asia. (Forum
Asia 2007a)
This organisation has also argued that in spite of some initial steps such as regular
workshops on the ASEAN Regional Mechanism on Human Rights, ASEAN has much
further to go in its civil society dialogue: These annual workshops attempt to bring together representatives from civil society,
governments in the region, and intergovernmental organisations in pursuit of a common
goal. However, the workshop has always to contend with the spectre of the “ASEAN way”
of non-interference and decision by consensus (by the governments in the region). This
year’s workshop has helped to highlight that if more significant progress is to be made on
the establishment of a credible regional human rights mechanism, then the “ASEAN way”
itself needs to be challenged, which can only occur through the greater involvement of civil
society in ASEAN’s decision making processes. (Forum Asia 2007b)
One practical suggestion that has been put forward is the idea of a regional Human
Rights Commission as opposed to a loosely conceived 'Mechanism' in the ASEAN
Charter (Forum Asia 2007b).
Southeast Asia can be fruitfully discussed as a region so long as an understanding of
its inherent diversity and the complexity of its external relations are kept in mind (see
lecture 11). Initiatives based around the ASEAN organisation have already moved
towards promoting wider regional stability. It is likely that future trends will draw most of
Southeast Asia into a closer dialogue on comprehensive security, based in large measure
on the need to continue economic development within a competitive world economy. The
region, however, is a complex zone of interactions in which national and external great
power interests need to be balanced. At present, this emerging system of tieredmultipolarity, buttress by a web of different multilateral organisations, remains subject to
turbulence from great power contests, and from unstable, threatened states or revisionist
agenda, e.g. focused on Pakistan, North Korea, and Myanmar (see for example Fair 2007).
This wider regional dialogue, based on core ASEAN agendas, has also begun to form a
wider Indo-Pacific zone of interactions, but by itself ASEAN may be too weak to lead
such a community. In this area, long term trade benefits, the balancing of needs for future
growth in the global system, and informal diplomacy may help erode some current
negative security perceptions. Australia has tried to position itself to benefit from
these trends, e.g. in terms of providing energy and resource access for China (with $25
billion of LNG sales being negotiated from 2006, Callick 2006), Japan, and to a lesser
degree South Korea and India, in remaining a strong support of the US based alliance
system, and in engaging strong in many multilateral organisations. At best they indicate a
creative effort by a ‘middle power’ to position itself with focused interactions with
ASEAN, Northeast Asia, South Asia, and with wider groupings such as APEC and the
ARF.
Indeed, the creation of regional groups such as APEC and ASEAN were based on the
need to manage or moderate existing regional and global flows, e.g. international trade
15
flows and their gradual liberalisation, the impact of transnational corporations, massive
flows of people, information, and problems under the wider impact of globalization (see
lecture 11). As we have seen, elite support for regionalism in Southeast Asia had
already been conditioned by the transnational patterns of trade and production run
via business and corporations: Yet even the most cursory glance at the empirical data associated with ‘globalization’
reveals that global flows of trade and investment, and even the transnational production
strategies of multinational companies, reveal a distinction regional bias. In other words,
whatever we take globalization to be, it is powerfully shaped by national and regional
forces as countries, companies and a range of other actors attempt to respond to the
challenges of external competition and the transnational integration of economic and
political activity. In this context, globalization is simply a convenient shorthand for that
complex array of processes – economic, political, social and even strategic – that have
transformed the context within which states conduct themselves and which have
constrained their autonomy as a consequence. If this contention about diminished
autonomy has merit as a general statement about the status of contemporary states, It is
doubly true of Southeast Asia, where the modern, independent state is a relatively recent
invention, and where the sovereignty of states has already been compromised to some
extent. (Beeson 2004, p3)
In one scenario the ARF or ASEAN-plus groupings would move from a dialogue process
into a genuine security community. Briefly, the term security community describes 'a
system of relations in which states become integrated to the point that feelings of
community and trust allow them to deal with conflicts of interest without resorting to
violence' (Garofano 2002, p503). Commentators such as Alan Dupont have suggested that
the ARF is a nascent or emerging security community (in Garofano 2002, p513).
However, trends through 2003-2007 suggest that a wide-footprint security is a
premature idea, in part due to clear bilateral tensions and limited convergence on peacekeeping and preventive security operations. From late 2003 there was a plan for regional
peacekeeping to be developed as part of ASEAN Concord II (see below), but this
proposal has been delayed due to opposition to the idea in 2004 from Singapore and
Vietnam.
3. Key Problems for the Indo-Pacific Region
These trends of multipolarity, complex interdependence and shifting power levels
suggest that major conflicts are possible if miscalculations occur during transition
periods, or if a sudden crisis emerges that cannot be contained by preventive or
immediate diplomacy. The collapse of a regime, an economy, escalation of military
tensions, changing nuclear or missile balances in theory could spark a complex crisis that
might generate great power confrontations. Medium-term tensions might be played out
in economic competition, energy access pressures, competition for regional influence, and
via long-term tensions that have yet to be resolved (the Taiwan-PRC tensions, US-China
confrontations, the prospect for a unified Korea). As noted in the Australian Defence
Update 2007, strategic miscalculation remains possible in the 21st Century: We do not believe that any regional power is eager to see fundamental geo-strategic
change. Still, as China and India grow, and the United States re-balances its global
commitments, power relations will change, and as this happens there is always a
possibility of strategic miscalculation. (Department of Defence 2007)
16
Resilience in the region, whether viewed as economic, national or strategic, should
be encouraged. This resilience might be based on both national and regional mechanisms
for coping with crisis, conflict, military threats (security dilemmas), developmental
problems and human insecurity. In summary, then, we can outline, the key issues that
need to be addressed if the Indo-Pacific region is to become a stable region of growth
in meeting the human expectations of more than 3 billion people: A) The potential nexus of Taiwan-China-US-alliance relations needs to be
manoeuvred to a peaceful resolution, gradual convergence or delayed. A major
economic or military confrontation would derail many agendas, interfering with both
APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Likewise, any overt clash would lead to greater
rearmament in the region, as would any possible deployment of a comprehensive missile
defence system to the island. Several changing realities impact on this issue: PRC’s
economic growth and continued defence modernisation, and Taiwan’s ongoing
importance as a major investor into the PRC economy. Likewise, PRC’s political elites
have now embraced not only pragmatism in international affairs, but also a stronger role
for multilaterism in supporting China’s wider interests (see Kuik 2005; Chai 2003). US
fears, however, focus on both PRC's increased military power and anti-satellite abilities
(Department of Defence 2007), and whether its increasing regional influence will
accommodate its vision of international norms (Strategic Comments 2005a).
B) A second long-term issues is the Korean peninsula, in spite of a cautious approach
towards intervention by the U.S., PRC, Russia and Japan via the Six-Party Talks. Even in
low-violence scenarios, e.g. economic collapse in the north and moderated regime
transition, this would still leave South Korea (the region) with the need to cope with
refugees, provide food security, rebuilt the north, aid political and cultural transition, and
cope with the long-term prospect of a nascent, unified Korea. Through mid-2007
progress had mean made on nuclear inspections, but this has not resolved the economic
fragility and North Korea, nor its long-term prospects for some kind of transition.
C) The problem of the repression of human rights and democracy in Burma
(Myanmar) remains a major regional irritant, but are symbolic of wider human rights
problems in the region. Not only will this be a test of will for ASEAN, but will affect
its prestige in the wider world. It must be remembered that the excesses of Burma's
regime do not just affect the Burmese, it is also the source of potential refugee, drug and
insurgency problems along all of Burma's borders (see lecture 7). These problems have
already affected Yunnan province in China, as well as created problems for Thailand and
Bangladesh. Likewise, there are direct strategic implications for India and ASEAN, since
Burma has a large territorial army (428,000 active troops), partly equipped with Russian
and Chinese-made weapons, which does not sit well within the context of ASEAN's
peace agenda (Chipman 2005). Over the last several years India and ASEAN have
shown an interest in deeper relations with Myanmar, but no agenda for a truly pluralist
political system has yet been established. Minor pressure applied by ASEAN over this
issue on Myanmar through 2003-2007 has only resulted in a closed dialogue with no
serious engagement of opposition groups (see lecture 6 and 7), while US and EU
pressure has not been able to pass resolutions through the UNSC through 2006-2007,
while PRC has only shown some interest in moderating this problem through mid-2007
(Agence France Presse 2007; Haacke 2006). Human rights and human security
generally needs careful monitoring throughout the region, with some move
towards minimum standards.
17
D) The Pakistan-India-PRC relationship has made limited progress through
2002-2007, but remains one of the main challenges to regional stability: it provide one
area of potentially wider tensions (linking South Asia with Chinese threat perceptions),
plus providing a limit to institutional memberships and effectiveness (e.g. restraints on
the effectiveness of SAARC and IOR-ARC). India and PRC through 2003-2005 have
had some reduction of mutual tensions, and both have signed ASEAN’s TAC.
However, some competition in their relationship seems to have re-emerged
through 2006-2007, perhaps due to energy and security concerns (see lecture 10).
However, this trend will need to be deepened into real progress between India and
Pakistan before this positive trends can be sustained. This would then improve the
prospects of both the SAARC and IOR-ARC organisations to move towards effective
free trade and cooperative agenda. At a deeper level, South Asia as a whole also needs to
cope with sustained poverty, strong religious and social divisions, economic degradation,
and ‘low intensity violence’ in political life (see lecture 10; for different speculative future
scenarios for India, see Waslekar & Bhatt 2004). This might prepare the ground for the
creation of a stronger Indian Ocean cooperative group, which can counter-balance
and emulate some of the benefits of the APEC and ASEAN groups. Current
institutional building in the Indian Ocean through the IOR-ARC organisation (19952007) remains in the early stages of a much longer process. Groups such as SAARC and
BIMSTEC (Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand Economic
Cooperation) also have a role in opening up trade, reducing barriers, improving
regional infrastructure, and providing for a for wider dialogue. This will be a long
term project (20-30 years), but also have the benefit of engaging Western Asia in a
constructive dialogue rather than excluding them from productive involvement in the
international systems. In the long run, Iran and Iraq may also to benefit from such
groupings.
E) Continued improvement of conditions for the poor and marginalised in all
regional countries. As we saw in lecture 10, Jasjit Singh (1994) has argued that this is the
central security necessity for India. However, if we also look at the populous countries
of the region, including Indonesia, Thailand and Vietnam, this is the key to their
survival as prosperous and stable states. These states have many poor citizens (urban
and rural poor) whose futures are still very limited - here, the benefits of trade and
economic growth must reach towards the bottom levels of society and beyond the
urban societies. In Thailand, for example, many poor farmers have not been able to
gain permanent gains from the past rapid growth in the Thai economy, even with PM
Thaksin's targeted programs. By the end of the 1990s some 8 million Thais,
approximately 13%, were living under the official poverty line of 886 baht per month,
while only 1% of the population had a monthly income of 20,000 baht (Chantomvong
2002, pp218-219), with poverty levels rose from 11.5 to 15% from 1996 to 2000
(Krongkaew 2002, p129). From May 2003 former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra
promised to end poverty within six years and build a comprehensive social safety net,
but many NGO groups have been highly critical of the government agenda for reform
(The Nation 2003; Xinhua 2003c). Moreover, the background to poverty in Thailand
rests in part on structural factors that exist even during periods of national
growth in GDP. Thus Johannes Schmidt summarises these apparent contradictions: Furthermore, economic growth has been characterized as a process of impoverishment,
marginalization and increasing inequality in income distribution. Over the past three
decades, this transition has led to several important trends, and has primarily meant
expansion of industrial output and services. But social welfare and the needs of the rural
18
areas have been largely neglected. In rural areas this occurred through an increase in
economic inequality and an uneven distribution of land and other productive assets, an
increase in the relative size of the class of agricultural labourers, and stagnation or decline
of rural wages. (Schmidt 2002, p94)
Thus the ‘ultra poor’ or ‘hard-core’ poor (in Thai, kon yak jon dak darn) have remained
unaffected by patterns of national economic growth (Krongkaev 2002, p129). In this
setting, the highly factionalised nature of politics, only partly reformed by the 1997
Constitution, embedded corruption, a huge untaxed underground economy, problems in
land-use rights, and limited decentralisation have reduced the ability of the government
to seriously aid the most vulnerable groups (Chantomvong 2002; Schmidt 2002).
Thailand’s Social Security Act, social benefit programs, small grant schemes, the
village fund program, debt suspension programs for farms, and cheap hospital
access have had a limited role in bridging the urban-rural income divide, and have not
been able to rectify poor educational enrolment levels in the countryside (Schmidt 202,
pp99-101). Ironically, many of the ultra poor receive little or no support from numerous
Thai social support schemes (Krongkaev 2002). Even with higher growth rates and
lower levels of political and regional instability, Thailand’s prospects for poverty
reduction in the long run may not be much better than Indonesia’s. Even within
relatively buoyant national economies such as Thailand, with GDP growth of between
7% and 5% for 2003-2006 (DFAT 2006c), problems of relative rural poverty, uneven
development between poorer regions and Bangkok, and a notable gap between rich and
poor remain clear indicators of unsustainable patterns of development (See Xinhua,
2003c; Schmidt 2002, pp.91-104; Hewison 2002; Laird 2000). The current trajectory of
development has been challenged on a range of local, cultural and gender grounds, at
the least demonstrating that economic growth is only one among many social needs in
the region (Samudavanija 2002, pp.137-156; Hewison 2002; Rigg 1997, pp23-66). Here
we can see sustained development gaps, in spite of the action of many international
agencies such as the IMF, the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and the
UNDP. The Thaksin government through 2001-2006 had sought to reduce rural
problems through village grants, subsidising health clinics and providing 'debt
relief for farmers' (Strategic Comments 2006, p1), and there have been claims that these
policies have reduced rural poverty but half. However, it has also been claimed that this
is part of a vote-garnering scheme, and the Thaksin government through 2006 went
through a crisis in confidence, in part due to 'self-serving policies' and due to the
inability to deal with tensions in South Thailand driven by 'the renewed Muslim
separatist insurgency' and the heavy-handed government response to it (Strategic
Comments 2006). There is a direct linkage between religious identity and political
discontent is in Southern Thailand, where urges either for separatism or autonomy
from Bangkok have remained strong. This had lead to intensified violence through
2003-2007, with a large-scale security clamp down by the Thai government apparently
not solving the underlying problems. Southern Thailand had been an independent state
under the Patani Sultanate (which fell to the Thai's in 1786), with the region of Patani
being converted to Islam through the 12-15th centuries (Azra 2004, p122). These
tensions have in general undermined the ability of Thai Muslims to feel
integrated into modern Thailand, and many feel closer to Muslim Malays south of the
border in Malaysia (Strategic Comments 2007). In turn, claims of corruption, policy and
court manipulation led to uncontested elections in 2006 that resulted in a constitutional
crisis and a coup which ousted the Thaksin government in September 2006. Though the
current interim government under Surayud Chulanont minister hopes to re-write
the constitution and return to democratic elections, its seems unlikely that this
could be done early 2008.
19
F) Avoidance of resource and environmental collapse. Much of Southeast Asia is
environmentally degraded, particularly along the large river systems with intensive
agricultural use and population growth. As we have seen, environmental decay is a major
economic and social dilemma facing many of the rapidly developing economies in the
region, with concerns about pollution, overuse of the damming of rivers, degradation of
water purity, and impacts on biodiversity. The collapse of any segment of this resource
base, whether the soil in one region, of forestry areas on a large scale, or of a river
system, can result in major human disasters with attendant migration and social
disturbances. This kind of collapse has been seen in parts of Africa (e.g. Ethiopia and
the Sudan), and has exacerbated political crises. The nations of the region, with help
from international organisations such as UN agencies (UNDP, UNEP, ESCAP), must
ensure that no such 'systems collapse' occurs in the Indo-Pacific region. The major fires
in Borneo and Sumatra from 1997 provided a major test of ASEAN resilience, and
improved management thereafter suggests that closer regional cooperation can be
developed on high profile issues (see lectures 3 & 6). Likewise, management of the
Mekong River, with large dams being built in branch upstream tributaries in China and
Laos, remains a major area of concern, as does new dams being built on the Salween
River that impacts on PRC, Myanmar and Thailand. Water and environmental
management in South Asia are also entering a phase of potential crisis, with projections
for serious water shortage through 2015 (Dupont 2000). In spite of some treaty
arrangements on river and water usage in South Asia, strong tensions re-emerged on this
issue through 206-2007: South Asia’s two main river systems have their headwaters in the Himalayan glaciers and
snow fields. The rivers of the Ganges-Brahmaputra system flow through China, Nepal,
Bhutan, India, Bangladesh and Myanmar. Sacred and symbolic for Hindus, the Ganges
runs across the northern Indian plains before joining the Brahmaputra in Bangladesh,
reaching the Bay of Bengal. The Indus constitutes the largest contiguous irrigation system
in the world. It rises in the Tibet Autonomous Region of China and its tributaries run
through China, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, five of which are shared between India
and Pakistan. From the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, the Indus flows mostly
through Pakistan until it reaches the Arabian Sea east of Karachi after a journey of 1,800
miles.
Both rivers and their tributaries are the subject of bitter and protracted bilateral disputes,
characterised by accusations of over-drawing. In 2005, Pakistan claimed that Indian plans
for the construction of the Baglihar dam on the Chenab river contravened the Indus
Waters Treaty. Despite the signing of the Ganges Water Treaty, disagreements persist
between India and Bangladesh about water diversion at the Farakka barrage on the
Ganges, and it does not include the upper riparian state, Nepal, which makes its own
arrangements regarding usage of the Ganges waters. For Bangladesh, the Brahmaputra,
which it shares with India and China, is potentially more important as it carries much more
run-off than the heavily used Ganges river, yet is not subject to any water-sharing treaty.
As well as legislative issues, bilateral discussions are sometimes complicated by other
political difficulties. For example, during the military stand-off between India and Pakistan
in 2001–02 following a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament, there were calls in India
for the repudiation of the Indus Treaty. (Strategic Comments 2007b)
In the worst case scenario, PRC might consider serious diversion of water flows on
the Tibetan plateau. As noted by one Indian analyst: The idea of a Great South-North Water Transfer Project diverting river Tibetan waters has
the backing of President Hu Jintao, a hydrologist. The first phase of this project calls for
building 300 kilometers of tunnels and channels to draw waters from the Jinsha, Yalong
and Dadu rivers, on the eastern rim of the Tibetan plateau.
20
In the second phase, the Brahmaputra waters may be rerouted northward, in what be
tantamount to the declaration of water war on lower-riparian India and Bangladesh. In fact,
Beijing has identified the bend where the Brahmaputra forms the world's longest and
deepest canyon just before entering India as holding the largest untapped reserves for
meeting its water and energy needs. (Chellaney 2007)
G) In this context, sustaining energy imports and cleaner energy sources is also
crucial for India, China and ASEAN, and in the future Southeast Asia, and provides a
needed linkage to environmental policies as well as providing new inter-regional
linkages, e.g. PRC's intensified trade and investments in Latin America and Africa (trade
with Africa grew from $10 billion in 2000 to $35 billion in 2005, and Africa now
supplies 30% of PRC's oil, Strategic Comments 2007c; Quek 2005). Likewise, from mid2006 ASEAN ministers also took on board this as a major concern for Southeast Asia: Concerned about the soaring oil prices all over the world, energy minister from the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) have affirmed the importance of
maintaining energy security and stability as a priority agenda, as high oil prices are clear
risks to sustained economic growth in the region.
In a communique issued at the conclusion of the 24th ministerial meeting here Thursday,
they said they viewed reliance on external resources for oil as having implications on the
security of ASEAN energy supply. (Zee News 2006b)
This concern led to regular meetings of ASEAN energy ministers and the creation
of the ASEAN Energy Business forum, with the creation of the ASEAN Centre for
Energy, shared databases on access to oil, as well as an extended ASEAN-Plus-Three
energy dialogue. The Chairman [Guillermo Balce] Third ASEAN+3 Energy Security
Forum noted that: . . . Energy Security becomes all the more critical in the context of competing
requirements against scare resources in member countries. He stated that the identified
five areas of cooperation, namely: energy security, oil market, oil stockpiling, renewable
energy and natural gas could offer concrete short to long term measures to abridge
dependency on imported energy sources, particularly crude oil, as well as to ensure the
diversity, stability and sustainability of the region's supply. Consequently, he called for
closer public-private sector collaboration. (ASEAN Centre for Energy 2006).
At present, countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Myanmar are net exporters
of gas, though oil exports have been largely committed from current fields, while
in turn countries such as Indonesia have considered future use of nuclear power.
In the long term, a stable regional network for energy supply has been considered but
remains far in the future (ASEAN Centre for Energy 2006).
H) The need to build a genuinely international civil society in the region which can
complement governmental and inter-government organisations (IGO's). It would be
useful for IGO regional organisations to enter into wider dialogue with NGOs
(non-government organisations) and INGO's that are finding expression in the global
media (Woods 1998). Environmental issues, mobilisation of local societies to fight
poverty, and enhancement of the role of women are areas which could benefit from this
approach (Magno 1997). This approach has begun to be recognised in APEC, ASEAN,
and even to some degree for environmental NGOs in China (Schwartz 2004), as well as
in Track II informal diplomacy, but has a long way to go before the region can one of
‘democratic participation’ (see Acharya 2003). This process has made only moderate
steps with affiliated regional NGOs and the regular ASEAN Civil Society Conference
21
(ACSC), which are to held 'annually on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit and that its
report be presented to the Leaders' (ASEAN 2005b). One NGO Conference, the
Regional Conference on Civil Society Engagement in the ASEAN, in October 2005,
also pushed for a more 'people-centred' ASEAN (RCCSE-ASEAN 2005), while Forum
Asia has been actively pushing for a stronger approach to human rights within
ASEAN (see above). The Alternative Asean Network on Burma has also built up a
wide range of advocacy tools to build alternative approaches to Myanmar (see
http://www.altsean.org/index.php)/
I) In general terms, the region might also be viewed as suffering tensions between
diverse channels of international power and governance, with different forces
operating at different levels; unipolar and greater power initiatives (whether driven by
the U.S. or China), overlapping and limited multilateral progresses (APEC, ASEAN-plus
groups, IOR-ARC), and bilateral trade and security treaties designed to buffer against
some of these problems. Thus, even at the level of global multilateralism, there have
been severe blockages in the Doha Round, leading to a failure to further liberalise
agricultural trade after some five years of talks, though the U.S. and Brazil may seek to
'reboot' these discussion within the coming year (ABC News Online 2006b; ABC News
Online 2006c). Further failures of the Doha round could 'lead to a situation when the
WTO may become only a complement to bilateral and regional trade accords' (Celso
Amorim, Brazilian foreign minister, in ABC News Online 2006c). In general terms,
these factors suggest that nations in the Indo-Pacific will continue to reduce risks
and enhance relative gains by the range of pragmatic means open to them, but
also thereby limiting any emergence of a genuine Indo-Asian community in the short to
medium term, i.e. regional systems remain competitive as well as cooperative.
However, the news is not all bad. The different powers in the region seem to be 'getting
along in the name of necessity' in spite of major differences in perception, e.g. between
PRC and the US, and India and PRC (Slingerland 2007; Garrison 2007). In general, the
region has high levels of risk and conflict-avoidance, based on shared perceptions of the
enormous costs of Asian-conflicts, whether tradition, counter-insurgency, or nuclear. To
ensure this, it may be necessary go beyond balance of power or hegemony conceptions
(which can be destabilised), to more active and positive relationships to secure mutual
regional interests. Relatively peaceful relations have created circles or patterns of
peaceful relations. These are the APEC circle in the Asia-Pacific Region, and a smaller
ASEAN focused circle in Southeast Asia, along with various ASEAN-plus agenda
reaching into East Asia, including the ASEAN+3 and East Asian Summit (the EAS
process). Through the ASEAN Regional forum, these two circles have been interacting
peacefully and constructively in the 1990s, though this agenda has slowed since 1999. The
long-term challenge is to bring in the third circle of Indian Ocean relations to ensure a
multilateral forum for coping with some of the key problems of South Asia. In the long
run, a more internationalised Indian Ocean may be a more stable region, with India’s and
Pakistan’s security needs at least partly met. At that time, it should also link into dialogue
with both ASEAN (political) and the APEC (economic) groups. New dialogue groups,
or enhanced second-track groupings, may also need to be considered in future, e.g. the
idea of enhancing the Shangri-La Dialogue on security, and perhaps creating a Head of
Government meeting for the wider region to aid leadership and fast decision making
(Gyngell 2007).
22
Here middle-rank countries such as Australia and Malaysia can take on relatively strong
roles, while such a ‘cooperative’ and ‘permissive’ environment is needed if the economic
and social well-being of larger countries such as Indonesia, India and PRC is to be
achieved. Innovation, it is clear, has been carried forward at brisk pace in regional
diplomacy through 1997-2007. This pattern of dialogue has not emerged as a secure
level of preventive diplomacy in the wider region, leaving prospects that global trends
might push the region towards intensified future competitive and, possibly, new types
of conflict. This suggests that much more needs to be done institution building in the
region, as well as greater participation in political process that will lead to more
accountable governance.
4. Bibliography and Further Resources
Resources
A range of useful news services, including an archive of current and past video
material will be found at the FoxNews Internet news service at:
http://www.foxnews.com/
The Australian newspaper and some of its archive can be accessed via
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/ and
http://www.theaustralian.news.com.au/archives/
The ESCAP (UN Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific) homepage can
be found at http://www.unescap.org/
Useful developmental data concerning East and South Asia will be found on the
United Nations Development Program site for Asia Pacific at:
http://www.undp.org/rbap/
Further Reading
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HE, Baogang “East Asian Ideas of Regionalism: A Normative Critique”, Australian Journal of
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KUIK, Cheng-Chwee " Multilateralism in China's ASEAN policy: its evolution,
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SAMUDAVANIJA, Chai-Anan Thailand: State-Building, Democracy and Globalization, Bangkok,
Institute of Public Policy Studies, 2002
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23
TAN, See Seng “Non-official diplomacy in Southeast Asia: ‘civil society’ or ‘civil service’?”
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 27 no.3, December 2005, pp370-388 [Access via Infotrac
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