Business Case and Intervention Summary
Intervention Summary
Title: Improving Schooling in Sierra Leone (ISIS): A Programme for Improving Learning Outcomes and Sustainable Capacity Development in Education in Sierra Leone
What support will the UK provide?
The UK will invest in a programme to enrol more children, from the most marginalised sections of society, in primary and Junior Secondary Schools (JSS) and support more of these children to complete their primary and JSS education by achieving better learning outcomes. The programme will support sustainable improvement by increasing individual and institutional capacity at national, local and school levels.
The programme will have 3 strategies with 8 components
A. Expand Access and Increase Completion in Primary and JSS Schools
1. Reduce the economic barriers to enrolling in primary school at the correct age, completing primary education and transferring to and completing JSS
2. Improve primary access and completion for the poorest in Sierra Leone with a special emphasis on out of school children
3. Reduce gender based barriers to access and completion of JSS for girls
B. Improve the Learning Outcomes Students Achieve
4. Improve school effectiveness and reduce grade repetition through better leadership and effective classroom teaching practice at primary and JSS
5. Develop and implement a framework of learning assessments to inform teaching and learning at school and national level
C. Increase Individual and Institutional Capacity at National, Local and School Level
6. Build the professional and technical capacity of national and local education authorities to effectively and efficiently manage and deploy educational resources – with special emphasis on payment and management of teachers.
7. Enhance the professional and technical capacity of national and local authorities to monitor and evaluate school effectiveness and collect critical data to inform education policies, systems and procedures.
8. Conduct school based longitudinal research to generate an evidence base to inform effective future education planning at local and national level
Evaluations of each component, including and impact evaluation of component 4, will add to the global knowledge of what works in education development, particularly in post conflict countries.
The components of the programme will be delivered through a combination of UNICEF and INGOs working within a consortium, where practicable, managed by coordination units at UNICEF and the
Consortium and overseen by a Steering Committee co-chaired by the Ministry of Education Science and Technology (MEST) and the DFID SL Education Adviser. This delivery mechanism provides the greatest value for mone y with the lowest level of risk; with every £1 invested providing £5 of benefits.
The UK will provide up to £15.4 million from 2012-2016.
Why is UK support required?
Sierra Leone has made impressive progress in the past decade to improve access to education for the majority of children at the primary level. Gender equity in access at the primary level has also improved to near parity. However, there are still very large disparities in educational opportunities as a result of
1

poverty and rural location. It is estimated that 232,645 children of school age are out of school with an estimated 40,000 of these never getting the opportunity to attend school. Poverty is identified as the overwhelming barrier to exercising rights to education. These disparities are magnified when combined with gender. Such disparities will not only hamper Sierra Leone’s plans to reduce poverty but could potentially destabilise the peace and state building process as the gaps between the haves and havenots increase. This intervention will directly address these disparities in educational opportunity at primary and JSS, targeting the most marginalised and improving equity.
Despite many more children attending and completing a full cycle of primary education educational outcomes are very low and the available evidence suggest children completing primary school may not be literate or numerate. 16% of children repeat a year of primary school every year. The system is therefore very inefficient. This intervention aims to improve learning outcomes and reduce repetition rates in targeted schools by increasing school effectiveness and the opportunity to learn. This will increase the efficiency of the money invested in education in Sierra Leone.
Capacity at MEST, local council and school level is insufficient to effect change and improvement without support. This intervention will improve schools’ leadership and management, support the decentralisation of education administration to local councils and build the capacity of MEST and local council capacity to plan effectively and implement education policy and improvement. This will enable future interventions to operate through more effective modalities and attract a broader range of partners into the sector.
What are the expected results?
The impact of the programme will be more children, from the most marginalised sections of society, enrolled in primary and JSS schools with more of them achieving better learning outcomes. The outcome will be increased and more equitable access to more effective schooling.
The expected results over the life time of the programme are:
150,000 children (50% girls) who would have enrolled late and been out of school will enrol at age 6 in grade 1
30,000 children (50% girls) who are identified as ‘out of school’ and unlikely to ever attend school will be supported to receive education
15,000 (66% girls) will be supported to attend and complete JSS
240,000 children (50% girls) will improve their learning outcomes by being taught by more effective teachers in schools run by more effective headteachers
1,450,000 1 children will benefit from having their learning assessed through a standardised test which teachers can use to increase their progress
1,500,000 children and young people will benefit from an effective and efficient Ministry of Education
Science and Technology and local councils
514,286 children and their families will benefit from more effective monitoring of schools that makes them accountable for improving students’ outcomes.
In addition, investment in research will provide detailed data on the education sector to enable evidence based policy making and improve planning. A planned impact evaluation of component 4 will also add to the global evidence of what works to improve learning outcomes for the poorest and most marginalised, particularly in Sierra Leone, as well as identifying the issues that the Sierra Leonean education system will need to address in the future.
2

Strategic Case
A. Context and need for a DFID intervention
[ See Annex 1 for further detail ]
In the decade since the end of the civil war, Sierra Leone has made significant progress towards all the
MDGs and has achieved political and social stability. Although it is in transition from fragile state to low income developing country (LIDC), Sierra Leone remains the eighth poorest country in the world. Low mean years and expected years of education are estimated to contribute one third towards total poverty.
2
Overseas development Assistance (ODA) to the education sector is the lowest of all major government ministries at 15% of total spending, compared to 44% in health.
3
Increased and More Equitable Access to Education
Access to education: According to official figures there is one primary school for every 165 children of primary school age 4 . Provision of schooling therefore appears adequate. However, 75% of children do not enrol in primary school at the correct age and account for a large proportion of the estimated 232,645 out of school children at primary. 14% of children will never go to school (approximately 42,000 children) 5 .
Inequity due to Poverty, Location and Gender: The poorest and those in rural locations are 8.5 times more likely to be out of school and less likely to complete a full cycle of education. There are approximately 0.8 girls for every boy in JSS and 0.6 girls for every boy at SSS. Poverty and rural location reduce the chances of children going to secondary school and impact hardest on girls.
6
Economic Barriers to Education: Cost is reported as the main barrier to enrolling and attending primary school. 55% of households pay fees for primary school and 40% report having children excluded for nonpayment of fees.
7
Improve Learning Outcomes
Very Low Learning Outcomes at All Levels of Education : The data available indicate that the majority of children who complete a full cycle of primary school are not literate or numerate at the most basic level. In regional grade 12 examinations the pass rate was 1% and Sierra Leone performs well below its
Anglophone neighbours in mathematics and English.
8
There is an Achievement Gap at All Levels of Education Between Girls and Boys: girls’ achievement lags behind boys’ in terminal examinations at each level of schooling. In the National Primary School
Examination (NPSE) girls achieve a pass rate of 72% compared to 76% for boys, girls are also less likely to sit for the exam. In the Grade 9 Basic Education Certificate Examination (BECE) girls achieve a pass rate of 39% compared to 47% for boys. Only 40% of the entries for the BECE are girls.
9
The Education System is Very Inefficient: Grade repetition, as a result of slow learning progress, is very high at 16% in primary and 13% at JSS and SSS and is rising. Proxy completion rates are good by regional standards but one in two students who enrol at JSS fail to complete the level and three in every four fail to complete at SSS. Formative learning assessments are not part of the school system only terminal cycle examinations.
Despite Attending, School Children do not always have the Opportunity to Learn: a government report in
2010 identified the unprofessional conduct of teachers as the main reason for poor student performance.
10
Teacher absence is reported at 8%-23%, varying by district, and worse in the most rural areas.
11 There are also big variations in the levels of teachers ’ education with the most educated and qualified teachers centred in the Western Region.
Increase Individual and Institutional Capacity
Absorptive Capacity of the Ministry of Education Science and Technology is low: although the sector is currently receiving relatively low levels of direct donor funding, the MEST is currently unable to absorb the funding that it has received from the Education for All Fast Track Initiative and Education Sector Support
Fund.
Weak Capacity in Evidence Based Policy and Planning: essential functions of the ministry, which impact on efficiency and quality, such as collection and dissemination of education data and curriculum development, lack human and professional capacity.
12
3

Issues Relating to Public Financial Management: in MEST, and the sector more generally, has been identified by the Auditor General as an area of specific concern.
13 Systemic weaknesses impact on quality and equity, for example, issues relating to the payment and management of teachers and the payment of school grants result in schools levying user fees and other fees at primary.
14
A2. Justification: Why is it Right for DFID to Intervene?
The impact of improved educational outcomes on poverty reduction and increased wellbeing is well established.
15 Low educational outcomes in Sierra Leone have been identified as a major constraint to economic growth and a leading cause of poverty.
16 As the largest bi-lateral donor to education, DFID’s intervention will improve educational access and outcomes, contribute to reducing poverty and enable
Sierra Leone to successfully transition from LIDC to Middle Income Country by 2030.
Education is high on the political agenda in Sierra Leone and the government commits a significant proportion of national resources. Approximately 20% of total government spending goes to education with
50% of all recurrent spending going to primary education. Following a high profile commission into poor student performance in public examinations, a Presidential Task Force has been created for education and a White Paper was published in 2010. With elections in November the focus on key education issues is likely to increase. Despite the GoSL meeting Global Partnership for Education (GPE) targets for education spending there is a substantial funding gap in education based on the existing Education Sector Plan
(ESP).
There is an opportunity for DFID to make a leading contribution to the development of education policy in
Sierra Leone. The existing policy framework for education is currently under revision and the existing ESP is being revised based on a new Country Status Report (CSR). This is preparation for applying for a second tranche of GPE funding. Sierra Leone’s current poverty reduction strategy ‘An Agenda For Change
2008-
2012’ is also being reviewed and a third poverty reduction strategy ‘An Agenda for Prosperity’ is under development. Education is a key component of the Human Development Pillar of the new strategy.
Complementing and Adding Value to Existing DFID Programmes
This intervention compliments DFID’s existing intervention in School Feeding which targets 110,000 children in the most vulnerable chiefdoms proving them with a hot balanced meal every day of the school year. It also targets a pilot group of 1,500 marginalised girls and provides them with take home food rations to further reduce the economic barriers to girls ’ completion of a full cycle of primary school.
17 This intervention is designed to reduce the economic barriers to attending primary school for the most vulnerable.
This intervention will also add value to DFID’s existing Schools’ WASH programme. This is designed to improve wash facilities in 2,000 primary schools and achieve better school attendance through improved health.
18
The global DFID G irls’ Education Challenge (GEC) initiative includes Sierra Leone in its priority countries and could potenti ally transform the funding landscape for girls’ education in the country. There is an opportunity to add value to the GEC programme in Sierra Leone through the effective deployment of country funds to compliment GEC interventions.
Value will also be added to the current DFID SL Improved Reproductive, Maternal and New-born Health programme with improved educational outcomes strongly correlated to reduced child mortality and lower rates of fertility. In addition, this intervention will add value to DFID SL’s governance portfolio, increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the MEST and providing the human capital for governance and decentralisation reforms.
A3. Links to DFID’s Strategic Policy Objectives
At a global level this programme is aligned to the 2011-15 DFID Business Plan. In particular the programme supports the objectives to: improve the lives of girls and women; honour international commitments, strengthen governance and security in fragile and conflict affected countries and boost
4

wealth creat ion. It feeds into DFID’s global commitments on results towards the MDGs and through the
Bilateral and Multilateral Aid Reviews (BAR/MAR). DFID’s Strategic Vision for Girls and Women has 4 priorities: delay first pregnancy and support safe childbirth; get economic assets directly to girls and women; get girls through secondary school and prevent violence against girls and women. This programme directly and indirectly contributes to all four of these outcomes. Furthermore, the interventions in this programme will add value to and complement the recently launched GEC.
At a national level this programme contributes directly to DFID Sierra Leone’s Operational Plan and DFID
Results Framework (DRF) for Sierra Leone. DFID SL’s Operational Plan has the education targets:

36,300 children supported in Lower Secondary school

24,200 children supported to complete a full cycle of primary education
DRF targets for education in Sierra Leone in addition to the OP targets are:

206,000 children supported in primary education

Improvement in the number of children who can read with sufficient fluency for comprehension in the early grades
This programme will be critical in achieving these results targets, together with General Budget Support and the DFID School Feeding programme. Also at a country level, DFID signed a partnership agreement in
June 2012 with the GoSL committing to achieving the following education outputs:

The learning of 1.5 million students in primary, junior secondary and senior secondary improves resulting in fewer children repeating a grade;

Up to 3,000 teachers and head teachers are trained;

And over 300,000 children in grades 1 to 3 have improved reading fluency.
B. Impact and Outcome that we expect to achieve
The impact of the programme will be more children, from the most marginalised sections of society, enrolled in primary and JSS schools with more of them achieving better learning outcomes. The outcome will be increased and more equitable access to more effective schooling.
The expected results over the life time of the programme are:
150,000 children (50%girls) who would have enrolled late and been out of school will enrol at age 6 in grade 1
30,000 children (50% girls) who are identified as ‘out of school’ and unlikely to attend will be supported to receive education
15,000 (66% girls) will be support to attend and complete Junior Secondary School
240,000 children (50% girls) will improve their learning outcomes by being taught by more effective teachers in schools run by more effective headteachers
1,450,000 children will benefit from having their learning assessed through a standardised test which teachers can use to increase their progress
1,500,000 children and young people will benefit from an effective and efficient Ministry of Education
Science and Technology and local councils
514,286 children and their families will benefit from more effective monitoring of schools that makes them accountable for improving students’ outcomes.
In addition, investment in research will provide detailed data on the education sector to enable evidence based policy making and improve planning. A planned impact evaluation of component 4 will also add to the global evidence of what works to improve learning outcomes for the poorest and most marginalised particularly in Sierra Leone as well as identifying the issues that the Sierra Leonean education system will need to address in the future.
A more effective and efficient MEST will be able to leverage more donor funding and manage this donor support itself through sector budget support which will further build capacity and resources.
5

Appraisal Case
A. What are the feasible options that address the need set out in the Strategic case?
Description of the Intervention Components
Component
Component 1
Reduce Economic
Barriers to Enrolment in G1
Inputs
Evaluation of the barriers and economic costs to families of enrolling children at age 6 in G1. Incentive package designed and implemented to target poorest to enrol children at the correct age
Outputs
Up to 150,000 children enrolling earlier in
G1 over 4 years.
Reduction in out of school children; increased completion of primary and reduced drop out; increased transfer to JSS
Component 2 Enrol
Out of School
Children in Access to
Primary School
Provision
Component 3
Reduce the
Economic Barriers to
Enrolment and completion of JSS
Evaluation of reasons for children being out of school, where these children are and what would get then to enrol.
Package of interventions to address identified issues
– incentives, complementary education, access/catch up classes
Evaluation of the level and mode of economic incentive required to achieve optimum access and completion of
JSS. Implementation of targeted incentive to achieve gender parity and improve equity in JSS
Up to 30,000 out of school children enrolled in an education programme or school
Minimum of 15,000 students, the majority girls, who would not have attended JSS enrolled and retained in JSS
Component 4
Improve Learning
Outcomes: Whole
School Improvement
Linked to Teacher
Training Colleges
Component 5
Learning
Assessment
Framework developed and implemented
Component 6 MEST
& Local Council
Capacity
Development
Strategy
Component 7 Cluster
Monitoring of
Schools
Component 8
Longitudinal School
Based Research
Development of a whole school approach to improving learning outcomes in literacy and numeracy at primary and
JSS. Coaching and mentoring model to improve professional practice in teaching and school leadership.
Teacher training colleges linked to schools and using knowledge of what works to improve pre and in-service teacher training.
RCT Evaluation to assess the impact and increase knowledge and evidence of what works to improve learning.
National reading assessment developed and baseline conducted with annual sampling
Development and implementation of a national framework to assess learning at key points in literacy and numeracy
Classroom assessment tools developed for teacher use to assess and benchmark learning
Implementation of strategy developed in 2011 following
UNICEF funded evaluation of the MEST and local councils
Scaling up of MEST/UNICEF pilot to improve the impact of school monitoring and evaluation on learning outcomes.
Research to identify the impact of a range of different variables currently being addressed by Education Partners’ interventions in Sierra Leone. Evidence to inform what are the most effective interventions and what combinations of interventions deliver best value for money
Minimum of 200 primary and 100 JSS schools.
Approximately 3,000 teachers and headteachers demonstrating better professional practice
Approximately 240,000 students benefitting from better learning outcomes in literacy and numeracy
Learning in literacy and numeracy can be tracked at a national level to inform teaching and learning practice and policy.
Learning can be tracked at a student and school level to inform school improvement
Effective decentralisation of the administration of basic education. Effective and efficient management and payment of teachers. MEST developing evidence based policy. Effective and efficient used of education resources
Minimum of 6 districts targeted with increased monitoring and supervision of primary and JSS schools.
Approximately 600,000 students benefiting from more effective schools
Country specific evidence base to inform
MEST policy and new ESP. Improved alignment and harmonisation of donor and partner programmes with GoSL and country priorities.
External Evaluation See evaluation plan in Management Case below Improved local knowledge base of what works and why
Summary of Options
Six options were considered for the delivery of the programme. Three were discounted prior to the appraisal stage as inappropriate and/or unfeasible. The discounted options were:
1. Implementation through the expansion of the private sector
Increases in access at Grade 1, for out of school children and for JSS could potentially have been achieved through an expansion of the private sector. In addition, the private sector could have provided the expertise
6

for the whole school improvement component. This has been discounted for a number of reasons. Although the private sector in school provision is considerable at JSS and SSS nationally it accounts for only 6% of enrolment. Private providers are limited to individual private schools and as such there are a large number of providers and no providers operating at scale. These private providers are not where the programme needs to be in order to target the poorest and most marginalised. The poorest districts of Sierra Leone have no private providers and private providers are concentrated in urban areas (58%) and in Freetown and Western
District (33%). Even if there were private providers in the locations that the programme is targeted at, the private sector lacks the capacity to expand to accommodate the numbers of beneficiaries and substantially increase access. This option was therefore discounted.
2. Implementation through direct funding and delivery through local councils
The education Act of 2004 devolves the responsibility for the management of basic education to local councils. It seemed plausible therefore, to consider an option whereby the programme was delivered through local councils. There are a number of reasons why this option was considered unfeasible. The decentralisation of education administration is incomplete and there is legislative and political confusion over roles and responsibilities. The infrastructure of education administration and the lion’s share of the financial resources remain at the national level with the MEST. The payment, deployment and management of teachers also remain the responsibility of the MEST. Capacity at the local level is considered weaker than at the national level and is untested; building this capacity is a central part of the Capacity Development
Strategy and Cluster Monitoring components of this programme. Therefore, the risks associated with implementation failure are very high. The fiduciary risks associated with funding directly through local councils are also high, and may be higher than funding directly though the GoSL. The combination of these factors, therefore, resulted in this option being discounted.
3. Increasing General Budget Support
The allocated country programme spending for education could be channelled through the existing systems of general budget support (GBS). The benefits of this option would be the extremely low transaction costs.
However, there are a range of reasons which make this option unfeasible. Currently budget support ranges between £10 million and £15 million per annum. Channelling an additional £15.4 million over three or four years is a significant uplift. Channelling education funding directly through GBS would not necessarily deliver the DFID’s OP and DRF results and the planned outcomes and impact of this programme. Under the present
GBS arrangements DFID could not ensure that GBS funding went to education and the GoSL did not achieve the two education targets in the current (2010-11) round of GBS. Furthermore, as identified in option 1 above, low levels of capacity at MEST and local council level are an issue which this programme addresses directly so that services can be effectively, efficiently and economically delivered.
The remaining options for appraisal are:
1. Implementation and funding through the MEST.
The key benefit from this option is that it builds and strengthens systemic capacity at the national level.
Technically it should reduce transaction costs and increase efficiency, however, experience from the EFA-FTI catalytic fund and ESSF indicate that this would not be the case. The principal drawback of this option is that the MEST has limited professional and institutional capacity, currently it is reported as carrying 200 vacancies, and has struggled with the EFA-FTI catalytic fund and ESSF.
19 This programme has specific components to build the capacity of national and local government to be able to manage and deliver improvement in the future.
2. Implementation and funding through a mix of multi-lateral and NGO partners
In this option UNICEF would be contracted through a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to deliver specific components of the programme. A consortium of up to 6 established INGOs would be contracted to deliver the remaining components in partnership with the MEST. The MEST would have a pivotal role on the programme steering committee, providing high level management input and identifying priorities. This option is relatively low risk with all the organisations involved having a proven track record in education in Sierra
Leone. There may, however, be a capacity issue with some of the key NGOs who are also applicants for the
GEC Step Change Window unable to deliver services both for GEC and the country programme. It should be
7

possible for other members of the consortium to address this if it is an issue. The Capacity Development
Strategy (CDS) component addresses the issues around sustainability. The CDS will be designed to enable the MEST and local councils to build their capacity to lead and manage improvements in the delivery of educational services.
3. The do nothing counterfactual
A third option is to do nothing. Doing nothing would fail to achieve DFID’s Operational Plan (OP) and DRF results in education and would mean that progress towards the MDGs in education in Sierra Leone would slow down considerably.
Theory of Change
Please refer to the detailed theory of change in the Annexes and diagram below.
[Information on context, need and complementary interventions is available in the Strategic Case]
8

A1. Appraisal of the Feasible Options
1. Implementation and funding through the MEST
In this option, if DFID put resources into the ESSF, the Government would manage the activities, which are integral to improving the quality of education. With FTI and SIDA funding through the ESSF, MEST has contracted private companies to build schools and WASH facilities and has paid teacher training colleges to train up to 1,000 teachers through distance education. It has also procured and will oversee the distribution of teaching and learning materials. MEST through the ESSF is therefore a feasible partner to deliver a package of support and improvement.
There would be major challenges associated with this choice though. The ESSF has experienced lengthy delays in almost every aspect of its work. SIDA funds given and intended for use in 2009 still are only partially utilised, resulting in a loss of $3m of funds in 2010 and risking a further $3m earmarked for 2011-12. Similarly the FTI grant has already had two extensions and funds have had to be restructured away from construction and into JSS fee subsidies which can be disbursed directly to schools. At the time of writing these disbursements had not yet been made. These delays have meant that teachers have not been trained (700 through SIDA funds), schools and water and sanitation facilities have not been built and teaching and learning materials only partially purchased and delivered. Audit, progress and financial reports have been very late and staff (for which funds have been available) have not been recruited. For both SIDA and FTI funding in the
ESSF, the MEST management has been marked by procurement problems, weak staff capacity, and poor working relationships with local councils and administrative bottlenecks. The MEST has already lost considerable SIDA funding and nearly lost FTI funding as a result of these weaknesses. These have as yet not been addressed. There are some recent indications that MEST will address these issues, bringing in greater engagement of the Ministry of Finance and the President’s Office to drive progress. After nearly three years of poor performance, however, MEST will need to demonstrate it can deliver results to restore confidence and this is the principal objective of the CDS. Therefore, until the CDS has achieved its objectives, working directly through MEST would be a high risk option.
A recent DFID Fiduciary Risk Assessment (FRA) of social sector Ministries, concluded that the MEST ’s fiduciary risk rating was ‘high’, marked by weak public financial management and controls and poor budget execution with only 74% of the MEST budget being utilised in 2010.
20 The Auditor General’s 2010 Report states in the executive summary that: ‘administrative and financial management of the school system is out of control.’ 21 Although the MEST CDS would help to tackle some of the concerns identified in the FRA particularly around procurement and financial management the impact and success of the CDS would not be known and improvements would not be achieved until the end of the intervention.
As a responsible Development Partner and a signatory to the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action,
DFID should support the ESP and ensure that resources are aligned with Government plans and policies.
However, the ESP is currently being revised and the new ESP will not be available before funds are programmed for this intervention, although this invention will be able to inform the ESP. To ensure that results are delivered reliably and efficiently, DFID will need to work with a range of partners, including those with greater capacity to engage with individual schools and Districts. These activities should fit within national and local education plans and support longer term efforts to build the capability and effectiveness of education institutions.
2. Implementation and funding through a mix of multi-lateral and NGO partners
Given the challenges of working directly through MEST and the current track record of delivery in the ESSF, the alternative option is to work through non-governmental partners, ensuring that they are aligned and engaged with MEST policy and programmes, with DFID and MEST providing central coordination. To deliver at the scale and in the timeframe required by DFID Sierra Leone’s Operational Plan, the choice of partners will be a key determining factor.
The range of delivery partners currently operating in Sierra Leone is limited. In education the only nongovernment agency working at any scale is UNICEF, which is the Lead Education Partner with programmes
9

of around $7m p.a. in 2010. UNICEF operates mainly in advocacy, teacher training, inspections and monitoring and WASH. There are also a large number of international and local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) working in education who vary in capacity and size, although even the largest focuses on relatively small-scale interventions which are targeted in specific districts rather than at national coverage.
For these reasons it will only be possible to work at scale in Sierra Leone through a combination of UNICEF and a consortium of NGOs.
This option would see one programme established with one logframe but with a combination of components delivered by different partners which all feed into the DFID SL Results Framework. Under DFID’s existing
Framework Agreement with UNICEF a Memorandum of Understanding would be signed to deliver the components where UNICEF has a comparative advantage.
UNICEF currently has programmes targeted at out of school children and enrolment in Grade 1. Components
1 and 2 of the planned programme would complement these supporting 30,000 out of school children to access school and 150,000 children to enrol at the correct age in Grade 1. Initial evaluations would be conducted to identify the target groups and the mode and the value of incentive that would maximise value for money and impact. With component 5 DFID SL would partner with UNICEF, building on an existing pilot in
Kenema that developed and trialled a reading assessment tool, and with the MEST and the World Bank to develop a framework for assessing learning at key points in the primary and JSS cycles. These assessments would then provide national level data on standards in learning as well as a school based suite of assessment tools which can be used in the classroom to track progress and inform teaching and learning.
Components 6, 7 and 8 are designed to develop the capacity, efficiency and effectiveness of the MEST and local councils to deliver and monitor the effectiveness of education services. DFID SL would partner with
UNICEF and the MEST in Component 6 to deliver the CDS which was developed and presented to the MEST in early 2012. The impact of the CDS will be evaluated after one year to assess its impact and implementation success. If necessary it will be restructured following the evaluation. In component 7 DFID SL would partner with UNICEF and the MEST Inspectorate to scale up the existing Cluster Monitoring Pilot. This will be evaluated at the end of the programme to provide an evidence base for a potential national scale up. In
Component 8 DFID SL will partner with UNICEF to provide high quality longitudinal data on students, teachers and the effectiveness and efficiency of the education system to inform MEST policies and plans and enable better stakeholder accountability.
In Component 3 DFID SL would partner with a consortium of NGOs to scale up existing JSS stipends which will target 15,000 of the most vulnerable students, the majority girls. This component will be closely aligned to compliment and add value to the approved GEC programme for Sierra Leone to ensuring value for money and maximising impact for the poorest.
In Component 4 the NGO consortium would implement a targeted programme of whole school improvement to improve the learning outcomes of 240,000 students through better teaching practice in literacy and numeracy along with more effective school leadership from headteachers that ensures students have the opportunity to learn. Selected schools in this intervention will work in partnership with the MEST and teacher training institutions to improve pre and in-service teacher training.
Working through a mix of non-government actors will increase the transactional and management costs to
DFID but these can be minimised where partners can deliver more than one component through a consortium. The identified partners are already established in Sierra Leone and many of the programme components are developing, redesigning or scaling up existing interventions where partners have comparative advantage and an existing knowledge base of what is effective, efficient and economical.
The over-riding advantage of this option is that that it overcomes or mitigates the high level of risk of either implementation failure and/or fiduciary risk associated with operating through the MEST by using a range of partners who have a proven track record in education in Sierra Leone. It also builds the capacity of MEST to take a central implementing role in the future. The partnership with MEST in components 2 and 3 will further build the MEST’s capacity.
10

The coordinating and partnership role of the MEST is a central part of this option. Although the interventions will be implemented by NGOs, the MEST will provide high level programme management and co-ordination through its role on the Steering Committee. It will also have a central role in the implementation and success of components 2 and 3.
3. The do nothing counterfactual
Doing no harm is one key criterion for working with fragile and conflict affected states and as such the counter factual of ‘do nothing’ is a valid option. Failure to address equity in educational access and outcomes at primary and JSS levels not only creates a current reason for potential conflict it threatens to create a longer term economic disparity which will entrench divisions and potential for conflict. A cycle of poverty linked to inequity in educational opportunity would develop. Similarly, a failure to seize the opportunity to improve students’ learning outcomes will result in a continued waste of resources in primary and JSS education. A large proportion of resources will continue to be spent on repeated years or on whole levels of education which do not deliver meaningful learning. Quality improvements would free up these resources and enable an expansion of JSS education through cost savings. Repetition at primary is currently 16% annually, this corresponds to approximately 192,000 school places and at JSS it is 13% which corresponds to approximately 30,000 school places. This additional 222,000 school places would represent an 89% expansion if it was translated in JSS school places which would create enough additional JSS school places for the estimated 400,000 children of JSS age.
The withdrawal of SIDA this year leaves DFID as the only significant bilateral donor in education 22 . If DFID were to do nothing aid funding to the education sector would decline significantly and it is fair to assume that education indicators would decline and poverty would increase. ODA to education is already significantly lower than other sectors 23 . One of the principle reasons for the low level of ODA to education in Sierra Leone is the low level of donor confidence in MEST to effectively absorb funds.
Without DFID’s intervention there will be little or no capacity improvement creating a vicious circle of continued low levels of ODA resulting in poor education outcomes for students resulting in continued poverty.
In addition to a reducing ODA to education, the proportion of government spending that goes to education is declining. It peaked in 2006 at 19.6% to an estimated 17% in 2012 24 . There has also been a decline in education spending as a share of GDP between 2004 and 2009 from 4.1% to 3.2%. If DFID were to do nothing there would be further decline in resources to education 25 .
To do nothing would do harm in a variety of ways. To do nothing is likely, in the worse-case scenario, to increase poverty as educational outcomes remain low especially in terms of learning, increase inequality and potentially lead to a renewal of civil strife. In the best case scenario it would delay the process of lifting Sierra
Leone out of poverty and improving the wellbeing of its citizens. The accumulation of human capital would be slow and inefficient and, as a result, economic growth would lag despite the fact that a large proportion of government resources were spent on education.
B. Assessing the strength of the evidence base for each feasible option
[A further analysis of the pertinent evidence base for the programme can be found in the Theory of Change
Annex]
Component 1 Reduce Economic Barriers to Enrolment in G1
Component 3) Reduce the Economic Barriers to Enrolment and completion of JSS
Evidence Rating: Strong
Cost is the most significant barrier to accessing education in Sierra Leone. The average annual cost of attending primary school has been estimated at Le 53,100 ($17) per year with the majority (89%) of rural
Sierra Leoneans living on less than Le 2,200 per day. 55% of households report paying fees for primary school. The average annual amount paid is Le 15,000 ($5). 40% of households have reported that children are excluded from school for not paying fees.
26 Only 24% of children enrol at age 6 in Grade 1 and late enrolment is probably the main reason for children being out of school. The probability of children never enrolling or dropping out of school increases with age as the opportunity costs increase and this affects girls
11

disproportionately. Probability of dropping out of school is 3.5 times more likely in 15-17 age group than 12-14 group. Drop-out rates at JSS are 1 in 2 and 3 in 4 at SSS.
27
The international evidence on the impact of enrolling at the correct age on completion and retention shows that age specific drop-out rates increase significantly after age 10 in Sub Saharan Africa. Therefore, starting school at the correct age is essential for completion of the full primary cycle. Children who are two years or more overage in the final grade of primary school have the highest dropout rates. Drop-out also increases with rural location and gender.
28
The DFID funded WFP school feeding programme provides an economic incentive to girls to enrol and remain in primary school. This pilot intervention is currently reporting attendance rates for the girls who received take home rations of 90%. Similarly the DFID funded WFP school feeding programme reported enrolment rates in schools with the school feeding double that of those without school feeding.
29 The evidence on economic interventions to support access to education is strong.
30 It is also being piloted by IRC in Sierra Leone and forms part of EFA-FTI plans although there is no evidence yet on the impact of these interventions.
Component 2 Enrol Out of School Children in Access to Primary School Provision
Evidence Rating : Strong
It is estimated that 16% of children of school age will never attend school in Sierra Leone, this equates to approximately 40,000 children. They are from the poorest and most marginalised sections of society and not being able to access education perpetuates the cycle of poverty.
31 The evidence at an individual level on the link between improved educational outcomes and reduced poverty is well established.
32 Enrolment of out of school children is obviously critical to the achievement of Universal Primary Education and MDG 2.
Component 4 Improve Learning Outcomes: Whole School Improvement Linked to Teacher Training
Colleges
Evidence Rating: Medium
Evidence on the impact of whole school interventions on learning outcomes shows that working at school level, as the key unit within the education system, can produce significant improvements in learning. Recent interventions in developing countries to improve the quality of teaching and learning and to increase learning outcomes have shown impressive results. These are summarised in the table below:
Table: Interventions to Improve the Quality of Teaching and Learning and Raise Learning Outcomes in
Developing Countries
Date
2011 –
On going
Name of intervention and country
Teacher Community Assistant
Initiative Ghana
Impact
Only evidence is after 10 weeks of programme. Students in afterschool remedial classes scored 10 percentage points higher than students in other groups.
33
2008-
2010
EGRA Plus Liberia The overall EGRA Plus effect size on learning achievement for the full treatment group was 0.79 standard deviations. This equates to between 1.9 and 8 years of additional schooling in specific aspects of reading achievement.
34
2006-
2009
1999-
2005
1998/9-
2003
Pratham Read India
Chhatisgarh State
Primary Reading Programme
Zambia
Increase in average ASER score from 60% in 2006 to 73% in 2009 (average in
2008 was 85%) 35
Change in English Reading and Writing Scores 1999-2002
Grade 2 575%
Grade 3 417%
Grade 4 300%
Grade 5 165%
There was also evidence of increased enrolment and reduced absenteeism.
36
30% gain in learner achievement (literacy and numeracy) between 2000-2002 37 District development Support
Programme (DDSP) South
Africa
12

The inventions above are indicative of the impact that can be achieved in a short period of time, albeit from a low baseline with intensive work at classroom and school level. It is this level of improvement in learning outcomes, sustained over a long period of time, and combined with access for all, that, it has been argued, explain the dramatic economic growth experienced in East Asia and India towards the end of the twentieth century 38 . Hanushek estimates that an average increase in learning outcomes of 0.25 standard deviations for
OECD countries over a 20 year period represents an increase in OECD GDP of US$114,930 billion.
39
Furthermore, he calculates that the impact of raising the performance of all students to the PISA minimum score of 400 would result in an increase in GDP for Mexico of 2,155% and 1,673% for Turkey, arguably the two least developed OECD countries 40 . The impact of improvements in learning outcomes of 0.79 standard deviations achieved in Liberia, if scaled up to a national level in Sierra Leone are, therefore, potentially very significant. However, although the evidence on the impact of improvements is strong the evidence on what works and how to achieve these outputs is inconclusive with a variety of different approaches, models and methodologies being used not all of which are sustainable or appropriate to scale up to a national level.
Component 5 Learning Assessment Framework developed and implemented
Evidence Rating: Strong
As discussed above, the evidence indicates that the private and public benefits to education come from learning rather than just school attendance. Assessing levels of learning and identifying barriers to learning so that policy and practice can be adjusted to address these is essential to improving learning outcomes and improving school effectiveness.
41 With improvement in educational access the focus is shifting to access plus learning.
42 There is a growing body of empirical research that demonstrates the benefits of specific types of tests, which when implemented and used correctly, impact positively on students’ learning outcomes. In particular, effective learning assessment enables achievement gaps between different groups of students to be addressed and equity improved.
43 Research on learning assessment has established a link between countries with effective learning assessment policies and high performance levels in international assessments such as PISA and TIMMS.
44 There is also a developing body of evidence that learning assessments play a role in increasing the accountability of schools and education authorities to stakeholders.
45
Component 6 MEST & Local Council Capacity Development Strategy
Evidence Rating: Medium
The evidence on improvement in central and local government capacity on school effectiveness is mixed and interventions to improve governance outcomes in Sierra Leone have shown slow improvement. The available evidence suggests that systemic reform is necessary to create an enabling environment for sustained improvement in the variables which impact on learning and reforms are rarely successful without effective leadership at the systemic and school level. Changing the governance and management of a system seems, therefore, to be a prerequisite for improvement.
46 DFID SL Country Governance Analysis indicates that there have been improvements in capability, accountability and responsiveness of governance albeit starting from an extremely low baseline at the end of the war. The trajectory of change has been positive but slow and much remains to be done.
Evidence on the impact of decentralisation in education on learning is mixed. Systems with both decentralised and centralised systems have achieved rapid improvements. However, where there is decentralisation and there has been impact on learning this has been achieved with rigorous standards and increased public accountability.
47 Evidence from India suggests that simply increasing the participation of stakeholders in the monitoring of public services has no impact. Community involvement in schools had no impact on teacher effort or learning outcomes.
48 Publically accessible published data are needed on school effectiveness and performance to overcome asymmetric information and moral hazard associated with the education production function.
49 Therefore, decentralisation, such as the introduction of SMCs needs to be accompanied by effective monitoring and evaluation of schools and the appropriate dissemination of monitoring and evaluation data.
Component 7 Cluster Monitoring of Schools
Evidence Rating: Medium
13

2
3
4
5
There is some evidence on the impact of improved monitoring and evaluation of school effectiveness on learning in developing countries. A study of inspection and supervision services in Namibia, Botswana,
Tanzania and Zimbabwe found that schools identified the impact of monitoring and supervision as positive.
More than 50% of schools identified the impact of monitoring and supervision as high or very high in the areas of: teacher motivation; teacher lesson preparation; classroom teaching and lesson delivery; staff attendance and staff development.
50 The monitoring and evaluation of school effectiveness is closely linked to ensuring that the conditions for ‘Opportunity to Learn’ exist in schools.
Summary of Evidence
Component Evidence rating
1 Strong
6
7
Strong
Strong
Medium
Strong
Medium medium
What is the likely impact (positive and negative) on climate change and environment for each feasible option?
The UNDP Climate Change Country Profile for Sierra Leone 51 notes that the potential impact of climate change on Sierra Leone is likely to be felt through changes in rainfall patterns and the durations of the wet/dry seasons, with impacts on agriculture and freshwater resources, and through increased risks of flooding, salinisation and damage to marine habitat as a result of rising sea levels.
There seems however to be a lack of a good scientific basis on which to predict the impacts of climate change on Sierra Leone. Understanding of the processes causing tropical rainfall is insufficient to allow a prediction of the direction of change with any certainty. The IPCC identify this as an area requiring further research to understand the variety of model responses in this region.
There is a low level of public awareness and insufficient attention being given to on climate change and environmental issues. It may be possible to integrate environment and climate change issues (impacts, adaptation, mitigation) into the curriculum, particularly focusing on the impacts likely to be experienced in the local area – droughts and flooding plus storms in coastal areas, and promote the establishment of school gardens and water harvesting as an educational intervention with a particular focus on adaptation 52 and low carbon technologies 53 . There needs to be flexibility to develop school learning materials that relate to appropriate climate change and environmental responses where this is relevant to the locality of schools.
Gender differences in loss of lives due to natural disasters are directly linked to weaker women’s and girls’ economic and social rights. Improving literacy and numeracy will enhance the ability of girls to earn livelihoods in the context of mounting environmental pressures. It is seen as one of the best climate change and disaster prevention investments, with high social rates of return.
54
The options considered in this appraisal case relate to the mechanisms for implementation and managing the three components of the programme. Likely climate and environmental impacts will therefore be the same for the two delivery options. The third option, do nothing, will have no direct influence on climate change and environment. The programme strategy, components and outcomes are focussed on improving learning outcomes through increasing school attendance and improving the quality of education and education services. The programme thus provides an opportunity to improve awareness and knowledge of climate and environment issues through better education. The programme itself will not have direct climate impacts. This analysis is reflected in the Table following.
DFID’s funding for the programme will not support infrastructure development or transport. Hence, there should be no direct negative environmental impacts.
Categorise as A, high potential risk / opportunity; B, medium / manageable potential risk / opportunity; C, low / no risk / opportunity; or D, core contribution to a multilateral organisation.
Option Climate change and environment risks and impacts, Category (A, B, C, D)
Climate change and environment opportunities, Category (A, B, C, D)
14

1
2
3
Implementation and funding through the
MEST
Implementation and funding through a mix of multi-laterals and NGO partners
Do nothing counterfactual
B/C
B/C
C
C. What are the costs and benefits of each feasible option?
The scope of the proposed intervention has been set out above and embodied in the components that comprise the intervention. The remaining choice is between the two feasible implementation mechanisms:

Implementation and funding through MEST

Implementation and funding through a mix of multilateral organisations and NGOs under joint
MEST/DFID leadership
The appraisal focuses on the costs and benefits of the components of the intervention, which are compared against a counterfactual. Whilst the choice of intervention mechanism is likely to have an impact on the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of the programme, there is a limited evidence base upon which to quantify this. As such, this is assessed separately.
COUNTERFACTUAL
The intervention is assessed against a counterfactual that assumes that the activities set out here would not be delivered without UK funding. This is a reasonable assumption given the lack of donor funding to the education sector compared with other sectors of the economy and the chronic budget constraints that the government currently faces, and which are likely to prevail in the medium term. As such, the current level of educational attainment is assumed to prevail without the intervention i.e. no change to primary and JSS completion rates, grade repetition, dropout rates nor exam passes.
INCREMENTAL COSTS
The total direct cost to DFID of delivering the intervention has been calculated as £15.4m over four years, which includes
£890,000 for monitoring and evaluation. The estimated cost of each component is
summarised in Table 1. The education adviser, team leader of the MDG team and programme assistant will
work on the project but the cost is not included. No other costs are envisaged at this time.
Component Details Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Total
Strategy A: Expand Access and Increase
Completion in Primary and JSS Schools
Strategy B:Improve the Learning Outcomes
Students Achieve
Strategy C: Increase Individual and
Institutional Capacity at National, Local and
School Level
External Evaluation
Total
0.6
1.0
0.6
0.2
2.4
1.2
2.0
1.2
0.15
4.5
1.2
2.0
1.2
0.15
4.5
1.0
1.6
1.0
0.39
4.0
4.1
6.5
3.8
0.89
15.4
Whilst the structure of the costs for each implementation mechanism is likely to be different, it is assumed that the overall costs would be the same. For example, using existing Government systems in option 1 would probably have lower unit costs but existing inefficiencies and low capacity of MEST would mean that more staff would need to be recruited, reducing the cost-effectiveness. In addition, using Government systems carries higher fiduciary (and corruption) risks and therefore, for the same outcome, more would need to be invested in safeguards and monitoring so raising the costs. These issues are explored in more depth below.
INCREMENTAL BENEFITS
This intervention, whether delivered through option 1 or option 2, is expected to result in more children
15

enrolled in school at the appropriate age and completing different levels of basic education with sufficient levels of learning to be a productive member of the work force and/or to contribute to society in other ways.
The benefits from the project fall under three categories:
1. Private returns: additional and better quality schooling, with more levels of education completed, valued through higher expected earnings (costed where possible). It is implicit here that higher earnings reflect higher productivity but the impact on economic growth is not quantified in this appraisal.
2. Improved health outcomes: higher levels of education, particularly for girls, are expected to raise awareness of health and wellbeing.
3. Social returns: wider benefits to society from a more educated population including a lower probability of conflict, enhanced political stability and accountability of the Government, enhanced entrepreneurship that should expand economic activity and levels of production and improved ability to cope with climate change (although these benefits are important they are not costed into the appraisal).
The programme is expected to benefit significant parts of the school-aged population (Table 2), though in
different ways. The main beneficiaries of the intervention will be children of primary and junior secondary school age from across the country and from a variety of socio-economic backgrounds. Given the focus on the economic barriers to participation, it is expected that a significant proportion of the beneficiaries will be from the poorest parts of the population and those who may not be able to access basic education.
Understanding the reasons behind the exclusion of these parts of the population from the education system is a fundamental aspect of this programme and its success will be measured by its ability to tackle these factors.
Component
Component 1 Reduce Economic Barriers to Enrolment in G1
No. of beneficiaries
150,000
Component 2 Enrol Out of School Children in Access to Primary School Provision 30,000
Component 3 Reduce the Economic Barriers to Enrolment and completion of JSS
(mainly girls) 15,000
Component 4 Improve Learning Outcomes: Whole School Improvement Linked to
Teacher Training Colleges 240,000
Component 5 Learning Assessment Framework developed and implemented
Component 6 MEST & Local Council Capacity Development Strategy
Component 7 Cluster Monitoring of Schools
1,450,000
1,500,000
514,286
The programme also seeks to address a number of fundamental weaknesses in the education system that have kept attendance and the quality of schooling at chronically low levels. This would therefore benefit all school-going children through an improved curriculum, better and more efficient school management and higher teaching standards.
Quantification of Benefits
The benefits have been quantified in a two-step process. Firstly, the number of children who are expected to enrol and complete primary and junior secondary school as a result of the first component is estimated and the level of increased private returns over the counterfactual, approximated by an expected increase in wages, is calculated. The second stage applies assumptions about how improvements to the quality of education – both its management and delivery – might impact on these students, principally through lower dropout rates and better performance in exams. This limits the potential benefits to a small sub-set of the school-age population, even though more children are expected to benefit.
A number of critical assumptions have been made in the estimation of beneficiaries for component 1:

150,000 children enrol in G1 at the correct age, resulting in a 100% primary completion rate compared with the current level of 76% (component 1).

30,000 children, who are currently out of school, enrol in primary school at G1 and complete primary
16

school. None of these children are expected to enrol without the intervention (component 2).

15,000 children complete JSS who would not have done otherwise (component 3).
It is further assumed that 73% of primary completers will progress to JSS, in line with current trends.
Similarly, the current drop-out rate of 1 in 2 is applied to those children who benefit from components 1 and 2.
Based on these assumptions, it is projected that 66,450 children (64% girls) would complete primary school who would not have otherwise and that 39,254 additional children would complete JSS (65% women).
The most obvious benefit to the individual of investing more time and resources in education is the prospect of higher expected earnings. There is a wealth of literature on the impact of increased educational attainment on wages and increased prospective earnings in more general terms. This literature often takes increased wages as an indicator of enhanced productivity, though the evidence is not conclusive. It is, however, widely recognised that by providing pupils with writing, reading, counting and cognitive skills, formal education makes children more adaptable to the requirements of the labour marke t, and it “enhances the adaptability and efficiency of workers” (Sackey, 2008).
There is limited evidence of the impact of educational achievement on wages in Sierra Leone. The most recent living standards survey, completed in 2004, found that poverty levels dropped progressively as the education level of the household head increased, particularly in female-headed households.
55 Unfortunately, age-earnings data were not calculated from the survey. Psacharopoulos (1994) estimated the social returns to investment in education to be 20% for primary and 22% for secondary school in Sierra Leone but did not assess the private returns; the lack of data in more recent times has prevented any further studies. A later study by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 56 (2004) estimated that an additional year of schooling increased earnings by 11.7% in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is used as the best available estimate for Sierra Leone at this time. For 6 years in primary school, this represents a 70% increase in expected earnings and an additional
35% for three years in JSS.
Annual wages are approximated by GNI per capita (Atlas method), which amounted to $340 in 2011, or £216
(exchange rate of 1.58 from April World Economic Update).
57 Using the 70% estimated rate of return on primary education implies that each additional child that completes primary education as a result of the intervention is expected to earn 70% of £216, which is about £151 extra per year, increasing total expected earnings to £367 per year thereafter. For completing JSS, this equates to an extra £76 each year, on top of
£367.
Impact of Improving Learning Outcomes
Developing the quality of teachers and school management is expected to have two impacts. Firstly, a reduction in grade repetition is expected to reduce the level of drop-outs at all levels, since the opportunity cost of attending school increases with age and being over-age is a significant contributing factor to drop outs. This could manifest itself in an improved transition rate from primary school to JSS but also through reducing the drop-out rate from 50% to 25%. This would result in an extra 12,127 children completing JSS.
Improved school effectiveness is expected to impact on the level of achievement of the students, particularly in underperforming areas such as literacy and numeracy. As highlighted above, Sierra Leone underperforms compared with its regional neighbours; the WASSCE pass rate for mathematics is 5% in Sierra Leone, compared with 60% in Nigeria. Using the social returns to secondary education in both countries from
Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) and GNI per capita, the wage impact in Sierra Leone is 49% of that of
Nigeria. Using this difference, it was estimated that increasing the pass rate in mathematics from 5% to 20% would increase the wages of those in Sierra Leone who pass by around 29%. Since the exams take place at the end of SSS, it is implicitly assumed that all of those who complete JSS under this programme achieve this.
Opportunity Costs
The target beneficiaries of the proposed intervention range from 6 to 14 years old (though some might be older because of grade repetition or other factors), particularly in the poorest and most deprived regions of
Sierra Leone. Evidence suggests that many of these children drop out of school in order to work. As they get older, their productivity levels increase and the potential lost income from attending school rises; this was
17

highlighted above as a major contributing factor to the high level of dropout rates in JSS and SSS.
The short-term opportunity cost is applied to each year that a child attends JSS under the programme. The opportunity cost is the estimated wage for a child that completes primary education (£367).
Health Benefits
Given the strength of available evidence, it is likely that improved education results in a range of improvements to health outcomes. The OECD 58 (2006) found considerable evidence that “education is strongly linked to health and to determinants of health such as health behaviours, risky contexts and preventative service use ”. These tend to be slightly higher for girls due to implications of delayed pregnancy, reduction in maternal and infant mortality. Both sexes benefit from the reduction in chances of contracting
HIV. A study by De Walque 59 (2004), based on data from Uganda, estimates that each additional year spent in school reduces both women and men’s probability of contracting HIV/AIDS by 6.7%.
BALANCE OF COSTS AND BENEFITS
The potential costs and benefits of the intervention are calculated over a 25 year period and discounted using a 10% discount, in line with other appraisals in DFID Sierra Leone. The outcome of the cost-benefit analysis
is summarised in Table 3. The net present value (NPV) is est
imated to be highly positive, at £52.7m, with a benefitcost ratio (BCR) of 5. This suggests that for every £1 spent, £5 of benefits will be realised and, with the positive NPV, the intervention should go ahead.
Costs Benefits Opp. Cost NPV BCR
Increased primary and
JSS completion
Reduced drop outs
Increased pass rates
£13.2m
£60.9m
£78.1m
£103.1m
£27.8m
£36.0m
£36.0m
£19.9m
£28.9m
£53.9m
2.51
3.19
5.09
If the only achievement of the project was to increase primary and JSS completion (i.e. Strategy A), that would still exhibit highly positive benefits and the appraisal recommends this should go ahead. As expected, the other components build on the potential benefits expected under component 1 and are likely to be selfreinforcing: improvements to management and teaching quality should free up resources that can be reinvested in increasing enrolment and providing educational equipment.
The analysis raises some questions about the cost-effectiveness of each component. For example, the additional (discounted) cost of Strategy B and C amounts to £8.9m and is expected to bring additional benefits of £42.2m; a benefit-cost ratio of 4.74, which is higher than simply for increasing primary and JSS completion. This is perhaps not surprising since the quality of the education system is arguably a more important, and perhaps more difficult, challenge to address. However, it should be noted that these benefits quantified within this appraisal are limited only to those direct beneficiaries and so are a likely underestimate of the true benefits. In reality, it is expected that all students would benefit from these improvements and so the private benefits are potentially understated.
Other Costs and Benefits
Political stability in a post-conflict environment:
There is a body of evidence that supports the impact of increased educational attainment on citizens’ political agency and democratic participation. Increased education also results in increased awareness and capability to exercise rights. These are essential factors in building peace and stability in the post conflict environment in Sierra Leone. In addition the ISIS programme will reduce inequities in access to schooling and in educational outcomes and opportunities. Disparities in educational access and opportunities were identified as one of the causal factors in the civil war.
Demographic dividend: An increased level of education among females tends to raise awareness of basic biological mechanisms and different means of birth control, which are likely to reduce the fertility rate. In
18

addition, higher educational outcomes for women may offer girls better career prospects, which may also contribute to reduced fertility through a higher opportunity cost of raising more children. When a decrease in the fertility rate follows a period of low mortality rates and high fertility rates, the age distribution shifts in favour of a very large workforce and a relatively smaller share of dependents (especially children), leading to a significant decrease in the economy’s dependency ratio (ratio of economically inactive to active population).
This demographic shift can give a major boost to economic growth over the long term.
Improved health and social returns: As discussed above, this analysis has not monetised other private benefits, such as improved health and wellbeing that are often associated with improved education. Similarly, it has not attempted to monetise the wider social benefits of a more educated population, which would be a significant challenge to do given the lack of data. This means that the benefits presented within the appraisal represent a likely conservative/under estimate of the actual benefits of the programme.
Fiscal implications: By increasing lifetime earnings, it is reasonable to assume that the intervention would also result in an increase in total revenue, primarily through increased collection of income tax but also through increased indirect tax collection that may result from higher consumption levels. Calculating this would require an analysis of microeconomic responses to different levels of taxation, for which only limited data exist. However, the revenue impact is potentially large, given that the highest level of increased salary is equal to around 1% of GDP. If the intervention also has positive growth effects emanating from higher productivity, the revenue take might be even greater.
Cost to government: It should be highlighted that some costs are also not monetised in the analysis. The increased enrolment will have a cost implication for the Government at the end of the intervention and, even though they will be incurred in the future and discounted, are likely to be substantial. The unit costs in 2010 were estimated at £16 in primary schools and £27 in JSS, though any additional costs incurred by the
Government might reasonably be assumed to be covered by the potential increased revenue.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Table 3 indicates that the intervention remains cost-effective even if it only achieved the objective of
component 1, to increase the completion rates of primary school and JSS. It may be argued that the extra cost involved in improving the quality and management of schools, as well as the capacity of MEST, does not justify the increase results. However, it should be highlighted that the analysis set out above on reduced drop-out and increased pass rates have only been applied to the beneficiaries directly targeted by the intervention.
Primary completion rate: if the existing primary completion rate is applied to those children who benefit from the project in terms of primary schooling (instead of assuming all of them complete primary school), the discounted benefits drop to £93.1m and the opportunity costs also drop to £32.8m. The result is an NPV of
£47.1m and BCR of 4.58.
Returns to education: It was found that only when the returns to education drop to 3.4% that the project breaks even (i.e. NPV=0 and BCR=1). Even if the benefits are limited to those expected from component 1, the rate of return would need to drop to 7% to break-even. This is an extremely low level of returns, much lower than the average for sub-Saharan Africa and especially for a low income country. Evidence suggests that the returns to education in low income countries tends to be higher because of low levels of schooling and relative scarcity of human capital.
Discount rate: the project remains cost-effective until the discount rate reaches 20%.
ASSESSMENT OF DELIVERY MECHANISMS
The appraisal has determined that the proposed package is likely to result in substantial positive net benefits.
These will depend, to some extent on the mechanism of delivery, which would be either through MEST or a mixture of other service providers. There is no clear empirical basis upon which the merits of these different delivery mechanisms can be assessed and compared. For example, there is limited evidence of the efficacy of achieving education outcomes through direct funding to the education ministry compared with civil society, multilateral agencies or private sector providers. In view of this, the relative merits of the two delivery options are scored against a set of subjective criteria that are considered vital to the successful implementation of the
19

intervention.
Each delivery mechanism was scored from 1-4 against each criteria. A score of 1 indicates that DFID is fully convinced of the ability to deliver against that criteria, whilst 4 indicates that there is significant doubt. The lowest total score therefore indicates the preferred delivery mechanism.
Scoring criteria
Option 1:
Implementation through MEST
Option 2:
Implementation through multilaterals and NGOs
Ability to deliver the ISIS programme at scale
4 1
Fiduciary risk 4 1
Government ownership 1 2
Timing
Sustainability and long term impact on government capacity
Total
3
2
1
2
14 7
On this basis, option 2 is the preferred delivery mechanism.
D. What measures can be used to assess Value for Money for the intervention?
The measures that can be used to measure value for money are set out in the table below
Indicator
1. The cost of delivery of economic incentive package
Definition
The cost of delivery per child of incentives to access education for components 1, 2 and 3
VfM Measure
Economy
Source of Data
Programme monitoring data
2. Primary and JSS completion rates nationally compared to targeted schools
3. BECE pass rate and
Learning assessment scores
Comparison of completion rates nationally with schools targeted in 4
Percentage of children passing the BECE annually and the average annual scores in learning assessments
Efficiency
Effectiveness
National EMIS and
Monitoring data
WAEC results data and
Monitoring data
Baseline
1 £1.125m for 150,000 children
£7.50
2 £1.5m for 30,000 children
£50
3 £1.5m for 15,000 children
£100
National completion rate for primary 79% (2010)
JSS 49% (2010)
BECE pass rate 43.8%
(2010)
4. Average cost of delivering CDS goals
5. Proportion of girls benefitting from the programme
6. The value for money of the intervention as a whole
Average cost of delivering a goal in the
MEST CDS
Number of girls compared to boys that benefit from the different components of the programme
Cost effectiveness and cost benefits analysis of the ISIS programme
Efficiency
Equity
Cost-effectiveness
Monitoring data
Monitoring data
Evaluation
Baseline to be established
Baseline to be established
NPV £53.9m BCR 5.09
Evaluation will test the assumptions underpinning the ex-ante cost benefit analysis
According to the estimates set out in the economic appraisal there would have to be very significant slippages in delivery costs for the intervention to no longer represent good value for money – see Section C above.
20

E. Summary Value for Money Statement for the preferred option
The expected benefits outweigh the expected costs by a factor of 5 with a highly positive net present value of
£52.7m. The analysis is robust to different assumptions about the rates of return to education, completion rates, pass rates and discounts rates. In addition, It has been assumed that returns to both primary and secondary schooling are the same when in reality returns to secondary are likely to be higher than for primary [i] , so the monetised benefits are potentially understated.
The analysis has not monetised a number of other possible costs and benefits: the costs of maintaining enrolment and educational attainment after the project are expected, on balance, to be significantly less than the other benefits that are likely to emanate from health improvements, political stability, a demographic dividend, economic growth, positive fiscal impacts, benefits to the community, and benefits to the environment and to climate change. This suggests that the intervention is even more cost-effective and is likely to deliver even higher returns.
The choice of delivery mechanism required balancing a number of factors including efficiency in delivery, corruption risk, ability to deliver in a timely manner and fiduciary risk. Our assessment found that option 2 almost universally entails a lower implementation risk and that option 1 has a high risk of delivery failure. On this basis, option 2 is deemed to have the lowest risk of not achieving the high economic and social returns on the investment more and is preferred.
Commercial Case
Direct procurement
A. Clearly state the procurement/commercial requirements for intervention
As outlined in the Appraisal Case above, the intervention consists of three strategies with eight components.
The key aspects for procurement are: Components 1-3 – the management and delivery of economic and other incentives and interventions to increase school access; Component 4 - the management and implementation of a whole school approach to improving learning outcomes; Component 5 technical assistance for the design and implementation of a framework for assessing learning; Component 6 management and implementation of the MEST Capacity Development Strategy (included in Annexes);
Component 7 the management of the Cluster Monitoring services and Component 8 longitudinal school based research.
It is expected that procurement will be indirect for all components based on proposals received from UNICEF and from NGOs working within a Consortium. If, however, at the end of the inception phase, it is clear that
UNICEF and the NGOs are unable to deliver or cannot meet quality standards the mix of implementing partners will be reviewed with a view to procuring directly through international tender.
The key area where direct procurement will be used will be in programme evaluation, the plan for which is described in detailed in the Management Case and relevant Annexes below and for which Terms of
Reference (ToRs) will be developed during the inception phase.
Direct procurement will be through international tendering according to OJEU procedures and the selection of contractors will be carried out jointly by DFID SL and the Procurement Group (PrG).
B. How does the intervention design use competition to drive commercial advantage for DFID?
DFID SL
’s expectations of service providers will relate directly to the expected results to be delivered by the programme. Specific terms of reference will relate to the component of the programme to be delivered by the service provider. Draft ToRs for the principal service providers are included in the Annexes below, other relevant ToRs will be developed during the inception phase.
Competitive bidding among providers will be used to deliver value for money. While quality, technical expertise and innovation will be critical considerations in selection of any potential service provider, DFID SL will give high priority to efficiency and the ability to deliver the results articulated in the logframe at the lowest
21

cost. In addition DFID SL will examine evidence of previous impact where similar interventions have been delivered.
DFID expects that service providers will obtain the best value for money by ensuring that their costs reflect market prices, overheads are efficient and they have the capacity to implement the programme effectively.
They will also have established formal structures for the careful control of resources to ensure that operational and financial implementation contributes to the achievement of programme objectives, and that procurement and payment processes are in accordance with best business practices.
Implementing partners will also have well-established and effective systems for strengthening performance and the ability to deliver and maximise results which will be monitored by DFID through regular progress reviews, narrative and financial and audit reports.
C. How do we expect the market place will respond to this opportunity?
Potential bidders will be identified at global level by PrG. There is likely to be a small but well qualified pool of potential bidders with a proven track record either regionally or specifically in Sierra Leone. Along with the
Girls’ Education Challenge this may also be an opportunity to expand the market of service providers in
Sierra Leone, increasing competitiveness and driving innovation in delivery.
D. What are the key cost elements that affect overall price? How is value added and how will we measure and improve this?
The key cost elements likely to be associated with direct procurement are the professional fees for the various elements of delivery.
ToRs will be used to define the key performance indicators in both the implementation and management of the components and key deliverables. Regular work plans, jointly agreed with DFID SL, will detail the inputs necessary to achieve programme results. Efficiencies will be maximised through competitive tender.
For the life of the programme DFID will:

Review the programme budget annually to monitor efficiency and identify cost savings

Ensure that all implementing partners have an efficiency savings plan for year on year cost savings
 Review the implementing partners’ procurement processes to ensure that these provide value for money

Conduct formal annual reviews to monitor progress, efficiency and value for money and look at these extensively at the mid and end of programme evaluations.

Conduct quarterly progress reviews to monitor performance and quickly address bottlenecks to performance
E. What is the intended Procurement Process to support contract award?
Procurement of technical assistance will take place through a competitive process using a shortlist of bidders selected following an evaluation of the Pre-Qualification Questionnaire (PQQ) stage. DFID also intends to publish a Prior Information Notice (PIN) both internationally and in the local press in advance of the OJEU process to enable potential suppliers to ready themselves and clarify any misunderstanding they may have about the process. The adjudication of submissions will be performed by DFID SL with PrG. Evaluation criteria for the selection of the preferred suppliers will include:

Feasibility and strength of proposed approaches. Suppliers will be required to articulate their proposed intervention approaches;

Ability to provide sufficient competent resources and the assurances that the team described in the bid documents will be available by the time work starts;

Unit costs (fee rates).
F. How will contract & supplier performance be managed through the life of the intervention?
Contractors will set out key performance indicators linked to annual programme work plans and the indicators, milestones and targets in the logical framework. DFID will:

Conduct an annual review of the programme including and assessment of service provider performance
22


Track programme performance and budget execution through quarterly narrative and financial reports through DFID Sierra Leone’s quarterly progress meetings with its education partners

Ensure that the service providers have quality assurance procedures in place to ensure goods and services are fit for purpose

PrG will negotiate management charges as part of the programme budget negotiations to ensure that these charges are set at an appropriate level to deliver programmes in the Sierra Leonean context

Agree and monitor a risk strategy which sets out specific responsibilities of DFID and the service providers for managing and mitigating risk, updated at each annual review.

Ensure an Exit Strategy is drafted by the end of the inception phase which will be monitored and updated at each annual review

Any contracts will incorporate steps to be taken in the event of poor performance, suspected corruption or fraud and failure to deliver expected results and value for money.

Regular updates will be requested on progress with regard to these performance indicators, and any shortcomings will be identified and addressed promptly.
Indirect procurement
A. Why is the proposed funding mechanism/form of arrangement the right one for this intervention, with this development partner?
The main components of the intervention will be procured indirectly through UNICEF and a Consortium of
NGOs this is based on proposals received and will enable the programme to be implemented as quickly and efficiently as possible.
The expected component breakdown is:
UNICEF
1 Reduce the economic barriers to enrolling in primary school at the correct age
5 Development a framework of learning assessments
6 Build the professional and technical capacity of national and local education authorities to effectively and efficiently manage and deploy education resources
7 Enhance the professional and technical capacity of national and local authorities to monitor and evaluate school effectiveness
Consortium of NGOs
2 Improve primary access for the poorest in Sierra Leone with special emphasis on out of school children
3 Reduce gender based barriers to access and completion for JSS girls
4 Improve school effectiveness and reduce grade repetition through better leadership and effective classroom practice
8 Conduct School Based Longitudinal Research
In financial terms the breakdown is approximately 50% UNICEF and 50% Consortium.
Indirect Procurement Through UNICEF
UNICEF is the Lead Education Partner and plays a unique role in Sierra Leone. Operating in all 14 districts, it is the only partner that has national coverage. UNICEF currently runs an advocacy programme at national level to encourage early enrolment of children which will complement additional incentives in Component 1 and focuses on the rights of children to education which complements Component 2. UNICEF have already partnered with IRC to develop a reading assessment which has been piloted in one district of Sierra Leone.
UNICEF have already piloted Cluster Monitoring of schools in three districts and Component 7 will scale up this programme with the MEST. UNICEF has 10 years’ experience of conducting national scale research in
Sierra Leone through its Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys and is the best placed partner to commission and manage the longitudinal school based research in Component 8 and to publish and effectively disseminate the results of the research.
The services provided through UNICEF will use the standard Administrative Framework Arrangement agreed centrally between DFID and UNICEF. As established in MoUs with UNICEF signed during 2012, further specific requirements for monitoring and reporting will be added to the agreement as determined by DFID
Sierra Leone and agreed with UNICEF.
23

Indirect Procurement through NGO Consortium
Components 2, 3 and 4 would be indirectly procured through NGOs operating as a consortium. These are the main education NGOs currently operating in Sierra Leone. Component 2 will benefit from the specialist knowledge, experience and success of Street Child in getting out of school children into education.
Component 3 will benefit from the experience and knowledge gained from two current programmes being implemented by members of the Consortium. Plan are the implementing partner for a take home rations pilots for WFP for vulnerable girls in primary school, and Concern and IBIS are implementing partners for
WFP in school feeding. Together with the other members, the consortium will be able to provide a programme with national scope targeted at JSS.
The NGO Consortium brings together the current best practice in improving learning in Sierra Leone and makes them best placed to manage and deliver component 4. IRC have already piloted baseline assessments of reading and implemented school based interventions to address identified gaps in learning.
Save the Children have developed and implemented training for headteachers and all members of the consortium have been involved to varying extents in different forms of teacher training.
B. Value for money through procurement
UNICEF: Memorandum and Understanding/Framework Agreement
This approach offers value for money for a number of reasons. The MAR found that UNICEF demonstrated v ery strong value for money and this is reflected in DFID Sierra Leone’s experience of working with the organisation at country level. UNICEF will also provide significant economies of scale and access to substantial resources in country. Currently UNICEF is the largest education partner in Sierra Leone and is the Lead Education Partner. It also manages four programmes within DFID Sierra Leone’s MDG portfolio:
Rural Water, Sanitation and Hygiene project (£8.5m), Joint UN Reproductive & Child Health programme
(£8.5m), the 2011 Free Health Care Initiative medicines and medical supplies project (£10m), and the
Reproductive, Maternal and New Born Health programme (£12.65m). Whilst the challenges to implementation in Sierra Leone are significant, UNICEF has been very responsive to these to ensure, in particular, strengthened fiduciary and corruption risk management so that programmes can deliver expected results.
NGO Consortium: Accountable Grant with a NGO Consortium
This approach will achieve value for money as the contracting of NGO service providers will address a number of concerns the MAR raised regarding UNICEF including strengthening partnership behaviour, transparency and accountability; driving cost and value consciousness; and ensuring strong financial resource, strategic and performance management. It will also enable national scope to be achieved when there are no single NGO partners operating at national scale. It will capitalise on the constituent NGO’s current expertise and operational knowledge and create the opportunity to generate savings from economies of scale as resources and personnel are shared across the organisations. The members of the Consortium are also all established actors in education in Sierra Leone and have built up local knowledge and expertise which gives them a comparative advantage over other organisations and a comparative advantage as a consortium. In particular they have built strong local partnerships with local councils in the districts where they operate.
A full due diligence of the Consortium will be completed by DFID SL w hich will evaluate the group’s financial systems. There will also be an assessment of the Consortium’s capacity to expand its current operations to provide national coverage and deliver expected results. We will require the Consortium to provide a value for money strategy and Action Plan demonstrating how it will achieve maximum effectiveness. This will include efficiency targets to ensure that costs remain as low as possible.
Financial Case
A. What are the costs, how are they profiled and how will you ensure accurate forecasting?
The programme budget is £15.4 million. Fund disbursements will be profiled over the period of implementation starting in 2012 and ending in 2016 broken down as follows:
24

Component Details
Budget £
Million
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Component 1 Reduce Economic Barriers to Enrolment in G1
Component 2 Enrol Out of School Children in Access to Primary School
Provision
Component 3 Reduce the Economic Barriers to Enrolment and completion of JSS
Component 4 Improve Learning Outcomes: Whole School Improvement
Linked to Teacher Training Colleges
Component 5 Learning Assessment Framework developed and implemented
1.125
1.5
1.5
6
0.5
Component 6 MEST & Local Council Capacity Development Strategy
Component 7 Cluster Monitoring of Schools
Component 8 Longitudinal School Based Research
External Evaluation
1.81
1.64
0.387
0.838
0.16875 0.3375 0.3375 0.28125
0.225 0.45 0.45 0.375
0.225 0.45 0.45 0.375
0.9 1.8 1.8 1.5
0.075 0.15 0.15 0.125
0.2715 0.543 0.543 0.4525
0.246 0.492 0.492 0.41
0.05805 0.1161 0.1161 0.09675
0.200 0.150 0.150 0.338
Totals 15.4 2.3693 4.4886 4.4886 3.9535
The financial breakdown is expected to be £6.962m UNICEF and £7.5m INGO with the balance used to conduct evaluation of components.
Disbursements under this programme have been forecast in DFID SL’s financial plan for the next four years.
Regular monitoring of forecasts will be carried out through the DFID education quarterly progress meetings where all service providers provide quarterly progress reports against results and expenditure and assess and review forecasts for the remainder of the financial year. This will ensure that accurate forecasts are provided. In addition, site visits will be made by DFID SL staff to inspect progress and activities on the ground.
B. How will it be funded: capital/programme/admin?
Adequate funds are available in DFID Sierra Leone’s programme resource allocation as detailed in the 2011
– 2015 Operational Plan.
C. How will funds be paid out?
DFID will sign a MOU with UNICEF. Payment of which will be front loaded to address initial outlays for services . Subsequent payments thereafter will be provided in two tranches in April and September each year and will only be made on the receipt of satisfactory six-monthly narrative and financial reports as per the
Framework Agreement.
An Accountable Grant Agreement will be signed between DFID and the appointed service providers. Funding tranches will be agreed with the service provider but are expected to be paid quarterly in arrears, subject to satisfactory narrative and financial reports and key performance indicators in the logframe and contract
ToRs. The payment terms for the accountable grant will be governed by the rules for accountable grants which will be clearly outlined in the Accountable Grant Letter.
25

For all implementing partners, the disbursement of funds will be linked to performance against the key performance indicators in the logframe and against particular requirements where these have been stipulated in the respective Accountable Grant or MOUs. The MDG Team Leader will authorise all payments on the basis of signed financial statements accounting for previous tranches, contingent on results.
D. What is the assessment of financial risk and fraud?
In general there is a high financial and fraud risk in Sierra Leone. This intervention will reduce these risks by channelling resources through UNICEF and NGOs which have better fiduciary controls than the Ministry of
Education, Science and Technology (rated as high risk in the recent 2011 DFID Fiduciary Risk Assessment).
DFID will conduct due diligence either at a global or country level for all service providers. Only service providers that meet minimum standards would be eligible to tender and/or receive DFID funds through other channels. The standards achieved would be assessed through readiness checks before large scale funds were released. Regular quarterly reporting and annual audits will be used to ensure that the standards required are maintained or exceeded throughout the programme. DFID will also undertake spot checks to add further rigour into the monitoring systems and processes already in place.
E. How will expenditure be monitored, reported, and accounted for?
DFID and its implementing partners will agree a four year work-plan with key performance indicators in line with the finalised logframe at the end of the five month inception period. Partners will submit narrative and financial reports and will provide quarterly progress reports against results and expenditure at the DFID
Education Partners ’ quarterly meetings. The broad monitoring and evaluation framework will be set out in line with current DFID reporting procedures, and form part of the logframe with results disaggregated by gender and poverty indicators where practicable.
All money received would have to be accounted for before receiving the next tranche. In line with the Blue
Book accountability and audit requirements, partners will be required to submit annual financial reports and certified annual audit statements showing funds received and expended. A final programme report - three months after the end of the programme will account for all funds received.
Any capital assets procured under this programme will be treated in accordance with DFID procedures and declared to the DFID programme manager. Should assets remain at the end of the programme a disposal strategy will be agreed with DFID.
DFID will also work closely with other development partners and the MEST to monitor the programme.
There will be two Joint Monitoring Review Missions in March and September in the first two years and
Annual Reviews thereafter. Release of DFID funding will depend on the satisfactory outcome of these missions.
The financial management costs of this project are reasonable in the context of the overall cost (less than
8%). The exit strategy for this project is the identification of long term funding of the additional donor partners. DFID will discuss a strategy for achieving this with the MEST, other donors and partners.
However, the main element of the exit strategy is centred on increased systemic capacity so that existing funds can be used more efficiently. Where additional funds are required these will come from GoSL sources through improved education efficiency – specifically a reduction in the repetition rate at primary school. The Capacity
Development Strategy will also support the devolved functions of local government to manage and administer education and therefore mobilise the resources made available to education at a local level which have increased in recent years.
Management Case
A. What are the Management Arrangements for implementing the intervention?
The programme will be managed in two parts with coordinating oversight through a steering committee.
26

The programme will be managed and implemented by UNICEF and Consortium management units. The
UNICEF unit will be headed by the UNICEF Chief Education Officer with UNICEF specialists taking the leads on specific component implementation and management. The Consortium unit will be headed by the lead consortium partner IRC which will provide a central point of contact and leadership. The lead consortium partner will co-ordinate the local teams of the constituent NGOs.
A high level steering committee consisting of the DFID Education Adviser, a MEST representative (either the
Chief Education Officer or Minister), Unicef Chief Education Officer (Also GPE Lead Partner) and the lead representative from the NGO consortium. The role of the steering committee will be to provide high level coordination of the programme; ensure alignment and harmonisation with the new ESP and other donor and partner activities; provide technical oversight and to ensure quality in the delivery of the programme. The steering committee will also enable the MEST to have a central role in priority setting and develop its role as overall coordinator for the sector.
Identified components will undergo ex ante and mid-term evaluations to add to the evidence and knowledge base, inform programme design and provide early evidence on performance. This will be used to feed into the management systems and structure. The evaluation plan is set out below. The DFID Education Adviser in partnership with the Programme Steering Committee will agree contracts and ToRs for evaluations and the DFID Education Adviser will manage the evaluation requirements.
This intervention will be overseen by the DFID Education Adviser and the Project Officer in the Millennium
Development Goals Team, and other advisers in DFID Sierra Leone as appropriate.
B. What are the risks and how these will be managed?
The probability of risk rating for this programme is medium and the impact risk rating is medium to high. This is primarily due to the high level of fiduciary risk in Sierra Leone. In view of the significant increase in funding to the health, education and water sectors as a result of the BAR, DFID Sierra Leone undertook a fiduciary risk assessment of these sectors in mid 2011. This was intended to inform the design of programmes and help define appropriate mitigation measures in programme design from the outset. These will complement existing mitigation measures that DFID Sierra Leone currently employs in the Education Sector, increasing the range and mix of mitigation measures and further safeguarding programme investment and impact.
DFID SL has also developed its own country specific Anti-Corruption Strategy. The implementation of this strategy and sharing it with partners provides another key mitigating action that addresses fiduciary risk and the misuse of programme funds.
The programme will be implemented through partners that have a proven track record both in Sierra Leone, or internationally, and specifically with DFID in other sectors. However, the whole school approach in component 4 is innovative and untested in Sierra Leone. Although there is a good body of international
27

evidence establishing its impact on learning outcomes. A key risk with this component will be the recruitment and retention of sufficient and appropriate coaches and mentor to work with teachers and headteachers.
Risk Mitigating Action
Probability Impact
Lack of government support and alignment with EDP priorities
The level of fiduciary risk is generally high in Sierra Leone
Misuse of funding by implementing partners.
Collaboration with GoSL and Development Partners in the development of the new ESP and GPE application. Roles for MEST and key partners in programme management and use of the Education Development Partners group to share information and results
The programme will be implemented through multilateral and NGO partners, with strong MAR rating and proven experience in Sierra Leone. Risk management will be built into the programme design with all partners and cost recovery mechanisms included in all MoUs and contracts
Quarterly assurance reports, visits by DFID, funds released in small tranches with clear accountabilities and conditions of release for future funds. The implementation of DFID
SL’s new Anti-Corruption Strategy
Low (1)
High (3)
Medium (2)
Medium
(2)
High (3)
High (3)
Competing priorities of government counterparts, especially the shortage of skilled staff at all levels will all affect the long term sustainability of the programme
UNICEF and consortium programmes will strengthen partnerships by engaging with NGOs at country level to spread risk. The Capacity Development Strategy and quality components specifically seek to address human resource capacity issues. DFID SL MDG team is developing the coordination of shared goals and priorities across the GoSL through formal agreements and structures
Medium (2)
The recruitment of experienced and appropriate experts as coaches and mentors for whole school improvement
Weak data collection and consequent inability to demonstrate results
Partnerships with VSO and Peace Corps to develop an international base for recruitment and to enable recruitment of experts from LIDCs
The Ministry of Education, Science and Technology
(MEST) is currently undertaking data verification to collect correct data on schools in the country and UNICEF plans to re-verify the list of primary schools. The CDS will strengthen data collection at MEST and local levels.
Medium (2)
Medium (2)
C. What conditions apply (for financial aid only)?
The programme does not include financial aid directly to the Government of Sierra Leone .
High (3)
High (3)
Medium
(2)
D. How will progress and results be monitored, measured and evaluated?
Monitoring Strategy
The programme will have an inception phase of five months during which the implementing partners will conduct baseline surveys, finalise the programme logframe, and develop work plans for the programme as a whole. In addition, implementing partners will provide quarterly narrative progress reports against jointly agreed indicators together with quarterly financial expenditure reports.
These will be reviewed and discussed with DFID and a summary will be presented by the partners at the
DFID Education Partners ’ Quarterly Progress meetings to facilitate synergy and sharing of lessons learned across DFID Sierra Leone’s education portfolio. The forums will also be a way of monitoring programme progress against results and forecasts. DFID will participate whenever appropriate and feasible in on-theground programme activities in order to assess programme activity and outputs, and also to verify whether costs were reasonable and kept within budget. Feedback will be shared with the implementing partners as appropriate.
Tracking progress against the logframe will be used to manage the results of the programme. Annual
Programme Reviews will also provide the forum to monitor the key assumptions underpinning the programme, identify and prioritise operational research needs, and review the programme risk management plan.
28

Evaluation Plan
Based on the strength of the evidence base for each component of the programme and the knowledge required for the effective, efficient and economical delivery of the programme components, the evaluation plan in the Annexes is proposed. It is expected that this plan will be adapted and modified in the light of learning during the inception phase.
Lograme
Quest No of logframe for this intervention: included as Annex 7
The logframe will be finalised as part of the four month inception period. This will confirm baselines and milestones.
1 This figure excludes the Senior Secondary School population
2 DFID 2012 Sierra Leone Growth Diagnostic Analysis
3 GoSL 2012 Budget Statement
4 GoSL 2012 Making Progress – Schools and Students in Sierra Leone
5 GoSL 2012 Draft Country Status Report
6 UNICEF 2012 MICS 4 Final Report; GoSL 2012 Making Progress – Schools and Students in Sierra Leone
7 IRC 2011 Primary Education in Sierra Leone: The State of Quality and Access
8 GoSL 2011 education Sector Review; West African Examinations Council quoted in SLEDEF 2012
9 GoSL 2011 Education Sector Review
10 GoSL 2010 Gbamanja Report
11 World Bank 2008 Textbook Provision and Educational Outcomes, Sierra Leone Baseline Report
12 GoSL 2011 Sierra Leone Education Sector Capacity Development Strategy
13 GoSL 2010 Auditor General’s Report on the Accounts of Sierra Leone
14 World Bank 2008 Education In Sierra Leone: Present Challenges, Future Opportunities
15 IOE 2012 Evidence on the Relationship Between education, Skills and Economic Growth in Low Income
Countries: A Systematic Review
16 DFID 2012 Sierra Leone Growth Diagnostic Analysis
17 DFID SL 2011 School Feeding
– Supporting Access to Primary Education for Vulnerable Children Business
18 DFID SL 2011 WASH in School and Clinics Business Case
19 World Bank 2011 December Restructuring Report; ESSF Financial report at ESSF meeting 15 th May 2012
20 Fiduciary Risk Assessment: Education, Health and Water Sectors, Sierra Leone, unpublished, August 2011.
21 GoSL 2011 Auditor General’s Report on the Accounts of Sierra Leone p8
22 GPE 2012 Sierra Leone Aid Effectiveness in the education Sector
23 GoSL 2012 Budget Statement
24 DFID 2011 Fiduciary Risk Assessment Education, Health and Water Sectors Sierra Leone
25 DFID 2011 Fiduciary Risk Assessment Education, Health and Water Sectors Sierra Leone
26 IRC 2011 Primary Education in Sierra Leone: The State of Quality and Access
27 GoSL 2012 Making Progress Schools and Students in Sierra Leone
28 UNESCO 2011 School Drop Out: Patterns, Causes, Changes, Policies
29 WFP2011 School Feeding Baseline Report
30 Baird, McIntosh & Ozler (2011) Cash or Condition? Evidence from a cash transfer programme Bolsa Escola in
Brazil and Progressa in Mexico hove both had significant impact on enrolment, completion and reducing drop out
31 GoSL 2012 Making Progress Schools and Students in Sierra Leone
32 Psacharopoulos and Patrinos 2004 Returns to Investment in Education: A Further Update
33 Innovations for Poverty Action 2012 An Evaluation of Teacher Community Assistant Initiative (TCAI) Pilot
Programme in Ghana: Preliminary Impact Results
34 USAid 2010 EGRA Plus Liberia Program Evaluation Report
35 2011 Introduction to Pratham Power Point Presentation
36 DFID 2005 Impact of the Zambia Primary Reading Programme
37 USAid 2006 Integrated Education Program Analysis of the Impact on Pupil Performance of the District
Development Support Programme (DDSP)
38 OECD 2010 The High Economic Cost of Low Educational Performance The Long Run Economic Impact of
Improving PISA Outcomes (fig 6)
39 OECD 2010: 23
40 OECD 2010: 26
41 Black and Wiliam 2005 Assessment and Classroom Learning
42 Guadlupe 2012 Learning Outcomes the Key Challenge
43 World Bank 2011 Framework for Building an Effective Student Assessment System
44 Ibid
45 Ibid
46 McKinsey 2007 How the World’s Best Performing School Systems Come Out on Top
47 Ibid
29

48 Banerjee et al 2008 Pitfalls of Participatory Programs: Evidence from a randomised Evaluation of Education in
India
49 Levacic 2010 Motivation and Agency in Schools
50 UNESCO IIEP 2001 School Supervision in Four African Countries
51 UNDP Climate Change Country Profiles http://country-profiles.geog.ox.ac.uk
52 “Coping with Drought” https://practicalaction.org/coping-with-drought , “Preparing for Flood” https://practicalaction.org/preparing-forfloods-
53 See http://tech-action.org/Guidebooks/TNA_Guidebook_AdaptationAgriculture.pdf
54 World Bank (2010) Adaptation to Climate Extremes in Developing Countries. The Role of Education . Policy
Research Working Paper 5342
55 For example, 28% of households headed by a female that had completed secondary school were below the $2 per day poverty line, compared with 72% of those headed by a female with no education (reported in World Bank
(2007).
56 Psacharopoulos G., Patrinos H. A. (2004), " Returns to Investment in Education: A Further Update " Education
Economics, 12(2), pp. 111
–134
57 Applying an exchange rate of 1.58 (IMF WEO). This does not distinguish between income levels and therefore probably overstates the level of income for individuals without primary education. However, it also inflates the wage uplift from educational attainment.
58 Feinstein L., Sabates R., Anderson T. M. , Sorhaindo A. , Hammond C. (2006), What are the effects of education on health?
, OECD
59 De Walque (2004), How Does the Impact of an HIV/AIDS Information Campaign Vary With Educational
Attainment?
Evidence From Rural Uganda , World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series 3289
[i] Psacharopoulos G., Patrinos H. A. (2004), " Returns to Investment in Education: A Further Update " Education
Economics, 12(2), pp. 111
–134
30