Long Abstract
HOW EXPECTATIONS AND THEIR VIOLATIONS AFFECT
DECISION MAKING
Cinzia Giorgetta1,2, Alessandro Grecucci2, Nicolao Bonini2,3, Roberta Ferrario1, Alan G. Sanfey2,4,5,6
1Institute
of Cognitive Science and Technology, CNR, Trento, Italy
2Department
3School
of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Italy
of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy
4
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
5
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, USA
6
Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
Among a number of widely investigated factors, such as emotions, beliefs, other preferences, also
expectations have recently received interest and attention in research, especially in the context of
social interaction. Many human decisions are taken in social interaction contexts, as humans live in
highly complex social environments. Psychological studies have demonstrated the relevant role of
expectations on judgment and on behavior (e.g., Klaaren et al., 1994; Allison and Uhl, 1964; Lee et
al., 2006; Shiv at al., 2005). Recently, the existence of a reciprocal modulation among expectations
and social decision making in negotiation contexts has been shown (e.g., Van Kleef et al., 2004;
Kopelman et al., 2006). Anyway, in these studies, participants build by themselves their
expectations from task features, but a direct manipulation of expectations is not used, which is
crucial if we want to investigate how expectations affect decision behavior. Until today, only one
study (Sanfey , 2009) has explicitly manipulated, in a between-subject design, the general
expectations of players in Game tasks, and then directly observed the consequences on their
behavior showing that players with higher expectations rejected more offers than those with lower
expectations or no expectations. However, in this study the author did not investigate whether both
lower and higher expectations are able to affect people decisional behavior in both directions within
the same context, that is, in a within-subject design.
Moreover, although we live in an interactive environment, and although the relevant role of
expectations on our ability to remember people previously met has already been shown (Chang and
Sanfey, 2009), it is unknown whether expectations also affect our decisional behavior when we reencounter the same person whom we have previously met.
In the present study we aim to broaden our knowledge of the relationship between expectation and
social interaction by examining and comparing how expectations affect people choice when
encountering a partner for the first time, as well as, how expectations affect people subsequent
choices when re-encountering the same partner again.
In order to address the first question we used an Ultimatum Game (Guth et al. 1982) paradigm.
After being instructed on the task and on the way players use to play (fairly or unfairly), 38
participants played with 20 players which usually do fair offers (high expectation condition) and
with 20 players which usually do unfair offers (low expectation condition). The two expectation
conditions were presented in counterbalanced order among participants. Before and after playing
with players belonging to each of the two experimental conditions, expectations were tested.
Findings highlighted that, indeed, participants expected, before and after playing, more fair offers
from the group belonging to the high expectation condition and more unfair offers from the group
belonging to the low expectation condition. As hypothesized, expectations affected choices leading
to reject more unfair offers when playing with the high expectation group than with the low one.
Therefore, people use specific expectations regarding social interaction as behavioral reference
point not only in a between-subjects condition, as previously shown, but also in a within-subjects
condition.
In order to address the second question we used a Dictator Game paradigm, where participants
played with the same players met during the Ultimatum Game. Participants had to decide the
amount of money they wanted to give to the other player. Findings showed that participants
allocated more money when playing with players belonging to the high expectation group than to
the low expectation group, and this was only true when they remembered the group the player
belonged to. Thus, expectations not only affect previous choices but also subsequent choices in
interactive contexts.
Taken together, findings from this study clearly highlighted that people use specific expectations
regarding social interaction as behavioral reference point and that information on the person they
are playing with have a significant impact on social decision making.
Short Abstract
HOW EXPECTATIONS AND THEIR VIOLATIONS AFFECT
DECISION MAKING
Cinzia Giorgetta1,2, Alessandro Grecucci2, Nicolao Bonini2,3, Roberta Ferrario1, Alan G. Sanfey2,4,5,6
1Institute
of Cognitive Science and Technology, CNR, Trento, Italy
2Department
3School
of Psychology and Cognitive Science, University of Trento, Italy
of Economics and Management, University of Trento, Italy
4
Donders Institute for Brain, Cognition and Behavior, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
5
Department of Psychology, University of Arizona, USA
6
Behavioural Science Institute, Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands
In the present study we aim to broaden our knowledge of the relationship between expectations and
social decision making. We did this by examining the role of expectations on people choice when
encountering a partner for the first time, as well as, how expectations affect people subsequent
choices when re-encountering the same partner again.
To answer the first question we used an Ultimatum Game paradigm. Participants were instructed
they were playing with two different groups of players: one that usually makes fair offers (high
expectation condition) and one that usually makes unfair offers (low expectation condition). Our
results showed that expectations affect choices leading to reject more unfair offers when playing
with the high expectation group than with the low one. Therefore, people use specific expectations
regarding social interaction as behavioral reference point not only in a between-subjects condition,
as previously shown, but also in a within-subjects condition. To answer the second question we
used a Dictator Game paradigm, where participants had to allocate money to the same players they
had encountered in the Ultimatum Game. Data demonstrated that participants allocated more money
to players belonging to the group that usually makes fair offers than to that of unfair offers. This
was true for well remembered players. This finding shows that, in interactive contexts, expectations
play an important role also on subsequent choices. Together these two studies extend our
knowledge of the role of expectations in social decision making.