Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group Inc.
ABN 95 177 668 265
Member Companies
Orica Australia Pty Ltd
Dyno Nobel Asia Pacific Pty Ltd
Maxam Australia Pty Ltd
Downer EDI Mining-Blasting Services Pty Ltd
Applied Explosives Technology Pty Ltd
Thales Limited
Johnex Explosive
Explosives Manufacturing Services
14 March 2013
Mr. Mark Whitechurch
Chemical Security Policy Unit
Attorney-General’s Department
3-5 National Circuit
Barton ACT 2600
Dear Mark,
RE: Draft National Code of Practice for Chemicals of Security Concern
The Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group Inc. (AEISG) is an incorporated association of
Australian explosives manufacturers and suppliers with an ongoing role of improving safety and security
within the explosives industry. As such, AEISG welcomes the opportunity to provide comment on the
above referenced Draft National Code.
The explosives industry supplies almost 3 million tonnes of blasting explosives each year, predominantly
to the mining and quarrying industries in Australia. Fortunately, by design and improving technology, the
bulk of these explosives are manufactured and handled at the point of use, i.e. on mine/quarry sites,
thereby minimising risks to the general community. However, the manufacturer, storage, handling and
use of explosives, and their associated chemicals, remains a significant safety and security issue for
consideration by all AEISG members in the development and implementation of their management
systems.
The explosives industry is, understandably, already heavily regulated in Australia and AEISG
acknowledges and accepts the need to protect the industry members, their customers and the
general community. However, the major impediment to safety and security improvements in the
explosives industry is the inconsistent and disjointed legislation across Commonwealth, State and
Territory jurisdictions which prevents the free flow of products, people and equipment across the
country.
Industry is currently constrained by multiple sets of requirements with little, to no, mutual recognition
or acknowledgement of licences, permits, security checks and other authorisations. The existing
system necessitates much duplication of effort on regulatory compliance, rather than towards
improvements in safety and security.
For example, security checks undertaken in one jurisdiction are not applicable nationally. Applicants
refused security clearance in one jurisdiction may well be acceptable and cleared in another. This has
led to continued divergence across jurisdictions with serious implications for security and safety. It can
only be addressed by national explosives legislation which would remove existing security
vulnerabilities, improve safety performance and reduce the burden of multi-jurisdictional compliance
costs for the Australian industries.
AEISG Inc., 2190 Gold Coast Highway, Miami, Qld. 4220
Email: bob.sheridan@aeisg.org.au
Telephone (07)55723332
Mobile 0417021032
Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group Inc.
The explosives industry has already experienced the issue of security sensitive chemicals in dealing
with the national set of principles developed to address the concerns related to SSAN (Security
Sensitive Ammonium Nitrate). While the principles were developed and accepted in a national forum,
the implementation of the principles, via legislation, was left to State and Territory jurisdictions. The
resultant outcomes are diverse, inconsistent, costly and importantly, less than effective from a
security perspective.
During the consultation period on the Consultation Regulation Impact on Chemical Security
Precursors to Homemade Explosives, AEISG, through its membership on the National Industry
Reference Group (NIRG), supported the development of a national government code as the preferred
option to address the appropriate control measures for precursor chemicals to homemade explosives,
but did not support the need for any legislative implementation of such code. In this way AEISG
believed that a national code would promote a consistent approach, avoid additional costly and
ineffective compliance requirements and ensure a level playing field for all Australian industries.
Several of the chemicals identified in the Draft Code are either manufactured or used within the
explosives industry for use in the manufacture of ammonium nitrate or explosives for commercial use.
Given the quite extensive legislative environment controlling the explosives industry and the licensing
arrangements under the Major Hazard Facilities legislation, security risk assessments and the
development of appropriate security plans are already a significant component of the management
plans of our member companies. Hence, the physical security, systems and processes established for
the control of explosives would also prove effective for controlling any of the identified chemicals of
security concern employed by AEISG member companies.
GENERAL ISSUES
While AEISG supports the development and implementation of a voluntary national code in this
instance, it is also interested in promoting its effectiveness. AEISG is not convinced that the Draft
Code is sufficiently clear on the need for risk assessments to be undertaken for various workplace
types, size, etc. Some particular guidance on risk assessments, including examples, would be
beneficial for those workplaces not familiar with such activities.
‘Suggested Actions’ are provided in the Draft Code, but there is little indication or information provided
on when certain actions would be recommended. It is considered that the ‘Suggested Actions’ may
become the norm rather than applied only when a relevant risk assessment identifies the need.
During the development of the national SSAN principles, it was agreed that solutions of SSAN would
be excluded and it was advised that such a decision was based on security assessments. In the
current Draft Code, solutions of the identified chemicals are included even down to what would
normally be considered to be fairly dilute levels.
Have there been further security assessments and advices to support or explain this apparent
inconsistency?
SPECIFIC ISSUES
(1) The Draft Code applies to 11 chemicals in forms specified in a table on page 6.
Will people be sufficiently aware of the detailed contents of various chemicals such that an
informed decision can be made as to what products fall into these categories?
Is there a requirement for such detailed information to be included in the labelling of
products? Will retailers know this information from their suppliers so that they can implement
relevant control measures? Does a product contain 9.9% of an identified chemical or 10.1%?
Does it matter? The exact formulations of some products may be commercial-in-confidence.
AEISG Inc., 2190 Gold Coast Highway, Miami, Qld. 4220
Email: bob.sheridan@aeisg.org.au
Telephone (07)55723332
Mobile 0417021032
Australian Explosives Industry and Safety Group Inc.
The concentrations quoted for sodium azide (95% or higher) is higher than other chemicals
listed, when experience would indicate that this chemical poses a risk at considerably lower
levels than others included in the list.
(2) The suggested control measure of criminal history checks for the full range of these listed
chemicals contained in commercially and freely available products raises significant practical
issues and some further guidance is required here. As previously indicated above, what are
the assessment criteria if a check is conducted? Each state/territory has different criteria,
what is an employer to use? Can a national security check be undertaken? Are national
assessment criteria available?
(3) The need for retailers to obtain personal information from members of the public who may be
potential purchases of commonly used and widely available chemical products may pose
privacy issues.
How is this information to be handled and secured? Could this obtained information be a
further security concern in itself, i.e. a list of possessors of chemicals of security concern?
(4) The ‘End-User Declaration – Example Format for Companies’ included in Appendix C does
not appear to follow a logical pattern e.g. under the heading ‘Product Details and Declaration’
are no product details.
As indicated earlier AEISG supports a voluntary Code of Practice to address the issues involving
chemicals of security concern and is pleased to have the opportunity to provide the above comments
in order to promote an effective document.
If you have any questions in relation to the above please do not hesitate to contact me.
Yours sincerely
R A (Bob) Sheridan
Chief Executive Officer
AEISG Inc., 2190 Gold Coast Highway, Miami, Qld. 4220
Email: bob.sheridan@aeisg.org.au
Telephone (07)55723332
Mobile 0417021032