References by topic
Social preferences and fairness
Andreoni, James (1990), “Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of
Warm Glow Giving,” Economic Journal, 100, 464-477.
Bolton, Gary E. & Ockenfels, Axel (2000), “ERCA Theory of Equity, Reciprocity and
Competition,” American Economic Review, 90, 166-193.
Charness, Gary & Matthew Rabin (2002), “Understanding Social Preferences with
Simple Tests,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817-869.
Charness and Rabin (2001), “Expressed Preferences and Behavior in Experimental
Games,” literature review contained therein, available from my website.
Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G. (1998), “A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity,”
forthcoming in Games and Economic Behavior.
Falk, A. & Fischbacher, U. (1998), “A Theory of Reciprocity,” forthcoming in Games
and Economic Behavior.
Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus (1999), “A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and
Cooperation, ” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868.
Rabin, Matthew (1993), “Incooperating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics,”
American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.
Communication and deception
Akerlof, A. (1970), “The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market
Mechanism,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 85, 488-500.
***Brandts, J. & G. Charness (2003), “Truth or Consequences: An Experiment,”
Management Science, 49, 116-130.
Charness, G. (2000) “Self-serving Cheap Talk and Credibility: A Test of Aumann’s
Conjecture,” Games and Economic Behavior 33, 177-194.
***Charness, G. & M. Dufwenberg (2003), “Promises & Partnership,” mimeo.
Cooper, R., D. DeJong, R. Forsythe & T. Ross (1992), “Communication in Coordination
Games,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107, 739-771.
Crawford, V. (1998), “A Survey of Experiments on Cheap Talk,” Journal of Economic
Theory, 78, 286-298.
***Gneezy, U. (2003) "Deception: The role of consequences," mimeo.
Behavioral finance
***Benartzi, S. and R. Thaler (1995), “Myopic Loss Aversion and the Equity Premium
Puzzle,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 75-92.
1
Biais, B., D. Hilton, K. Mazurier & S. Pouget (2002), “Psychological Dispositions and
Trading Behavior,” forthcoming in Review of Economic Studies.
***Charness, G. and U. Gneezy (2003), “Portfolio Choice and Risk Attitudes: An
Experiment,” mimeo.
Daniel, K., D. Hirshliefer & A. Subramanyam (1998), “Investor Psychology and Security
Market Under- and Over-reactions,” Journal of Finance, 53, 1839-1886.
Fama, E. (1998), “Market Efficiency, Long-term Returns and Behavioral Finance,”
Journal of Financial Economics, 49, 283-306.
Gneezy, U. and J. Potters (1997), “An Experiment on Risk Taking and Evaluation
Periods, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 631-645.
Hirshleifer, D. (2001), “Investor Psychology and Asset Pricing,” Journal of Finance, 56,
1533-1597.
Lei, V., C. Noussair & C. Plott (2001), “Non-Speculative Bubbles in Experimental Asset
Markets: Lack of Common Knowledge of Rationality vs. Actual Irrationality,”
Econometrica, 69, 831-859.
***Odean, T. (1999), “Do Investors Trade too Much?,” American Economic Review, 89,
1279-1298.
***Smith, V., G. Suchanek & A. Williams (1988), “Bubbles, Crashes, and Endogenous
Expectations in Experimental Spot Asset Markets,” Econometrica, 56, 1119-1151.
Anthropology and evolution
Camerer, C. and E. Fehr (2001), “Measuring social norms and preferences using
experimental games: A guide for social scientists,” in Henrich, Boyd, Bowles, Gintis,
Fehr, Camerer (editors) Foundations of Human Sociality: Ethnography and Experiments
in 15 small-scale societies, forthcoming, Oxford University Press.
Cosmides, L. and J. Tooby (1996), “Are humans good intuitive statisticians after all?
Rethinking some conclusions from the literature on judgement under uncertainty,”
Cognition, 58, 1-73
Henrich, J. (2001), “Cooperation, Reciprocity, and Punishment in Fifteen Small-scale
Societies,” short version
Henrich, J. & R. McElreath (2002), “Are Peasants Risk Averse Decision-Makers?,”
Current Anthropology, 43, 172-181.
2
Henrich, J. (2000), “Does culture matter in economic behavior? Ultimatum game
bargaining among the Machiguenga,” American Economic Review, 90, 973-979 (also,
long version from website)
Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, C. Camerer, H. Gintis, R. McElreath and E. Fehr (2001)
“In search of Homo economicus: Experiments in 15 Small-Scale Societies,” American
Economic Review, 91, 73-79.
Henrich, Joseph & Natalie Smith (forthcoming), “Comparative experimental evidence
from Machiguenga, Mapuche, Huinca & American populations shows substantial
variation among social groups in bargaining and public goods behavior,” in Foundations
of Human Sociality: Ethnography and Experiments in 15 small-scale societies, edited by
Henrich, J., R. Boyd, S. Bowles, H. Gintis, E. Fehr and C. Camerer, Oxford University
Press.
Mehta, J., C. Starmer, C. and R. Sugden (1994), “The Nature of Salience – an
Experimental Investigation in Pure Coordination Games,” American Economic Review,
84, 658-673
Emotions, punishment, and identity
***Akerlof, G. & R. Kranton (2000). “Economics and Identity,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 115, 715-753.
Charness, G. and D. Levine (2003), “The Road to Hell: An Experimental Study of
Intentions,” mimeo
Fehr, E. and S. Gachter (2000), “Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods
Experiments,” American Economic Review, 90, 980-994.
***Fehr, E. and S. Gachter (2002), “Altruistic Punishment in Humans,” Nature, 415,
137-140.
***Henrich, J. and R. Boyd (2001), “Why people punish defectors,” Journal of
Theoretical Biology, 208, 103-119.
Kirchsteiger, G., L. Rigotti & A. Rustichini (2001), “Your Morals are Your Mood,”
mimeo.
Loewenstein, G. (1996), “Out of control: visceral influences on behavior,”
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 65, 272-92.
***Loewenstein, G. (2000), “Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior,”
American Economic Review: Papers and Proceedings, 90, 426-32.
Intertemporal choice and self-control
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***Laibson, D. (1997), “Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 112, 443-478.
Lowenstein, G. and J. Elster (1992), Choice over Time, New York: Russell Sage
Foundation.
Loewenstein, G. and Thaler, R. (1989), “Anomalies: Intertemporal Choice,” Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 3, 181-193.
***O’Donoghue, T. and Rabin, M. (1999), “Doing it Now or Later,” American Economic
Review, 89, 103-124.
O'Donoghue, T. & M. Rabin (1999), “Incentives for procrastinators,” Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 114, 769-816.
Prelec, D. and G. Loewenstein (1998), “The Red and the Black: Mental Accounting of
Savings and Debt,” Marketing Science, 17, 4-28.
***Thaler, R., D. Kahnemann, J. Knetsch (1992), “Intertemporal Choice,” in The
Winner’s Curse, New York: The Free Press.
Adaptive Learning
***Camerer, C. & T.-H- Ho (1999), “Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning in
Normal Form Games,” Econometrica, 67, 827-874.
Crawford, V. (1995), “Adaptive Dynamics in Coordination Games,” Econometrica, 63,
103-143.
***Erev, I. & A. Roth (1998), “Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement
Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria,” American
Economic Review, 88, 848-81.
Fudenberg, D. and D. Levine, Theory of Learning in Games, MIT Press, but can also be
downloaded at http://levine.sscnet.ucla.net
***Nagel, Rosemarie (1995), “Unravelling in Guessing Games: An Experimental Study,”
American Economic Review, 85, 1313-26.
Roth, A. and Erev, I. (1995), “Learning in Extensive-form Games: Experimental Data
and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term,” Games and Economic Behavior,
8, 164-212.
***Selten, R. (1991), “Evolution, Learning & Economic Behavior,” Games & Economic
Behavior 3, 3-24.
Stahl, D. (1996), “Boundedly Rational Rule Learning in a Guessing Game,” Games and
Economic Behavior, 16, 303-330
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Other readings
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Andreoni, J. & L. Vesterlund (2001), "Which is the fair sex? Gender differences in
altruism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116, 293-312.
Apesteguia, Jose, Martin Dufwenberg & Reinhard Selten (2003), Blowing the whistle,
Discussion Paper 9/2003, Bonn Graduate School of Economics.
Banerjee, A. (1992) "A Simple Model of Herd Behavior", Quarterly Journal of
Economics 107, 797-817.
Baumeister, Roy F., Stillwell, Arlene M. and Heatherton, Todd F. (1995), "Personal
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and Applied Social Psychology 17, 173–98.
Bikhchandani, S., D. Hirschleifer & I. Welch (1992), "A Theory of Fads, Fashion,
Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades ", Journal of Political Economy
100, 992-1026.
Bosman, R., & Winden, F., van, (2002), Emotional hazard in a power-to-take game
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Camerer, C (1997), "Progress in Behavioral Game Theory", Journal of Economic
Perspectives 11, 167-88.
Chamberlain, E. (1948), "An Experimental Imperfect Market", Journal of Political
Economy 56, 95-101.
Cox, J. (2004), “How to Identify Trust and Reciprocity,” Games and Economic Behavior
46, 260-81.
Cox, J. & D. Friedman, “A Tractable Model of Reciprocity and Fairness,” Working Paper
02-04, Department of Economics, University of Arizona.
Cox, J. & V. Sadiraj (2001), “Risk Aversion and Expected Utility Theory: Coherence for
Smalland Large-Stakes Gambles,” Working Paper 01-03, Department of Economics,
University of Arizona.
Cox, J. V. Smith & J. Walker (1988), "Theory and Individual Behavior of First Price
Auctions," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, March, 61-99.
Davis, D. & C. Holt (1993), Experimental Economics, Princeton University Press.
Dufwenberg, Martin (2002), Marital investment, time consistency & emotions. Journal of
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Dufwenberg, Martin and Gneezy, Uri (2000), Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost
wallet game, Games and Economic Behavior 30, 163-182.
Dufwenberg, M. & Kirchsteiger, G. (2000), Reciprocity and wage undercutting (with
Georg Kirchsteiger), European Economic Review 44, 1069-78.
5
Dufwenberg, M, T Lindqvist & E Moore (2003) Bubbles & experience: An experiment
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Fehr, E. & A. Falk (2002), Psychological Foundations of Incentives, European Economic
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Fehr, Ernst & Simon Gächter (2000), “Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of
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Fehr, E., Kirchsteiger, G. & Riedl, A. (1993), "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing?
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Fershtman, C. & U. Gneezy (2001) "Discrimination in a Segmented Society: An
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6
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