Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
An Essay Presented
by
Sean L.A.M. Bennett
To
The Department of Music
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the Degree of Master of Philosophy
in the Subject of
Musicology
Wolfson College
Cambridge University
Cambridge, England
April 26, 2002
Cliburn Adored By The Russian Audience in the Final, Moscow, 1958.
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Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
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Introduction
Winning the Tchaikovsky International Piano Competition 1st Prize in 1958 in Moscow,
Van Cliburn was not the only one to emerge victorious. In addition to increasing the
popularity of the piano in both the US and USSR, his 1958 win increased “nationalist”
sentiments among citizens in the two dissimilar cultures. Cliburn’s win also showed how
musical judgment, a highly subjective medium, may be employed to reduce “nationalist”
tensions among politicians from rival nations.1 Explication of these two effects, preceded
by historical details about Cliburn and my definition of “nationalism,” will allow a better
understanding of the “nationalist” context surrounding Cliburn’s win.
The Setting
Born in 1934, Van Cliburn studied with his mother, Rilda Bee O’Bryan Cliburn, until he
was 17. At that time, Cliburn went to work with the Russian pedagogue Rosina Lhevinne
at Juilliard. Already armed with the Chopin and Leventritt Awards, good looks and a
formidable technique, by 1958 Cliburn was America’s best hope to win a prize in the
Tchaikovsky Competition (Blair, 1995).
However, in 1958, Cold War tensions between the US and the USSR were high.
Khrushchev, the relatively new Russian leader, and Eisenhower, the American leader,
were both eager to find ways to decelerate the Arms race. When the USSR beat the US in
the space race with Sputnik in 1957, it was viewed by many homeland Americans as a
crushing blow to capitalist progress. This boost to technological achievement by the
Russian states left many politicians in the US eager for an international win, but not at the
expense of civilian or national safety.
Just less than six months after the Sputnik launch, Cliburn took to the stage of the
Great Hall at the Moscow Conservatory in 1958 in the Tchaikovsky competition. While
other piano competitions, such as the Warsaw Chopin and the Queen Elizabeth had
reigned supreme, never had a competition mustered so much attention by the press or the
public as the Tchaikovsky. An assembly of the world’s greatest musicians comprised the
jury – no less than Neuhaus, Shostakovich, Kabalevsky, Gilels, and Richter towered over
the 50 contestants (Schwarz, 1972; Chasins, 1959).
While Cliburn won the audience’s hearts in the early rounds, it appeared that
some (Russian) jurors were penalizing Cliburn for his American background, giving him
outlier scores of 16 and 17 out of 25 rather than the 24s and 25s he received from most
jurors. These scores, which would jeopardize Cliburn’s advancement to the later rounds,
so angered Sviatoslav Richter, that Richter decided to give only 3 candidates (including
Cliburn) 25 out of 25, and the rest 0 out of 25. This assured that Cliburn would advance
to the semifinal and final (Blair, 1995).
In the final, playing Tchaikovsky’s First Piano Concerto and the Rachmaninov
Third Piano Concerto back-to-back with only a 3-minute pause between, Cliburn
received 8 minutes of applause. The jury, faced with a dilemma, having already pre1
Khrushchev wished to create a nearly opposite regime from Stalin, and this influenced the lack of terror in
his political actions towards other nations. He was involved in the decision to let Cliburn win (Davies,
1979).
Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
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selected the Russian Lev Vlassenko as the potential winner, consulted Khrushchev.
"Well, what are the professionals saying?" supposedly Khruschev wanted to know. "Is
Cliburn the best?" When the jury avowed that Cliburn was, Khrushchev replied, "Then,
in that case, give him the prize!" (Blair, 1995). However, as will be explained,
Khrushchev’s decision had many more political incentives than this conversation
suggests.
After winning, Cliburn became a hero in both the US and the USSR. Via the
media, many Americans built a conception of Cliburn as political hero: his picture was on
the cover of Time as the “Texan who conquered Russia” and television coverage
followed his journey home and first concerts in the US. Greeted with the only ticker tape
parade ever in New York for a classical musician, Cliburn’s record of the Tchaikovsky
Concerto with Moscow conductor Kiril Kondrashin sold 3 million copies. To many
Russians, especially the intellectual elite who were helping to shape a post-Stalin Russian
nationalism (Brundy, 1998), Cliburn was a musical icon, the representation of a marriage
between modernism and recent Russian musical traditions, an “honest” and “grand”
pianist in the pedagogical traditions of the Moscow Conservatory. Khruschev insisted
that Cliburn return to give a tour even after relations between the US had broken off.
“Nationalism” and “Nationalist” Defined
In order to better understand Van Cliburn’s wins through “nationalist” frameworks, and
given the myriad of scholarly definitions of “nationalism,2” it is useful to carefully
consider what I mean by “nationalist” and “nationalism.” Let me start by giving a few
hypotheses that help to ground my definition of nationalism.
First, while I am critical of other scholars’ uses of the term “nationalism3” it is
clear that 1) people under most circumstances belong to a nation even if not by choice, 2)
people feel a national unity more strongly during crises and times of stress than at other
times, and 3) people are willing under the right circumstances to give up everything,
including cynicism, for the abstract tenets they believe govern “national unity.” An
example demonstrating this 3-part hypothesis is the recent reaction of citizens in the US
following the September 11 attacks. Americans banded together, the usually unpatriotic
bought flags and people gave to strangers. The psychological tenets governing group
identity sublimated individual’s energy into the idea of “nation” to keep people from
suffering moral aloneness during this difficult time (Isaacs, 1975). Many people silently
had harsh opinions of Bush’s reaction, but reacted in the same way as supporters, putting
their outspoken cynicism on hold for the sake of “America.” The myth of the nation as a
collective whole was in effect during this time of tragedy (Mosse, 1991).
Second, it is also clear that when people transmit information to each other, they
do not understand the full meaning of the information because of cognitive constraints in
processing linguistic information (Chomsky, 2000; Sperber, 1996). As a result, people
can never subjectively interpret cultural information in the same way. The trick to getting
people of different backgrounds to exhibit positive sentiments about their nation is to
2
Dahbour (1995) and Ozkirimli (2000) are so overwhelmed by the scholarly debate over what
“nationalism” is that instead of defining it, they formed an anthology of “nationalism” definitions.
3
“Nationalism” can be seen as a linguistic construct in the tradition of Chomsky (2000) and Laitin (1992) –
a segment of reactions, thoughts, and behaviors with fluid boundary lines.
Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
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allow each person to map their subjective beliefs onto what they think the nation means,
what they think the leaders believe and what they think the leaders are doing. This
requires a special ambiguity in communication between the leaders and the masses that
allows “nationalism” to have a unique meaning to each person, while creating the illusion
that “nationalism” means the same thing for everyone.
With this paradox and the first hypothesis set in mind, my definition of
“nationalism” logically follows: any emotion or belief among a member of an established
nation that raises the importance they place on believing in a “national unity.” This
definition allows people to define “nationalism” and “nationalist” for themselves.
Even though individuals define “nationalism” for themselves, as historians and
musicologists we can still identify “nationalist” feelings among the people of a nation.
Identifying examples of “national unity” is quite simple – you just have to sample a
group of people and ask them how they are feeling towards their nation. If enough
believe in a “national unity,” there is a pervading “nationalist” sentiment. However, you
cannot know the precise mechanism each person used to arrive at their “nationalist”
feelings. Similarly, a theorist can model the major causes (but not all of the causes) of a
collective “nationalism” by examining the historical context for changes that coincide
with the overall levels of claimed “nationalism.” Because “nationalist” sentiments may be
examined theoretically, this essay is capable of proposing and defending the following
two suggestions: 1) single events can evoke “nationalist” feelings among citizens of
multiple nations and 2) creating “nationalist” feelings among the masses through
subjective mediums can indirectly reduce political tensions between leaders of rival
nations.
A Single Event Can Evoke “Nationalist” Feelings Among Citizens of Two Nations
Utilizing the above definition of “nationalism,” it is possible for one event to invigorate
members of more than one nation to feel “nationalist.” The event must affect people in
more than one nation. Additionally, the members of the different nations usually must be
similar politically and culturally. If they are not, “nationalist” sentiments are possible
among both groups, but only under certain conditions. The event must be subjective and
ambiguous enough for members of the different contexts to capably project interpretive
meanings onto the event that align with their respective conceptions of “national unity.”
Cliburn’s win embodies this latter notion – by virtue of the subjective nature of music
(Shepherd & Giles-Davis, 1991), the media, and the political climate of the late 1950s,
members of both the US and the USSR were each able to interpret his win as a way to
increase their belief in their own “national unities.”
The notion of “winning” played a key contextual role in Cliburn eliciting
“nationalist” feelings among Americans. Many Americans viewed the winning Cliburn as
an American hero, as a commander who broke down established political conventions,
and as a single man who had “won” a war against the USSR. Schonberg (1965) notes that
Cliburn was viewed as so fundamentally American that his win (nicknamed “conquering
Russia”) was an excuse for Americans to “unify.” The Cliburn Foundation Biography
(2001) further explains the importance of “winning,” “Cliburn is a classical pianist who
brought honor to our country … when he won…Americans beamed with pride to see a
young performer from our country play with such skill and style in front of an
Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
5
international audience. His dedication and talent drew admiration for classical music at a
time when the space rocket Sputnik had focused many on science and competition
between the US and the USSR was strong.”
On the other hand, in the USSR, the context was very different from the US, but
Cliburn’s win still resulted in the expression of “nationalist” sentiments. Monsaingeon
(2001) notes that in the USSR the public had fallen in love with Van Cliburn and they
were ecstatic when he won. To many Russians, Cliburn provided the mythologised but
romanticised ideal of what music should be: strong, honest, virtuosic, and emotional. To
some, Cliburn represented the typical Russian musician – he was trained by the Russian
pedagogue Rosina Lhevinne in the Russian tradition of the piano pedagogy of the
Moscow Conservatory (even though, ironically, his training was at the most American of
Conservatories – the Juilliard School).
Cliburn’s win also came at a time when the intellectual elite of Russia were
gaining political strength, and were attempting to create their own unified “Russian
nationalism.” (Brundy, 1998). With Khrushchev regulating freedom of the press less than
his predecessor Stalin, the intellectual elite was promoting the arts extensively to try to
improve the unity of the geographically disparate Russian peoples (Kaiser, 1994).
Because most of those able to attend the Tchaikovsky competition were among these
intellectual elite, it is reasonable that the sentiment among most Russians after the
competition was “Cliburn as hero,” and that he was seen to embody “Russian nationalist
ideals.” The intellectual elite effectively used Cliburn’s win as a way to embrace both
Western Modernist ideologies while retaining elements of mythologised “Russian
tradition” and pushing their own “nationalist” agendas (Paperno, 1997).
However, besides the American infatuation with “winning” and the Russian
elite’s “nationalist agenda,” the media also increased Americans’ and Russians’ feelings
of “nationalism” following the Cliburn win. During the 20-year period preceding
Cliburn’s win, radios and televisions became more ubiquitous than ever before. Even
though Cliburn was “media friendly” because of his youthful, tall appearance and polite
manners in interviews, had he gone into Russia just 20 years earlier, it is highly unlikely
that he would have made front page news in either country, would have been the “hero”
Americans and Russians labeled him, or would have had the incredible LP sales. For
example, when Paul Robeson returned from his tours in The USSR in the 1930s he
encountered a politically charged context similar to Cliburn’s but was lacking the media
coverage necessary to build a unified positive reception towards his travels (Duberman,
1989).4
Americans followed the story by Mac Frankel in the New York Times and on
network television (Schonberg, 1965). The Russian intellectual elite likely used their
Novy Mir, or thick journals, to get the word out about the importance of the Cliburn win
(Brundy, 1998). The media not only publicized the story, they told Americans and
Russians how to react. Americans were persuaded to unify behind Cliburn as an
“American hero” and Russians were persuaded by the intellectual elite to unify into a
unique (but contrived) “Russian Nationalism.”
It should also be noted that Robeson was not considered “media friendly” in the 1930s because of
prevailing prejudices against African-Americans and right-wing political advocates.
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Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
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Music Judgment as a “Safe” Window to Release National Tensions
Music competitions in general, by their subjective and ambiguous nature, can allow
individuals in ideologically different nations to each increase their "nationalist" feelings
by viewing the same event. Music competitions allow the audience and juries to project
their own meanings onto each performance. This cannot happen in objective competitions
like the US versus USSR chess matches because there was is little doubt as to the
meaning of each game (it is either a win, lose, or draw). The Kennedy Center (2001),
while with a highly American bias, captures the enthusiasm of music as subjective and
unifying medium: “Cliburn tore down cultural barriers years ahead of glasnost and
perestroika, reaching out across political frontiers with a universal message all could
greet with joy: the message of beautiful music.”
By consulting with the jury, Khrushchev was able to utilize the subjectivity
inherent in the process of musical judgment to his advantage.5 It is likely that he knew a
Cliburn win could be strategically used to reduce some of the political tensions brought
about by competing conceptions of "nationalism" between citizens of the US and the
USSR (Deutsch, 1966).6 Through Cliburn’s music, Americans got their desired political
“wins” and the USSR had its “national”7 music cherished by the intellectual. Schwarz
(1972) points out that if anyone questioned Khrushchev’s decision, he could always refer
to Cliburn’s Soviet piano teacher lineage and performing merit as the reason for his
selection.
If Khrushchev’s political strategy were absent, there would have been no
politically advantageous reason for the jury to pick Cliburn. If the jury had awarded
Cliburn the prize without consulting Khrushchev, they may have faced serious issues
with their own USSR-led musical careers. If Cliburn had not been selected, no wars
would have started, and most people would probably have forgotten about his loss in
short time, moving on with their lives.
Importantly, by using the music judgment to get people from rival countries to
embody their respective “nationalisms,” Khrushchev was also able to divert attention
from the politics between the two nations. During Cliburn’s rise to fame, many people
(including politicians) forgot about Khrushchev’s UN 1957 shoe-banging incident and
the nuclear threats America hinted at. Citizens and politicians were less concerned about
the Arms Race and were more optimistic about the relationship between the two
countries.
Cliburn expected his first trip back to the USSR after the competition to be
cancelled. It came after the U-2 affair in May 1960 in which Soviets shot down a U.S.
To explore this “music as political vent” idea further, consider the words of Devereux and LaBarre
(1961), “In addition to viewing art as a harmless safety valve, society and the artist alike consider the
artistic utterance as unrepudiable in form but repudiable as to content. In brief, art can function as a social
safety valve precisely because, like wit, it is a compromise and is, moreover repudiable as to intent and
content.”
6
This shows, in an interesting way, a contrast to the events of the jurors, trying to further advance their
own nationalist interests by giving Cliburn low scores. Therefore, the politics of Khrushchev allow me to
conclude that it is those in power who most influence how “nationalist” sentiments are expressed.
7
Frovola-Walker (1997) demonstrates that this idea of a “national” music in the USSR was a myth.
However, the very fact that the myth existed helped “nationalist” sentiments to exist among citizens (by my
definition).
5
Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
7
reconnaissance plane, capturing pilot Gary Powers. Although relations between the
countries broke off, and Eisenhower cancelled a trip, Khruschev issued a special directive
to Cliburn to proceed with the cultural exchange by performing his Soviet concert tour
(Blair, 1995). Virtually at war with the US, Khrushchev recognized the value of Cliburn
as a Russian icon promoting “nationalism” and utilized his ability again to lower tensions
between the two country’s citizens and politicians during the difficult Cold War period.
Conclusion
Cliburn’s 1958 Tchaikovsky Competition win can be better understood by considering
the “nationalist” frameworks that guided it and resulted from it. Cliburn’s win elicited
“nationalist” feelings from both Americans and Russians, but for different reasons. For
many Americans, Cliburn’s win was a political and capitalist victory. For many Russians,
particularly the contemporaneously influential intellectual elite, Cliburn’s win
represented an opportunity to shape the Modernist Russian “nationalist ideology” that
would become prevalent in the late 1960s and 1970s. Because Cliburn competed in the
highly subjective field of music, Khrushchev was able to justify Cliburn’s win based on
merit, even though political machinations played a role in his victory. As a result of these
political machinations, Cliburn’s win elicited “nationalist” feelings in both Americans
and Russians, indirectly giving Khrushchev an opportunity to decrease tensions between
politicians in the two nations.
Cliburn’s Win Understood in the Context of “Nationalism”
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