On the Concept of the One: an Analysis of
Plotinus and Giordano Bruno
by Caroline Stark
In trying to grasp the concept of God and the universe, philosophers have explored
the concept of the one, all in all and all in every part. Bruno explores this concept of the
One in his De la Causa, Principio, e Uno, where he expands on the ideas of Plotinus in the
Ennead VI.4 and VI.5 as well as those of other philosophers. Bruno differs from Plotinus
on a few major points: his conclusion that soul is form, his conception of matter, and his
definition of the infinite.
Plotinus, in trying to grasp the concept of God and the universe, begins by
separating the universe into the Intelligible and the Sensible universes. The Intelligible
universe consists of the Intellect-Being or Soul, which is the True All, and the Sensible
universe is the natural image of the intelligible or the representation of the All (visible
universe). According to Plotinus, there is nothing before the All, and naturally that which
comes after the All must exist in the All, not as a part of the All but as participating in the
All:
It is certainly not possible for the All, being All, to fall short of itself, but it
exists as self-fulfilled and as a being equal to itself; and where the all is, there
is itself: for it is itself the All. And altogether, if anything which is other than
that All is set firm in the All, it participates in it and coincides with it and
draws its strength from it, not dividing it into parts but finding it in itself as it
itself approaches it without that All going outside itself; for it is not possible
for being to be in not-being but, if at all, not-being in being (Plotinus, 279).
The True All is not a matter of material bulk because it is impossible to measure or to take
away from the All. Therefore the participation of the sensible in the intelligible does not
involve a division of the intelligible, but rather it is present to All as a whole. Since body is
subject to divisibility, then the indivisible is that which is not body. Soul is not divided into
parts and is therefore incorporeal and without size. The sensible participates in the
intelligible by the power of the whole according to the capacity of the participant, but the
intelligible remains the same and is not affected or divided into parts.
After separating body and soul Plotinus must then explain how body comes to
participate in soul. Since there is but one soul and that soul is indivisible, body must come
to soul. Plotinus explains this by using the metaphor of the “other man” who came and
attached himself to our true original self, which is in the intelligible:
Even before this coming to be came to be we were there, men who were
different, and some of us even gods, pure souls and intellect united with the
whole of reality; we were parts of the intelligible, not marked off or cut off
but belonging to the whole; and we are not cut off even now. But now
another man, wishing to exist, approached that man; and when he found
us—for we were not outside the All—he wound himself round us and
attached himself to that man who was then each one of us (as if there was
one voice and one word and one here and another there turned their ears to
it and heard and received it, and there came to be a hearing made actual,
having that which acted on it present): and we have come to be a pair of
them, not the one which we were before—and sometimes just the other one
which we added on afterwards, when that prior one is inactive and in another
way not present (Plotinus, 317).
This “other man” who had a share in soul must have come from that which is nonbeing because it is impossible to add to the being. Plotinus separates soul and body in this
way, being and non-being. He explains that the soul is all-present in this union, but there
exists a limitation of presence due to the capacity of the participant. Therefore, while there
is only one soul, it is present to all living things through their limited capacity:
But what comes to exist in such a way as not to receive all soul, though all is
present, but not to it, like the other animals and the plants receives as much
as it can take: as when a voice says a word, and some partake of the word
along with the noise of the voice, some only of the voice and its impact
(Plotinus, 317).
There exists in this pair a type of duality, a good self and an evil other. From this,
Plotinus asserts that the “descent” of the soul is that of self-limitation and particularization.
We must reject all else and return to the one, which is the true Good. We must strive to
become the All by liberation from the apparent unreal addition of particularity. God is
within us, and therefore the good comes from within and not from outside. Plotinus uses
the metaphor of lovers to explain how all things desire unity and the good:
This is “Love camping on the doorstep”, even coming from outside into the
presence of beauty and longing for it, and satisfied if in this way he can have
a part in it; since the lover here below also has beauty in this way, not by
receiving it [into himself] but by lying with it. But that [one beauty] remains
by itself, and the many lovers of the one love the whole and have the whole
like this, when they have it: for it was the whole that they loved (Plotinus,
349-51).
In this way, Plotinus’ message is one which later inspires Bruno who strives to understand
and achieve unity in this one, although Bruno takes Plotinus’ theories to another level.
In De La Causa, Principio, e Uno, Bruno articulates his philosophy on the nature of the
one, expanding and criticizing certain ideas of Plotinus. According to Bruno, God is beyond
our concept of understanding , and therefore, he will refrain from speaking of matters
pertaining to God. However, Bruno then proceeds to analyze Nature in such a way that he
will come to an understanding of God. By doing this, Bruno first determines that everything
must have a first principle and a first cause, except of course, the First principle and the
First cause. Our first step to understanding the First principle and the First cause, God, is
understanding principle and cause in Nature. The principle is “that which intrinsically
contributes to the constitution of things, and remains in the effect; as is said of matter and
form which remain in their composite; or again, the elements of which the thing has been
composed, and into which it is resolved” (Bruno, 111). Cause is “that which contributes to
the production of things from without, and which has its being outside of the composition,
as is the case with the efficient cause, and the end to which the thing produced is ordained”
(Bruno, 111). By setting these definitions, Bruno then concludes that God is both the First
principle and the First Cause. God is the First Principle because all things come after him in
order, nature, duration, and worthiness and the First Cause because he is the efficient cause,
the producer; as two aspects of one being. Bruno then asserts God’s relation to the universe
by being the universal efficient cause: “The universal physical efficient cause is the universal
intellect, which is the first and principal faculty of the world soul, which [the soul] is the
universal form of that [the world]” (Bruno, 111). God is the intermediary between extrinsic
and intrinsic causes. God as extrinsic cause “does not form a part of the things composed
and the things produced,” and God as intrinsic cause “does not operate around and outside
of matter” (Bruno, 113). God before producing something, must have in this supreme
intellect, an idea of that he wishes to create, and thus, must possess all forms before creation:
And therefore, this intellect, which has the power to produce all species, and
to send them forth with such beautiful construction from the potentiality of
matter into actuality, must possess all of them in advance, after the manner
of forms, without which forms the agent could not proceed to their
production, just as it is impossible for the sculptor to execute diverse statues
without first having inwardly imagined the diverse forms (Bruno, 113-114).
In this way, Bruno separates himself from Plotinus, who while conceding that Form
is in some way present in everything, insisted on separating form from idea and matter.
Bruno places all forms in matter and at different times, manifesting different forms in
succession. Thus, God seeks perfection of the universe by the existence of all forms in
diverse parts of matter. Bruno does not believe that form comes from the outside as does
Plotinus, in whose philosophy the Form of a man came to a particular man and became a
particular man, but instead believes that forms are various dispositions of matter:
Where there is a form, there is in a certain way everything; and where there is
soul, spirit, life, there is everything; for the intellect is the shaper of the ideal
species, and if it does not bring the forms forth from matter, it none the less
does not go begging for them outside of matter, because this spirit fills the
whole (Bruno, 122).
Bruno in his last dialogue criticizes Aristotle for his contradictory stance on this
point. Aristotle states that matter does not possess in itself some form or act but receives
them from the outside, yet, says at the same time that forms proceed and come out of the
interior of matter. Thus, Bruno clarifies this incongruity in Aristotle and also this question in
Plotinus.
Bruno further separates himself from Plotinus by stating that the Universal soul is
the Universal form. There are two kinds of form: cause and principle. Cause is that through
which the efficient cause works, and the Principle is that which is called forth from matter by
the efficient cause. Likewise, the soul has two aspects: “Just so the soul of the universe, in
so far as it animates and informs, is an intrinsic and formal part of that [universe]; but in so
far as it directs and governs, it is not a part: it has no the role of a principle, but of a cause”
(Bruno, 114). Bruno continues by stating that the soul is not passive, does not receive any
imperfection from the body, and is eternally joined to the same subject. He makes the
assertion that all forms are souls and that everything has a soul which is not necessarily
animated. In this way, Bruno continues along the same lines as Plotinus by inferring that
soul is all present but is limited by the capacity of the participant. However, he differs from
Plotinus by equating form and soul and by saying that everything has a soul. Bruno goes
further to say that form changes place and condition but is never destroyed because form is
not things but of things:
Thus, while this form changes place and condition, it is impossible that it be
annulled; because the spiritual substance is not less subsistent than the
material. Then only external forms change themselves and are even annulled
because they are not things, but of things; they are not substances, but of
substances—accidents and circumstances of substances (Bruno, 119).
Bruno makes a distinction in form between the material which is the primal form
and must have matter and the formal principle which consists of the vegetative and sensitive
soul and the soul or intellective soul. Bruno clarifies that form is invariable in itself but is
variable through its various subjects and dispositions of matter:
And such form, although in the subject it makes the part differ from the
whole, (yet itself) does not differ in the part and in the whole; although one
reason suits it as subsistent in and by itself, and another in so far as it is the
activity and perfection of some subject, and still another in regard to a
subject with dispositions of some kind, and another with those of
another…This form is not to be understood as accidental, nor as similar to
the accidental, nor as mixed with matter, nor as inherent in that, but rather
existing in, associated, and assistant (Bruno, 121-122).
However, Bruno makes a clear distinction between his concept of form and matter
as being different from the philosophical tradition in the Epicureans, Cynics, Stoics, and
others who argue that matter alone is the substance of things and that forms are nothing else
but certain accidental dispositions of matter. Bruno claims that in nature there are two kinds
of substance: form and matter. The former has the substantial act in which exists the active
potency or the power to make, and the latter has both potency and substratum in which
exists the passive potency or the power to be made (Bruno, 128). Bruno agrees that Nature
must have for its operations a substratum, and he uses the analogy of Art to illustrate this
point:
Therefore, nature, to which art is similar, needs to have for its operations a
matter; because it is not possible that there be an agent which, when it wishes
to make something, does not have that out of which it can make it; or
likewise, if it wishes to work, does not have that on which to work. There is
then a kind of substratum from which, with which, and in which, nature
effects its operations and its work; and which is by nature endowed with so
many forms that it presents for our consideration such a variety of
species...the subjects of art are manifold, but the subject of nature is one;
because the former being diversely formed by nature, are different and
variegated; the latter, being formless, is entirely indifferent, since all
difference and diversity stem from the form (Bruno, 129-130).
He disagrees with Plotinus by making this substratum of nature matter rather than
soul. However, in form there exist two types: one which changes and the other of which is
constant. The former is the accidental form, and the latter is the substantial form. The
substantial form in nature (soul) is like matter in that it cannot be destroyed. From this,
Bruno sets his body of nature as consisting of the following: one intellect that gives being to
everything, the giver of forms; one soul and formal principle that becomes and informs
everything, the fountain of forms; and one matter from out of which everything is produced
and formed, the receptacle of forms (Bruno, 134). He does this in order to distinguish
himself from the other philosophers who do not separate the activity from the concept of
matter but consider the matter as something divine:
Nothing works absolutely on itself; for there is always some distinction
between that which is the agent, and that which is produced, or concerning
which the action and the operation takes place; for that reason it is good to
distinguish in the body of nature, the matter from the soul, and in this to
distinguish the general from the specific kinds. Therefore, we say, that there
are three things in this body: first, the universal intellect inherent in things;
second, the vivifying soul of all; third, the substratum (Bruno, 135).
From this, Bruno further concludes that the two potencies, both active and passive potency,
cannot exist without each other. Therefore, there is not a thing which can be said to be
which cannot be said to have the capacity to be (Bruno, 138). Bruno continues by saying
that the act and the capacity to be must coexist simultaneously. If this is true, then in the
highest principle, that which is all that it can be, act and potency must be the same thing :
Because the absolute possibility through which the things which are in act
can be is not before that actuality, nor after that; moreover, the capacity to be
is together with the being in act, and does not precede that; because if that
which can be could make itself, it would be before it was made. Now
contemplate the highest and best principle, which is all that it can be; it itself
would not be all if it could not be all; in it, therefore, the act and the potency
is the same thing (Bruno, 139).
As a result, God is the first act and the first potency because no other thing is all that
it can be, for in nature the potency is not equal to the act:
That which is all that it can be is one, which comprehends and contains in its
being all being. It is all that is and can be whatever other things that is and
can be. Every other thing is not so; for here potency is not equal to the act
because the act is not absolute but limited; moreover, the potency is always
limited to one act because it never has more than one specific and particular
being; and when it nevertheless refers itself to every form and act, it does so
through certain dispositions and through a certain order of succession of one
being after another (Bruno, 139).
The universe is also all that it can be, being inclusive of all matter, to which nothing
is added or subtracted. However, the universe is only a shadow of the first act and first
potency because no one of its parts is all that it can be, and thus, in it potency and act are
not absolutely the same (Bruno, 139).
Seeing that there is a certain distinction between those principles pertaining to the
One and those pertaining to nature, Bruno separates things into the eternal and the variable.
In eternal things matter is always under one act, has all that it can have, and is all that it can
be, at once, always and together. In variable things, it always contains one act at different
times in an order of succession (Bruno, 151). Bruno then separates substances into
corporeal and incorporeal substances. Corporeal substance is that which can be made or can
be, or is made, in virtue of the dimensions and extension of the subject; has existence in
quantity; and presupposes corporeal matter. Incorporeal substance is that which is made,
has its being newly without dimensions, extension, and qualities; and presupposes the said
matter (Bruno, 150-1). Bruno concludes that just as there are two differences of substance,
corporeal and incorporeal, there are also forms of two classes. One is transcendent which
pertains to the one, and the other is of a certain kind that is like substantiality and
accidentality (Bruno, 148). However, Bruno believes that there must be a certain
participation:
Besides, if all that which is, beginning from the highest and most supreme
being, has a certain order and constitutes a subordination, a scale in which
one rises from composed things to the simple, from these to the most simple
and absolute, through corresponding means that combine and participate in
the nature of the one and the other extreme, and are in their proper essence
neutral, there is no order in which there is not a certain participation; there is
no participation where there is not found a certain combination; there is no
combination without a certain participation. It is necessary, therefore, that
there be a principle of subsistent existence, of all [subsistent] existent
things…it is necessary, then, that there be something that corresponds to the
common concept of one and the other substratum, because every essence is
necessarily founded on some existence, except that first essence that is
identical with its existence, because its potency is the same as its act, and it is
everything that it can be (Bruno, 148).
Likewise, Bruno asserts that there is a participation between corporeal substances
and divine substances, and so that in the end, inferior things conform to the superior.
Bruno agrees with Plotinus that that which is common has the function of matter, and that
which is proper and makes for distinction, the function of form (Bruno, 149). However,
Bruno continues by saying that matter is where all forms are united. Therefore, there is only
one matter, and one potency through which everything that is, is in act (Bruno, 149-50). He
carries this further to belonging both to incorporeal and corporeal substances, “since the
former no less have their existence through the capacity to be than the latter have their being
through the power to exist” (Bruno, 150). Bruno distinguishes the difference between
matter in both substances by saying that matter in incorporeal things coincides with act as
the capacity to be coincides with being (Bruno, 151). He considers matter in absolute
potency and absolute act , in which case, matter is not different from form because matter is
absolutely all:
That matter, through being actually all that it can be, has all the
measurements, has all the species of figures and dimensions, and because it
has all, has none of them; because for that which is so many different things
it is necessary that it be no one of those particular things. It is proper for
that which is all to exclude all particular being (Bruno, 151).
Bruno concludes therefore that as the formal concept ascends, so does the material concept.
Then Bruno discusses Plotinus’ discussion of the differences between the matter of
superior and inferior things. Plotinus makes this distinction between superior and inferior
matter by separating superior matter into that which is everything at the same time and does
not change; and inferior matter into that which becomes everything at different times and is
always under diversity, alteration, and movement:
Therefore, the former matter (superior) is never formless, as the latter
(inferior) is not also, although each in a different manner; the former, in the
instant of eternity; the latter, in the instants of time; the former, at the same
time; the latter, successively; the former, as unfolding; the latter, as enfolding;
the former, as many; the latter, as one; the former, through each and every
thing; the latter, as all and everything (Bruno,153).
However, Bruno believes that there exists the possibility in inferior things a
coincidence of act and potency. As stated above, Bruno also differs from Plotinus in his
belief that forms proceed and come out of the interior of matter, and therefore, the efficient
cause, nature, does not come from without but from within, and is an internal principle and
not an external one. He proves this through his ongoing analogy of Art and Nature:
And I say that being expressed, sensible, and unfolded, is not the principal
concept of actuality, but is a consequent and effect of that…I prescind from
this that it is according to a higher reason that natural things are made from
natural matter, than artificial things are made from artificial matter: because
art produces the forms from matter, either by subtraction (as when it makes
a statue out of stone) of by addition (as when, joining stone upon stone,
earth, and wood, it constructs a house); but nature makes everything out of
its matter by way of separation, birth, and effluxion…It is more appropriate
to say, then, that matter contains forms and implies them, than to think that
it is empty of them and excludes them (Bruno, 155-156).
In Bruno’s last dialogue, he brings all of his statements from the previous dialogues
together into his conclusion of the One. In this dialogue, Bruno agrees with Plotinus on
many points concerning the nature of the One, however, there are a few major differences.
The most important is that Bruno believes that everything comes together in the One and
that there is no order of superior and inferior things. Plotinus separates the soul and body,
the good and the evil, respectively. Bruno dismisses these distinctions, because in the
infinite, these things are indifferent. Bruno begins the dialogue by joining matter, body, and
soul with the usual disclaimer that our capacity to understand the One is limited:
The universe is, then, one, infinite, immobile. One, I say, is the absolute
possibility, one the act, one the form or soul, one the matter or body, one the
thing, one the being, one the greatest and the best—which must not be
capable of being comprehended and, therefore, is without end and without
limit—and in so far infinite and indeterminate—and consequently immobile
(Bruno, 160).
Despite our limited capacity to understand the One, Bruno continues to draw
conclusions about the nature of the One and the infinite. The One does not move, does not
generate itself, is incorruptible, is infinite and thus nothing can be added or subtracted, is
equal to itself, does not have parts because it is all, and in short, is one (Bruno, 160). In the
infinite there is no greater or lesser part because a greater part does not conform more to the
proportion of the infinite than any other smaller part (Bruno, 161). The universe is all that it
can be, and therefore, the act is not different from the potency. Bruno illustrates this by
concluding that in it, the point, the line, the surfaces, and the body are not different, with the
following example:
If the potency is not different from the act, it is necessary that in it the point,
the line, the surfaces, and the body are not different; for then, that line is
surface, as the line, moving itself, can become surface; then, that surface is
moved and becomes a body, since the surface can be moved, and with its
movement can become a body. It is necessary, then, that in the infinite, the
point does not differ from the body because the point, running away from
being a point, becomes a line; running away from being a line, it becomes a
surface; running away from being a surface, it becomes a body; the point
then, since it is in potentiality a body, does not differ from being a body,
where the potency and the act are one and the same thing (Bruno, 161-2).
Bruno explains why matter changes itself into other forms because no mutation
seeks another being, but rather another mode of being (Bruno, 162). He also clarifies the
distinction between the universe and things of the universe because the universe is all being
and all modes of being, but the things of the universe have all being but not all modes of
being (Bruno, 162). He defends this description of the infinite by its absolute nature:
Therefore, it is not an error to call entity, substance, and essence, one being,
which as infinite and undetermined, as much according to substance, as to
duration, as to greatness, as to power, has not the function of principle, nor
of the originated because, everything concurring in unity and identity—I say
the same being—comes to have an absolute essence and not a relative one
(Bruno, 162-3).
Therefore, as stated earlier, God seeks the perfection of the universe by the existence
of all forms in diverse parts of matter. Since the universe is infinite, all in every part, and
everywhere itself, Bruno concludes: “that which is in the universe is through all relation to
the universe, or in relation to the other particular bodies, according to the mode of its
capacity” (Bruno, 164). Bruno explains his conception of God by saying that there exists
one divine and immortal being which is the original and universal substance of the whole:
Therefore, all that which makes for diversity of genus, species, difference,
properties—all that which consists in generation, corruption, alteration, and
change—is not being or existence, but a condition and circumstance of being
and existence, which is one, infinite, immobile, subject, matter, life, soul, true,
and good (Bruno, 165).
Then, Bruno proceeds to outline the four basic concepts on which he bases most of
his philosophy and pinpoints the differences between his philosophy and others: 1) there is
one and the same scale, through which nature descends to the production of things, and the
intellect ascends to the cognition of them; 2) the intellect uses mathematical and imaginable
figures to understand the being and substance of things; 3) measure and number are not
substance, but about substance, not being, but things of being, are not a particular substance,
but substance in the particular and the differences; and 4) through signs and verifications,
contraries coincide in one. Bruno states in the first point that there is one and the same scale,
which he proves earlier in his definition of the infinite. In this conclusion, he develops
further the concept of the infinite and thereby eliminates the inferior and superior order of
Plotinus. Bruno asserts in his second point that the intellect is capable of understanding
God by using mathematical and imaginable figures. Perhaps for this reason Bruno sees
Copernicus’ theory of the sun as the center of the solar system as a divine revelation and
believes in his mnemonic devices to comprehend and contemplate the One. In his last
point, Bruno finds reconciliation in opposites through various diagrams and mathematical
figures. He states that one must contemplate the extremities in nature, the contraries and
opposites, in order to understand the one and its all-embracing nature: “In conclusion, he
who wishes to know the greatest secrets of nature should regard and contemplate the
minimum and maximum of contraries and opposites” (Bruno, 172). Therefore Bruno comes
to his idea of God, the highest good, the highest perfect which consists in the unity that
embraces all (Bruno, 173).
In De la Causa, Principio, e Uno, Bruno espouses his philosophy on the nature of the
One. In doing so, he sets a framework for others to follow, explaining his own philosophy
and how it differs from his predecessors, especially in the case of Plotinus. He also seems to
suggest a method in which man may obtain an understanding of God and the infinite, and to
take this further, become like this divine intellect. His motive is not unlike that of Plotinus,
although Plotinus would never suggest that man is capable of becoming a god, but rather
that man strives towards the knowledge of God and the good. It is not difficult to see how
all the rest of Bruno’s philosophy stems from this dialogue. This dialogue, especially its last
four points, seem to bring all of his works together. Bruno espouses his philosophy for
those who are capable of seeing his truth through the eyes of reason. To those who are not
willing (as at Oxford), Bruno’s response would be that of Theophilus: “My most illustrious
gentleman, or your sacred majesty, since some things cannot become evident except through
the hands and the sense of touch, and others with the ears, and still others only with the
tongue, and others with the eyes—so this matter of natural things cannot become evident
except through the intellect” (Bruno, 132).
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Greenberg, S.T. The Infinite in Giordano Bruno. With a Translation of his Dialogue Concerning
Cause, Principle, and One. London-New York, 1950.
the