Introduction
According to classical philosophy, there were two means of managing knowledge: rhetoric and
dialectic. Today, in the field of argumentation studies, these two concepts coexist, but argumentation
theorists generally favor dialectical means of analysis. Dialectic is viewed as a solid, trustworthy
method of resolving disputes by finding the greater truths/Truths within dialogues and texts, in
which the audience consists of all rational people who may be convinced of the truthfulness of the
proposition at hand. Rhetoric, on the other hand, is viewed as a questionable, somewhat
untrustworthy undertaking, an innately tainted method of searching for advantages that lead to
gaining an audience’s acceptance. Its goal is not to convince all rational audience members, but to
persuade specific audience members, and thus is not supposed to be oriented toward resolving
disputes. In rhetoric’s defense, some scholars say dialectic is relatively feeble on its own and arguers
cannot come to agreement on disputed points without presenting their truths via rhetorical means.
In turn, this leaves open the charge that rhetoric’s persuasive techniques place a higher value on
winning than on finding the truth. At the same time, finding the truth implicitly involves settling a
dispute, and in dispute resolution, truths are both made and manifested through rhetoric.
This unsettled interrelation manifests itself in argumentation studies, for the role of rhetoric and
dialectic in argument is an unsettled question that has existed ever since the concepts’ origin in
ancient Greek philosophy. In Gorgias, Plato distinguishes rhetoric from dialectic and condemns the
former as untrustworthy. In his later dialogue Phaedrus, Plato describes dialectic as a method for
uncovering truths and partially rehabilitates rhetoric by describing it as the way to present these
truths. Plato’s student, Aristotle, took a similar route but elevated rhetoric by defining it as the
counterpart (antistrophos) of dialectic, both of which concerned things that could only probably be
known, not pinned down. In contrast, Aristotle defined science as the realm of the definite and
excluded both dialectic and rhetoric, which emphasized their united concern with common,
everyday knowledge: “all people...try both to test and maintain an argument [as in dialectic] and to
defend themselves and attack [others, as in rhetoric]” (On Rhetoric, I 1.1 1354a1). However, even
modern scholars cannot agree whether Aristotle regarded one subordinate to the other. For
example, Feteris (2000) suggests that to Aristotle, dialectic was a tool of rhetoric, but Krabbe (2000)
quotes Aristotle to suggest dialectic was the root from which the rhetorical branch sprang.
The debate within argumentation studies continued as the balance of power shifted throughout the
centuries. In the Roman Empire, rhetoric occupied the dominant position. For example, the Greek
rhetor Hermagoras introduced and the Roman orators Cicero and Quintilian advocated the concept
of proclaiming theses within speeches (van der Poel, 2000). According to this idea, orators should
identify and argue a larger argument that would normally be a subject for dialectic discussion (the
thesis) within a specific question that takes into account all situational variables (the hypothesis),
which would normally be a subject for rhetorical discussion. In this manner, rhetoric subsumed
dialectic.
After the fall of the Roman Empire, during the reign of the illiterate Ostrogothic king Theodoric,
the noted politician, literary commentator, and philosopher Boethius played an instrumental role in
reversing rhetoric’s supremacy over dialectic. According to Boethius, dialectic is superior to rhetoric
because the topics present in hypotheses are simply more specific versions of the topics present in
fundamental theses. Thus, subjects suitable for rhetorical presentation derive from subjects suitable
for dialectic analysis, and rhetoric becomes an application of dialectical argumentation. This pattern
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became the accepted paradigm during the Middle Ages, and dialectic became the dominant force for
hundreds of years.
About the time of the Renaissance, humanists led a revolt of sorts and urged a focus on practical
spiritual, moral, and political issues rather than the abstract, abstruse questions that pure Scholastic
dialectic tended to foster, such as how many angels could dance on the head of a pin. In the citystates of northern Italy, in particular, rhetoric regained its former stature and seemed poised to act as
the center of epistemology; however, as the Renaissance continued and absolute monarchies
entrenched themselves across Europe, rhetoric’s political role as an arbiter of public opinion waned,
and the certitude that dialectical and empirical epistemologies provided eclipsed the uncertain
knowledge that rhetoric offered.
Rhetoric has experienced a great revival within the past 250 years, and particularly since the 1970s;
however, the field of argumentation continues to elevate dialectic and thereby relegates rhetoric to
second-class status. This generally holds true today, and rhetoricians and dialecticians still disagree
whether, and to what extent, rhetoric should have a place in argumentation studies. A common view
is that of Schiappa (1995), who states that “typically, from the standpoint of argument evaluation,
our standards are lowered once a text is dubbed ‘rhetoric’” (p. x). Other scholars, such as Feteris
(2000), seek a middle ground. She states that “in some dialectical theories rhetoric is conceived as a
tool for the dialectician, while in other theories, which are rhetorical, dialectic is a tool for the
rhetorician” (236). A prime example of the former case is the pragma-dialectic school of
argumentation theory, which includes some rhetorical features within its dialectical framework.
Pragma-dialectics is an immensely practical theory of argumentative discourse that began as a purely
dialectical method, but in recent years, theorists have made great strides in incorporating rhetorical
insights, which brought about two effects. First, rhetoric’s inclusion within a dialectical framework
helped partially rehabilitate rhetoric’s validity as a part of argumentation studies. Second, pragmadialectics’ power and scope have expanded from recognizing rhetoric’s presence within
argumentation and incorporating rhetoric into its analyses. However, rhetoric’s integration into
pragma-dialectics is incomplete; rather than being seen as an adjunct to critical analysis, rhetoric
should be recognized as a necessary, integral component of pragma-dialectics. In order to
demonstrate this, I propose to extend pragma-dialectical analysis into a controversy in scientific
discourse, which may shed new light on the fundamental connections between rhetoric and dialectic
and highlight the presence of rhetorical elements in pragma-dialectic analysis.
Pragma-Dialectics
In the 1970s and ‘80s, Frans van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst, argumentation theorists at the
University of Amsterdam, created a branch of argumentation theory called pragma-dialectics, which
takes into account both the linguistic (pragmatic) aspects of interpersonal communication and the
dialectic ideal of coming to a negotiated conclusion through dialogue. In a nutshell, the pragmadialectic approach focuses on highlighting discussants’ speech acts within verbal interchanges aimed
at settling differences of opinion and identifying those speech acts’ dialectic function in leading the
discussants to reach consensus.
A pragma-dialectic analysis begins by breaking down discussions into four sequential stages:
confrontation, opening, argumentation, and conclusion. Differences of opinion appear in the
confrontation stage. The substantive points of disagreement and the method for exploring them
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both emerge in the opening stage. Discussants challenge each others’ standpoints and defend their
own in the argumentation stage. The discussants then come to an agreement about the result of the
interchange in the conclusion stage.
In each of these stages, the analyst categorizes the discussants’ speech acts into one of five types:
assertives, directives, commissives, expressives, and usage declaratives. Assertives are the means by
which discussants put forth their standpoints. Directives are challenges or requests for discussants to
support a standpoint. Commissives are action-oriented speech acts in which the discussant agrees to
commit an action of some sort toward another party, such as accepting or rejecting a standpoint.
Expressives are emotional expressions and play no explicit role in analyses of critical discussions.
Usage declaratives indicate how speech acts should be interpreted.
Next, the pragma-dialectic analyst uses four transformative steps—deletion, addition, permutation,
and substitution—to disassemble the natural language speech acts and reconstruct them in an
idealized, abstract format that makes the discussants’ assertions clear. Thus, the transformative
abstractions enable the analyst to lay bare the dialectical skeleton by stripping away rhetorical
elements such as redundancies and extra-argumentative material, rearranging the discourse to make
the chain of argument easier to analyze, and replacing ambiguous or slightly different iterations of
the same ideas with clear, specific, standard phrases. Finally, the analyst subjects the transformed
speech acts to a set of rules in order to determine if the participants committed any fallacies. This
definition of fallacy is a unique strength of pragma-dialectics, for it operationalizes fallacies in situ
rather than according to a universal logical constant that often may not apply due to situational
exigencies.
Van Eemeren & Grootendorst (2003) suggest and discuss 15 pragma-dialectic rules for discussions
in their article, “A Pragma-dialectical Procedure for a Critical Discussion.” They acknowledge that
these rules are not exhaustive, but they provide a general outline for resolving conflicts of opinion
through argumentative interchanges:
Rule 1
a. Special conditions apply neither to the propositional content of the assertives by which a
standpoint is expressed, nor to the propositional content of the negation of the commissive
by means of which a standpoint is called into question;
b. In the performance of these assertives and negative commissives, no special preparatory
conditions apply to the position or status of the speaker or writer and listener or reader.
Rule 2
The discussant that has called the standpoint of the other discussant into question in the
confrontation stage is always entitled to challenge this discussant to defend his or her standpoint.
Rule 3
The discussant who is challenged by the other discussant to defend the standpoint that he or she
has put forward in the confrontation stage is always obliged to accept this challenge, unless the
other discussant is not prepared to accept certain shared premises and discussion rules; the
discussant remains obliged to defend the standpoint as long as he or she does not retract it and
as long as he or she has not successfully defended it against the other discussant on the basis of
the agreed premises and discussion rules.
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Rule 4
The discussant that in the opening stage has accepted the other discussant’s challenge to defend
his or her standpoint will fulfill the role of protagonist in the argumentation stage, and the other
discussant will fulfill the role of antagonist, unless they agree otherwise; the distribution of roles
is maintained until the end of the discussion.
Rule 5
The discussants who will fulfill the roles of protagonist and antagonist in the argumentation
stage agree before the start of the argumentation stage on the rules for the following: how the
protagonist is to defend the initial standpoint and how the antagonist is to attack this standpoint,
and in which case the protagonist has successfully defended the standpoint and in which case
the antagonist has successfully attacked it; the rules in which this is laid down apply throughout
the duration of the discussion, and may not be called into question during the discussion itself
by either of the parties.
Rule 6
a. The protagonist may always defend the standpoint that he or she adopts in the initial
difference of opinion or in a sub-difference of opinion by performing a complex speech act
of argumentation, which then counts as a provisional defense of this standpoint;
b. the antagonist may always attack a standpoint by calling into question its propositional
content or the force of the argumentation as a justification or refutation;
c. the protagonist and the antagonist may not attack or defend standpoints in any other way.
Rule 7
a. The protagonist has successfully defended a complex speech act of argumentation against an
attack by the antagonist with regard to its propositional content if the application of the
intersubjective identification procedure yields a positive result or if the propositional content
is in the second instance accepted by both parties as a result of a sub-discussion in which the
protagonist has successfully defended a positive sub-standpoint with regard to this
propositional content;
b. the antagonist has successfully attacked the propositional content of the complex speech act
of argumentation if the application of the intersubjective identification procedure yields a
negative result and the protagonist has not successfully defended a positive sub-standpoint
with regard to this propositional content in a sub-discussion.
Rule 8
a. The protagonist has successfully defended a complex speech act of argumentation against an
attack by the antagonist with regard to its force of justification or refutation if the application
of the intersubjective inference procedure or (after application of the intersubjective
explicitization procedure) the application of the intersubjective testing procedure yields a
positive result;
b. if the application of the intersubjective inference procedure or (after application of the
intersubjective explicitization procedure) the application of the intersubjective testing
procedure yields a negative result, the antagonist has successfully attacked the force of
justification or refutation of the argument.
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Rule 9
a. The protagonist has conclusively defended an initial standpoint or sub-standpoint by means
of a complex speech act of argumentation if he or she has successfully defended both the
propositional content called into question by the antagonist and its force of justification or
refutation called into question by the antagonist;
b. the antagonist has conclusively attacked the standpoint of the protagonist if he or she has
successfully attacked either the propositional content or the force of justification or
refutation of the complex speech act of argumentation.
Rule 10
The antagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to call into question both the
propositional content and the force of justification or refutation of every complex speech act of
argumentation of the protagonist that the latter has not yet successfully defended.
Rule 11
The protagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to defend both the
propositional content and the force of justification or refutation of every complex speech act of
argumentation that he or she has performed and not yet successfully defended against every
attack by the antagonist.
Rule 12
The protagonist retains throughout the entire discussion the right to retract the complex speech
act of argumentation that he or she has performed and thereby to remove the obligation to
defend it.
Rule 13
a. The protagonist and the antagonist may only once perform the same speech act or the same
complex speech act with the same role in the discussion.
b. The protagonist and the antagonist must perform speech acts or complex speech acts in
turn.
c. The protagonist and the antagonist may not perform more than one speech act or complex
speech act at one time.
Rule 14
a. The protagonist is obliged to retract the initial standpoint if the antagonist has conclusively
attacked it (in the manner prescribed in rule 9) in the argumentation stage (and ha also
observed the other discussion rules);
b. the antagonist is obliged to retract the calling into question of the initial standpoint if the
protagonist has conclusively defended it (in the manner prescribed in rule 9) in the
argumentation stage (and ha also observed the other discussion rules);
c. in all other cases the protagonist is not obliged to retract the initial standpoint, nor is the
antagonist obliged to withdraw his or her calling into question the initial standpoint.
Rule 15
a. The discussants have the right at every stage of the discussion to request the other discussant
to perform a usage declarative and to perform one themselves.
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b. The discussant who is requested to perform a usage declarative by the other discussant is
obliged to do so.
Rhetoric and Pragma-Dialectics
At first, pragma-dialectics was strictly dialectical in nature and did not include rhetorical elements,
but its creators’ writings included passages that clearly indicated a space for rhetoric. For example, in
van Eemeren, Grootendorst, and Snoeck Henkemans’ 1996 book Fundamentals of Argumentation
Theory, Chapter 10, which concerns pragma-dialectics, includes this passage:
In order not to ‘overinterpret’ what may be implicit in the discourse, the analyst must
be sensitive to the communication rules, the details of the presentation, and the
contextual constraints inherent in the speech event concerned. ... The analyst’s
intuitions can be augmented by the results of empirical research varying from
qualitative phenomenology to quantitative measuring. … None of the sources of
information about what is being argued works alone, and all need to be interpreted
against some knowledge of the cultural background of the speech event concerned
and a trained intuition with respect to the conduct of argumentative discourse. (p.
295-6)
Clearly, rhetorical considerations exist in this conception.
Since 1996, though, pragma-dialectic theorists have made great strides toward taking rhetorical
considerations into account. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2001, 2003) propose including rhetoric
inside a dialectic framework because they recognize pure reason is not the guiding principle within
real-world arguments; winning is the ultimate goal in an argument, even when the discussants share a
genuine interest in resolving differences of opinion. As such, van Eemeren and Houtlosser state that
arguers seek to balance “the potential tension in argumentative discourse between the extremes of
arguing perfectly reasonably and just having things one’s own way” (2003, p. 394) by engaging in
strategic maneuvers, which are speech acts that discussants use to steer discussions toward more
favorable grounds and gain argumentative leverage. The authors describe three basic rhetorical
aspects to these strategic maneuvers: discussants choose appropriate topoi; analyze their audiences’
needs and desires, and adapt their messages accordingly; and use the most effective presentation
methods possible (2001). These three aspects neatly parallel the classic advice that appears in
Aristotle’s Rhetoric.
However, it is not entirely clear how a pragma-dialectician should go about incorporating these
rhetorical elements in an analysis. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003) recommend that “normative
and descriptive insights [are to be] systematically integrated” (p. 398), but they do not provide a
general procedure for integration. They do state that the confrontation, opening, argumentation, and
conclusion stages each contain rhetorical complements that correspond to each stage’s dialectical
objectives, and that analysts must identify situational criteria that determine the extent to which
discussants may employ rhetorical elements before derailing a critical discussion’s progress.
Even if their method of analytical application is not clear, choosing topoi, analyzing audiences, and
adapting presentations are beneficial toward the pragma-dialectical project, for even a limited
incursion of rhetoric into a pragma-dialectics injects a needed dose of realism into what is otherwise
a dry, abstract enterprise. In particular, rhetoric’s analytic power helps address four issues the strictly
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dialectic version of pragma-dialectics cannot account for (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2003). First,
analysts can see arguments as they really are, not as abstractions. Second, understanding the
rationales behind discussants’ rhetorical moves creates a more meaningful analysis. Third, pragmadialectic analysts can better justify their overall efforts by taking into account the previous two
benefits (p. 392-3). Fourth, analysts can operationally define fallacy as instances where strategic
maneuvers imperil discussions’ dialectic progress (p. 394). Each of these four considerations is
congruent with Aristotle’s description of rhetoric’s function as a mechanism “not to persuade but to
see the available means of persuasion in each case” (1.1.14).
First, rhetoric enables analysts to examine real, not abstracted, arguments. The pragma-dialectic
method still specifies that a full analysis involves rewriting speech acts in a standardized form, but
the greater point is a rhetorical analysis allows pragma-dialectic analysts to examine expressive
speech acts, which pragma-dialectics’ original conception did not take into consideration. This
exclusion was unfortunate, for no interpersonal discussion is ever completely dialectic in nature;
contextual, expressive communicative factors are always present. For example, in written arguments,
authors may use typographical elements such as ellipses, paragraph breaks, and italicized, bolded,
capitalized, or underlined passages. Verbal discussions also include expressive speech acts. In the
first argument described by van Rees (2003b), discussants employ the rhetorical elements of
concessions, pauses, absence of straightforward agreement, and interjections, each of which creates
meaning in a speech act that leads toward a productive result. Some expressive elements may be
fallacies, as will be discussed below, but expressive elements need to be recognized and dealt with if
rhetoric is to have a place in pragma-dialectics.
Another consideration about argumentative reality regards pragma-dialectics’ ideal situation as an
interchange between two rational discussants, which spurs questions about how to deal with
multiple-discussant situations, where audiences are involved in settling arguments. Two common
examples of this situation are lawyers trying legal cases before juries and candidates running for
public office. From a purely dialectical standpoint, addressing audiences can be addressed on two
fronts: first, a discussant should treat an audience as a theoretical antagonist and argue points as if
the audience was taking an opposing position; second, a rational audience will be convinced by
dialectic arguments because pragma-dialectics is based on a dialectic framework (van Rees, 2003a).
However, these approaches are a bit awkward in practice and benefit from a rhetorical analysis. In
the first case, since a third-party audience simply observes and does not participate in an
interchange, in order to directly address this audience as if it were an antagonist, a protagonist must
consider the rhetorical elements suggested by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2003): appropriate topoi;
the audiences’ needs and desires, and effective presentation methods. In the second case, what is
convincing to one rational audience may not be convincing to another. Thus, Bonevac (2003)
suggests that in order to account for both audiences and discussants, analysts must reconsider the
role of relevance in argumentation. As he puts it, “One person’s red herring may be another
person’s crucial distinction” (p. 457).
Second, regarding discussants’ motivations and standpoints, rhetoric greatly expands pragmadialectic’s analytical power and results in a more meaningful analysis. A strictly dialectical analysis
cannot fully reveal internal factors such as arguers’ incentive to make a stand, nor can it explain the
origin of the discussant’s stance, for dialectic is limited to describing the empirically observable or
rationally deducible facts at hand, such as the sequence an argument takes, the bare facts raised by
each discussant, and those facts’ logical consequences (van Rees, 2003b). Rhetoric, on the other
hand, is very useful at exposing discussants’ standpoints and motivations, but it is unable to provide
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a logical framework for critical discussions toward the goal of reasonably settling disputes. When a
rhetorical analysis is included in pragma-dialectics’ framework, the combination enables an analyst to
limn the interactions at play in an argumentative discussion and reveal not only the course and
structure of a discussion, but the participants’ starting points and their motivations for arguing their
positions (van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2001, 2003).
Third, for the reasons above, rhetoric’s ability to account for the rhetorical aspects of real-world
argumentative interchanges as well as discussants’ motivations and standpoints further justify
rhetoric’s inclusion in pragma-dialectics.
Fourth, including rhetoric within pragma-dialectics permits the operational definition of fallacy as
instances where strategic maneuvers imperil discussions’ dialectic progress (van Eemeren &
Houtlosser, 2003). The analyses in van Rees (2003b) are particularly interesting in terms of fallacy
theory. In the first analysis, van Rees disregards a speaker’s “status-raising techniques” (p. 470) as
being irrelevant toward the discussion’s resolution and interprets an ambiguous speech act—a
statement that is on the surface a yes, but in context a no—to reconstruct it as a no. From a strictly
dialectical standpoint, it is true that the status-raising strategic maneuver does not factor into a
problem’s resolution and reconstructed statement does, for the former does not advance the
discussion according to logical rules and the latter does. It cannot be denied, however, that statusraising techniques have an impact on the eventual outcome of the discussion; as van Rees (2003a)
states, “...enhancing one’s own credibility and undermining the opponent’s certainly have a function
with regard to the audience” (p. 463). Although van Rees clearly refers to third-party audiences in
this passage, in the same article, she suggests treating an audience as an antagonistic discussant; thus,
the parallel between strategic maneuvers performed on an audience and on a discussant is clear. Van
Eemeren and Houtlosser would likely classify the status-raising maneuver as a fallacy because of its
damping effect on the likelihood of achieving a consensual resolution. Thus, fallacy theory is one
way in which expressive speech acts may be recognized and dealt with inside pragma-dialectics.
In spite of these advantages and the overall recognition of rhetoric’s value to critical analyses such as
pragma-dialectics, argumentation theorists do not fully recognize the degree to which pragmadialectics employs rhetoric. As it stands, rhetoric is seen as a supplement to the rational framework
that pragma-dialectics employs. If we accept Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric as the ability “not to
persuade but to see the available means of persuasion in each case” (On Rhetoric, 1.1.14), though, it
becomes clear that rhetoric is an integral part of pragma-dialectical analysis.
Specifically, when performing a pragma-dialectic analysis, an analyst must identify speech acts, locate
them in argumentative stages, classify them as the five statement types, and rewrite them into an
abstract format. Each of these steps is a dialectical action in a critical, analytical sense, but each
includes natural language and thus implicitly contains rhetorical considerations. This aspect has been
addressed by van Eemeren and Houtlosser (2001, 2003), as discussed above. However, a
fundamental rhetorical issue within the fourth step—transformation—has not been addressed.
In the transformative step, an analyst will use “well-defined and...precise standard phrases” (van
Eemeren, Grootendorst, & Snoeck Henkemans, p. 293) to restate the original speech acts as
abstracted statements. This abstracting process removes expressive elements and other rhetorical
factors that do not pertain directly to achieving a dialectical consensus. Laying the dialectical
skeleton of an argument is necessary for an objective, critical analysis, but it tends to obscure
rhetorical considerations. This objection has been addressed satisfactorily by rhetoric’s inclusion in
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pragma-dialectic analysis, but this reconstructive act still remains doubly problematic for different
reasons. First, the reconstructed phrases will necessarily be constructed from natural language, not
highly abstract, structured symbolic notation that is innately free from ambiguity, redundancy, and
elliptical statements. Since natural language is replete with rhetorical devices, the possibility exists of
reintroducing the same perceived flaws that the transformative step attempts to strip away from an
argument’s dialectic core. Therefore, an alert analyst must be on guard against this possibility and
take great care when restructuring dialectically-oriented speech acts. However, the analyst’s care sets
up the second problem: according to Aristotle’s definition of rhetoric, an analyst’s diligence toward
restating imprecise speech acts in standardized, bias-free terms requires attention toward eliminating
the transformed speech acts’ persuasive content. Thus, by definition, a rationally-based
transformation becomes a rhetorical act.
In this fashion, rhetoric reveals itself as a necessary, integral component of pragma-dialectics, not
merely an adjunct used to increase pragma-dialectics’ flexibility and analytical power.
Application
A great deal of pragma-dialectic investigation deals with legal questions (van Eemeren & Houtlosser,
2003; Hohmann, 2000), but another good place to test pragma-dialectics with regard to rhetoric is in
scientific literature, particularly professional journal articles.
Every scientific journal article contains an argument of some sort, and this type of article is
supposed to be an exemplar of dialectic argument. In a typical scientific article, the
author/protagonist presents a research question, a hypothesis (potential claim), the study’s
methodology, its results, a discussion of the results, and a summative conclusion to the
reader/antagonist. The goal is to provide a dispassionate account of investigation and dialectically
convince, rather than rhetorically persuade, the author’s academic peers of the rightness of the
proposed standpoint. Studies in the literature of science suggest rhetoric is present in these
interchanges and the dialectic ideal is not fully realized (see, for example, Moore (1997), Myers
(1997), and Dombrowski (2003)), but dialectic remains the ideal model for scientific discourse.
Another way in which scientific journal articles make good subjects for pragma-dialectic analysis is
their lack of appeals to ultimate authority for dispute resolution. Prominent scientists may function
as quasi-authoritative figures and wield great influence within their respective fields of expertise, but
they do not actually possess the ability to settle disputes conclusively. Instead, scientific disputes are
aired for general input and criticism in journals, which function as a sort of clearinghouse in which
academics can exchange ideas and information and engage in mediated debates about ideas and
information, toward the end goal of coming to a general consensus regarding disputed points.
Another consideration is whether scientific journal articles are really dialectic arguments in the sense
that the author/arguer and reader have the chance to interact. This is sometimes a stretch, but it’s
generally the case. One type of interaction is through a letters to the editor section; some journals
allow readers to write letters to the editor and respond to articles; quite often, the journals print the
authors’ reply beneath the letter. Thus, a dialogue takes place.
Another type of interaction is through a series of articles. For example, journals sometimes print
articles written to expand on or rebut ideas raised in previous issues, or they may follow a long
article with an invited short article that comments on the longer article’s contents. (The Fall 2000
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special issue of Argumentation about pragma-dialectics—Volume 14, Issue 3—is an example of this
type.)
Another kind of interaction is through the typical article. This case is a bit more complex, for it does
not appear to be an interpersonal exchange, at least not at first glance. Outwardly, journal articles,
especially the first articles to broach a new subject, appear to be monologues couched in an
impersonal, dialectically-oriented style; the articles seem to be written by and to nobody in particular,
and the implication is that its readers should be convinced, not persuaded, of the contents’
truthfulness. Thus, the articles ostensibly aim toward convincing what Perelman refers to as the
“universal audience,” but as previously noted, studies in the rhetoric of science have revealed that a
great deal of professional discourse is intensely rhetorical and clearly aimed toward persuading a
specific audience. Therefore, although it appears as if authors are not directly writing to any
particular reader, the authors are actually talking directly to, or sometimes about, about one another
or are actively promoting their ideas, not simply presenting them for discussion. In addition, if we
accept the previously discussed idea that a protagonist should treat a generic audience as antagonists,
then the impersonal style of a typical scientific journal article fits the paradigm of a pragma-dialectic
interchange.
Analyses
The three scientific journal articles which this paper will examine are the first three in a series of
papers regarding research on a link between LSD use and chromosomal damage. The first paper, by
Cohen, Marinello, & Back, appeared in the March 1967 issue of Science and set off a spate of
intensive research that culminated in a landmark literature review by Dishotsky, Loughman, Mogar,
& Lipscomb in the April 1971 issue of Science. In order to preserve methodological uniformity and
ensure representative selections across the sample, I will pragma-dialectically analyze each article’s
first paragraph and highlight the areas in which rhetoric benefits the analysis.
Cohen, Marinello, & Back
The first paper, “Chromosomal Damage in Human Leukocytes Induced by Lysergic Acid
Diethylamide,” by Cohen, Marinello, & Back (March 1967), contains the first appearance of a
suggested link between LSD use and genetic damage. This paper is unique in that since it is the first
in the series, it is not directly responding to any existing papers; thus, the authors immediately pass
through the confrontation stage and take on the role of protagonist, orienting their propositions and
defenses toward a generic antagonist.
This paper’s first paragraph is as follows:
The induction of chromosomal abnormalities by various exogenous agents has been
studied extensively (1, 2). In addition, compounds with specific pharmacologic and
chemotherapeutic value cause chromosome damage (3). The psychotomimetic agent
lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25), when added to cultures of human peripheral
leukocytes, produces a marked increase in the frequencies of chromosomal breaks
and rearrangements compared to untreated cultures (p. 1417).
These three sentences are each in the opening stage; in them, the authors introduce the data points
upon which they base their argument and briefly describe their method of investigation. Each
sentence is an assertive speech act.
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Arnett — Rhetoric and Pragma-Dialectics
The following are the transformed, abstracted speech acts:
 Previous researchers studied links between chromosomal abnormalities and non-bodilyproduced chemicals.
 Some drugs cause chromosomal damage.
 We ran an in vitro experiment and found that LSD causes chromosomal damage.
As previously noted, critically analyzing the authors’ speech acts through identifying them, locating
them in argumentative stages, and classifying them as one of five statement types is a dialecticallybased task, but the actual work is rhetorical.
In addition, the analyst performed the following rhetorical steps in transforming the first sentence:
 Restructuring the sentence to match a standard subject-verb-object format;
 Changing the passive voice verb construction to active voice;
 Inserting an implied indirect object as the transformed sentence’s subject;
 Interpreting the meaning of “exogenous agents”; and
 Substituting the synonymous phrase “non-bodily-produced chemicals.”
The authors do not have a real adversary—other than the value of p, that is—to argue against, so the
authors can be forgiven the putative breach of Rule #3, which does not allow imaginary opponents
because all discussants must agree on the argumentative premises and discussion rules. However, in
light of the highly regarded, peer-reviewed venue in which this article appears, we can safely infer
that the authors follow scientific methodologies that are, at least on the surface level, acceptable to
other scientists.
A rhetorical analysis within pragma-dialectical framework brings several interesting factors to light
that the original conception of pragma-dialectics would not have revealed. In particular, the authors’
selection of the word “psychotomimetic” as a descriptor for LSD is a revealing choice. This word is
a pejorative term meaning “mimicking mental illness” (Bunce, 1979, p. 223), and, even at the time
this article was written, psychotomimetic was an outdated term. In 1957, a full ten years before
Cohen, Marinello, & Back wrote this article, Osmond stated that the term psychotomimetic, which
implies a drug has the “capacity to mimic the mental illnesses called psychoses” (p. 418), “is far too
narrow a general term, and...suggested several that imply alternation in the normal mind...[his] own
preference being ‘psychelytic,’ or ‘psychedelic’—mind-manifesting” (p. 432). Psychedelic became the
generally accepted term for LSD and similar psychoactive drugs, but the negative connotations
associated with the original scientific descriptor “psychotomimetic” lingered (Bunce, 1979).
The third sentence’s phrasing “...lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25)...produces...” (Cohen,
Marinello, & Back, March 1967, p. 1417) indicates a great deal of confidence in the results, but this
confidence is not reflected in the paper’s concluding paragraph, which hedges the authors’
conclusions: “The significance of these findings cannot yet be assessed fully. However, LSD-25 is
apparently...” (p. 1418). In this case, the combination of dialectical reasoning and rhetorical analysis
highlights a potential problem in the authors’ force of justification.
Rhetorical analysis also highlights a problem that strictly dialectical analysis would not. Cohen,
Marinello, and Back provide a general description of their study in the opening stage, but they also
forecast their conclusion, which is a very unusual move, to say the least. Generally speaking, in a
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Arnett — Rhetoric and Pragma-Dialectics
scientific paper, authors do not place their conclusions at the beginning of an article. Placing a brief
summary of experimental results in an abstract is commonly accepted, but placing a statement of
results in the introduction is very uncommon. Instead, scientists typically pose a research question
and propose a hypothesis which they then test. Simultaneously introducing the study and describing
its results as an established fact does not qualify as a fallacy because it does not actually derail a
dialectic discussion, but it displays a bias toward the desired results on the authors’ part and suggests
that the investigation may not be an open, fully dialectic search for truth.
Irwin & Egozcue
The second article in the series, “Chromosomal Abnormalities in Leukocytes from LSD-25 Users,”
by Irwin & Egozcue, appeared in the July 1967 issue of Science. Its first paragraph is as follows:
The addition of LSD-25 to cultured human leukocytes produces increased
chromosomal abnormalities. Similar damage was observed in a schizophrenic patient
tested 8 months after he had received 15 treatments with LSD-25 over a 4-year
period (1). The present study was undertaken to validate these observations among
users of LSD-25 (p. 313).
These are the first paragraph’s speech acts, as transformed according to pragma-dialectic rules:
 LSD causes chromosomal damage in vitro.
 A schizophrenic person who used LSD had similar damage.
 We ran this study to test these results in vivo.
In a pragma-dialectic sense, these speech acts are more complex and interesting than those from the
previous article. The first two are assertives in the confrontation stage; however, they are simply
repeating Cohen, Marinello, and Back’s results, so it is not clear if Irwin and Egozcue are supporting
or attacking the cited authors’ proposition. The third sentence is a commissive in the opening stage.
Again, though, it is not immediately clear whether Irwin and Egozcue are taking an antagonistic
position toward the cited authors or assuming the role of protagonist and arguing the same position.
Based on Rule #3, which posits that a protagonist is under no obligation to defend a standpoint
twice against the same antagonist (in this case, the general readership of Science), and the generally
accepted scientific rule that novel results must be independently confirmed before they are accepted,
Irwin and Egozcue appear to take the antagonist role.
Even so, the first two sentences’ rhetorical presentation of a link between LSD and chromosomal
damage as an established fact rather than a research result needing confirmation is troubling because
their implication of factuality can be interpreted in two radically different ways. The most intuitive
reading is to interpret the first sentence as a simple, definitive statement of established fact—“The
addition of LSD-25...produces...”—and the second sentence as a tentative description of research
findings—“ Similar damage was observed....” On the other hand, the citation marker following the
second sentence signifies that the first two sentences are a summary of Cohen, Marinello, & Back’s
results, not uncontroversial statements of fact. In addition, the verb “to validate” in the third
sentence is a separate indication that the results described in the first two sentences have not been
confirmed, so the reader does not need to take the reported findings as gospel. Reaching this
conclusion requires a close reading and logical thinking, though, so the combination of rhetoric
within a pragma-dialectic framework appears to do a good job in laying clear the argument in Irwin
& Egozcue’s justification for their study.
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Arnett — Rhetoric and Pragma-Dialectics
The verb “to validate” in the third sentence is also interesting for another reason. This verb choice
may be a simple case of common scientific phrasing, but it connotes that the researchers may have
approached their study with some bias toward the desired results; validating implies confirming and
therefore reifying results, not just attempting to discover if results can even be replicated. The
transformations in a pragma-dialectic reading may obscure this point, but a rhetorical analysis of the
untransformed speech acts brings out evidence of the authors’ motivations and standpoints. Also,
transforming the verb involved choosing an equivalent word that did not connote bias, thus
demonstrating rhetoric’s presence in the transformative act.
Cohen, Hirschhorn, & Frosch
The third article in the series, “In Vivo and In Vitro Chromosomal Damage Induced by LSD-25,”
by Cohen, Hirschhorn, & Frosch, appeared in the November 16, 1967, issue of The New England
Journal of Medicine. Its first paragraph is as follows:
The induction of chromosomal aberrations by exogenous agents, such as viruses,
radiation and chemicals, is an area of active cytogenetic investigation.1 Recently, the
psychotomimetic hallucinogen, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD-25), has been added
to the list of chemicals capable of causing abnormalities in the chromosomes of
human leukocytes.2,3 Such preliminary studies report the in vitro and in vivo
chromosomal effects of LSD, and the present communication extends these
observations to include additional in vitro findings and a significant sample of
patients (p. 1044).
The first two sentences are both assertive speech acts in the confrontation stage; in them, the
authors present their standpoints in opposition to a hypothetical antagonist, once again consisting of
the journal’s readership. The third sentence is more complex; it appears to contain two individual
speech acts, each one an independent clause. The first clause is also an assertion in the confrontation
stage. The second clause is an assertion in the opening stage, for it provides both a claim and a
general description of the authors’ method of supporting their claim.
In abstracted form, the speech acts are as follows:




Cell researchers have studied links between chromosomal abnormalities and non-bodilyproduced chemicals.
Researchers found that LSD is another chemical that causes chromosomal damage.
The previously mentioned researchers did in vitro and in vivo studies.
We ran a statistically significant experiment and found that LSD causes chromosomal
damage in vitro and in vivo.
Once again, pragma-dialectic analysis does a good job of laying bare the passage’s argumentative
structure, but a rhetorical analysis provides valuable detail and insights into the text. For example,
the second sentence rhetorically creates the appearance of consensus; it characterizes both the
Cohen, Marinello, and Back and the Irwin and Egozcue articles as valid and confirms the link
between LSD and chromosome damage, even though those two articles describe the only two
studies performed on the topic at that time. In the third sentence, the authors further reify this link
by using the word “report,” which implies objective conveyance of facts, to describe the authors’
communication of their results. In addition, although Cohen, Marinello, and Back describe the cited
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Arnett — Rhetoric and Pragma-Dialectics
studies as “preliminary,” they state that their new study “extends these observations,” which implies
that their new study contains the same information as but is superior to the previous studies.
Also, the pejorative term “psychotomimetic” appears again, which provides some valuable insight
into the authors’ standpoint that a rhetoric-free pragma-dialectic method overlooks.
Audience analysis makes a clear appearance in this article. It was published in The New England
Journal of Medicine and includes an appeal to the journal’s audience by using the word “patients”
instead of “subjects” to describe human participants in the experiments. Attributing hidden bias to
the authors may not be entirely justified in this case, for this article was published in a medical
journal, and referring to “patients” may be a simple rhetorical appeal to the article’s readers.
However, the word “patients” also implicitly asserts that people who ingested LSD need medical
treatment; thus, the authors also medicalize the issue, gain ethos as authorities in the field, and reify
their findings.
Conclusion
I.
Role of the concluding paragraph
A.
B.
C.
Remind the reader of the principal "problem"
Summarize the validation of your position
1. Indicate your most important points
2. Re-present one or two of your most important evidence
Present a conclusion to your "story"
Perhaps we’re doomed to a perpetual, uneasy détente between rhetoric and dialectic. As Feteris
suggests, maybe we should just accept the view that from a dialectician’s perspective, rhetoric is
subordinate, whereas from a rhetorician’s point of view, dialectic is subordinate. However, I prefer
to think that we can actually place the two on an equal theoretical footing.
I have no argument with viewing rhetoric as a supplement to dialectic, at least within the confines of
the pragma-dialectic method. The structure provided by a rationally-centered analytic method
provides a valuable counterbalance to rhetoric’s perceptive but wandering gaze.
I am not arguing for subsuming dialectic within rhetoric; instead, I suggest that they should work in
tandem.
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leukocytes induced by lysergic acid diethylamide. Science, 155, 1417-9.
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Arnett — Rhetoric and Pragma-Dialectics
Cohen, M. M., Hirschhorn, K., & Frosch, W. A. (November 1967). In vivo and in vitro
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