Supervenience and Truth
Matjaž Potrč
Global supervenience on microphysics thesis bases truths of special sciences, sciences
and common sense upon truths of microphysics. Truths based on microphysics are
thus sufficient for construal of all other truths. The plausibility of the global
supervenience on microphysics thesis is taken into question by arguments of open
disjunctive microphysical basis for truths of special sciences, and by impossibility of
such a basis for generalities as opposed to just occasional sentences. It is claimed that
these arguments are misguided because they do not take into account the distinction
between the construal of truth as direct correspondence and construal of truth as
indirect correspondence. Truths pertaining to special sciences, sciences and common
sense need to be construed as truths according to the normative requirements of
indirect correspondence. The truthmaker for such truths is then the world, in an
indirect manner. Global supervenience is thus a natural choice for truths of special
sciences, construed under normative requirements of truth as indirect and not as direct
correspondence. It follows that it is a misconstrual and disrespect for ontological
difference to construe truths of special sciences by a tacit presupposition of truth as
direct correspondence applying to them. Proceeding in such a misguided manner
leads to deconstruction of the global supervenience on microphysics thesis. But global
supervenience on microphysics thesis stays well in place as an appropriate approach
under the construal of truth as indirect correspondence, fitting to truths of special
sciences, sciences and common sense.
1. Supervenience, emergence and superdupervenience.
A nickel tour of supervenience proposes the real difference between emergence and
supervenience to reside in an explanatory kosher supervenience or
superdupervenience.
Supervenience is a construal with the aim to account for the existence in the
material and physical world of the kind of properties such as these belonging to the
area of morals and of psychology which do not have any obvious place in the material
or physical world. Supervenience argues for the subvenient basis, normally in the
material and physical world, upon which the higher-level properties, such as those
characterizing morals and psychology supervene. We use the terminology of
properties here in order to provide a basic picture of supervenience in easy
understandable terms, although we agree that the terminology of properties may be
controversial.
Introducing subvenient basis and supervenient properties is compatible with
the approach of emergentism that also tries to account for the existence of moral,
psychological and similar properties, which may be treated with suspicion as
inhabitants of the physical and material world. Emergentists typically believe in the
power of sciences, such as physics and chemistry. So take these two atoms of
hydrogen and this one atom of oxygen. Now observe properties of each of these
elements separately, perhaps as coming in togetherness of the multitude of atoms.
Then, let these elements come in the form of H2O. Just coming together of these
atoms in the just indicated manner produces a new substance that wasn’t present
before, namely water, with special properties, new in respect to the earlier ingredient
elements, such as properties of liquidity. A shift from the underlying chemical
elements basis to the new quality of water related properties, well noticed by the
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everyday common sense, also needs to be pointed out. The important point now is
that emergentists believe how the coming on the stage of emergent properties, the
properties that were not present in the elements on the basic level, should be simply
accepted with a due piety. The coming into place of moral, psychological and other
properties in the material and physical world does not have any explanation for
emergentists.
This is where supervenience really comes into the picture, in counter
distinction to emergentism. According to supervenience, there does exist an
explanation for coming into being of moral, psychological and other properties that
may be suspect as forthcoming in the physical world. Explanation builds upon two
elements: generality and modality. An example of supervenient moral properties can
illustrate this. Take Saint Anthony whose deeds made him a morally good person.
Now embark on the following thought experiment. Suppose that there is a twin world
that is equivalent, in all of its physical and material properties, to our world. As the
physical constitution, such as coming together of atomic and subatomic particles in
the twin world comes in the form of a direct projection from the physical constitution
of our world, we may presume that there will be your twin in the twin world that
reads a copy of this paper just as you do in this world. Parallelism of physical
constitution of our world and of the discussed twin world can be then extended to
cover the past. And so we may presume to be able affirming the following:
“If in the twin world, exactly parallel in its physical and material constitution
to our world, there would exist a twin Saint Anthony, then the following must hold: If
Saint Anthony in our world has the property of being morally good, then it cannot be
the case that the twin Saint Anthony in the twin world would also not be morally
good.”
This is an illustration of the supervenient property of moral goodness that is not just
an emergent property. Why? Because the approach according to supervenience, in
counter distinction to the approach of emergence, explains the coming upon the stage
of supervenient properties. Explanation is introduced by the general form in which
supervenient properties enter the stage, and by the modal elements forthcoming
therein. Generality already comes with the very fact that there is parallelism and thus
comparison between the physical basis of our world and between the presupposed
twin world. Further, the above statement is spelled out in the conditional form that
introduces generality of statement by this very fact. Also, the conditional comes in the
form of a counterfactual, which is again a general statement, appropriate for law-like
explanation. Finally, there is the modal element (given the counterfactual conditional
“it has to be the case”) also enhancing the explanatory generality.
The appropriate form of supervenience thus needs to be distinguished from
emergence in that it allows for generality and necessity induced explanation. Such an
explanatory kosher kind of supervenience may be called superdupervenience (Horgan
1993).
2. Global supervenience on microphysics thesis bases truths of special sciences,
sciences and common sense upon truths of microphysics.
Laplacean daemon needs just the time to construe the basis for truths related to
microphysics in order to construe all truths, including the ones of special sciences,
sciences and common sense. In respect to the usage of her time Laplacean daemon is
an efficient deity.
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Suppose that Goddess construes the world in its material aspect, in all of its
microphysical details. The question is then whether she still needs some additional
time to construe other aspects and properties of the world. Or, to put it in other terms:
once as all truths about the world as the material physical world, in all of its
microphysical details, are given – how about other truths concerning our world, such
as truths pertaining to special sciences such as sociology, psychology and economics?
If the thesis of global supervenience on microphysics is in charge, then all these other
truths are already available once as the complete truths of the material physical world
are taken on the board. This would mean an efficient usage of timely resources by the
deity. If she would construe the basis of all the physical aspect of the world related
truths in one day, say, she would then not need another couple of days in order to
bring on board the rest of the truths related to the world, such as truths pertaining to
special sciences. All these truths would already be forthcoming at the end of the first
day of her labor.
The global supervenience on microphysics thesis simply claims that once all
truths of the world are told by the resources proper to physics, this automatically
covers all other truths of the world, such as truths in domains covered by special
sciences.
3. Truths based on microphysics are thus sufficient for construal of all other truths.
According to the global supervenience on microphysics thesis thus, once as all the
truths about the constitution of the world in its material aspect are given, the rest of all
other truths pertaining to the world are given as well. Or, to put it the other way
round: if truths of some special sciences, such as sociology or biology, would be
different, then there has to exist some variation in the material and microphysical
constitution of the world. So truths based on microphysics are sufficient for construal
of all other truths. It is not possible that there is a variation of supervenient truths
without some variation in the subvenient microphysical basis of the world. Take any
statement of special sciences. The thesis is then that truth of such a statement is
nothing over and above the instantiation of some microphysical basis. The statement
“Economy is going better now than it did a year ago” is made true, ultimately, by a
complex arrangement of material and ultimately microphysical world. If the behavior
of the microphysical basis on a wide scale would be rather different in a relevant
sense, then the just mentioned statement would not be true. The statement “Economy
is approaching recession” would have quite a different microphysical basis as its
truthmaker. Anyway, independent variation of supervenient truths without the
corresponding variation in the microphysical basis would not be possible.
4. The plausibility of the global supervenience on microphysics thesis is taken into
question by arguments of open disjunctive microphysical basis for truths of special
sciences, and by impossibility of such a basis for generalities as opposed to just
occasional sentences.
The plausibility of the global supervenience on microphysics thesis can be taken into
question however. We will take a short look at two such trials to shatter the thesis:
disjunctive realization and subvenient base of generalities.
Take the disjunctive realization objection to the global supervenience on
microphysics thesis first. This thesis says that truthmaker of truth for all the
statements is, each time, the microphysical basis of such statements. Statement “The
cat is on the mat” has as its truthmaker a specific complex arrangement of micro
particles in the world. If the arrangement of micro particles would be much different,
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then the mentioned statement would not be true. But now, truthmaker for the just
given statement will normally differ as instantiation of micro particles arrangement,
up to a certain point. In everyday terms, many variable cats, mats and their
positionings in the world will be truthmaker candidates for the statement, without that
the exact variation could be precisely and finally taken into account. One can portray
such microphysical arrangements as a very wide-ranging disjunctive realization row
of truthmakers. The point is then that it will be quite impossible to determine a bound
to these truthmaker disjunctive microphysical bases without having some checkup at
the level of supervenient properties, such as cats and mats. These would provide the
necessary parameters of relevance by which to constrain the subvenient support
choice. But this would then put into jeopardy the nothing-over-and-above
microphysical arrangement thesis, prohibiting independent variation or determining
truthmaker oomph at the level of supervenient properties. Now take as another
example my thought about the cat. According to the supervenience on microphysics
thesis its truthmaker will be a complex arrangement of physical particles pattern in
my brain. My dog directed thought, say, would have another microphysical
realization in my brain as its truthmaker, no matter what exactly this arrangement
would ultimately look like as investigated by neuroscience. But the cat directed
thought would also have a wide range of microphysical bases as distributed over a
population. Each of us had different cat related experiences, and other recent
experiences, so the bases may be expected to be very different between themselves as
well. And this also goes for various cat directed thoughts forthcoming in my
experiences through the stretch of time. If truthmaker for the statement that somebody
thinks about the cat is microphysical subvenient arrangement, then it looks that such
an arrangement will rather be forthcoming as a potentially infinite disjunctive
realization row. But it is hard to see how such an infinite disjunctive basis can have
the role of truthmaker, without some constraints coming upon it from the part of
supervenient concepts and statements, putting thereby into question the nothing-overand-above microphysical basis as the truthmaker of sentences pertaining to special
sciences and common sense.
Now take a look at the subvenient basis of generalities objection to the global
supervenience on microphysics thesis. Take the occasion sentence such as “I am now
thinking about the cat”. Given the temporal variation that would still allow to satisfy
truth conditions for this sentence, there will be a wide ranging microphysical basis of
truthmaker candidates already. But the basis for a general form of the statement that
would be in charge in respect to anybody entertaining the cat directed thought would
be still harder to obtain. This then shows that the claim how truthmakers of all the
truths are truthmakers satisfying microphysical basis truths is highly suspicious, and
that some determining force from the supervenient level of concepts and statementarrangements is needed as well to constrain the microphysical basis. But if this is true,
then the thesis of global supervenience on microphysics is put into question.
5. It is claimed that open disjunction and generality arguments are misguided because
they do not take into account the distinction between the construal of truth as direct
correspondence and construal of truth as indirect correspondence.
According to global supervenience on microphysics thesis, truths of all sciences and
of common sense are determined by truths by microphysics obtaining in the world. So
truths of special sciences and of common sense are wholly determined by truths
pertaining to microphysical arrangements in the world. So there is no independent
variation allowed in the area of truths of special sciences and common sense,
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supervening upon truths concerning the microphysical constitution of the world.
Nothing but truths related to the microphysical constitution determine all the truths.
But if this is the case, then one would expect to find a plausibly well-determined
microphysical basis for each of statements forthcoming in special sciences and in
common sense. Unfortunately it turns out that such a basis will consist of practically
infinite disjunctive instantiations. An answer to the question what is the truthmaker
for a given statement of special sciences or of common sense will thus not be
forthcoming without the needed help of some constraints at the supervenient level of
special sciences statements. But this goes against the nothing-over-and-above
requirement of global supervenience on microphysics for such truths. So, global
supervenience on microphysics principle does not come through. Similarly and even
more clearly it happens with the search for subvenient microphysical basis that would
be sufficient to determine truths of general statements. Some constraints appearing on
the level of statements proper to special sciences and common sense will be needed
here as well in order to plausibly determine the relevant microphysical support for
such statements. But this goes again against the nothing-over-and-above truths of
microphysics thesis, and therewith against the global supervenience on microphysics
thesis for truths of all statements appearing in the world. This is the reach of the
disjunctive realization objection and of the subvenient basis of generalities objection
against the global supervenience on microphysics thesis.
The just mentioned objections sound as quite powerful statements to the effect
that global supervenience on microphysics thesis cannot come through. In the
following however, we will claim that these objections do not shatter the importance
of global supervenience on microphysics thesis. We namely believe that there exists a
material, mind and language independent world and that truths of physics capture
aspects of this world’s constitution, irrespective of further endorsement of such theses
in respect whether there are micro-particles or fields in the physical constitution of the
world, and irrespective to whether we should acknowledge existence of regions in the
world for making several statements about it true. These are hard and important
questions indeed, to be dealt with at another occasion. Right now, we wish to tackle
another question that is related more immediately to the concerns of the global
supervenience on microphysics thesis. This is namely a thesis whose main concern is
semantic. It claims that truths of special sciences and common sense statements
supervene upon truths of statements dealing with microphysical arrangements in the
world.
So a short look at the theory of truth will be welcome at this stage. In the
abundance of topics related to the theory of truth we will choose just one distinction
that seems crucial to us: that between the construal of truth as direct correspondence
and between construal of truth as indirect correspondence. Construal of truth as
correspondence seems one plausible way to go in the semantic matters. It conceives
truth as correspondence obtaining between statements and between some kind of
facts: “P” is true iff P. Truth as direct correspondence is forthcoming in the cases as
the truthmaker of the concerned statement is really forthcoming, in the ultimate
industrial strength ontological sense, to support such a statement by corresponding to
it. According to our ontological views just the world without any parts exists as such a
industrial strength ontological basis, and accordingly as the only such appropriate
basis for the construal of truth as direct correspondence. Notice that, somehow in
agreement with ontological exclusivity of this ultimately existing material world, the
truth of statements according to normative requirements of direct correspondence is
reserved for quite artificially looking settings where such statements may be
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appropriately asserted. One such setting is that of the philosophical seminar where
truths pertaining to the ultimate ontological reality, such as “There is just one material
object out there, the world”, the direct correspondence truths, are properly asserted.
What about the abundance of the rest of truths? Do we think that, in
accordance with our industrial strength ontological beliefs, none of truths pertaining
to common sense and to special sciences are forthcoming at all? We certainly think
that tables and cats do not exist in the ultimately industrial strength ontological sense.
But we still rejoice ourselves plentifully at their ontic everyday ex-sistence. The truth
of statements figuring cats and thoughts about cats are still there, according to our
understanding, and these are truths following principles of correspondence. Yet as
these cats do not ultimately ontologically exist, but they merrily ex-sist in the world,
the statements referring to them are those of indirect correspondence. By this we
mean the following. As there is just the world around as the only material object,
according to our understanding, just statements referring to the world in a direct
manner may have their truth construed as direct correspondence. But statements
referring to the ontic stuff in the world, including state of affairs local equivalents that
ex-sist in the world, need to have their truth construed as that of indirect
correspondence. Truth-maker in their case is the world, whereas the ontic stuff related
statements refer to this world in an indirect manner. It is obvious that truth construed
as indirect correspondence allows for truth of innumerable statements of common
sense, special sciences and of sciences, and that this kind of truth comes with much
less stringent normative requirements, allowing it to be truth used in the marketplace
and in our everyday in-worldly engagements.
Now, we claim that open disjunction arguments and subvenient basis of
generalities arguments against the global supervenience on microphysics are
misguided because they do not take into account the distinction between truths
construed as direct and as indirect correspondence. In short, these arguments try to
establish local subvenient basis as truthmaker for each statement of common sense
and special sciences. But this is wrong because they treat the subvenient
microphysical basis as truthmakers for common sense and special sciences statements
in the manner as if they would be industrial strength ontological stuff supporting
truths in a direct correspondence manner. Yet the mentioned stuff, such as cats and
economy, is obviously ontic, and accordingly it deserves treatment by the construal of
truth as indirect correspondence. So, global supervenience on microphysics thesis can
well stay in place.
6. Truths pertaining to special sciences, sciences and common sense need to be
construed as truths according to the normative requirements of indirect
correspondence.
Let us say something more about truths pertaining to special sciences, sciences and
common sense. There are statements such as “Economy is growing stronger”,
“Molecules consist of arrangements of atoms”, “Many cooks spoil the broth”.
Economy, molecules and cooks are the stuff of our everyday statements for the
mentioned respective areas. We may say that these statements deal with the ontic
things, thus with the in-worldly stuff, and not with the ultimately industrial strength
ontological stuff. They are dealing with in-worldly things, not with the ultimate world
as such. So we do not need to treat these statements with respect by which we treat
the ultimately ontologically existing things, involving all the normative tricky to be
satisfied requirements for such occasions. We should treat truths involving cooks and
their broths with normative requirements proper to much more usual indirect
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correspondence. In this case then the material world in its microphysical constitution
will still be the truthmaker for such statements, in accordance with our monistic
ontology featuring the material world. Just that it will be indirectly such a truthmaker.
We understand that there may be some nagging questions here about possible regions
supporting such indirect truths in the world. But we have better response to this: the
truthmaker for indirect correspondence truths is still the world, but under different
contextually determined standards. Notice that this allows us to retain the global
supervenience on microphysics thesis.
7. The truthmaker for truths of special sciences, sciences and common sense is then
the world, in an indirect manner.
Take again statements figuring economy, molecules and cooks. We say that
truthmaker for statements figuring these matters is the world.
Be attentive at the fact that we are dealing with semantics as we try to
establish truth conditions for statements of special sciences, sciences and common
sense. Now, in semantics, it happens that there is a usual procedure to use possible
worlds. This is a tactics we comply with as we use the world as truthmaker of the
mentioned statements. Just that we use the actual world as the truthmaker, which
fares very well in our case as we construe truth as the correspondence. But in addition
to this, we construe truth for the mentioned statements as indirect correspondence.
This means that the truthmaker for such kind of statements is the whole actual world,
but the actual world makes such statements true in an indirect manner. We can say not
that the microphysical subvenient basis, possibly a precisely delineated one, is what
makes the truth of “Many cooks spoil the broth” a true sentence. It is rather the whole
actual world that makes the mentioned sentence come true. But it makes the sentence
come true in an indirect manner, because of cooks and broths somehow being there in
the world. But cooks and broths, notice again, do not exist, at least not in the
industrial strength ontological sense. So, saying that global supervenience on
microphysics holds is a fairly non-pretentious matter, once as the construal of truth as
indirect correspondence is being taken into account.
8. Global supervenience is thus a natural choice for truths of special sciences,
construed under normative requirements of truth as indirect and not as direct
correspondence.
But not just that global supervenience is an arbitrarily forthcoming option in the
construal of truth appropriate for special sciences and common sense. We claim that
global supervenience is a natural option for these matters, at least under our
understanding of ontology and of its relation to the ontic in-worldly stuff. It is namely
sensible to say that we are talking about the world as we are mentioning cooks and
broths, just that we are talking about the world in an indirect manner, by referring to it
through the in-worldly stuff forthcoming in the world. The same goes for truths
pertaining to economy: in them, we refer to the world, but in an indirect manner as we
use the path of referring to the world through the economical matters happening in the
world. In respect to the material basis, we may still say that world is truthmaker for
such statements, no matter how the microphysics gets interpreted, as containing
particles or fields, the choice we would rather prefer. As we talk about supervenience
on microphysics, global supervenience is thus a natural choice for truthmaking power
of the world. Just that the truth, for statements of special sciences and common sense,
needs to be construed as indirect and not as direct correspondence to the world. For
otherwise, cooks and broths would have to figure as the ultimate ontological stuff,
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besides to the world. But this does not seem to be a plausible option. Under normative
pressures of construal of truth as indirect correspondence, global supervenience on
microphysics is a proper choice. And it is wrong to look for local supervenient basis
of special science and common sense statements, as this is effectuated by disjunctive
and generality basis arguments against the global supervenience on microphysics
thesis. But if so this thesis stays in power.
9. It follows that it is a misconstrual and disrespect for ontological difference to
construe truths of special sciences by a tacit presupposition of truth as direct
correspondence applying to them.
One issue that was mentioned in our discussion and that needs some further
explanation is the difference between the ontology and between the ontic. The
ontology, as we understand, deals with the ultimate reality. The area of the ontic, to
the contrary, covers the in-worldly, rather secondary stuff. It is natural to make
statements pertaining to ontology in quite special setting of philosophical seminar,
say. Whereas we are producing truths related to the in-worldly ontic on the everyday
basis in various areas of our engagement. Table, cat and economy are ontic matters,
no matter how complex their structure should be. Whereas the world, in its ultimate
material constituency is a good candidate for the ontological object, it seems to us.
The difference between the ontological and the ontic, between the world and
your neighbors’ cat, say, may be called ontological difference. It is the difference
between the industrial strength ultimately existing objects and between the more free
floating and passing ontic objects. We think that it is a disrespect for ontological
difference to treat truths related to cats, economy and broth as ultimately existing
industrial strength ontological stuff. We think that cats do not exist in the ultimately
ontological sense, although they happily ex-sist in the in-worldly ontic sense. This is a
way for us to respect ontological difference.
If we treat truths of social sciences and of common sense by normative
requirements of truth as direct correspondence applying to them, we think that we
thereby commit an act of disrespect in relation to the plausibly sounding principle of
ontological difference. If we, namely, treat truths of special sciences by normative
requirements proper to direct correspondence, we treat the presumed objects and
states of affairs forthcoming in them as something that pertains to the ultimate
industrial strength ontological reality. But we just do not think that cats and broths,
with all respect to their in-worldly happy condition, belong to the ultimate ontological
area. So we think that it shows disrespect for ontological difference if we treat ontic
truths in the direct correspondence manner, as does objection to the global
supervenience on microphysics thesis. It is simply misconstruing the truthmaker for
such sentences. The truthmaker is still the world for such cases, with its material
constitution, but in an indirect manner.
10. Proceeding in such a misguided manner leads to deconstruction of the global
supervenience on microphysics thesis.
Here is what we further think. We believe that disrespect for ontological difference
and construal of truths pertaining to special sciences and to common sense as direct
correspondence matters is misguided, for the reason already spelled out. But once as
this kind of approach is embraced, once as truths of special sciences are supposed to
deal with ultimate ontologically constituted reality, and as normative requirements
appropriate for construal of truth as direct correspondence get applied to them, it is
natural that the global supervenience on microphysics thesis deconstructs itself. The
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reason is that one applies ontological and direct correspondence requirements to the
stuff that naturally belongs under ontic and indirect correspondence requirements.
Truths about cats and about economy have still the global physical world as
truthmaker, just that in an indirect manner. Once as they are tacitly supposed to be the
last ontological truths, the local subvenient material basis is searched for, without any
real luck. So global supervenience is shattered by this direct correspondence truth
approach, whereas it may be reestablished by indirect correspondence to truth
approach.
11. But global supervenience on microphysics thesis stays well in place as an
appropriate approach under construal of truth as indirect correspondence, fitting to
truths of special sciences, sciences and common sense.
Once as truth is construed as indirect correspondence, which is a natural move for
truths of special sciences and common sense, global supervenience on microphysics
thesis may well stay in place. The truthmaker for cats, economy and cooks related
statements is then still the physical world, in its microphysical constitution in the
widest sense of this term. But the physical world is such a truthmaker in a global
manner, without the presupposition of any of the above-mentioned stuff having a
direct correspondence basis in a determinate region of the world. It is namely quite
sensible view to say that such ultimate regions do not exist in the world, although
again it also seems a sensible view that the world is an object that ultimately does
exist. The talk about economy, cats, molecules and dinners will still be true, and
thesis of global supervenience of these truths on microphysics will stay in place as a
sensible hypothesis, in its widest sense.1
Bibliography
Horgan, T. (1993). “From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the
Demands of a Material World”, Mind 102: 555-86.
Horgan, T. and Potrč, M. (2008). Austere Realism. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
1
I thank authors of a reviewed paper, A. Pogačnik, V, Strahovnik, T. Horgan, M.
Povich, and my students for their support and discussion.
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