This research paper has been commissioned by the International Commission on
Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament, but reflects the views of the author
and should not be construed as necessarily reflecting the views of the Commission.
IAEA SAFEGUARDS ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
John Carlson1
20 January 2009
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The Additional Protocol (AP) is an agreement concluded between a state and the IAEA,
complementary to the state’s safeguards agreement with the IAEA, broadening the
information to be reported to the IAEA and the access to be given to safeguards inspectors.

The AP is essential to strengthening the IAEA safeguards system – without the AP the
IAEA’s ability to detect undeclared nuclear activities is limited.

The Model AP was agreed by the IAEA’s Board of Governors in 1997
- currently 129 states – two-thirds of NPT parties – have signed an AP
- 89 of these APs are in force.

Although these figures are disappointing – showing that the AP is not yet universal – the
figures for those non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT that have significant nuclear
activities are more encouraging. There are 65 such states:
- 59 of these - 90% - have an AP in force, or at least have signed an AP or had an AP
approved by the IAEA Board
- thus the AP is now thoroughly established by international practice as the NPT
safeguards standard
- but 6 such states – Argentina, Brazil, North Korea, Egypt, Syria and Venezuela –
have yet to sign an AP, and Iran, which was applying its AP provisionally, has
“suspended” it.

All states supporting the non-proliferation regime should do what they can to achieve
universalisation of the AP
- in particular, the AP must be made an essential condition for nuclear supply – there is
no valid reason for not requiring this now.

While it has yet to be shown that the AP needs improvement overall, its reporting
requirements should be reviewed and updated where necessary (e.g. to include dual-use items
and export denials)
- strengthened verification authority (“AP Plus”) might be considered for states
operating enrichment or reprocessing plants, and probably is required for noncompliance cases.
1
Director General, Australian Safeguards and Non-Proliferation Office. The views in this paper are those
of the author, and not necessarily those of the Australian Government.
2.
1. INTRODUCTION
The Additional Protocol – so-called because it is intended to be additional to a state’s
existing safeguards agreement with the IAEA – arose from efforts commencing in the
1990s to strengthen the IAEA safeguards system in response to the discovery of Iraq’s
nuclear weapon program following the first Gulf War.
The primary focus of the “traditional” safeguards system, first developed for the NPT in
the early 1970s, was verifying declared nuclear material and activities. It was assumed
that development of fuel cycle capabilities independent of declared facilities would be
beyond the resources of most states, and in any event would be readily detectable, so that
proliferation attempts were likely to involve diversion of nuclear material from declared
facilities. Events in Iraq demonstrated that this assumption was wrong.
The program to strengthen safeguards is focusing particularly on establishing the
technical capabilities and legal authority necessary for detection of undeclared nuclear
material and activities. Central to these efforts is the effective use of information –
involving collection and analysis of information that can enhance the IAEA’s knowledge
and understanding of nuclear programs – and providing more extensive rights of access
for IAEA inspectors to nuclear and nuclear-related locations, including for the resolution
of questions arising from information analysis.
2. THE NEED TO STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARDS
Implementation of safeguards by the IAEA is based on a safeguards agreement concluded
with the IAEA by each state. In the case of parties to the NPT, the NPT requires nonnuclear-weapons states to accept IAEA safeguards on all their nuclear material, and to
conclude a safeguards agreement for this purpose. This form of safeguards used to be
known as “full scope safeguards”, and today is known as “comprehensive safeguards”.
The text of a standard safeguards agreement, INFCIRC/1532, was negotiated in the
IAEA’s Board of Governors, to be used for each non-nuclear-weapon state NPT party.
Agreements on the INFCIRC/153 model are called “comprehensive safeguards
agreements”.
Comprehensive safeguards agreements require states to declare and submit regular
reports on their nuclear material and nuclear facilities, and to accept inspections and other
measures by the IAEA to verify these declarations and reports. In what later turned out
to be a serious weakness in INFCIRC/153, routine inspections are limited to agreed
“strategic points” in declared facilities. This reflected concerns by some states in 196971, when the text of INFCIRC/153 was negotiated, that safeguards inspections might be
used for industrial espionage.
In addition to routine inspections, the IAEA is also given the right of special inspection,
which can allow inspectors to go anywhere in the state to investigate circumstances
giving rise to suspicion. In practice however the right of special inspection has been
2.
INFCIRC is the IAEA abbreviation for “Information Circular”.
3.
rarely used – in fact, the IAEA has sought special inspections to investigate a suspected
undeclared nuclear activity only once, in 1993 in the case of the DPRK.3
Reasons for the lack of use of the special inspection provisions are not clear, but the
situation appears to have become self-reinforcing, i.e. the longer the provisions were not
used, the more they came to be regarded as being available only in very exceptional
circumstances. This perception may have been strengthened by the 1993 case which
occurred in adversarial circumstances – and by discussion in the Board of Governors in
1992 that special inspections should occur only on “rare occasions”.4
Following the first Gulf War, Iraq’s clandestine nuclear program came to light through
new techniques not then used for safeguards. The fact that Iraq had undertaken uranium
enrichment was first revealed through detection and analysis of microscopic uranium
particles on the clothing of hostages held by the Iraqis. Thus an important new
verification tool - environmental sampling - was introduced to safeguards. Action to
unravel Iraq’s nuclear program made extensive use of satellite imagery. Environmental
analysis and satellite imagery have since become well established safeguards tools.
Major elements of Iraq’s nuclear program were located well away from declared nuclear
sites, with no obvious connection to these – so traditional safeguards measures were
unlikely ever to have found them. But some other undeclared activities had been
undertaken at declared sites, almost under the noses of IAEA inspectors - in buildings
which, because of the restriction of routine inspections to strategic points, they could not
enter.
From the Iraq experience it was clear that a major shake-up of the safeguards system was
needed. A collaborative effort between the IAEA and Member States was launched.
This came to be called Programme 93+2 – because it commenced in 1993 and at that
time was planned for completion in 1995. Programme 93+2 proceeded on two fronts:


technical - development of new safeguards technologies and methods; and
legal – identification of new information and inspector access rights required by
the IAEA, and development of new legal authority to provide for these.
By 1995 the IAEA and Member States had developed a detailed outline of strengthened
safeguards measures. There was general acceptance that certain of the measures
proposed could be carried out under existing safeguards agreements, and the Board of
Governors endorsed the implementation of these in 1995. Important aspects include use
of environmental sampling5 in conjunction with inspection activities, and use of
unannounced inspections.
3. Special inspections were conducted in Romania in 1992, at the request of the new Romanian
government. The IAEA sought unsuccessfully to use special inspections in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea in 1993, but the DPRK refused to cooperate.
4. The currency of the Board’s 1992 discussion is questionable, given all that has happened subsequently
to strengthen the safeguards system, especially with respect to detection of undeclared nuclear activities.
5. Environmental analysis has proven to be a very powerful safeguards tool. Nuclear activities leave
indicators – minute traces – on building surfaces, in plants and soil, in water, and in the air. Detection of
such traces can indicate the existence of undeclared nuclear activities.
4.
For certain other measures it was concluded that additional legal authority was required6,
and it was decided to develop the Additional Protocol. Rather than re-negotiate existing
safeguards agreements, with the obvious problems this could involve, it was decided to
develop a new instrument which would be additional and complementary to existing
agreements, addressing the deficiencies in these. A special open-ended committee of the
Board of Governors was established (“Committee 24”), and the Additional Protocol was
negotiated in 1996-7. The model Additional Protocol – known as INFCIRC/540 – was
agreed by the Board of Governors in May 1997. Later that year Australia, which had
been very active in the negotiations, became the first state to sign and ratify an Additional
Protocol.
3. OUTLINE OF THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL
Key elements of the model Additional Protocol can be summarised as follows:
(a)
The IAEA is to be given considerably more information on nuclear and nuclearrelated activities, including through an “Expanded Declaration” by each state and
widened reporting requirements.
This information is to include, inter alia:
 nuclear fuel cycle development plans 10 years ahead;
 nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities not involving nuclear material7;
 production of uranium and thorium at mines and mills;
 nuclear-related imports and exports;
 production of heavy water and graphite;
 manufacture of centrifuge and other enrichment components;
 manufacture of flasks for irradiated fuel;
 construction of large hot cells;
 location, or further processing, of nuclear wastes.
(b)
IAEA inspectors have substantially increased access rights, termed
“complementary access”, to:
 anywhere on a declared nuclear site;
 locations included in the Expanded Declaration; and
 locations anywhere else in the state which the IAEA has identified for
investigation through analysis of the information available to it.
At nuclear sites and certain locations listed in the Expanded Declaration the IAEA
has access as of right. Elsewhere access is given where the IAEA wishes to resolve
any “question or inconsistency” arising from information analysis. At locations not
included in the Expanded Declaration, in the first instance inspectors are to carry
out environmental sampling. If this is inconclusive, inspectors may use radiation
detection and measurement devices and, as agreed with the state, other “objective
measures”.
6. At the time, many argued that the necessary authority could be found in existing safeguards
agreements, but it was decided to put the matter beyond doubt through a new legal instrument.
7. Note: any fuel cycle activity involving nuclear material should be declared under “traditional”
safeguards.
5.
(c)
Access on nuclear sites can be at short-notice, two hours or less, if carried out with
an inspection8; elsewhere access is available on 24 hours’ notice.
(d)
The IAEA can deploy environmental sampling, to look for indications of
undeclared nuclear activities anywhere in the state.
Initially environmental sampling is to be “location-specific”, directed at a particular
location identified in a question or inconsistency. But the Additional Protocol
recognises the right of the IAEA to deploy “wide area environmental sampling”9,
looking for nuclear indications over extensive areas, once the efficacy of this
technique is established.
An aspect that was queried early on is whether the Additional Protocol goes beyond the
IAEA’s mandate in INFCIRC/153 to verify nuclear material. The Additional Protocol
has extended the IAEA’s authority into a number of areas where nuclear material would
not normally be present, such as manufacture of centrifuge components, heavy water and
nuclear grade graphite. However, the rationale for this is clear: the IAEA can – and
should – look at broader information that strengthens its ability to draw the conclusion
that all nuclear material in the state has been declared (i.e. that there is no undeclared
nuclear material). This encompasses procedures to find indicators of undeclared nuclear
material and nuclear activities, or indicators of diversion or intended diversion of nuclear
material.10
Following agreement on the model Additional Protocol, there has been some discussion
as to whether the Additional Protocol is voluntary or mandatory. There is no
determination, by the Board of Governors or elsewhere, that conclusion of an Additional
Protocol is mandatory. On the other hand, non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT
have committed to accept “the Agency safeguards system”. The Agency safeguards
system is not frozen at 1970, when the NPT entered into force (indeed, the model
comprehensive safeguards agreement, INFCIRC/153, had yet to be negotiated then), but
evolves over time. The Additional Protocol, in conjunction with the comprehensive
safeguards agreement, represents a consolidated statement of the “Agency safeguards
system”, and – as indicated in the following paragraph – has now become established by
international practice as the contemporary standard for NPT safeguards.
Of the 65 non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT that have significant nuclear
activities, at the time of writing 47 have Additional Protocols in force and 12 have signed
an Additional Protocol or had an Additional Protocol approved by the Board of
Governors – an uptake of 90% of such states. In all, 129 Additional Protocols are in
force or have been signed or approved. Further information on states with an Additional
Protocol is at Annex A.
8. Including design information verification.
9. Wide area environmental sampling involves atmospheric or water sampling, looking for indicators of
nuclear activities. Through careful positioning of a few sampling stations it might be possible to monitor
quite large areas, even entire states. If indicators were found, further work would be necessary to identify a
specific location for investigation (by complementary access or special inspection).
10. The term “diversion” includes both removal of nuclear material from safeguards and failure to submit
(i.e. to declare) nuclear material to safeguards.
6.
It is of serious concern that more than 11 years after the model Additional Protocol was
agreed, six non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT with significant nuclear activities
– Argentina, Brazil, DPRK, Egypt, Syria and Venezuela – have yet to adopt the
Additional Protocol. In addition Iran, which was applying the Additional Protocol on a
“provisional” basis, has “suspended” its cooperation under the Additional Protocol. The
cases of Syria as well as Iran show why refusal to implement an Additional Protocol can
no longer be considered acceptable.
While the Additional Protocol relates primarily to states with comprehensive safeguards
agreements (non-nuclear-weapon states party to the NPT), the foreword to INFCIRC/540
affirms that nuclear-weapon states and “other states” may also conclude an Additional
Protocol. All the nuclear-weapon states have an Additional Protocol, and India is
committed to concluding one.
Because the nuclear-weapon states and non-NPT parties have nuclear material and
activities outside safeguards, which they are under no obligation to declare, clearly the
purpose of the Additional Protocol is not to strengthen the IAEA’s capability to detect
undeclared nuclear material and activities in those states. Accordingly, their Additional
Protocols vary from the INFCIRC/540 model. The nuclear-weapon states’ Additional
Protocols operate so as to increase the information available to the IAEA regarding
nuclear cooperation with and transfers to non-nuclear-weapon states. The scope of
India’s Additional Protocol has yet to be negotiated.
4. “ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL PLUS” – IS
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL?
THERE A
NEED
TO
IMPROVE
ON THE
In discussions about the possibility of an “Additional Protocol Plus”, the term has been
used in two senses – strengthening the Additional Protocol itself, and additional
measures further to the Additional Protocol.11 The following discussion covers both
aspects.
Although the Additional Protocol has now been in existence for over 11 years, it might be
thought premature to consider that INFCIRC/540 is deficient. The major safeguards
violations that have occurred since 1997 have involved states without Additional
Protocols (Libya, Iran and likely Syria).12
Further, there is some concern whether proposing an “Additional Protocol Plus” will
complicate efforts to sign up states still without an Additional Protocol. Also, amending
the main body of the Additional Protocol would be very difficult – since Additional
Protocols are concluded between the IAEA and individual states, the IAEA would need
to negotiate proposed changes with each and every state.
However, when INFCIRC/540 was negotiated, technical aspects were incorporated in
Annexes, and a simplified process was established to amend the Annexes. Annex I lists
nuclear-related activities that are to be reported to the IAEA, and Annex II lists nuclear11. See e.g. the 2008 report of the Independent Commission advising the IAEA, Reinforcing the Global
Nuclear Order for Peace and Security: the Role of the IAEA to 2020 and Beyond, which appears to use the
term “Additional Protocol Plus” in both senses.
12. Libya has since concluded an AP. As noted earlier, Iran has signed an AP, but has “suspended” its
application. The IAEA is investigating apparent safeguards violations by Syria.
7.
related equipment and materials for which exports and imports are to be reported to the
IAEA.
Discussion of the need to improve the Additional Protocol generally covers the following
topics:


further information that should be reported to the IAEA; and
further access rights for IAEA inspectors.
Information and access are closely related, since some of the complementary access
provisions are linked to matters to be reported pursuant to Annexes I and II, and analysis
of information is key to identification of specific locations that may warrant
investigation.
Further information This falls into three broad areas:



updating the Protocol Annexes;
extending the coverage of the Annexes; and
reporting to the IAEA on export denials as well as approvals.
INFCIRC/540 provides that the Annexes may be amended by the Board upon the advice
of an “open-ended group of experts” established by the Board. A step in this direction
was taken with the establishment of “Committee 25” of the Board, the Committee on
Safeguards and Verification, in 2005, but little progress was made and the Committee
lapsed in 2007.
An obvious area for updating the Annexes relates to Annex II, listing equipment and
materials specially designed and prepared for nuclear use, which corresponds to the
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) Part 1 “Trigger List” as it was when the text of
INFCIRC/540 was agreed in 1997. At that time the NSG Trigger List was in its second
revision (Rev.2). Since then, the Trigger List has been amended several times, and is
currently at Rev.9. The intervening changes are too numerous to describe here, suffice to
say that it is highly desirable to keep Annex II in line with the Trigger List.
Another important change would be to extend the Annex from equipment and materials
specially prepared for nuclear use, to also include information on dual-use items (NSG
Part 2 list). While by definition dual-use items are not necessarily intended for nuclear
use, lack of information on procurements in this area impacts adversely on the IAEA’s
ability to find indicators of possible undeclared nuclear activities for further investigation.
There is a strong case for requiring export denials as well as export approvals to be
reported to the IAEA. Information on unsuccessful procurement efforts could be
important for alerting the IAEA to the possible interest of a state in pursuing clandestine
nuclear activities. Because of the complication of securing amendments to the main text
of the Additional Protocol, it would be preferable, if possible, to cover this through an
amendment to Annex II, or some other mechanism such as a Board decision.
Whether there are additional kinds of locations that would be usefully included in the
Expanded Declaration is a matter for examination. This could be pertinent in the cases of
states with sensitive nuclear activities or states under investigation for major safeguards
violations, discussed below.
8.
Further access rights This falls into four broad areas:




widened access as a consequence of adding to the locations to be included in the
Expanded Declaration, as mentioned above;
stronger access rights into locations identified by the IAEA as requiring
investigation;
shorter notice periods for access; and
the right to interview specific individuals.
Some commentators consider that the IAEA’s rights of complementary access under the
Additional Protocol to locations outside those declared by the state are too constrained.
As noted earlier, inspectors may carry out environmental sampling at such locations and,
if environmental sampling is inconclusive, may use radiation detection and measurement
devices and other agreed “objective measures”. Of course, there could be some delay
before analysis of samples would show whether the results were inconclusive. Further,
the IAEA is required to give at least 24 hours notice of access – and must provide the
state with the opportunity to resolve the particular question or inconsistency before
requesting access, unless the IAEA considers that the delay would prejudice the access
objectives.
During the negotiation of INFCIRC/540 it was considered that providing for
complementary access subject to these constraints was a reasonable balance between the
interests of the IAEA and those of the state. If there were nuclear activities at a location
under investigation, it was considered that both the verification measures and the notice
requirements would work satisfactorily – the state would not be able to successfully
remove evidence of nuclear activities in the time available. A further point is that under
comprehensive safeguards agreements the IAEA has the right of special inspection – if
the information regarding a location is sufficiently strong the IAEA can gain access to the
location and carry out necessary verification measures through the exercise of the special
inspection provisions.
Weaponisation activities This area has drawn attention through the IAEA’s efforts to
gain access to locations of suspected weaponisation activities, such as high explosives
testing, in Iran. Some have questioned the IAEA’s mandate to investigate apparent
weaponisation activities – however weaponisation is not only a breach of NPT
commitments, but indicates diversion or intended diversion of nuclear material, so is
clearly encompassed by the IAEA’s responsibility to provide timely warning of
diversion.13
Some have questioned the adequacy of the Additional Protocol’s access provisions with
respect to detection of weaponisation activities – indicators of weaponisation activities
might not be as easy to detect, and could be more easily concealed, compared with
nuclear activities. Accordingly, it is argued, the IAEA needs a much shorter notice
period and the right to search a suspect location. There is no doubt some weaponisation
activities will be difficult to detect. Documentary evidence, whether in hard copy or
electronic form, will be particularly difficult to find. The adequacy of the IAEA’s access
13. See the author’s Nuclear Weaponisation Activities: What is the Role of IAEA Safeguards?, reference at
end of this paper.
9.
rights should be kept under review, and further addressed if experience shows this is
necessary.
In considering access issues, the key point is that the IAEA must have location-specific
information, either through its own information analysis or through information
provided by third parties. If location-specific information is available, it can be actioned,
if necessary through a special inspection rather than complementary access. If locationspecific information is not available, realistically this shortcoming is unlikely to be
remedied simply by providing the IAEA stronger access rights.14
Right of access to specific individuals On the question of whether the IAEA has the
right to interview specific individuals, the IAEA Statute expressly provides for this.15
The IAEA Secretariat appears to construe this provision narrowly. This aspect – and the
reluctance to use special inspections – are more issues of the Secretariat’s policy and
practice than any inadequacy in the Additional Protocol.
There are two situations where stronger authority than provided by the current Additional
Protocol might be considered:


states with sensitive nuclear facilities (uranium enrichment or reprocessing);
states that have been found in non-compliance with their safeguards agreements.
Sensitive nuclear facilities In some cases states with sensitive facilities, especially
centrifuge enrichment plants, may present a major challenge to IAEA safeguards. If a
state has enrichment technology and is able to replicate centrifuge installations, it will be
very difficult to detect any undeclared enrichment facilities, particularly as the “footprint”
for centrifuge facilities is relatively small. The most effective solution to this problem is
to seek international agreement to limit the states having these capabilities.
For states that have enrichment capabilities, it may be necessary to provide the IAEA
with authority to apply more intrusive verification. For example, to counter the
possibility of a state producing more centrifuge components than declared, in order to
supply undeclared facilities, the IAEA may need to look more closely than provided for
in the current Additional Protocol at component manufacturing operations – as well as
relevant export/import data – to try to monitor the flow of components. It would be
important that any such strengthened authority would not be applied as a matter of
routine, but only where the IAEA has determined, on the basis of a specific state-level
safeguards approach, that it needs to do so.
More broadly, issues of confidence about a state’s use of sensitive nuclear facilities
involve more than technical verification. Safeguards are retrospective – they can show
that diversion has not occurred – but they can provide only limited assurance about future
intent. As part of demonstrating that nuclear programs are intended for exclusively
peaceful purposes, the international community needs to develop transparency
mechanisms to complement safeguards. One example would be to move away from
national to multilateralised programs for the sensitive stages of the fuel cycle.
14. The special inspection provisions can be used to require information, but in practical terms this may be
of limited value if not linked to specific activities and locations.
15. Article XII.A.6.
10.
Verification in non-compliance cases
The situation of non-compliance needs
particular attention. Fortunately non-compliance is an exceptional situation, and there is
no established model for how to deal with follow-up verification. There is a good
argument that the Additional Protocol is not sufficient for following up a case of noncompliance. This was the experience with Iran – before Iran’s “suspension” of the
provisional application of its Additional Protocol, the IAEA had considerable difficulties
obtaining Iran’s cooperation in providing information and access.
There would be advantage for the IAEA to have stronger authority, as was done in Iraq
under UN Security Council Resolution 687 (which of course pre-dated the Additional
Protocol). This might include “anywhere/any time” access, the right to install monitoring
systems, authority to interview any person, and so on. A more rigorous verification
regime for states in non-compliance could be mandated by Security Council resolution.16
5. CONCLUSIONS
The Additional Protocol is an essential element in strengthening the IAEA’s capability to
detect undeclared nuclear activities. The IAEA has emphasised that without an
Additional Protocol its ability to draw conclusions on the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities is limited.
All states must do more towards achieving universalisation of the Additional Protocol. It
is high time all nuclear suppliers made the Additional Protocol a condition for supply –
there is no justification for continuing nuclear supply under insufficient safeguards.
While it has yet to be shown that the Additional Protocol needs improvement overall, the
Protocol provides a procedure for the revision of its Annexes, and these should be
reviewed and updated where necessary. Further, dual-use items and a requirement to
report export denials should be added. Consideration should also be given to
strengthened verification authority, through an amended Additional Protocol or a further
instrument, to be available to the IAEA where needed – as well as complementary
transparency mechanisms – for states operating enrichment or reprocessing plants.
Finally, as part of an examination of strengthening the IAEA’s authority in cases of
safeguards non-compliance, consideration should be given to the need for a strengthened
form of Additional Protocol, mandated by the Security Council.
___________________________________________
16. The IAEA’s former DDG for Safeguards, Pierre Goldschmidt, now Visiting Scholar, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, has published a number of papers arguing for a Security Councilmandated verification regime for non-compliance cases.
11.
Some related papers by the author:
Five Decades of Safeguards, and Directions for the Future: An Australian Perspective,
Journal of Nuclear Materials Management, Summer 2007.
Defining the Safeguards Mission, IAEA Safeguards Symposium, Vienna, 16-20 October
2006.
[With R.Leslie and A.Berriman], Nuclear Weaponisation Activities: What is the Role of
IAEA Safeguards?, Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials Management,
Nashville, Tennessee, 16-20 July 2006.
Special Inspections Revisited, Annual Meeting of the Institute of Nuclear Materials
Management, Phoenix, Arizona, 10-14 July 2005.
12.
ANNEX A
STATUS OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (AS AT 6 JANUARY 2009)
Prepared by ASNO on basis of latest available IAEA information
SUMMARY:
States with significant nuclear activities [1]:
Total
73 + Taiwan
65 NNWS NPT Parties (see note on DPRK, Table 3)
5 NWS
3 INFCIRC/66 (India, Israel, Pakistan)
Number of APs in force:
APs signed or approved:
Overall total of APs:
89 [+ Taiwan]
40
129
Of the 65 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities:
47 have APs in force
12 have signed (or had APs approved by Board)
6 have not signed (or had APs approved)
Note: 1. “Significant nuclear activities” encompasses any amount of nuclear material in a
facility or location outside facilities (LOF), or nuclear material in excess of the exemption
limits in INFCIRC/153 paragraph 37.
[Tables 1 and 2 – States with significant nuclear activities shown in bold]
TABLE 1
STATES WITH ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS IN FORCE
State
In Force
State
In Force
Afghanistan
19 Jul 05
China
28 Mar 02
Armenia
28 Jun 04
Croatia
6 Jul 00
Australia
12 Dec 97
Cuba
3 Jun 04
Austria
30 Apr 04
Cyprus
1 May 08
Azerbaijan
29 Nov 00
Czech Republic
1 Jul 02
Bangladesh
30 Mar 01
DR Congo
9 Apr 03
Belgium
30 Apr 04
Denmark
30 Apr 04
Botswana
24 Aug 06
Ecuador
24 Oct 01
Bulgaria
10 Oct 00
El Salvador
24 May 04
Burkina Faso
17 Apr 03
Estonia
1 Dec 05
….. continued next page
13.
TABLE 1
STATES WITH ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS IN FORCE (continued)
State
In Force
State
In Force
Burundi
27 Sep 07
Fiji
14 Jul 06
Canada
8 Sep 00
Finland
30 Apr 04
Chile
3 Nov 03
France
30 Apr 04
FYROM
11 May 07
New Zealand
24 Sep 98
Georgia
3 Jun 03
Nicaragua
18 Feb 05
Germany
30 Apr 04
Niger
2 May 07
Ghana
11 June 04
Nigeria
4 Apr 07
Greece
30 Apr 04
Norway
16 May 00
Guatemala
28 May 08
Palau
13 May 05
Haiti
9 Mar 06
Panama
11 Dec 01
Holy See
24 Sep 98
Paraguay
14 Sep 04
Hungary
1 July 07
Peru
23 Jul 01
Iceland
12 Sep 03
Poland
1 Mar 07
Indonesia
29 Sep 99
Portugal
30 Apr 04
Ireland
30 Apr 04
ROK
19 Feb 04
Italy
30 Apr 04
Romania
7 Jul 00
Jamaica
19 Mar 03
Russia
16 Oct 07
Japan
16 Dec 99
Seychelles
13 Oct 04
Jordan
28 Jul 98
Singapore
31 Mar 08
Kazakhstan
9 May 07
Slovakia
1 Dec 05
Kuwait
2 Jun 03
Slovenia
1 Sep 06
Latvia
1 Oct 08
South Africa
13 Sep 02
Libya
11 Aug 06
Spain
30 Apr 04
Lithuania
5 Jul 00
Sweden
30 Apr 04
Luxembourg
30 Apr 04
Switzerland
1 Feb 05
Madagascar
18 Sep 03
Tajikistan
14 Dec 04
Malawi
26 Jul 07
Tanzania
7 Feb 05
Mali
12 Sep 02
Turkey
17 July 01
Malta
1 Jul 07
Turkmenistan
3 Jan 06
Marshall Islands
3 May 05
Uganda
14 Feb 06
Mauritius
17 Dec 07
Ukraine
24 Jan 06
Monaco
30 Sep 99
UK
30 Apr 04
Mongolia
12 May 03
Uruguay
30 Apr 04
Netherlands
30 Apr 04
USA
6 Jan 09
Uzbekistan
21 Dec 98
Notes: Total 89 states — [47 NNWS with significant nuclear activities] plus Taiwan.
14.
TABLE 2
STATES WITH ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS SIGNED OR APPROVED BY THE IAEA
BOARD OF GOVERNORS, BUT NOT YET IN FORCE
State
Signed/approved
State
Signed/approved
Albania
2 Dec 04
Lesotho
24 Sep 08
Algeria
14 Sep 04
Liechtenstein
14 Jul 06
Andorra
9 Jan 01
Malaysia
22 Nov 05
Belarus
15 Nov 05
Mauritania
2 Jun 03
Benin
7 Jun 05
Mexico
29 Mar 04
Cameroon
16 Dec 04
Moldova
13 Sep 06
Cape Verde
28 Jun 05
Montenegro
26 May 08
Central African Rep
7 Mar 06
Morocco
22 Sep 04
Chad
22 Nov 07
Mozambique
22 Nov 07
Colombia
11 May 05
Namibia
22 Mar 00
Comoros
13 Dec 05
Philippines
30 Sep 97
Costa Rica
12 Dec 01
Senegal
15 Dec 06
Côte d´Ivoir
22 Nov 07
Serbia [1]
14 Sep 04
Dominican Republic
20 Sep 07
Swaziland
4 Mar 08
Gabon
8 Jun 05
Thailand
22 Sep 05
Honduras
7 Jul 05
Timor-Leste
11 Sep 07
Iran
18 Dec 03
Togo
26 Sep 03
Iraq
9 Oct 08
Tunisia
24 May 05
Kiribati
9 Nov 04
Vietnam
10 Aug 07
Kyrgyzstan
29 Jan 07
Zambia
27 Nov 08
Total 40 states – [12 NNWS NPT Parties with significant nuclear activities]
Note:
Notes: 1. An AP for the former “Serbia and Montenegro” was approved by the BOG on 14 Sep
04. A separate AP has been approved for Montenegro. A Serbian AP is pending.
TABLE 3
STATES WITH SIGNIFICANT NUCLEAR ACTIVITIES, WHICH HAVE NOT YET
SIGNED ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS (OR HAD APS APPROVED BY BOARD)
State
State
Argentina
Israel [1]
Brazil
Pakistan [1]
DPRK [3]
Syria
Egypt
Venezuela
India [1, 2]
Notes: 1. Non-NPT Parties.
2. India is negotiating an AP with the IAEA.
3. On 10 January 2003 DPRK gave notice of withdrawal from the NPT – pending
clarification of its status, DPRK is counted here as an NPT Party.
4. Total 9 states [6 NPT].