47.11.07A
(1140w)
TO McGEORGE BUNDY1
November 7, 1947
[Washington, DC]
Dear Bundy: I received the draft of the chapters on Mr. Stimson’s years as Secretary of
War and have read almost all of it, but have not quite finished. I thought it best to give
you my immediate reactions and I will have more to write later. As you will understand, I
am under such heavy pressure now that it is very difficult for me to find time for anything
but my direct business in the Department and with the Congress. Most of what I have
done on the draft has been between 11 and two or three at night.
Starting at the beginning, I have no comments to make until page 129 of Chapter
5, next to the last sentence of the leading paragraph starting with the words “Both of
these moves” etc., which I think misleading because it seems to imply that we had been
urging M[a]cArthur to leave [the Philippines in February 1942], which was not the case
until a direct order was given him to leave, and this was an order and not persuasion. As
to Mr. Quezon, he held back quite a time on that despite the serious questions brought to
me from the State Department, because he felt, at least I felt, that Mr. Quezon’s departure
at the early date first suggested might have a very serious effect on the resistance of the
Philippine troops. We did suggest to M[a]cArthur that he send his wife and family out
with Quezon.2
On page 130 in the early sentence, commencing “The American Commander”
etc., the use of the words “admire or” seems questionable.
Page 141, Chapter 6, second paragraph, 3rd sentence, there is an error in referring
to “four” Britons. It was three.
On Page 174 you apparently indicated the omission of the latter part of the
paragraph commencing “On the other side” etc., with which I agree as important to omit.
The same applies to the words “towards Russia” in the next sentence.
I have no comments on Chapters 9 to 11 other than to say that the Secretary and
you have certainly treated me most generously.3
2
This leaves only Chapters 12 to 14 for comment by me, which I will send you
later.
Meanwhile, I wish to make this suggestion: I think the Secretary and you have
omitted one of the great issues that was involved in the creation of an American army and
air force and one that is not at all understood by the general public, whose memory now
only goes back to the liberation of France and the final phases of the campaign and the
atomic bomb. The point I am making is that we were struggling to create a ground army
of really modest size, considering our immense involvement in the war—105 divisions
and a huge air force. We were being pressed most heavily by the British for equipment,
both ground and air, by the Russians in the same way, by the manufacturers in the United
States not to levy on their personnel and to reduce the strain on the demands for materiel,
and by the Navy who did not have the same faith in the necessity for the ground army and
the air force in the European campaign as we did and were jealous of the demands for
materiel. Now the most important factor behind all this pressure is that there was quite
evident to me the feeling of the British leaders that our ground army was not going to be
effective, at least in time to play a decisive part in the fighting. As you know, Mr.
Churchill had grave doubts about the comparative fighting ability of the American
divisions as compared to the German divisions, though we should never say this publicly.
And, as you know, Alexander was criticizing our divisions in Africa as not being “battle
worthy”4. There was also the feeling that we would have no commanders comparable to
the British Field Marshal, instead of which we had commanders who handled and
supplied divisions, and almost armies, with the efficiency and facility and dispatch that
formerly would be applied to a regiment.
The tactical and strategical triumph over the German forces such as was
conducted from the time of the Avranches break-through, particularly in comparison to
the laborious progress of Montgomery’s forces, made largely by divisions never before
engaged in battle and by commanders who had little or no previous battle experience on a
large scale, was not even vaguely anticipated and came as a tremendous surprise to the
world and particularly to the British and Germans.5 So there was a battle that we had to
win here in Washington against all these influences and for which we found complete
justification in the final operations of the war. Along with this goes the procedure of
3
taking over tremendous areas in Louisiana, Tennessee, North Carolina and in the south
west desert country to give our high commanders complete familiarity with the handling
of large bodies of troops with celerity and efficiency.
I do not mean that direct reference should be made to all or maybe even part of
this, but the general proposition should be, I think, stated very clearly.
I am giving very careful consideration to the chapter on the atomic bomb in
relation to the Soviets because the question of its publication at the present time is a very
critical matter.6
I will send you more information later. Faithfully yours,
GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers (Pentagon Office, Selected)
1. Bundy, selected in 1941 as a junior fellow at Harvard University before he
served in US Army Intelligence during the war, was a son of Henry L. Stimson’s closest
wartime aide, Harvey Bundy. Stimson had chosen McGeorge in mid-1946 to write his
wartime memoir, which would be based on the secretary’s diary and oral reminiscences
to Bundy.
Bundy had recently sent Marshall a complete draft of the manuscript, noting: “in
particular, if there should be any comments relating to your own views and actions which
seem to you inaccurate, or which you would prefer that we omit, you must know that Mr.
Stimson would cut off his right hand, and both of mine, rather than include them.”
(Bundy to Marshall, October 31, 1947, GCMRL/G. C. Marshall Papers [Secretary of
State, General].)
2. Manuel Luis Quezon y Molina was the first president of the Philippine
Commonwealth, from 1933 to 1944. For further information about his evacuation from
the Philippines, see Papers of GCM, 3: 94–95.
4
3. “As for any supposed ‘generosity’ in what we have written so far as it concerns
you,” Bundy replied, “the principal fear we have had in that connection is that any
attempt to tell of the War Department without centering its story around you was in itself
an injustice, and there is not a word about your work that I should not cheerfully submit
to the most dispassionate of academic historians for judgment.” (Bundy to Marshall,
November 10, 1947, ibid. [Pentagon Office, Selected].)
4. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Harold Alexander had in early 1943
been appointed Eisenhower’s deputy in North Africa and placed in charge of all Allied
ground forces there.
5. General (later Field Marshal) Sir Bernard Montgomery was the commander of
Allied ground forces during the OVERLORD invasion of June 1944 and continued to
command Twenty-first Army Group in northwestern Europe through the end of the war.
6. See Marshall to Bundy, November 19, 1947, pp. 000–00.