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The Behavioural and Brain Sciences (1986) 9, pp.365-370.
Rational_vsEmp83.doc
Commentary on
James A. Dinsmoor (1983) Observing and conditioned reinforcement. BBS 6: 693-28.
Abstract of the original article: When experimenters require their subjects to perform some readily recorded
response to gain access to discriminative stimuli but do not permit this behavior to alter the schedule of
reinforcement, the response is classified, by analogy, as an “observing” response. Observing responses have been
used not only to analyze discrimination learning but also to substantiate the concept of conditioned reinforcement
and to measure the reinforcing effect of stimuli serving other behavioral functions. A controversy however,
centers around the puzzling question of how observing can be sustained when the resulting stimuli are not
associated with any increase in the frequency of primary reinforcement. Two possible answers have been advanced:
(a) that differential preparatory responses to these stimuli as conditional stimuli make both the receipt and the
nonreceipt of unconditional stimuli more reinforcing; and (b) that information concerning biologically significant
events is inherently reinforcing. It appears, however, that the stimulus associated with the less desirable outcome is
not reinforcing. The maintenance of observing can be reconciled with the traditional theory that the acquisition of
reinforcing properties proceeds according to the same rules as those for Pavlovian conditioning if it is recognized
that the subject is selective in what it observes and procures a greater than proportionate exposure to the stimulus
associated with the more desirable outcome. As a result of this selection, the overall frequency of primary
reinforcement increases in the presence of the observed stimuli and declines in the presence of the
nondifferential stimuli that prevail when the subject is not observing.
Rationalist versus empirical approaches
to observing and conditioned
reinforcement: The (so-called)
preference-for-signaled-shock
J. J. Furedy and G. B. Biederman
Department of Psychology, University of
Toronto, Toronto, Ontario, MSS 1A1 Canada
Experimental psychologists in general, and
operant psychologists in particular, consider
themselves as primarily empirical in orientation.
However, a rationalist strain sometimes may
introduce itself in the form of the uncritical
acceptance of certain generalizations that are
assigned the status of a phenomenon. Once the
elevation to this status occurs, critical analysis is
suspended and the so-called phenomenon
becomes entrenched in the manner of a
rationalist first principle. From then on, further
intellectual efforts are devoted solely to seeking
to explain the mechanism through which the
unquestioned
and
universally
accepted
phenomenon operates.
An example of this type of approach is seen in
Dinsmoor’s (1983) remarks and in the
commentaries of most of his critics with respect
to the so-called preference-for-signaled shock
(PSS) phenomenon. The existence of the PSS
phenomenon is accepted by all, and the only
concern appears to be to determine whether the
operative mechanism of the phenomenon is
safety signal (as Dinsmoor, 1983, asserts),
preparatory response (as Davis, 1983, and
Perkins, 1983, claim), or information seeking (as,
for example, Berlyne, 1960, had suggested). So
in his reply to the commentators, Dinsmoor
(1983) remarks that the "only mystery in this
area . . . is why the animal will perform responses that produce a stimulus that is
accompanied by an aversive stimulus" (p. 720).
Thus, the implication is that only the mechanism
of PSS needs further consideration. Dinsmoor
states that he “lost interest” in the area "when
the solution became apparent" that subjects
were seeking safety signals (Dinsmoor 1983, p.
720). The implication of this remark appears to be
that identifying the mechanism of a supposed
phenomenon shuts down further critical
Continuing commentary/Dinsmoor: Observing and conditioned reinforcement
evaluation. To those commentators who disagree
with Dinsmoor's account of the mechanism of the
PSS phenomenon, his "solution" will be less than
“apparent.” We may expect that argument to
continue with the net effect of reinforcing the
status of PSS as a first principle without further
elucidating the status of the mechanism.
At the empirical level we wish to question the
unstated rationalist principle of the PSS as a
universal effect despite its heuristic potential for
theory, and its currently paradigmatic status
(Biederman & Furedy 1979). Neither the logic
of Dinsmoor's analysis and that of the
commentators nor the evidence justifies the
treatment of PSS as a first principle. Logically,
two other effects are possible: There may be no
preference for signaled shock, or there may even
be a preference for unsignaled shock (PUS).
Indeed, the PUS possibility is derivable both from
some human subject accounts (e.g. "the shock
hurts more when I tense up to prepare myself,"
cf., Furedy 1975), and some less current but not
refuted psychological theory (e.g. the Hullian
notion that the signal produces conditioned fear
which potentiates the impact of signaled relative
to unsignaled shock through the resultant
increase in drive level).
More important from an empirical standpoint
is the fact that the empirical literature in support
of the universality of PSS is by no means
unequivocal. Much of it suffers from methodological problems (confounded experimental
design), technical difficulties (unauthorized shock
modification), and perhaps most serious, lack &f
independent replication (see, e.g., Biederman &
Furedy 1979). Moreover, even in procedures that
do not suffer from these difficulties, the
universality of PSS was not apparent even to a
commentator such as Miller, who, together with
some associates, concluded that they were
"impressed with" and "disturbed by" the fact that
"the effect is not universal across subjects under
essentially identical conditions" (Miller, Marlin
& Berk 1977, p. 308). Finally, although we are
admittedly in a minority, others besides
ourselves have reported no preference in studies
that have had no obvious methodological
shortcomings except the rationalist one of not
succeeding in demonstrating the effect, e.g.
Badia (1959), Cotsonas (1972), and Douglass
(1969). The unclear status of PSS is best illustrated
by our own recent experience. Having once found
PSS (Biederman, Furedy & Beatty 1981) we
were unable to replicate that result. Then, using
a new procedure, we have recently found PUS
in each of 10 subjects (Biederman, Furedy &
Heighington 1984).
In short, although there is little doubt that the
weight of current scientific opinion is that PSS
is a basic and universal effect whose existence
should not be subject to serious question, the
weight of sound scientific evidence does not
support this conclusion, and scientific knowledge
of the conditions producing PSS, no preference,
or PUS is almost totally lacking. Such knowledge
would in our view constitute a genuine “sign that
we may be making progress toward becoming an
objective science, in which theories converge
because they are constrained by the data”
(Dinsmoor 1983, p. 718).
Author's Response
On preferences for unsignaled shocks
and for unpredictable rewards
James A. Dinsmoor
Department of Psychology, Indiana
University. Bloomington, Ind. 47405
Furedy & Biederman complain that in taking an
interest only in the mechanism responsible for
the phenomenon of preference for signaled
shock, not in an evaluation of the validity or the
universality of the phenomenon, I and other
writers on the topic have abandoned the
empirical approach to behavior. I cannot agree. I
do not equate lack of interest in further efforts to
evaluate the phenomenon with uncritical
acceptance of the data currently available. The
reason the preference for signaled shock
originally attracted a certain amount of scientific
attention was that on first acquaintance it seemed
to contravene established principles of behavior.
Signals positively correlated with the receipt of
shock should have been aversive to the subject
(e.g. Dinsmoor 1962; for additional references,
see McAllister, McAllister, Hampton & Scoles
1980) rather than reinforcing. However,
experimental analyses of the situation (e.g. Badia
& Culbertson 1972; Badia, Culbertson & Lewis
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1986) 9:2
Continuing commentary/Dinsmoor: Observing and conditioned reinforcement
1971; Dinsmoor, Flint, Smith & Viemeister
1969) indicated that it was the stimulus negatively correlated with the shock (safety signal)
that was doing the job. If this is the case, the
phenomenon per se recedes in interest, as it is
not clear, whether amply or poorly verified,
what implications a preference for signaled
shock has for a systematic science of behavior.
To repeat the familiar adage, we do not count the
pebbles on the beach.
References
Badia, P. (1959) Intermittent immediate
punishment preceded by a warning signal as
determiners of choice. Unpublished MA thesis.
Kent State University. [JJF]
Badia, P. & Culbertson, S. (1972) The relative
aversiveness of signalled vs unsignalled
escapable and inescapable shock. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior 17:463-71.
[JAD]
Badia, P., Culbertson, S. & Lewis, P. (1971) The
relative aversiveness of signalled vs unsignalled
avoidance. Journal of the Experimental Analysis
of Behavior 16:113-21. [JAD]
Berlyne, D. E. (1960) Conflict, arousal, and
curiosity. McGraw-Hill. [JJF]
Biederman, G. B. & Furedy, J. J. (1979) A history
of rat preference for signaled shock: From
paradox to paradigm. Australian Journal of
Psychology 31:101-18. [JJF]
Biederman, G. B., Furedy, J. J. & Beatty, J. C.
(1981) The preference for signaled shock
phenomenon: Classical conditioning paradigms.
The Psychological Record 31:357-69. [JJF]
Biederman, G. B., Furedy, J. J. & Heighington, G.
A. (1984) The double-alternative, double-start
experimental apparatus: A new procedure for
measuring preference. Journal of the
Experimental Analysis of Behavior 42:137-41.
[JJF]
Cotsonas, P. M. (1972) Preference for signaled over
unsignaled aversive stimulation. Unpublished
MA thesis, University of North Carolina.
[JJF]
Davis, H. (1983) Observing responses and the
limits of animal learning theory. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 6:706-7. [JJF]
Dinsmoor, J. A. (1962) Variable-interval escape
from stimuli accompanied by shocks. Journal of
the Experimental Analysis of Behavior 5:41-7.
[JAD]
Dinsmoor, J. A. (1983) Observing and conditioned
reinforcement. Behavioral and Brain Sciences
6:693-728. [HBD, JAD, JJF]
Dinsmoor, J. A., Flint, G. A., Smith, R. F. &
Viemeister, N. F. (1969) Differential
reinforcing effects of stimuli associated with the
presence or absence of a schedule of
punishment. In: Conditioned reinforcement, ed.
D. P. Hendry. Dorsey Press. [JAD]
Douglass, W. K. (1969) Some determinants of the
preference for signaled shock. Paper presented
at the meeting of the Eastern Psychological
Association, New York. [JJF]
Furedy, J. J. (1975) An integrative progress report
on informational control in humans: Some
laboratory findings and methodological claims.
Australian Journal of Psychology 27:61-83.
[JJF]
McAllister, D. E., McAllister, W. R., Hampton, S.
R. & Scoles, M. T. (1980) Escape-from-fear
performance as affected by handling method
and an additional CS-shock treatment. Animal
Learning and Behavior 8:417-23. [JAD]
Miller, R. R., Marlin, N. A. & Berk, A. M. (1977)
Reliability and sources of control of preferences
for signaled shock. Animal Learning Behavior
5:303-8. [JJF]
Perkins, C. C. (1983) Ways of observing
conditioned reinforcement. Behavioral and
Brain Sciences 6:712-13. [JJF]
THE BEHAVIORAL AND BRAIN SCIENCES (1986) 9:2