The Yemen Port Cities Development Program

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ANNEX IV
C. Draft Papers Received
a. Decentralization & Local Government Support in Yemen
The
World
Bank
Governance Knowledge Sharing Program (GKSP)
Policy Initiatives and Reforms in the MENA Region
Review Workshop
Decentralization and Local Government Support in Yemen
Lessons from the experience of the
Port Cities Development Program’s first phase and the
City Development Strategy Process in Aden
Draft Paper By
Sameh Wahba
23-24 February 2004
Beirut, Lebanon
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ...................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.
Background and Context ...............................................................................................................4
Aden’s competitive advantage .....................................................................................................4
Challenges facing the Aden local authorities ...............................................................................4
Decentralization and urban governance in Aden .........................................................................5
The Port Cities Development Program ........................................................................................6
Support to local government’s strategic and physical planning efforts .......................................7
Establishment of a Local Economic Development Department (LEDD) ....................................8
The Aden City Development Strategy (CDS) and LED process ................................................9
Key lessons and challenges in the Aden CDS process ...............................................................12
Challenges facing Aden’s development and the CDS process ..................................................12
Lessons from the CDS process ..................................................................................................13
The CDS as a learning process ..............................................................................................13
Public officials and the CDS process.....................................................................................14
Private sector and civil society involvement in the CDS process ..........................................16
Role of the LEDD and the CDS subgroups ...........................................................................17
The phasing of the CDS strategy ...........................................................................................17
Lessons learnt from the PCDP first phase .................................................................................18
Conclusions ...................................................................................................................................20
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................21
2
Introduction
This case study examines the World Bank-funded Port Cities Development Program (PCDP) in
Yemen by focusing on the first year’s experience in the City of Aden. The PCDP’s main objective
is to enable the transformation of three strategic port cities in Yemen—Aden, Hodeidah and
Mukalla—into engines for economic growth by creating an environment conducive to private
sector-led growth and to the creation of employment opportunities. The PCDP’s implementation
takes place in the context of the far-reaching decentralization legislation, enacted by the
Government of Yemen in February 2000. The new Law on Local Authorities transferred decisionmaking from central government to elected local councils, putting them in charge of supervising
the activities of the newly decentralized line ministries.
Even though the devolution of authority and responsibility for service delivery is a fairly recent
undertaking and thus not yet fully operational, local councils at the governorate level are playing
an increasingly important role in the development process, especially in Aden. The devolution of
authority to local councils at the municipal or district level is scheduled at a later stage once their
capacity to assume their new responsibilities has been built. The PCDP’s launch created a unique,
propitious opportunity to empower the Aden Governorate Local Council in the process of
assuming its new responsibilities and defining its working relationship vis-à-vis the executive
branch in the governorate.
The purpose of this case study is to distill the lessons learnt from the experience of the PCDP’s
first phase in Aden, which is nearing completion at the time of writing. The key objective of the
Program’s first phase was to strengthen local government’s capacity in undertaking strategic and
physical planning initiatives, namely through the formulation of a medium to long-term City
Development Strategy (CDS) that aims to promote economic development, alleviate poverty, and
improve the quality of life for Aden’s citizens. The Aden CDS process, launched officially in July
2002 with the assistance of the World Bank’s Cities Alliance Program, is structured around
participatory workshops in which stakeholders take part in formulating a vision for Aden’s
development in the future, as well as the objectives, strategies, programs, and projects needed to
achieve this vision.
The key component of the CDS is an action plan for Local Economic Development (LED),
developed with inputs from key stakeholders in the Governorate on the basis of an assessment of
Aden’s competitiveness to identify the economic clusters that require strategic investments. The
PCDP’s first phase also mapped the regulatory, administrative and procedural bottlenecks at key
local government agencies that interface with the private sector, to be targeted in the Program’s
second phase in the aim of building an enabling business environment.
Finally, it is important to note that this case study examines a program (PCDP) and a process
(CDS) in progress, which implies that the emphasis is primarily on the lessons learnt from
planning such initiatives (as it is too early to evaluate the implementation of the CDS
recommendations or to assess the long-term impact of PCDP-assisted reforms on the ground).
Nonetheless, the case study has important implications for setting up new participatory processes
to strengthen local governance in the MENA region.
3
Background and Context
Aden’s competitive advantage
Aden is a major port on the Red Sea and the economic capital of the Republic of Yemen. Its
position at the tip of the Arabian Peninsula near the entrance to the Red Sea, at only four miles
from the main East-West shipping route, and its natural deep-water harbor have historically made
the city one of the busiest refueling stations in the world, servicing most ships that pass through
the Suez Canal.
After the unification of Yemen in 1990 and to capitalize on Aden’s locational advantage, the city
was declared a free trade zone in May 1991, which further enhanced its role as the economic and
commercial capital of Yemen. Since then, the Government of Yemen invested significantly in the
expansion of port and airport facilities, and in upgrading the city’s infrastructure that was
devastated during the 1994 civil war. The government’s flagship investment was the Aden
Container Terminal (ACT), a USD250 million public-private investment, which was opened to
business in March 1999. ACT, operated by the Port of Singapore Authority (PSA), 1 resulted in a
significant expansion of activities in the Port of Aden (which includes both ACT and the Ma’lla
Terminal). Indeed, the volume of goods transshipped in the Port of Aden has increased by 28-fold
between 1997 and 2001. In addition, the government invested USD25 million to renovate the
Aden International Airport. The improvements, finished in 2001, include a new runway capable
of handling large long-haul flights.
The declaration of Aden as a Free Zone, the construction of ACT, and the infrastructure
investments have been met with growing interest from both national and international investors to
locate operations in the city and capitalize on the free zone and port facilities. Today, major
international shipping lines call on the Port of Aden. In addition, a number of manufacturing and
services firms owned by local investors have established large-scale operations in Aden over the
past five years, including the flour mills and cement bagging operations within the Ma’lla port
complex.
Aden also contains a number of important industrial complexes, including the oil refinery where
production started in 1954. The refinery and the port complex (both ACT and Ma’lla Terminal)
are the principal sources of employment in the Governorate, which today has an estimated
population of approximately 600,000 inhabitants.
Challenges facing the Aden local authorities
Yet, despite Aden’s comparative advantages, the local authority faces serious difficulties in
providing basic services to both citizens and investors, in attracting the investments needed to
expand job creation and service delivery, and in formulating and implementing effective and
sustained urban poverty alleviation strategies. Urban poverty is on the rise, with 10% of urban
1
In October 2003, the PSA was reported to have withdrawn out of the ACT partnership and to have started
discussions with the authorities on the transfer of assets. Although ACT was considered to be PSA’s most profitable
international venture and to have significant growth prospects, it appears that business never really picked up since the
USS Cole incident (insurance companies required significant premiums after the incident, which led many shipping
lines to shift their operations to nearby ports such as Salalah).
4
households in Aden under the so-called “Food Poverty Line” and 24% under the “Upper Poverty
line.”2
Some of the main socio-economic challenges that the Aden local government confronts today
include worsening poverty, unemployment, skill mismatch, increasing migration to Aden from the
neighboring Abyan and Taiz Governorates, limited access to commercial credit facilities, complex
regulatory procedures, and massive real estate speculation. One particularly daunting challenge in
Aden is the difficult access to serviced (or unserviced) land for residential and non-residential uses
by households and investors, as a result of the massive and chaotic land distribution process that
took place in the 1990’s.
Decentralization and urban governance in Aden
In terms of urban governance, a highly centralized decision-making process in Yemen has, in the
past, acted as a major constraint on local governments’ ability to address their cities’ problems.
However, in February 2000, the Government of Yemen enacted far-reaching decentralization
legislation. The new Law on Local Authorities transferred decision-making from the central level
to elected local councils, putting them in charge of supervising the activities of the newly
decentralized line ministries. Elected local councils are expected to play an important role in
soliciting the needs of the poor and supporting poverty reduction programs.
In addition, the central government issued in 2002 an executive decree decentralizing the master
plan revision and updating process to Aden governorate, an achievement that constitutes a radical
break with the centralized, non-participatory master planning process currently in place in Yemen.
Such reforms undoubtedly open new opportunities to tackle urban poverty, improve service
delivery, and increase local participation in urban planning and management.
Notwithstanding such bold measures to devolve powers and responsibilities from central
government to the local level, the decentralization of service delivery remains is a fairly recent
undertaking and as such not yet fully operational. The Aden local government still lacks the
experience needed to implement the process, especially in terms of budget formulation and local
revenue generation, as well as the entrepreneurship that can secure the investment flows needed to
expand job creation and service delivery. The financial resources of the eight municipalities in
Aden Governorate are severely limited due to poor revenue collection and insufficient budget
transfers from central government during this transition period.
In addition to limited financial resources, the relatively weak human resources at the disposal of
the Aden local government have resulted in several problems including the absence of a
comprehensive city development vision and updated land use planning, the lack of transportation
planning, difficult access to industrial and commercial land, the deficiency, unreliability, and poor
maintenance of local infrastructure and utility networks, and the inadequacy of municipal services
(especially solid waste collection and disposal). Indeed, Aden’s eight municipalities suffer from a
In the Central Statistical Organization’s poverty survey in Yemen in 1998, the Food Poverty Line was defined at
YR2067 per capita per month (or USD0.4 per person per day) and the Upper Poverty Line—representing the
minimum cost of basic needs, i.e. food, shelter, clothing, transportation, education, and health—was defined at YR
2873 per capita per month (USD 0.60 per person per day).
2
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lack of experienced staff that can effectively formulate a city development strategy and
institutionalize participatory planning and urban management.
Finally, the ability to undertake comprehensive planning in Aden is further exacerbated by
administrative fragmentation and the lack of a coherent development vision for the city. The
massive and chaotic land distribution that took place during the 1990’s (until stopped by
Presidential decree in 2001) was done without consideration of the overall impact on the city or of
sustainability. Since then, much development—both formal and informal—has taken place
outside of a legal and regulatory planning framework, which is threatening the city’s functional
efficiency. In effect, Aden’s master plan, developed in 1984, has never been revisited since,
despite the many dramatic socio-economic and political changes that took place (e.g. the
unification of Yemen in 1990, the declaration of Aden as free zone in 1991, the civil war of 1994).
The master plan was only updated (in 1994, 1996 and 2002) to document a posteriori the outcome
of the land distribution process, without questioning its negative implications on Aden’s ability to
accommodate future development. Such lack of an updated framework to guide urban
development has resulted in unsustainable living conditions for Aden residents, haphazard service
delivery, and the deterioration of the conditions favorable for economic development, in addition
to the environmental degradation and the threat to the city’s natural assets.
Notwithstanding the many problems and challenges facing local government, Aden has
tremendous potential for economic growth, capitalizing on its modern port and airport facilities,
the free zone draw factor, a relatively well-educated labor force (the city has the highest literary
rate of all Yemeni cities, almost twice as much as the national average), and significant natural
resources and tourism potential. Indeed, Aden possesses beautiful beaches and a coastline that is
largely unaffected by development, and the old quarter of Crater is surrounded by picturesque
mountains. Finally, the city’s road network was also significantly improved during the 2001-2003
period. It is such potential for economic growth in Aden, as well as in the two other port cities of
Hodeidah and Mukalla that led to the launch of the Port Cities Development Program (PCDP) in
2002.
The Port Cities Development Program
On January 23, 2003, the International Development Association, member of the World Bank
group, approved a 12-year USD 96 million Adjustable Programmatic Loan to the Government of
Yemen, called the Port Cities Development Program (PCDP). The Program’s main objective is to
develop the potential of strategic port cities in Yemen as engines for economic growth by creating
an environment conducive to private sector-led growth and to the creation of employment
opportunities in the three participating cities. The Program’s first phase financing, amounting to
USD23 million, is intended to achieve three key objectives:
1. Strengthen local government strategic, financial and physical planning and
coordination capabilities to better utilize existing assets and resources;
2. Improve the efficiency of, and streamline administrative procedures at key local
government agencies that interface with the private sector; and
3. Revitalize port city business districts and clusters through strategic physical
investments that can promote economic growth and employment creation in the city
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and attract investments. This component comprises investments aimed at improving
access to vital transport infrastructure and supporting the rehabilitation of commercial
areas and emerging business clusters.
Support to local government’s strategic and physical planning efforts
A key objective of the Program’s first phase is to support strategic and physical planning
initiatives, namely the formulation of medium to long-term City Development Strategies (CDS)
that aim to promote economic development, alleviate poverty, and improve the quality of life for
their citizens. The CDS process was launched in Aden with support from the World Bank’s Cities
Alliance Program.
The CDS process is structured around participatory workshops in which stakeholders take part in
formulating a vision for their city’s development, as well as the objectives, strategies, programs,
and projects needed to achieve this vision. The key component of the Aden CDS is an action plan
for Local Economic Development (LED), which was developed in a participatory way and which
relies on an assessment of the city’s competitiveness to identify the economic clusters that require
strategic investments.
The second component of the CDS is a Capital Investment Plan that establishes priority
investments in the short and medium-term according to the LED plan recommendations.
Investments are primarily aimed at improving access to and the quality of infrastructure services in
Aden, using the most effective service delivery mechanisms, while ensuring appropriate cost
recovery and regulatory control. Preparation of the Capital Investment Plan is undertaken within
the framework of revising and updating the master plan for Greater Aden, which was developed in
1984 and has not been revised since. Finally, the third CDS component is an Institutional
Modernization program that targets the principal institutions with which investors interface,
namely the General Investment Authority, the State Land Authority, the Urban Planning and
Surveying department under the Public Works Directorate, the Customs Authority, and the Tax
Authority.
Program implementation began in Aden and gradually extended to the cities of Mukalla and
Hodeidah. Program coordination takes place at the national level through the Port Cities Interministerial Committee (PCIC), which was established in September 2002 by Cabinet Decree (No.
264) with the mandate of undertaking the necessary policy changes to enable the local
administration reforms carried out under the Program. The PCIC is headed by the Prime Minister
and its membership includes the Ministers of Planning, Finance, Industry and Trade, Public Works
and Roads, Transport and Maritime Affairs, Local Administration, and Interior, the Governors of
Aden, Hodeidah and Mukalla, the Chairman of the Free Zones Authority, the President of the
General Investment Authority, and the Presidents of the Chambers of Commerce for Aden,
Hodeidah and Mukalla (other governmental agencies would be included as needs be). The PCIC,
which meets twice a year and/or when the need arises, designated a national coordinator to manage
the PCDP.
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Establishment of a Local Economic Development Department (LEDD)
The PCDP assists participating port cities in establishing Local Economic Development
Departments (LEDD), which would be in charge of program implementation at the local level.
The LEDD’s mission is to provide an institutional foundation for the participating port cities to
launch and coordinate strategic, financial, budgeting and physical planning efforts. The Aden
LEDD was established by Governor decree (No. 63) in 2002 and placed under the Governor’s
Office. The LEDD reports to the Aden Governor’s Office, which retains the final decision-making
authority over strategies, plans, and investments relating to the Program activities. At first, the
Aden LEDD shared offices with the PCDP (in part to contribute to building the new department’s
capacity) until separate premises were made available within the Aden Governorate complex.
The main functions of the Aden LEDD include facilitating the CDS process, coordinating the
formulation of the LED strategy and action plan, commissioning studies and technical assistance
to enable Aden to capitalize on its competitive advantage, monitoring the city’s economic
performance, guiding the necessary reform efforts, assessing progress on agreed actions through a
performance-based monitoring system established under the PCDP, and implementing Aden’s
component of the Program. The LEDD’s overarching mandate is to ensure that local economic
development remains the central objective throughout the CDS process and in all PCDP activities,
and that physical investments serve this purpose. The responsibility for administering physical
works’ projects and investments financed under the Credit is entrusted to the Aden branch office
of the Ministry of Public Works and Roads, with the LEDD responsible for oversight to ensure
that investments align with the prioritized needs determined by the CDS process.
Members of the Aden CDS Team and its technical committees who are responsible for
formulating the LED strategy and action plan and proposing investments in infrastructure and
services, although without formal decision-making powers, serve in an advisory role for the
LEDD. The Aden LEDD and the relevant public agencies in the city also receive technical
assistance from a team of specialists hired under the PCDP. This team includes local specialists in
economic development, procurement, financial management, and the management of information
systems, and international consultants in the fields of urban planning and infrastructure, private
sector development, competitiveness assessment, marketing and industrial development.
The design of the LEDD team composition was intended to be small and flexible in order to
ensure its full integration within the local government administration. The LEDD team therefore
consists of a Director, Procurement Officer, Financial Officer and an Executive Secretary (all as
civil servants). The team would be joined by other staff as need arises as well as by short-term
consultants responsible for capacity building efforts and specific technical assignments. In
addition to its reporting function to the Governor’s office, one of the LEDD’s key roles is to
provide assistance to the Governor and Local Council in matters related to economic development
(by commissioning studies, writing reports, etc) to facilitate well informed decision-making. The
LEDD is also expected to work in close cooperation with the PCDP’s national coordinator and the
relevant local government agencies and public officials in Aden Governorate.3
3
The PCDP is currently replicating the process in Mukalla and Hodeidah (setting up their respective LEDDs and
launching the CDS process) following the Aden experience.
8
The Aden City Development Strategy (CDS) and LED process
The Aden CDS process started in December 2001 when the World Bank’s Cities Alliance Program
approved a grant to Aden Governorate to develop a “Medium to Long-term City Development
Strategy for Local Economic Development.” A series of consultations with local authorities in
Aden and several civil society organizations in March 2002 resulted in a vision on the CDS team
composition and responsibilities. The Aden CDS team was officially established on June 16, 2002
by executive decree (No.36) of the Governor, and its responsibilities, including the production of
the CDS strategy, were detailed.
The CDS team is headed by the Secretary General of the Aden Local Council (also the Vice
Governor as per the new Local Authorities Law). The team’s membership includes the chairman
of the Aden Free Zone, the directors of the Aden branches of the Ministry of Planning and
International Cooperation, the Ministry of Public Works and Roads, and the General Investment
Authority, the PCDP national coordinator, and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce and
Industries, the Transport Syndicate, Aden University, developmental NGOs, small and microenterprises, women’s associations, and members of Parliament representing the city.
The CDS team receives specific sector assistance from the so-called ‘CDS supportive teams’ in
LED and Urban Planning and Infrastructure (UPI) issues. The LED supportive team is headed by
the Director of the Aden branch of the Ministry of Development and International Cooperation and
includes representatives of the Aden Free Zone, the Aden Port Authority, Aden International
Airport, the Aden branch of the General Investment Authority, the Chamber of Commerce,
representatives of the refineries, fisheries and tourism sectors, SMEs, women in the economy, and
higher and vocational training institutions, as well as donor agencies working in Aden.
The structure of the UPI supportive team builds on the Aden City Planning Council, which was
established around 1997 to ensure the coordination infrastructure planning and implementation in
the city. The UPI supportive team is chaired by the Director of Public Works and Roads in Aden
and includes the heads of the different utility companies (the Aden Branch of the Public Electricity
Corporation, the Aden Local Water and Sanitation Corporation, and the Aden Branch of the Public
Telecommunications Corporation), and representatives of the Aden branch of the State Land
Authority, the Environmental Protection Authority, and the Municipal Affairs directorate (under
the Public Works and Roads Directorate).
A first workshop was held in July 2002 to introduce the PCDP and CDS process to key
stakeholders in the city, including government organizations and representatives of the private
sector and civil society. In total, 89 representatives of the different stakeholder groups participated
in the first day’s plenary activities (see Table 1). The second and third days were specifically
targeted at elected Local Council members with the aim of initiating a constructive dialogue and
reviewing their role in introducing and ensuring sustained participation in the CDS process in their
districts.
In the first day and following an introductory session, participants were divided into four
stakeholder groups: government officials, local councilors, private sector businesses and investors,
and representatives of civil society organizations. Each group was asked to develop their vision of
the future of Aden, and analyze the potentials for and obstacles hindering the achievement of this
9
vision. Each group was also asked to identify the endogenous and exogenous obstacles to
participation within their group, in view of addressing such issues. Finally, CDS team members
were asked to develop strategies and procedures to promote and ensure broad-based participation
in the CDS process. At the end of the workshop, the PCDP commissioned two studies to assess
Aden’s competitiveness and institutional capacity in preparation for the LED strategy and the
following workshop.
The assessment of existing institutional capacity in Aden was undertaken in parallel with a socalled “investor-line” study that aimed to uncover the institutional bottlenecks that face investors.
The investor-line study identified the key institutions that interface with investors: the General
Investment Authority (the investors’ first stop and facilitator of the process), the Public Works
Directorate’s Urban Planning and Surveying department (to identify appropriate land parcels for
the development according to zoning regulations and obtain the necessary planning and building
permits), the State Land Authority’s Investment department (to decide on the land’s rental value
and sign the contract), and the Customs and Tax authorities. The bottlenecks identified in each of
these authorities along with other problems highlighted in an investors’ survey became the subject
of an administrative modernization and automation project financed by PCDP.
The objective of the second workshop, held in October 2002, was to develop a consensus among
the different stakeholders on a unified vision for the future of Aden, and formulate the LED goals
that are needed to achieve this vision and to contribute to economic growth, the improvement of
the quality of life for residents and for poverty alleviation. In the introductory sessions,
participants were briefed on the findings of the assessment studies of Aden’s competitiveness and
institutional capacity. Participants were then split into four groups to undertake a SWOT
(strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats) analysis concerning Aden’s competitiveness and
development prospects. Building on the SWOT analysis, each of the four stakeholder groups
formulated a vision for Aden’s future and the broad goals or requirements for achieving the vision.
The results of the different stakeholder groups’ work were synthesized into one unified vision for
Aden’s future, which would serve as a basis for the CDS process and for the development of LED
and UPI strategies. The stakeholder-agreed vision views Aden in the future as “a modern city with
an economy based on sea and air services, international trade, and tourism, building on its
competitive advantage to become an attractive hub for local and international investment.”
Achieving Aden’s vision in the stakeholders’ view requires changes in the legal and institutional
environment and measures for economic and infrastructure development. These goals are
summarized as follows:
An efficient and competitive CORE (Free Zone, Port and Airport):
 Improving and enhancing the efficiency of the Aden Port and Airport, supported by an
effective legal and institutional framework for Aden Free Zone to become competitive and
attractive poles.
Continuous diversification of a dynamic economic base:
 Capitalizing on Aden’s competitive advantages and utilizing its resources in an optimal,
sustainable way;
 Strengthening and supporting the modernization of the small enterprises sector, with a
special focus on women’s role in the economy;
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An enabling business environment:
 Enforcing existing laws and developing the necessary legislation in support of a business
enabling environment;
 Strengthening the judicial system and security environment to the benefit of investors and
citizens;
Effective private sector support institutions:
 Building the institutional capacity of the public and private sectors;
 Human resources development, especially in terms of qualified administrative cadres and
local labour force;
Revitalization of urban centers and an efficient public infrastructure:
 Developing and upgrading infrastructure networks.
At the end of the workshop, it was agreed that the different stakeholders participating in the
formulation of the Aden city vision and LED objectives would prepare for the next workshop their
institutions’ strategies and the plans and programs that can contribute to achieving the city vision
and the LED objectives.
Table 1. Participation in the different CDS workshops in Aden
Workshop 1
CDS team
Public sector (govt. officials, parastatals)
Local council members
Private sector
Civil society
World Bank, PCDP and other dev. Orgs.
Total
Plenary
NA
38
16
6
18
11
89
Workshop
NA
8
21
-5
8
42
Workshop Workshop 3
2
**
10
8*
11 *
9*
5
4
47
8
9
11
6
4
5
43
Notes: * Only two of the nine invited private sector representatives participated. In addition, some local councilors
and government officials were absent due to an unexpected visit by the President of Yemen to Aden during
the workshop period.
** Invited participants. The workshop, however, was attended by at least 80 persons.
The third workshop, held in May 2003 and attended by over 80 persons, reaffirmed the Aden city
vision and LED goals, developed by stakeholders’ consensus in the previous workshop. The LED
strategy was further developed through the formulation of specific objectives and programs for
each of the stakeholder institutions involved, based on the institutions’ strategic planning efforts to
meet Aden’s future vision and goals. The urban planning component of the CDS strategy was also
launched through a presentation of existing urban planning and management problems and
anticipated challenges in Aden, followed by discussions among the key stakeholders. The
linkages between the two key components of the strategy—LED and UPI—were clarified and
reinforced through the holding of preparatory meetings prior to the workshop between the CDS,
LED and UPI subgroup members with PCDP and World Bank officials. Finally, the Aden Local
Council presented its achievements to date and reaffirmed its commitment to the CDS formulation
and enactment process.
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Key lessons and challenges in the Aden CDS process
Challenges facing Aden’s development and the CDS process
One of the most critical challenges facing Aden’s future development, and a priority issue that the
CDS process will have to tackle, is the lack of coordination (and even basic collaboration) between
the key institutional stakeholders in the Governorate. This problem can be attributed to the unclear
mandates of these entities and their often-overlapping jurisdictions. Three particularly important
such instances of limited coordination and unclear jurisdiction stand out:

Within the so-called CORE (i.e. between the authorities in charge of the Aden Free Zone,
Ma’lla Seaport, and Aden International Airport): This problem is due to the unclear
jurisdiction between these three entities. On the one hand, the Prime Ministerial
Resolution No. 65 of 1993, which defined the location and geographical boundaries for
free zones activities in Aden, placed both the land and existing facilities of Ma’lla Seaport
and the Aden International Airport under the administration of the Aden Free Zone
Authority. An ambiguous clause (No. 32) of the Free Zones Law No. 4 of 1993 stipulates
the transfer of responsibilities and jurisdiction over the “projects” within the free zone area
from the authorities that had hitherto been in charge to the Free Zone Authority. Taken
together, these two clauses mean that Aden Free Zone Authority (AFZA) is in effect
responsible for both the Ma’lla Seaport and the Airport since 1993.
Yet, on the other hand, the authorities in charge of Ma’lla Seaport (Yemen Port Authority)
and the Aden International Airport have kept a high level of autonomy in decision-making,
even if they nominally report to AFZA. It is, however, not clear whether these authorities’
autonomy is meant to fill a temporary institutional vacuum created by AFZA’s
administrative withdrawal or if it is part of AFZA’s policy of devolution of responsibilities;

Between the Aden Free Zone Authority (AFZA) and the Aden Public Works and Roads
Directorate: The Prime Ministerial Resolution No. 65 of 1993 placed over 70% of the
Aden Governorate area under AFZA. Within its jurisdiction limits, AFZA is empowered
to authorize investment projects (including infrastructure, industrial, commercial, services,
touristic, and even residential developments), provide land for such projects, facilitate
investors’ access to infrastructure and services, deliver occupational licenses, and even
grant building permits and oversee construction through their Engineering Department.
The latter’s work in effect amounted to a withdrawal of some of the Aden Public Works
Directorate’s traditional functions, which became a source of tension between the two
authorities.
Interestingly, by virtue of being a recently established institution, AFZA (still) lacks the
human resources that are needed to effectively fulfill all functions prescribed in its
mandate, as well as the technical expertise in such matters as granting building permits. It
is unclear whether AFZA should invest in expanding such capacity or instead focus on
what it can do best, i.e. infrastructure financing, marketing, investor services, etc. It can be
argued that AFZA’s duplication of the functions that the Public Works Directorate is
supposedly well equipped to perform would be neither efficient not cost-effective. A more
pragmatic approach may consist of streamlining the complex bureaucratic procedures
facing investors, developing a one-stop shop application process to assist investors in
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obtaining the necessary permits, and enhancing coordination with the Public Works
Directorate.

Between the different public agencies in charge of infrastructure service delivery in Aden
(the Aden Public Works and Roads Directorate, the local branches of the Public Electricity
Corporation and the Telecommunications Corporation, and the Aden Local Corporation
for Water and Sanitation). The genesis of this problem occurred within the Aden City
Planning Council, which was initially scheduled to be chaired by the Aden Governor. The
Governor’s delegation of authority to the Director of Public Works caused tension within
the Council, especially as some of the utilities saw the Council’s role transformed from one
of coordination and joint planning into a conduit for implementing the Public Works
Directorate’s agenda. Instead of planning utility network improvements according to their
own priorities and perceived needs, utility providers found themselves forced to allocate
most of their limited annual budgets for maintenance and capital investments to relocate
water, sewerage and electricity mains in those road improvement projects that the Public
Works Directorate suggested. Some utility providers found that the Public Works
Directorate’s designation as Council Chair meant that road construction and improvement
projects were thereby given priority over their own agenda, which they saw as dismantling
their authority over project planning and leading to an inefficient budget allocation process.
Moreover, within this framework, utility providers found themselves co-financing projects
for which the Public Works Directorate would get all the credit and spending their limited
budgets without achieving any of their own projects.
Lessons from the CDS process
The CDS as a learning process
The CDS process, particularly the workshops’ consensus building initiatives, proved to be an
important learning experience in which the different stakeholder institutions were (and often for
the first time) exposed to other groups’ perspectives and ideas related to Aden’s development.
This process of convergence was particularly relevant and badly needed to expand the executive
and elected local officials’ understanding of the needs of private sector and civil society
institutions, the challenges facing them, and their potential contribution to the development
process.
One of the manifestations of the learning experience in the CDS process was the way in which the
visions for Aden’s future developed by the key stakeholder groups—public sector, local council,
private sector, and civil society—evolved from a narrow, limited scope focused on the institution
itself to a broad-based vision for the city that revolves around partnerships between the different
stakeholders.
The public sector stakeholders’ vision for Aden’s development is a case in a point. In the first
workshop, their vision was the establishment of the conditions in which government institutions
would be “capable of performing all duties and tasks in [a] proper manner to improve living
conditions in Aden,” a statement that ultimately ignores the potential that private sector and civil
society organizations could play in the process. For public sector stakeholders, all that was needed
was to find solutions to the problems of “inappropriate procedures and regulations, duplication in
authority, political interference in technical matters, and corruption.” Similarly, the private sector
13
representatives were primarily focused on the development of a business-enabling environment,
while civil society organizations were calling for a more important role in the development process
and participation in decision-making. By the second workshop, the different stakeholder groups
had converged to a more balanced vision for Aden’s future development.
Public officials and the CDS process
The Aden CDS process particularly benefited from the Governorate Local Council and Governor’s
strong endorsement and involvement. The fact that the Secretary General of the Aden
Governorate Local Council heads the CDS team and that the Governor and the Governorate’s
Local Councilors are very committed to the process has had an important rallying effect on most
stakeholders in Aden, especially the different public agencies.
Up until then, public sector institutions in Aden had operated in a very fragmented way. Public
sector institutions implemented directives from the relevant line ministries in Sana’a (vertical
coordination) with little or no coordination between their activities at the local level (horizontal
coordination). A previous attempt at coordinating between the decentralized public agencies in
charge of infrastructure services delivery, namely the establishment of the Aden City Planning
Council, had collapsed because the participating agencies viewed the Council’s role as a mere
notification tool of their plans rather than as a planning and coordination instrument through which
to resolve the conflicts between their annual plans and targets. Most agencies seemed to fear that
the Council might erode their autonomy over budget allocation and capital investment decisionmaking.
The Aden Governorate Local Council and Governor’s strong commitment to the CDS process was
the impetus behind the decentralized public agencies’ initial involvement. The Governorate
leadership’s commitment to the process is also expected to ensure that public agencies’ role
throughout the process is not simply token participation but rather active involvement and
effective implementation of the CDS recommendations. Thus far, the first signs are encouraging.
Public agencies such as the Public Works and Roads Directorate and the Public Electricity
Corporation had to set aside their differences and actively take part in the process as a result of the
leadership effect.
Inasmuch as strong leadership from the Aden Governor and Local Council has largely been
responsible for rallying the different public agencies in the CDS process (at least in the initial
stages), other factors contributed to sustaining the different institutions’ active involvement. By
far the most important such factor was the PCDP’s funding of five pilot infrastructure projects in
Aden (dealing with critical improvements to the road network, service delivery to an existing zone
with light industries and workshops, and upgrading of the Sirah fish market). The possibility of
accessing external funding for their activities acted as an incentive for the different public
institutions to actively participate in the CDS process, especially as the PCDP set the completion
of the CDS process and the revision and updating of Aden’s master plan as prerequisites for any
future funding of (large scale) infrastructure projects. As such, and despite recognizing the fact
that public agencies may have variable degrees of motivation to take part in the process, the
prospect that their own projects could access external funding (in other words, that they get the
credit without paying the bill) ensured all agencies were aligned with the CDS process, which is a
key condition if such effort is to succeed.
14
The CDS process also appears to be firmly positioned and hence resilient to the change in political
leadership in Aden (as far as one can tell in the initial stage, since it is too early to evaluate longterm implications). Indeed, a change of Governor took place in Aden in May 2003 at a critical
moment of the CDS process, around the same time as the third stakeholders’ workshop. Yet, in
his first week in office, the newly appointed Governor held three meetings with the Aden CDS,
PCDP and World Bank teams, where he was briefed on the current state of the CDS process and
the progress achieved so far. The Governor expressed his strong commitment to the process and
to Aden’s development program under the PCDP, which he said represented an important priority
for the Yemeni government. The Governor also emphasized the urgency of revising and updating
Aden’s master plan—a key component of the CDS process—to guide future development in the
Governorate, and he committed to take the necessary steps in support of the master plan revision
process, even if it requires such a politically unpopular decision as declaring a temporary
moratorium on development in the extension zones where land was chaotically distributed in the
1990s. Finally, the Governor issued instructions to the different decentralized public agencies to
sustain their active involvement and facilitate the CDS process.
The launch of the PCDP and CDS process was undoubtedly a timely opportunity for the Aden
Governorate Local Council to exercise their newly expanded responsibilities and decision-making
role in guiding local development. As part of its effort to accelerate the decentralization of
development planning and service delivery to the local level and to effectively involve both
executive and elected local officials, the design of the CDS and PCDP investment selection
processes struck a delicate balance of power between Aden Governorate’s executive and elected
leadership, since marginalizing or alienating any of them is likely to cause a stalemate in the
process. Thus, on the one hand, it is the elected Council that plays the lead role in preparing
Aden’s future development strategy and capital investment plan, understandably so as they are
best placed to translate community inputs. Yet, on the other hand, it is the Governor who
appointed the Local Council Secretary General as head of the CDS Team and who retains the
“final decision-making authority to accept, reject or modify strategies, plans and investments
relating to [PCDP] activities (PAD, p.14),” a check intended to ensure that CDS criteria are
satisfied and that proposed projects serve the purpose of economic development (See Figure 1).
And thus far, under this power-sharing formula, both the Aden Governor and Governorate Local
Council have been effectively involved in the CDS process.
In contrast to Aden Governorate Local Council’s key role and active involvement in the CDS
process, Local Councilors representing Aden Governorate’s eight municipalities have voiced some
concern over their seemingly limited role thus far in the process. In a questionnaire administered
during the third stakeholder workshop, some municipal local councilors mentioned that they were
not adequately informed of the CDS process and its requirements nor of the workshops’ schedule.
In reality, the eight municipalities in Aden seemed on the whole relatively well represented, with
19 representatives in the first workshop (21% and 59% of the total audience in the first and second
day respectively). However, more than half of the participating municipal local councilors came
from two municipalities: Sirah and Al Mansourah (each with five representatives), whereas other
(poorer) districts such as Dar Saad and Sheikh Osman had only one representative each in the CDS
workshop.
Yet, ultimately, the extent of local officials’ involvement in the CDS process reflects the phased
nature of the decentralization process in Yemen. The first stage in effect focuses on the devolution
15
of authority and responsibilities from central government to the Governorates, where some level of
capacity to plan and deliver services, and generate revenues already exists (Sana’a and Aden being
the most prepared of all governorates to assume such tasks). The second stage envisages further
devolution to the municipal or district level, the timing of which is contingent on progress in
capacity building efforts. It is not surprising then that municipal local councilors feel that the
process is largely ran at the Governorate Local Council level.
Private sector and civil society involvement in the CDS process
In contrast to local council and the public sector agencies’ active involvement in the CDS process,
private sector participation has been very limited in the first stage of the process. Only three out of
nine private sector representatives invited to participate in the first CDS workshop showed up for
part of the proceedings. Similarly, private sector involvement in the second workshop was almost
non-existent. It was not until the third CDs workshop that private sector representation increased,
although still not far below expectations in a process that is primarily concerned with local
economic development and the creation of an enabling business environment. Informal
discussions indicate that for the most part private sector institutions did not take part in the process
initially because they did not expect such discussions to yield any concrete results, while a few
indicated that they were not informed of the workshops. Private sector participation only gained
some momentum with the increased concretization of the LED strategy through the formulation of
tangible objectives and programs for the different participating institutional stakeholders. As for
the small and micro-enterprise (SME) sector, its presence in the CDS process has thus far been
primarily through a donor-financed SME support program, which arguably reflects the sector’s
fragmentation and lack of clear representation mechanisms.
Similarly, the input of NGOs and other civil society organizations in the CDS process has been
rather limited. Unlike the private sector, civil society organizations emphasized their willingness
to participate in the CDS process as part of their aim to play a more proactive role in the
development process. The problem lies on the one hand in local government officials’ endemic
caution towards involving civil society organizations in the development process, and on the other
hand in the sector’s inadequate track record, mobilization and professionalization. Indeed, the
NGO sector is for the most part still nascent in Aden, which means that an NGO’s influence in the
development process is often a function of their chairperson or board members’ position in society
(derived from, say, their former or current employment) rather than from the NGO’s track record.
Another noticeable issue is women’s limited participation in and contribution to the CDS process,
despite the emphasis placed by the PCDP and the World Bank on their adequate representation. In
effect, only one of the fourteen CDS team members is a female whose role is to represent women’s
associations in the Governorate. In addition, only seven women attended the first CDS workshop
(9% of the audience excluding donor agency representatives). Of these, only two were in public
office, including a member of the Aden Governorate Local Council, and the rest represented the
media and NGOs. In the second workshop, the ratio of women in the audience almost doubled to
reach 15.6%, although still a very limited representation.
Part of the explanation for women’s under-representation in the Aden CDS process can be
attributed to the generally low level of female participation in economic activities in Yemen.
Indeed, in 2000, only 22.7% of working age Yemeni females were involved in economic activities,
compared to 69.2% among males (Yemen PRSP, 2002). Moreover, the agricultural sector, alone,
16
absorbed 90.6% of the 331,000 Yemeni women that entered the labor force between 1995 and
2000 (Ibid), which implies that women’s participation in economic activities in urban areas is very
limited. Yet, Aden is reputed to have one of the highest levels of female participation in economic
activities in Yemeni Governorates, which should have translated into a higher ratio of women’s
representation in the CDS process.
Role of the LEDD and the CDS subgroups
Contrary to the initial planning of the CDS process, the newly established LEDD has not (yet)
played any role in the formulation of the LED strategy, which meant that the task of coordinating
the strategy was left to the consultants hired under the PCDP. The fact that the Aden LEDD did
not provide any momentum or follow up in the preparation of the LED strategy meant that the
entire process came to a halt at the end of each consultant mission and had to be revived again two
or three months later including the need to reassemble and motivate the different stakeholders.
This has led to significant delays in the LED strategy formulation, which took approximately 18
months to complete. While it is understandable that the process of building consensus and
developing a participatory CDS may take a long time (participation in this case being an end in of
itself as much as a means-to-an-end), yet an active role for the LEDD would have certainly saved
much time in the process. The time factor is particularly important in the context of participatory
planning to ensure that neither public officials (who often want to see results fast) nor the other
stakeholders (especially the private sector) lose momentum.
The unclear mandate and responsibilities of the LED sub-group added to the ambiguity of the
overall CDS process. Whereas the executive decree establishing the different CDS teams
specified that the LED sub-group members’ role was to offer sector advice to the CDS Team,
which was made responsible for the CDS strategy preparation, in reality the CDS Team’s input in
the strategy stopped at the development of Aden’s future vision and the broad goals to achieve this
vision. Beyond these broad guidelines, it was the different entities represented in the LED subgroup (particularly the Ma’lla Port, the Airport, and to a lesser extent the Aden Free Zone) that
contributed the most to the preparation of the LED strategy, including the detailed objectives and
programs for action.
The UPI sub-group’s mandate is also not clearly defined, although the problem extends also to the
group’s composition. It is unclear whether the UPI sub-group members’ role is to prepare an
urban planning strategy that will guide the Aden master plan revision process or simply facilitate
the master planning process under the guidance of the LED strategy. The ambiguity surrounding
the UPI sub-group’s mandate is also compounded by the legacy of the now dysfunctional Aden
City Planning Council, especially that both entities are perceived to have intersecting functions.
More importantly, it is unclear how the preparation of the urban planning strategy to guide future
development in Aden will be able to balance the inputs of the two key institutional stakeholders in
the Governorate, namely the Free Zone and the Public Works Directorate, especially that the
cooperation between both entities has thus far been sub-optimal.
The phasing of the CDS strategy
Perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of the Aden CDS process is the phasing of its two key
components: LED and UPI. The process started with the formulation of the LED strategy, with
the introduction of the urban planning and infrastructure component delayed to the second phase
after the LED strategy was well underway. Lagging the UPI component helped to keep the urban
17
planning strategy and the ensuing selection process of capital investments in infrastructure focused
on enabling the realization of economic growth and development, which has been determined as
the key priority of the CDS strategy. The underlying rationale for focusing government’s (limited)
resources and donor assistance on enabling the process of economic development in Aden is that
the achievement of growth will contribute to the improvement of living conditions in the city.
Lessons learnt from the PCDP first phase
Overall, the PCDP’s first phase can be deemed successful, especially in setting up the foundations
of a participatory strategic planning and decision-making forum in Aden and in sustaining the key
stakeholders’ active involvement in the CDS process. One of the main catalysts of such active
stakeholder involvement has been the strategic investments by the PCDP in small-scale
infrastructure projects during the early stages of the process (knowingly labeled as the
“appetizers”). Although undertaken prior to the preparation of the CDS (one of the prerequisites
for PCDP investments), these small-scale infrastructure schemes satisfied its main criteria, namely
the selection of projects that have a clear economic development impact and that can be expected
to achieve a reasonable economic rate of return. These strategic investments have been
particularly instrumental in enlisting the active involvement of the different public sector agencies
in the hope of accessing external funding for their own activities. The appeal of PCDP funding for
local government officials and public sector agencies in Aden cannot be understated, especially in
a context of decentralization and the decrease in central government transfers.
As with the public sector, the PCDP’s early project financing led private sector and civil society
organizations to become aware of the unique opportunities afforded to them under the Program.
The private sector came to view the PCDP as an effective instrument for financing important
infrastructure projects and pushing through the implementation of the necessary reforms to achieve
an enabling business environment, whereas civil society organizations view the potential of the
Program in advancing their own agendas, be it of environmental protection, social development,
participatory governance, etc.
Yet, inasmuch as the PCDP’s funding of such small-scale projects early on motivated the
involvement of the different stakeholders in the CDS process, it also heightened their expectations
of the Program. The PCDP Coordination Unit has since been under constant pressure to finance
diverse development projects. Rarely do the Program Coordinator’s meetings with the different
public, private, or civil society stakeholders end without project proposals being submitted for
PCDP funding, and often accompanied by high-level political interference and pressure. Project
proposals included the construction of flyovers in the city center and road paving in the poorer
neighborhoods (for the Public Works Directorate), support for capacity building and office
automation (demanded by several public sector agencies other than those eligible under the
PCDP’s administrative modernization component), financing water supply, sewerage and
electricity network improvements (for the different utilities), as well as NGOs’ developmental
activities.
18
It is against this backdrop of political pressure and demands for funding that the effective role
played by the PCDP National Coordinator can be appreciated. 4 Indeed, the latter has thus far
managed to maintain the stakeholders’ active involvement despite (temporarily) turning away their
funding requests, and without undermining the basic premise of tying PCDP project funding to the
completion of the CDS strategy and LED action plan. The PCDP National Coordinator has also
consolidated the Program’s presence by managing to sustain the backing and active involvement
of the key political figures in the process, namely the Minister of Development and International
Cooperation who heads the Port Cities inter-ministerial committee, the Aden Governor, and the
Secretary General of the Aden Governorate Local Council. Finally, the PCDP National
Coordinator proved to be, at several occasions, an effective mediator between disputing parties,
especially among the public sector agencies that formerly took part in the Aden City Planning
Council.
The fact that the role of the PCDP National Coordinator is critical in determining whether the
Program will be successful or not exposes a paradoxical situation that is sometimes encountered in
donor-funded programs of a similar nature. On the one hand, the PCDP implementation has thus
far been greatly facilitated by the National Coordinator’s high-level political connections,
developed over years of government service. It can also be argued that pushing through the policy
and administrative reforms planned under the PCDP requires the connections and familiarity with
the system of a well-situated civil servant. On the other hand, Program regulations restrict
government employees from filling jobs at the Coordination Unit, which seems as a sensible
restriction for various reasons (whether to avoid the two-hat problem in which the agent and
subject of reform belong to the same entity or simply to curb corruption). Yet, one cannot help but
wonder if such a restriction may be too limiting in a setting like Yemen where most of the highly
qualified cadres capable of carrying out the task tend to go for government positions due to
political aspirations and/or the security of civil service jobs. In the case of the PCDP, this
restriction was (technically) avoided with the current National Coordinator taking a leave of
absence from his government post, a temporary solution to the problem.
The other factor that proved critical in sustaining the momentum of the CDS process and the
different stakeholders’ motivation was to introduce the notion of competitive funding among
participating port cities. In effect, the PCDP did not earmark specific investment budgets for each
participating port city from the onset, but rather tied the funding level to the state of preparedness
in each city (including the completion of the CDS process, the formulation of a LED action plan
and a capital investment plan, the revision of the city’s master plan, and the capacity of the Public
Works Directorate to effectively implement PCDP-funded projects). The competition for funding
strategy has thus far proved to be one of the main drivers of progress in the Aden CDS process,
especially that the PCDP’s periodic dissemination of information on each city’s progress pressures
the Governorate and CDS leadership to do more.
Yet, despite the pressure of competing with the other port cities participating in the PCDP, the
overall progress in Aden can be described as slow. It took 18 months to complete the LED
strategy since the date of issue of the Governor’s decree establishing the CDS team (24 months
4
The person serving as PCDP National Coordinator was handpicked for the job after having successfully directed,
between 1999 and 2002, an UNDP-funded poverty alleviation program in Yemen through the Ministry of
Development. The program was reportedly lauded by civil society organizations, which is rather unlikely for
programs administered by central government ministries in Yemen.
19
since the Cities Alliance Program started providing technical assistance to the Aden CDS process).
The master plan revision and updating process, whose launch was contingent upon the completion
of the LED strategy, is just about to start and is expected to last for one year.
While it is conceivable that a two to three-year period may be needed to complete a long-term
strategic planning process based on broad-based stakeholder participation (and it is certainly a
worthwhile effort to establish the foundation for participatory decision-making at the local level),
it is nonetheless a very long timeline for local officials who need to see during their term of office
rapid results and “ribbon-cutting” opportunities to enhance their reelection or re-appointment
prospects. This explains why the PCDP’s financing of infrastructure projects early on was a
widely popular decision and why local officials are uncomfortable with the one-year period
needed to revise Aden’s master plan (especially if they have to enforce some kind of moratorium
on development in the urban extension areas while planning studies are being undertaken).
The slow speed of the CDS process, especially in the completion of the LED strategy, is in large
part due to the ineffective role played thus far by the LEDD. One reason for such ineffectiveness
was the very long period of time it took to find a suitable candidate for the post of LEDD director.
It was reported that most qualified candidates avoided applying for the LEDD director position
despite the prestige and latitude associated with it, as it was a civil service appointment with a poor
remuneration. Instead, most applications were for the LEDD consultant position, whose pay was
comparable to the private sector. Even the Aden Governor’s intervention of supplementing 50%
of the LEDD director’s salary from the Governorate’s resources could not solve the demand
problem.
The salary scale limit in fact puts into question the whole idea of establishing a new unit with
newly hired staff to be in charge of LED within Aden, and whether building the capacity of
existing qualified staff in the Governorate and motivating them with a pay raise would not have
been a better idea. Ultimately, the importance of capacity building for local officials and civil
servants in the Aden Governorate cannot be understated. The PCDP will spearhead administrative
modernization efforts by funding capacity building programs in the public institutions that
interface with the private sector: the General Investment Authority, the State Land Authority, the
Public Works’ Urban Planning and Surveying department, and the Customs and Tax authorities.
The Aden Local Council should mobilize local and, where possible, national resources to finance
the rest of the capacity building effort in the Governorate.
Conclusions
Overall, the PCDP’s first phase seems to have succeeded in establishing the foundation of a
participatory strategic planning and decision-making forum in Aden (in the form of the CDS
process), in sustaining active stakeholder involvement throughout the CDS process and in the
formulation of a LED strategy, and in assisting local government and building their capacity in
strategic and physical planning initiatives. The PCDP’s financing of several small-scale
infrastructure projects in the early stages played an important role in aligning the different public,
private and civil society stakeholders in the CDS process, in the hope of accessing external
funding for their activities. Similarly, the introduction of the notion of competitive funding by the
PCDP between the different participating port cities according to their level of preparedness seems
20
to have played a part in sustaining the momentum for the process in Aden. In addition, the
seriousness of the CDS process owes a great deal to the strong commitment displayed by the
Governor and Governorate Local Council.
Yet, despite all these positive contributing factors, the CDS process and particularly the LED
strategy formulation have suffered some delays due to the ineffectual role of the LEDD thus far.
Finally, and despite the many positive results achieved so far, the PCDP and CDS processes still
remain in the planning phase. It will not be until the CDS recommendations are actually
implemented that the PCDP’s real impact (in establishing an enabling business environment, in
pushing forward policy and administrative reforms, and in contributing to Aden’s economic
development) can be assessed.
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Shawa, Ala’edeen (2003). Preliminary Outline of Aden’s Local Economic Development Strategy.
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Figure 1. PCDP Investment Selection Process Flow Chart
Source: World Bank (2002). Project Appraisal Document of the PCDP First Phase, p.64
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