Australia and the Asia-Pacific
R. James Ferguson © 2007
Lecture 7:
Asia-Pacific Patterns of Transnational Transition:
Foci of Instability and Underdevelopment
Topics: -
1. Transnational Linkages
2. Myanmar: Domestic, Ethnic and International Tensions
3. Case Study: Drug Trade in the Golden ‘Quadrangle’
4. Vietnam: National and Regional Gaps in Environmental Protection
5. Conclusion: The Case for Layered Cooperation
6. Bibliography and Further Resources
1. Transnational Linkages
Today, we will study the day-to-day problems that impact on the sense of wellbeing of people in the Indo-Pacific region and challenge the capacities and
stability of regional states, organisations, and society. Some of these are routine
national problems, but in many cases they flow beyond the control of individual
states or societies. Problems of infrastructure development, limited transport
linkages, international disease vectors, poverty, environmental disasters, crime
and smuggling, new dam projects on the Mekong and Salween Rivers,
underdevelopment and ethnic and religious tensions are of immediate
significance for national and regional planning (Severino 2007; International Railway
Journal 2007; Dupont 2001). These issues are of special concern to countries which
are still in the 'developmental stage', i.e. going through rapid modernisation and
industrialisation, as well as to developed economies that sit within a wider region
of uneven development, e.g. Singapore alongside Indonesia, and the developmental
gap within ASEAN which has only been partly addressed by programs such as the
Initiative for ASEAN Integration (IAI) and programs to support development of the
Mekong River Basin (see Severino 2007). We will look at some examples which
show how these 'low level' internal challenges have become a major problem for
several nations in the region, but are also strong grounds for international
cooperation. We can see these problems, for example, and in the problem of the drug
trade in the Golden Triangle of Southeast Asia (referring to the mountainous terrain
between Myanmar, Thailand and Laos (sometimes now dubbed a quadrangle,
including south-western inland Chinese provinces), the only partly controlled flow of
labour and migration in the region, and sustained environment damage in a country
such as Vietnam that impacts on regional agenda and resources.
As we have seen (lecture 2), this has already become a major focus of Australian
regional concerns: -
1
With the advance of globalisation, communications, transport, financial transactions
and even criminal activity have become more transnational than ever before. Threats
to peace and security are generated by much more than disputes between nation
states and are not readily confined by state borders. Transnational terrorism, threats
posed by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, increased intra-state
conflict and the weakening of states by poor governance demonstrate this. We need
an effective international system, including a reformed United Nations, which can help
deliver timely outcomes in the face of these contemporary threats. While recent
developments in international law, including the conclusion of treaties covering
terrorism, transnational crime and corruption, go some of the way, international law
must continue to evolve to remain relevant in the face of states under stress, terrorist
groups acting outside any international norms and the threat of proliferation of
weapons of mass destruction among state and nonstate actors. (Downer 2005, p7)
ASEAN, too, though basically an inter-state dialogue process, has also become aware
of the crucial turbulence that can be generated by transnational groups and
transboundary problems that make non-interference possible only if levels of
regional cooperation remain high. One of the clearest examples of this is the impact
of drug flows out of a 'political challenged' Myanmar into adjacent states and thence in
wider regional and 'global' markets.
2. Myanmar: Domestic, Ethnic and International Tensions
The Golden Triangle refers to the region where the borders of Myanmar
(Burma), Thailand, and Laos meet. It could now be dubbed the Golden
Quadrangle, since south-west China also abuts this region, and the drug trade
flows through it into Chinese provinces such as Yunnan. There is a direct connection
between military conflict, regional instability, and drug production, with illegal drugs
providing a main funding mechanism for insurgent groups, ethnic groups resisting
central governments, or military regimes in Afghanistan, Columbia and Myanmar (see
Steinberg 2000; Hache 2006). This emphasises an international problem for the
region, compounded by the oppression of the Burmese regime against the National
League for Democracy, whose general secretary Aung San Suu Kyi makes
international headlines regularly as a detained political leader demanding improved
human and political rights for Burma. The SPDC's (State Peace and Development
Council) poor human rights record and its greed for power have helped cause 'the
narcotics explosion in northeastern Burma after 1988', as well as complicating
relations with Thailand and ASEAN as a whole (Lintner 1994, p305; Haacke 2006).
There is no immediate prospect that the military-authoritarian government will
quickly chart a path towards a liberal democratic system, in spite of calls by
ASEAN for gradual reform, and some efforts by SPDC leaders to seem more
accommodating to international demands, e.g. PM (Lt-General) Khin Nyunt’s holding
of a constitutional convention (the National Convention) from May 2004 (see Khosla
1998; Strategic Comments 2003; Strategic Comments 2001; see lecture 6). The
regime did not allow Suu Kyi or other key National League for Democracy
Leaders such as U Tin Oo to be effectively involved the convention, in spite of
Thailand’s expectation that this would be the case, and the National Convention has
spoken of reform based on a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’ (Lyall 2004). Even
though some dissidents were released through late 2004, and Constitutional
2
Convention continued from early 2005 without the involvement of either opposition
or the main ethnic groups, reconvened again in October 2006 and adjourned on 29
December 2006 (DFAT 2007).
Myanmar (Burma): Political Divisions
(Map Courtesy PCL Map Library)
The country has been able to maintain a flow of foreign currency (over $1 billion in
tourist investment since 1988, Zhou 2005) largely through promoting tourism
activity and new energy deals even as hardliners such as retained power (Haacke
2006; Zhou 2005). The SPDC is led by Chairman and Senior General Than Shwe,
an expert in psychological warfare who is also Defence Minister, while the Prime
Minister is Lieutenant General Soe Win (BBC 2006b; BBC 2007a) In general,
3
through dialogue with Thailand, ASEAN, PRC and to a lesser extent India and Russia,
Myanmar has been able to improve its international relations environment, in
spite of strong criticism from the US, EU, and UK.
Through minor reform, regional cooperation, and some gradual emergence of civil
society groups among ethnic communities (see South 2004) the SPDC has been able
to ward off strong external interventions. Thus, one of Myanmar's main foreign
policy objectives has been to avoid being viewed as a threat to regional peace in
the UNSC. The US has pursued such an agenda for the last several years, most
recently in early 2007, but with the motion being vetoed by PRC (Economist 2007;
Haacke 2006).
However, Myanmar has a long way to go before meeting implicit regional
governance norms: Myanmar's international relations strategy could therefore be seen as an amalgam of
both the realist "balance of power" and constructivist "security through cooperative
partnerships with regional neighbours" paradigms. Both approaches however are
focused on state and regime security. The challenge for Myanmar will be to integrate
the socioeconomic and political changes needed to enhance human security with the
traditional indigenous approaches to state and regime security. To put the dilemma
another way, the challenge will be for the state to acknowledge that its own future
security is predicated on its capacity to deliver the reforms necessary for
implementation of human security - a commitment to the protection of human rights in
accordance with international standards; a commitment to transparency and
participative practices in governance; a commitment to pluralistic democratic norms.
Unless the issues fundamental to human security are successfully integrated into
state/regime security, Myanmar's international relations strategy - winning friends and
influencing regional governments - will be unable to deliver on its expectations.
(James 2004)
In part, these problems spring from the nature of the Burma as a multi-ethnic and
multi-religious state. Myanmar was the name given to the country by the military
regime when it felt that Burma (the English pronunciation of the colloquial ‘Bama’)
emphasised too strongly the dominance of the largest ethnic group in the country, the
‘Burmese’, while Myanmnar meant 'first people in the world' (Lintner 1999, p15).
Myanmar is a federal state, and has some 100 smaller ethnic groups that
comprise 32-40% of the population, with the Shan (a ‘Tai’ people related to the
modern Thais) being the second largest group with 7% of the total population (Lintner
1999, p15). Somewhat different official figures suggest a breakdown of ‘Burman
68%, Shan 9%, Karen 7%, Rakhine 4%, Chinese 3%, Mon 2%, Indian 2%, other 5%’
(UNDCP 2002). The country is mainly Buddhist (87%), but has religious minorities
that are partly linked to ethnic groups: Christian (5%) groups including the Karen, and
Muslim (4%) minorities in the cities and the Rohingya in the north (DFAT 2007).
4
Burma: A Country of Buddhist Monuments such as great Shwedagon Pagoda, but a land with significant
Christian and Muslim minorities. (Photo Copyright: R. James Ferguson 2004)
Through late 2005-early 2007 Myanmar has engaged in another round of conflict
with the Karen ethnic group, which has been seeking greater autonomy, with the
Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Karen National Union (KNU)
viewed as rebels by the Burmese government. The conflict pushed dislocated an
extra 10,000 Karen during this period, with up to 140,000 refugees from different
parts of Burma now housed in 9 camps in Thailand. Human rights groups have
signalled wide spread human rights abuses as Karen are forced from their villages
(BBC 2006a). Conflict continued through early 2007: A poorly-equipped force of 12,000 men from the Karen ethnic minority is pitched
against 400,000 Burmese government soldiers, complete with AK-47s, tanks and
fighter planes.
Most of the once huge array of ethnic rebel armies in Burma's north-east have given
up the fight, signing ceasefire deals with the ruling military junta.
The Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) is increasingly alone - and certainly the
largest of the groups remaining. Yet it is gradually being driven further and further
back towards the Thai border. (McGeown 2007)
5
Though a UN envoy was allowed to visit the country in mid-2006, this has not led to
changes in the country's closed political system, which seems unlikely to evolve
towards a more open democratic system, in spite of repeated efforts by enoys such as
Ibrahim Gambari (Agence France Presse 2007). The US, along with Malaysia and
Indonesis, had pushed for a pattern of reform that would include the release of Aung
San Suu Kyi , dialogue with democratic opposition parties, an inclusive national
congress that would lead to reconciliation, and eventual return via a referendum to
elections (Haacke 2006). In spite of Burma's claims that it is following a multi-step
roadmap towards democracy, this has not involved a genuine reconciliation with the
National League for Democracy (Reuters 2006; Haacke 2006). It has been suggested,
however, that the SPDC has no real interest in an open democracy, has no interest in
power-sharing or a system that might see a transition via reserved military seats in
parliament, nor in allowing opposition parties to operate effectively. In this view, the
National Congress and discussion since 2004 has largely been a series of delaying
tactics: The junta, despite its announcement to conclude the national convention and go
ahead with a referendum and general election, seems to have another plan up its
sleeve.
According to Aung Naing Oo, the junta has been using the national convention, which
is the first step to the junta's roadmap, to extend its rules. In the real sense the junta,
in any case, does not have plans to democratize the country.
While it is likely that the junta will wind-up the constitution drafting convention, the
military has other plans to delay the process of political reforms. (Mungpi 2007)
In spite of past criticism in the UN General Assembly, the United Nations
Commission on Human Rights, and even in ASEAN meetings from 2003, Myanmar
has been able to secure economic support from China and India, plus continued
engagement from Thailand and ASEAN. Through June 2007, the regime held
discussions the US in Beijing, with PRC willing to try to reduce tensions, but seem
reluctant to release Auun San Suu Kyi or other political prisoners (Agence France
Presse 2007).
Table I: Post-Independence Timeline of Myanmar (BBC 2004a-2007b)
1948 - Burma becomes independent with U Nu as prime minister.
Mid-1950s - U Nu, together with Indian Prime Minister Nehru, Indonesian President Sukarno,
Yugoslav President Tito and Egyptian President Nasser co-found the Movement of NonAligned States.
1958-60 - Caretaker government, led by army Chief of Staff General Ne Win, formed
following a split in the ruling AFPFL party.
1960 - U Nu's party faction wins decisive victory in elections, but his promotion of Buddhism
as the state religion and his tolerance of separatism angers the military.
1962 - U Nu's faction ousted in military coup led by Gen Ne Win, who abolishes the federal
system and inaugurates "the Burmese Way to Socialism"- nationalising the economy, forming
a single-party state with the Socialist Programme Party as the sole political party, and banning
independent newspapers.
1974 - New constitution comes into effect, transferring power from the armed forces to a
People's Assembly headed by Ne Win and other former military leaders; body of former
United Nations secretary-general U Thant returned to Burma for burial.
1975 - Opposition National Democratic Front formed by regionally-based minority groups,
who mounted guerrilla insurgencies.
6
1981 - Ne Win relinquishes the presidency to San Yu, a retired general, but continues as
chairman of the ruling Socialist Programme Party.
1982 - Law designating people of non-indigenous background as "associate citizens" in effect
bars such people from public office.
1987 - Currency devaluation wipes out many people's savings and triggers anti-government
riots.
1988 - Thousands of people are killed in anti-government riots. The State Law and Order
Restoration Council (Slorc) is formed.
1989 - Slorc declares martial law, arrests thousands of people, including advocates of
democracy and human rights, renames Burma Myanmar, with the capital, Rangoon, becoming
Yangon. NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Aung San, is put under house arrest.
1990 - Opposition National League for Democracy (NLD) wins landslide victory in general
election, but the result is ignored by the military.
1991 - Aung San Suu Kyi awarded Nobel Peace Prize for her commitment to peaceful change.
1992 - Than Shwe replaces Saw Maung as Slorc chairman, prime minister and defence
minister. Several political prisoners freed in bid to improve Burma's international image.
1995 - Aung San Suu Kyi is released from house arrest after six years.
1996 - Aung San Suu Kyi attends first NLD congress since her release; Slorc arrests more than
200 delegates on their way to party congress.
1997 - Burma admitted to Association of South East Asian Nations (Asean); Slorc renamed
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC).
1998 - 300 NLD members released from prison; ruling council refuses to comply with NLD
deadline for convening of parliament; student demonstrations broken up.
1999 - Aung San Suu Kyi rejects ruling council conditions to visit her British husband,
Michael Aris, who dies of cancer in UK.
2000 September - Ruling council lifts restrictions on movements of Aung San Suu Kyi and
senior NLD members.
2000 October - Aung San Suu Kyi begins secret talks with ruling council.
2001 Ruling council releases some 200 pro-democracy activists. Government says releases
reflect progress in talks with opposition NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi who remains under
house arrest.
2001 February - Burmese army, Shan rebels clash on Thai border.
2001 June - Thai Prime Minister Shinawatra visits, says relations are back on track.
2001 September - Intelligence chief Khin Nyunt visits Thailand. Burma pledges to eliminate
drugs trade in the Golden Triangle by 2005.
2001 November - Chinese President Jiang Zemin visits, issues statement supporting
government, reportedly urges economic reform.
2002 May - Pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi released after nearly 20 months of house
arrest.
2003 May - Aung San Suu Kyi taken into "protective custody" after clashes between her
supporters and those of government.
2003 July - Military leadership says it has uncovered plot to "sabotage" government and
assassinate some leading members.
2003 August - Khin Nyunt becomes prime minister. He proposes to hold convention in 2004
on drafting new constitution as part of "road map" to democracy.
2003 November - Five senior NLD leaders released from house arrest after visit of UN human
rights envoy.
2004 January - Government and Karen National Union - most significant ethnic group fighting
government - agree to end hostilities.
2004 April - Government says pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi will be released from
house arrest by 17 May, ahead of a constitutional convention on Burma's future.
2004 May - Constitutional convention begins, despite boycott by National League for
Democracy (NLD) whose leader Aung San Suu Kyi remains under house arrest.
2004 October - Khin Nyunt is replaced as prime minister amid reports of a power struggle. He
is placed under house arrest.
7
2004 November - Leading dissidents are freed as part of a release of thousands of prisoners,
including Min Ko Naing, who led the 1988 pro-democracy student demonstrations.
2004 December - Giant waves, generated by an undersea earthquake off the Indonesian coast,
hit coastal regions. The prime minister says 59 people were killed and more than 3,000 left
homeless.
2005 February - Constitutional convention resumes, but without the participation of the main
opposition and ethnic groups.
2005 May - Three near-simultaneous explosions go off in shopping districts in the capital; the
government puts the death toll at 23.
2005 July - Asean announces that Burma has turned down the 2006 chairmanship of the
regional grouping.
2005 November - Burma says its seat of government is moving to a new site near the central
town of Pyinmana.
2006 March - The new capital - Nay Pyi Taw - hosts its first official event, an Armed Forces
Day parade.
2007 January - China and Russia veto a draft US resolution at the UN Security Council urging
Burma to stop persecuting minority and opposition groups.
2007 April - Burma and North Korea restore diplomatic ties, 24 years after Rangoon broke
them off, accusing North Korean agents of staging a deadly bomb attack against the visiting
South Korean president.
2007 May - Aung San Suu Kyi's house arrest extended for another year.
2007 June - In a rare departure from its normally neutral stance, the International Committee
of the Red Cross (ICRC) accuses the government of abusing the Burmese people's rights.
In part, Burma represents a regional problem due to its extended borders (e.g. with
Thailand and China), and to its inclusion of a wide range of diverse ethnic groups
within its national framework. On this basis, Thailand, ASEAN, PRC and India have
expressed special interest in Burma, based up stability issue and transnational flows
out of the country. Thailand and ASEAN have been concerned about labour and
undocumented labour flows, PRC has a strong trade flow with Burma but is also
troubled by drug flows into its South-western province, and Indian has sought to some
degree to balance the strong Chinese presence in the country. Likewise, Thailand,
PRC and India have been interested in securing greater access to energy flows of
Burmese gas fields, with PRC now most likely to proceed with new major pipelines
out of new gas fields in 2007.
The borders problem derived from the traditional development of civilisation in
Southeast Asia. Geographically, Indochina is dominated by the orientation of the
Mekong, Chindwin, Salween and Irrawaddy Rivers in a basically north-south
orientation, with the structure of the peninsula forcing the use of rivers and coastlines
to facilitate trade and communications. In Southeast Asia today the major states have
developed along river basins or with access to the sea, and in many cases
minorities have inhabited higher and less productive land, often along borders.
Minority groups, ethnic groups, and oppositional groups are often forced up into the
mountainous and forested inland terrain which lies along many of the borders of the
region. These borders are very 'porous' (as in the Thai-Burma and the BurmaChinese border), and problematic in that highland and forest territories are often
occupied by minority peoples, who straddle key border areas. The Meo, the Karen (for
the impact of the refugee experience and Christianity on the Karen’s sense of nation,
see Rajah 2002; South 2007), the Karennis, Pa-os, Kachins (who had a powerful
military organisation and have opposed opium growing), Lahu, Wa, and the
Montagnard peoples do not readily fit into one state region and remain remote from
8
central state control. These porous borders intensify the problems of gun and drug
smuggling, the issue of cross-border 'rebel' groups, and refugee exodus, which
can constitute a major security problem for these nations (Harris 1993, p23; Loescher
1992). As of mid-2000, for example, some 90,000 people remained in refugee camps
along the Thai-Myanmar border, most of them having fled from the repressive
military regime which still used forced corvee ('slave') labour, especially in the border
Shan and Karen areas, in the 1980s (Economist 2000). Through 2002-2003, due to
conflicts with the Myanmar government, some 100,000 Karen were pushed across the
Thai border (see Checchi et al. 2003), with these numbers being increased again
through 2005-2007 towards 140,000 refugees. The Karen and the Mon are two
minorities that are generally not involved in ‘narcotics business’, while through 2007
the southern part of Shan state and the Wa region (until 2005) had strong drug
production (Haacke 2006; Gibson & Haseman 2003, p14). The power of the ancient
political kingdoms was based mainly on the lowlands of Southeast Asia, with remote
hill peoples being much more difficult to control (Wolters 1982, p32). It is no accident
that insurgent groups used remote border regions for their activities, e.g. in the past
the communist parties of Malaysia, Thailand and Burma, and now efforts by the Karen
and the Wa to retain stronger independence from the Burmese state.
Ethnic Groups within Burma (Courtesy PCL Map Library)
9
3. Drug Trade in the Golden ‘Quadrangle’
These themes of porous borders, and lack of direct control of ethnic minorities,
were complicated by the threat posed by communism to the post-War governments of
Southeast Asia. These governments, especially in Myanmar and Thailand, were often
willing to use rebel minority groups, including opium warlords, to help patrol
their borders, provide intelligence information, and contain communist infiltration.
This was a conscious policy used by both the Thai and Burmese governments in the
1960s and 1970s. Even academic institutions had their role to play. This anticommunist aspect is seen most clearly in the fact that with the defeat of the
Kuomintang (Nationalist, KMT) forces in the Chinese Civil war in 1949, various
KMT groups and their leaders (including Generals Li and Duan) fled into the
northern sections of Thailand and Burma. From this position, they hoped to
continue waging their war against communists, sometimes in raids launched into
Yunnan province, and with aid supplied by the CIA during the 1950s (Lintner 1993a,
p56). It is also possible that the CIA supported drug production through the 1970s to
fund anti-communist groups along the Thai and Burmese border (Takano 2002, p7).
However, after Taiwan cut off economic aid in the early 1960s, the Kuomintang
groups had to rely on the only cash resource with which to buy arms and keep
their struggle going - the opium and heroin trade. Likewise, insurgent groups such
as the Burmese Communist Party, though opposed to opium in principle, in the long
run also had to become involved in the opium trade.
Ironically, the Myanmar government helped boost these activities by the way they
created local militia units to fight regional communists. They allowed the creation
of the Shan United Army in 1963, and permitted the militia the use of government
controlled roads and villages, but offered no wages, and little equipment. It was the
commander of this Shan United Army (SUA) who would become the most famous
drug warlord of the region - Khun Sa, alias Chan See Fu, who in the late 1990s
retired under a Myanmar government amnesty and lived comfortably under a
surrender agreement (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p13). Khun Sa had moved into the
refining of opium into heroin, and that by the 1970s was responsible for 40% of the
drug output of the Golden Triangle (200-300 tons). Ironically, Khun Sa became a
regional strongman not as the leader of a separatist revolt, but as a local militia
commander was supposed to suppress such groups. In time, Khun Sa established
bases inside Thailand north of Chiang Rai, and his stepbrothers Oscar and Billy joined
him in a prosperous international trade (Lintner 1994, p244). Khun Sa fought against
the remaining KMT operations, and soon established his position securely. His main
role was to retain control of a stretch of the Thai border where heroin refineries
were placed, with the owners of these refineries being syndicates based in Bangkok,
Hong Kong and Taiwan - these groups paid a tax to Khun Sa in exchange for
protection by his army (Lintner 1994, p254), while at the same time claiming to
support Shan autonomy.
From 1985 Khun Sa merged his forces with other Shan elements to form the Shan
State Army (SSA), an 8,000 strong force. Khun Sa had claimed to be earning $8
million as his cut in the opium trade (Asiaweek 1987a). Yet the Thais 'were not
entirely unhappy' with Khun Sa's army acting as an unofficial border control unit, and
his usefulness as an 'intelligence asset' was widely recognised (Lintner 1994, p263).
10
Indeed, elements in the Thai military were keen to gain millions of dollars in foreign
aid for drug suppression, but did not wish to actually destroy Khun Sa - as a result
they arranged a series of fake drug suppression raids in 1984 and 1987 - in return,
Khun Sa was allowed to build a road in Northern Thailand up to his Homong
headquarters in Shan State (Lintner 1994, pp305-6). The Shan State Army remains
active through mid-2007 in resisting the Burmese military, but has how largely shifted
out of poppy production (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p13).
The Myanmar government, too, was willing to use its trained troops against
minority insurgent groups and communist guerrillas (Lintner 1994, p264) and
officials in the Myanmar military were soon either involved in direct corruption, or in
indirect money laundering schemes (Bernstein & Kean 1996). Revenue from the
drug trade also flowed into the national economy - revenues in Thailand from the
Golden Triangle drug trade were estimated at US$3.2 billion for 1989 (Lintner 1994,
p327). By 1996, this had greatly increased. The total Asian heroin trade in the mid1990s was estimated as producing about $63 billion in profits each year, with
Myanmar then supplying up to 50% of the world supply (Bernstein & Kean 1996),
though the late 1990s Afghanistan also increased production to become the major
supplier. At the same time, other operators took up the trade, e.g. Lin Mingxian, a
former member of the Communist Party of Myanmar, well connected with Chinese
officials in Yunnan, has been routing drugs through China, but 'for transit only, not for
sale in China' (Lintner 1993, p27). Through 2004-2007 there have been downturns
in opium production in Burma of around 26% through the year, with only 312
metric tons being produced, with local 'farm gate' production worth around US$58
million and supporting some 965,000 persons through 2004 (UNODC 2005).
Likewise, Afghanistan through emerged as the major global supplier, while Burmese
production seems to have slowed through 2006: While the statistics of opium production in Burma remain disputed, there is little doubt
that the global center for opium production has decidedly shifted to Afghanistan, with
the UNODC estimating that Afghanistan now accounts for nearly 90 percent of the
world's raw opium.
Burma remains a distant second behind Afghanistan in opium cultivation, with the
UNODC reporting that 2006 opium harvesting in Burma was a mere 16 percent of its
1998 numbers. (Smith 2007)
Through 2006 the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) 'found that the area in
Myanmar devoted to growing the plants fell by more than a third last year, to 21,500
hectares' with Myanmar remaining 'the world’s second-largest opium producer'
but with only '11 percent of global production' (Daily Times 2007).
Through 2004-2007, these problems have taken on a different form, with new
drugs taking on large user markets within Thailand, and creating a nexus of
organised crime, corruption and localised violence that has been of major concern
to the country even as it become more affluent, with heroin and methamphetamines
emerging as major problems. This has led to Thai government under former Prime
Minister Thaksin through 2003-2005 to take on a tough law and order approach,
hunting down, arresting, and in many cases killing known drug distributors, with some
1,700-2,000 deaths during the campaign (Strategic Comments 2006; Ahmad 2003; for
11
authoritarian trends under Thaksin's administration, see Connors 2003). However, this
approach is not a long-term solution: it has since been recognised, that up to one
third of those arrested may have been innocent, that numerous police officers have
died during the crackdown, and that the drug flows may only been slowed but the
problem has not been solved. At the same time it should be noted that Myanmar has
something in the order of 500,000 addicts, indicating a real social cost for a relatively
poor country (see Brook 2001).
Within Myanmar, locally, these drug growers and runners were often not viewed as
criminals. On the contrary, they brought wealth to poor villages, helped build schools
and hospitals, and gave donations 'to charities and religious institutions' (Lintner 1994,
p248) - they provided a social infrastructure to bind local groups to them loyally, a
technique used by small insider groups around the world. Thus the Wa people of
Burma (who live in remote parts of Shan state), for example, even into the early 1990s
lived in a region largely without roads, educational systems, health care or
electricity, and therefore found opium one of the few viable crop alternatives. It
was no surprise that they therefore were one of the main producers of opium,
especially when this was encouraged by local 'warlords' and elements in the military
(see Bernstein & Kean 1996). As of 2000-2002 it was estimated that some 300,000
members of these ethnic minorities then involved in drug production, with Wa region
being the largest drug producing area of the country (followed by Kokang state),
with production being controlled and protected in part by the anti-government United
Wa State Army (UNDP 2000; Takano 2002, pp1-11). A cease-fire for 1989-1999 had
been signed between the Wa and the government on the basis of the establishment of
‘transportation routes, communication, electricity, education, medical services’ etc.
but through 2002 little of this had been done (Takano 2002, p13). Some of these tasks
have been taken up by a UNDCP project, emphasising alternative ‘agriculture, road
building, water and sanitation, and community development’, especially in the
southern Wa area and around Kyaingtonge (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p16). The Wa
region had been basically a ‘no go’ area for government troops, and local level
autonomy largely recognised (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p8). When the Wa began to
move out of opium production through 2005, this did not solve all their
problems, with UN and local SHAN news sources (Shan Herald Agency for News)
giving different views: Both reports detail the eradication of opium farming in Wa regions, with the UNODC
estimating that throughout Burma approximately 300,000 fewer people, 632,000 in
total, were involved in the cultivation of opium during the previous year.
However, whereas the UNODC views this as the successful implementation of drug
policy, SHAN stresses the economic plight of the Wa population and the "growing
dissatisfaction among hundreds of thousands of Wa farmers forced into hardship by
the opium ban", often leading to forced migration.
Consequently, SHAN views this supposed success as a widespread failure, providing
the Wa community with no alternative means of sustainability and ultimately leaving
approximately 75 percent of the population with an inadequate supply of food. (Smith
2007)
The connection between the Golden Triangle and the Yunnan region can be seen
in the way the border trade could be used as a base of power. The Communist Party of
12
Burma (CPB) in the 1980s, for example, used its control of the town of Pangsai (7,000
people) to regulate trade into China. The town 'had several video halls, beauty
parlours, hotels, a big market place with plenty of contraband goods and excellent
Chinese food' - yet its main benefit was that the CPB could tax the drug trade flowing
into China. Hence the loss of this town in 1986 dealt an almost fatal blow to the
finances of the group (Lintner 1994, pp270-271). It is significant to note that only after
this, in 1988, could the Chinese and Myanmar governments sign an agreement
recognising official cross-border trade between the two countries - this would
allow a huge influx of Chinese consumer goods into Myanmar and then out into the
Indian Ocean trade routes. In turn, Myanmar became a political and military ally, with
China trading military equipment (F-7 jet fighters, patrol boats, tanks, APCs etc.), as
well as helping build road, rail and port facilities (Haacke 2006; Lintner 1994, pp3135). Ironically, however, this in turn intensified the porousness of this border from the
Chinese point of view, and drug abuse soon emerged as a major form of 'social
and cultural pollution' (and associated AIDS problems due to the shared use of
needles) in Yunnan province. Routes also opened up from Yunnan to ports in
Southern coastal China (Lintner 1994, p324). Things became so serious along several
borders that in 1992 the People's Liberation Army brought in thousands of troops
supported by tanks to take a border town, Pingyuan, near the Vietnamese border,
totally run by drug smugglers. After 80 days of fighting, 854 people were arrested, 981
kilos of drugs taken and 353 assorted weapons found (Lintner 1994, pp324-5; Lintner
1993b, p27). From 1991, China has also regularly executed smugglers of drugs, and
engaged in regular crackdowns (Boyd 1991). Street posters throughout Chinese cities
emphasise the degrading social and health effects of drug abuse.
Drugs still transit through Yunnan, though PRC has sought to improve its ability
to interdict such flows: Yunnan, with more than 4,000 kilometers of border with Myanmar, Thailand and Laos,
is a neighbor of the Golden Triangle, a notorious drug production area. It easily falls
victim to drug dealing and has been designated by Chinese authorities as a target
area for cracking down on the influx of drugs.
Frontier guards in Yunnan province had built a dual-level network to prevent narcotics
from entering the country from the Golden Triangle on the one hand and enhanced
crack-down on narcotics transport and smuggling in Yunnan on the other hand.
The Mukang checkpoint, an advanced unit for striking narcotics smuggling, cracked
915 drug-related cases, seizing 507 kg of drugs and capturing 765 suspects last year.
The checkpoint has opened training courses and built new information channels to
combat drug smuggling. (Xinhua 2005a)
Through 2007 Thai and Chinese authorities have intensified anti-drug
cooperation, with crystal meth and Ecstasy being transported in large quantities
across the border, while PRC has sought to control the base chemicals used in
drug production: . . . crystal meth and Ecstasy are now taking the places of traditional drugs like heroin
and opium. In 2005 alone, China confiscated nearly 6 tones of Crystal Meth. The
production of these drugs don't require large fields or human power. They can be
made by easily accessible chemicals like Toluene and Ephedrine.
13
Qujing is the provincial industrial base for such chemicals' production. Authorities say
strict regulation is the only option.
Chai Jiaping, vice-director Qujing anti-drug committee, said, "All the chemical
factories here must register with us. We also cooperate with local police to monitor the
use of chemicals. Over the past 5 years, no drugs confiscated by us have been made
from Qujing materials."
Now, 29 chemicals are strictly controlled by Yunnan's provincial regulations. This
exceeds the UN's list by 7 chemicals.
Yunnan has a long border with Myanmar, Thailand and Laos and is close to the
Golden Triangle- one of the world's 3 biggest drug sources. The Chinese government
has been fighting a fierce struggle against drugs there for many years. (Du 2007)
A Busy Street in Kunming (Yunnan, PRC):
A Multicultural Society, as much Southeast Asian in Style as Chinese.
(Photo Copyright: R. James Ferguson 2001)
In general terms, the drug trade was easier to organise during periods of civil war,
ethnic violence, and during nearby large-scale conflicts, e.g. during the Vietnam
War, during periods of conflict in Myanmar. Against this background we can see why
most governments of the ASEAN grouping and Greater Mekong Sub-region
(GMS) take a very hard line on drugs, drug use, and drug running, with calls for a
strengthened agenda through 2005-2007, with partly successful efforts in Laos,
Thailand and Myanmar (Xinhua 2005b). In most countries, the possession,
manufacture or smuggling of relatively small amounts of heroin (usually 100 grams or
more) results in a mandatory death penalty or life imprisonment (e.g. in Malaysia,
Singapore, and Thailand). At the same time, this has resulted in diplomatic tensions
14
with foreign governments, who do not have the death penalty and whose citizens are
sometimes caught smuggling drugs, e.g. friction with Britain, Australia, the US, and
New Zealand. Moreover, the ASEAN target that the region would be drug free by
2015 (and Myanmar claiming to eradicate its own problem by 2005), with a special
reduction of drug flows from Myanmar (Razak 2001; BBC 2004), will not been easy
to achieve, especially with new drug exports and with patterns of relative poverty
within Myanmar.
The deeper problem of this drug trade is that there is a thriving local and global
market for the product, with local economies implicated as largely operating on
laundered or in actually laundering drug funds (Bernstein & Kean 1996). To some
extent, the economy of Myanmar was partly dependent on flows out of the drug trade
through the 1990s. The country’s ‘lax banking and commercial laws have encouraged
the laundering of drug profits, a major source of capital and infrastructure investment
over the last decade’ (Gibson & Haseman 2003, p13). By one estimate, in the late
1990s the country itself earned something in the order of US$700 million to 1
billion each year from drugs, as well as seeking to garner some limited military and
economic support from the US by running anti-drug suppression campaigns of limited
success (Steinberg 2000). Likewise, the drug issue has been used as a political tool
against particular ethnic groups, often tolerating one group or pitting one against
another. Indeed, it now seems likely that a large segment of the national economy, and
perhaps even the military acquisitions of Myanmar, had been indirectly funded
through flows of drug-money (Bernstein & Kean 1996).
There has been some limited improvement in regional cooperation in dealing with
these drug and related problems (money laundering, arms smuggling, transnational
criminal groups). ASEAN and Thai groups now have stronger cooperation and
working committees that have been in operation since 2002, with Thailand trying to
develop a multi-level ‘interlocking series of programs’ including replacement
crops, enforcement and education approaches (Emery 2003; New Straits Times 2002).
Likewise, the UN has sought over three decades to develop a comprehensive antidrug program. For Myanmar this includes use of satellite imagery, extensive
ground verifications in Shan state, and 'rapid' ground assessments in Kachin
state (UNODC 2005). Key features of the program for the 2003-2007 period
include: 





‘Objective monitoring of the drug situation in the country and evaluation of
interventions
Provision of holistic alternatives for opium poppy farmers living in areas accounting for
about 70%of nation-wide opium production.
Intensive cross-border cooperation with emphasis on halting production and trafficking
in Amphetamine-Type Stimulants (ATS) and trade in its precursor chemicals.
Effective implementation of the 2002 money laundering legislation and the pending
mutual legal assistance act.
Introducing targeted demand reduction activities, including prevention focussed on the
needs of youth, and treatment and rehabilitation for addicts.
Introduction of solutions to drug use and HIV transmission through co-ordination,
scaling up and implementation of innovative initiatives.’ (UNDCP 2002)
15
Although opium production and heroin flows directly into Thailand from Myanmar
have been reduced over the last five years, new products have been developed: While Thai authorities have been successful in eradicating the indigenous opium crop
and intercepting heroin shipments coming from Burma, they have been plagued by a
growing problem with amphetamine-type stimulants, primarily methamphetamine.
Called ya ba in Thailand, methamphetamine pills have been around for decades. The
Thai government estimates that over 600 million pills are smuggled into the country
each year. Virtually all of the production takes place in Burma and is smuggled across
the border into Thailand, with some shipments being routed through Laos. The Wa
and Shan tribes are the primary players in the "meth" trade, just as they have been in
opium and heroin. (Emery 2003)
These amphetamine type stimulants (ATS) flow in the wider market, with two
thirds of these users globally living in Asia, some 33 million users globally (Ahmad
2003). There are also concerns that social realities make intervention approaches
hard to apply, since ATS is used not just as a recreational and youth drug, but is also
used to sustain and boost work performance on a routine basis in parts of Southeast
Asia (Ahmad 2003). Likewise, Myanmar has emerged as a major source of fake
antibiotics and illegal pharmaceuticals, many of which lack the active or
appropriate levels of ingredients to be effective and safe, e.g. in treating malaria and
tuberculosis (Health and Medicine Week 2004).
The issue is not the private morality of drug use, but the fact that as banned or
controlled commodities, the production and use of opium, heroin and
methamphetamines become a criminal activity linked to regional conflicts, local
insurgencies and transnational criminal networks. Basically, Myanmar would need
to meet the ‘legitimate political aspirations’ of the country’s diverse minorities,
and offer these people realistic economic alternatives for making a living (Gibson &
Haseman 2003, pp1-2).
Furthermore, traditional military organisations are not very effective in dealing
with the international drug problems, with criminal organisations treating national
borders with contempt, and often being able to suborn elements of the military forces
used against them (Dziedzic 1989, pp543-4). This is not a problem that can be dealt
with by normal enforcement, either at the final sale point on the street, nor just by
attacking the producers. As noted by Michael Dziedzic: 'Countries that provide a
demand for illicit drugs thus create conditions that can lead to a serious deterioration
in the security environment of producer countries' (Dziedzic 1989, p546). Here we see
a problem which is at once national, regional, and global. This means that the problem
is complex, and must be approached by a multifaceted program, with real,
alternative development counterbalancing the economic benefits of drug
production (see further Gibson & Haseman 2003). This is difficult to sustain within a
system with an authoritarian that has not made peace some ethnic groups that have
relied on drugs as part of their funding base, and in a region where transnational lfows
remain hard to control.
16
4. Vietnam: National and Regional Gaps in Environmental Protection
During the wars which plagued Vietnam through World War II, then in following
decades against the French and the Americans, Vietnam suffered huge ecological
damage, due to both the massive bombing and military campaigns, as well as the
effects of an economy in sustained crisis and thereafter rapid economic expansion
from the mid-1990s. It took more than two decades after the end of this period of wars
(ended in 1975) for the full ecological and social impact to become obvious (Kinh
1994).
Since Vietnam (the Socialist Republic of Vietnam) had suffered such extensive
damage in the Vietnam War, its government has become very proactive in its
attitude to environmental policy, in spite of the desire for foreign investment and
modernisation. Indeed, Vietnam's foreign investment code became quite liberal and its
market is partly openning in line with a desire for modernisation and economical
renewal from the mid-1980s. The link between rapid economic growth and
environmental pressure was well established in Southeast Asia from the 1990s: Trends show that rapid economic growth leads to an exponential increase of pollution
. . .. Because more investment will take place when Vietnam enters AFTA [ASEAN
Free Trade Area], there is a threat of increases in both "brown" pollution (industrial
and urban pollution) and "green" pollution (depletion of natural resources). Given the
ongoing industrialization and urbanization, air and water pollution have already
become critical issues in Vietnam's major cities, particularly in the areas of growth
called the economic triangles. . . .
With regard to the official development aid (ODA), the picture is similar to that for
foreign direct investment (FDI). Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City account for 9% of the
country's population but absorbed 37% of the total ODA of U.S. $185 million in 1993
and 38% of U.S. $216 million in 1994 (United Nations Development Program [UNDP],
1995). In these areas, water and air pollutants are at levels many times higher than
maximum permissible levels under Vietnam's new laws. (Phuong 1997)
Vietnam has joined the WTO through early 2007, with solid progress in negotiations
through mid-2006 (John 2006) leading to full membership, and with GDP growth
rates of annually 6.9-7.7% for the 2001-2006 (DFAT 2006; Vietnam Investment
Review 2004). Such growth in part has been based on sustained patterns of foreign
investment: Foreign direct investment (FDI) into Vietnam is expected to reach $20 billion this year,
double the figure of 2004. FDI rose 50% in 2005 and 60% last year.
However, the country's reliance on FDI to spur growth has its drawbacks as Vietnam
lacks the type of huge foreign-exchange reserve cushion that China enjoys.
Vietnam's current reserves are only $15 billion, compared with more than $1 trillion in
China and $72 billion in Thailand. The country's trade deficit as of June 30 was $4
billion and could top $7 billion for fiscal 2007.
The deficit reflects high imports of capital goods, but . . . Vietnam's inflation rate of 67% also needed to be watched closely. (Pandey 2007)
Within this time frame, too, the enormous ecological impact caused by poorly
controlled resource exploitation in several south-east Asian countries has
17
emerged, ranging from deforestation and soil erosion through to the problems of air
and soil pollution. As a result, environmental concerns have received a strong focus in
Vietnamese planning (Lansbury 1994, p14). The country of Vietnam, even after the
unification of north and south, faces several general factors which exacerbate
ecological problems. Essentially, Vietnam had an underdeveloped resource base
combined with a relatively high growth rate in population through the 1980s and
1990s (circa 2.1-2.3%). Furthermore, considerable ecological damage has been
experienced by one third of the country, leaving a range of serious war legacies and
contemporary problems to be dealt with. There been demographic drifts into cities
with over-stretched infrastructures. During the early 1990s infrastructure limitations,
such as poor roads, ports, telecommunications and electricity limited the rate of
foreign investment, as well as attempts to develop a strong, modern economy (Hiebert
& Awanohara 1993, pp68-69). Certain regions, such as the Red River Delta, to the
east of Hanoi, suffer from extensive population pressure. In 1989, this region had 8001000 people per square kilometre, and was a source of out-migration into virgin hill
forests (Hiebert 1989, pp42-3). With a population growth rate peaking at 2.3% the
population could have reached 119 million in 2025 (Huynh & Stengel 1993, p269).
Since that time, a strong population-growth reduction strategy has led to a drop in
growth rate to around 1.4% and ‘in its 2001-2010 population strategy, Vietnam has set
the target of reducing its population growth rate to 1.1 percent and limit the
population to 88 million in 2010’ (Xinhua 2001). The population in 2005 reached
83.8 million (DFAT 2006).
Generally there has been considerable damage to forest areas, extensive soil
erosion with subsequent silting up of dams and river systems, and related
problems in agriculture and fishing industries. These problems have now begun to
be exacerbated by recent economic development, including illegal logging and
mining (for the illegal extraction smuggling of iron ore, of up to one million tons each
year, and coal, see Energy CustomWire 2004), with the result that more resources are
used and the risk of environmental degradation continuing. Hence, the issue of past
and prospective environmental damage has emerged as a major national problem
needing immediate action. Vietnam saw its open door policy to foreign investment as
crucial to the further development of the country. This policy is part of a broader
economic reform called doi moi, renovation, which has been running since reforms
introduced in December 1986 and accelerated after 1989 (Hiebert 1991, p18; Thanh
2005). This economic reform process has also led to Vietnam engaging in bilateral
and regional trade agreements: The reform process in Vietnam, however, has been uneven. It was recognized even in
1996 that the reforms were not keeping pace with economic development. Moreover,
the reform process in general slowed down during the period 1996-99, especially after
the Asian financial crisis. The years 2000 to 2004 witnessed new commitments to
reform continuation and some progresses were made, especially in the development
of private sector and trade liberalization. Meanwhile, the reforms of the state-owned
enterprises (SOEs), the banking system, and the public administration were slower
than expected, and this has limited the effectiveness of other reforms.
In parallel with the economic reforms, the acceleration of the process of international
economic integration has played a key role in enhancing efficiency and promoting
economic growth. In 1992, Vietnam signed a trade agreement with the European
Union (EU). In 1995, it joined ASEAN and committed to fulfil the agreements under
18
AFTA by 2006. Vietnam applied for WTO membership in 1995 and is expected to be
a member in 2005. In 1998, it became a member of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), and in the year 2000, signed the Bilateral Trade Agreement with
the United States (VN-U.S. BTA). This agreement came into force in December 2001.
Recently, Vietnam has also joined regional integration clubs such as ASEAN-China
Free Trade Area (2002) and ASEAN-Japan Comprehensive Economic Partnership
(2003). (Thanh 2005)
On this basis, it has been suggested that the country will need to privatise some 1,700
state owned companies by 2010, and that Vietnam has key advantages in
agricultural exports such as pepper, cashew nuts, rice and coffee (Pandey 2007).
At the same time, even before opening up the country to economic reform, Vietnam
began to develop legal guidelines to help control the possible negative
environmental impacts of such development. For example, each major project
requires an environmental impact study, using guidelines and procedures developed
by the Ministry of Science Technology and Environment. These policies were
needed to avoid further damaging an already ravaged environment. The issue here is
not one of the aesthetic niceties, but of having clean water, intact soil and marine
resources, and avoiding disease and severe health problems (Kinh 1994). Water
resources around Ho Chi Minh City, in particular, were also highly stressed (Duc &
Truong 2003).
A wide range of factors have led to ecological damage in Vietnam. One central
factor was the last Vietnam War, in which the massive use of air power led to the
spraying of 72 million litres of herbicides, and 13 million tons of bombs, with some
1.7 million hectares being affected (figures from Konh 1994). The use of saturation
bombing also led to a loss of 20 million cubic metres of commercial timbers and over
300 million kilograms in food production (Kinh 1994). The pollution caused by the
spraying of defoliants, in particular, has left serious soil damage and there has only
been limited success in replanting these forest areas, especially in the central-western
region. Toxic chemicals such as 'Agent Orange' created something of a scandal in the
US and Australia where it now emerges that 'all veterans who served in Vietnam were
exposed to Agent Orange, often at levels higher than those inflicted on the men who
sprayed it' (ENV 2000). Most of these studies, however, ignored the cumulative effect
on the Vietnamese population, who were exposed most directly and for the longest
periods. On this basis, the Vietnamese government made payments to workers,
soldiers and volunteers working in affected areas through 1961 to 1975 and their
disabled children. Through 2000-2002 these issues lead to research that in some cases
‘agent orange’ has entered local food supply chains (Phuong 2000), e.g. some
fisheries, while some dioxin 'hot spots' have been found near Bien Hoa City, 35
kilometres north of Ho Chi Minh City, and some food has had higher than safe levels,
e.g. concentrated in animal fats (Economist 2002; Spurgeon 2003). President Nguyen
Minh Triet in June 2007 thanked the US for some $3 million of funding in support of
victims of agent orange (CNN 2007).
The war, however, was only part of the problem for Vietnam's environment. Shifting
cultivation patterns by certain ethnic minorities have been seen by the government to
be problematic for preservation of forests and for soil and water conservation,
especially in the rugged north-west of the country. The Meo people, for example,
19
use rotating slash-and-burn forms of agriculture that require the use of extensive lands
to feed a single family. The Vietnamese government has already excluded them from
small sectors of the forest, hoping to ensure that certain segments remain unaffected,
especially in watershed areas (Kinh 1994). Likewise, the government has tried to
encourage the Meo to adopt a more sedentary village life style, and provide both
food and fertilisers in order to make this shift easier. Although there is some concern
about the impact this would have on traditional Meo culture, the Vietnamese
government feels that the forest region is too crucial an ecological region to be left unmanaged. Although such traditional shifting agriculture patterns may be viable, they
can only support low population numbers and can impact on water catchment areas as
well as lead to some deforestation (for cultural aspects of this debate, see O’Brien
2002; for parallel issues for the Hmong and Karen people in northen Thailand, see
Tomforde 2003).
There has also been a serious agricultural encroachment of farming into forest
areas in other parts of Vietnam. This was often due to spontaneous immigration
from the coastal regions by poorer farmers who sought to improve their standard of
living by clearing new land. The result has been some rolling back of forest.
Unfortunately, some farmers engaged in these activities do not have sufficient
knowledge to do this effectively. In the case of rainforest areas, there is no
guarantee the soil will remain fertile once cleared of the ecosystem which supported it.
Thus uncontrolled migration, and to a lesser extent, government-managed
migration schemes, have destroyed forests and led to conflicts with minority peoples
such as the Montagnard groups of the central highlands. From 1975-1989 some
550,000 people had taken part in government sponsored migration into this central
region, while a total 3.5 million people have been resettled from high population areas
into 300 special economic zones located throughout underdeveloped parts of Vietnam
(Kinh 1994). Through the 1980s most of these schemes were voluntary, and were
aimed at reducing unemployment, increasing internal food supplies, and encouraging
cash crops such as coffee, rubber and pepper (Heibert 1989, pp42-3).
Through the 1990s agriculture was also modernised, allowing the sale of 'land use
rights', the use of agricultural inputs and machinery, and growing production levels of
production; In the improved economic climate, the new agricultural policies quickly generated
positive results. (1) First, land was used more productively. Through contracts and
bids, much land that under collectivism had only been marginally farmed was put back
into use. Second, a large source of private investment capital for agriculture was
mobilized in rural areas. Third, agricultural productivity increased considerably, and
agriculture developed from self-sufficiency to commodity production. In 1989,
Vietnam's rice production was 21.44 million tonnes, an increase of over three million
tonnes over 1987. Vietnam was able to export 1.4 million tonnes of polished rice.
Since 1989, food production has expanded well beyond the national population growth
rate of 2.3%. By 1995, food production per capita was 370 kg, an increase of 70 kg
over 1989. Rice production had reached 25 million tonnes. Vietnam had become the
third largest rice exporter in the world. (Henin 2002).
While this helped overall reductions in poverty levels (this decreased from 58% in
1992/93 to 37% in 1997/98, Henin 2002), it also intensified pockets of rural
20
poverty as less workers were needed, and also started a drift towards the major cities:
Unemployment in Vietnam's rural areas has risen sharply since the introduction of the
economic reforms. One explanation is purely demographic. Each year the number of
rural people who reach the working age increases by over 800,000. Meanwhile the
already scarce agricultural area (0.51 hectare per household) continues to decline due
to urbanization. Another explanation lies in the modernization of farming practices and
the replacement of collective agriculture by more productive, less labour-intensive
forms of agricultural production, which have contributed to the rise of
underemployment in rural areas. Rural unemployment, in part, has triggered a
process of rural-urban migration nationwide. The share of urban population, which
was relatively stable before socio-economic renovation, increased from 20.3% in 1990
to 24% in 1992. Most estimates point to a total level of urbanization of at least 35% by
the year 2010. Yet only half the annual 1.2 million young migrants are able to find
employment. The migration of young and adult workers to cities has resulted in a
shortage of infrastructure and social services in urban areas and in their neglect in the
countryside. (Henin 2002)
Generally too, these forest regions have suffered from over-hunting and the rivers
from overfishing. At the same time, an illegal endangered wildlife trade has
developed in Vietnam, linked to international smuggling operations, which depletes
the rich genetic resources of the country through the export of rare animals and plants
(see further Drollette 2000). Vietnamese banns on the exporting of some rare
examples of flora and fauna, for example, have been helped by international
cooperation against the illegal shipment and sale of these species. Australia
cooperation has been helpful in this area (Kinh 1994). The CITES treaty in particular
tries to restrict these flows globally: Trade in these wildlife products is restricted under the terms of the 1973 Convention
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES),
which bans international trade in some 900 animal and plant species in danger of
extinction, including all tigers, great apes, and sea turtles, and many species of
elephants, orchids, and crocodiles. CITES also restricts trade in some 29,000
additional species that are threatened by commerce; among them birdwing butterflies,
parrots, black and stony corals, and some hummingbirds.
CITES has shrunk the trade in many threatened species, including cheetahs,
chimpanzees, crocodiles, and elephants. But the trafficking in these and other species
continues, earning smugglers profits of $8 billion to $12 billion annually. Among the
most coveted black market items are tigers and other large cats, rhinos, reptiles, rare
birds, and botanical specimens. (Mastny & French 2002)
A major network of illegal smuggling in endangered species has emerged in Southeast
Asia, leading to a regional response. Through late 2005-2006, the ASEAN Wildlife
Enforcement Network aimed 'to target traffickers and criminal syndicates in a region
that accounts for a quarter of the global illegal wildlife trade' (Schuettler 2006).
Timber production is a major industry in Vietnam, and the government has
introduced laws requiring reforestation after logging. Unfortunately, these procedures
are not yet fully regulated, while an estimated 7,000 hectares per year were logged
illegally (Kinh 1994). A related problem has been fuel collection of wood from forest
areas, which has gone beyond local use to collection for selling at village and town
markets. The extension of electrical grids drawing power from hydro-electric power
21
produced by dams in North Vietnam has somewhat reduced this problem (Lansbury
1994, p14). Lastly, forest fires have been a serious threat to natural resources, with
some 20-30,000 hectares burnt out each year (with peaks of up to 100,000 hectares
being affected), usually due to accidental fires which get out of control, e.g. fires lit
while clearing land (Kinh 1994).
Aside from these specific problems, a wide range of other issues remain to be dealt
with: over-exploitation of coral beds from the intertidal zone for lime manufacture,
urban air pollution, and the need to preserve intact freshwater and marine
ecologies (Kinh 1994). Thus by 2001 seabed fish reserves were 40% of those of the
1970s, and riverine fisheries had dropped by 80%, with extensive past damage to reefs
and spawning grounds due to the use of dynamite and trawler fishing (Lam 2001). On
this basis, the government moved for a time to support deep sea fishing, but soon
had to set a cap of 1.8 million tons as an annual limit to avoid depletion of fish
stocks (Lam 2001). In the long run, however, the government has suggested that fish
farming and aquaculture are the only long term solution, and hoped to boost this
area past the 35% of total production covered by these methods by offering credit and
engaging in focused research projects (Lam 2001). Meanwhile, fisheries conservation
was boosted by a $1.9 million donation by the Global Environmental Fund (GEF) and
other agencies, from 2001 (Lam 2001).
In the long term, Vietnam's forestry plan hoped create 6 million hectares of protected
forests (there were only 1 million in the early 1990s), while creating of 11 million
hectares of sustainable production forests, with timber being one of the main areas of
foreign investment (Janssen 1991). From 1998 a 12-year Reforestation program was
also initiated 'to being the process of natural forest and watershed rehabilitation, and
to secure over time a sustainable wood supply for industry' (Dick & Son 2003). In
general, these plans aim to greatly increase the forest cover of the country, which had
been greatly reduced in last forty years. It is hoped to improve forestation from 278% up to 40% (in 1943, it had a forest cover of 60%, Huynh & Stengel 1993, p273).
Current land use, of course, is regulated by the state, but the government allows the
long-term lease of land to cater for foreign investment. It aims, however, to regulate
environmental impacts, and to set effective guidelines for all investors, whether
internal or international. Unfortunately, this has not entirely stopped illegal and poorly
planned logging, or the processing of such timbres from less regulated countries such
as Cambodia (see Lang & Chan 2005). Through 2002, timber industry ‘posted a
turnover of 410 million dollars, a 20 million dollars increase on 2001’, with 1,200
agro-forestry enterprises in Vietnam (Xinhua 2003), but by 2006 the Vietnamese
furniture industry was running of suitable wood and began importing from Brazil,
with furniture exports rising from '219 million dollars in 2000 to 1.9 billion dollars' in
2006, with local plantations only coming up to full production in future years
(Business News 2007).
Within the cities of Vietnam there has also been a very strong emphasis on recycling
(Lansbury 1994), with virtually all reusable items being sorted and then picked up
from households. The Ministry of Science Technology and Environment in
Vietnam had also developed a wide range of curriculum and educational packages at
all levels to increase environmental awareness, and has run numerous workshops. It
has also developed programs to hire local peoples to protect designated forest areas. It
22
sees international cooperation as crucial to the success of its environmental programs
(Kinh 1994). Through 2004, $39.5 million was provided by the World Bank to
support sustainable forest management, with the aim of supporting small-scale
forest plantations on poorly stocked land (World Bank 2004b). From 2005 the
Vietnam Environment Protection Agency (VEPA) also sought to regulate
environmental impact within Vietnam's resource development, as well as strengthen
environmental laws and new clean air initiatives within city environments.
Although considerable progress had been made in all these areas, much more
information needs to be collected on the Vietnamese ecology, and extensive
research projects are essential if the outlined problems are to be solved alongside
population growth and economic growth. Likewise, it seemed clear that the
implementation of these national policies would need further commitments of staff
and resources. International cooperation at all levels, whether with foreign
governments, research groups or non-government-organisations (NGO's) need to be
further encouraged. Though the legal framework has been well established, but its
practical ability to enforce these rules remains limited. Vietnam therefore has also
allowed a system of 'community complaints, a right guaranteed by Vietnamese law, in
regulating the impacts of industry' with 'regulators, politicians and the media' all
having played roles in environmental cases or compensation (DiGregorio 2005
following O'Rourke).
In summary, its seems that Vietnam has combined an open market policy with an
effort to protect its diverse and valuable ecology. That the Vietnamese government
has been able to mobilise a range of human resources is partly due to its socialist
legacy, but in the new age of privatisation and foreign capital, alongside wildcat
logging, non-compliance and corruption, many of these government initiatives may be
undermined (Phuong 1997). In summary, Vietnam has needed to urgently boost
development while protecting a rich but fragile environment. From 2000,
international agencies (including the Asian Development Bank and the World Bank)
had allocated $2.4 billion in support of Vietnam's poverty reduction and
development programs (M2 Presswire 2000), with recent addition funds of $320
million allocated through July 2004 (World Bank 2004a).
Yet positive attitudes towards the environment will also have to be revived. As
noted in a Vietnamese government report discussing modernisation trends in the
1990s which undermined traditional views of protecting the environment ((Huynh &
Stengel 1993, p279). Environmental problems in the face of population growth,
rapid investment and industrialisation are shared by most developing countries
in the Indo-Pacific region, and are a major national and regional challenge. Regional
cooperation on resources and environmental protection are also one avenue for
aiding a more peaceful and sustainable environment in Southeast Asia. The ability of
the culture of dialogue to effectively moderate behaviour and expectations in the
South China Sea, either through ongoing multilateral dialogues, or through new
regional initiatives which cooperate on less sensitive issues such as environmental,
scientific research and eventually cooperative resource management (Lee 1999;
Towsend-Gault 1998; Magno 1997). Water and river pollution remain a major
challenge for most Southeast Asian countries (Elliott 2004, p185), even including
23
Singapore, which in large measure relies on reservoirs in nearby Malaysia. Likewise,
the need to sustain access to fresh water and maintain food security in East Asia as a
whole may be increasingly problematic through to 2015 (Dupont 2000), and is another
area where Southeast Asia and China could collaborate more widely.
However, with some partial exceptions, environmentally-based regionalism has
been slow to develop and is far from comprehensive in Southeast Asia and even
less so in East Asia as a whole. ASEAN states have begin to cooperate in areas such
as the 1997 Regional Haze Action Plan (Rosenberg 1997) and to a lesser degree in
cooperation over river usage, e.g. limited cooperation on the Mekong River water
usage during dry seasons via the Mekong River Commission (which has some
dialogue with PRC and Mynamar) and support for flood management from the Asian
Development Bank (Elliott 2004, p191; Environment Custom Wire 2004a). From
2001 a Regional Roundtable began to chart a vision for an environmentally
sustainable Southeast Asia in its ASEAN Vision 2020 agenda, with most countries
signing onto aspects of Agenda 21 for sustainable development (Elliott 2004, p188).
On this basis the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (AMME) meets
every year (Elliott 2004, p189). Action plans formulated through 1998 and the
Strategic Plan of Action on the Environment 1999-2004 (SPAE) called for ‘the
strengthening of harmonized environmental standards, especially on ambient air and
river water quality’, plans to protect coastal zones and marine environments, with a
target year of 2010 (Elliott 2004, p190). However, ASEAN dialogue processes, its
consensus approach and non-interference principles have meant that it is not strong
in enforcing environmental policy (Elliott 2004, p197). Likewise, through 2007
plans have been laid to protect environmental and natural resources in the
ASEAN region: There were also discussions on the Asean Heritage Parks Programme, Ascan
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources, Asean Centre for
Biodiversity, as well as the Asean-ROK flagship project, "Restoration of Degraded
Forest Ecosystem in Southeast Asian Tropical Regions Phase II".
The meeting also involved the drafting of the Asean Framework Agreement on access
to fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilisation of biological and
genetic resources.
The meeting continues today. The delegates will be working on the Ascan Regional
Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora 2005-2010.
There will also be discussions on the Asean Working Group Nature Conservation and
Biodiversity's key activities to implement the Vientiane Action Plan 2004-2010.
(Marilyn 2007)
Other institutions which have sought some role in reducing environmental impact in
the region include the Asian Development Bank, the United Nations Economic and
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the UNEP, the UNDP, and the Economic
and Social Commission for Asian and the Pacific, ESCAP (Elliott 2004, p191). Yet
key issues remain unresolved: thus the maxim of ‘user’ pays (or is taxed) for use
natural resources is problematic in poorer societies, and in many cases poor land
tenure systems and insecurity has mean that ‘peasant farmers and indigenous
communities’ have no reason to reduce resource extraction from the lands they occupy
or access (Elliott 2004, p193). Many of these agreements are voluntary, and only
24
partially funded and unevenly implemented. Regional environmental activism, via
NGOs, INGO’s and local civil society, e.g. in Thailand and Indonesia, has begun to
improve political will in this area, but is often focused on a particular issue that affects
local livelihood or a particular resource (Elliott 2004, p196).
5. Conclusion: The Case for Layered Cooperation
We can see, then, that transnational issues such as smuggling, arms and drug flows,
and environmental issues have begun to be dealt with by regional and global
organisations, but have not been addressed comprehensively.
Likewise, the drug flows (opium, heroin, metamphetamines) out of what used to be
called the Golden Triangle directly affects the people of Burma, Laos, Thailand,
nearby areas in Southeast Asia, as well as flowing into Australian and some north
American markets. The flows are linked to 'invisible' untaxed economies in the region,
to illegal arms flows, and transnational criminal networks, as well instability in
Myanmar. On this basis, illicit drug flows have funded turbulence within Burma,
exacerbated border control issues with PRC and Thailand, and given ASEAN a
major challenge which at present seem to be only slowly moderating (through 20012007). Nor has subtle pressure from ASEAN been able to greatly moderate military
control of Myanmar’s government. With an army of around 400,000 supported by a
nucleus of advanced PRC and Indian weapons purchases (Haacke 2006), the fate of
Myanmar’s constitutional debate and political reforms process remains important and
ASEAN and other neighbouring states.
Other areas in the Indo-Pacific region where layered regional approaches might apply
include the development of resource security in the South Pacific, the management
and control of water and riverine resources in South Asia and Southeast Asia
(especially Nepal, India, Bangladesh, nations along the Mekong River system, see
Hassan 1991; Bengwayan 2000), and the international management of oil, gas, and
maritime resources in contested areas of the South China Sea. These examples,
including the shared environmental problems of Southeast Asia, the drug trade from
the Golden ‘quadrangle’, regional environmental problems, and poorly regulated
migration and worker flows show some of the 'on the ground' problems which occupy
Indo-Pacific nations. As such, they indicate that many of these nations have rather
different priorities to ‘great and developed’ nations such as Australia, the US or the
European Union. They are also of direct interest to the trading and regional partners of
the Indo-Pacific, indicating that further investment and research in these areas by
countries such as Australia may be required. These problems will need to be met if
the region is to become stable and prosperous in the 21st century. At present,
there has been some limited progress in this area, but secure solutions within
limited timeframes have not emerged.
25
5. Bibliography and Further Resources
Resources
The official Webpage of the United Nations International Drug Control Program (UNDCP)
can be found at http://www.undcp.org/index.html
A Webpage outlining the activities of CSCAP, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia
Pacific will be found at http://aus-cscap.anu.edu.au
The UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) webpage will be
found at http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home
A range of data can be found via the United Nations Environment Programme, including the
CITES convention on endangered wildlife, with one access point via http://www.unep.ch/
Further Reading
BEYER, Chris et al "Responding to AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, and Emerging
Infectious Diseases in Burma: Dilemmas of Policy and Practice", Public Library of
Science Medicine, 3 no. 10, October 2006, pp1733-1740 [Access via Infotrac
Expanded Academic]
Economist "Dirty Dealings, Myanmar", 26 May 2007, p42 [Access via Infotrac Expanded
Academic]
EMERY, James “Thailand's World-Class Antidrug Program”, World & I, 18 no. 2,
February 2003, pp56-63 [Access via Ebsco Database]
GIBSON, Richard M. & HASEMAN, John B. “Prospects for Controlling Narcotics
Production and Trafficking in Myanmar”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 no. 1,
April 2003, pp1-19 [Access via Ebsco Database]
HLAING, Kyaw Yin et al. (eds.) Myanmar: Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, Singapore,
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005
JAMES, Helen "Myanmar's international relations strategy: the search for security",
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 26 no. 3, December 2004, p530-553 [Access via
Infotrac Database]
UNDCP Myanmar Country Profile, Myanmar Country Office of UNDP, 2005 [Internet
Access http://www.odccp.org:80/myanmar/country_profile_2005.html]
SEVERINO, Rodolfo C. "The ASEAN Developmental Divide and the Initiative or
ASEAN Integration", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 24 no. 1, April 2007, pp35-44
[Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
THAN, Mya & THEIN, Myat "Transitional Economy of Myanmar: Present Status,
Developmental Divide, and Future Prospects", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 24 no.
1, April 2007, pp98-119 [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
THANH, Vo Tri "Vietnam's trade liberalization and international economic integration:
evolution, problems, and challenges", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 22 no.1, April
2005, pp75-91 [Access via Infotrac Database]
References and Research
AAP “Federal: Australia to Put More Money in to Fight Transnational Crime”, AAP Newsfeed, 8 June
2004 [Access via Nexis Database]
ABC "Immigration Dept denies child detention regime 'inadequate'", ABC News Online, 2 December
2002 [Internet Access at http://www.abc.net.au/news/justin/nat/newsnat-2dec2002-72.htm]
Agence France Presse “IS, Myanmar Hold Rare Talks in China over Aung San Suu Kyi”, Taiwan
Security Research, June 2007
Asiaweek "Prince of Darkness", 8 February 1987a, pp29-39
26
ADELMAN, Howard "Canadian Borders and Immigration Post 9/11", IMR, 36 no. 1, Spring 2002,
pp15-28
ALBINSKI, Henry S. "Issues in Australian Foreign Policy: January to June 2000", Australian Journal
of Politics and History, 46 no. 4, 2000, pp536-557
AZIZ, Abdul Rashid Abdul & HASHIM, Hafiz "Immigrant Entrepreneurs in Malaysia: The Case of
Indonesian Construction Subcontractors", The Indonesian Quarterly, 30 no. 2, 2002, pp175194
AZIZAH, Kassim "Indonesian Immigrant Settlements in Peninsular Malaysia", SOJOURN: Journal of
Social Issues in Southeast Asia, 15 no. 1, April 2000, pp100-122
BAILEY, Jacqueline "Australia and Asylum Seekers: Is a Policy of Protection in the 'National
Interest'?", Australian Journal of Human Rights, 8 no. 1, 2002, pp57-68
BBC “Timeline Burma”, BBC World Online, 2004a, 2005a, February 2006b [Internet Access]
BBC " Action urged on Burmese 'abuse'", BBC News, 3 May 2006a [Access via
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/4969472.stm]
BBC "Burma - Country Profile", BBC News, 19 April 2007a [Access via news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/country_profiles/1300003.stm]
BBC " Timeline: Burma" BBC News, 29 June 2007b [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asiapacific/country_profiles/1300082.stm]
BEAN, Frank D. "Circular, Invisible, and Ambiguous Migrants: Components of Difference in Estimates
of the Number of Unauthorized Mexican Migrants in the United States", Demography, 38 no.
3, August 2001, pp411-422
BENGWAYAN, Michael "Water Management Poses Challenges for Southeast Asia", The Earth Times,
9 February 2000 [Internet Access]
BERESON, I. & MATHESON, A. Racism: An Australian Perspective, Victoria, Hawker Brownlow
Education, 1992
BERNSTEIN, Dennis & KEAN, Leslie "People of the Opiate: Burma's Dictatorship of Drugs", The
Nation, 263 no. 20, 16 December 1996, pp11-15 [Internet Access via Infotrac SearchBank]
BESSANT, Judith "The Camps, A Site of Exceptionality: Australia's Detention of Asylum", Australian
Journal of Social Issues, 37 no. 1, February 2002, pp1-29
BEYER, Chris et al "Responding to AIDS, Tuberculosis, Malaria, and Emerging Infectious Diseases in
Burma: Dilemmas of Policy and Practice", Public Library of Science Medicine, 3 no. 10,
October 2006, pp1733-1740 [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
BOYD, Alan "Wild Jungle Rains Reveal Asia's New Killing Fields", Weekend Australian, 11-12
November 1989, p16
BOYD, Alan "Opium Trade Claws Back to Scourge Level", Weekend Australian, 23-4 March 1991,
p14
BROOKE, Micool “Drugs Thugs”, Armed Forces Journal International, 138 no. 7, February 2001
[Access via Ebsco Database]
BURNSIDE, Julian "Authoritarianism in the Name of Freedom: How Our Detention Camps Breach the
Most Basic Human Rights", Arena, December 2001 - January 2002, pp14-17
Business News "Vietnam's furniture exporters running out of wood", June 11, 2007 [Access via
http://news.monstersandcritics.com/business/news/article_1315941.php/Vietnams_furniture_e
xporters_running_out_of_wood]
CASTLES, Stephen "Globalisation from Below: Migrants in the Twenty-First Century", Arena,
November 2000, p47
CHECCHI, Francesco et al. “Consequences of armed conflict for an ethnic Karen population” , Lancet,
362, Issue 9377, 7/5/2003 [Access via Ebsco Database]
CHEESEMAN, Graeme Alternative Defence Strategies and Australia's Defence, Canberra, Australian
National University Peace Research Centre, Working Paper no. 51, September 1988
CHINWORTH, Michael Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics and Strategy, Washington,
Brassey's (US) Inc., 1992
CHONG, Florence "U.S. Decision No Magic Wand for Vietnam", The Australian, 9 Feb, 1994, p31
CHURCH, Peter (ed.) Focus on Southeast Asia, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1995
CNN "Vietnam has highest regard for human rights: President tells CNN", Thanhnien News, July 6,
2007 [Access via www.thanhniennews.com/]
CONNORS, Michael Kelly "Goodbye to the Security State: Thailand and Ideological Change", Journal
of Contemporary Asia, 33 no. 4, 2004, pp431-448
CORBEN. Ron "Thais Threaten Retaliation Over Border Raids", Weekend Australian, 6-7 May 1995,
p14
27
CRAWFORD, Darryl "Chinese Capitalism: Cultures, the Southeast Asian Region and Economic
Globalisation", Third World Quarterly, 21 no. 1, February 2000, pp69-86
CROCK, Mary "Heroic Litigation And 'a Law Unto Itself'", Australian Financial Review, 30 August
2002, p56
CROUCH, Harold The Army and Politics in Indonesia, Ithaca, Cornell University, 1978
DAE-JUNG, Kim "Asians Must Take the Lead With Burma", Burma Debate, June/July 1995, pp4-10
Daily Times "Myanmar burns drugs worth $272.5m", 27 June 2007 [Access via
http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/]
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE (U.S.) The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific
Region, Washington, Office of International Security Affairs, 1998
DFAT "Vietnam Fact Sheet", Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May 2006 [Internet
Access via http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/fs/viet.pdf]
DFAT "Burma Country Brief - May 2007", Canberra, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, May
2007 [Access via http://www.dfat.gov.au/geo/burma/burma_brief.html]
DICKENS, David (ed.) No Better Alternative: Towards Comprehensive and Cooperative Security in
the Asia Pacific, Wellington, Centre for Strategic Studies New Zealand, 1997
DIBB, Paul "Indonesia's Grim Outlook", Orbis, Fall 2001 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
DOCK, John & SON, Vo Thanh Environmental Impact Assessmentand Impact Management and
Monitoring Plan: Executive Summary, Prepared for the Government of Vietnam, August 2003
DIGREGORIO, Michael "Community-Driven Regulation: Balancing Development and the
Environment in Vietnam (Book Review)", Pacific Affairs, 78 no .1, Spring 2005, pp161-162
[Access via Infotrac Database]
DOWNER, Alexander “Securing Australia’s Interests – Australian Foreign Policy”, Australian Journal
of International Affairs, 59 no. 1, March 2005, pp7-12 [Access via Ebsco Database]
DROLLETTE, Daniel “Lost and Found: Wildlife Conservation in Vietnam”, The Sciences, 40 no. 1,
Jan 2000 [Access via Infotrac Database]
DU, Xiaodan "Yunnan tightens control on drug-production chemicals", CCTV.com, 06-15-2007
[Access via http://www.cctv.com/english/20070615/106115.shtml]
DUC, Hiep Nguyen & TRUONG, Truong Phuoc “Water Resources and Environment Around Ho Chi
Minh City, Vietnam”, Electronic Green Journal, December 2003 [Access via Ebsco Database]
DUPONT, Alan "Beware of the Growing Thirst: Looming Asian Food Shortage Poses a Security
Threat", Australian, 1 August 2000, p13
DUPONT, Alan East Asia Imperilled: Transnational Challenges to Security, Cambridge, CUP, 2001
DZIEDZIC, Michael J. "The Transnational Drug Trade and Regional Security", Survival, 31 no. 6,
November/December 1989, pp533-548
Economist, “Uncle Ho’s Legacy”, 25 July 1998, p31
Economist "Asia: Drugs and Slavery in Myanmar", 24 June 2000 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Economist “A Killer Still; Vietnam”, March 9, 2002 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Economist “Investing in a misruled land”, Vol. 367, Issue 8319, 4/12/2003 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
Economist "Going Nowhere: By Doing Business with Burma, Asian Countries Help Its Brutal Military
Regime Stay in power", 30 January 2006, p26 [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
Economist "Dirty Dealings, Myanmar", 26 May 2007, p42 [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
ELLIOT, Patricia The White Umbrella, Bangkok, Post Books, 1999
ELLIOT, Lorraine “Environmental Challenges, Policy Failure and Regional Dynamics in Southeast
Asia”, in BEESON, Mark (ed.) Contemporary Southeast: Regional Dynamics, National
Differences, Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004, pp178-197
ELSON, John "Viet Nam Loosens Up", Time, 1 February 1988
EMERY, James “Thailand's World-Class Antidrug Program”, World & I, 18 no. 2, Feb2003, pp56-63
[Access via Ebsco Database]
EMMOTT, Bill "The Economic Sources of Japan's Foreign Policy", Survival, 34 no. 2, Summer 1992,
pp50-70
ENV “Agent Orange Alert", Environmental News Network, 17 March 2000 [Internet Access]
Environment Custom Wire “ADB to Help Develop Flood Management for Meking River”, 15 March
2004a [Access via Ebsco Database]
FAIST, Thomas "'Extension du domaine de la lutte': International Migration and Security Before and
After September 11", International Migration Review, 36 no. 1, Spring 2002, pp7-14 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
28
GANESAN, N. "Thai-Myanmar-ASEAN Relations: The Politics of Face and Grace", Asian Affairs: An
American Review, 33 no. 3, Fall 2006, pp131-149 [Access via Infotrac Database]
GIBNEY, Matthew " Liberal Democratic and Responsibilities to Refugees", American Political
Science Review, March 1999 [Internet Access via www.findarticles.com]
GIBSON, Richard M. & HASEMAN, John B. “Prospects for Controlling Narcotics Production and
Trafficking in Myanmar”, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 no. 1, April 2003, pp1-19
[Access via Ebsco Database]
GORDON, Michael "Crean Is Failing the Tampa Test", The Age, 30 August 2002, p13
GORDON, Michael "176 Tampa Hopefuls Lose Appeal", The Age, 7 September 2002b, p16
GRAINGER, Matthew "Critics Slam Tough Drug Law Pushed by US", Phomm Penh Post, 14-27 June,
1996, p1 & p3 [Internet Access]
HAACKE, Jurgen Myanmar's Foreign Policy: Domestic Influence and International Implications,
Adelphi Paper 381, London, IISS, 2006
HAN, Vo Xuan & BAUMGARTE, Roger "Economic Reform, Private Sector Development, and the
Business Environment in Viet Nam", Comparative Economic Studies, 42 no. 3, Fall 2000,
pp1-30 [Internet Access via Proquest]
HARRIS, Stuart "The Economic Aspects of Pacific Security", Adelphi Paper 275, Conference Papers:
Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Part I, (Papers from the 34th Annual
Conference of the IISS held in Seoul, South Korea, from 9-12 September 1992), March 1993,
pp14-30
HASEMAN, JOHN B. "An Expanded ASEAN: The Security Implications", Burma Debate, June/July
1995, pp15-20
HASLEM, Benjamin "Justices Hammer Tampa Laws", Australian, 5 September 2002, p1
HASSAN, Shaukat Environmental Issues and Security in South Asia, Adelphi Paper 262, London,
IISS, Autumn 1991
HASSAN, Mohamed Jawhar & RAMNATH, Thangam (eds.) Conceptualising Asia-Pacific Security:
Papers Presented at the 2nd Meeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Comprehensive and
Co-operative Security, Kuala Lumpur, ISIS Malaysia, 1996
Health and Medicine Week “Millions of fake Drugs Seized”, 9 February 2004, p230 [Access via Ebsco
Database]
HENIN, Bernard "Agrarian change in Vietnam's northern upland region", Journal of Contemporary
Asia, 32 no.1, March 2002, pp3-28 [Access via Infotrac Database]
HIEBERT, Murray "Taking to the Hills: Massive Migration Changes the Face of Dac Lac", Far
Eastern Economic Review, 25 May 1989, pp42-3
HIEBERT, Murray "Changing faces: Personnel Moves Mooted for Communist Congress", Far Eastern
Economic Review, 13 June 1991, p18
HIEBERT, Murray "In the Family Way - One Thing is Booming in Vietnam: Its Population", Far
Eastern Economic Review, 22 April 1993, p72
HIEBERT, Murray & AWANOHARA, Susumu "The Next Great Leap", Far Eastern Economic
Review, 22 April 1993a
HIEBERT, Murray & AWANOHARA, Susumu "Ready to Help: Agencies Prepare Their Menus of
Projects", Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 April 1993b
HIEBERT, Murray & VATIKIOTIS, Michael "Asean's Embrace: Vietnam Premier's Trip Leads to
Improving Ties", Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 November, 1991
HREOC A Last Resort: The National Inquiry into Children in Immigration Detention, Human Rights
and Equal Opportunity Commission, May 2004 [Internet Access via
http://www.humanrights.gov.au]
HUGO, Graeme "Australian Immigration Policy: The Significance of the Events of September 11", The
International Migration Review, 36 no. 1, 2002, pp37-40
HUGO, Graeme & STAHL, Charles "Labour Export Strategies in Asia", a paper presented at The 4th
International Conference on Development and Future Studies: Economic and Social Issues of
21st Century Asia and Developing Economies, Equatorial Hotel, Bangi, 2-4 September 1997
HUYNH, Frank & STENGEL, Heike "Sustainable Development: Challenges to a Developing
Country", in THAN, Mya & TAN, Joseph (eds.) Vietnam's Dilemmas and Options: The
Challenge of Economic Transition in the 1990s, Singapore, ASEAN Economic Research Unit,
pp259-284
HYNDMAN, Jennifer & WALTON, Roberts "Interrogating Borders: A Transnational Approach to
Refugee Research in Vancouver", Canadian Geographer, 44 no. 3, Fall 2000, pp244-258
29
International Railway Journal "Trans-Asia Gaps to be Plugged", 47 no. 5, May 2007, p12 [Access via
Infotrac Expanded Academic]
INOGUCHI, Takashi "Japan's Role in International Affairs", Survival, 34 no. 2, Summer 1992, pp7187
INOGUCHI, Takashi "Japan in Search of a Normal Role", Adelphi Paper 275, Conference Papers:
Asia's International Role in the Post-Cold War Era, Part I, (Papers from the 34th Annual
Conference of the IISS held in Seoul, South Korea, from 9-12 September 1992), March 1993,
pp58-68
Jakarta Post "ASEAN must find the best way to solve issues of migrant workers", October 9, 2003a
[Access via LexisNexis Database]
Jakarta Post “Asia-Pacific Region to Spur Anti-people-smuggling”, 1 May 2003b [Access via Ebsco
Database]
JAMES, Helen "Myanmar's international relations strategy: the search for security", Contemporary
Southeast Asia,26 no. 3,December 2004, p530-553 [Access via Infotrac Database]
JANSSEN, Peter "Economy Braces for Toughest Year", Asian Business, March 1991
JOFFE, Ellis "The PLA and the Chinese Economy: The Effect of Involvement", Survival, 37 no.2,
Summer 1995, pp24-43
JOHN, Karl D. "Vietnam's WTO Challenge", Asia Times Online, 6 June 2006 [Access via
www.atimes.com]
KEAL, Paul "Japan's Security Policy and Arms Control", in MACK, Andrew & KEAL, Paul (eds.)
Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Sydney, Allen & Unwin, 1988, pp123-144
KHOSLA, I.P "Myanmar: Cohesion and Liberalism", Strategic Analysis, 21 no. 11, February 1998,
pp1639-1670 [Internet Access]
KINH, Nguyen “Vietnam’s Environmental Challenges”, Conference Presentation, April the 2nd, during
the International Green Left Conference held at the University of New South Wales in
Sydney, 1994
KOSAKA, Masataka (ed.) "Japan's Contributions to the World Community as a New Culturally
Orientated Industrial State", in Japan's Choices: New Globalism and Cultural Orientations in
an Industrial State, London, Pinter Publishers, 1989, pp63-89
KRIEN, Peter SBS World Guide, Melbourne, The Text Publishing Company, 1992
LAM, Tran Dink Thanh "Environment-Vietnam: Fish and Shrimp Farms to the Rescue", Environment
Bulletin, 11 January 2001 [Access via Infotrac Database]
LANG, Graeme & CHAN, Cathy Hiu Wan "China's impact on forests in Southeast Asia (1)", Journal
of Contemporary Asia, 36 no.2, May 2006, pp167-194 [Access via Infotrac Database]
LANSBURY, Nina "Vietnamese Struggling to Save Environment", Green Left, March 30, 1994, p14
LEAVER, Richard Restructuring in the Global Economy: From Pax Americana to Pax Nipponica?
Canberra, Australian National University Peace Research Centre, Working Paper no. 16,
February 1989
LEE, Lai To, "The South China Sea: China and Multilateral Dialogues", Security Dialogue, 30 No. 2,
June 1999, pp.165-178
LINTNER, Bertil "The CIA's First Secret War", Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 September 1993a,
pp56-58
LINTNER, Bertil "A Fatal Overdose", Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 June 1993b, pp26-7
LINTNER, Bertil Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency Since 1948, Boulder, Westview Press, 1994
LINTNER, Bertil “Prologue”, to ELLIOT, Patricia The White Umbrella, Bangkok, Post Books, 1999,
p14-20
LIOW, Joseph "Malaysia's illegal Indonesian migrant labour problem: in search of solutions",
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 25 no. 1, April 2003, pp44-64
LOESCHER, Gil Refugee Movements and International Security, Adelphi Paper no 268, London, IISS,
1992
LYALL, Kimina “Suu Kyi Detention a Cloud Over Democracy Summit”, Australian, 18 May 2004,
p10
M2 Presswire "World Bank: Donors Pledge Support as Vietnam Enters the 21 st Century", 15 December
2000
MAGNO, Francisco A. "Environmental Security in the South China Sea", Security Dialogue, 28 No.1,
March 1997, pp104-107
MALIK, J. Mohan "Patterns of Conflict and the Security Environment in the Asia-Pacific Region: the
Post - Cold War Era", in MALIK, J. Mohan et al. Asian Defence Policies: Great Powers and
Regional Powers (Book I), Geelong, Deakin University Press, 1992, pp33-52
30
MARILYN, P. "Brunei Hosts 17th Meeting Of Asean Working Group On Nature Conservation &
Biodiversity", Brudirect.com, 4 July 2007
[http://www.brudirect.com/DailyInfo/News/Archive/July07/040707/nite09.htm]
MARSH, Virginia "Boat people cost Australia A$500m", Financial Times, February 14, 2002, p12
MASTNY, Lisa & FRENCH, Hilary "Crimes of (a) global nature: forging environmental treaties is
difficult. Enforcing them is even tougher", World Watch, 15 no.5, Sept-Oct 2002. pp12-22
[Access via Infotrac Database]
MATHEW, Penelope "Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa", American Journal of
International Law, 96 no. 3, July 2002, pp661-676
McGEOWN, Kate "The fighting spirit of Burma's Karen", BBC News, 1 March 2007 [Access via
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/6407305.stm]
McMASTER, Don "Asylum-Seekers and the Insecurity of a Nation", Australian Journal of
International Affairs, 56 no. 2, 2002b, pp279-290
McMASTER, Don Asylum Seekers: Australia's Response to Refugees, Melbourne, Melbourne
University Press, 2002
METHERELL, Mark "I Did Not Mislead on the Tampa, PM Says", Sydney Morning Herald, 29
October 2002, p7
MORRIS, Sophie “Vasas Grant Flags Pacific Solution End”, Australian, 18 May 2004
MUNGPI "What is the Burmese Junta's next political move?", Mizzima News, 22 June 2007 [Access
via www.mizzima.com]
MURATA, Fuminori "Vietnam's Old Guard Finds New Foe: Fears of Foreign Funds Eroding Power,
Straits Times, 21 May 1996 [Interactive Internet Access]
MURDOLO, Adele "Keeping 'Our' Women Safe: Containing Australian Fear and Danger Through
Immigration", Hecate, 28 no. 1, 2002, pp121-131
NAIM, Moises "What is a Gongo? How Government-Sponsored Groups Masquerade as Civil Society",
Foreign Policy, 160, May-June 2007, pp96-97 [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
NASIM, Kaya "Road to Freedom", New Internationalist, no. 350, October 2002, pp18-19
New Straits Times “No proof drugs money in Myanmar being used to finance terror groups” , May 18,
2002 [Access via Ebsco Database]
O’BRIEN, William E. “The nature of shifting cultivation: stories of harmony, degradation, and
redemption”, Human Ecology: An Interdisciplinary Journal, 30 no. 4, December 2002,
pp483-502 [Access via Infotrac Database]
OZAKI, Robert S. & WALTER, Arnold (eds.) Japan's Foreign Relations: A Global Search for
Economic Security, Boulder, Westview Press, Inc., 1985
PANDEY, Umesh "Confident Vietnam seeks larger role", Bangkok Post, 7 July 2007 [Access via
http://www.bangkokpost.com/Business/07Jul2007_focus03.php]
PHONG, Nguyen Nam "Environment-Vietnam: Effects of Agent Orange Still Evident", Environment
Bulletin, 11 August 2000 [Access via Infotrac Database]
PHUONG, Tran Thi Thanh "AFTA and its environmental implications for Vietnam. (Association of
Southeast Asian Nations Free Trade Area)", Journal of Environment & Development, 6 no. 3,
Sept 1997, pp341-348 [Access via Infotrac Database]
PILGER, John "At War With Refugees: Few Asylum-Seekers Actually Reach Australia's Shores, and if
they do, Their Treatment Beggars Belief", New Statesman, 28 January 2002
PIPER, Nicola & BALL, Rochelle "Globalisation of Asian Migrant Labour: The Philippine-Japan
Connection", Journal of Contemporary Asia, 31 no. 4, 2001, pp533-554
RAJAH, Ananda “A ‘Nation of Intent’ in Burma: Karen Ethno-Nationalism, Nationalism, and
Narrations of Nation”, Pacific Review, 15 no. 4, December 2002, pp517-537 [Access via
Ebsco Database]
RAZAK, Dzulkifli Abdul “Hopes Rise Anew for a Drug-Free ASEAN”, New Straits Times, 5 May
2001 [Access via Ebsco Database]
Reuters "Myanmar says "villain" US seeks to topple regime", Sun Jun 25, 2006 [Internet Access via
http://today.reuters.com/news/]
ROSENBERG, David "Environmental Pollution Around the South China Sea: Developing a Regional
Response", Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21 No.1, April 1999, pp137-141
RUNDLE, Guy "The Terror Pretext; the ALP and Asylum Seekers", Arena, February-March 2002,
pp2-3
SCHUETTLER, Darren "Southeast Asia plans wildlife crime-busting units", Reuters Foundation
AlertNet, 25 May 2006 [Internet Access via
http://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/BKK265128.htm]
31
SCHLOENHARDT, Andreas "Migrant Trafficking and Regional Security", Forum for Applied
Research and Public Policy, 16 no. 2, Summer 2001, pp83-88
SERCHUK, David "Burma's Millionaires", Forbes Global, 3 no. 7, 23 April 2007 [Access via infotrac
Expanded Academic]
SEVERINO, Rodolfo C. "The ASEAN Developmental Divide and the Initiative or ASEAN
Integration", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 24 no. 1, April 2007, pp35-44 [Access via Infotrac
Expanded Academic]
SHOUYI, Bai (ed.) An Outline History of China, Beijing, Foreign Languages Press, 1982, p397-401
SILOVE, Derrick et al. "Policies of Deterrence and the Mental Health of Asylum Seekers", JAMA, 284
no. 5, 2 August 2000, pp604-611
SINGH, Udai Bhanu "Vietnam's Security Perspectives", Strategic Analysis, 29 no. 9, December 1999,
pp1481-1492
SMITH, Anthony L. "Indonesia in 2002: Megawati's Way", in SINGH, Daljit & CHIN, Kin Wah (eds)
Southeast Asian Affairs 2003, Singapore, ISEAS, 2003, pp97-116
SMITH, Christopher "Conflicting reports on Burma drug production", Mizzima News
(www.mizzima.com), 27 June 2007
SNITWONGSE, Kusuma & BUNBONGKARM, Suchit "New Security Issues and Their Impact on
ASEAN", in TAY, Simon S.C. et al. Reinventing ASEAN, Singapore, Institute of Southeast
Asian Studies, 2001, pp148-162
SOUTH, Ashley "Political transition in Myanmar: a new model for democratization", Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 26 no. 2, August 2004, pp233-255 [Access via Infotrac Database]
SOUTH, Ashely "Karen Nationalist Communities: The 'Problem' of Diversity", Contemporary
Southeast Asia, 29 no. 1, April 2007, pp55-76 [Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
SPURGEON, David "Traces of Agent Orange are found in food in Vietnam", British Medical Journal,
327.7414, Sept 6, 2003, p521 [Access via Infotrac Database]
Strategic Comments “Political Dialogue in Myanmar: No Breakthrough in Sight”, 7 no. 7, August 2001
Strategic Comments “Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: ASEAN’s Credibility Tested”, 9 no. 8, October
2003
SWAIN, John "Burma Sends Smoke Signal to Drug Warlords", Weekend Australian, 24-5 February
1990, p20
STEINBERG, Michael K. "General, Guerrillas, Drugs, and Third World War Making", Geographical
Review, 90 no. 2, April 2000, pp260-267 [Internet Access via Proquest]
STEWART, Cameron "PM's Regrets to Vietnam", The Australian, 12 April, 1994, p1
Sydney Morning Herald "Tampa and the Need for Truth", 31 October 2002, p14
TAKANO, Hideyuki The Shore Beyond Good and Evil: A Report from Inside Burma’s Opium
Kingdom, Tokyo, Kotan Publishing, 2002
TADEM, Teresa S. Encarnacion " Thai social movements and the anti-ADB campaign", Journal of
Contemporary Asia, 33 no. 3, August 2003, pp377-398 [Access via Infotrac Database]
TASCÓN, Sonia Magdalena "Refugees and Asylum Seekers in Australia: Border-Crossers and
Postcolonial Imagery", Australian Journal of Human Rights, 8 no. 1, 2002, pp125-139
TAZREITER, Claudia "History, Memory and the Stranger in the Practice of Detention in Australia",
Journal of Australian Studies, January 2002, pp3-12
THAN, Mya & THEIN, Myat "Transitional Economy of Myanmar: Present Status, Developmental
Divide, and Future Prospects", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 24 no. 1, April 2007, pp98-119
[Access via Infotrac Expanded Academic]
THANH, Vo Tri "Vietnam's trade liberalization and international economic integration: evolution,
problems, and challenges", ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 22 no.1, April 2005, pp75-91 [Access
via Infotrac Database]
TOMFORDE, Maren "The global in the local: contested resource-use systems of the Karen and Hmong
in Northern Thailand", Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 34.2 , June 2003, pp347-360
[Access via Infotrac Database]
TOWSEND-GAULT, Ian "Preventive Diplomacy and Pro-Activity in the South China Sea",
Contemporary Southeast Asia, 20 No.2, August 1998, pp171-190
UNDCP Myanmar Country Profile, Myanmar Country Office of UNDP, 2000-2002 [Internet Access
via http://www.odccp.org:80/myanmar/country_profile.html]
UNODC Myanmar Opium Survey 2005, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, November 2005
[Access via http://www.unodc.org/pdf/Myanmar_opium-survey-2005.pdf]
Vietnam Investment Review “MPI: Economic Growth Set to Hit 8 per cent”, 31 March 2004 [Access
via Ebsco Database]
32
WANG, Tai Peng The Origins of Chinese Kongsi, Selangor Darul Ehsan, Pelanduk Publications, 1994
WEHRFRITZ, George "Australia's Refugee Archipelago; Canberra Diverts Asylum Seekers to Remote
Holding Camps in the South Pacific", Newsweek, 12 November 2001, p56
WILLIAMS, Daniel " Nauru's Shot In The Arm", Time International, 58 no. 15, 15 October 2001, p20
WILLIAMS, Michael "Vietnam", in World Economic and Business Review 1990, Oxford, World of
Information, 1990
WILKINSON, Marian "Revealed: How Howard Brushed Aside the Tampa's Medical Alert", Sydney
Morning Herald, 28 October 2002, p1
WOLTERS, O.W. History, Culture, and Region in Southeast Asian Perspectives, Singapore, Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 1982
WORLD BANK, “$320 Million Credits Inked to Support Reforms and Poverty Reduction in Vietnam”,
News Release No: 2005/22EAP, July 8 2004a [Internet Access]
WORLD BANK “$49 million in credit and grant to help sustainable forest management in Vietnam”,
News Release No:2005/18/EAP, 9 July 2004b [Internet Access]
WRIGHT, Tony "Why Keating's Timing is Spot on for Hanoi Visit", Sydney Morning Herald, 19 Feb.
1994, p27
Xinhua “Vietnam's Population Growth Rate Drops to 1.4 Percent”, Xinhua News Agency, Nov 27, 2001
[Access via Infotrac Database]
Xinhua “ Arms Traffickers in the Golden Triangle Supply Weapons for Terrorists: UN”, Xinhua News
Agency, 2 September 2002a [Access via Ebso Database]
Xinhua "Nearly 4,000 illegal Myanmar workers return from Thailand", Xinhua News Agency, July 17,
2002b]
Xinhua "Canberra Struggles Ahead For 'Pacific Solution' on Asylum Seeker Issue", Xinhua News
Agency, 17 January 2002c [Access via Infotrac Database]
Xinhua “Vietnam targets exporting 450 Mln US dollars worth of timber in 2003”, Xinhua News
Agency, Jan 9, 2003 [Internet Access via Infotrac Database]
Xinhua "Yunnan police seize 3 tons of drugs in 2004", Xinhua News Agency, Jan 5, 2005a [Access via
Infotrac Database]
Xinhua "GMS countries determine to strenthen anti-drugs cooperation", Xinhua News Agency, May 19,
2005b
YUAN Chung-Ming Awakening Conscience: Racism in Australia, Hong Kong, Lung Men Press, 1983
ZHOU, Peter "Troubling travels: funding Myanmar's junta", Harvard International Review, 26 no. 4,
Winter 2005, pp9-10
33