Political Science 530
Theoretical Explanations of Foreign Policy
Spring 2012
Roy Licklider
licklide@rci.rutgers.edu
732 932-9249
Our purpose in this course is to explore a variety of ideas about why states behave as they
do. The approach is to try to isolate small groups of factors believed to be important,
trace the theoretical assumptions about the circumstances under which they are expected
to influence policy, and then look briefly at the best scholarship available to see whether
in fact such relationships exist. Ideally we would have for each set of variables
theoretical arguments, case studies (which are helpful in tracing relationships in detail),
and cross-national quantitative analyses (to test the existence and power of relationships);
in fact we are restricted by what research has been done and a limited amount of time.
The following required books (all paperback) are available for purchase at the Rutgers
University Bookstore:
Valerie Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis: Classic and Contemporary Theory
G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy: Theoretical Essays (Fifth Edition, 2005)
Rose McDermott, Political Psychology in International Relations
We will also be reading a substantial number of articles and book chapters, because much
of the important theoretical and empirical work in foreign policy analysis has been
published in this form. There will be no formal reading packet, but all of the articles will
be available at the class Sakai site (https://sakai.rutgers.edu/portal). I have listed some
suggestions for optional reading on the syllabus, but many more suggestions can be found
in the 2010 syllabus of this course by Professor Levy; that syllabus is included on the
Sakai site as well.
A very long time ago I contemplated writing a textbook on comparative foreign policy.
The project was never completed, but I did produce drafts of several chapters which I
have resurrected from very deep storage and, perhaps in a fit of inappropriate vanity,
have added to the syllabus. At least they are fairly short.
Course Requirements:
We will organize our weekly meetings as follows. We will usually begin with my own
introductory comments on a particular body of literature, though in weeks of student
presentations my own remarks will be briefer. We will then move to an open discussion
of the material, including any student presentations. Most weeks we will cover several
distinct topics, and we may have more than one presentation. For this system to work,
and for students to benefit from it, each member of the seminar must complete all of the
required reading prior to each class meeting and be prepared to discuss it. Each week I
will try to provide some guidance as to what to emphasize in the following week’s
reading.
Given the different backgrounds and goals of different members of the seminar, I have
adopted Professor Levy’s strategy of two alternative “tracks” or sets of requirements, a
literature review track and a research track. You are free to select whichever track you
prefer. I generally recommend, however, that IR majors planning to write a dissertation
that involves some attention to how states formulate and implement their foreign policies
(security, economic, human rights, environmental, etc.), especially those past their first
year, write a research paper. I recommend that IR minors and those whose dissertation
work is not likely to focus on how states formulate foreign policy adopt the literature
review track. It is worth noting, however, that even a lot of system-level research
includes a substantial foreign policy component, and that a case study of foreign policy
making might nicely supplement a dissertation that employs a different methodology.
1) literature review track
The basic requirement is a literature review paper . A electronic version of a full draft is
due a week before an oral presentation in the class on the day that your subject is
scheduled, as specified in the syllabus; it will be posted on Sakai and be part of the
required reading for the class. The paper should be a 20-25 page (double space, with
single space footnotes and references) critical review of the literature on a well-defined
theoretical question relating to foreign policy analysis, often but not always equivalent to
a sub-section of the syllabus. Whatever topic you choose, you must secure approval in
advance, both to avoid misunderstandings and to facilitate the scheduling of presentations
(see below). I would be happy to talk to you about what topics make most sense given
your background and objectives in the program.
The required and optional readings from the relevant section of the syllabus in many
cases serve as a useful guide to the literature on any given topic, but please consult me for
suggestions as to possible additions to the list (if the list on the syllabus is short) and/or
priorities among them (if the number of items is quite large). Please do not assume that
by reading all of the items in a particular section of the syllabus you have adequately
covered a particular topic for your review. I also encourage you to incorporate material
from other courses where relevant.
In your literature review you should summarize the literature on your topic and at the
same time organize it in some coherent way – preferably around a useful typology or
theoretical theme, not around a succession of books and articles. You should note the
theoretical questions that this literature attempts to answer, identify the key concepts and
causal arguments, note some of the empirical research that bears on these theoretical
propositions, and relate it to the broader literature on war and peace. You should identify
the logical inconsistencies, broader analytical limitations, and unanswered questions of
the leading scholarship in this area. You should also suggest fruitful areas for subsequent
research. If you have any thoughts on how particular hypotheses could be tested, please
elaborate on that. If you are uncertain as to what I am looking for in a critical review, I
would be happy to make available a sample paper from a previous course.
I expect rigorous analytical thinking that is well-grounded in the literature. You should
include citations and a list of references. You may use either a "scientific" style (with
parenthetical in-text citations) or a more traditional bibliographic style (as reflected in the
Chicago Manual of Style), but just be consistent. See various journals for illustrations.
Note that I want a separate bibliography even if a traditional footnoting style is used. I
prefer footnotes to endnotes, but endnotes are also acceptable.
The presentation based on each literature review will be scheduled for the day we
discuss that topic in class. This is important, and it requires you to plan in advance,
especially since the paper is due the week before the presentation. If you want to do a
literature review on a topic that arises early in the term, you must get to work early. The
formal part of the talk will be 12-15 minutes. You will then have the opportunity to
respond to questions from the class for another half hour or so. I expect you to benefit
from the feedback from class discussion and incorporate it into the final version of your
paper, which is due in my mailbox May 7 at 2:00. There is no penalty for papers handed
in within two weeks of that date, but papers handed in even a day late might receive an
incomplete, given deadlines for handing in grades.
2) Research paper track.
The requirement here is variable, depending on the stage of a student's work on a project.
If you are just starting on a research project, a research design will be sufficient, but if
you have been working on a particular project for a while I expect you to implement the
research design and carry out the empirical research. If your paper for the class is a
research design, I expect you to identify the question you are trying to answer, ground it
in the theoretical literature and in competing analytical approaches, specify your key
hypotheses, offer a theoretical explanation for those hypotheses, and provide a detailed
statement as to how you would carry out the research. This includes the specification of
the dependent and independent variables and the form of the relationship between them,
the operationalization of the variables, the identification (and theoretical justification) of
the empirical domain of the study (i.e., case selection), the identification of alternative
explanations for the phenomenon in question, and an acknowledgment of what kinds of
evidence would confirm your hypotheses and what kinds of evidence would disconfirm
or falsify your hypotheses. Try to do this in 20-25 pages. And please consult with me
along the way. Submitting an outline along the way would be helpful.
You should understand that I have high standards for the research designs. I think of them
as roughly equivalent to rough drafts of dissertation proposals or grant proposals. As to
your presentation based on the research, consult with me, but in most cases I prefer that
you emphasize (in the presentation) the theoretical argument and the research design
phase of the project rather than your findings. We will schedule these presentations for
late in the term, though if it fits earlier and if you are ready at that time we could go
earlier (which would be a good way for you to get feedback on your project). Note that
while I am quite tolerant of incompletes for research papers, I still expect a presentation
of the theory and research design during the term.
Research papers are more elaborate and involve a lot more work, but presumably Ph.D.
students enroll in the program because this is what they want to do. There is no set length
for a research paper, but one guideline is about 35-40 pages, which is the outer limit for
most journal submissions. Please double space the text and single space the footnotes and
references and submit an electronic copy to me a week before the presentation so I can
post in on Sakai for the class to read.
I am generally quite open to very different methodological perspectives, the norms of
mainstream IR favor research that aims to construct and test falsifiable (loosely defined)
hypotheses about foreign policy or international behavior, or to construct interpretations
of particular episodes and then support those interpretations with empirical evidence. I
share these norms, and I am unenthusiastic about theoretical arguments about the
empirical world for which there is no conceivable evidence that would lead to their
rejection. At the same time, I recognize the value some research communities place on
formal theory construction independent of empirical test, or on radical constructivist
critiques without systematic empirical analysis, and I would be willing to discuss the
possibility of papers along these lines.
Paper (literature and research review) Due Dates: May 7, 2:00, in my mailbox; email is appropriate only if absolutely necessary
Grading
The point of a seminar, as opposed to just being given a reading list, is to participate in
and learn from class discussion of the reading. This requires all of us to read the assigned
material in advance with some care, and it is often useful to take written notes on it as
well. Life often makes this inconvenient so I have structured institutions to shape
expectations and behaviors in such circumstances.
20% READING QUIZZES: Each session will begin with a short reading quiz—three
questions about one of the assigned readings for that day. Students will have 5-10
minutes to answer them, and you may use your own written notes (but nothing on
computers for obvious reasons). The quizzes are graded pass/fail—satisfactory answers
to two questions are a pass. We have fourteen sessions scheduled. Students who pass 11
of the 14 quizzes will receive an A for that part of the course, students who pass 10 will
receive a B, etc. There will be no final exam.
20% CLASS PARTICIPATION: Since the whole point of discussion is to help your
classmates, at the end of the semester each students will assign a letter grade to every
other student’s class participation. The average of these grades will count half of the total
participation grade; I will independently assign a participation grade for the other half.
10% CRITIQUES: Everyone doing a presentation (literature or research) is required to
submit a full draft of the paper a week in advance for distribution to the class as required
reading. Everyone else in the class is required to prepare a brief (2-3 page) written
critique of the paper and bring two copies to class, one for the author and one for me. I
do not grade the draft, but I do grade the critiques; the criterion is how much you have
made helpful suggestions to improve the quality of the draft. Broader rather than narrow
comments are encouraged; do not simply check grammar and spelling!
50%: PAPER GRADE
1. THEORETICAL INTRODUCTION (1/19/12)
Roy Licklider, “How Do We Know What We Know?”
Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War, chapter 1
J. David Singer, “The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Politics” in
James N. Rosenau, International Politics and Foreign Policy (1969),
chapter 7.
Hudson, chapter 1
Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976),
chapter 1
G. John Ikenberry et. al., “Introduction: Approaches to Explaining American
Foreign Economic Policy,” International Organization, 41, 1 (Winter
1988), 1-14
Ikenberry, Introduction and part 1, chapter 1 (Holsti)
Walter Carlsnaes, “Foreign Policy” in Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth
A. Simmons, eds., Handbook of International Relations (2002), 331-349
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus sections 1 and 2
2. SYSTEMIC EXPLANATIONS (1/26/12)
Hudson, pp. 153-162
Roy Licklider, “The Effects of the International System on Foreign Policy of
Individual States”
Ikenberry, part 2, chapter 1 (Waltz) and part 8, chapters 1-4 (Huntington;
Krauthammer; Ikenberry; Jervis)
Lars-Erik Cederman et. al., “Testing Clausewitz: Nationalism, Mass Mobilization
and the Severity of War,” International Organization, 65 (October 2011),
605-638
Steven Pinker, “A History of Violence,” New Republic, 236, 12 (March 19, 2007),
18-21
Douglas Lemke, “The Continuation of History: Power Transition Theory and the
End of the Cold War,” Journal of Peace Research, 34 (February 1997),
23-36
Ann Florini, “The Evolution of International Norms,” International Studies
Quarterly, 40 (1996), 363-389
Stefan Fritsch, “Technology and Global Affairs,” International Studies
Perspectives, 12, 1 (February 2011), 27-45
OPTIONAL:
Levy 2010 syllabus, part 3 (also relevant for External Explanations)
Elizabeth Fausett and Thomas J. Volgy, “Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)
and Interstate Conflict: Parsing Out IGO Effects for Alternative
Dimensions of Conflict in Postcommunist Space,” International Studies
Quarterly, 54, 1 (March 2010), 79-101
Brian Greenhill, “The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the
Diffusion of Human Rights Norms,” International Studies Quarterly, 54, 1
(March 2010), 127-145
Derick Becker, “The New Legitimacy and International Legitimation: Civilization
and South African Foreign Policy,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 6, 2 (April
2010), 133-146
3. EXTERNAL EXPLANATIONS (2/2/12)
Roy Licklider, “External Variables: How Does One State Influence Another’s
Foreign Policy?”
Ikenberry, part 2, chapter 3 (Ikenberry) and pp. 402-413 (Allison)
Roy Licklider, “The Power of Oil: The Arab Oil Weapon and the Netherlands,
the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and the United States,” International
Studies Quarterly, 32, 2 (June, 1988), 205-226
Peter Viggo Jakobsen, “Pushing the Limits of Military Coercion Theory,”
International Studies Perspectives, 12, 2 (May 2011), 153-170
Douglas M. Stinnett et. al., “Complying By Denying: Explaining Why States
Develop Nonproliferation Export Controls,” International Studies
Perspectives, 12, 3 (August 2011), 308-326
Kenneth A. Schultz, “The Enforcement Problem in Coercive Bargaining:
Interstate Conflict over Rebel Support in Civil Wars,” International
Organization, 64, 4 (2010), 281-312
Miroslav Nitide, “Getting What You Want: Positive Inducements in International
Relations,” International Security, 35, 1 (Summer 2010), 138-183.
Valentin Krustev, “Strategic Demands, Credible Threats, and Economic Coercion
Outcomes,” International Studies Quarterly, 54, 1 (March 2010), 147-174
OPTIONAL:
Alexander George et. al., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
Wallace Thies, When Government Collide: Coercion and Diplomacy in the
Vietnam Conflict, 1964-1968, pp. 284-348
Roy Licklider, Political Power and the Arab Oil Weapon: The Experience of
Five Industrial Nations (1988)
Barry Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, Force without War: U.S. Armed Force
as a Political Instrument
Stephen S. Kaplan, Diplomacy of Power: Soviet Armed Forces as a Political
Instrument
Todd Sechser, “Goliath’s Curse: Coercive Threats and Asymmetric Power,”
International Organization, 64, 4 (2010), 627-660
Michael Allen and Benjamin Fordham, “From Melos to Baghdad: Explaining
Resistance to Militarized Challenges from More Powerful States,”
International Studies Quarterly, 55, 4 (December 2011), 1025-1045
Levy 2010 syllabus, part 3 (also relevant to Systemic Explanations)
4. SOCIETAL EXPLANATIONS I (2/9/12)
SIZE (POWER)
Roy Licklider, “Societal Variables: Size and Power Capabilities”
Hudson, pp. 143-153
Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: Power Seeking in a Globalized Era,
chapters 8-9
Andrew J. R. Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of
Asymmetric Conflict,” World Politics, 27 (January, 1975), 175-200.
David A. Cooper, “Challenging Contemporary Notions of Middle Power
Influence: Implications of the Proliferation Security Initiative for ‘Middle
Power Theory,’” Foreign Policy Analysis, 7, 3 (July 2011), 317-336
DEVELOPMENT
Roy Licklider, “Economic Development and Modernization”
Mohammed Ayoob, “The Security Problematic of the Third World,” World
Politics, 43 (January 1991), 257-283
Jack Levy and Michael Barnett, “Alliance Formation, Domestic Political
Economy, and Third World Security,” Jerusalem Journal of International
Relations, 14 (December 1992)
Robert Rothstein, “National Security, Domestic Resource Constraints, and Elite
Choices in the Third World” in S. Deger and R. West, Defense, Security
and Development
Jeff Colgan, “Oil and Revolutionary Governments: Fuel for International
Conflict,” International Organization, 64, 4 (2010), 661-694
OPTIONAL:
Levy 2010 syllabus, part 4k
Maurice A. East, Size and Foreign Policy Behavior: A Test of Two Models,
World Politics, 25 (July, 1973), 555-576.
Jeanne A. K. Hay, Small States in World Politics: Explaining Foreign Policy
Behavior
Andrew Cooper and Timothy Shaw, The Diplomacies of Small States: Between
Vulnerability and Resilience (2009)
The Foreign Policy Power of Small States, special issue of Cambridge Review of
International Affairs, 23 (September 2010), 381-453
John Scott Masker, Small States and Security Regimes: The International Politics
Of Nuclear Non-Proliferation in Nordic Europe and the South Pacific
Jacqueline Braveboy-Wagner, Small States in Global Affairs: The Foreign
Policies of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM)
5. SOCIETAL EXPLANATIONS II (2/16/12)
CULTURE
Hudson, chapter 4
Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane, “Ideas and Foreign Policy: An Analytic
Framework” in Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy:
Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change (1993), chapter 1
Ikenberry, part 4 chapters 1 (Huntington) and 4 (Keohane)
Fritz Gaenslen, “Culture and Decision Making in China, Japan, Russia, and the
United States,” World Politics, 39, 1 (October 1986), 78-103
Jeffrey W. Legro, "Which Norms Matter? Revisiting the 'Failure' of
Internationalism." International Organization, 51/1 (Winter 1997), 31-64.
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink, “Taking Stock: The Constructivist
Research Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics,”
Annual Review of Political Science, 4 (2001), 391-416
Peter Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in
World Politics (1996), chapters 1 (Katzenstein) and 2 (Jepperson et. al.)
Steve Smith, “Foreign Policy Is What States Make of It: Social Construction and
International Relations Theory” in Vendulka Kubalkova, Foreign Policy
in a Constructed World (2001)
Lisa Ann Richey, “In Search of Feminist Foreign Policy: Gender, Development,
and Danish State Identity,” Cooperation and Conflict, 36, 2 (June 2001),
177-212
Carolyn M. Warner and Stephen G. Walker, “Thinking about the Role of Religion
in Foreign Policy: A Framework for Analysis,” Foreign Policy Analysis,
7, 1 (January 2011), 113-135.
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, part 8
6. SOCIETAL EXPLANATIONS III IDEOLOGY AND CLASS (2/23/12)
Ikenberry, part 3, chapters 1-3 (Frieden; Bacevich; Wade
X (George Kennan), The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Foreign Affairs, 25, 4 (July,
1947), pp. 566-582 (18)
Thomas E. Weisskopf, “Capitalism, Socialism, and the Sources of Imperialism”
in G. John Ikenberry, American Foreign Policy (Scott, Foresman, 1989—
not the text), 162-185.
Jerome Slater and Terry Nardin, “The Concept of a Military-Industrial Complex”
in Steven Rosen, Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex
(1973), chapter 2
Kevin Narizny, “Both Guns and Butter, or Neither: Class Interests in the Political
Economy of Rearmament,” American Political Science Review, 97, 2
(May 2003), 203-220
Jerome Slater, "Two Books of Mearsheimer and Walt." Security Studies,
18, 1 (2009): 4-30 (remainder is optional).
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, parts 7a, 7b, and 8b
7. GOVERNMENTAL EXPLANATIONS-ACCOUNTABILITY I (3/1/12)
Hudson, chapter 5
John Owen, “How Liberalism Produces Democratic Peace,” International
Security, 19, 2 (Autumn 1994), 87-125
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita et. al., “An Institutional Explanation of the Democratic
Peace,” American Political Science Review, 93, 4 (December 1999), 791807
Kenneth A. Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy (2001), chapters 1-3
Jun Koga, “Where Do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties’ Domestic
Institutions and Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts,” International
Studies Quarterly, 55, 4 (December 2011), 1143-1166
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, part 6a-c
8. GOVERNMENTAL EXPLANATIONS: ACCOUNTABILITY II (3/8/12)
Ikenberry, part 5, chapters 1-4 (Roskin; George; Jacobs and Page; Trubowitz)
Ole R. Holsti, “Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Challenges to the AlmondLippmann Consensus,” International Studies Quarterly, 36, 4 (December
1992), 439-466
Jack Levy, “The Diversionary Theory of War: A Critique” in Manus Midlarsky,
Handbook of War Studies (1989), chapter 11
Jack Levy and William Mabe, “Politically Motivated Opposition to War,”
International Studies Review, 6 (2004), 65-83
Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(1991), chapters 1, 2, & 8
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, part 6d-g
9. GOVERNMENTAL EXPLANATIONS-BUREAUCRACY I (3/22/12)
Ikenberry, part 6, chapters 1-2 (Allison; Krasner)
Morton Halperin and Arnold Kanter, “The Bureaucratic Perspective: A
Preliminary Framework” in Halperin and Kanter, Bureaucratic Politics
and Foreign Policy (1974), 1-42
John Steinbruner, The Cybernetic Theory of Decision (1976), chapter 3
James C. Thomson, “How Vietnam Happened” in Morton Halperin and Arnold
Kanter, Readings in American Foreign Policy (1973), 98-110
Jack Levy, “Organizational Routines and the Causes of War,” International
Studies Quarterly, 30 (June 1986), 193-222
Stuart J. Kaufman, “Organizational Politics and Change in Soviet Military
Policy,” World Politics, 46, 3 (April 1994), 355-382
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, part 4a-h
10. GOVERNMENTAL EXPLANATIONS: BUREAUCRACY II (3/29/12)
Robert J. Art, “Bureaucratic Politics and American Foreign Policy: A Critique,”
Policy Sciences, 4 (1973), 467-490
Jonathan Bender and Thomas H. Hammond, “Rethinking Allison’s Models,”
American Political Science Review, 86 (June 1992), 301-322
Alexander George, “The Case for Multiple Advocacy in Making Foreign Policy,”
American Political Science Review, 66 (September 1972), 751-785
Margaret G. Hermann, “How Decision Units Shape Foreign Policy: A
Theoretical Framework,” International Studies Review, 3, 2 (Summer
2001), 47-82
Helen V. Milner, “Rationalizing Politics: The Emerging Synthesis of
International, American, and Comparative Politics,” International
Organization, 52, 4 (Autumn 1998), 759-786
Ronald Rogowski, “Institutions as Constraints on Strategic Choice” in David A.
Lake and Robert Powell, Strategic Choice and International Relations
(1999), 116-136
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, parts 4i-j and 5
11. GOVERNMENTAL EXPLANATIONS: SMALL GROUPS (4/5/12)
Hudson, chapter 3 (38)
McDermott, chapter 9
Eric K. Stern, “Probing the Plausibility of Newgroup Syndrome: Kennedy and
the Bay of Pigs” in Paul ‘t Hart et. al., Beyond Groupthink: Political
Group Dynamics and Foreign Policy-making (1997), chapter 6
Philip E. Tetlock et. al., “Assessing Political Group Dynamics: A Test of the
Groupthink Model,” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63
(September 1992), 403-425
Dina Badie, “Groupthink, Iraq, and the War on Terror: Explaining US Policy
Shift toward Iraq,” Foreign Policy Analysis, 6, 4 (October 2010), 277-296
Margaret G. Hermann et. al., “Who Leads Matters: The Effects of Powerful
Individuals”, International Studies Review, 3, 2 (Summer 2001), 83-132
David G. Myers and Helmut Lamm, “The Group Polarization Phenomenon,”
Psychological Bulletin, 83, 4 (1976), 605-627
Thomas Preston, “Presidential Personality and Leadership Style” in Preston, The
President and His Inner Circle: Leadership Style and the Advisory
Process in Foreign Affairs, chapter 1
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, part 11
12. INDIVIDUAL EXPLANATIONS I (4/12/12)
Hudson, chapter 2
McDermott, chapters 1-3 and 10
INFORMATION PROCESSING: COGNITION, BELIEFS AND IMAGES
Ikenberry, part 7, chapters 1-3 (Jervis; Tetlock and McGuire; Khong)
OPTIONAL:
McDermott, chapters 4-5
OPERATIONAL CODE
Stephen G. Walker, “Operational Code Analysis as a Scientific Research
Program: A Cautionary Tale” in Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius Elman,
Progress in International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field (2003),
245-276
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, parts 9a-e
13. INDIVIDUAL EXPLANATIONS II (4/19/12)
EMOTIONS AND MOTIVATIONS
McDermott, chapter 6
MODELS OF LEARNING
Lisa R. Anderson and Charles A. Holt, “Classroom Games: Understanding
Bayes’ Rule,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10, 4 (Spring 1996),
179-187
Robert Jervis, “How Decision-Makers Learn from History” in Jervis,
Perception and Misperception in International Politics (1976), chapter 6
Jack Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,”
International Organization 48 (Spring 1994), 279-312
PERSONALITY: PSYCHOBIOGRAPHY
McDermott, chapter 7
Ikenberry, part 7, chapter 4 (Winter et. al.)
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP
McDermott, chapter 8
OPTIONAL:
Levy 2010 syllabus, parts 9f and 10
14. INDIVIDUAL EXPLANATIONS III (4/26/12)
THREAT PERCEPTON AND INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
Robert Jervis, “Perceiving and Coping with Threat” in Jervis et. al., Psychology
and Deterrence (1985), chapter 2
Avi Shlaim, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom
Kippur War,” World Politics, 28 (1976), 348-380
HEURISTICS AND BIASES
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics
and biases” in Daniel Kahneman et. al., Judgment under Uncertainty:
Heuristics and Biases (1982), chapter 9
PROSPECT THEORY
Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman, “Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions,” Journal of Business, 59 (4/2 (1986), S251-278
Jack S. Levy, “Prospect Theory, Rational Choice and International Relations,”
International Studies Quarterly, 41/1 (March 1997), 87-112
SUNK COSTS AND MODELS OF ENTRAPMENT
Barry M. Staw and Jerry Ross, “Behavior in Escalation Situations: Antecedents,
Prototypes, and Solutions,” Research in Organizational Behavior, 9
(1987), 39-78
TIME HORIZONS AND INTERTEMPORAL CHOICES
Philip Streich and Jack S. Levy, “Time Horizons, Discounting, and Intertemporal
Choice,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51, 2 (April 2007), 199-226
OPTIONAL: Levy 2010 syllabus, parts 11f-g and 12