Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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**AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENTS** ................................................................................ 9
**Animal Rights Not Respected Now** .......................................................................... 10
Federal Government Violates Animal Rights ................................................................... 11
Animal Exploitation & Confinement Extensive Now ...................................................... 12
Species Barrier Blocks Recognition of Animal Rights Now ............................................ 13
Species Barrier Blocks Recognition of Animal Rights Now ............................................ 14
Characterization of Animals as “Property” Blocks Recognition of Rights ...................... 15
Characterization of Animals as “Property” Blocks Recognition of Rights ...................... 16
Courts Refuse to Extend Recognition of Rights to Animals ............................................ 18
Court Refusal to Extend Rights Irrational and Arbitrary .................................................. 19
**Failure to Recognize Animal Rights Harmful** .......................................................... 20
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in Moral Frameworks .............. 21
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in Moral Frameworks .............. 22
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in Moral Frameworks .............. 23
Non-Human Animals Should Be Accorded Equal Consideration in Moral Frameworks 24
Infliction of Pain & Suffering on Animals Immoral ......................................................... 25
Adherence to Species Barrier Entrenches Speciesism ...................................................... 26
Speciesism Immoral – Akin to Racism and Sexism ......................................................... 27
Speciesism Immoral – Akin to Racism and Sexism ......................................................... 28
Speciesism Immoral – Akin to Racism and Sexism ......................................................... 29
Confinement of Animals in Zoos/Circuses Immoral ........................................................ 30
Failure to Recognize Animal Rights Violates Justice....................................................... 31
Viewing Animals as Property Negatively Impacts How People Treat Each Other .......... 32
Viewing Animals as Property Negatively Impacts How People Treat Each Other .......... 33
**Should Recognize Rights for Animals** ...................................................................... 34
Moral Framework Should be Extended to Animals ......................................................... 35
Moral Framework Should be Extended to Animals ......................................................... 36
Moral Framework Should be Extended to Animals ......................................................... 37
Cruelty Towards and the Infliction of Suffering Upon Animals Must be Rejected ......... 38
Respect for Animals Rights is a Deontological Moral Consideration .............................. 39
Respect for Animals Rights is a Deontological Moral Consideration .............................. 40
Animal Rights Justified by Bentham ................................................................................ 41
Consequentialism Bad ...................................................................................................... 42
Consequentialism Bad ...................................................................................................... 43
Respect for Animal Rights Key to Avoiding Treating Them as a Means to an End ........ 44
Respect for Animal Rights Justified in Consequentialist Framework .............................. 45
Respect for Animal Rights Justified by Precautionary Principle...................................... 46
Duty Toward Animals in Captivity Different from Those in the Wild ............................ 47
Justifications for Rigid Species Barrier Wrong ................................................................ 48
Justifications for Rigid Species Barrier Wrong ................................................................ 49
Ethical Justifications Against Animal Rights Wrong and Outdated ................................. 50
Ethical Justifications Against Animal Rights Wrong and Outdated ................................. 51
Ethical Justifications Against Animal Rights Wrong and Outdated ................................. 52
Descartes Indicts ............................................................................................................... 53
Cohen Indicts .................................................................................................................... 54
Posner Indicts .................................................................................................................... 55
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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Posner Indicts .................................................................................................................... 56
Should Extend Legal Personhood to Animals .................................................................. 57
Should Recognize Animal Rights ..................................................................................... 58
Should Recognize Animal Rights ..................................................................................... 59
Should Reject Property Status of Animals........................................................................ 60
Should Reject Property Status of Animals........................................................................ 61
Incremental Extension of Rights Key to Solve Speciesism .............................................. 62
Should Reject Property Status of Animals........................................................................ 63
Respect for Animal Rights Challenges Biopower ............................................................ 64
AT: “Can Achieve Justice Short of Recognition of Rights” ............................................ 65
AT: “Focus on Animal Welfare Enough—Don’t Need Rights” ...................................... 66
AT: “Focus on Animal Welfare Enough—Don’t Need Rights” ...................................... 67
AT: “Focus on Animal Welfare Enough—Don’t Need Rights” ...................................... 68
**Answer To: Animals Do Not Deserve Rights**........................................................... 70
AT: “Differences Between Humans and Animals Justify Restricting Animal Rights” ... 71
AT: “Differences Between Humans and Animals Justify Restricting Animal Rights” ... 72
AT: “Animals Lack Rationality” ...................................................................................... 74
AT: “Animals Lack Rationality” ...................................................................................... 75
AT: “Animals Lack Intelligence & Self Awareness” ....................................................... 76
AT: “Animals Lack Rationality” ...................................................................................... 77
AT: “Animals Lack Capacity for Moral Reasoning” ....................................................... 79
AT: “Animals Lack Capacity for Moral Reasoning” ....................................................... 80
AT: “Humans Possess Intrinsic Value that Distinguish Them From Animals” ............... 81
AT: “All Humans Have Potential for Autonomy and Reasoning” ................................... 82
AT: “All Humans Have Potential for Autonomy and Reasoning” ................................... 83
AT: “Animals Do Not Have Souls” .................................................................................. 84
AT: “Rights Require Capacity to Enter into Contracts” ................................................... 85
AT: “Animals Can’t Demand Their Own Rights” ............................................................ 86
AT: “Animals Lack Level of Sentience Sufficient for Ethical Concern” ......................... 87
AT: “Animals Lack Empathy”.......................................................................................... 88
**Answer To: Problems with Recognizing Animal Rights** .......................................... 89
Animal Rights Can Be Recognized in Pragmatic Manner................................................ 90
Slavery Abolition Proves Obstacles to Animal Liberation can be Overcome .................. 91
Representations Key ......................................................................................................... 92
AT: “If You Don’t Solve All Animal Exploitation There’s No Advantage” ................... 93
AT: “Animal Rights Threatens Interests of Humans” ...................................................... 94
AT: “Animal Rights Threatens Interests of Humans” ...................................................... 95
AT: “Animal Rights Dilute Human Rights” ..................................................................... 96
AT: “Animal Rights Dilute Human Rights” ..................................................................... 97
AT: “Recognizing Rights Results Absurd Results”.......................................................... 98
AT: “Recognizing Rights Results Absurd Results”.......................................................... 99
AT: “Rights Talk Bad – No Trivialization”.................................................................... 100
AT: “Rights Talk Bad – No Trivialization”.................................................................... 101
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Rights Talk Good for Animals .............................................. 102
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Rights Talk Good for Animals .............................................. 103
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Rights Talk Good for Animals .............................................. 104
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Solves Rights Kritiks ............................................................ 105
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Solves Rights Kritiks ............................................................ 106
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Animal Rights Talk Increases Meaning of Rights ................. 107
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” - Permutation ............................................................................ 108
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” - Permutation ............................................................................ 109
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” - Permutation ............................................................................ 110
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Alternatives Bad .................................................................... 111
AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Alternatives Bad .................................................................... 112
AT: “CLS Kritik of Rights” – Animal Rights Solve the K ............................................ 113
AT: “CLS Kritik of Rights” – Animal Rights Solve the K ............................................ 114
AT: “CLS Kritik of Rights” – Indeterminacy Good ....................................................... 115
AT: “CLS Kritik of Rights” – Indeterminacy Good ....................................................... 116
AT: “CLS Kritik of Rights” – General ........................................................................... 117
AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights” ..................................................................................... 118
AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights” ..................................................................................... 119
AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights” ..................................................................................... 119
AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights” ..................................................................................... 121
AT: Feminist Kritik of Rights ......................................................................................... 122
AT: “Human Suffering Higher Priority” ........................................................................ 123
AT: “Animal Rights Prop up Capitalism” ...................................................................... 124
AT: “Animal Rights Prop up Capitalism” ...................................................................... 125
AT: “Animal Rights Prop up Capitalism” ...................................................................... 126
AT: “Animal Rights Trade Off With Necessary Biomedical Research” ........................ 127
AT: “Animal Rights Trade Off With Necessary Biomedical Research” ........................ 128
AT: “Animal Rights Trade Off With Necessary Biomedical Research” ........................ 129
AT: “Animal Rights Trade Off With Necessary Biomedical Research” ........................ 130
AT: “Animal Rights Trade Off With Necessary Biomedical Research” ........................ 131
AT: “Animal Testing Necessary” ................................................................................... 132
AT: “Animal Testing Necessary” ................................................................................... 133
AT: “Animal Rights Justifies Naziism” .......................................................................... 134
AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals – Undermines
Movements/Advocacy”................................................................................................... 135
AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals – Undermines
Movements/Advocacy”................................................................................................... 136
AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals – Undermines
Movements/Advocacy”................................................................................................... 137
AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals- Trades Off With Species
Protection” ...................................................................................................................... 138
AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals- Trades Off With Species
Protection” ...................................................................................................................... 139
AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals- Trades Off With Species
Protection” ...................................................................................................................... 140
AT: “Zoos Key to Species Protection” ........................................................................... 141
AT: “Zoos Key to Species Protection” ........................................................................... 142
AT: “Zoos Key to Research for Animal Welfare”.......................................................... 143
AT: “Zoos Key to Research for Animal Welfare”.......................................................... 145
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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AT: “Kritik of the Term ‘Animal’” ................................................................................ 146
**Great Apes Project Aff**............................................................................................ 147
Great Apes Denied Basic Liberty Rights Now ............................................................... 148
Exploitation of Great Apes Constitutes Genocide .......................................................... 149
Confinement for Great Apes Harmful ............................................................................ 150
Confinement for Great Apes Harmful ............................................................................ 151
Confinement for Great Apes Harmful ............................................................................ 152
Zoo Confinement for Great Apes Immoral ..................................................................... 153
Zoo Confinement for Great Apes Immoral ..................................................................... 154
Failure to Extend Liberty Rights to Great Apes Threatens Future Existence................. 155
Denial of Basic Liberty Rights for Great Apes Immoral ................................................ 156
Denial of Basic Liberty Rights for Great Apes Immoral ................................................ 157
Denial of Basic Liberty Rights for Great Apes Immoral ................................................ 158
Legal “Personhood” Key to According Apes Rights ...................................................... 159
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Challenging War, Genocide and Slavery
......................................................................................................................................... 160
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Challenging War, Genocide and Slavery
......................................................................................................................................... 161
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Breaking the Species Barrier ............ 162
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Breaking the Species Barrier ............ 163
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Breaking the Species Barrier ............ 164
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Breaking the Species Barrier ............ 165
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Breaking the Species Barrier ............ 166
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Breaking the Species Barrier ............ 167
Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Breaking the Species Barrier ............ 168
Incremental Steps Key to Solve Speciesism ................................................................... 169
AT: “Great Ape Project is Speciest” ............................................................................... 170
AT: “Great Ape Project is Speciest” ............................................................................... 171
AT: “Great Ape Project is Speciest” ............................................................................... 172
Should Extend Legal Protections/Rights to Great Apes ................................................. 173
Should Extend Due Process Protections of Liberty to Apes........................................... 174
No Justification for Differential Treatment Among Great Apes .................................... 175
Apes Meet Requirements for Legal Personhood ............................................................ 176
Apes Meet Requirements for Legal Personhood ............................................................ 177
Apes Have Intelligence & Self Awareness ..................................................................... 178
Apes Capable of Moral Reasoning ................................................................................. 179
Apes Capable of Communication/Language .................................................................. 180
Apes and Humans Share DNA ....................................................................................... 181
Apes and Humans Have Similar Brain Function ............................................................ 182
Apes Have Culture .......................................................................................................... 183
AT: “Public Opposes Extension of Rights to Apes” ...................................................... 184
AT: “Extension of Rights Meaningless- Courts Won’t Enforce Them” ........................ 185
AT: “Extension of Rights to Apes Creates Practical Difficulties” ................................. 186
AT: “No Place to Send Liberated Apes” ........................................................................ 187
AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research”.................................................. 188
AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research ................................................... 189
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research”.................................................. 190
AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research”.................................................. 191
**Factory Farm Aff** .................................................................................................... 192
Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now ................................................. 193
Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now ................................................. 194
Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now ................................................. 195
Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now ................................................. 197
Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now ................................................. 198
Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now ................................................. 199
Factory Farm Abuse Immoral/Unethical ........................................................................ 200
Factory Farms Result of Speciesism ............................................................................... 201
AT: “Confinement More Humane/Better for Animal Welfare” ..................................... 202
Abuse of Farm Animals Threatens Human Survival ...................................................... 203
Abuse of Farm Animals Threatens Human Survival ...................................................... 204
Abuse of Farm Animals Threatens Food Safety ............................................................. 205
Abuse of Farm Animals Increases Disease Risk ............................................................ 206
Abuse of Farm Animals Increases Disease Risk ............................................................ 207
Abuse of Farm Animals Undermines Sustainable Agriculture....................................... 208
Should Recognize Rights of Farm Animals.................................................................... 209
Kantian Ethics Requires Treating Farm Animals with Respect ..................................... 210
What We Eat is an Inherently Ethical and Moral Act .................................................... 211
AT: “Rights Discourse Bad for Improving Animal Welfare” ........................................ 212
AT: “Impractical to Change Animal Agricultural Practices” ......................................... 213
AT: “Impractical to Change Animal Agricultural Practices” ......................................... 214
AT: “Reduced Suffering Would Require Everyone to Become Vegetarian” ................. 215
AT: “Animal Rights and Animal Welfare Approaches Trade-Off” ............................... 216
AT: “Animal Rights and Animal Welfare Approaches Trade-Off” ............................... 217
AT: “Improving Conditions for Farm Animals Trades Off with Trend Toward
Vegetarianism” ............................................................................................................... 218
**NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS** .................................................................................. 219
**Animals Don’t Need Expanded Rights** ................................................................... 220
Captivity Doesn’t Threaten Animal Interests ................................................................. 221
Zoos Good ....................................................................................................................... 222
Zoos Good ....................................................................................................................... 223
**Should Not Recognize Animal Rights** .................................................................... 224
No Moral Obligation to Animals .................................................................................... 225
No Moral Obligation to Animals .................................................................................... 226
No Moral Obligation to Animals .................................................................................... 227
No Moral Obligation to Animals: Wild Animals ........................................................... 229
Animal Rights are Immoral ............................................................................................ 230
Treating Animals Differently Not Akin to Racism and/or Sexism................................. 231
Animal Rights are Immoral ............................................................................................ 232
Treating Animals Differently Justified ........................................................................... 233
Human Needs and Suffering Outweigh Animals Interests ............................................. 234
Sentience Not A Good Standard for Rights .................................................................... 235
Arguments Supporting Human Dignity Not Speciest ..................................................... 236
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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Animal Rights Unnecessary: Can Meet Moral Obligations Without Rights .................. 237
Should Protect Animal Interests Without Granting Animal Rights................................ 238
Animal Rights Unnecessary: Can Meet Moral Obligations Without Rights .................. 239
Animal Rights Unnecessary: Can Meet Moral Obligations Without Rights .................. 240
Pragmatism Doesn’t Require Endorsement of Animal Rights ....................................... 241
Singer’s Utilitarian Justification Flawed ........................................................................ 242
Singer’s Utilitarian Justification Flawed ........................................................................ 243
Singer’s Utilitarian Justification Flawed ........................................................................ 244
**Animals Do Not Deserve Rights**............................................................................. 245
Animals Lack Moral Agency Necessary for Rights ....................................................... 246
Animals Lack Ability to Participate in Asking for Rights .............................................. 247
Rights Demands Responsibilities ................................................................................... 248
Sentience Insufficient to Necessitate Rights ................................................................... 249
Sentience Insufficient to Necessitate Rights ................................................................... 250
Cognitive Capacity Does Not Necessitate Rights Extension .......................................... 251
Cognitive Capacity Does Not Necessitate Rights Extension .......................................... 252
Cognitive Capacity Bad Justification for Rights ............................................................ 253
Genetic Similarity Does not Necessitate Rights ............................................................. 254
**Problems with Recognizing Animal Rights” .............................................................. 255
Animal Rights System Threatens Global Extinction ...................................................... 256
Animal Rights Focus Trades Off with Efforts to Improve Animal Welfare .................. 257
Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements ..................................... 258
Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements ..................................... 259
Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements ..................................... 260
Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements ..................................... 261
Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements ..................................... 262
Animal Rights Focus Trades Off With Ecosystem Protection ....................................... 263
Animal Rights Focus Conflicts with Protecting Endangered Species ............................ 264
Animal Rights Focus Conflicts with Protecting Endangered Species ............................ 266
Animal Rights Focus Conflicts with Protecting Endangered Species ............................ 267
Asserting Moral Duty to Individual Animals Undermines Moral Obligation to Animal
Species ............................................................................................................................ 268
Asserting Moral Duty to Individual Animals Undermines Moral Obligation to Animal
Species ............................................................................................................................ 269
Animal Rights Expansion Devalues Humans ................................................................. 270
Animal Rights Expansion Devalues Humans ................................................................. 271
Animal Rights Kills AIDS Vaccine - Shell .................................................................... 272
AIDS Research DA – Link Extensions – Apes Key ....................................................... 273
AIDS Research DA – Link Extensions – Apes Key ....................................................... 274
AIDS Research DA – Animal Research Key ................................................................. 276
AIDS Research DA – Vaccine Key to Prevent Pandemic .............................................. 277
AIDS Research DA – Global Destruction Impact .......................................................... 278
AIDS Research DA – Racism Impacts ........................................................................... 279
Animal Rights Kills Ebola Research – Shell .................................................................. 280
Ebola Research DA – Links – Apes Key ........................................................................ 281
Animal Rights Flawed – CLS Kritik .............................................................................. 282
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September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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Animal Rights Flawed – CLS Kritik .............................................................................. 283
Animal Rights Flawed – CLS Kritik .............................................................................. 284
Animal Rights Flawed – CLS Kritik .............................................................................. 285
Animal Rights Focus Bad – Entrenches Capitalism ....................................................... 286
Animal Rights Discourse Bad – Biopower ..................................................................... 287
Animal Rights Bad – Feminist Kritik of Rights Discourse ............................................ 288
Animal Rights Bad – Feminist Kritik of Rights Discourse ............................................ 289
Animal Rights Bad – Feminist Kritik of Rights Discourse ............................................ 290
Animal Rights Paradigm Counterproductive – Entrenches Speciesism ......................... 291
Animal Rights Discourse Bad – Entrenches Anthropocentrism ..................................... 293
Animal Rights Discourse Bad – Entrenches Anthropocentrism ..................................... 294
Animal Rights Focus Promotes Romanticism ................................................................ 295
Animal Rights Focus Promotes Romanticism ................................................................ 296
Animal Rights Focus Promotes Romanticism ................................................................ 297
Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Counterproductive .............................. 298
Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Counterproductive .............................. 299
Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Counterproductive .............................. 300
Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Counterproductive .............................. 301
Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Increases Animal Research ................ 302
Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Bad – AT Perm ................................... 303
Animal Rights Entrenches the Logic of Nazism............................................................. 304
Animal Rights Entrenches the Logic of Nazism............................................................. 305
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Ethical Arguments Insufficient to Change Attitudes ... 306
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Rights Can’t Pierce Anthropocentrism......................... 307
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Ineffective Strategy for Social Change ........................ 308
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Focus on Rights Undermines Success of Movements.. 309
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Focus on Rights Undermines Success of Movements.. 310
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Will Never Gain Acceptance by Public or Leaders ..... 311
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Will Never Gain Acceptance by Public or Leaders ..... 312
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Systemic Bias Proves Inadequacy of Rights ................ 313
Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Non-Rights Discourse More Effective ......................... 314
Animal Rights System Creates Problems ....................................................................... 315
Animal Rights System Creates Problems ....................................................................... 316
**Great Ape Project Neg** ............................................................................................ 317
Apes Differ from Humans in Moral Codes..................................................................... 318
Recognizing Moral Agency of Apes Excludes Other Animals ...................................... 319
Genetic Similarity to Other Apes Insufficient to Justify Rights Extension .................... 320
Genetic Similarity to Other Apes Insufficient to Justify Rights Extension .................... 321
Incremental Extension of Rights Fails ............................................................................ 322
Incremental Extension of Rights Fails ............................................................................ 323
Singling Out Apes for Protection Speciesist ................................................................... 324
Singling Out Apes for Protection Speciesist ................................................................... 325
Singling Out Apes for Protection Speciesist ................................................................... 326
Singling Out Apes for Protection Speciesist ................................................................... 327
Singling Out Apes for Protection Speciesist ................................................................... 328
Extension of Rights Not Necessary to Admit Apes to Moral Community ..................... 329
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September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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Extension of Rights Fails to Treat Apes as Members of the Community of Equals ...... 330
Releasing Apes from Confinement Counterproductive to Their Welfare ...................... 331
**Factory Farm Neg** ................................................................................................... 332
Humane Treatment of Farm Animals Increasing............................................................ 333
Factory Farms More Humane than Alternatives ............................................................. 334
“Animal Rights” Discourse Counterproductive to Improving Farm Animal Welfare ... 335
“Animal Rights” Discourse Counterproductive to Improving Farm Animal Welfare ... 336
Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve......................................................................... 337
Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve......................................................................... 338
Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve......................................................................... 339
Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve......................................................................... 340
Alternatives to Factory Farming Not Feasible ................................................................ 342
Focus on Improving Farm Animal Treatment Undermines Shift to Vegetarianism ...... 343
Dismantlement Movement Best Approach ..................................................................... 344
Dismantlement Movement Best Approach ..................................................................... 345
Dismantlement Movement Best Approach ..................................................................... 346
**Vegan Negative** ....................................................................................................... 347
Veganism Counterproductive ......................................................................................... 348
Veganism Counterproductive ......................................................................................... 349
Veganism Counterproductive ......................................................................................... 350
Veganism Denigrates Non-Western Cultures ................................................................. 351
Veganism Counterproductive ......................................................................................... 352
Must Acknowledge and Affirm the Place of Humans and Other Animals in the Food
Chain ............................................................................................................................... 353
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
**AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENTS**
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
**Animal Rights Not Respected Now**
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Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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Federal Government Violates Animal Rights
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS DIRECTLY AND DEEPLY INVOLVED IN ANIMAL
EXPLOITATION
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 137
The US government is deeply involved in nonhuman exploitation. The Department of Agriculture
subsidizes and promotes the flesh, egg, honey and milk industries. The National Institutes of Health fund
vivisection. The Food and Drug Administration requires that drugs be tested on nonhumans. The
Department of Defense uses dolphins, dogs, and other nonhuman animals for military purposes. The Fish
and Wildlife Service supports hunting, fishing and trapping. And on and on.
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September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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Animal Exploitation & Confinement Extensive Now
MILLIONS OF ANIMALS SUBJECT TO RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 109-10
In the United States alone, we use millions of animals annually for biomedical experiments, product
testing, and education. Animals are used to measure the effects of toxins, diseases, drugs, radiation, bullets,
and all forms of physical and psychological deprivations. We burn, poison, irradiate, blind, starve, and
electrocute them. They are purposely riddled with diseases such as cancer and infections such as
pneumonia. We deprive them of sleep, keep them in solitary confinement, remove their limbs and eyes,
addict them to drugs, force them to withdraw from drug addiction, and cage them for the duration of their
lives. If they do not die during experimental procedures, we almost always kill them immediately
afterward, or we recycle them for other experiments or tests and then kill them.
MILLIONS OF ANIMALS KEPT IN CONFINEMENT FOR ENTERTAINMENT PURPOSES
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 110
We use millions of animals for the sole purpose of providing entertainment. Animals are used in film and
television. There are thousands of zoos, circuses, carnivals, race tracks, dolphin exhibits and rodeos in the
United States, and these and similar activities, such as bullfighting, also take place in other countries.
Animals used in entertainment are often forced to endure lifelong incarceration and confinement, poor
living conditions, extreme physical danger and hardship, and brutal treatment. Most animals used for
entertainment purposes are killed when no longer useful, or sold into research or as targets for shooting
on commercial hunting preserves.
MANY ANIMALS CONFINED FOR FASION INDUSTRY
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 110
And we kill millions of animals annually simply for fashion. Approximately 40 million animals worldwide
are trapped, snared, or raised in intensive confinement on fur farms, where they are electrocuted or gassed
or have their necks broken. In the United States, 8-10 million animals are killed every year for fur.
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September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
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Species Barrier Blocks Recognition of Animal Rights Now
THE RIGID SPECIES BARRIER IS FIRMLY ENTRENCHED
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 19
Professor Robert Brumbaugh has written that "(f)rom Xenophon through Aristotle through the Stoic school,
the preposterous idea of a world designed for human exploitation diffused quite thoroughly into Western
common sense." 80 Professor Lovejoy believed it "one of the most curious movements of human
imbecility." 81 Preposterous as it may be, imbecilic as it may now appear, it buried itself so deeply into
philosophy, science, political science, and finally, the law, that it has proven exceedingly resistant to
change. 82 It became a commonplace in the Middle Ages. Aquinas accepted it almost exactly the way
Aristotle had proposed it seventeen.
Now all animals are naturally subject to man. This can be proved in three ways. First, from the order
observed by nature. For just as in the generation of things we perceive a certain order of procession from
the imperfect (thus matter is for the sake of form; and the imperfect form for the sake of the perfect), so
also is there order in the use of natural things. For the imperfect are for the use of the perfect: as the plants
make use of the earth for their nourishment, animals make use of plants, and man makes use of both plants
and animals. Therefore it is in keeping with the order of nature, that man should be master over animals.
Hence the philosopher [ Aristotle] says that the hunting of wild animals is just and natural, because man
thereby exercises a natural right. Secondly, this is proved from the order of divine providence which always
governs inferior things by the superior. Wherefore, since man, being made to the image of God, is above
other animals, these are rightly governed by him . . . 83
PLACING A BEING ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE SPECIES BARRIER RENDERS THEM
INELIGIBLE FOR ALMOST ANY LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 248-9
Those who support these principles as legal rules, and not just as moral statements, must recognize that the
laws of most countries, and certainly American law, present very serious conceptual obstacles to such a
position. The American legal system is replete with categories and attaches negative consequences to those
categories based on race, sex, sexual preference, age, nationality and disability. But there are no more
serious consequences than those attached to classification based on species.
For example, although experimentation involving a human being requires the person’s informed consent
(or the consent of a legal guardian if the person is incapable of giving consent), and is subject to legal
scrutiny on a number of different levels, animal experiments (in the United States) may be performed an
any animal for any purpose that is approved by a committee of other animal experimenters, and the concept
of informed consent obviously has no applicability. Moreover, there is no need—as there is in virtually
every instance of human experimentation—to demonstrate that the experiment will benefit the
experimental subject. Once some being is placed on the other side of the species barrier, the law provides
virtually no protection for that being, and humans may harm that being in ways that would be
unthinkable if applied to even the most disadvantaged members of human society.
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14
Species Barrier Blocks Recognition of Animal Rights Now
ANIMAL INTERESTS CAN NEVER PREVAIL IN A FRAMEWORK THAT SAYS ONLY
HUMANS HAVE RIGHTS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 249-50
There is however, general consensus that animals ought not to be subjected to “unnecessary” pain or
“unjustified” killing. Although animals are viewed as property that cannot possess rights, there are many
laws that purport to provide some level of protection for animals in a variety of different circumstances.
The problem is that when humans try to determine whether suffering or death is “necessary”, they
inevitably engage in “hybrid” reasoning in which they balance human interests, including the legal fact that
humans are regarded as having rights, and especially rights in property, and animal interests, which are
unsupported by accompanying claims of right. And nonhumans are a form of property that humans seek to
control. Under this framework, animals can virtually never prevail as long as humans are the only
rightholders and animals are merely regarded as property—the object of the exercise of an important
human right.
NONHUMAN ANIMALS ARE THE ULTIMATE “OTHER”
Kim Stallwood, PETA, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 195
The dominant culture’s attitude toward animals also is similar to the attitude toward women described in
Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex (1983). Nonhuman animals are the “Other.” They are other than
humans, nonhuman, things, no-things, or simply nothing. Nonhuman animals are thoroughly objectified—
even down to the way they commonly are referred to in the abstract as “it” rather than “he” or “she.” They
are reduced to the status of the economic units of production, sources or entertainment or adornment, or
objects to be manipulated for human ends.
PERSONHOOD IS A WALL THAT SEPARATES THOSE WITH RIGHTS FROM THOSE
WITHOUT RIGHTS
Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and law professor, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds.
Armstrong & Botzler, p. 539
Not until the nineteenth century was slavery abolished in the West and every human formally cloaked with
the legal personhood that signifies eligibility for fundamental legal rights. So the final brick of a great legal
wall, begun millennia ago, was cemented into place. Today, on one side of this legal wall reside all the
natural legal persons, all the members of a single species, Homo sapiens. We have assigned ourselves,
alone among the millions of animals species, the exalted status of legal persons, entitled to all the rights,
privileges, powers and immunities of “legal personhood” (Wise, 1996).
On the other side of the wall lies every other animal. They are not legal persons but legal things. During
the American Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln was said to have spurned South Carolina’s peace
commissioners with the statement, “As President, I have no eyes but Constitutional eyes; I cannot see you.
In this way, their “legal thinghood” makes nonhuman animals invisible to the civil law. Civil judges have
no eyes for anyone but legal persons.
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15
Characterization of Animals as “Property” Blocks Recognition
of Rights
NON-HUMAN ANIMALS CURRENTLY GIVEN THE STATUS AS PROPERTY – NOT
PERSONS ENTITLED TO RIGHTS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 249
The reason for the differential treatment accorded to nonhumans has to do with the fact that as far as the
legal system is concerned, animals and humans occupy completely different positions. Human beings are
regarded by the law as capable of having rights; nonhumans are regarding as incapable of having rights.
Although there is an increasing social awareness about nonhuman animals and a consensus that animals
possess at least some moral rights that ought to be recognized by the legal system, animals still have the
status of being the property of human beings—just as slaves were once regarded as the property of their
master, or women as the property of their husbands or fathers.
CATEGORIZATION OF NON-HUMANS AS “PROPERTY” MEANS THAT EVEN TRIVIAL
HUMAN INTERESTS WILL ALWAYS TRUMP THEIR VITAL INTERESTS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 250
The animal interest, even when it is substantial from the animal’s point of view, is virtually always
accorded less weight than the most trivial of human interests because, for the most part, human beings have
absolutely no way of looking at nonhumans except as some form of property. Most human/animal conflicts
arise because some human is trying to exercise his or her rights of property over some nonhuman, and the
conflict ostensibly requires that we balance the human and animal interests. In doing so, however, we are
comparing the interests of humans, which are supported by claims of legal right, and especially the legal
right to exercise control over property, with the interests of nonhumans, which are unsupported by claims
of legal right because the animal is regarded as the property of the human whose interest is at stake.
This balancing of completely dissimilar but peculiarly related legal entities accounts for why animals
virtually always lose in the balance. For example, we condemn the “unnecessary” suffering of animals, but
we tolerate the use (which is synonymous with “the abuse”) of chimpanzees in circuses. There is no way
that the use of chimpanzees in circuses can be squared with our rejection of “unnecessary” animal
suffering, without understanding that such animal abuse is made “necessary” merely by the existence of the
right of property in the chimpanzee—and in Western societies, that property right is seen as a very
powerful right.
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16
Characterization of Animals as “Property” Blocks Recognition
of Rights
PROPERTY STATUS OF NON-HUMAN ANIMALS MEANS HUMAN INTERESTS ALWAYS
TRUMP THEIRS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 117
The property status of animals renders meaningless any balancing that is supposedly required under the
humane treatment principle or animal welfare laws, because what we really balance are the interests of
property owners against the interest of their animal property. It is, of course, absurd to suggest that we can
balance human interests, which are protected by claims of right in general and of a right to own property in
particular, against the interests of property, which exists only as a means to the ends of humans. Although
we claim to recognize that we may prefer animal interests over human interests only when there is a
conflict of interests, there is always a conflict between the interests of property owners who want to use
their property and the interests of their animal property. The human property interest will almost always
prevail. The animal in question is always a “pet” or a “laboratory animal,” or a “game animal,” or a “food
animal,” or a “rodeo animal,” or some other form of property that exists solely for our use and has no value
except that which we give it. There is really no choice to be made between the human and the animal
interest because the choice has already been predetermined by the property status of the animal; the
“suffering” of property owners who cannot use their property as they wish counts more than animal
suffering. We are allowed to impose any suffering required to use our animal property for a particular
purpose even if that purpose is our mere amusement or pleasure. As long as we use our animal property to
generate an economic benefit there is no effective limit on our use or treatment of animals.
PROPERTY STATUS RENDERS MEANINGLESS ATTEMPTS TO SERIOUSLY PROTECT
ANIMAL INTERESTS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 120
The status of animals as property renders meaningless our claim that we reject the status of animals as
things. We treat animals as the moral equivalent of inanimate objects with no morally significant interests.
We bring billions of animals into existence annually for the purpose of killing them. Animals have market
prices. Dogs and cats are sold in pet stores like compact discs; financial markets trade in futures for pork
bellies and cattle. Any interest that an animal has represents an economic cost that may; be ignored to
maximize overall social wealth and ha no intrinsic value in our assessments. That is what it means to be
property.
PROPERTY STATUS MEANS THAT NONHUMAN ANIMALS ARE TREATED AS SLAVES
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 15
As legal things, nonhuman animals are treated today as human slaves were treated once and continue to be
treated in those few places in which human slavery is unlawfully practiced. The African American writer
Alice Walker says that this, “even for those of us who recognize its validity, is a difficult one to face.
Especially so if we are the descendants of slaves. Or of slave owners. Or of both. Especially so if we are
responsible in some way for the present treatment of animals [or]…if we are complicit in their enslavement
and destruction, which is to say at this juncture in history, master.
DESIGNATING ALL NONHUMAN ANIMALS AS PROPERTY IS SLAVERY
Cass Sunstein, Law Professor, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 11
There is no simple answer. Perhaps those who insist that animals should not be seen as property are
making a simple and modest claim: Human beings should not be able to treat animals however they wish.
Their starting point seems to be this: If you are property, you are, in law and in effect, a slave, wholly
subject to the will of your owner. A table, a chair, or a stereo can be treated as the owner likes; it can be
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broken, or sold or replaced at the owner’s whim. Many people think that, for animals, the status of
property is devastating to actual protection against cruelty and abuse.
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18
Courts Refuse to Extend Recognition of Rights to Animals
SUPREME COURT IS LOCKED INTO A MINDSET THAT HAS EXISTED SINCE ROMAN
TIMES
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 42
A century ago, the United States Supreme Court could write that "the fundamental principles upon which
the common property in game rests have undergone no change" since Roman times, 60 and Holmes could
say, with respect to wild animals, that "we have adopted the Roman law." 61 Few would challenge either
statement today. With almost no exceptions, the common law of wild animals in England and every
American state still hews to Roman law either by (1) citing Justinian, (2) citing Bracton, Blackstone, or
Kent, who incorporated the essentials of Roman law, (3) citing cases that adopted the essentials of Roman
law, (4) calling Roman law common law, or (5) stating a common law rule that sounds like a Roman rule.
62
The common law of domesticated animals is even more overtly Roman. A leading modern American
legal encyclopedia tersely states that "[g]enerally, all domestic animals are regarded as property, and an
owner thereof has a property right therein as absolute as that in inanimate objects." 63
COURTS HAVE RULED THAT NON-HUMANS ARE NOT “PERSONS” UNDER THE LAW
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 250
LeVasseur argued that he was trying to prevent greater harm to another in two senses. First, he argued that
the dolphins should be included within the term another. The appellate court rejected this argument
because the statute defined “another” as a person, and although corporations and associations can be
considered as “persons” under the law, the court ruled that dolphins could not be so considered.
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19
Court Refusal to Extend Rights Irrational and Arbitrary
USING THE LAW TO REJECT PERSONHOOD FOR ALL NONHUMAN ANIMALS
IRRATIONAL
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 31-2
Judges who deny personhood to every nonhuman animal act arbitrarily. They don’t say they do. Instead,
they use legal fictions. Legal fictions are transparent lies they insist we believe. These allow them to
attribute personhood not only to humans lacking consciousness and even brains but to ships, trusts,
corporations, even religious idols. They pretend these entities enjoy autonomy. Legal scholars John
Chipman Gray could not see any difference between pretending that will-less humans have autonomy and
doing the same for nonhuman animals. Because legal fictions may cloak abuses of judicial power, Jeremy
Bentham characterized them as a “syphilis…[that] carries into every part of the system the principle of
rottenness.”
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**Failure to Recognize Animal Rights Harmful**
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21
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in
Moral Frameworks
GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF MORAL DUTY TO SENTIENT BEINGS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 113
In short, most of us claim to reject the characterization of animals as things that has dominated Western
thinking for many centuries. For the better part of 200 years, Anglo-American moral and legal culture has
made a distinction between sentient creatures and inanimate objects. Although we believe that we ought to
prefer humans over animals when interests conflict, most of us accept as completely uncontroversial that
our use and treatment of animals are guided by what we might call the humane treatment principle, or the
view that because animals can suffer, we have a moral obligation that we owe directly to animal not to
impose unnecessary suffering on them.
ALL SENTIENT BEINGS ENTITLTED TO THE SAME LEVEL OF MORAL CONSIDERATION
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 124
Sapontzis espouses a more egalitarian philosophy. He advocates not only that all sentient nonhumans be
freed from human exploitation but also that they have equal rights—equal not in the sense of being entirely
the same as humans’ but in the sense of affording equal protection. All sentient beings (nonhuman and
human) have equal value, he asserts; they’re entitled to “the same level of moral and legal protection.”
In her most recent work, Paola Cavalieri too rejects an animal hierarchy. In her view, all conscious beings
should receive “full moral status,” which would entail an equal right to be spared suffering, as well as an
equal right to life. Also, she maintains that nonhumans need a number of legal rights in addition to the
right not to be property.
DRAWING THE LINE FOR CONSIDERATION OF OTHERS ANYWHERE ELSE BUT
SENTIENCE IS WRONG – JUST AS RACISM AND SEXISM ARE
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 8-9
If a being suffers there can be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.
No matter what the nature of the being, the principle of equality requires that its suffering to be counted
equally with the like suffering—insofar as rough comparisons can be made—of any other being. If a being
is not capable of suffering, or of experiencing enjoyment or happiness, there is nothing to be taken into
account. So the limit of sentience (using the term as a convenient if not strictly accurate shorthand for the
capacity to suffer and/or experience enjoyment) is the only defensible boundary of concern for the interests
of others. To mark this boundary by some other characteristic like intelligence or rationality would be to
mark it in an arbitrary manner. Why not choose some other characteristic, like skin color?
Racists violate the principle of equality by giving greater weight to the interests of members of their own
race when there is a clash between their interests and the interests of those of another race. Sexists violate
the principle of equality by favoring the interests of their own sex. Similarly, speciesists allow the interests
of their own species to override the greater interests of members of other species. The pattern is identical
in each case.
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22
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in
Moral Frameworks
SHOULD DRAW THE LINE FOR MORAL CONSIDERATION AT SENTIENCE
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 6-8
Many philosophers and other writers have proposed the principle of equal consideration of interests, in some form or
other, as a basic moral principle; but not many of them have recognized that this principle applies to members of other
species as well as to our own. Jeremy Bentham was one of the few who did realize this. In a forward-looking passage
written at a time when black slaves had been freed by the French but in the British dominions were still being treated in
the way we now treat animals, Bentham wrote,
“The day may come when the rest of the animal creation may acquire those rights which never could have been
witholden from them but by the hand of tyranny. The French have already discovered that the blackness of skin is no
reason why a human being should be abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormenter. It may one day come to
be recognized that the number of the legs, the villosity of the skin, or the termination of the os sacrum are reasons
equally insufficient for abandoning a sensitive being to the same fate. What else is it that should trace the insuperable
line? Is it the faculty of a reason, or perhaps the faculty of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond
comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, than an infant of a day or a week or even a month,
old. But suppose they were otherwise, what would it avail? The question is not, Can they reason? Nor can they talk?
But, Can they suffer?”
In this passage Bentham points to the capacity of suffering as the vital characteristic that gives a being the right to equal
consideration. The capacity for suffering – or more strictly, for suffering and/or enjoyment or happiness—is not just
another characteristic like the capacity for language or higher mathematics. Bentham is not saying that those who try to
mark “the insuperable line” that determines whether beings should be considered happen to have chosen the wrong
characteristic. By saying that we must consider the interests of all beings with the capacity for suffering or enjoyment
Bentham does not arbitrarily exclude from consideration any interests at all – as those who draw the line with reference
to the possession or reason or language do. The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is a prerequisite for having
interests at all, a condition that must be satisfied before we can speak of interests in a meaningful way. It would be
nonsense to say that it was not in the interests of a stone to be kicked along the road by a schoolboy. A stone does not
have interests because it cannot suffer. Nothing that we can do to it could possibly make any difference to its welfare.
The capacity for suffering and enjoyment is, however, not only necessary, but also sufficient for us to say that a being
as interests—at an absolute minimum, an interest in not suffering. A mouse, for example, does have an interest in not
being kicked along the road, because it will suffer if it is.
REJECTION OF SPECIESISM DOES NOT REQUIRE TREATING EVERYONE THE SAME –
CAPACITY FOR PAIN ALL THAT MATTERS
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 20-1
I conclude, then, that a rejection of speciesism does not imply that all lives are of equal worth. While self-awareness,
the capacity to think ahead and have hopes and aspirations for the future, the capacity for meaningful relations with
others and so on are not relevant to the question of inflicting pain—since pain is pain, whatever other capacities,
beyond the capacity to feel pain, the being may have—these capacities are relevant to the question of taking life. It is
not arbitrary to hold that the life of a self-aware being, capable of abstract thought, of planning for the future, of
complex acts of communication, and so on, is more valuable than the life of a being without these capacities. To see
the difference between the issues of inflicting pain and taking life, consider how we would choose within our own
species. If we had to choose to save the life of a normal human being or an intellectually disabled human being, we
would probably choose to save the life of a normal human being; but if we had to choose between preventing pain the
normal human being or the intellectually disabled one—imagine that both have received painful but superficial injuries,
and we only have enough painkiller for one of them—it is not nearly so clear how we ought to choose. The same is
true when we consider other species. The evil of pain is, in itself, unaffected by the other characteristics of the being
who feels the pain; the value of life is affected by these other characteristics. To give just one reason for this difference,
to take the life of a being who has been hoping, planning, and working for some future goal is to deprive that being of
the fulfillment of all those efforts; to take the life of a being with a mental capacity below the level needed to grasp that
one is a being with a future—much less make plans for the future—cannot involve this particular kind of loss.
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23
All Sentient Beings Should be Accorded Consideration in
Moral Frameworks
MULTIPLE ARGUMENTS FAVOR EXTENDING MORAL CONSIDERATION TO ANIMALS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 52
Regan argues that it is morally wrong to regard animals as nothing more than receptacles for intrinsic value
that lack any value of their own. Animals have inherent value apart and it is inappropriate to treat them
solely as the means to the end of value maximization. Regan claims that evolutionary theory, common
sense, and ordinary language all point to the possession of consciousness—indeed, of a complex mental
life—by nonhuman animals. Normal mammals aged one year or more (human and nonhuman) share mind
states such as perception, memory, desire, belief, self-consciousness, a sense of the future intention,
emotion sentience. Human and nonhuman animals possess equal inherent value precisely because they
share a crucial similarity; almost every mammal—human or nonhuman—is the subject of a life that is
meaningful to that being, irrespective of the value of that being to anyone else. The basic moral right
possessed by all moral agents and patients is the right to respectful treatment. This right is based on the
respect principle, which precludes treating the rightholder merely as a means to an end. Rather, the
rightholder must be treated in a manner consistent with the recognition that she possesses an inherent value
that is the same as any other holder of such right. Inherent value and respect support the harm principle,
which holds that we have a prima facie duty not to harm individuals and we owe this duty directly to the
beneficiaries of the duty. Although the harm principle imposes a prima facie and not absolute obligation,
we need valid moral reasons to override the obligation and cannot do so simply by appeal to consequences,
as is the case with animal welfare.
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24
Non-Human Animals Should Be Accorded Equal
Consideration in Moral Frameworks
NON-HUMAN ANIMALS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED PERSONS
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 270
“Person” has both a descriptive and an evaluative meaning. In the evaluative sense of the term, “person”
refers to beings whose interests are morally or legally protected against routine exploitation by those whose
actions can be directly influenced by moral or legal concepts. Persons are those whom morality or the law
indicates we, as moral or legal agents, must treat fairly: must not, as Kant would say, treat as a mere means
to the satisfaction of our interests. I think –and have argued at length for this conclusion elsewhere – that
we should regard beings with interests (i.e. all beings with feelings) as persons in this evaluative sense of
the term. That is, I think we should treat all beings with interests fairly, regarding none of them as mere
means to the satisfaction of our interests. That is what animal liberation is all about.
Very briefly, the argument for this conclusion runs as follows. Morality is goal-directed activity which
aims at making the world a better place in terms of reduced suffering and frustration, increased happiness
and fulfillment, a wider reign of fairness and respect for others, and enhanced presence and effectiveness of
such virtues as kindness and impartiality. Through our exploitation of nonhuman animals we detract from
all of these moral goals. Factory farming, fur trapping and other exploitations of nonhuman animals
increase the suffering and frustration in the world and reduce happiness and fulfillment—the exact opposite
of our moral goals. In using our vast power over nonhuman animals to make them bear burdens and suffer
losses so that we may be comfortable and prosperous, we extend and enforce a reign of tyranny and
disregard, verging on contempt, for others – again, the exact opposite of our moral goals. Finally, by
giving revulsion at and compassion for the suffering of nonhuman animals the demeaning labels of
“squeamishness” and “sentimentality” and by conditioning children to disregard such feelings as they learn
to hunt, butcher or vivisect nonhuman animals, we limit and inhibit the virtues of which we are capable—
again, just the opposite of our moral goals. Consequently, in all these ways our goal of making the world
a morally better place will be more effectively pursued by liberating from human exploitation all those
capable of suffering and happiness and of being treated fairly and virtuously.
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25
Infliction of Pain & Suffering on Animals Immoral
INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF SUFFERING ON SENTIENT BEINGS IS IMMORAL
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 112
Consider the following example. Simon proposes to torture a dog by burning the dog with a blowtorch.
Simon’ only reason for torturing the dog is that he derives pleasure from this sort of activity. Does Simon’s
proposal raises any moral concern? Is Simon violating some moral obligation not to use the animal in this
way for his amusement? Or is Simon’s action morally no different from crushing and eating a walnut?
I think most of us would not hesitate to maintain that blowtorching the dog simply for the pleasure of it is
not a morally justifiable way to act under any circumstances. What is the basis of our moral judgment? Is
it merely that we are concerned about the effect of Simon’s action on other humans? Do we object to the
torture of the dog merely because by torturing the dog Simon may become a more callous or unkind person
in his dealings with other humans? We may very well rest our moral objection to Simon’s action in part on
our concern for the effect of his action on other humans, but that is not our primary reason for objecting.
After all, we would condemn the act even if Simon tortures the animal in secret, or even if, apart from his
appetite for torturing dogs, Simon is a charming fellow who shows only kindness to other humans.
Suppose that the dog is the companion animal of Simon’s neighbor Jane. Do we object to the torture
because the dog is Jane’s property? We may very well object to Simon’s action because the dog belongs to
Jane, but again, that is not our first concern. We would find Simon’s action objectionable even if the dog
were a stray.
The primary reason that we find Simon’s action morally objectionable is its effect on the dog. The dog is
sentient; like us, the dog is the sort of being who has the capacity to suffer and has an interest in not being
blowtorched. The dog prefers, or wants, or desires not to be blowtorched. We have an obligation—one
owed directly to the dog and not merely one that concerns the dog—not to torture the dog. The sole ground
for this obligation is that the dog is sentient; no other characteristic, such as humanlike rationality,
reflective self-consciousness, or the ability to communicate in a human language is necessary. Simply
because the dog can experience pain and suffering, we regard it as morally necessary to justify the
infliction of harm on the dog. We may disagree about whether a particular justification suffices, but we all
agree that some justification is required, and Simon’s pleasure simply cannot constitute such a justification.
An integral part of our moral thinking is the idea that, other things being equal, the fact than an action
causes pain counts as a reason against that action, not merely because imposing harm on another sentient
being somehow diminishes us, but because imposing harm on another sentient being is wrong in itself.
And it does not matter whether Simon propose to blowtorch for pleasure the dog or another animal, such as
a cow. We would object to his conduct in either case.
MORAL STANDING SHOULD BE TIED TO AN INDIVIDUAL’S ABILITY TO BE HARMED BY
A PARTICULAR TREATMENT
James Rachels, Professor of Philosophy-University of Alabama, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates
and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 170
We could spin these observations into a theory of moral standing that would compete with the other
theories. Our theory would start like this: There is no such thing as moral standing simpliciter. Rather,
moral standing is always oral standing with respect to some particular mode of treatment. A sentient being
has moral standing with respect to not being tortured. A self-conscious being has moral standing with
respect to not being humiliated. An autonomous being has moral standing with respect to not being
coerced. And so on. If asked, toward whom is it appropriate to direct fundamental moral considerations?
we could reply: It is appropriate to direct moral consideration to any individual who has any of the
indefinitely long list of characteristics that constitute morally good reasons why he or she should not be
treated in any of the various ways in which individuals may be treated.
You may think this isn’t a very appealing theory. It is tedious; it lacks the crispness of the other theories; it
doesn’t yield quick and easy answers to practical questions; and worse, it isn’t exciting. But it is the truth
about moral standing.
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26
Adherence to Species Barrier Entrenches Speciesism
DRAWING LINES BETWEEN HUMANS AND NON-HUMANS IS A FORM OF SPECIESISM
Peter Staudenmeir, human rights advocate and philosopher, “THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANIMAL
RIGHTS”, March 2003, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
Relying on a dubious analogy to institutionalized forms of social domination and hierarchy, animal rights
advocates argue that drawing an ethically significant distinction between human beings and non-human
animals is a form of ‘speciesism’, a mere prejudice that illegitimately privileges members of one’s own
species over members of other species. According to this theory, animals that display a certain level of
relative physiological and psychological complexity – usually vertebrates, that is, fish, amphibians, reptiles,
birds and mammals – have the same basic moral status as humans. A central nervous system is, at bottom,
what confers moral considerability; in some versions of the theory, only creatures with the capacity to
experience pain have any moral status whatsoever. These animals are often designated as ‘sentient’.
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Speciesism Immoral – Akin to Racism and Sexism
SPECIESISM IS A BIAS AS PERNICIOUS AS RACISM AND SEXISM
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 24
Mamet’s book is an allegory about racism and sexism and every other “ism” by which humans arbitrarily
favor their own kind. It’s also about “speciesism.” Coined nearly thirty years ago by British psychologist
Richard Ryder, “speciesism” is defined by the Oxford English Dictionary as “discrimination
against…animal species by human beings, based on an assumption of mankind’s superiority.” In other
words, it’s a bias, as arbitrary and hateful as any other. The English philosopher R.G. Frey, who opposes
rights for nonhuman animals, “cannot think of anything at all compelling that cedes all human life of any
quality greater value than animal life of any quality.”
SPECIESISM LOGICAL PARALLEL TO RACISM AND SEXISM
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 79-80
Once we understand that in respect of any valuable characteristic we can think of, there is no gap between
humans and animals, but rather an overlap in the possession of that characteristic by individuals of different
species, it is easy to see the belief that all humans are somehow infinitely more valuable than any animal is
a prejudice. It is in some respects akin to the prejudice that racists have in favor of their own race, and
sexists have in favor of their own gender (although there are also differences, as with any complex social
phenomena). Speciesism is logically parallel to racism and sexism, in the sense that speciesists, racists, and
sexists all say: The boundary of my own group is also the boundary of my concern. Never mind what you
are like, if you are a member of my group, you are superior to all those who are not members of my group.
The speciesist favors a large group than the racist, and so has a larger circle of concern, but all of these
prejudices use an arbitrary and morally irrelevant fact—membership in a race, gender, or species—as if it
were morally crucial.
SPECIESISM LICENSES THE HATRED OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Kim Stallwood, PETA, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 195
The basis for this domination is the social construction of speciesism, which is based on the assumed
superiority of Homo sapiens and which segregates nonhuman from human animals. This segregation, in
turn, licenses a hatred of animals. Animal activist Jim Mason, writing in An Unnatural Order (1993), calls
that hatred misothery and explains that it gives humans license to exempt the labor of nonhuman animals
from moral consideration. Consequently, in every human society, whether communist, capitalist, or
developing world, the labor of nonhuman animals is used without any moral consideration to provide
services and to produce commodities for human consumption.
SPECIESISM IS FOUNDED ON IGNORANCE AND PREJUDICE
Kyle Ash, lobbying strategist at the European Environmental Bureau, Copyright (c) 2005 Animal Law
(INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY,)
2005 p. 197-8
The time has long gone by when one should apologize for running counter to human conceptions that are
founded upon human ignorance, inherited prejudice, or crass stupidity. If the purpose were to write a work
upon geography, it would not be necessary to begin with an extended demonstration of the spherecity of
the earth, although a few centuries ago a man could, with entire legality, have been burned at the stake for
asserting such a proposition. n15Though it is unlikely anti-speciesists will be burned at the stake,
international law has not yet reached a time when rejection of bigotry expands to non-human animal rights
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Speciesism Immoral – Akin to Racism and Sexism
SPECIESISM IS THE MORAL EQUIVALENT TO RACISM AND SEXISM
Peter Staudenmeir, human rights advocate and philosopher, “THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANIMAL
RIGHTS”, March 2003, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
Thus on the animal rights view, to draw a line between human beings and other sentient creatures is
arbitrary and unwarranted, in the same way that classical racism and sexism unjustly deemed women and
people of color to be undeserving of moral equality. The next logical step in expanding the circle of ethical
concern is to overcome speciesism and grant equal consideration to the interests of all sentient beings,
human and non-human.
ARGUMENT THAT SPECIESISM IS IMMORAL BACKED WITH SOLID REASONING
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 243
The core of this book is the claim that to discriminate against beings solely on account of their species is a
form of prejudice, immoral and indefensible in the same way that discrimination on the basis of race is
immoral and indefensible. I have not been content to put forward this claim as a bare assertion, or as a
statement of my own personal view, which others may or may not choose to accept. I have argued for it,
appealing to reason rather than to emotion or sentiment. I have chosen this path, not because I am unaware
of the importance of kind feelings and sentiments of respect toward other creatures, but because reason is
more universal and more compelling in its appeal. Greatly as I admire those who have eliminated
speciesism from their lives purely because their sympathetic concern for others reaches out to all sentient
creatures, I do not think than an appeal to sympathy and good-heartedness alone will convince most people
of the wrongness of speciesism. Even where other human beings are concerned, people are surprisingly
adept at limiting their sympathies to those of their own nation or race. Almost everyone, however, is at
least nominally prepared to listen to reason. Admittedly, there are some who flirt with an excessive
subjectivism in morality, saying that any morality is as good as any other; but when these same people are
pressed to say if they think the morality of Hitler, or of the slave traders, is as good as the morality of
Albert Schweitzer or Martin Luther King, they find that, after all, they believe some moralities are better
than others.
So throughout this book I have relied on rational argument. Unless you can refute the central argument of
this book, you should now recognize that speciesism is wrong, and this means that, if you take morality
seriously, you should try to eliminate speciesist practices from your own life, and oppose them elsewhere.
Otherwise no basis remains from which you can, without hypocrisy, criticize racism or sexism.
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Speciesism Immoral – Akin to Racism and Sexism
THE ELIMINATION OF SPECIESISM LIKE RACISM AND SEXISM IS ESSENTIAL IN THE
MORAL PROGRESS OF HUMANITY AND ASSURES THE PROTECTIONS OF ANIMAL
RIGHTS
Bernard Chevassus-au-Louis, geneticist, PhD, is currently president of the National Natural History
Museum in Paris, Robert Barbault, director of the French Institute of Basic and Applied Ecology, and
Patrick Blandin, President of the IUCN French National Committee, “Towards a national biodiversity
research strategy for sustainable development” Biodiversity and Global Change, 17 january 2005, VIII
http://www.adpf.asso.fr/adpf-publi/ folio/biodiversite/pdf/en/chap8.pdf
There is also the thesis of the intrinsic value of all living creatures and their right to live, which forms the
basis of the “biocentric” point of view. This vision attempts to position our species as one among many,
and to relativise – even radically call into question – human beings’ right to impede the future of other
species. In a more limited fashion, the existence of rights for certain species, domestic animals in particular,
is defended by such philosophers as Élisabeth de Fontenay (1998). Domestication, by modifying animals
for the needs of humans, creates a common destiny and also a chap. viii 201
responsibility towards these species in the future. The concept of “animal rights” vis-à- vis human rights is
implicitly present in certain legal texts (Hermitte, 1993). This point of view has been adopted by those who
see the progressive elimination of forms of discrimination –racism, sexism, and now “speciism” (negative
discrimination against other species) – as a form of moral progress for humanity. More generally, the idea
that all of nature has rights that humans must respect – even at the expense of their proper future – forms
the basis of the “ecocentric” vision, which asserts that human beings must take their place without
damaging the functioning of planet Earth. In this vision, the earth itself is compared to a living “super
organism”. This is the “Gaia hypothesis” (the Earth mother in Greek mythology), which was developed
some twenty years ago by British thinker James Lovelock (Barbault, 1994, Stengers, 2003).
SPECIESISM IS RACIST
Roger Fouts, President of non-profit organization, Friends of Washoe; Co-Director of Chimpanzee and Human
Communication Institute; Professor of Psychology; and Distinguished Professor of Research at Central Washington
University. “APES, DARWINIAN CONTINUITY, AND THE LAW”. Animal Law. 10 Animal L. 99 2004
Our conception of nonhuman animals derives from our assumptions about humans and then presumes that
these unique abilities are [*105] absent in our fellow animals, without finding out. Under this system,
nonhuman animals are conceptualized as either defective humans or worse, mere unthinking, unfeeling
objects to be exploited. It also deems defective any humans who are not ideal in the Platonic sense.n40 This
approach is "implicitly, and perhaps necessarily, racist." n41 It forces us "to convince ourselves how a few
of the have-nots could have come upon what we consider to be language." n42 Of course, many academics
have used the absence of evidence or studied intentional ignorance to come up with explanations to do just
that. Two such academics, Steven Pinker and Konrad Lorenz, are discussed in the section that follows. n43
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Confinement of Animals in Zoos/Circuses Immoral
CONFINING ANIMALS FOR ENTERTAINMENT PURPOSES IMMORAL
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 92
In terms of captive wild animals, we can make a distinction between zoos on the one hand—which usually
claim to fulfill functions other than merely entertaining the public with displays of wild animals – and
circuses and dolphinaria on the other which, although they have increasingly sought to justify their use of
animals in other ways, remain primarily concerned with entertainment. Given that the moral orthodoxy
demands that we balance the suffering of animals with the benefits that accrue to humans as a result, the
predominance of the trivial benefit in the latter category would make the infliction of suffering morally
illegitimate. The case of zoos, where it is claimed in particular that captive wild animals provide important
conservation functions which will benefit wild animals in general, is more complex.
CIRCUSES IMPOSE REAL SUFFERING ON ANIMALS
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 92
There is little doubt that many circus animals do suffer as a result of their captivity. There is evidence of
deliberately inflicted cruelty particularly as a result of the training methods which often depend upon
engendering fear in animals to make them perform. More important, though, is that even if circus
employees did not inflict pain on their animals (and many no doubt do not) it is doubtful if circuses could
ever provide a reasonable environment to prevent suffering. For obvious reasons, animals have to remain
shackled or caged for most of the time between performances and are transported between venues in socalled “beast wagons” which, by definition, have to be small and often basic. So even, without considering
the morally dubious nature of the “tricks” that circus animals are expected to perform (the roller-skating
elephant, for instance, or the ice-skating polar bear) the level of suffering inflicted on circus animal is high.
NO MORAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ANIMALS IN CIRCUSES—CAN HAVE CIRCUSES
WITHOUT ANIMALS
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 93
Since circuses have no significant human purpose, the moral orthodoxy demands that these strict
regulations be enforced elsewhere. The moral orthodoxy does compel us to consider the livelihoods of
circus employees, but it should be remembered that circuses can and do exist without using wild animals as
part of the performance. In addition, as William Johnson (1990:318) has suggested, it is possible for
governments to provide tax concessions and grants to enable circuses to develop non-animal shows and to
retrain the animal handlers.
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Failure to Recognize Animal Rights Violates Justice
VALUE OF LIFE MUST BE ASSERTED – ARGUMENTS OTHERWISE USE THE LOGIC OF
NAZISM
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 66
The core question is this: Are things or beings or ideas valuable because we value them or because they are
inherently valuable? If nonhuman animals, or humans, are valuable only because we value them, then they
must lack value when we don't, and we must face the fact that Adolph Eichmann, Adolph Hitler, and the
killing doctors of Hadamar, who did not value many kinds of human beings, were correct. It would then
follow that the Final Solution, legal in Nazi Germany, was neither illegal nor unjust. Instead, it was the
judges at Nuremberg and Frankfurt and Jerusalem who acted illegally and unjustly.
On the other hand, if humans, or nonhuman animals, are inherently valuable, then we ignore their value at
the dreadful price of acting toward them with monumental injustice. In the first century B.C., Cicero wrote
that "there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different law now and in the future, but one
eternal and unchangeable law will be valid for all nations and all times." 13 "Wicked and unjust statutes," he
claimed, "were anything but law." 14 Natty Bummpo, the hero of James Fenimore Cooper Leatherstocking
Tales of life on the eighteenth-century American frontier, earthily said, "When the colony's laws, or the
king's laws, run a'gin the laws of God, they got to be onlawful, and ought not to be obeyed." 15 While the
Frankfurt judge almost certainly had never heard of Natty Bummpo, he may have had Sophocles or Cicero
on his mind, perhaps on his desk, when he wrote in judgment of the killing doctors of Hadamar. If they
were right, then slavery was wrong even if everyone thought it was right. Then Hans and Sophie Scholl and
the judges of Nuremberg and Frankfurt and Jerusalem were right and the Nazis were wrong. The
Confederates were wrong and Mr. Lincoln was right.
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Viewing Animals as Property Negatively Impacts How People
Treat Each Other
IMPOSSIBLE TO VIEW ANIMALS AS MERE RESOURCES WITHOUT IT INFECTING HOW
WE VIEW EACH OTHER
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 196
There are many problems with viewing the world and the things in it a simply resources. The arrogance involved is, of course,
breathtaking. But, from the point of view of human beings, there is a more pressing drawback . It is impossible to view the
world and everything in it primarily as a resource without this infecting the way we view each other. This
is the logical culmination of the resource-based view of nature: humans are part of nature, and therefore
humans are resources too. And whenever something—humans or otherwise—is viewed primarily a
resource, things generally don’t go well for it.
The logic of the situation, and its implications for human beings, is exemplified in our treatment of animals.
Almost every facet of this treatment screams out the idea that they are nothing more than renewable
resources. They are things to be eaten, things to be experimented on, things to be stared at, hunted or killed
for our entertainment. In most countries, farm and laboratory animals are classified, in law, as property. A recent attempt by
Compassion in World Farming and other animal welfare groups to have animals reclassified as “sentient beings”—a change that
would have enormous ramifications for the way animals are raised and transported—was recently thrown out of the European High
Court because of the anticipated economic consequences. What makes this particularly staggering is that animals are sentient
creatures is undeniably true. In the European Union, apparently, truth comes a poor second to profit.
However, when you are talking about fundamental ways of conceptualizing and understanding the world,
what goes around comes around. The instrumental view of animals necessarily infects our views of
humans. In philosophy, the industry term for the logic that characterizes the development of a situation is
dialectic. This final chapter, then, examines the dialectic by which the instrumental view of animals
becomes transformed into an instrumental view of human beings, and the unfortunate consequences this
transformation yields.
VIEW OF ANIMALS AS RESOURCES YIELDS ACCEPTANCE OF THE CONCEPT OF
ACCEPTABLE LOSSES
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 212
We are literally killing ourselves, and killing each other. We foul our water, our air and our food. The great killers of today—cancer
and heart disease—are increasingly inflicted on us by the corporations that churn chemicals out into our air, our rivers and our
groundwater, and by the food producers that pile our plates full with food high in fat and laced with poisonous chemical cocktails. Do
we fight this? Do we rage against what is being done to us and to our world? On the contrary, our complicity in the dialectic is
unquestionable. What are we in this great scheme of things? Acceptable losses. As long as not too many of us die, then our deaths
are an acceptable trade-off for economic gain and material luxury. Environmental degradation on an unprecedented scale? Ditto. In
the gestell everything is a resource –ourselves and our world included. Everything is up for grabs, anything can be traded off against
anything else. And, in this process, a loss—whether human or environmental –that is not too great, and which procures something
else that is valued more, is an acceptable one.
We are acceptable losses. Why don’t we do anything about it? Because, implicitly, we have come to understand and accept this fact.
Not only do we understand other people as resources, this is also how we understand ourselves. This is the culmination of the
resource-based view of the world; the logic of the gestell. We are simply one resource against others. Our position is hopeless, and
we are, consequently, helpless. We are not responsible for what we do, and what we let others do to us, because we are just acceptable
losses. Why should we pretend otherwise?
We are killing ourselves, and killing each other. If I were religiously inclined—which I am not—I would
be tempted to describe these as our sins. And what do we do with sins? We get someone else to take our
sins upon them. Whether they want to or not! Animals can suffer for us, not only for those things that
have been thrust upon us, but also for those things that we have brought upon ourselves. They suffer for
our smoke-induced lung cancer, for our obesity-induced heart disease, for the sloppy and irresponsible way
we have used antibiotics. We, their self-styled masters, are lazy and stupid and, above all, ungrateful. But
that’s OK. If anything, these are just other sins, and someone, or something, else can be made to take our
sins upon them, and suffer so that we might not have to. Jesus is, apparently, live and well, but somewhat
unwilling this time around. He’s living as a Draize rabbit, and LD-50 mouse, a heroin monkey, and a
smoking dog.
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Viewing Animals as Property Negatively Impacts How People
Treat Each Other
UNIVERSALIZING ALL NONHUMAN ANIMALS AS “THINGS” OR “PROPERTY” WILL
FRAME HOW WE VIEW OTHER HUMANS
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 205-6
Heidegger, with whom we began this chapter, talked of the view of nature as a resource as stemming from
a conceptualization of the world he called a gestell, which can be translated “framework” or “matrix.” The
danger of the gestell, or one of its dangers, is its tendency to universality. If we view nature, and all things
in it, as simply resources, then it is inevitable we eventually acquire the same view of human beings. But
viewing human beings as resources has two facets. Obviously, one thing it means is that you will view
other human beings as resources. Less obviously, you are yourself a human being, and you will come to
think of yourself as a resource also.
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**Should Recognize Rights for Animals**
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Moral Framework Should be Extended to Animals
SHOULD EXTEND OUR ETHICAL AND MORAL FRAMEWORKS FOR TREATING PEOPLE
APPROPRIATELY MODIFIED TO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 16
As we have seen, society has grown increasingly concerned about animal suffering even when the source of
the suffering is not cruelty, most notably in the case of research and confinement agriculture, but also in
such areas as trapping. Indeed, a 1985 case in New York State vividly pointed out the need for ethical
evolution beyond cruelty. A group of attorneys brought suit against the branch of New York State
government charged with administering public lands on the grounds that the agency’s permitting the use of
steel-jawed traps on public lands entailed violation of the cruelty laws, since animals trapped were deprived
of food, water, and medical care for injury. Although sympathetic to the moral point, the judge dismissed
the case, reiterating that cruelty laws did not apply to “standard” practices such as trapping, which fulfill a
legal human purpose – provision of furs and pest control. If the plaintiffs wished to ban steel-jawed traps,
said the judge, they needed to go to the legislature, that is, change the social ethic, not the judiciary, which
is bound b the ethic encoded in the anticruelty law.
Thus, society is faced with the need for new moral categories and laws that reflect those categories in order
to deal with animal use in science and agriculture and to limit the animal suffering with which it is
increasingly concerned. At the same time, society has gone through almost fifty years of extending its
moral categories for humans to people who were morally ignored or invisible. As noted, new and viable
ethics does not emerge ex nihilo. So a plausible and obvious move is for society to continue in its tendency
and attempt to extend the moral machinery it has developed for dealing with people, appropriately
modified, to animals. And this is precisely what has occurred. Society has taken elements of the moral
categories it uses for assessing the treatment of people and is in the process of modifying these concepts to
make them appropriate for dealing with new issues in the treatment of animals, especially their use in
science and confinement agriculture.
SHOULD ADOPT AN ETHIC THAT RESPECTS THE INTERESTS OF NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
DERIVED FROM THEIR NATURE AND INTERESTS – NOT EQUAL RIGHTS
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 17-8
It is necessary to stress here certain things that this ethic, in its mainstream version, is not and does not attempt to be.
As a mainstream movement, it does not try to give human rights to animals. Since animals do not have the same
natures and interests flowing from there natures as humans do, human rights do not fit animals. Animals do not have
basic natures that demand speech, religion, or property; thus according them these rights would be absurd. On the other
hand, animals have natures of their own (what I have, following Aristotle, called their telos) and interests that flow
from these natures, and the thwarting of these interests matters to animals as much as the thwarting of speech matters to
humans. The agenda is not, for mainstream society, making animals “equal” to people. It is rather preserving the
commonsense insight that “fish gotta swim and birds gotta fly,” and suffer if they don’t.
Nor is this ethic, in the minds of mainstream society, an abolitionist one, dictating that animals cannot be used by
humans. Rather, it is an attempt to constrain how they can be used, so as to limit their pain and suffering. In this
regard, as a 1993 Beef Today article points out, the thrust for protection of animal nature is not at all radical; it is very
conservative, asking for the same sort of husbandry that characterized the overwhelming majority of animal use during
all of human history, save the last fifty or so years. It is not opposed to animal use, it is opposed to animal use that goes
against the animals’ natures and tries to force square pegs into round holes, leading to friction and suffering. If animals
are to be used for food and labor, they should, as they traditionally did, live lives that respect their natures. If animals
are to be used to probe nature and cure disease for human benefit, they should not suffer in the process. Thus this new
ethic is conservative, not radical, harking back to the animal use that necessitated and thus entailed respect for the
animals’ natures. It is based on the insight that what we do to animals matters to them, just as what we do to humans
matters to them, and that consequently we should respect that mattering in our treatment and use of humans. And since
respect for animal nature is no longer automatic as it was in traditional agriculture, society is demanding that it be
encoded in law.
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Moral Framework Should be Extended to Animals
OUR GREATNESS IS DETERMINED BY HOW WE TREAT NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Ruth Layton, Director Food Animal Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the
ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 92-3
Often in my work I am reminded of Ghandi’s well known quote, “The greatness of a nation and its moral
progress can be judged by the way its animals are treated.” It is a source of hope to me therefore that the
leaflet produced by our government last year, in response to the bicententary of the abolition of the slave
trade, made the following statement: “2007 is a chance to make a collective commitment that in another
two centuries time no-one should feel the need to express regret for our activities today.” At present, our
treatment of many of the animals throughout the world who provide our food falls into just such a category,
which with hindsight we certainly will come to regret.
DIFFICULT TO JUSTIFY EXCLUDING NON-HUMAN ANIMALS FROM THE SPHERE OF
EQUALITY
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 237
For philosophers of the 1950s and 1960s, the problem was to interpret the idea that all human beings are
equal in a manner that does not make it plainly false. In most ways, human beings are not equal; and if we
seek some characteristic that all of them possess, then this characteristic must be a kind of lowest common
denominator, pitched so low that no human being lacks it. The catch is that any such characteristic that is
possessed by all human beings will not be possessed by only human beings. For example, all human
beings, but not only human beings, are capable of feeling pain; and while only human beings are capable of
solving complex mathematical problems, not all humans can do this. So it turns out that in the only sense
in which we can truly say, as an assertion of fact, that all humans are equal, at least some members of other
species are also “equal” – equal, that is, to some humans.
If, on the other hand, we decide that, as I argued in Chapter 1, these characteristics are really irrelevant to
the problem of equality, and equality must be based on the moral principle of equal consideration of
interests rather than on the possession of some characteristic, it is even more difficult to find some basis for
excluding animals from the sphere of equality.
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Moral Framework Should be Extended to Animals
PHILOSOPHERS SUCH AS RAWLS OFFER NO GOOD REASON FOR EXCLUDING ANIMALS
FROM MORAL CONSIDERATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 239-40
In case anyone still thinks it may be possible to find some relevant characteristic that distinguishes all
human beings from all members of other species, let us consider again the fact that there are some human
beings who quite clearly are below the level of awareness, self-consciousness, intelligence, and sentience of
many nonhuman beings. I am thinking of human beings with severe and irreparable brain damage, and also
of infant human beings; to avoid the complication of the potential of infants, however, I shall concentrate
on permanently and profoundly retarded human beings.
Philosophers who set out to find a characteristic that would distinguish human beings from other animals
rarely took the course of abandoning these groups of human beings by lumping them in with other animals.
It is easy to see why they did not do so; to take this line without rethinking our attitudes to other animals
would mean we have the right to perform painful experiments on retarded humans for trivial reasons;
similarly it would follow that we have the right to rear and kill them for food.
For philosophers discussing the problem of equality, the easiest way out of the difficulty posed by the
existence of human beings who are profoundly and permanently disabled intellectually was to ignore it.
The Harvard philosopher John Rawls, in his long book, A Theory of Justice, came up against this problem
when in trying to explain why we owe justice to human beings but not to other animals, but he brushed it
aside with the remark, “I cannot examine this problem here, but I assume that the account of equality would
not be materially affected.” This is an extraordinary way of handling the issue of equal treatment: it would
appear to imply either that we may treat people who are profoundly and permanently disabled intellectually
as we now treat animals, or that, contrary to Rawls’s own statements, we do owe justice to animals.
What else could philosophers do? If they honestly confronted the problem posed by the existence of
human beings with no morally relevant characteristics not also possessed by nonhuman beings, it would be
impossible to cling to the equality of human beings without suggesting a radical revision in the status of
non-humans. In a desperate attempt to save the usually accepted views, it was even argued that we should
treat beings according to what is “normal for their species” rather than according to their actual
characteristics. To see how outrageous this is, imagine that at some future date evidence were to be found
that, even in the absence of any cultural conditioning, it was normal for more females than males in a
society to stay at home looking after the children instead of going out to work. This finding would, of
course, be perfectly compatible with the obvious fact that there are some women who are less well suited to
looking after children, and better suited to going out to work, then some men. Would any philosopher then
claim that these exceptional women should be treated in accordance with what is “normal for the sex” –
and therefore, say, not be admitted to medical school – rather than in accordance with their actual
characteristics? I do not think so. I find it hard to see anything in this argument except a defense of
preferring the interests of members of our own species because they are members of our own species.
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Cruelty Towards and the Infliction of Suffering Upon
Animals Must be Rejected
MUST ADDRESS AND REDUCE HUMAN CRUELTY TO OTHER SPECIES
(we do not endorse the gendered language in this card)
Jon Wynne-Tyson, 1975, Food for a Future: the ecological priority of a humane diet, p. 138-41
Cruelty is the worst sin of all. It might almost be called the only one. A form of obsession with self and excluding
consideration of others, cruelty has to go before any other reform of ourselves or our environment begins to
be possible. The cruelty inherent in our exploitation of the animal world is so undoubted that anyone who has read this far and
now finds himself in disagreement with such a statement will have wasted his time, for he will be so far from knowing that I am
talking about that he will never have suffered a moment’s pang about anything at all that is going on in the world outside his own
immediate circle. I believe and hope that there are few intelligent people who have declined to such a low of ignorance and selfobsession, though we have to face that very many of us have allowed the scum of daily pollution so to cloud our consciences that the
truth and importance of what really matters – of what it is really all about – have been lost to sight.
There are, as we all know, no reasons for indulging in cruelty. The arguments for a humane treatment of other
creatures cannot be refuted except by a nihilist. Such arguments are answered not by reasons, but by excuses. When such excuses
are accompanied by deference to the theory rather than the practice of idealism, the result is that most human of human failings, hypocrisy. Excuses
provide the easy way out, the path of least effort and continued self-indulgence. The educated and intelligent person who pays lip service to morality, and
has at least intelligently faced the inexcusable nature of flesh-eating, is more difficult to excuse than the unthinking, who have thought about little, and
see no alternative. Most of us prefer to fall back on the childish defense of “But I want to” rather than accept the necessity for self-reform. Dispensing
our compassion with absurd selectivity – shedding crocodile tears over the bull-fight or the mauled bird brought in by the cat, while in the next breath
crooning over the tenderized flesh of the castrated steer or the caponized fowl – few of us have progressed further than the picture-book clichés of our
childhood. We want the grass to be green, the sky to be blue, and no splashes of red except on the poppies and the instantly recognized “baddies.”
when we look at what
our failings have made of the world, and the hell that we have created for its more defenseless inhabitants,
it is surely incumbent on everyone who can see the total picture to put that understanding at the disposal of
those weaker creatures who need it most.
Before it is too late we must become aware that this earth we live on is not anthropocentric. Only man is mancentered. Ecologically speaking, we are totally dispensable. The biosphere is in no way dependent on man and would in
It may be possible to understand and to feel some pity for the weakness and gullibility of our species, but
fact be much better off without him. The environmentalists who have suggested that man is like a fatal disease that the earth has
been unfortunate enough to contract are not indulging in absurd exaggeration. We have the power of choice. We can
help what we do. Animals cannot. It is up to us to realize the necessity to ourselves and to our environment to become
an influence for good rather than for evil – to learn to live symbiotically instead of like parasites and rogue predators
who kill without need or even hatred. The fox, some may protest, kills in excess of need, and therefore animals are no
better than man. But if man chooses to upset the local ecology by his own predatoriness, and then creates an artificial
situation in which a quantity of poultry are held captive in a small area, he cannot complain when a fox starts to behave
like a man. We cannot justify our own actions by citing those of a fox or any other animal when man behaves far worse by breeding
and slaughtering thousands of pheasants, grouse, cattle sheep, pigs and other victims of his “sport” and stomach.
In a way this all boils down to the only viable kind of morality being little more than a sense of balance. In my last book I suggested
that only by a change of values, not by a change of political administrators from the same stable as their predecessors, can
people learn to behave more like humane beings. Unregenerate people can only create an unregenerate organization and
an unregenerate society. Only better people can create a better society. They do not even have to create it – it is already there by the
very act of self improvement. By “better people” I was meaning, above all, more compassionate people: people who have seen the
paramount necessity to eradicate their cruelties. For cruelty is humanity’s worse form of unbalance.
There is no parallel in nature to mankind’s cruelty. It is a unique vice, peculiar to man, and the cause of the
major ills of our society. Oddly enough, despite the state of the world by which so many of us are now downright scared, there
are still plenty of people who breathe brimstone at the very suggestion that people should become better. They get, it seems, an instant
vision of mere goody-goodiness, or interfering busy-bodying and probably a reduction of their sex life. Let them be assured that
although all sorts of baddy-baddiness may well get tidied up in the course of educating ourselves into a more balanced concept of life
and our responsibilities, it is above all cruelty in its many forms that is the evil we must concentrate on
eradicating. There is no more constant and widespread example of this evil than in our daily treatment of
other species.
The eradication of cruelty is an educational problem, little more. But two great hurdles stand in the way. The first of
these is man’s fierce resistance to change – personal change, that it, or habits and heart. We all know that one of the major irritants
within a consumer society is change for the sake of change, but this relates only to such idiocies as planned obsolescence and other
short cuts to high profits and low standards. The kind of change that can come about through increasing knowledge
leading to a revision of habits established in times of greater ignorance is a rarer but much more important
phenomenon.
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Respect for Animals Rights is a Deontological Moral
Consideration
THE RIGHTS OF NONHUMANS TO MORAL CONSIDERATION ARE DEONTOLOGICAL –
THAT IS THEY ARE JUSTIFIED REGARDLESS OF POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES.
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 14]
Although Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation had an unquestionable impact on traditional animal welfarists,
it was American philosopher Tom Regan who, in his book The Case for Animal Rights, presented an
argument in favor of animal rights. For Regan, if a person or animal has a right, then that right may not be
sacrificed or violated simply because the consequences of doing so are thought to be more desirable than
the consequences of respecting the right. Regan’s theory is deontological, which means simply that the
morality of conduct is not dependent on consequences but, instead, is dependent on something else--in this
case, an appeal to a moral right.
WEIGHING FUNDAMENTAL CLAIMS TO MORAL CONSIDERATION AGAINST POLITICAL
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES IS INHERENTLY SUSPECT.
Daar, Professor of Law, Whittier Law School, 03, <Judith, “The Prospect of Human Cloning: Improving
Nature or Dooming the Species?”, Seton Hall Law Review>
The problem with measuring the benefits of a certain action is that the notion of benefit is highly imprecise.
Utilitarians share the conviction that human actions should be assessed morally in terms of their production
of maximal value, but they disagree over which values are most important. n104 For some utilitarians, the value of
happiness should be the sole measure of utility, n105 while others argue that values other than happiness have intrinsic worth. n106
Among these other values are knowledge, health, and personal autonomy. n107 In the case of cloning, if happiness is the sole measure
of utility, then the [*536] happiness of the parents derived from rearing a cloned child would outweigh the difficulties experienced by
the child because of physical or psychological infirmities. n108 The two parents' happiness would also likely outweigh any
generalized concerns over the impact of cloning on society, because individual happiness trumps speculative societal harms.
In addition to imprecision in the measure of utility, an objection to utilitarianism is the subjective nature
of benefit. An individual can express a preference that would be viewed as morally unacceptable under
prevailing social norms, yet that individual will derive happiness by exercising that preference. Here, the
theory of utilitarianism must struggle with determining whether individual preferences should be the
measure of utility, or whether preferences must fit within prevailing norms. For example, if a parent cloned
a child solely to serve as a solid organ donor for an ill sibling, we might condemn that action and seek to
prevent it. n110 In our society, we value parents who embrace each of their children for his or her
individual self-worth. A parental preference that would involve killing a child to save another should cause
us to question the soundness of a utility equation where three people are benefitted and only one is harmed,
when that harm involves unacceptable moral (and legal) consequences.
As noted above, utilitarianism is problematic in its relative and absolute assessment of benefit. Perhaps
even more troubling, however, is its dismissal of harm and tendency toward a tyranny of the majority.
Since the principles of utilitarianism dictate that the interests of the majority are to override the rights of
the minority, the harms suffered by a few would be dismissed as unimportant in the overall utilitarian
calculus. In a cloning scenario, the harms may be profoundly damaging to a few individuals, so much so that their
objections should not be disregarded. If cloning produces children who are severely impaired and who suffer greatly during their
shortened lifetimes, their conception could be morally justified using utilitarian logic if their parents, and the physicians and
researchers who helped develop the technology for their birth, derive great happiness from the accomplishment of creating a cloned
human being. In thinking about whether a ban on human cloning can be morally justified, it is difficult to dismiss the potential harm to
the cloned individuals, even if the vast majority of those affected incur tremendous benefit. n111 Conversely, if only a few members
of society fear the repercussions of cloning, and the vast majority, including the cloned individuals themselves, are greatly benefited,
overriding the harms anticipated by those who are not directly affected by the technology may be morally justified under utilitarian
theory.
In the end, assessing the morality of a ban on human cloning is difficult to accomplish using utilitarian principles because the science
has yet to reveal any actual benefits or harms to human beings. The danger with proceeding to develop the science is, of course, that
the harms to cloned individuals will overwhelm any benefits. For this reason alone, many have supported a total ban on human
reproductive cloning. n112 But as noted in Part II.C., whether or not a ban is enacted in the United States or abroad, cloning
researchers will continue to pursue the holy grail that human cloning has become. Perhaps the better approach is to minimize the
harms by dedicating the most talented and highly organized scientific teams to unravel the cloning mysteries, rather than allowing
underground and sporadic efforts to cause unnecessary pain and suffering.
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Planet Debate 2011
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Respect for Animals Rights is a Deontological Moral
Consideration
UTILITARIANISM—ADDING UP THE COSTS AND BENEFITS—JUSTIFIES IMMORAL
OUTCOMES SUCH AS FORCED ORGAN DONATION.
Mark Bernstein, Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Texas, San Antonio, 2004, Terrorists of
Freedom Fighters: reflections on the liberation of animals, eds. Best & Nocella, p. 98
Animal liberationists may, as have many others, question the utilitarian presumption. There seems to be
more to determining right and wrong behavior than merely subtracting bad from good. Suppose that an
unsuspecting innocent walks into a hospital to visit a sick friend. Several very ill patients are waiting for
life-saving organ transplants. If our visitor donated his kidneys and heart, he would save the lives of three
deserving human beings. Understandably, our visitor, although feeling sympathy for the dying patients,
does not want his organs extracted. Surely, we believe that by refusing donation he acts permissibly, and
we just as certainly believe that if the doctors compelled him to involuntarily undergo the fatal operation to
get his organs, they would be doing something horribly wrong. Yet, on utilitarian grounds, our innocent
visitor ought to give up his organs and the doctors, if need be, ought to force him to yield his life. After all,
although we are killing one, we are saving three.
There are limits on what others can do to us without our voluntary consent. Although the general good may
be served by our discomfort and death, our lives have a certain value that allows us not to sacrifice
ourselves to this end. Cases vary, of course, but to deny animal liberationists the use, in general, of nonutilitarian considerations will also impoverish our moral interactions among humans.
EVEN IF PEOPLE DON’T ACCEPT ANIMAL LIBERATION OUR DEMAND IS NECESSARY
TO END EXPLOITATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert
Garner, p. 7
Whether or not these people, as individuals, would all agree that they are launching a liberation movement
for animals, the book as a whole amounts to no less. It is a demand for a complete change in our attitudes
to nonhumans. It is a demand that we cease to regard the exploitation of other species as natural and
inevitable, and that instead, we see it as a continuing moral outrage. Patrick Corbett, Professor of
Philosophy at Sussex University, captures the spirit of the book in his closing words:
“…we require now to extend the great principles of liberty, equality and fraternity over the lives of animals.
Let animal slavery join human slavery in the graveyard of the past.”
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Animal Rights Justified by Bentham
BENTHAM’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY PROVIDES JUSTIFICATION FOR EXTENDING
THEPRINCIPLE OF CONSIDERATION TO ANIMALS
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 5-6
Jeremy Bentham, the founder of the reforming utilitarian school of moral philosophy, incorporated the
essential basis of moral equality into his system of ethics by means of the formula: “Each to count for one
and none for more than one. “ In other words, the interests of every being affected by an action are to be
taken into account and given the same weight as the like interests of any other being. A later utilitarian,
Henry Sidwick, put the point in this way: “The good of any one individual is of no more importance, from
the point of view (if I may say so) of the Universe, than the good of any other.” More recently, the leading
figures in contemporary moral philosophy have shown a great deal of agreement in specifying as a
fundamental presupposition of their moral theories some similar requirement that works to give everyone’s
interests equal consideration – although these writers generally cannot agree on how this requirement is
best formulated.
It is an implication of this principle of equality that our concern for others and our readiness to consider
their interests ought not to depend on what they are like or on what abilities they may possess. Precisely
what our concern or consideration requires us to do may vary according to the characteristics of those
affected by what we do: concern for the well-being of children growing up in America would require that
we teach tem to read; concern for the well-being of pigs in a place where there is adequate food and room
to fun freely. But the basic element—the taking into account of the interests of the being, whatever those
interests may be—must, according to the principle of equality, be extended to all beings, black or white,
masculine or feminine, human or nonhuman.
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Consequentialism Bad
SHOULD JUSTIFY ANIMAL RIGHTS IN TERMS OF ANIMAL – NOT HUMAN -- INTERESTS
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 244
I have generally avoided arguing that we ought to be kind to animals because cruelty to animals leads to
cruelty to human beings. Perhaps it is true that kindness to human beings and to other animals often go
together; but whether or not this is true, to say, as Aquinas and Kant did, that this is the real reason why we
ought to be kind to animals is a thoroughly speciesist position. We ought to consider the interests of
animals because they have interests and it is unjustifiable to exclude them from the sphere of moral
concern; to make this consideration depend on beneficial consequences for human beings is to accept the
implication that the interests of animals do not warrant consideration for their own sakes.
IMMORAL TO CONSIDER THE ECONOMIC INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO ENSLAVE
ANIMALS LIKE IT WAS FOR THOSE WHO ENSLAVED PEOPLE
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 37
What is true of human liberation is no less true of animal liberation. That the interests of nonhuman
animals are not counted or, when they are, not counted equitably is a symptom, not the underlying cause, of
their systematic exploitation. The fundamental wrong is the failure to respect their basic moral rights,
including their rights to life, liberty, and bodily integrity. Moreover, as in the case of human slavery, so in
the case of animal slavery: the interests of those who profit from animal exploitation should play no role
whatsoever in deciding whether to abolish the institution that furthers those interests. It is only if or as
humanity transforms itself and begins to respect the rights of other-than-human animals that anything like
animal liberation can be achieved.
LIBERTIES OUTWEIGH ECONOMIC RIGHTS – WESTERN LAW PRECEDENT
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 259
Far more likely, she will not believe that law is just a system of rules. Instead, she will feel it represents the
community's present sense of right and justice and not what it felt a hundred years ago, or a thousand. She
will hesitate to perpetrate ancient injustices blindly. More numerous than Precedent (Rules) Judges today
are Policy Judges. If Judge Juno is a Policy Judge, she thinks that good policy is good justice and that it
promotes society's important values. She cares mostly about the effects of their rulings. The biomedical
research laboratory will bombard her with policy arguments. Consider the benefits that could accrue from
using the apes in biomedical research. Aphasia might be conquered. Children will learn how to read and
speak better. If we can't open ape skulls for language investigations, what will happen when we need them
for cancer research? What of the economic consequences? Biomedical research centers will have to close
their doors. Breadwinners will lose their jobs. American research will fail to compete with countries whose
laws are not so foolish.
But when economic rights clash with dignity-rights, the policy of modern Western law is to choose liberty
at nearly every juncture. This was not always so. The policy of promoting economics fortified the
determination of some of the finest Northern judges to uphold American slavery in the years before the
Civil War. Today this policy is widely conceived as the foulest blot on American justice. No economic
argument can justify human slavery.
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Consequentialism Bad
CONSEQUENTIALISM IMMORAL – JUSTIFIES TORTURE
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 23
There is another quite standard argument against utilitarian moral theory, one which has tended to be the
most prominent in the debate about the moral standing of animals. This is the objection to the theory as a
version of “consequentialism”. Consequentialists deny that the moral character of an act, or a proposed
rule of conduct is inherent in the act or rule by measuring or estimating its consequences. One
uncomfortable implication of consequentialism is that it appears to allow that it would be right to mistreat
an innocent individual if it could be shown that some aggregate benefits could be achieved by it. This cuts
against very widespread moral institutions that it is wrong to punish the innocent, no matter what the
consequences, that some forms of treatment, such as torture and enslavement, are simply unacceptable, and
cannot be justified in any circumstances.
PREOCCUPATION WITH CONSEQUENCES HAS HISTORICALLY PREVENTED
EXPANDING PERSONHOOD TO NONHUMANS
Lee Hall & Anthony Jon Waters, Lawyer in Baltimore & Law Professor at the University of
Maryland School of Law, 1999, Seton Hall Constitutional Law Journal,
http://www.personhood.org/lawreview/frompropertytopersonframe.html
Whenever humans have considered extending the scope of personhood, fear of the consequences has
emerged as the prime argument for not doing it. John Stuart Mill asked:
But was there any domination which did not appear natural to those who possessed it? ...So true is it that
unnatural generally means only uncustomary, and that everything which is usual appears natural. The
subjection of women to men being a universal custom, any departure from it quite naturally appears
unnatural.
Because the property classification treats non-human apes as instruments, tools, and toys, their interests can
be protected only by reclassifying them as persons. Our present knowledge about their abilities compels
this reclassification. In 1997, the British Parliament acknowledged this when it announced a ban on
invasive experiments on chimpanzees and other hominids. Lord Williams of Mostyn said, "This is a matter
of morality. The cognitive and behavioural characteristics and qualities of these animals means it is
unethical to treat them as expendable for research." Thus a government has officially decided that the
nature and capacities of certain non-humans demand that we no longer be entitled to treat them as property.
This, without regard to any benefit to humans that might result from doing so.
ITS IMPOSSIBLE TO ENTER ANIMAL RIGHTS INTO A UTILITARIAN CALCULUS – WE
TAKE ACTION FOR LONG TERM BENEFITS
Bernard Chevassus-au-Louis, geneticist, PhD, is currently president of the National Natural History
Museum in Paris, Robert Barbault, director of the French Institute of Basic and Applied Ecology, and
Patrick Blandin, President of the IUCN French National Committee, “Towards a national biodiversity
research strategy for sustainable development” Biodiversity and Global Change, 17 january 2005, VIII
http://www.adpf.asso.fr/adpf-publi/ folio/biodiversite/pdf/en/chap8.pdf
These different ethical codes can be thought of as “non-utilitarian”, in that their justifications for the
preservation of biodiversity are not based on immediate practical interests. Blandin (2004) emphasizes that
the difficulty in promoting nature protection using such ethical codes progressively led, by the midtwentieth century, to the emergence of a much more utilitarian discourse, in which the services rendered by
nature were used to justify the need for its protection. This change can also be explained by the progressive
awareness of an internal contradiction in non-utilitarian ethical codes when faced with the aspirations of
developing nations – how can a code of ethics lead to choices likely to restrict the capacity of certain
people to achieve those very satisfactions – both aesthetic and moral – that that same code is justifying?
Before concluding this bird’s eye view of environmental ethics, we would like to emphasize that they are
all situated in a Western cosmological vision of nature as a separate entity, a vision whose distinctive
character we have outlined above.
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Planet Debate 2011
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Respect for Animal Rights Key to Avoiding Treating Them as a
Means to an End
ANIMALS MATTER AS INDIVIDUALS—THEY ARE NOT HUMAN COMMODITIES
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 454
The rights view rests on a number of factual beliefs about those animals humans eat, hunt, and trap, as well
as those relevantly similar animals humans use in scientific research and exhibit in zoos. Included among
those factual beliefs are the following: these animals are not only in the world, but they are also aware of
it—and of what happens to them. And what happens to them matters to them. Each has a life that fares
experientially better or worse for the one whose life it is. As such, all have lives of their own that are of
importance to them apart from their utility to us. Like us, they bring a unified psychological presence to
the world. Like us, they are somebodies, not somethings. They are not our tools, not our models, not our
resources, not our commodities.
ANIMAL RIGHTS MEANS THEY CANNOT BE TREATED AS MEANS TO OUR ENDS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 455
To view nonhuman animals after the fashion of the philosophy of animal rights makes a truly profound
difference to our understanding of what we may do to them. Because other animals have a moral right to
respectful treatment, we ought not reduce their moral status to that of being useful means to our ends.
LEGAL RIGHTS PROTECT THE INVIOLABILITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO SERVE THE
GREATER SOCIAL GOOD (EVIDENCE IS SPECIES PARAPHRASED)
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 208
In our democratic society, the consensus social ethic effects a balance between individuality and sociality,
between what philosophers call deontology and teleology, more specifically between individual rights and
social utility. While most social decisions and policies are made according to that which produces the
greatest benefit for the greatest number, this is constrained by respect for the individual. Our ethic builds
protective fences around the individual to protect the sanctity his or her human nature, or telos, from being
submerged by the general or majority welfare. Thus we cannot silence an unpopular speaker, or torture a
terrorist to find out where he has planted a bomb, or beat a thief into revealing where he has hidden his illgotten gains. These protective fences around the individual are rights; they guard fundamental aspects of
the individual even from the general good. Specifically, they protect what is plausibly thought to be
essential to being a human—believing what you wish, speaking what you wish, holding on to your property
and privacy, not wanting to be tortured, etc. And they are fuelled by the force of law.
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Respect for Animal Rights Justified in Consequentialist
Framework
IF YOU CHOOSE TO EVALUATE THIS ROUND FROM A CONSEQUENTIALIST OR
UTILITARIAN FRAMEWORK, THEN YOU MUST CONSIDER ALL THE CONSEQUENCES,
INCLUDING THE SYSTEMATIC TORTURE AND MURDER OF OVER 10 MILLION NONHUMAN ANIMALS A YEAR.
Mark Bernstein, Professor of Philosophy @ the University of Texas, San Antonio, 2004, Terrorists of
Freedom Fighters: reflections on the liberation of animals, eds. Best & Nocella, p. 97-8
We should take note that, at bottom, this is a utilitarian argument. It suggests that, given the situation in
which we currently find ourselves, the consequences of animal liberation would be dire; we are
incalculably better off if, at most, we tinker with the present system, making just minor concessions to the
demands of pro-animal forces. Of course, the ‘we’ here conveniently refers to our human community. If we
were to consider the interest of all the nonhuman animals that lie at the lifeblood of our institutions, the
calculus would undoubtedly be quite different.
Consider a similar argument purveyed by a slaveowner in early nineteenth-century Virginia. He rails
against abolitionists, reminding them that the agricultural industry would suffer untold economic setbacks
were the practice of slavery abandoned. He reminds his idealistic, tender-hearted opponents that cheap
labor is what makes the cotton industry, among so many others, profitable. Being a kind and decent fellow,
he is willing to make some minor modifications. He will provide his slaves with slightly larger living
quarters and not beat them quite as severely if they fail to give him an honest day’s work.
We need not belabor the analogy. If we want to employ a utilitarian or consequentialist criterion to
determine the right course of action, we cannot, without being arbitrary and self-serving, limit the interests
to be calculated to a group of persons or which we, mirabile dictum, happen to be members. The welfare of
all must be considered, be it that of black slaves on colonial plantations or animals in contemporary
institutions.
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Respect for Animal Rights Justified by Precautionary Principle
SHOULD APPLY PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE TO RESOLVE SCIENTIFIC
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT AN ANIMAL’S PRACTICAL AUTONOMY
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 40
For centuries, law followed an “exploitation principle” in its dealing with nonhuman animals. All
nonhuman animals were erroneously thought to lack every sophisticated mental ability—desire,
intentionality, self, probably even consciousness—and were categorized as legal things, mercilessly
exploited. But evidence is clear that at least some do not lack basic mental abilities. In light of what we
know, it is time to apply a precautionary principle to the law of nonhuman animals. Depriving any being
possessed with practical autonomy of basic liberty rights is the most terrible injustice imaginable. When
there is doubt and serious damage is threatened, we should err on the cautious side when some evidence of
practical autonomy exists. And some evidence is required, for every version of the precautionary principle
instructs “how to respond when there is some evidence, but not proof, that a human practice is damaging
the environment.” Speculation is not enough.
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE USED AS A REASON TO NOT USE “DEFECTIVE” HUMAN
BEINGS IN PAINFUL BIOMEDICAL EXPERIMENTS
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 41
A kind of precautionary principle has been argued as a reason for not using seriously defective human
beings in painful biomedical research. The reason, philosopher Christina Hoff wrote, is not because they
are human, for Hoff concedes that is insufficient. It is because we cannot “safely permit anyone to decide
which human beings fall short of worthiness. Judgments of this kind and the creation of institutions for
making them are fraught with danger and open to grave abuse.” When rights for nonhuman animals are
involved, there is a compelling reason to apply the precautionary principle, and it goes even beyond Hoff’s
reasoning. However, it doesn’t yet exist in environmental law.
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Duty Toward Animals in Captivity Different from Those in the
Wild
DUTIES TO ANIMALS IN HUMAN CAPTIVITY DIFFERENT THAN THOSE TO WILD
ANIMALS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 388
In the wild, we only express our awe at the power and cruelty of nature, and we avoid intervening
whenever possible. But once the individual animal is brought by us into the human community, new
constraints are imposed upon human treatment of individuals – we have taken responsibility for the
animal’s well-being. The humans in question have therefore committed themselves to act as responsible
stewards for the now helpless animals, and they must devise a new ethic appropriate to this different
situation.
This line of reasoning explains the gravity of our decision to remove wild animals from the wild; it also
explains the seriousness of the responsibilities we come to owe individuals once we become their moral
guardians. Sometimes this responsibility is thrust upon us, as when a baby animal is orphaned as an
unforeseen outcome of human activities; at other times, we grasp this responsibility, recognizing that a
given species, which we value, is threatened and that extraordinary interventions are necessary to prevent
permanent rents in the fabric of natural systems. In either case we must act responsibly, recognizing to the
extent possible the impacts our actions will have on individual lives, and recognizing also the gravity of the
situation.
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Justifications for Rigid Species Barrier Wrong
BELIEF IN RIGID BARRIERS BETWEEN HUMANS AND NON-HUMANS GROUNDED IN
FANTASIES MASQUERADING AS TRUTH
Stephen R. L. Clark, professor of philosophy at Liverpool University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 122-3
I said before that either we are simply natural products of evolutionary processes or we are not. If we are,
then it seems clear that there are no rigid boundaries between species groups, that species, and other taxa,
are quite real, but only as Realgattungen. There is a real difficulty, however, in believing this, despite the
efforts made by other contributors to this very volume to expound a fully naturalized epistemology. The
argument, which is a powerful one even if it has not convinced all theorists, runs as follows. If we are the
products of evolutionary processes, then we have no good ground for thinking that our thoughts are
anything but none-too-harmful fantasies. As Nietzsche saw, we must presume that we have evolved as the
descendants of creatures who could ignore a lot, who could live out their fantasies. There is nothing in
evolutionary epistemology to give us reason to expect that we would care about the abstract truth, or ever
be able to obtain it. If the theory is correct, we have no reason to think that we could find out any correct
theories, beyond (at best) such truths or falsehoods as we need to obtain the next meal or avoid being one.
And so we have no reason to suppose that any theory that we have devised is really true, including the
current theory of evolution. Only if the divine reason is somehow present in us can we expect that we
would find our truths, or trust our moral instincts. That, after all, was what Enlightenment thinkers thought,
borrowing a Platonic doctrine about the powers of reason that does not fit the neo-Aristotelian framework I
have so far described.
This alternative picture—that evolutionary theory does not leave room for the kind of being we have to
think we are (namely truth-seeking and would-be moral images of a divine reason)—is what has often lain
behind attempts to insist upon a radical disjunction between apes and people. But there is a better answer.
Plato, after all, denied that it was sensible to contrast human and nonhuman things, creatures of our specific
kind and all others. We might as well divide the universe into cranes and noncranes. By his account (or at
least the account developed from his writings), there are indeed real natures, but they are not identical with
the things that partly remind us of them. Even we ourselves are not wholly identical with the Form of
Humanity, though we are called to serve it. The Form of Humanity, is the divine reason, and we are indeed
more human, in this sense, insofar as we think and do as the divine reason requires. The true image of
humanity, for us, is the saint or perfect sage.
POPULARITY OF BELIEF IN HUMAN MORAL SUPERIORITY DOESN’T MAKE IT RIGHT
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 78-9
Most people draw a sharp moral line between humans and other animals. Humans, they say, are infinitely
more valuable than any “lower creatures.” If our interests conflict with those of animals, it is always their
interests which should be sacrificed. But why should this be so? To say that everyone believes this is not
enough to justify it. Until very recently it was the common view that a woman should obey her father, until
she is married, and then her husband (and in some countries, this is still the prevailing view). Or, not quite
so recently, but still not all that long ago, it was widely held that people of African descent could properly
be enslaved. As these examples show, the fact that a view is widespread does not make it right. It may be
an indefensible prejudice that survives primarily because it suits the interests of the dominant group.
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Justifications for Rigid Species Barrier Wrong
IRRATIONAL TO DRAW THE LINE AT MORAL CONSIDERATION BASED ON HUMANLIKE ATTRIBUTES
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 129
First, any attempt to justify treating animals as resources based on their lack of supposed uniquely human
characteristics begs the question from the outset by assuming that certain human characteristics are special
and justify differential treatment. Even if, for instance, no animals other than humans can recognize
themselves in mirrors or can communicate through symbolic language, no human is capable of flying, or
breathing underwater, without assistance. What makes the ability to recognize oneself in a mirror or use
symbolic language better in a moral sense than the ability to fly or breathe underwater? The answer, of
course, is that we say so. But apart from our proclamation, there is simply no reason to conclude that
characteristics thought to be uniquely human have any value that allows us to use them as a nonarbitrary
justification for treating animals as property. These characteristics can serve this role only after we have
assumed their moral relevance.
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Ethical Justifications Against Animal Rights Wrong and
Outdated
THE JUSTIFICATION FOR SPECIESISM IS OUTDATED AND UNFOUNDED
Kyle Ash, lobbying strategist at the European Environmental Bureau, Copyright (c) 2005 Animal Law
(INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY,)
2005 (lexis)
Since international law today broadly draws its germination from Europe, both of the above reasons for
excluding other animals from legal entitlement can be traced in part to the Judaeo-Christian tradition, in
which the Bible explains in the book of Genesis, inter alia, that the Earth and all Earth's nonhuman
inhabitants are man's to rule. Although, like the Judaeo-Christian tradition, other dominant world religions
generally preach compassion and responsibility toward other animals, they all profess man's inherent
existential superiority. This is influenced by the much more pervasive roots of the secular aspect of
speciesism, which conspire to determine that other species are inferior with several different explanations.
What the explanations all have in common is the claim that other animals either lack or are deficient in
qualities for which humans claim pride; for example, human reason, language, and use of symbols, humor,
reflective capacity, and self-awareness. n13 Our tendency to infer these differences between us and other
creatures has created a heuristic riddle, to which our answer has been to shift human supremacist claims
from one reputed human-only asset to another, as sciences like biology, genetics, and anthropology have
revealed evidence that one "uniquely human" trait after another turns out to be not so unique. The law has
not kept up, and continues to validate our value-laden misconceptions.
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Ethical Justifications Against Animal Rights Wrong and
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WASSERSTROM AND OTHER PHILOSOPHERS FIND IT DIFFICULT TO MAKE A MORAL
CASE AGAINST ANIMAL RIGHTS
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 238-9
This result is not what the egalitarian philosophers of that period originally intended to assert. Instead of
accepting the outcome to which they own reasonings naturally pointed, however, they tried to reconcile
their beliefs in human equality and animal inequality by arguments that are either devious or myopic. For
instance, one philosopher prominent in philosophical discussions of equality at the time was Richard
Wasserstrom, then professor of philosophy and law at the University of California, Los Angeles. In is
article, “Rights, Human Rights and Racial Discrimination,” Wasserstrom defined “human rights” as those
rights that human beings have and nonhumans do not have. He then argued that there are human rights to
well-being and to freedom. In defending the idea of a human right to well-being, Wasserstrom said that to
deny someone relief from acute physical pain makes it impossible for that person to live a full or satisfying
life. He then went on: “In a real sense, the enjoyment of these goods differentiates human from nonhuman
entities.” The problem is that when we look back to find to what the expression “these goods” refers, the
only example given is relief from acute physical pain – something that nonhumans may appreciate as well
as humans. So if human beings have a right to relief from acute physical pain, it would not be a
specifically human right, in the sense Wasserstrom had defined. Animals would have it too.
Faced with a situation in which they saw a need for some basis for the moral gulf that is still commonly
thought to separate human beings from animals, but unable to find any concrete difference between human
beings and animals that would do this without undermining the equality of human beings, philosophers
tended to waffle. They resorted to high-sounding phrases like “the intrinsic worth of all men” (sexism was
as little questioned as specieism) as if all men (humans?) had some unspecified worth that other beings do
not have. Or they would say that human beings, and only human beings, are “ends in themselves” while
“everything other than a person can only have a value for a person.”
As we saw in the preceding chapter, the idea of a distinctive human dignity and worth has a long history.
In the present century, until the 1970s, philosophers had cast off the original metaphysical and religious
shackles of this idea, and freely invoked it without feeling any need to justify the idea at all. Why should
we not attribute “intrinsic dignity” or “intrinsic worth” to ourselves? Why should we not say that we are
the only things in the universe that are intrinsic value? Our fellow human beings are unlikely to reject the
accolades we so generously bestow upon them, and those to whom we deny the honor are unable to object.
Indeed, when we think only of human beings it can be very liberal, very progressive, to talk of the dignity
of all of them. In so doing we implicitly condemn slavery, racism, and other violations of human rights.
We admit that we ourselves are in some fundamental sense on a par with the poorest, most ignorant
members of our own species. It is only when we think of human beings as no more than a small subgroup
of all the beings that inhabit our planet that we may realize that in elevating our own species we are at the
same time lowering the relative status of all other species.
TIME TO EXTEND COMMUNITY OF PERSONHOOD TO NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 34
As we discuss the entitlement of nonhuman animals to dignity-rights, it is important to remember that the
united voice of Aritsotle and the Stoics were just one of many –Stoic, Aristotelian, Epicurian, Platonist,
Pythagorean, Cynic, and others—competing in the Ancient World about animal minds and the place of
nonhumans in the universe. But Western Christianity and law listened to just this one voice. With few
exceptions, there are no more human slaves. Women and children are not legal things. But every
nonhuman animal remains a thing, as she was 2,000 years ago. We will see that twenty-first century
science tells us that the old way of seeing nonhuman animals as mindless was terribly wrong. It is time for
animal law to enter the present.
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Ethical Justifications Against Animal Rights Wrong and
Outdated
MANY LAWS EXIST TODAY ARE LEFTOVERS FROM AN OLDER TIME – NONE MORE
UNJUST THEN THE THING-HOOD OF NON-HUMAN ANIMALS
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 24-25
Law--good, mediocre, and bad--tends to survive, borrowed from one age by another. This borrowing of
law, whether consciously or unconsciously (as Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., the great American judge
believed), has long been the primary workaday business of lawmakers. 4 Professor Alan Watson, an expert
in comparing the law of different legal systems in different ages, tells us that "to a truly astounding degree
the law is rooted in the past." 5 This makes sense. Borrowing law is simpler than constantly beginning
anew. It provides continuity and stability. But when we borrow past law, we borrow the past. The law of a
modern society often springs from a different time and place, perhaps even from a culture that may have
believed in an entirely different cosmology or belief about how the universe works. 6 Legal rules that may
have made good sense when fashioned may make little sense when transplanted to a vastly different time,
place, and culture. Raised by age to the status of self-evident truths, ancient legal rules mindlessly
borrowed may perpetrate ancient injustices that may once have been less unjust because we knew no better.
But they may no longer reflect shared values and often constitute little more than evidence for the
extraordinary respect that lawmakers have for the past. 7 Early this century, the philosopher George
Santayana famously claimed, "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." 8 Every
legal rule has its tangled history. Sometimes that history has nothing to do with whether a borrowed law is
just in a new and different context. Holmes explained that often "(s)ome ground of policy is thought of that
which seems to explain it and to reconcile it with the present state of things: and then the rule adapts itself
to the new reasons which have been found for it, and enters on a new career." 9 But this is not always so.
Sometimes a rule does not embark upon a new career at all but becomes an anachronism stubbornly
holding out in defiance of modern sensibilities. Whole books about these leftover laws have been written to
amuse us. We think it's funny when a law enacted at the turn of the last century still requires someone to
walk in front of an automobile with a lantern to warn unwary horsemen of its approach. We may be less
amused to learn that other laws demand a belief in God in order to hold public office. Few legal rules are as
doddering, or as unjust, as the legal thinghood of every nonhuman animal. Some untangling will be
necessary to spur its overdue reconsideration. 10 Like Theseus in the palace of the Minotaur, we will follow
its winding thread through the labyrinth of legal history. It will lead us to the most ancient legal systems
known.
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Descartes Indicts
DESCARTES’ VIEW THAT ANIMALS CAN BE TREATED HOWEVER WE WISH NOT
WIDELY ENDORSED
Cass Sunstein, Law Professor, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 5-6
If we understand “rights” to be legal protections against harm, then many animals already do have rights,
and the idea of animal rights is not terribly controversial. Of course some people, including Descartes,
have argued that animals lack emotions and that people should be allowed to treat them however they
choose. But to most people, including sharp critics of the animal rights movement, this position seems
unacceptable. Almost everyone agrees that people should not be able to torture animals or to engage in acts
of cruelty against them. And indeed, state law includes a wide range of protections against cruelty and
neglect. We can build on state laws to define a simple, minimalist position in favor of animal rights: The
law should prevent acts of cruelty to animals.
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Cohen Indicts
COHEN’S LIMITATION OF RIGHTS TO THOSE OF THE SAME “KIND” ILLOGICAL
Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and law professor, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds.
Armstrong & Botzler, p. 543-4
Probably the strongest argument that just being human is necessary for the possession of fundamental
equality rights ha been offered by Carl Cohen, who has argued that at least moral rights should be limited
to all and only human beings. “The issue,” said Cohen, “is one of kind” (Cohen 1986, 866). He
acknowledges that some humans lack autonomy and the ability to make moral choices. However, because
humans as a “kind” possess this ability, it should be imputed to all humans, regardless of their actual
abilities. But Cohen’s argument can succeed only if the species, H. sapiens, can nonarbitrarily be designed
as the boundary of a relevant “kind.” That is doubtful. Other classifications, some wider, such as animals,
vertebrates, mammals, primates, and apes, and at least one narrower—normal adult humans—also contain
every fully autonomous human.
As well as being logically flawed, Cohen’s argument for group benefits is normatively flawed. It ‘assumes
that we should determine how an individual is to be treated, not only the basis of its qualities but on the
basis of other individuals’ qualities.’ Rachels calls the opposing moral idea ‘moral individualism’ and
defines it to mean that ‘how an individual may be treated to be determined, not by considering his group
membership, but by considering his own particular characteristics’. It is individualism, and not group
benefits, that is more consistent with the overarching principles and values of a liberal democracy and that
has the firmer basis in present law.
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Posner Indicts
SHOULD SUBJECT “MORAL” INSTINCTS TO ETHICAL INTERROGATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 83
Even at a commonsense level, Posner’s position is implausible. Whatever the moral instincts may turn out
to be, why exempt just those ones from the power of ethical argument? Our instincts, moral and nonmoral,
developed during the eons of time in which we and our ancestors lived in circumstances very different from
those in which we live today. For most of our evolutionary history, we lived in small groups in which
everyone knew everyone else in the group, and interactions with members of our species who were not also
members of our group were rare. The planet was sparsely populated, which was just as well, since we had
no way of consciously regulating our reproductive capacities. There were ample uncleared forests, no ill
effects from our emissions of greenhouse gases, and our weapons killed one at a time, and only in close
proximity. Isn’t it highly probable that moral instincts formed under those circumstances should be
changed by ethical argument based on our current, very different circumstances?
APPROPRIATE TO CHALLENGE MORAL INSTINCTS IN WAYS OTHER THAN POINTING
OUT FACTUAL ERRORS IN ASSUMPTION
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 83
The only way in which Posner is prepared to allow argument to have an impact on our moral instincts is by
demonstrating a factual error in the assumptions on which our instincts are based. (For example, correcting
factual errors about the capacities of animals to suffer, or that sexual intercourse with an animal leads to the
birth of a monster, is in his view an acceptable way of arguing against an instinct). Sometimes, however,
we need to change moral instincts that do not rest on factual errors. Although it is a always controversial
what I really an instinct, and what is acquired by culture and education, we can take, as an example,
preference for my “own kind” over someone who talks, looks, or smells differently. This preference,
which is plausibly instinctive, does not require any false factual beliefs. Rather, people add factual beliefs
about the negative characteristics of the outsiders in order to strengthen the hold of the instinct that they
already have.
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Posner Indicts
ARGUMENT THAT MORAL INSTINCTS CANNOT BE CHALLENGED WRONG –
HISTORICALLY HAD INSTINCT TO KILL MEMBERS OF OTHER GROUPS
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 85-6
As another example, take the tenacious instinct that leads humans to show unprovoked hostility, sometimes
to the point of murder, against those who belong to different tribes or nations. Those who believe that this
is not an instinct, but the product of relatively recent economic, social, or cultural circumstances, should
read the Bible, and see how often the Israelites massacred their neighbors, often without serious
provocation. But in ancient times, there was nothing unusual about this. War, as Lawrence Keeley has
shown, has been a regular part of the existence of the overwhelming majority of human cultures.
Massacred of entire groups seem not to have been unusual. Additional evidence that this killing has its
roots deep in our biological nature is provided by observations of similar intraspecies killing among our
close relatives, the chimpanzees. Yet, tenacious as this instinct is, we are making progress in confronting
it. It is a sobering thought that in many tribal societies, despite the absence of machine guns and high
explosives, the percentage of the population killed annually in warfare far exceeds that of any modern
society, including Germany and Russia in the twentieth century. Though the conflict between Israel and
Palestine is tragic and depressing, there is widespread agreement that it should not be solved by the
methods used by the ancient Israelites. Since the mass genocide of the twentieth century, we have
developed principles of humanitarian intervention to stop such occurrences, and even instituted an
International Criminal Court to bring to justice those who commit crimes against humanity. Needless to
say, these positive developments have been accompanied by plenty of ethical argument, from the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights—a document drafted, incidentally, by a commission on which two men who
had been “academic philosophers” played a significant role—to the statements of countless prominent
secular and religious figures. While one could certainly wish that these ethical arguments had been more
effective, to claim that they are all completely without effect is, to use one of Posner’s phrases, sheer
assertion, and not particularly plausible assertion at that.
POSNER IGNORES MULTIPLE APPROACHES TO EFFECTIVE ETHICAL INTERROGATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 86-7
How is it possible that ethical argument can be effective given that, as Posner and many others have
pointed out, there is great difficulty in establishing the first premises of any ethical position? The answer is
that ethical argument does not always proceed from first premises. It may, for example, show that widely
held view is inconsistent, or leads to conflicts with other views that its supporters hold. (Look again at the
ethical argument about the moral status of animals with which this essay opened, and you will see that it
takes this form). Ethical argument can also show that particular views have been held unreflectively. Once
they have are subjected to critique, and applied to a wider range of situations than had previously been
considered, the view may become less attractive. Though ethical argument would be easier if we could
establish first premises, it is a mistake to assume that without it, it must be ineffective.
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Should Extend Legal Personhood to Animals
WE HAVE HISTORICALLY EXPANDED THE COMMUNITY OF MORAL PERSONS
Stephen R. L. Clark, professor of philosophy at Liverpool University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 121
The moral truth that lies behind the error that others have called “speciesism” (and justly rebuked) is that
we both do and should treat those “of our kind” better. But now recall the remarks that I have already
made about the actual nature of a species. We retain the word as physicists retain the word “atomic”. But
modern atoms are not atomic (which is indivisible), and modern species are not specific (any more than
Aristotle’s were). Species kinship rests on relationship, and not resemblance, although there will be
various similarities to reckon with within and without the kind. UNESCO’s sloganeers did not recognize
that Pan, Pongo and Gorilla were our sister, any more than the writers of the American Declaration of
Independence fully realized what they had committed themselves to by saying that all men were created
equal. They and their successors could have insisted that no mention was made here of women, or that the
obvious intention at the time was not to include Negroes (since the passages denouncing Britain’s
involvement in the slave trade were, of set purpose, omitted from the final document.) Instead, the real
implications were allowed to emerge. All those of one kind with us begin as equals: we are, each one of us,
a part of one long, variegated lineage, sharing enough of our habits, gestures, and abilities to reveal our
common source.
PERSONHOOD STATUS MEANS ONE HAS MORALLY SIGNIFICANT INTERESTS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 131
If we extend the right not to be property to animals, then animals will become moral persons. To say that a
being is a person is merely to say that the being has morally significant interests, that the principle of equal
consideration applies to that being, that the being is not a thing. In a sense, we already accept that animals
are persons; we claim to reject the view that animals are things and to recognize that, at the very least,
animals have a morally significant interest in not suffering. Their status as property, however, has
prevented their personhood from being realized.
APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CONSIDERATION ONLY WAY TO
ENFORCE MORAL CONSIDERATION FOR ANIMAL INTERESTS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 121
Alternatively, if we are to make good on our claim to take animal interests seriously, then we can do so in
only one way: by applying the principle of equal consideration—the rule that we ought to treat like cases
alike unless there is good reason not to do so—to animals. The principle of equal consideration is a
necessary component of every moral theory. Any theory that maintains that it is permissible to treat similar
cases in dissimilar way would fail to qualify as an acceptable moral theory for that reason alone. Although
there may be many differences between humans and animals, there is at least one important similarity that
we all already recognize: our shared capacity to suffer. In this sense, humans and animals are similar to
each other and different from everything else in the universe that is not sentient. If our supposed
prohibition on the infliction of unnecessary suffering on animals is to have any meaning at all, then we
must give equal consideration to animal interests is not suffering.
PERSONHOOD STATUS KEY TO SEEK REDRESS FOR LEGAL HARMS
Laura G. Kniaz, J.D., University at Buffalo, Copyright (c) 1995 Buffalo Law Review (: Animal Liberation
and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad) 1995 (lexis)
Rights should be endowed upon animals themselves. Many scholars have argued that animals deserve legal
recognition of their inherent rights because they may be injured, they have interests, and they may directly
benefit from legal rights. n369 If animals were granted personhood, they would have standing themselves
and could pursue remedies for their injuries through a legal representative.
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Should Recognize Animal Rights
BASIC EQUALITY PRINCIPLE DEMANDS RECOGNIZING BASIC RIGHTS FOR NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Steven M. Wise, President of the Center for the Expansion of Fundamental Rights, 2004, Animal
Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 39
At some point, autonomy completely winks out and with it any nonarbitrary entitlement to liberty rights on
the ground of possessing practical autonomy. Judges and legislators might decide to grant even a
completely nonautonomous being basic liberty rights. But it’s hard to think of grounds upon which they
might do it nonarbitrarily. However, this strengthens the argument that, as a matter of equality,
nonautonomous animals of many species should be entitled to basic rights.
DUE PROCESS MAIN RIGHT RELEVANT TO ANIMALS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 140
Amendments 5 and 14 bestow the constitutional rights most applicable to nonhumans. The Fifth
Amendment applies to the federal government and the District of Columbia; the 14th applies to state
governments. These amendments prohibit government from depriving any “person” of “life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law.”
“Liberty” includes bodily integrity and physical freedom. If nonhumans were constitutional persons,
governments couldn’t subject them to maiming, battery, torture, or other bodily harm. Nor could
governments unjustly incarcerate them or otherwise restrict their movements.
“Without due process of law” means unfairly or arbitrarily. The Constitution prohibits government from
depriving a “person” of life, liberty or property for patently unjust reasons or without following proper
judicial procedure. Nonhuman personhood would prohibit government from unjustifiably depriving
nonhumans of life, liberty or property.
NONHUMAN ANIMALS NEED A RIGHT TO LIBERTY
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 142
Along with a legal right to life, emancipated nonhumans would need a legal right to liberty (which includes
physical freedom and bodily integrity). Without such a right, they could be trapped, confined, and
otherwise denied physical freedom by any human who considered them a threat.
Without a right to liberty, nonhumans would also be vulnerable to human violation of their bodily integrity.
Consider “domesticated” sheep who would exist during the transition period immediately following legal
emancipation. No longer property, they still would need legal protection against battery or sexual assault
by a human, just as humans do. Similarly, a right not to be tortured exists apart from a right not to be
property. Although property status vastly increases the opportunity for sadism, it isn’t a necessary
component of sadism. A human can torture a dog whether or not the dog is property.
EQUALITY PRINCIPLES JUSTIFY FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHTS FOR GREAT APES
Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and law professor, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds.
Armstrong & Botzler, p. 543
At least three independent equality or proportionality arguments supports fundamental legal rights for the
great apes. First, great apes who possess Kant’s full autonomy should be entitled to dignity-rights if
humans who possess full autonomy are entitled to them. To do otherwise would be to undermine the major
principled against racism and sexism. Second, great apes who possess a practical autonomy should be
entitled to dignity-rights in proportion to the degree to which they approach full Kantian autonomy. Thus,
if a human is entitled to the degree with which they approach full Kantian autonomy. Thus if a human is
entitled to fewer, narrower, or partial legal rights as their capabilities approach the quality Q, so should
nonhuman animal whose capabilities also approach the quality Q. Third, in perhaps the clearest argument
for equality, great apes who possess either full Kantian autonomy or a practical autonomy should be
entitled to the same fundamental rights to which humans who entirely lack autonomy are entitled. Placing
the rightless legal thing, the bonobo Kazni, beside an anencephalic 1-day-old human with the legal right to
choose to consent or withhold consent to medical treatment highlights the legal aberration that is Kanzi’s
legal thingood.
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Should Recognize Animal Rights
ASSIGNING LIBERTY AND EQUALITY TO NON-HUMAN ANIMALS IS THE STRONGEST
GROUND TO SECURE DIGNITY RIGHTS
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 79-80
The thinking component of Western law has led to wide agreement on core values and principles. Liberty
and equality are preferred over unfairness, invidious discrimination, and arbitrary restraints. The dignityrights of nonhuman animals should be derived from these same principles and values and in the same ways.
This is not just because it is the strongest ground for securing the dignity-rights of nonhuman animals,
though it is. It is not just because both reason and fairness demand it, though they do. Arbitrary refusals to
extend dignity-rights to those who would be entitled to them, if only they were human, looses a virulent
injustice upon beings entitled to justice. Their awful irrationality, arbitrariness, and invidiousness undercut
the foundations of our own fundamental rights.
RIGHTS ONLY WAY TO PROTECT NONHUMAN INTERESTS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 123
By definition, sentient beings experience. The capacity to experience should confer legal rights because
that capacity creates a need for protection. Given humans’ propensity to needlessly harm other animals,
nonhumans need legal rights to protect them from humans. For example, they need rights to life and
liberty.
ANIMAL RIGHTS POSE IMMEDIATE AND PRACTICAL THREATS TO ANIMAL
EXPLOITATION
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 42
The rights/welfare issue has, however, gone in a most peculiar direction in recent years. On one hand,
many in the animal protection community appear to regard the rights/welfare distinction as involving a
tedious and irrelevant philosophical distraction in light of the perceived inevitability of animal welfare and
the supposed utopian and unrealistic nature of animal rights. On the other hand, many who support animal
exploitation seem not only to recognize the philosophical, political, and economic relevance of the
distinction but also to understand that animal rights is a concept that poses practical and immediate threats
to at least some forms of animal exploitation.
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Should Reject Property Status of Animals
RIGHT NOT TO BE TREATED AS PROPERTY IS A PRE-CONDITION FOR ALL OTHER
RIGHTS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 124
The right not to be treated as the property of others is a basic and different right from other rights we might
have because it is the grounding for those other rights; it is the prelegal right that serves as the precondition
for the possession of morally significant interests. The basic right is the right to equal consideration of
one’s fundamental interests. Therefore, the basic right must be understood as prohibiting human slavery, or
any other institutional arrangement that treats humans exclusively as means to the ends of others and not as
ends in themselves.
EXTENSION OF EQUALITY PRINCIPLES TO ANIMALS MEANINGLESS IF THEY ARE
STILL REGARDED AS PROPERTY
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 125
Animals, like humans, have an interest in not suffering, but, as we have seen, the principle of equal
consideration has no meaningful application to animal interests if they are the property of others just as it
had no meaningful application to the interests of slaves. The interests of animals as property will almost
always count for less than do the interests of their owners. Some owners may choose to treat their animals
well, or even as members of their families as some do with their pets, but the law generally will not protect
animals against their owners. Animal ownership as a legal institution inevitably has the effect of treating
animals as commodities. Moreover, animals, like humans, have an interest in not suffering at all from the ways in
which we use them, however “humane” that use may be. To the extent that we protect humans from being used in
these ways and we do not extend the same protection to animals, we fail to accord equal consideration to animal
interests in not suffering.
MUST ABANDON “PROPERTY” STATUS TO TAKE ANIMAL INTERESTS SERIOUSLY
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 108
When it comes to other animals, we humans exhibit what can best be described as moral schizophrenia.
Although we claim to take animals seriously and to regard them as having morally significant interests, we
routinely ignore those interests for trivial reasons. In this essay, I argue that our moral schizophrenia is
related to the status of animals as property, which means that animals are nothing more than things despite
the many laws that supposedly protect them. If we are going to make good on our claim to take animal
interests seriously, then we have no choice but to accord animals one right: the right not to be treated as
property. Our acceptance that animals have this one right would require that we abolish and not merely
better regulate our institutionalized exploitation of animals. Although this is an ostensibly radical
conclusion, it necessarily follows from certain moral notions that we have professed to accept for the better
part of 200 years. Moreover, recognition of this right would not preclude our choosing humans over
animals in situations of genuine conflict.
EQUALITY PRINCIPLE MEANINGLESS IF ANIMALS RETAIN PROPERTY STATUS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 122
The problem is that, as we have seen, there can be no meaningful balancing of interests if animals are
property. The property status of animals a two-edged sword wielded against their interest. First, it acts as
blinders that effectively block even our perception of their interests as similar to ours because human
“suffering” is understood as any detriment to property owners. Second, in those instances in which human
and animal interests are recognized as similar, animal interest will fail in the balancing because the property
status of animals is always a good reason not to accord similar treatment unless to do so would property
owners. Animal interests will almost always count for less than one; animals remain as they were before
the nineteenth century—things without morally significant interests.
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ANIMAL WELFARE APPROACHES DOOMED TO FAIL – UNEQUAL STATUS BETWEEN
HUMANS AND NONHUMANS MEANS HUMAN INTERESTS ALWAYS WIN
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 47
Animal welfare provides that we ought to balance human and animal interests in situations when
human/animal conflict, and that we ought to avoid imposing “unnecessary” suffering on animals. The
problem is that when we balance these interests in order to see whether the suffering or death of an animals
is “necessary”, we actually balance two very different normative entities. Human beings are regarded by
the law as having interests that are protected by rights. To the extent that the law recognizes that
nonhumans have interests, those interests are virtually never protected by right and can always be sacrificed
if the benefit to humans (however measured) justify the sacrifice. This lopsided approach is exacerbated
when the property rights of humans Are involved because animals are a form of property. As such, humans
are entitled under the law to convey or sell their animals, consume or kill them, use them as collateral,
obtain the offspring and natural dividends from animals, and exclude others from interfering in the owner’s
dominion and control. Indeed, to characterize animals as property is precisely to regard them solely as
means to human ends, and without any inherent value recognized under the law.
ANIMAL RIGHTS NOT POSSIBLE AS LONG AS THEY ARE REGARDED AS PROPERTY
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 54
If animals are property, and property status is inconsistent with the existence of basic rights, such as the
right of physical security, then the achievement of animal rights may well be impossible as long as animals
are regarded as property. That is, if animals are to have any rights at all (other than merely legalistic or
abstract ones), they must have certain basic rights that would then necessarily protect them from being used
as food or clothing sources, or as experimental animals. If animal rights requires at a minimum the
recognition of basic rights as Shue understands them, then animal rights may very well be an all-or-nothing
state of affairs.
NO CHANCE OF SUCCESSFUL REFORM THROUGH THE POLITICAL SYSTEM WITHOUT
FIRST REJECTING THE PROPERTY STATUS OF ANIMALS”
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 170-1
As long as animals are property, insider status is almost always what Garner refers to as “phoney.” The
best that the moderate insider will be able to do in the overwhelming number of cases is to ascertain what
level of property regulation will be agreed to by property owners as acceptable, and not much more.
Garner is correct to say that only those who articulate “moderate and realistic aims pursued in a
conciliatory and calm fashion” will achieve insider status, but that status in this context means only that its
possessors will have the ability to promote those changes that are going to be acceptable to the unified
opposition of property owners, whose interests are protected conscientiously by the government in any
case. It should, then, come as no surprise that “radicals” do not see this arrangement as even potentially
promising and so stop supporting it. To call such unwillingness to participate “divisive” or to argue for the
desirability of unity under these circumstances is to make an argument in favor of unity, but merely to
restate support for welfarist reform in opposition to the rights approach.
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Incremental Extension of Rights Key to Solve Speciesism
RIGHTS THEORY PRESCRIBES A STRATEGY OF INCREMENTALISM
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 162
To suggest that any animal rights advocate is maintaining that we can achieve “total victory” in “one
move” is simply ridiculous. If an advocate of animal rights is going to advocate on behalf of legal or
social change on the macro level at all, the rights advocate has no choice but to support some sort of social
change. And on at least two levels, rights theory prescribes a very definite theory of incremental change.
First, by requiring that individuals eschew animal products in their own lives (as a matter of the micro
component of moral theory), rights theory implicitly contains a prescription for achieving the ideal state
through the incremental means of more and more people who do not participate directly in institutionalized
animal exploitation as a political matter. Non-violent civil disobedience may also be used to protect
individual animals, which is also consistent with rights theory. Boycotts of products and companies
directed at the eradication of institutionalized exploitation can also be regarded as incremental change that
is totally consistent with rights theory. In sum, advocating on behalf of complete and immediate abolition
is itself incremental and completely consistent with rights.
INCREMENTALISM IS THE ONLY POLITICALLY SUSTAINABLE WAY TO EXTEND
ANIMAL RIGHTS
David Favre, Professor of Law, Michigan State University, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and
new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 236
It is a burden of the animal rights movement that so many of its leaders will support only the purest
philosophical position, regardless of political feasibility. It must be realized by all that there is a key
difference between personal philosophy and political reality. Many assume that the full legal
implementation of their vegan philosophy is the immediate and only appropriate goal of legal change. And
yet, such radical change in the short term is impossible in our legal system. It would be more realistic to be
incremental, to begin the journey of change by modifying, but not eliminating, the existence of the property
status of animals.
LEGAL CHANGES –AS REGARDED NEW CONCEPTIONS OF PROPERTY STATUS—MUST
OCCUR INCREMENTAL
David Favre, Professor of Law, Michigan State University, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and
new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 239
Some continuation of the property status will be essential in the new animal paradigm, not only for the
animals, but for the judges or lawmakers who take the next step on behalf of animals. Change in the legal
system, because of its conservative structure, normally happens incrementally. Judges do not like to be put
into positions where the consequences of their actions, by judgments, are not knowable in advance, and
acceptable to them. If the next step for animal jurisprudence continues to be spoken in terms of traditional
property concepts, then the judges and lawmakers will be more comfortable in pushing the process along.
INCREMENTALISM MAKES RIGHTS STRATEGY MORE LIKELY TO BE EFFECTIVE
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 51
The flip side of the myth that animal welfare works is the myth that rights for animals is an unrealistic and
unachievable alternative. Just as the efficacy of animal welfare has been challenged, so too will the
supposed inefficacy of animals rights.
The notion that animal rights represents an unworkable or unrealistic approach is based on the supposed
status of the philosophy of animals rights as an all-or-nothing philosophy that demands an immediate and
complete cessation of all types of animal exploitation and can tolerate nothing less. In certain respects, this
is a correct characterization of the rights position as articulated by Regan, and in certain respects, it is not.
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INCREMENTAL EXTENSION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS MOST FEASIBLE AND PRACTICAL
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 52-3
There are two ways (at least) of looking at all of this. First, Regan’s theory may, indeed, be viewed as
entailing an all or nothing proposition in that it requires that we relinquish completely all property rights in
animals, and that we cease immediately all forms of exploitation that are based on the instrumental status of
animals as property. Regan unequivocally endorses this “abolitionist” position, which, of course, makes
perfect sense in light of his view that our treatment of animals and our treatment, say, of slaves, are based
on the same underlying notion that it is morally permissible to treat certain sentient beings in a completely
instrumental manner that regards any interest of the being as subject to sacrifice upon a finding that the
aggregation of consequences favors that sacrifice. If this is the only possible interpretation of the rights
view, then, although it may present a sound moral theory that ought to be adopted immediately, the realistic
possibilities for such a situation occurring, especially in light of the increasingly reactionary political and
legal systems, are slight to none. But that does not mean that there is no alternative other than animal
welfare, which does not work anyway and is no real alternative. The concept of animal rights, I will argue,
allows for a third choice: the incremental achievement of animals rights through the use of deontological
norms that prohibit rather than regulate certain conduct, that recognize that animals have certain interests
that are not subject to being sacrificed, and that do not prescribe alternative, supposedly more “humane”
forms of exploitations as substitutes for the original conduct.
TOTAL ANIMAL LIBERATION NOT FEASIBLE – INCREMENTALISM ONLY VIABLE
STRATEGY
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 59
I have also argued that the theory of animal rights does, indeed, provide a viable theoretical and political
alternative to animal welfare. Although the complete abolition of all animal exploitation is – at least in my
view—morally required, that state of affairs is not realistic at the present time. Incremental abolition is
realistic and achievable through prohibitions that recognize that animals have non-tradable interests and
where those prohibitions do not substitute alternative forms of exploitation.
INCREMENTAL ABOLITIONISM BEST STRATEGY FOR ANIMAL LIBERATION
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 251-2
It is more likely that the social structural transformation necessary to bring an end to the oppression of
humans and other animals will occur—if it comes at all—more gradually. Efforts for the end of
oppression of other animals therefore should be what Gary Francione calls “incremental abolitionist”—
which he defines as measures of ‘change achievable through prohibitions that recognize that animals have
non-tradable interest and where those prohibitions do not substitute alternative forms of exploitation.”
Francione’s strategy for liberation is very similar to that of French sociologist Andre Gorz, who called for the necessity of
“nonreformist reforms” in order to bring about significant structural changes in capitalist society.
TRUE SHIFTS IN MORAL PROGRESS OCCUR WHEN ENOUGH PEOPLE BELIEVE IN
THEIR FOUNDATIONS—SHOULD START EXTENDING RIGHTS GRADUALLY
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 22
Shifts occur only after people come to believe that something is possible. This book argues that at least
some nonhuman animals should have basic legal rights. At its core is the supporting scientific evidence,
much of which is currently known only to a cadre of experts in scientific subdisciplines. Making the
argument is the first step toward informing policymakers, judges, and the public about what is known, and,
therefore, attaining the goal.
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Respect for Animal Rights Challenges Biopower
BELIEFS AND VALUES REQUIRED TO LEGITIMIZE SYSTEMIC ABUSE OF ANIMALS
SHAPES INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS TOWARD ANIMALS—GOVERNMENT AUTHORIZATION
EXERTS HEGEMONY OVER SOCIETY
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 204-5
Such circumstances underlie the attack by the boys on bicycles on Willow Grear, the woman with a vision
disability, and Cassidy, the dog. A dog, a woman, a human with a disability, and a human with limited
monetary resources, all combined in the forms of Cassidy and Willow Grear, can be an irresistible target
for a group of adolescent boys in the United States. Most would not commit or condone their cruelty. But
the prevailing beliefs and values required to legitimize widespread institutionalized oppression, such as that
practiced by agribusiness and the pharmaceutical and chemical industries, shape the reality and cultivate
the general personality types of human members of society. In an often predatory system, in which the
prevailing ideology glorifies wealth and power, more humans will be inclined to accept or tolerate, if not
practice, violence against those “others” who are perceived as poor, weak, or powerless. The widespread
acceptance of the general concept of the hierarchy of worth of living beings both rationalizes oppressive
acts and arrangements and thoroughly entangles the various beliefs that arise from a hierarchical
worldview. Only the rejection of the entire notion of such hierarchy can remove the ideological support for
oppression of any group and begin to make all groups secure.
The indoctrination of the masses of humans is achieved mainly through their daily experiences in a
stratified and hegemonically controlled society. (Hegemony, as used here, refers to the process in which a
relatively small number of powerful humans and corporations exert an enormous influence over cultural
beliefs, values, practices, and institutionalized arrangements.) As the early twentieth-century critical
theorist Antonio Gramsci observed, humans develop what seems to be ‘common sense” through their daily
experiences. After one is taught successfully that a “natural hierarchy” exists in the world, one’s worldly
task is perhaps not so much to make it to the top of the social order as it is to distance one’s self from the
bottom—for those at the bottom suffer derision, deprivation and violence. This socially created hierarchy
is deeply rooted in the social fabric and is embedded in individual consciousness, so much so that, for
many, challenges to the existence of oppression appear “stupid.”
RIGHTS DISCOURSE PROVIDES AN OPPORTUNITY TO CHALLENGE EXISTING POWER
RELATIONS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 224
In sum, scholars pointing to indeterminacy persuasively suggest that rights language and judicial decisions
provide no determinate outcome. They also provide insight in their observation that the ability to
manipulate legal languages generally benefits the powerful. However, the animal rights movement
indicates that we must also recognize the second face of indeterminacy. Rights talk provides the
opportunity to reconstruct legal meaning and, in so doing, to challenge the existing relations of power and
the traditional foundations and uses of rights.
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PERSONHOOD STATUS ALONE INSUFFICIENT—MUST HAVE RIGHTS AS WELL
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 141
Nonhumans need a number of rights that constitutional personhood confers on humans, such as a right to
life. Eventually after emancipation, virtually all nonhumans would be free-living and non “domesticated.”
Free-living nonhumans can’t be completely isolated from humans. Geese visit “our” ponds; squirrels enter
our backyards; pigeons roost on our buildings. We encounter bears in the forest and crabs on the seashore.
Wherever they may be, nonhumans need protection against humans. They need legal rights that prevent
human interference. Unless buzzards and coyotes have a legal right to life, humans can shoot or poison
them without impunity.
Following emancipation, humans couldn’t legally hunt, Francione says, because hunting is “a form of
institutionalized exploitation.” In its current form, yes. However, individual humans could hunt unless
emancipated nonhumans had a right to life.
Francione sometimes refers to the “one right” that he advocates for nonhumans as a right “not to be treated
as a resource.” If I murder a human out of anger, I haven’t treated them as a resource. Nevertheless, I’ve
violated their right to life. Nonhuman rights, too, can be violated whether or not nonhumans are regarded
as resources. When an exterminator murders all of the wasps who live in a nest attached to a house, the
wasps are viewed as pests, not resources. Their murder doesn’t involve any exploitation. Wasps need a
legal right to life. Similarly, when humans kill a nonpoisonous snake out of irrational fear and dislike, they
aren’t treating the snake as a resource. Snakes need a legal right to life.
According to Francione, abolishing institutionalized speciesist exploitation would eliminate the vast
majority of human-nonhuman conflicts. I agree that emancipation would eliminate a massive amount of
nonhuman suffering and death. However, it wouldn’t eliminate human-nonhuman conflicts over land or
other natural resources such as water. These conflicts are ongoing and worldwide.
END OF PROPERTY STATUS ALONE INSUFFICIENT—MUST HAVE RIGHTS AS WELL
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 147
Cavalieri’s book The Animal Question is subtitled Why Nonhuman Animals Deserve Human Rights.
Nonhumans should have every relevant legal right currently reserved for humans, such as a right not be
kidnapped, maimed, or murdered. Emancipated nonhumans wouldn’t be integrated into human society;
nonhumans’ forced “participation” in human society would end. However, free and independent
nonhumans would need legal protection from humans. Racism toward African-Americans didn’t end when
they ceased to be property. Nor will speciesism end when nonhumans cease to be property. Free humans
have legal rights. Free nonhumans must have them as well.
TURN – ENDING PROPERTY STATUS CANT SOLVE – ASLONG AS APES DO NOT HAVE
FULL RIGHTS THEIR WELFARE WILL BE SUBORDINATED TO HUMAN NEEDS
STRONGER ANIMAL WELFARE LAWS FAIL – STILL IMMORAL
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 50*
A defender of animal welfare may agree that the current standards of animal welfare are inadequate, but
may argue that the solution is to improve animal welfare and not reject it in favor of animal rights. The
problem with this approach, however, is that all forms of animal welfare, including the theory articulated
by Peter Singer in Animal Liberation (1990) are linked by the notion that it is morally justifiable to support
the institutionalized exploitation of animals under some circumstances. All versions of animal welfare
necessarily involve the use of a balancing construct; because animals are regarded as property, it is difficult
to understand how this balancing construct could be adjusted to ensure greater animal protection.
It is, of course, possible to conceive of a situation in which animals were not regarded as property but were
also not regarded as rightholders. Presumably, animal interests would be taken more seriously were
animals not regarded, as a matter of law, as solely means to human ends. The problem is that if humans are
still rightholders and animals are not (although they would no longer be regarded as property), then any
welfarist balancing of human and animal interests would still weigh interests protected by right against
interest unprotected by right.
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TURN - HUMANE TREATMENT PERCEPTION MASKS UNDERLYING ABUSE
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 60
“Welfarist” campaigns suggest that the problem lies in specific abuses (such as excruciatingly small cages)
rather than the whole, needless, unjust enterprise of exploiting nonhumans for food. They keep the focus
off genuine freedom. The goal becomes slightly less horrendous prison conditions—room to flap one’s
wings, space to turn around, 67 square inches of space instead of 48 – rather than release from false
imprisonment. Until nonhuman advocates demand emancipation and stop sending mixed messages,
emancipation will be endlessly deferred.
When PETA applauds McDonald’s, Burger King and Wendy’s for buying flesh and eggs from particular
suppliers, it gives positive publicity to companies rooted in the sale of flesh. This publicity encourages
people to patronize those restaurants and eat animal-derived food.
In a 2000 Zogby America poll of 1,204 US adults, 81 percent of respondents indicated that they’d willingly
pay more for eggs from hens kept under better conditions. Many people feel better about eating animalderived food if they believe that the victims were treated humanely. A façade of humaneness helps
companies to sell eggs, flesh and milk.
The press fosters the illusion that McDonald’s and other corporations have “set tough standards for animal
welfare.” About 8 by 8.5 inches of space for each hen? That’s tough only on the hens. “The United States
is dramatically improving the quality of lives—and the humaneness of the deaths—of the cows, pigs, and
chickens that we eat.” That’s how a 2003 USA Today article begins. And that’s an utterly false statement.
It sanitizes food-industry enslavement and slaughter and comforts consumers of animal-derived food.
TURN – BETTER TREATMENT ISNT ENOUGH – IT MAKES MARGINAL GAINS AT THE
EXPENSE OF REINFORCING THE SYSTEM OF OPPRESSION
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 131-2
We could, of course, treat animals better than we do; there are, however, powerful economic forces that
militate against better treatment in light of the status of animals as property. But simply according better
treatment to animals would not mean that they are no longer things. It may have been better to beat slaves
three rather than five times a week, but this better treatment would not have removed slaves from the
category of things. The similar interests of slave owners and slaves were not accorded similar treatment
because the former had a right not to suffer at all from being used exclusively as a resource, and the latter
did not possess such a right. Animals, like humans, have an interest in not suffering at all from the ways in
which we use them, however “humane” that use may be. To the extent that we protect humans from
suffering from these uses and we do not extend the same protections to animals, we fail to accord equal
consideration to animal interests in not suffering.
TURN - MORAL OBLIGATION TO SUPPORT ABOLITIONIST NOT WELFARE GOALS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 43
It is on this basis that I reach conclusions that, in Jan Naverson’s cheerful words, qualify me as “a starry
eyed radical” (Narveson 1987:38). In my view, since the utiliazation of nonhuman animals for purposes of,
among other things, fashion, research, entertainment, or gustatory delight harms them and treats them as
(our) resources, and since such treatment violates the right to be treated with respect, it follows that such
utilization is morally wrong and ought to end. Merely to reform such institutional injustice (by resolving to
eat only “happy” cows or to insist on larger cages, for example) is not enough. Morally considered,
abolition is required.
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TURN - FOCUS ON IMPROVING CONDITIONS OF EXPLOITATION PERPETUATES AND
LEGITIMATES IT
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 176-7
While some animal advocates see all such efforts to assist other animals as laudable, not all agree. Law
professor Gary Francione urges that those working to establish legal protections for other animals should be
careful that their efforts do not merely (and not just ostensibly) ameliorate the suffering of other animals
while accepting their status as “livestock,” “laboratory subject,” and other instruments of production—as
has happened, for example, in the Humane Slaughter and Animal Welfare Acts. Instead, Francione argues
purely for abolitionist measures that challenge and reduce oppression of other animals. Such measures
would denounce the property status of other animals, and their cumulative effects would substantially
reduce and eliminate that oppression – not legitimate it. He states:
If we decide to pursue legislation, we should stop pursing welfarist solutions to the problem. Animal
welfare seeks to regulate atrocity by making cages bigger or by adding additional layers of bureaucratic
review to ensure that the atrocity is “humane.” We should pursue legislation that seeks to abolish particular
forms of exploitation. Animal advocates should always be upfront about their ultimate objective, and use
all campaigns as an opportunity to teach about nonviolence and the rejection of all institutionalized animal
exploitation.
TURN - ANIMAL WELFARE SEEKS TO MAINTAIN SYSTEM OF ANIMAL EXPLOITATION
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 35
Even if the critics are right, however, and the quality of life for these animals can be improved, this will not
change the system in any fundamental way. True, more space might be provided, or perhaps better
ventilation or a change in diet or exercise opportunities. That is, the system of utilization might be
reformed with a view to improving the welfare of the animals being used. Nevertheless, the philosophy of
animal welfare by its very nature permits utilizing other animals for human purposes, even if this means (as
it always does) that most of the animals will experience pain, frustration, and other harms, and even if it
means, as it almost always does, that these animals will have their lives terminated prematurely. This is
what I mean by saying that welfare reforms within the system of utilization will not change the system in
any fundamental way.
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE TO FOCUS ON IMPROVING CONDITIONS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 63
Welfarists commonly call abolitionists “unrealistic.” In their view, it’s simply practical to advocate
modifications in speciesist abuse. No, that’s impractical—counterproductive. Modifications maintain,
rather than dismantle, enslavement. To advance emancipation, we must increase public opposition to
enslavement.
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INHERENT FLAWS IN THE WELFARE ACT MEANS ABUSES AND EXPLOITATION WILL
ALWAYS OCCUR
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 117-8
There are several specific ways in which animal welfare laws ensure that there will never be a meaningful
balance of human and animal interests. First, many of these laws explicitly exempt most forms of
institutionalized property use, which account for the largest number of animals that we use. The most
frequent exemptions from state anti-cruelty statutes involve scientific experiments, agricultural practices,
and hunting. The Animal Welfare Act, the primary federal law that regulates the use of animals in
biomedical experiments, does not even apply to most of the animals used in experiments—rats and mice—
and imposes no meaningful limits on the amount of pain and suffering that may be inflicted on animals in
the conduct of experiment.
Second, even if anticruelty statutes do not do so explicitly, courts have effectively exempted our common
uses of animal from scrutiny by interpreting these statutes as not prohibiting the infliction of even extreme
suffering if it is incidental to an accepted use of animals and a customary practice on the part of animal
owners. An act “which inflicts pain, even the great pain of mutilation, and which is cruel in the ordinary
sense of the word” is not prohibited “whenever the purpose for which the act is done is to make the animal
more serviceable for the use of man.” For example, courts have held consistently that animals used for food may be
mutilated in ways that unquestionably cause severe pain and suffering and that would be normally be regarded as cruel or even as
torture. These practices are permitted, however, because animal agriculture is an accepted institutionalized animal use, and those in
the meat industry regard the practices as normal and necessary to facilitate that use. Courts often presume that animal owners will act
in their best economic interests and will not intentionally inflict more suffering than is necessary on an animal because to do so would
diminish the monetary value of the animal. For example, in Callaghan v Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals, the court
held that the painful act of dehorning cattle did not constitute unnecessary abuse because farmers would not perform this procedure if
it were not necessary. The self interest of the farmer would prevent the infliction of “useless pain or torture,” which “would
necessarily reduce the condition of the animal, and, unless they very soon recovered, the farmer would lose in the sale.”
Third, anticruelty laws are generally criminal laws, and the state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
a defendant engaged in an unlawful act with a culpable state of mind. The problem is that if a defendant is inflicting
pain or suffering on an animal as pat of an accepted institutionalized use of animals, it is difficult to prove that she acted with the
requisite mental state to justify criminal liability. For example, in Regalado v US, Regalado was convicted of violating the anticruelty
statute of the District of Columbia for beating a puppy. Regalado appealed, claiming that he did not intend to harm the puppy and
inflicted the beating only for disciplinary purposes. The court held that anticruelty statutes were “not intended to place unreasonable
restrictions on the infliction of such pain as may be necessary for the training or discipline of an animal” and that the statute only
prohibited acts done with malice or a cruel disposition. Although the court affirmed Regalado’s conviction, it recognized that “proof
of malice will usually be circumstantial and the line between discipline and cruelty will often be difficult to draw.
Fourth, many animal welfare laws have wholly inadequate penalty provisions, and we are reluctant, in any
event, to impose the stigma of criminal liability on animal owners for what they do with their property.
Moreover, those without an ownership interest generally do not have standing to bring legal challenges to
the use of treatment of animals by their owners.
ANIMAL WELFARE FAILS—NO EFFECTIVE POLICE ENFORCEMENT
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 186
Moreover, the structural problems of animal welfare militate against effective enforcement by police and
fair adjudication in courts. After all, American slaves supposedly enjoyed some “rights” guaranteed by
law, but, as numerous historians have pointed out, these laws were never enforced, and courts routinely
simply failed to punish those (usually the owners of the slave property) who violated these slave “rights.”
But several additional considerations are relevant here. Whatever notion of “practicality” is employed,
welfarist reform, which has done little to help animals, is not “practical” in any significant way. However
little we may gain by seeking incrementally to eliminate property status, we do not lose much in the
process. As it presently stands, those who seek justice for nonhumans are being told to pursue a strategy
that merely reinforces the very property paradigm that is responsible for the problem in the first place, and
are told that continuing to reinforce the property status of animals through what are ineffective regulations
on the use of animal property will lead to the abolition of institutionalized animal exploitation. That
prescription provides—and only can provide—for the continuation of the property paradigm. Animal
welfare can not provide the normative guidance sought by someone who rejects the notion that animals are
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property; if animal rights theory can provide normative guidance, that is the most that can be asked for the
present. It remains for those in the future to evaluate whether this normative guidance has been effective in
eradicating property status.
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**Answer To: Animals Do Not Deserve Rights**
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AT: “Differences Between Humans and Animals Justify
Restricting Animal Rights”
NO MORALLY RELEVANT DISTINCTIONS JUSTIFY DISCRIMINATING AGAINST NONHUMANS
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 209
One major step towards extending the ethic to animals, not difficult for the average person to take, is the
realization that there exists no good reason for withholding it: in other words, that there is no morally
relevant difference between humans and animals which can rationally justify not assessing the treatment of
animals by the machinery of our consensus ethic for humans. Not only are there no morally relevant
differences, there are significant morally relevant similarities. Most important, most people believe that
animals are conscious beings, that what we do to them matters to them, that they are capable of a wide
range of morally relevant experiences—pain, fear, happiness, boredom, joy, sorrow, grief; in short, the
full range of feelings which figure so prominently in our moral concern for humans.
“RIGHTS” DISCOURSE IMPLIES THE CONCEPT OF LIBERATION – ARGUMENTS THAT
ANIMALS LACK ATTRIBUTES FOR RIGHTS IRRELEVANT
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 8
In misguided attempts to refute the arguments of this book, some philosophers have gone to much trouble
development arguments to show that animals do not have rights. They have claimed that to have rights a
being must be autonomous, or must be a member of a community, or just have the ability to respect the
rights of others, or must possess a sense of justice. These claims are irrelevant to the case for Animal
Liberation. The language of rights is a convenient political shorthand. It is even more valuable in the era
of thirty-second TV news clips than it was in Bentham’s day; but in the argument for a radical change in
our attitude to animals, it is in no way necessary.
JUSTIFYING DISCRIMINATORY TREATMENT ON SUPPOSED “HUMAN” TRAITS RATHER
THAN MERE MEMBERSHIP IN THE SPECIES EXCLUDES HUMANS WHO LACK THE
TRAITS
Ingmar Persson, professor of philosophy, Lund University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 191
But probably, when all is said and done, this is not what speciesism would come down to—just as racism
and sexism do not simply amount to the doctrine that certain beings be discriminated against just because
of their race or gender. A more intelligent speciesism (racism, sexism) proposes that beings belonging to
some species (race, sex) be favored at the expense of beings belonging to other species (races, sexes) due to
characteristics typical of these species (races, sexes); for instance, that humans should be better catered for
than all nonhuman animals because they alone are rational, have the capacity to speak a language, etc. In
other words, the real basis for discrimination is not species membership, but the possession of rationality or
some other mental faculty.
Against this sort of speciesism the so-called argument from marginal cases has been marshaled: it is
pointed out that if it is the absence of rationality, linguistic ability, etc., that justifies discrimination against
nonhuman animals, discrimination against some humans—in particular, those who are severely mentally
handicapped—is also justifiable, since they, too, lack the precious qualities. Apparently, normal
chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans are at least as intelligent as some mentally impaired humans. It does
not help the human speciesist that these humans belong to a species that is normally equipped with the
mental assets in question, because it is surely more reasonable to treat a being according to the properties it
in fact possesses than according to those that make up the norm for some group to which it belongs,
regardless of whether or not the individual in question has them.
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AT: “Differences Between Humans and Animals Justify
Restricting Animal Rights”
BASING MORAL CONSIDERATION ON THE POSSESSION OF “HUMAN” ATTRIBUTES
NECESSARILY EXCLUDES SOME HUMANS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 129-30
Second, even if all animals other than humans lack a particular characteristic beyond sentience, or possess
it to a different degree than do humans, there is no logically defensible relationship between the lack or
lesser degree of that characteristic and our treatment of animals as resources. Differences between humans
and other animals may be relevant for other purposes—no sensible person argues that we ought to enable
nonhuman animals to drive cars or vote or attend universities—but the differences have no bearing on
whether animals should have the status of property. We recognize this inescapable conclusion where
humans are involved. Whatever characteristic we identify as uniquely human will be seen to a lesser
degree in some humans and not at all in others. Some humans will have the exact same deficiency that we
attribute to animals, and although the deficiency may be relevant for some purposes, most of us would
reject enslaving such humans, or otherwise treating such humans exclusively as means to the ends of
others.
EVERY UNIQUELY “HUMAN” CHARACTERISTIC OFFERED TO JUSTIFY TREATING
ANIMALS AS PROPERTY APPLIES TO SOME HUMAN BEINGS AS WELL
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 130
Consider, for instance, self-consciousness. Peter Carruthers defines self-consciousness as the ability to
have a “conscious experience…whose existence and content are available to be consciously thought about
(that is, available for description in acts of thinking that are themselves made available to further acts of
thinking).” According to Carruthers, humans must have what Damasio refers to as the most complex level
of extended consciousness, or a language-enriched autobiographical sense of self, in order to be selfconscious. But many humans, such as the severely mentally disabled, do not have self-consciousness in
that sense; we do not, however, regard it as permissible to use them as we do laboratory animals, or to
enslave them to labor for those without their particular disability. Nor should we. We recognize that a
mentally disabled human has an interest in her life and in not being treated exclusively as a means to the
ends of others even if she does not have the same level of self-consciousness that is possessed by normal
adults; in this sense, she is similarly situated to all other sentient humans, who have an interest in being
treated as ends in themselves, irrespective of their particular characteristics. Indeed, to say that a mentally
disabled person is not similarly situated to all others for the purposes of being treated exclusively as a
resource is to say that a less intelligent person is not similarly situated to a more intelligent person for
purposes of being used, for instance, as a forced organ donor. The fact that the mentally disabled human
may not have a particular sort of self-consciousness may serve as a nonarbitrary reason for treating her
differently in some respects—it may be relevant to whether we make her the host of a talk show, or giver
her a job teaching at a university, or allow her to drive a car—but it has no relevance to whether we treat
her exclusively as a resource and disregard her fundamental interests, including her interest in not suffering
and in her continued existence, it if benefits us to do so.
The same analysis applies to every human characteristic beyond sentience that is offered to justify treating
animals as resources. There will be some humans who also lack this characteristic or possess it to a lesser
degree than normal humans. This “defect” may be relevant for some purposes, but not for whether we treat
humans exclusively as resources. We do not treat as things those humans who lack characteristics beyond
sentience simply out of some sense of charity. We realize that to do so would violate the principle of equal
consideration b y using an arbitrary reason to deny similar treatment to similar interests in not being treated
exclusively as a means to the ends of others. “The question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk?
but, Can they suffer?”
In sum, there is no characteristic that serves to distinguish humans from all other animals for purposes of
denying to animals the one right that we extend to all humans. Whatever attribute we may think makes all
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humans special and thereby deserving the right not to be the property of others is shared by nonhumans.
More important, even if there are uniquely human characteristics, some humans will not possess those
characteristics, but we would never think of using such humans as resources. In the end, the only
difference between humans and animals is species, and species is not a justification for treating animals as
property any more than race is a justification for human slavery.
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AT: “Animals Lack Rationality”
JUDGES GRANT LEGAL RIGHTS TO HUMANS WITH LITTLE OR NO PRACTICAL
AUTONOMY
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 237
Judges and legislators actually do this. Some humans have little or no autonomy but have legal rights. We
were introduced to a couple of them in Rattling the Cage: Joseph Saikewicz, a sixty-seven-year-old man
with an IQ of ten, and Beth, a ten-month-old girl born into a persistent vegetative state. The state of
Louisiana has even enacted a statute that designates a fertilized in vitro ovum a legal person before it is
implanted in a womb. Louisiana judges may appoint curators to protect its rights, and the fertilized ovum
can even sue and be sued.
SEVERELY IMPAIRED HUMANS STILL HAVE RIGHTS
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 237-8
Imagine a little girl like Beth was born in a local hospital to a young woman who doesn’t want her. No one
knows who the father is. Her nearly nonexistent brain does nothing more than keep her alive. Her heart
pumps, her lungs inflate, her intestines absorb. But she is neither conscious nor sentient. She cannot think
or feel. She is so utterly devoid of any higher brain functions that emergency surgery was performed on
her immediately after birth without anesthesia; she didn’t need any. She has no mind. Yet she has the legal
right to bodily integrity, though it must be exercised by someone else. It is important to note that no one
suggests she be eaten or used in terminal biomedical research.
NONHUMANS CAPABLE OF REASONING
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 23-4
Nonhuman behavior continually refutes the assertion that only humans reason. While a family of beavers
slept in their lodge, a vandal tore a large hold in their dam. Water escaped with such force that the beavers’
pond soon would drain. Emerging from the family lodge at his usual time of early evening, the father
beaver rapidly swam to the dam and, wide-eyed, observed its condition. Quickly he crossed the pond,
felled a large shrub, dragged it into the water, towed it to the break, and wedged it into the top of dam’s
wall. He repeated this process, which failed to staunch the outflow, only once. By sight and sound, the
pond’s water loss was obvious only at the surface, yet the beaver addressed underwater damage. He started
to uproot lily plants (usually reserved for eating) and began using them to plug the dam’s underwater leaks.
Soon three of his offspring emerged from the lodge and hurried to assist him. The four beavers worked to
repair the dam with vegetation, mud and sticks. Whenever dissatisfied with his offsprings’ placement of
sticks, the father repositioned them for greater tightness and stability. The next day while the beavers slept,
human volunteers carried sticks to the dam. When the father beaver emerged from the lodge at his usual
time, he pulled a log from the roof and towed it to the dam. Clearly, he remembered the urgent need for
building materials. With cries of joy, he discovered the pile of sticks left by human well-wishers. He
started putting the sticks to use. Soon four of his offspring arrived, towing logs that they had removed from
the lodge. Of those beavers able to help, only the mother stayed behind, to care for newborn kids. In
addition to making the dam leak-proof, the beavers added six inches to its height, so that future rainfall
would raise the pond’s water level. Beavers plan, deduce, and act accordingly.
DIFFERENCES IN INTELLIGENCE AMONG HUMANS DON’T JUSTIFY DIFFERENCES IN
TREATMENT CONCERNING RIGHTS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 25
Some humans have much higher IQs than others. Should the law permit those with high IQs to enslave or
murder those with low IQs? We don’t accord rights in proportion to a human’s IQ. In the 2002 case
Atkins v Virginia, the US Supreme Court ruled that capital punishment of humans with profound mental
disabilities is unconstitutional. The law affords special protections to humans of exceptionally low mental
capacity. Yet, the allegedly lower intelligence of nonhumans is cited as justification for denying them
rights.
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AT: “Animals Lack Rationality”
INTELLIGENCE IS MORALLY IRRELEVANT TO THE QUESTION OF RIGHTS
ENTITLEMENT
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 26
Normal human intelligence isn’t a valid criterion for basic rights. Any signs of thought indicate than an
individual is conscious, capable of experiencing. Beyond that, intelligence is morally irrelevant.
Regardless of their degree of human-like intelligence, nonhumans would greatly benefit from laws
protecting them from human harm.
We don’t require that a human possess any particular level of intelligence in order to have rights.
Democratic societies protect all human animals, whatever their intellectual capacity. The same should
apply to other animals.
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AT: “Animals Lack Intelligence & Self Awareness”
USING INTELLIGENCE AS THE BENCHMARK FOR RIGHTS WOULD EXCLUDE SOME
HUMANS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 25-6
Those who disqualify nonhumans from rights on the grounds that they lack human-like intelligence
unwittingly disqualify many humans as well. Humans differ widely in their cognitive abilities, which
overlap with nonhuman ones. If no nonhuman can solve complex equations or write a philosophical
treatise, neither can most humans. Even by conventional standards, a mature catfish is in many ways more
cognizant than a newborn or a senile human, and the average pigeon or rat possesses greater learning and
reasoning ability than many humans with mental disabilities.
ARGUMENTS OF LACK OF INTELLIGENCE OR THE ANIMALS ABILITY TO MAKE
CLAIMS ON ITS OWN EXCLUDE MILLIONS OF HUMANS
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 57
Must a person be able to physically make a claim in order to have one? The answer depends upon whether
one emphasizes the "claim" part or the "duty" part of the claim-duty pairing. One school of legal scholars
(we'll call them the Benefit/Interest School) emphasizes "duty." Any being with interests--an adult woman,
a profoundly retarded man, an infant, a chimpanzee, or a dolphin--could, if allowed to be a legal person,
have a claim that correlates to another person's duty. The opposing school (the Control/Choice School)
accents "claims." These scholars argue that a person must actually have the mental wherewithal to be able
to choose to make a claim and to control how it is made. 36 Profoundly retarded men / WOMEN and
infants, who lack these mental abilities, cannot then have claims. An even stricter branch of the
Control/Choice School--we'll call it the "Strict Control/Choice" School--says that claims and duties can
only exist between members of a "moral community." Unless one has the capacity not just to choose but to
act morally, one can have no claims.
If required to meet the more stringent requirements of the Strict Control/Choicers, none but the most
extraordinary nonhuman animal could ever have a claim. But here's the rub: Millions of human beings
would also be ineligible--and not just the profoundly retarded, but the insane, the permanently vegetative,
and the very young. Many more human adults and older children, and perhaps even apes, whales, and
parrots, might have claims if the Control/Choice School prevailed. But vast numbers of human beings
would still be ineligible, as would most other animals. However, if the Benefit/Interest School triumphs,
aside from the permanently vegetative, virtually every human being would be entitled to claims; but so
would a large number of other animals.
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AT: “Animals Lack Rationality”
LACK OF SELF-AWARENESS NOT A REASON TO MAINTAIN PROPERTY STATUS FOR
ANIMALS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 126-7
Although Bentham explicitly rejected the position that, because animals lack characteristics beyond
sentience, such as self-awareness, we could treat them as things, he maintained that because animals lack
self-awareness, we do not violate the principle of equal consideration by using animals as our resources as
long as we give equal consideration to their interests in not suffering.
Bentham’s position is problematic for several reasons. Bentham failed to recognize that although particular
animal owners might treat their animal property kindly, institutionalized animal exploitation would, like
slavery, become “the lot of large numbers,” and animals would necessarily be treated as economic
commodities that were, like slaves, “abandoned without redress to the caprice of a tormentor.” Moreover,
Bentham never explained how to apply the principle of equal consideration to animals who were the
property of humans. But most important, Bentham was simply wrong to claim that animals are not selfaware and have no interest in their lives.
Sentience is not an end in itself. It is a means to the end of staying alive. Sentient beings use sensations of
pain and suffering to escape situations that threaten their lives and sensations of pleasure to pursue
situations that enhance their lives. Just as humans will often endure excruciating pain in order to remain
alive, animals will often not only endure but inflict on themselves excruciating pain—as when gnawing off
a paw caught in a trap—in order to live. Sentience is what evolution has produced in order to ensure the
survival of certain complex organisms. To claim that a being who has evolved to develop a consciousness
of pain and pleasure has no interest in remaining alive is to say that conscious beings have no interest in
remaining conscious, a most peculiar position to take.
CONSCIOUSNESS OF NONHUMAN ANIMAL IS PROVEN - MEMORY
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 141
Some objective evidence does exist for the consciousness of nonhuman animals, if we are conscious. Here's
some of the most intriguing evidence. Scientists think there are two forms of memory. 119 Some experiences
can be remembered consciously. These are called explicit, or declarative, memories and are what we
nonscientists normally think of as "memory." Our explicit (or declarative, or conscious) memories emerge
in our consciousness as words or images. 120 But we can nonconsciously "remember" other experiences as
well. We just don't know that we remember them. But they influence our behavior just the same. These
memories are implicit or nondeclarative. The part of the brain known as the cerebellum, which all
mammals and many other animals have, seems to be required for implicit memory. 121 Conscious
awareness, however, is thought to require coordination between the medial temporal lobes of the brain,
which includes the hippocampus and its supporting structure, and the cortex. The brains of all mammals
have both.
DETERMINING AUTONOMY BASED ON HUMAN CONSIDERATIONS – SUCH AS
INTELLIGENCE—DOES NOT MEAN THAT HUMAN INTELLIGENCE IS ALL THAT
COUNTS
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 45-6
But just because law is so parochial, we mustn’t think human intelligence is the only intelligence.
Intelligence is a complicated concept that intimately relates to an ability to solve problems. Biologist
Bernd Heinrich says “we can’t credibly claim that one species is more intelligent than another unless we
specify intelligent with respect to what, since each animal lives in a different world of its own sensory
inputs and decoding mechanisms of those inputs.” Dolphins expert Diana Reis argues that intelligence
cannot properly be conceived solely in human terms and condemns any assumption that “only our kind of
intelligence is ‘real intelligence.’” We mustn’t think human self the only self or human abilities the only
important mental abilities.
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AT: “Animals Lack Capacity for Moral Reasoning”
REQUIRING ACCEPTANCE OF MORAL SYSTEMS FOR PERSONHOOD WOULD EXCLUDE
MANY HUMANS
H. Lyn White Miles, Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee @ Chattanooga, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 53-4
In fact a problem for those who require reflective self-awareness or full rational faculties (or the potential
thereof) for personhood, or only the most extensive altruistic social behavior, is that there are several
categories of human that do not meet this definition. Sociopaths, who can feel compassion for themselves
but not for their victims, are self-reflective, but have not internalized a sense of cultural morality; they are
familiar with the culture’s morality, but their personal morality is purely egocentric. Severely mentally
handicapped individuals and people who have extensive brain damage are not always self-reflective, yet we
would consider them to be persons and protect them under the law. We excuse children and mentally
impaired people from adult responsibility, but we maintain that killing them (unless it is officially
sanctioned by the state) is murder because of their ‘potential’ to have full human faculties, which may
never be realized. Ethically speaking, enculturated apes are analogous to children.
USING “MORAL CAPACITY” TO JUSTIFY RIGHTS ENTITLEMENT IS IMMORAL
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 26
Of all the supposed reasons for denying rights to nonhumans, the most hypocritical is the claim that
humans are morally superior. People who argue that only humans are sufficiently moral to deserve rights
demonstrate their own immorality. They selfishly seek to keep speciesist abuse legal.
CAPACITY TO MAKE MORAL CHOICES NOT NECESSARY TO DESERVE EQUAL MORAL
CONSIDERATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 225
(Now, someone is sure to say, I have admitted that there is a significant difference between humans and
other animals, and thus I have revealed the flaw in y case for the equality of all animals. Anyone to whom
this criticism has occurred should read Chapter 1 more carefully. You will then find that you have
misunderstood the nature of the case for equality I made there. I have never made the absurd claim that
there are no significant differences between normal adult humans and other animals. My point is not that
animals are capable of acting morally, but that the moral principle of equal consideration of interests
applies to them as it applies to humans. That it is often right to include within the sphere of equal
consideration beings who are not themselves capable of making moral choices is implied by out treatment
of young children and other humans who, for one reason or another, do not have the mental capacity to
understand the nature of moral choice. As Bentham might have said, the point is not whether they can
choose, but whether they can suffer.)
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AT: “Animals Lack Capacity for Moral Reasoning”
MANY ANIMALS DEMONSTRATE MORE MORAL BEHAVIOR THAN MANY HUMANS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 27
Many humans routinely abuse other humans as well. Child abuse, spouse abuse, and other forms of intrahuman violence are widespread. Who’s more moral: the rapist who leaves his victim to die or the dog who
fetches help for the victim? Many nonhumans evince more goodness than many humans.
EXPERIMENTS DEMONSTRATE NONHUMANS ACT MORE MORALLY THAN HUMANS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 28
In experiments by psychologist Stanley Milgram, human subjects were told to give a man an electric shock
every time that he answered a question incorrectly. Subjects faced no penalty if they refused to comply.
Nevertheless, the majority pressed switches signaling increasingly powerful shocks, even after the man had
started to plead and scream. Unknown to the subjects, the electrical shocks were fake.
In similar experiments using rhesus monkeys, the shocks were real. Monkeys learned to pull chains for
food. Then one of the chains was linked to a shock generator. Now, in addition to releasing food, this
chain would inflict an electric shock on another monkey, visible in an adjoining cage. To get adequate
food, a monkey to needed to pull both chains. Unlike Milgram’s subjects, the monkeys were forced to
choose between equally grave alternatives: shock another monkey, or go hungry. Most monkeys went
hungry. Apparently unwilling to risk giving even a single shock, two stopped pulling either chain and went
completely without food—one for five days, the other for twelve.
In the human experiments, most subjects believed that they were inflicting pain on a man guilty of nothing
worse than incorrect answers. In the monkey experiments, humans robbed innocent beings of their
freedom, deprived them of food, and subjected them to electric shocks. In contrast, most of the monkeys
showed altruism, at considerable expense to themselves. Who’s consciously moral?
MANY HUMANS LACK SELF-CONSCIOUS MORAL REASONING
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 28
Even if no nonhuman were capable of self-conscious morality, what difference would that make? Many
humans—infants, sociopaths, adults with severe mental disabilities—aren’t capable of self-conscious
morality. That doesn’t entitle us to deprive them of basic rights.
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AT: “Humans Possess Intrinsic Value that Distinguish Them
From Animals”
APPEAL TO “INTRINSIC DIGNITY OF HUMANS” AS AN ARGUMENT AGAINST ANIMAL
RIGHTS IS A PHILOSOPHICAL COP OUT
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 239
The truth is that the appeal to the intrinsic dignity of human beings appears to solve the egalitarian
philosopher’s problems only as long as it goes unchallenged. Once we ask why it should be that all human
beings – including infants, the intellectually disabled, criminal psychopaths, Hitler, Stalin, and the rest—
have some kind of dignity or worth that no elephant, pig, or chimpanzee can ever achieve, we see that this
question is as difficult to answer as our original request for some relevant fact that justifies the inequality of
humans and other animals. In fact, these two questions are really one: talk of intrinsic dignity or moral
worth does not help, because any satisfactory defense of the claim that all and only human beings have
intrinsic dignity would need to refer to some relevant capacities or characteristics that only human beings
have, in virtue of which they have this unique dignity or worth. To introduce ideas of dignity and worth as
a substitute for other reasons for distinguishing humans and animals is not good enough. Fine phrases are
the last resource of those who have run out of arguments.
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AT: “All Humans Have Potential for Autonomy and
Reasoning”
PRACTICAL AUTONOMY DISTINCT FROM POTENTIAL AUTONOMY
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 32
Human newborns, fetuses, even ovums, sometimes have legal rights. This might have something to do
with autonomy. They may not have it now, but it’s believed they have the potential. And if they have the
potential, the viewpoint holds that we should treat them as if they had autonomy now.
But the potential for autonomy no more justifies treating one as if one had autonomy any more, and
probably less, than does one’s potential for dying justify that one should be treated as if one were dead.
Philosopher Joel Feinberg thinks allocating rights based on potential is a logical error. Potential autonomy
gives rise to potential rights. Actual autonomy gives rise to actual rights. The potentiality argument
moreover fails to explain how common law can grant dignity-rights to adult humans who never enjoyed
autonomy, and never will.
Isaiah Berlin wrote, “If the essence of men is that they are autonomous beings…then nothing is worse than
to treat them as if they were not autonomous, but natural objects, played on by casual influences at the
mercy of external stimuli.” The same is true for any being who meets the requirement for practical
autonomy. She is entitled to liberty rights. Because much of the world, certainly the West, links basic
liberty rights to autonomy, and because autonomy is often seen as the foundation of human dignity, in
Rattling the Cage, I called basic liberty rights “dignity-rights.”
LIMITING RIGHTS EXTENSION TO THOSE WITH CAPACITY FOR UNDERSTANDING
IRRATIONAL
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 123
As I demonstrated in chapter 5, new-speciesist rationales for favoring humans and the nonhumans who
most resemble them are unfair and logically inconsistent. Because much suffering isn’t directly related to
understanding, the extent to which a particular individual possesses the understanding of a normal adult
human is “beside the point,” Steve Sapontzis notes.
The law prohibits the torture of humans because they can suffer, not because they have language (some
don’t) or are rational (I often feel that most aren’t). Other animals do reason, including in humanlike ways,
but neither physical nor psychological suffering requires human-like intelligence. Beatings hurt and hunger
aches whatever an individual’s IQ. Most animals will suffer from imposed immobility. Social animals will
suffer from isolation. Curious ones will suffer from monotony. Suffering matters, whoever is doing the
suffering.
And thought and perception matter, whoever is doing the thinking and perceiving. Each sentient being
represents a mental world. Any form of consciousness should suffice to confer legal personhood.
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AT: “All Humans Have Potential for Autonomy and
Reasoning”
“POTENTIAL” FOR HUMAN CAPACITY AMONG MARGINAL HUMAN CASES DOES NOT
JUJSTIFY DISTINCTION WITH GREAT APES
Daniel A. Dombrowski, 1997, Babies and Beasts: the argument from marginal cases, p. 148-9
If it is wrong to test the effects of toxic gas on a severely retarded human being, is it not also wrong to do
these things on an animal with equivalent or (in the case of great apes) higher mental capacities: Some
might claim at this point that infants have at least the potential for rationality or autonomy and that
marginal cases would have had these potentials were it not for their tragic condition, but that animals,
including the great apes, have no such tragedy. Evelyn Pluhar asks some interesting questions regarding
this claim: “What moral weight could thwarted potential have on such a view? Does one’s degree of moral
significance increase depending on how close to personhood one was when misfortune struck? Does a
human damaged as a three-month-old fetus count for less than a child who became brain-damaged after
birth? At what point, if any, does a victim of thwarted potential gain a right to life? Perhaps only if he or
she had achieved personhood, then tragically lost it?” Pluhar is distinguishing here between a strict
potentiality view and a gradualist potentiality view, and she rightly thinks that both are inadequate. Both
views have this defect: they can at most allow ascribing a right to life to a nonperson who once was a
potential person or potentially rational or autonomous. Those who were conceived without this potential
(say, by having defective genes) have no such potential to thwart. Perhaps it will be objected at this point
that a human nonperson has a “species potential” that the animal nonperson does not have (accepting for
the moment the questionable assumption that great apes are not persons). Pluhar’s response to this
objection is crucial because it focuses attention on the question-begging character of much opposition to
AMC: “Tempting though this line of argument may be, we cannot use it support speciesism, for it assumes
the very point at issue. According to speciesism, membership in a species where personhood is the nor m is
morally relevant. We cannot establish this conclusion by asserting that nonpersons belonging to species
where personhood is the norm are thereby more morally significant than nonpersons who are in the normal
range for their species. This argument is plainly circular. Thus, however it is interpreted, the thwarted
potential argument fails to support any speciesist conclusions.”
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AT: “Animals Do Not Have Souls”
HAVING A SOUL IS NOT MORALLY RELEVANT TO RIGHTS DETERMINATIONS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 15-6
Also, the soul issue isn’t relevant to basic rights. Why on Earth (or beyond) would it be more justifiable to
inflict suffering and death on someone who doesn’t have a soul than on someone who does? (In earlier
eras, Christians frequently tortured or killed humans in an alleged effort to save their souls).
Anyone who believes that an afterlife compensates humans, but not nonhumans, for undeserved suffering
should find nonhuman suffering more appalling than human suffering. Anyone who believes that only
humans experience life after death should find nonhuman death more tragic than human death. The soul
criterion makes no sense.
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AT: “Rights Require Capacity to Enter into Contracts”
FAILURE TO ENTER INTO CONTRACTS DOESN’T JUSTIFY DENIAL OF RIGHTS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 16
Nonhumans shouldn’t have legal rights, other old-speciesists claim, because they cannot enter into social
contracts and fulfill responsibilities. Infants, young children, and numerous adult humans with permanent
mental disabilities can’t enter into contracts either. They can’t negotiate agreements or understand
accountability. They’re the very humans most vulnerable to abuse and, therefore, most in need of legal
protection. And the law does protect them.
The contract argument is fundamentally inconsistent. If an inability to make contracts banishes all
nonhumans from the realm of rights, it must banish many humans as well.
The contract argument is an incoherent excuse for continuing to deny rights to nonhumans. In effect, it’s
little more than “Might makes right”: Humans have the power and ability to make laws, so they’re entitled
to make them solely for their own benefit. Again, only some humans have the power and ability to make
laws. If they’re compassionate and just, they make laws that also protect humans who can’t enter into
contracts. Compassion and justice similarly require laws that protect nonhumans.
ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS SEEK A CONTRACT AMONG HUMANS, NOT ONE BETWEEN
ANIMALS AND HUMANS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 16-7
The contract argument reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of nonhuman rights. Animal rights
advocates don’t seek some kind of contract between humans and nonhumans. They seek a contract among
humans, a legally binding agreement that nonhumans have basic rights—for example to life and liberty.
Laws restrict human behavior. Animal rights advocates want laws that will prohibit humans from
exploiting and otherwise harming nonhumans. They don’t seek to protect nonhumans within human
society. They seek to protect nonhumans from human society. The goal is an end to nonhumans’
“domestication” and other forced “participation” in human society. Nonhumans should be allowed to live
free in natural environments, forming their own societies.
The laws that currently oppress nonhumans are contracts among humans. No speciesist argues that those
laws should be void because nonhumans had no part in framing them.
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AT: “Animals Can’t Demand Their Own Rights”
HIERARCHICAL BASIS OF OPPRESSION NECESSITATES HUMANS TO MAKE THE
DEMAND FOR INCLUSION OF NONHUMANS
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 13-14
Aristotle forged many intellectual molds in science, ethics, taxonomy, politics, psychology, and
philosophy. Some were not broken for hundreds, even thousands, of years. One of them was the syllogism.
He virtually invented it ("Socrates is a man; all men are mortal; therefore Socrates is mortal"). Whether
intentional or not, Aristotle's own place on the Great Chain of Being illustrated a syllogism. It was this:
"Greek males occupy the top rung of the Great Chain of Being; I am a Greek male; therefore I occupy the
top rung." Over the centuries, it generalized to this: "Only groups to which I belong occupy the top ring; I
belong to those groups; therefore I occupy the top rung." It has remained in constant use in determining
who has what rights. We'll call it "Aristotle's Axiom," and it is an axiom because no one ever, ever, assigns
a group to which he or she belongs to any place in a hierarchy of rights other than the top. Mel Brooks
nicely summarized Aristotle's Axiom in his movie The History of the World, Part One: "It's great to be the
king!"
These hierarchies are created in two ways. One group either pushes every other group below by force or
threat of force or persuades the others that they belong on the lower rungs. Soldiers like the first way;
philosophers, legal writers, taxonomists, and priests prefer the second. The problem for nonhuman animals
is that they can neither fight nor write. Well, they can fight a little, and some times do very well one-onone. But they are uniformly terrible at organized warfare against humans, and we are excellent at
slaughtering them. That is why until humans learn to fight for them or write for them, nonhuman animals
will never have any rights.
GREAT APES MERIT PROTECTION WHETHER THEY CAN ASK FOR IT NOT
Daniel A. Dombrowski, 1997, Babies and Beasts: the argument from marginal cases, p. 144
The great apes are, like children and people with a mental handicap, unable to claim their due. Yet it seems
to me that they should receive their due, even if what they are due is in some ways below that of normal
adult human beings. Remember that Regan holds the basis for this desert to lie in inherent value, a view
that he expresses quite clearly and without G.E.Moore—like mystery:
“It remains to be asked…what underlies the possession of inherent value. Some are tempted by the idea that life itself
is inherently valuable. This view would authorize attributing inherent value to chimpanzees, for example, and so might
find favor with some people who oppose using these animals as means to our ends. But this view would also authorize
attributing inherent value to anything and everything that is alive, including, for example, crabgrass, lice, bacteria and
cancer cells. It is exceedingly unclear, to put the point as mildly as possible, either that we can have a duty to treat
these things with respect or that any clear sense can be given to the idea that we do. More plausible by far is the
view that those individuals who have inherent value are the subjects of a life—are, that is, the experiencing
subjects of a life that fares well or ill for them over time, those who have an individual experiencing welfare,
logically independent of their utility relative to the interests or welfare of others. Competent humans are subjects of a
life in this sense. But so, too, are those incompetent humans who have concerned us. Indeed, so too are those
incompetent humans who have concerned us. Indeed, so too are many other animals: cats and dogs, hogs, and sheep,
dolphins and wolves, horses and cattle—and, most obviously, chimpanzees and the other nonhuman great apes.”
Surely the great apes qualify as being subjects of a life with individual experience welfare. This is not
obvious to some perhaps because (as Rollin argues, echoing Clark) it has only recently been noticed that
certain human beings are subjects of a life: women, blacks, homosexuals, native populations, the insane,
the handicapped, and so on. One major step toward extending the franchise to the great apes is taken when
it is noticed that there exists no good reason not to extend it, “that there is no morally relevant difference
between humans and animals which can rationally justify not assessing the treatment of animals by the
machinery of our consensus ethic for humans.” In addition, Rollin, like Clark, is comfort able with the
Aristotelian notion that each animal has a telos that can be more easily thwarted if basic rights are not
extended to help them. Perhaps it is not part of a chimpanzee’s telos to comprehend English, but the fact
that a ten-year-old chimpanzee can comprehend it better than a two-year-old child indicates that the
chimpanzee’s telos must be rather sophisticated.
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AT: “Animals Lack Level of Sentience Sufficient for Ethical
Concern”
SHOULD PRESEUME THAT FARM ANIMALS CAN FEEL PAIN AND SUFFER
Joyce D’Silva, Chief Executive of Compassion in World Farming, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 40
The truth can perhaps best be found in our own common sense – and in our hearts. If behaving towards
farm animals with understanding and compassion is too hard to swallow, then I think we can at least agree
to give them the benefit of the doubt in how we treat them. Let us assume that they feel pain and can suffer
both physically and psychologically. Let us make this our premise when we design new systems and
breeding methodologies. Let the well-being of the animals be our guide.
SHOULD PRESUME THAT ANIMALS ARE SENTIENT
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 38-9
The common sense of science’s claim that one cannot know animal mental experience is bad philosophy.
The same positivism that would exclude talk of animal consciousness from science would also exclude talk
of an external world that exists independently of perception, talk of minds in other human beings, and the
knowability of the past. Evolutionary continuity and neurophysiological and behavioral analogies across
species favor the claim than animals experience pain, and the fact that the failure to feel pain is biologically
disastrous in human beings so born or suffering from such conditions as Hansen’s disease is ample
evidence that animals also feel pain and do not merely exhibit pain mechanisms and responses. In addition,
although we cannot directly perceive thoughts and feelings in animals, we cannot directly perceive quanta
and black holes either, or, for that matter, minds in other humans; all are postulated theoretical entities that
are presumed to exist because they provide us with the best explanations for certain phenomena and enable
us to predict features of those phenomena.
DENYING SENTIENCE LACKS CREDIBILITY
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 39
The key point for our purposes, however, is the incompatibility of the denial of animal consciousness and
feeling with research into animal welfare, research demanded by the emerging social ethic we have
detailed. Ordinary common sense now not only takes it for granted that animals can feel pain, distress,
fear, anxiety, pleasure, boredom, happiness, and other morally relevant modalities of mutation; it now cares
about that morally, and cares a great deal. Thus, any research undertaken as part of the attempt to meet
social concern about farm animal welfare must accord not only with such social moral concerns but also
with the ordinary commonsense view that animals can experience the morally relevant modalities of
consciousness. Any attempt to deny this fundamental commonsense dictum is likely to destroy the
credibility of the research as a vehicle for finding solutions to social concerns about animal welfare. As
both Ian Duncan and I have forcefully pointed out, mental states and feelings are everything to welfare—
even such physical interests as food and water are important essentially because their thwarting results in
suffering (a state of consciousness).
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AT: “Animals Lack Empathy”
NON HUMAN ANIMALS DO EXHIBIT ALTRUISM
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 386
Field studies of social behavior of wild animals of course reveal behaviors very analogous to altruism, but
our reluctance to say unqualifiedly that such behavior is voluntary (a requirement that is currently at issue)
causes us to pause before calling it truly altruistic. But when the dominant male in a gorilla band stays
behind and sacrifices himself in order to protect the band from poachers, the analogy seems strong and we
have no problem seeing the heroism involved; nobody would quarrel, I think, with calling this animal
altruism. Further analogous behavior can be recognized in far less complex creatures than gorillas; army
ants sacrifice themselves by the thousands by marching into a stream to create a bridge of dead bodies for
their advancing comrades behind them.
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**Answer To: Problems with Recognizing Animal Rights**
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Animal Rights Can Be Recognized in Pragmatic Manner
MUST BALANCE ABSOLUTE MORAL IDEALS WITH PRAGMATIC STRATEGY
Kim Stallwood, PETA, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 201
The task of the animal advocacy movement is to challenge the cultural, political, and scientific assumptions
of speciesism through the pursuit of a strategy that balances a utopian vision of animal liberation with a
pragmatic political agenda for achieving rights for animals. If successful, this strategy will achieve two
goals: The community of [human] equals will be extended to include all nonhuman animals, and nonhuman
animals will be accorded under the law the right to life, the protection of individual liberty, and the
prohibition of torture.
IMAGINATION EXPERIMENTS VITAL TO ENDORSING RADICAL SOCIAL CHANGE
Dale Jamieson, Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 224-5
One source of our resistance may be this: we are unsure what recognizing our equality with the other great
apes would mean for our individual behavior and our social institutions. Would they be allowed to run for
public office? Would we be required to establish affirmative action programs to compensate for millennia
of injustices? To some extent, this unclarity comes from the narrowness of our vision, and to some extent
because there are significant questions involved that cannot be answered in advance. Humans often seem
to have failures of imagination when considering radical social change. A world without slavery was
unfathomable to many white southerners prior to the American Civil War. Life without apartheid is still
unimaginable to many South Africans. One reason we may resist radical social change is because we
cannot imagine the future, and we fear what we cannot imagine.
ANIMAL LIBERATION ADVOCACY DOES NOT REQUIRE AN “ALL-OR-NOTHING”
APPROACH
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 161-2
I have been unable to find anyone who argues that the animal rights advocate is somehow committed to
violent revolution. Robert Garner argues that rights theory can support “extreme forms of direct action in
defense of animal rights,” although “Regan himself fails to draw the revolutionary conclusions that appear
logically to follow from his philosophical arguments.” Instead, Regan extols “the virtues of Ghandian
principles of non-violent civil disobedience,” which Garner pejoratively likens to threatening to scream
until one makes oneself sick. But Garner does not argue that rights theory compels any particular “extreme
forms of direct action,” and he fails to explain why Regan cannot carry forward revolutionary conclusions
in a nonviolent manner. In any event, I do not thing that anything about the macro component of rights
theory clearly requires the individual to seek social and legal change that will lead to the abolition of all
animal exploitation, although the micro component does direct the individual not to participate in those
institutions of exploitation. Indeed, some of the reasons Regan gives in support of Ghandian nonviolence
may be reasons against any incremental action that includes violence against humans or nonhumans, or
even against property crimes that do not involve removing animals from harm’s way.
LEGAL SYSTEM GRANTS RIGHTS TO HUMANS IN PROPORTION TO THEIR PRACTICAL
AUTONOMY NOW
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 44
The idea of granting proportional liberty rights accords with how judges often think. They may give fewer
legal rights to a human who lacks autonomy, but they don’t make her a thing. A severely retarded human
adult or child who lacks the mental wherewhital to participate in the political process may still move about
freely. Judges may give narrower legal rights to her. A severely mentally limited human adult or child
might not have the right to move in the world at large, but may move freely within her home or within an
institution. Judges may give parts of a complex right (remember, what we normally think of as a legal right
is actually a bundle of them). A profoundly retarded human might have a claim to bodily integrity but lack
the power to waive it, thus being un able to consent to a risky medical procedure or the withdrawal of lifesaving medical treatment.
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Slavery Abolition Proves Obstacles to Animal Liberation can
be Overcome
THERE WERE PRACTICAL PROBLEMS WITH ABOLISHING HUMAN SLAVERY AS
WELL—DIDN’T JUSTIFY ITS CONTINUATION
Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, Editor Edica & Animali and Professor of Bioethics @ Princeton,
1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 310
Finally, we cannot ignore doubts about the practical feasibility of the project, and the concrete implications
of admitting chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans into the community of equals. Quite novel problems
are likely to arise, but they will not be insuperable, and as we overcome each one, we will reveal the
spurious nature of the alleged obstacles to overcoming the boundaries between species. In fact, difficulties
also occurred in similar situations involving humans, but this was no reason to abandon the overall plan of
emancipation. Readers will not need to be reminded that the liberation of American slaves after the Civil
War was not sufficient to achieve equal civil rights for them. Instead, a new set of obstacles to equality
arose, some of which were overcome only by the civil rights movement of the 1960s, while others remain a
problem today.
EMANCIPATION OF HUMAN SLAVES PROVES THAT OBSTACLES TO ANIMAL
LIBERATION CAN BE OVERCOME
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 239-40
The obstacles to basic legal rights for any nonhuman animal, physical, economic, political, religious,
historical, legal and psychological, that I set out in Chapter 2 are major and real. But despite the blindness
of even our greatest citizens, these obstacles have been hurdled before, at least with regard to humans. The
most significant example is the abolition of human slavery, within decades after the American Revolution.
“Considering that slavery had been globally accepted for millennia, it is encouraging that people were able
to make such a major shift in their moral view, especially when a cause like abolition conflicted with strong
economic interests,” David Brion Davis has written. “We can still learn from history the invaluable lesson
that an enormously powerful and profitable evil can be overcome.” Then we will have taken the first and
most crucial step toward unlocking the cage. Judges must recognize that even using a human yardstick, at
least some nonhuman animals are entitled to recognition as legal persons.
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Representations Key
REPRESENTATIONS SHAPE REALITY – THE VIEW THAT ‘MAN’ IS OUTSIDE AND
SEPARATE FROM NATURE CREATES ACTION TO SUPPORT IT
Fouts, President of non-profit organization, Friends of Washoe; Co-Director of Chimpanzee and Human
Communication Institute; Professor of Psychology and Research at Central Washington University. 2004
“APES, DARWINIAN CONTINUITY, AND THE LAW”. Animal Law. 10 Animal L. 99 , p. 102-3
Our perspective of the world determines how we behave in it. If we thought Earth was flat, we would avoid
trying to sail around it. If we thought Earth was the center of the universe, we might try to explore other
planets, but without much success. While geocentric models are now regarded as an erroneous part of our
scientific history, we are currently experiencing a major change in perspective with regard to our species'
place in nature and our relationships with other organic beings. Since Darwin wrote The Origin of Species
almost 150 years ago, a great deal of evidence has been discovered stimulating change from the erroneous
view that "man" is superior to and different in kind from our fellow beings, to a view emphasizing
evolutionary continuity for both the mind and body. For an example of how our worldview affects our
behavior, consider the following questions: How would witch hunts be viewed today? Would our
legislatures consider laws that would allow the punishment of people who practice witchcraft? Could one
seek damages from a person they accused of putting a curse on them? Such charges and claims would be
laughed at today, yet it is estimated that they resulted in hundreds of thousands of deaths in our past
through the offices of church and state. These wrongs were visited mainly on women and were the result of
a misled worldview. The judges, prosecutors, and people of that time believed in this false worldview,
though it was inconsistent with the empirical realities of life. The Platonic-Aristotelian and Cartesian
worldviews, which see "man" as superior to all other beings, including women, are also unrealistic. They
remain popular even though they starkly contrast the empirical reality of Darwinian continuity, which states
that evolution must be gradual, with no major breaks or discontinuities. In the ancient Greek worldview the more traditional and ladder-like "chain of being" model - inferior creatures were placed in descending
order below the superior Greek male human. Descartes' worldview was slightly different, maintaining that
a definite gap, or difference in kind, existed between man and the defective automata below him. But his
view still maintained a hierarchy with "man" above and outside of nature, and lumped all the other beings
below "man" in one great unthinking, unfeeling, imperfect mass of automata. These imperfect automata
were considered quite distinct and different in kind from "man" because they lacked reason and, being
machinelike, were incapable of thought and feeling.
EVEN IF WE CANNOT EVER TRULY BECOME ONE WITH “THE OTHER” A PRINCIPLE OF
RESPECT HELPS BUILD UNDERSTANDING
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 265
Admittedly there is a sense in which we can never be at one with the other. We will never succeed in
leaping over our own socialization and our Western history. Thus Western anthropologists cannot ever
totally know or understand the people they study. Anthropologists necessarily remain prisoners of their
own background. In this fundamental sense ethnocentrism can never be totally overcome. But at least as
far as human subjects are concerned, the anthropologist is supposed to tread upon this unknowable ground
with respect rather than with disdain.
A similar situation is bound to occur while studying ape subjects.
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AT: “If You Don’t Solve All Animal Exploitation There’s No
Advantage”
FACT THAT ANIMALS MIGHT STILL BE ABUSED IN OTHER WAYS DOESN’T MEAN
THAT THE INITIAL PROHIBITION IS WORTHLESS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 213-4
What this demonstrates, however, is not that the incremental approach cannot work but rather that it is
essential to understand, in analyzing a proposed prohibition on particular animal use, that the rights
advocate cannot fairly be made to account for what others do to effect other types of exploitation. For
example, if I abolish the forced labor of children who work sixteen hours a day in Indian carpet mills, I
have prohibited a particular activity that is constitutive of child slavery. If someone comes along and
forces these children into an alternative form of servitude, such as child prostitution, that does not mean
that my efforts have not resulted in an increment in the total eradication of the status of children as the
property of their parents. I may know with some certainty that, people being who and what they are, the
exploitation of children will continue in various forms. That recognition, it seems, does not relieve me of
the obligation to seek the eradication of those forms of exploitation that I can eliminate. And to the extent
that consequences are important, this whole matter is far more vexing for Singer and the animal welfarists
than it is for Regan or rights advocates. After all, the utilitarian needs a fairly detailed theory that serves to
distinguish her acts from the consequences of her acts. The reason for this is that utilitarian theory require
that we judge acts in light of consequences. But this is a theoretical and not an empirical matter. As
philosopher Jonathan Bennett argues, a description of what someone did will include certain upshots of
certain bodily movements, but certain upshots will not be included in a description of what the person did,
but rather, as the consequences of what the person has done. “There are various criteria for drawing the
line between what someone did and the consequences of what he did; and there can be several proper ways
of drawing it in a given case,” and “there are wrong ways of dividing a set of happenings into action and
consequences.” We can be grateful that we not need to develop a theory to distinguish actions from
consequences in the sense that is required by the new welfarist or the utilitarian, who need a fully
developed theory of consequences in order to evaluate the morality of actions. The rights theorist, who
lacks the crystal ball that would be required in such a case, can rely on the principle of moral agency.
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AT: “Animal Rights Threatens Interests of Humans”
MOST CONFLICTS BETWEEN HUMAN AND ANIMAL INTERESTS ARE CONSTRUCTED
AND INVOLVE TRIVIAL HUMAN INTERESTS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 132-3
Because animals are property, we treat every issue concerning their use or treatment as though it presented
a genuine conflict of interests, and invariably we choose the human interest over the animal interest even
when animal suffering can be justified only by human convenience, amusement, or pleasure. In the
overwhelming number of instances in which we evaluate our moral obligations to animals, however, there
is no true conflict. When we contemplate whether to eat a hamburger, buy a fur coat, or attend a rodeo, we
do not confront any sort of conflict worthy of serious moral consideration. If we take animal interests
seriously, we must desist from manufacturing such conflicts, which can only be construed in the first place
by ignoring the principle of equal consideration and by making an arbitrary decision to use animals in ways
in which we rightly decline to use any human.
CHOOSING A HUMAN OVER A NON-HUMAN ANIMAL IN A TRUE EMERGENCY
SITUATION DOES NOT JUSTIFY TREATING THEM AS PROPERTY
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 133
There may, of course be situations in which we are confronted with a true emergency, such as the burning
house that contains an animal and a human, where we have time to save only one. Such emergency
situations require what are, in the end, decisions that are arbitrary and not amenable to satisfying general
principles of conduct. Yet even if we would always choose to save the human over the animal in such
situations, it does not follow that animals are merely resources that we may use for our purposes. We
would draw no such conclusion when making a choice between two humans. Imagine that two humans are
in the burning house. One is a young child; the other is an old adult, who, barring the present
conflagration, will soon die of natural causes anyway. If we decide to save the child for the simple reason
that she has not yet lived her life, we would not conclude that it is morally acceptable to enslave old people,
or to use them for target practice. Similarly, assume that a wild animal is just about to attack a friend. Our
choice to kill the animal in order the save friend’s life does not mean that it is morally acceptable to kill
animals for food, any more than our moral justification in killing a deranged human about to kill our friend
would serve to justify our using deranged humans as forced organ donors.
ANIMAL RIGHTS DON’T PRECLUDE SELF-DEFENSE AND PROTECTIVE ACTIONS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 125
Except that humans shouldn’t interfere with predator-prey relationships among free-living nonhumans, I
also think we’re morally entitled to kill someone (as always, human or nonhuman) who directly,
immediately threatens our life or that of another. I’ve been asked, “If a lion attacked your child or our dog,
wouldn’t you wish that you could intervene?” I would intervene. I’d do everything in my power to defend
my (hypothetical) child or dog. If necessary, I’d kill the lion. But I’d just as readily kill a human attacker.
I think we have a right to kill anyone who is invading our body or that of another (again, with the exception
of natural situations among free-living nonhumans.) For example, it’s justifiable defense of self or another,
such as a dog or cat, to kill parasites (unless they’re external and can be removed benignly). Everyone has
a right to bodily integrity. In keeping with US law, I think an individual is entitled to kill an attacker if
that’s the only way to prevent being raped.
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REGARDING ANIMALS AS PART OF THE COMMUNITY OF EQUALS DOES NOT MEAN
THAT WE CAN’T CHOOSE HUMAN INTERESTS OVER THE ANIMALS IN CASES OF
GENUINE CONFLICT, OR THAT ANIMALS MUST BE GIVEN THE SAME RIGHTS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 133-4
In sum, if we take animal interests seriously, we are not obliged to regard animals as the same as humans
for all purposes any more than we regard all humans as being the same for all purposes; nor do we have to
accord to animals all or most of the rights that we accord to humans. We may still choose the human over
the animal in cases of genuine conflict—when it is truly necessary to do so – but that does not mean that we
are justified in treating animals as resources for human use. And if the treatment of animals as resources
cannot be justified, then we should abolish the institutionalized exploitation of animals. We should care for
domestic animals presently alive, but we should bring no more into existence. The abolition of animal
exploitation could not, as a realistic matter, be imposed legally unless and until a significant portion of us
took animal interests seriously. Our moral compass will not find animals while they are lying on our
plates. In other words, we have to put our vegetables where our mouths are and start acting on the moral
principles that we profess to accept.
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AT: “Animal Rights Dilute Human Rights”
DENYING BASIC RIGHTS TO NON-HUMAN APES UNDERMINES FOUNDATION FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 8
Based on the present state of scientific knowledge about the minds of these animals, I will argue that the case for legal rights for some
of them is overwhelming; for others, currently not. But each determination will be saturated in the highest legal values and principles,
free of the pervasive legal bias against nonhuman animals, and deeply anchored in scientific fact . To deny the most deserving
amongst nonhuman animals basic rights is arbitrary, biased, and therefore unjust. It undermines, and
finally destroys, every rationale for basic human rights as well. And states without justice, wrote St.
Augustine, are nothing but robber bands.
BASING RIGHTS EXTENSION ON SENTIENCE WOULD STRENGTHEN RIGHTS FOR
VULNERABLE HUMANS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 17
Making sentience the sole criterion for legal rights not only would protect nonhumans; it also would affirm
the rights of the most vulnerable humans. If mallards and butterflies had legal rights, the rights of autistic
and senile humans would be more, not less, secure. Opponents often claim that nonhuman rights would diminish human
rights. To the contrary, laws that protect the most vulnerable beings protect us all.
ENSLAVEMENT OF ANIMALS SET THE STAGE FOR ENSLAVEMENT OF PEOPLE
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 198-9
Writing about this process, and providing yet another insight into the entanglements of the oppression of humans and other animals,
Elizabeth Fisher notes:
”Humans violated animals by making them their slaves. In taking them in and feeding them, humans first
made friends with animals and then killed them. To do so, they had to kill something in themselves. When
they began manipulating the reproduction of animals, they were even more personally involved in practices
which led to cruelty, guilt, and subsequent numbness. The keeping of animals would seem to have set a
model for the enslavement of humans, in particular the large scale exploitation of women captives for
breeding and labor, which is a salient feature of the developing civilization.”
JUDICIAL REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE AUTONOMY INTERESTS OF GREAT APES
UNDERMINES FOUNDATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and law professor, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds.
Armstrong & Botzler, p. 542-3
Courts recognize human dignity-rights in the complete absence of autonomy only by using an arbitrary
legal fiction that controverts the empirical evidence that no such autonomy exists. Conversely, courts
refuse to recognize dignity-rights of the great apes only by using a second arbitrary legal fiction in the teeth
of empirical evidence that they possess it. But legal fictions can only be justified when they harmonize
with, or least do not undermine, the overarching values and principles of a legal system. Thus the legal
fiction that a human who actually lacks autonomy ha it is benign, for at worst it extends legal rights to those
who might not need them. At best it protects the bodily integrity of the most helpless humans alive. But the
legal fiction that great apes are not autonomous when they actually are undermines every important
principle and value of Western justice: liberty, equality, fairness, and reasoned judicial decision making. It
is pernicious.
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ARGUMENTS FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS STRENGTHEN THE CASE FOR PROTECTIONS FOR
HUMAN RIGHTS FOR “MARGINAL” CASES
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2004, The Case for
Animal Rights, p. xiii
Second, The Case does more than argue for animal rights. It seeks to describe and ground a family of basic
human rights, especially for the most vulnerable members of the extended family, for example, young
children. (For a later development of my theory applied to children, see Regan, 1989). As I have said on
many occasions, I never would have become an animal rights advocate if I had not first been a human
rights advocate. While in the past, the main interest of friend and foe alike had been (and understandably
so) in my argument for animal rights, I hope new readers will not overlook, and will test the mettle of, my
more fundamental argument for human rights.
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AT: “Recognizing Rights Results Absurd Results”
EXTENDING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS DOES NOT START A SLIPPERY SLOPE OF ABSURDLY
EXTENDING RIGHTS AND TRIVIALIZING THEM
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 52
It is, as yet, unclear how far rights can be extended beyond animals before they lose their content. What is
clear, though, is that the philosophical basis for extending rights to animals does not necessarily imply a
further extension of rights to plants, the unborn, the earth, or future generations. By basing rights on
sentience, animal rights theory limits the expansion of rights to those being that are capable of suffering. In
other words, sentience is a barrier that limits further sliding down the slippery slope. Future generations,
by definition, are nonsentient because they have yet to come into existence. Although there is evidence that
plants react to stimulus, it is generally accepted that plants do not experience suffering. Thus, granting
rights to animals does not, by itself, entail awarding rights to future generations, plants or the earth.
Extending rights to animals may logically require a similar extension to unborn fetuses if it could be shown
that fetuses experience suffering through abortions. But beyond that, expanding the circle to animal rights
does not lead to an unending slide down the slippery slope.
EQUAL MORAL CONSIDERATION DOES NOT ENTAIL LITERAL EQUALITY IN RIGHTS
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 79
Hence, it seems that no adequate reason can be given for taking species membership, in itself, as the ground
for putting some beings inside the boundary for moral protection and others either totally or very largely
outside it. That doesn’t mean that all animals have the same rights as humans. It would be absurd to give
animals the right to vote, but then it would be no less absurd to give that right to infants or to severely
retarded human beings. Yet we still give equal consideration to the interests of those humans incapable of
voting. We don’t raise them for food, nor test cosmetics in their eyes. Nor should we. But we do these
things to nonhuman animals who show greater rationality, self-awareness, and a sense of justice than they
do.
EXTENDING THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CONSIDERATION TO ANIMALS DOES NOT
REQUIRE THAT THEY BE GIVEN THE SAME RIGHTS AS HUMANS
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. 2
The reasoning behind this reply to Taylor’s analogy is correct up to a point, but it does not go far enough.
There are obviously important differences between humans and other animals, and these differences must
give rise to some differences in the rights that each have. Recognizing this evident fact, however, is no
barrier to the case for extending the basic principle of equality to nonhuman animals. The differences that
exist between men and women are equally undeniable, and the supporters of Women’s Liberation are
aware that these differences may give rise to different rights. Many feminists hold that women have the
right to an abortion on request. It does not follow that since these same feminists are campaigning for
equality between men and women they must support the right of men to have abortions too. Since a man
cannot have an abortion, it is meaningless to talk of his right to have one. Since dogs can’t vote, it is
meaningless to talk of their right to vote. There is no reason why either Women’s Liberation or Animal
Liberation should get involved in such nonsense. The extension of the basic principle of equality from one
group to another does not imply that we must treat both groups in exactly the same way, or grant exactly
the same rights to both groups. Whether we should do so will depend on the nature of the members of the
two groups. The basic principle of equality does not require equal or identical treatment; it requires equal
consideration. Equal consideration for different beings may lead to different treatment and different rights.
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EXTENDING “PERSONHOOD” STATUS TO NONHUMAN ANIMALS DOES NOT REQUIRE
FULL PANOPLY OF ALL RIGHTS
Cass Sunstein, Law Professor, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 11
On this view, a central goal of the animal rights movement—eliminating the idea that animals are
property—can be taken in a modest way, as an effort to remove a legal status that inevitably promotes
suffering, and in that sense it is a small part of the animal welfare agenda. But the goal can be taken far
more ambitiously, as an effort to say that animals should have rights of self-determination, or a certain kind
of autonomy. Hence, some people urge that certain animals, at least, are ‘persons,’ not property, and that
they should have many of the legal rights that human beings have. Of course this does not mean that those
animals can vote or run for office. Their status would be akin to that of children—a status commensurate
with their capacities. What that status is, particularly, remains to be spelled out. But at a minimum, it
would seem to entail protection against torture, battery, and even confinement (except for purposes of
human self-defense).
PERSONHOOD STATUS FOR ANIMALS DOES NOT MEAN THEY MUST BE TREATED
EXACTLY LIKE HUMAN PERSONS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 132
If animals are persons, that does not mean that they are human persons; it does not mean that we must treat
animals in the same way that we treat humans or that we must extend to animals any of the legal rights that
we reserve to competent humans. Nor does this mean that animals have any sort of guarantee of a life free
from suffering, or that we must protect animals from harm from other animals in the wild or from
accidental injury by humans. As I argue below, it does not necessarily preclude our choosing human
interests over animal interests in situations of genuine conflict. But it does require that we accept that we
have a moral obligation to stop using animals for food, biomedical experiments, entertainment, or clothing,
or any other uses that assume that animals are merely resources, and that we prohibit the ownership of
animals. The abolition of animal slavery is required by any moral theory that purports to treat animal
interests as morally significant, even if the particular theory otherwise rejects rights, just as the abolition of
human slavery is required by any theory that purports to treat human interests as morally significant
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RATHER THAN TRIVILIAZE EXTENDING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS STRENGTHENS THE
MEANING OF RIGHTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 49-50
While there is reason to suspect that boundless expansion trivializes existing rights, two questions remain.
Does the animal rights movement demonstrate that rights can be extended to animals without diminishing
rights of content, meaning, and power? And, if so, how far can rights be extended before they lose their
meaning? In addressing the first question, I shall argue that both the philosophical and political activism of
the animal rights movement illustrates a powerful extension of rights. Indeed, I shall suggest that it is the
very extension of rights to animals that advances the strength of rights language. Rather than trivializing
the language, the expanding scope of rights, and it does so through a reconstruction of the meaning of
rights. As for the second question, I will offer some speculations suggesting that if rights are to be
extended to nonsentient, nonliving beings a significantly transformed understanding of rights would have to
be advanced. More likely, increasing respect and protection for nonsentient beings would be better
advanced by an alternative to rights language.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE FOR ANIMALS EXPANDS MEANING OF RIGHTS FOR HUMANS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 51
By expanding the circle, the application of rights to animals does not necessarily undermine the meaning of
rights. I suggest, in contrast to what critics of rights suggest, that the very act of extending moral rights to
animals strengthens the meaning of human rights in several ways. First, it reaffirms the rights of humans
who lack rational capabilities. By basing the allocation of rights on sentience over rationality, animal rights
reaffirm the rights of mentally disabled human beings and children. Second, it reinforces the notion that
arbitrary demarcations, including those that justify racism, sexism, and other “isms,” are inappropriate.
Third, it advances the values of sentience, feeling, and empathy. In doing so, the philosophical expansion
of rights to animals does not trivialize an rights or empty them of their content. To the contrary, it fills
rights with an alternative content—sentience—that reaffirms human rights and concomitantly advances
animal rights.
TURN: USING RIGHTS DISCOURSE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS STRENGHTENS THEIR
POWER—DOES NOT TRIVIALIZE THEM.
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 51-2
Although stretching rights to animals initially fosters claims of absurdity that may undermine the power of the language, upon more
careful inspection, the stretch is hardly absurd. Most of the absurdity claims arise from superficial responses such as “animal rights
means pigs in school, driving cars, and voting” and animal rights activists hate humans and love animals.” These types of
allegations can be easily dismissed in such a way as to reinvigorate rights with power. All animal rights
philosophers and proponents agree that granting rights to animals does not imply granting animals the same rights
that humans hold, just as proponents of human rights agree, for instance, that the rights of children can be restricted. In addition,
the allegation that animal advocates hate humans is largely exaggerated. In fact, philosophical and
movement literature concerning animal interests frequently reaffirms human rights.
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AT: “Rights Talk Bad – No Trivialization”
DENYING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS BECAUSE IT MIGHT RISK TRIVIALIZING RIGHTS FOR
HUMANS IS THE LOGIC THAT ALLOWS THE ARBITRARY RESTRICTION
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 50
If these view is accepted, then the slippery slope argument must be rejected . To deny rights to animals simply because
extending rights might lead to problems further down the slope is not persuasive. Indeed, applying the
slippery slope argument to deny the extension of rights to animals fosters an arbitrary demarcation at the
level of species. The danger of such a capricious demarcation is clear when we consider that the same line
can be drawn further up the slope, as it has in the past, within the human species. The slippery slope argument
thus is not unique to animal rights. It was the kind of argument expressed by many who wished to deny rights to
blacks, women, and other marginalized groups. If we agree that the slippery slope argument does not
justify denial of human rights, we similarly have to agree that it does not, in itself, warrant denial of animal
rights.
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AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Rights Talk Good for Animals
RIGHTS TALK IS A POWERFUL TOOL FOR OPPRESSED GROUPS TO ENTER INTO
POPULAR DISCOURSE—GIVES THEM A VOICE
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 88-89
In invoking human rights and connecting them to animals, advocates resort to an authoritative language.
To be sure, such a resort does not guarantee acceptance of animal rights. Yet, from the perspective of the
marginalized, right language is a powerful tool because it provides a means of entering popular discourse.
It gives a voice to the silenced and a language with which to articulate demands for change. The language
is particularly useful due to its recognition and common usage throughout society. Activists, aware of the
ubiquity of rights, appropriate the language in an implicit attempt to “turn society’s ‘institutional logic’
against itself.”
RIGHTS TALK IS A POWERFUL TOOL TO PROMOTE THE INTERESTS OF
MARGINALIZED GROUPS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 88
Along with its familiarity, rights language is a powerful medium for a variety of reasons. First, rights
language is persuasive talk that provides a solid normative foundation from which to wage social struggles.
The search for normative grounding is a method rooted in our society, and the ‘persistence of rights talk
implies an aspiration to base moral arguments on the basis of reason.” Rights talk is therefore significant
not only due to its acceptance and common usage but because its very usage provides ‘invigorating words
with the power to explain.” Second, rights talk generates discussion, debate, and education, thereby
rousing thought and dialogue. The very battles and disagreements prompted by rights talk can be beneficial
because they promote analysis and dialogue. And third, rights may contribute to a sense of self-worth and
definition for movement activists. As Elizabeth Schneider concludes in her study of the women’s
movement, rights can enhance self-worth and empowerment: “The articulation of women’s rights provides
a sense of self and distinction for individual women…Claims of equal rights and reproductive choice, for
example, empowered women.”
RIGHTS TALK EFFECTIVE FOR ANIMALS—NOT UTOPIAN
FRANCIONE, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996
Rain Without Thunder, p. 4
I argue that rights theory provides more concrete normative guidance for incremental change than other
views relied on by animal advocates. That is, animal rights theory is not “utopian”; it contains a nascent
blueprint for the incremental eradication of the property status of animals. The incremental eradication of
animal suffering prescribed by classical welfarism—cannot and will not, in itself, lead to the abolition of
institutionalized exploitation; what is needed is the incremental eradication of the property status of
animals.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE UNIQUELY VALUABLE FOR PROTECTING ANIMAL INTERESTS
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994
The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 216-7
Elsewhere, I stressed the close connection between law and morality. As long as animals were legally
property, whose treatment was qualified only by vacuous prohibitions against deliberate “cruelty”, virtually
all animal suffering at human hands could be countenanced by the social ethic. For this reason, talk of
rights is of paramount importance, for rights, as we have seen, serve a legal as well as a moral function.
Ultimately, the rights of animals, protecting fundamental aspects of their telos, must be “writ large” in the
legal system, if their systematic violation is to end. As we have indicated, this notion informs the emerging
ethic for animals.
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AT: “Rights Talk Bad” – Rights Talk Good for Animals
HISTORY OF MORAL PROGRESS DEMONSTRATES EFFECTIVENESS OF ETHICAL
INTERROGATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 1996
Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 84
Is ethical argument powerless against tenacious instinct? If so, it would be hard to explain the moral
progress hat has been made in areas in which, previously, some of our most tenacious moral instincts have
held sway. Consider areas like race relations, crimes of genocide and crimes against humanity, gender
issues, attitudes toward homosexuality, and the area here under discussion, the treatment of animals. In
discussing such changes, Posner provides us with a textbook example of ignoratio elenchi, or the fallacy of
the irrelevant conclusion:
“Our moral norms regarding race, homosexuality, nommarital sex, contraception, and suicide have changed
in recent times, but not as a result of ethical arguments. Philosophers have not been prominent in any of
these movements…Thurgood Marshall, Earl Warren, and Martin Luther King, Jr., had a lot more to do with
the development of an antidiscrimination norm than any academic philosopher.”
Note how the initial claim that “ethical arguments” did not bring about these changes is suddenly turned
into the entirely separate claim that “philosophers” were not prominent in these movements, and then at the
end, this becomes a claim about “academic philosophers.” But that I not what was to be shown. Can
anyone read the judgments of Thurgood Marshall or Earl Warren, or the speeches of Martin Luther King,
Jr., and not believe that they were putting forward ethical arguments?
RIGHTS DISCOURSE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY TO PROTECT INTERESTS—WILL BE
EFFECTIVE FOR ANIMALS AS WELL
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 51
Nevertheless, it is true that the extensions of rights does lead us to consider the slippery slope. That is the
very nature of the “expanding circle.” While some find his extremely problematic, the slippery slope can
be reconstructed in a way that bolsters the meaning of rights. This occurs when the slippery slope is
redefined as the expanding circle. The less pejorative expanding circle encourages increases compassion,
caring, and awareness of “the other.” The expanding circle makes us aware of who and what have been
excluded from moral consideration, thus highlighting mistreatment of the other. Moreover, in this culture,
rights language happens to be one of the most common and accepted ways of heightening awareness of
marginalization and mistreatment. Rights language thus becomes the means by which the circle expands,
and the other is included within the parameters of moral consideration.
RIGHTS TALK EFFECTIVE FOR ANIMALS – GENERATES DISCUSSION AND EDUCATES
THE PUBLIC
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 90
Some activists further highlighted the power of language by suggesting that it generates discussion, debate,
and education. Rights claims, as these activists noted, spark debate and though about the prevalent position
of animals in our society. Unlike animal protection and animal welfare, which are more easily accepted,
mention of animal rights activates discussion and analysis. According to one analyst:
”More than anything, [animal rights] provokes discussion because it seems so outrageous as opposed to
humane treatment…Even people making fun of it promotes discussion of it, and I think that’s very, very
helpful. It frightens a lot of people, but I believe that’s an obligation. If you tell people things they accept,
why bother?”
Similarly, attorney Gary Francione related the following:
“When I first started talking about animal rights…people would say, ‘why talk about rights, why not talk
about welfare? It will upset people.’ Who gives a shit about upsetting people! One of the ways you
educate people is to shock them. When I teach law, some of the things I say are totally outrageous, because
I do that to stimulate them, to challenge them.”
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RIGHTS DISCOURSE EFFECTIVE AT PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE FOR ANIMALS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 122
In sum, an assessment of rights language by the animal rights movement specifically and by other
movements more generally must consider the complexity of deploying rights language. Recognizing the
complexity of any political language means that we must address its diverse and flexible meanings, its
potential benefits and costs, its strategic components, and its variations within differing social contexts.
When we do so in the case of the animal rights movement, it becomes clear that the practice of
reconstructing and deploying rights language plays a significant part in the overall scheme of advancing
social change.
ANIMAL RIGHTS TALK HAS A CATALYTIC EFFECT ON DISCUSSION
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 225
The generative aspect of rights language is even more significant when we consider its catalytic effects on
dialogue, alternative language, and alternative constructions of meaning. The attempt to extend rights to
nonhumans has fostered significant debate on what kinds of being can be rights holders. Just as the “use of
rights and legal struggle by the women’s movement started the ‘conversation’ about women’s role society,”
animal rights talk has instigated conversation and debate on new fronts.
The debate and dialogue over animal rights has materialized in many different locations: in the spheres of
philosophical analysis, in legislatures, in the media, in the board rooms of the cosmetics industry, and in
schools. Much of the debate is heated, and, to a large extent, the notion of animal rights continues to be
rejected. But, as John Stuart Mill observed: “Every great movement must experience three stages: ridicule,
discussion, adoption”. If Mill is correct, the animal rights movement has made the move from the first to
the second stage. While the notion of animal rights once may have contributed to the ridicule, it now
contributes to the discussion.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE VALUABLE FOR PROMOTING ANIMAL INTERESTS—4 REASONS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 121-2
It should be stressed that this conclusion is reached largely by recognizing the significance of the context
within which meaning is constructed. Within the animal rights movement, four central contextual variables
suggest the importance of deploying a reconstituted version of rights. First, the growth of the movement in
the wake of other rights-oriented movements helps explain the turn to rights. Second, the lack of viable
alternative languages supports the appropriation of rights language. Third, the pervasiveness of rights talk
within this culture makes the deployment of rights logical and sensible, at least at the present time. Fourth,
and most important for the reconstruction of rights, is the fact that this movement focuses its concern on
nonhumans. Placing rights within the context of nonhumans offers the opportunity to recreate the
foundational meaning of the language.
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UTILIZING RIGHTS DISCOURSE FOR ANIMALS MAINTAINS THE MEANINGS OF RIGHTS
WHILE SOLVING THE KRITIKS OF RIGHTS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 79
In short, there is good reason to believe that philosophical and political attempts to extend rights to animals
maintain the power of the language while at the same time infusing the language with alternative meaning.
Still this extension of rights is significantly constrained. It is constrained by the fact that not all animal
advocates are proponents of rights talk. Even for those advocates who use rights, there is not complete
clarity on what the language means or how it ought to be applied. The indeterminacy of rights, while
offering flexibility, does create some degree of ambiguity and incoherence. If, for instance, animals have
the right to be free from suffering, is it acceptable to kill and eat them if the killing is done painlessly?
APPLYING RIGHTS DISCOURSE TO ANIMALS SOLVES THE RIGHTS KRITIKS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 32
What may be surprising is that this movement deploys rights in a way that stresses the values of
relationship, responsibility, caring, and community. Unlike the traditional, liberal conception of rights,
which emphasizes individualism, separation, and freedom from interference, the implicit and explicit
association of these alternative values with the terminology of animal rights has helped to imbue the
language with a new content. As a result, the construction of animals rights based on the associated notions
of sentience, reciprocal responsibility, and relationship to a broad community begins to challenge the
liberal, individualistic underpinnings of rights and fosters a reconceptualization of the language.
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT PRESENTS THE OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSFORM RIGHTS
DISCOURSE – SOLVE THE KS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 79
Nevertheless, the point to be stressed is the following. The ability to extend rights language, alter its
content, and maintain its power is clearly constrained, but the constraints do not stem from anything
intrinsic in or absolute about rights language. Nor are critics correct to suggest that rights are always
constrained because only those in power control the meaning and potency of the language. Instead, the
primary constraint stems from the philosophical and practical context within which rights have been
deployed. On the other hand, this constraint also provides opportunity: the opportunity to find in the
historical practice of rights the foundations for alternative meanings and power and the opportunity to alter
the present practical context in which rights are deployed. This is what the animal rights movement sought
to do.
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UNIQUE POSITION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT UNDERCUTS GENERAL
APPLICATION OF RIGHTS AND LAW KRITIKS TO IT
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 228-9
One of the most crucial contextual variables influencing the animal rights movement is its unique position,
one that is politically and ideologically at the margins but occupied by advocates and supporters who are
relatively mainstream and privileged in terms of wealth and education. When we consider this positioning,
we see the importance of addressing context. On the one hand, recognizing the composition and
characteristics of the movement’s constituency and leadership highlights the resonance and appeal that
rights language and philosophical debate over rights have for supporters. At the same time, since
movement supporters and leaders tend to be more privileged than the rest of the population, the appeal of
the philosophical attempts to alter rights may be less successful beyond this white, educated, professional,
affluent constituency.
On the other hand the marginalized position of the movement as a whole signals the importance of
addressing the view from the outside. As the minority critique of Critical Legal Studies suggests, scholars
should “look to the bottom,” that is, to the perspective of the oppressed, in order to develop a more
complete understanding of the turn to law. Delgado (1987) makes this point by arguing that rights continue
to be useful for minorities who experience racism because they may make the oppressors pause before they
oppress and inhibit further oppression. To dismiss rights, Delagado observes, might be easy for scholars
theorizing about a more ideal future. But, for outsiders experiencing oppression in their everyday lives,
rights offer a weapon that cannot yet be discarded. Along these lines, the marginalized position of the
animal rights movement stresses the present-day utility of rights. Rights continue to provide an entry point
through which the marginalized can challenge the system. Rights offer a language with which to
communicate within the system. Given animal advocates’ views of the tremendous abuse and oppression
nonhumans experience each day, the need to employ all the tools at their disposal is crucial.
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Meaning of Rights
RIGHTS DISCOURSE FOR ANIMALS STRENGHTENS THE LANGUAGE OF RIGHTS FOR
HUMANS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and
the animal rights movement, p. 53
We should not be surprised by the turn to rights language or by the influence rights analysis has had on
animal issues. Given Western theory’s emphasis on natural rights and human rights, the extension to
animal rights is hardly shocking. Still, there is understandable concern that extending rights too far may
diminish the power and content of rights language. However, I have argued that extension of rights to
animals as it is promoted in philosophical works has not and does not threaten to undermine the power and
meaning of the language. To the contrary, expanding rights to animals reaffirms human rights in a variety
of ways and imbues rights language with a content emphasizing sentience.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE FOR ANIMALS INCREAESES MEANING OF RIGHTS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and
the animal rights movement, p. 53
If it is true that philosophical debate over animal rights has offered alternative meaning to the language and
reinforced the power of rights, then it may be said that specific debate over animal rights has constituted the
meaning of rights in general. It is certainly true that rights theory in general has constituted the
development and meaning of animal rights. But it also appears that the development of animal rights
philosophy shapes, or at least has the potential to shape, the meaning of rights. By infusing rights with
alternative content, the philosophical meaning of rights is reconstituted. Although this infusion of
alternative content has not replaced more traditional notions of rights, it has offered a competing
perspective on how rights might be understood.
ANIMAL RIGHTS STRENGTHENS THE CASE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 231
The alternative identity images of humans and nonhumans are noteworthy because not only do they elevate
animals to the level of rights-bearing entities, they further speak to human rights. On the one hand,
identifying animals as rights-bearing beings places considerable limits on what we now take to be human
rights. If animal rights are accepted, the rights of humans to eat and wear what we choose is no longer
viable. On the other hand, as argued in earlier chapters, animal rights reinforce certain human rights and, in
turn, human identity. Because the notion of animal rights goes beyond rationality, it maintains the rights
and identities of those humans who lack rationality, including the rights of the mentally disabled and
children.
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PERMUTATION SOLVES – CRITICISMS OF RIGHTS DON’T JUSTIFY REJECTING RIGHTS
OR THE LAW
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 241-2
Fear of a new myth of rights should not lead us to discard legal practices. While it is tempting for activists
seeking social transformation to throw out the old and bring in the new, such a strategy involves significant
costs. And the fear of a new myth of rights should not provide the sole justification for scholarly dismissal
of rights. Scholars who may find it easy, in the abstract, to dismiss the old should not forget the tangible
and significant benefits offered by rights and litigation. On the contrary, scholars should reevaluate the
potential gains to be made as a result of legal activism and an extension of rights language. Indeed,
scholars should, and with critical reflections, consider the advice of Patricia J. Williams:
”In discarding rights altogether, one discards a symbol too deeply enmeshed in the psyche of the oppressed
to lose without trauma and much resistance. Instead, society must give them away. Unlock them from
reification by giving them to slaves. Give them to trees. Give them to cows. Give them to history. Give
them to rivers and rocks. Give to all of society’s objects and untouchables the rights of privacy, integrity,
and self-assertion; give them distance and respect. Flood them with the animating spirit which rights
mythology fires in this country’s most oppressed psyches, and wash away the shrouds of inanimate object
status, so that we may say not that we won gold, but that a luminous gold spirit owns us.” (1987, 433)
MUST WEIGH RIGHTS DISCOURSE AGAINST THE ALTERNATIVES BEFORE DECIDING
TO REJECT IT
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 119
What is being suggested in this discussion is that the recent practical application of rights language to
animal issues makes sense when we consider the context in which the movement developed and the
available alternative languages. The animal rights movement grew at a time when other rights-oriented
movements had begun to make gains in politics. Rights, as a central and popular language in this culture,
were easily extended and appropriated by activists concerned about animals. Moreover, the alternative
languages did not have the power, familiarity, and persuasiveness of rights. Hence, when evaluating the
productivity of animal rights language, and rights more generally, we must consider contextual factors and
the viability of alternative modes of speaking.
MUST COMPARE RIGHTS DISCOURSE TO ALTERNATIVES BEFORE REJECTING IT
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 122
Analyzing rights language solely in the abstract, without recognizing such contextual variables, may lead
us to misunderstand its strategic and practical importance. In addition, without contextual analysis, our
assessment may neglect crucial comparisons with the practical applicability of other languages. Without
these comparisons, it is easy to dismiss rights language, as many critics on the left and right do. But such a
dismal ignores the fact that rights language, unlike the alternatives, provides an entry into popular debate.
Rights language offers a respected language to the silenced and an ability to communicate demands for
social change. And a malleable rights language affords the possibility of reconstitution. Thus, it make
practical sense for the marginalized, in seeking to enter and challenge the mainstream, to appeal to a
language that is itself mainstream and to at the same time reconstruct this language.
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NO EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO RIGHTS TALK FOR ANIMALS TODAY
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 91
Overall, activists stated that, while the future m ay hold something different, the present power of rights
language should not be ignored. As one activist put it,
“If society ever gets rid of the notion of rights and just starts talking about fair treatment, or what is just, or
whatever, that’s fine…I just think that as political discourse it has a meaning and to not use that discourse
when you’re talking about animals and to use it when you’re talking about other oppressed groups I think
is…to say, well, my issue is not as important as those issues.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE EMPIRICALLY EFFECTIVE—NO ALTERNATIVE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 82
Exploring these questions, this chapter begins with an overview of critical legal scholarship on rights and
some responses to that scholarship. The chapter then evaluates the evidence gathered from in-depth
interviews with animal advocates, conducted between 1990 and 1991, on the subject of rights. In doing so,
we shall see that, as a whole, animal rights activists are not misled by the myth of rights. Rather, activists
maintain a sophisticated and strategic consciousness regarding the deployment of rights. Moreover, the
argument suggests generally that a strategic approach to the deployment of rights combined with the fact
that the flexible language of rights can emphasize values of responsibility and community offer social
movements a productive tool to challenge existing relations of power. Although the weapon provided by
rights is constrained and by no means assures success, the potential benefits of rights and the lack of
alternative languages suggest that those who would discard rights go too far.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE FOR ANIMALS MORE EFFECTIVE THAN THE ALTERNATIVE
DISCOURSES
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 114
But might there be other ways of speaking and advancing the cause of animals that do not inspire some of
the drawbacks associated with rights? Might critics of rights be correct in advising a turn to alternative
modes of speaking? I shall argue here that when we compare the various choices it becomes clear that, at
least when we compare the various choices it becomes clear that, at l east in the present, rights language is
the most productive for those interested in advancing the cause of animals.
As we have seen, the traditional animal welfare movement employed the language of compassion rather
than rights. The welfare movement maintained that humans ought to be compassionate to animals. This
language was, and continues to be, associated with the language of protection. If we are to be
compassionate and if compassion is an ideal to be fostered, animals deserved at least some protection
against humans who lack compassion.
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RIGHTS TALK MORE EFFECTIVE THAN ALTERNATIVE DISCOURSES
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 117-8
This brings us to the strength of animal rights in comparison to the alternatives. Rights talk certainly has its
general drawbacks as well as drawbacks connected to its particular usage with animals. For instance, it can
be argued that animal rights talk, like the language of compassion, still places humans at the center of
analysis. Human rights may still outweigh animal rights because of rationality, and therefore they have
more guarantees of rights.
Despite these and other drawbacks, rights language carries a great deal of weight. As Salt said,
“A great and far-reaching effect was produced in England…by the publication of such revolutionary works
as Paine’s ‘Rights of Man’ and Mary Wollstencraft’s ‘Vindication of the Rights of Women;’ and looking
back now, after the lapse of a hundred years, we can see that a still wider extension of the theory of rights
was thenceforth inevitable.” (1980, 4).
Rights language has a strong history in this country. Grounded in the Bill of Rights and our natural law
heritage, the language has been deployed by numerous social movements in struggles to gain political,
social, and economic acceptance. Workers’ rights, civil rights, women’s rights, and gay and lesbian rights
are some of the many precursors of the contemporary animal rights movement. Thus, unlike liberation and
equal consideration, animal rights has a history to draw upon and a ready language that is both familiar and
accepted.
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PROTECTION DISCOURSE PATRONIZING
GRASP, 2002, [Great Ape Standing & Personhood], Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.personhood.org/main/faq.html
So if we shift our efforts away from welfare legislation, what do we do to protect them until we get them
personhood and rights? Because it seems you are saying there is nothing that effectively protects them now.
Exactly. And to be precise, we don't ask that they be protected. We ask that they be respected. This makes
a big difference as to how we see the other great apes. They are not our children. Some people think
women need to be protected too. Women need no such thing, if given appropriate respect.
“EQUAL CONSIDERATION” DISCOURSE NOT AN EFFECTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO RIGHTS
TALK
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 116
The language or equal consideration, like liberation, has expanded. Singer lays out the concept of equal
consideration in Animal Liberation, and, as a concept, it is quite useful. But as a movement label it does
not work well. The “animal equal consideration movement,” the “equal consideration movement” are all
awkward. But, more than awkwardness, the problem with equal consideration is that it lacks the history,
background, and recognition that make animal rights powerful.
EQUAL CONSIDERATION PRINCIPLE INEFFECTIVE IN PRACTICE
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 169
In sum, Singer’s principle of equal consideration for equal interests may sound simple, but it is not at all
clear what is required by its ideals, and practical application on the micro level is almost impossible
because of uncertainty and controversy surrounding the assessment of consequences, the characterization of
competing interests, and the weighing of those interests. But even if the uncertainty was reduced and the
controversy diminished, the question of animal use would still have to be evaluated on a case-by-case basis.
And herein lies what is perhaps the most important difference between rights theory and welfare theory for
purposes of applying either to concrete situations. Singer may be correct to say that rights theory in general
can become complicated in light of complex rule formulations and ranking structures to govern rights
conflicts, but Regan’s rights theory provides relatively clear and unambiguous normative direction at the
long-term level and on the level of personal moral choice as that choice involves the institutionalized
exploitation of animals. Regan argues that his long-term goal is the abolition of the institutionalized exploitation of
animals, and he argues that if we accept that animals have at least the basic right not to be treated exclusively as means
to human ends, then certain animal uses, such as the eating of animals, or the use of animals in experiments to which
the animal cannot consent, or the killing of animals to make clothes, cannot be morally unjustified. Period.
LIBERATION DISCOURSE NOT AS EFFECTIVE AS RIGHTS TALK
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 115-6
In addition to the language of compassion, activists increasingly employ animal liberation in contrast to
animal rights. As noted previously, the book that inspired the animal rights movement and is often cited as
its bible is entitled Animal Liberation. Despite the title, the language of liberation never gained the
prominence now associated with animal rights.
The language of liberation lacks the power of rights, probably because it is not a common language.
Certainly the concept of liberty plays an important role in Western thought and ideology. Nonetheless,
liberation does not bring with it the same kind of familiarity and popularity as does the language of rights,
especially in the United States. This may well change as people move more and more to the concept of
animal liberation. Utilitarians, uncomfortable with the notion of rights, feel more at ease with the language
of liberation. Likewise, feminists concerned with the drawbacks of rights talk have moved toward the
concept of liberation. But animal liberation as a general language for the movement is not likely to attain
much power in the near future given that it is only recently that the notion of animal rights has begun to be
taken seriously.
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RECOGNITION OF BASIC MORAL RIGHTS PREREQUISITE TO ANIMAL LIBERATION
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 37-8
There is, then, I believe, a much better way to understand animal liberation than the one provided by an
egalitarian interpretation of interests. It takes its cue from other kinds of liberation and rests the call for
animal liberation on the recognition of the rights of nonhuman animals. When viewed in this light, animal
liberation is the goal for which the philosophy of animal rights is the philosophy. The two—animal
liberation and animal rights—go together like a hand in a vinyl glove.
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EXTENDING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS PROMOTES COMMUNITARIAN VALUES
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 79
I will also suggest two primary reasons why the infusion of these alternative values is likely to be successful in
altering and reinvigorating rights language. First, as in the previous chapter, I will suggest that it is the very
move to animal rights that advance the adjustment in the underlying meaning of rights. Advancing rights for
animals has inspired a focus on the relationship between humans and their nonhuman counterparts. Addressing
this relationship has highlighted the shared characteristic of sentience and put forth the notion that it is
sentience, not rationality, that makes one a member of the moral community. Moreover, since animals cannot
claim or secure their rights within the human community, extending rights to animals has enhanced the notions
of care and responsibility. Overall, the move to animal rights has promoted a wider sense of community—one
that incorporates both human and nonhuman life.
EXTENSION OF RIGHTS DISCOURSE TO ANIMALS SOLVES THE COMMUNITARIAN
CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 79
This last point is most crucial for understanding the way this movement has constituted the meaning of rights
and for responding to critics of rights language. Critics of rights contend, among other things, that the language
is embedded within traditional liberal ideology that privileges the value of individualism. By privileging
individualism, rights language fosters separation and conflict and thereby inhibits appreciation for relationship
and community. In addition, the dominant conception of rights in this culture, critics argue, is a negative one
that stresses the right to be free from the interference of others and the state. As such, rights language
undermines the values of responsibility and caring within the community.
If, as will be argued here, the deployment of rights language by this social movement effectively supports the
concepts of relationship, caring, responsibility, and community, then we may conclude that critics have been
inaccurate in their attack against rights. We may further conclude that infusing rights with content that
competes with individualism provides the opportunity to reinvigorate the power and meaning of language.
Finally, we may interpret this appropriation of rights not simply as one that seeks to include a marginalized
group into the mainstream but as one that challenges and attempts to transform the very conception and
understanding of the language. In other words, the deployment of rights by this movement both extends the
language and, more importantly, alters the underlying substantive terms of the language itself.
ANIMAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE SUPPORTS COMMUNITARIAN GOALS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 238
What is probably the most significant insight to be drawn from animal rights activism is that the attempts to
revise rights offer reinforcement of certain values. The emphasis on a broadened notion of community and on
the responsibility we have in our relations with members of the community may be important in advancing
causes beyond animals. What is noteworthy for these other causes is the fact that the effort to extend rights to
animals has not simply maintained an individualistic version of liberalism but has challenged that version. In
other words, it is the general challenge and resistance to dominant constructions of meaning from which other
movements may learn and draw support.
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ANIMAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE PROMOTES THE GOALS OF THE COMMUNITARIAN KRITIK
OF RIGHTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 76-7
Of course, it is impossible to say at this early stage whether the infusion of these alternatives values will alter
the language of rights in the long run or result in the extension of rights to animals. Nevertheless, five points
can b e made. First, the animal rights movement provides evidence to counter the claim of critics who argue
that rights language is inherently individualistic and cannot be made compatible with values of responsibility
and community. We must at least admit that the potential exists to cultivate alternative values upon which
rights can be founded. In this way, the animal rights experience supports the work of some scholars who have
sought to advance a “collective” understanding of rights.
Second, this potential for countering the individualism of rights demonstrates that extending rights to animals
does not necessarily undermine the power and meaning of the language. On first glance, it might appear that
such an extension would rob rights of their meaning. But upon reflection we see the possibility for
reinvigorating the language. Third, the very fact that advocates have attempted to extend rights to animals has
helped highlight these alternative values. Since most animals do not have the same intellectual and rational
abilities as humans, philosophers and activists have had to look for other common characteristics that unite
humans with animals. This has resulted in the emphasis on sentience, relationship, and responsibility for beings
who cannot stand up for themselves. In turn, such a focus moves us away form a human-centric view of
community to a wider, more inclusive understanding of the collectivity.
ANIMAL RIGHTS TALK ALLOWS EMPHASIS OF THE COMMUNITARIAN AND
RESPONSIBILITY JUSTIFICATIONS FOR LIBERALISM AND RIGHTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 120-1
One way that the meaning of rights can be manipulated is to alter the underlying liberal foundations upon which
the language is based. While it is true that rights language is founded upon liberalism, it is also true that
liberalism contains within it various competing ideals. On the one hand, liberalism stresses Lockean
individualism, autonomy, and self-interest. On the other hand, various proponents of liberalism emphasize
community, responsibility, and concern for the common good. Rights, likewise, can be infused with these
alternative, and often conflictual, ideals. And, while it is true that American culture’s Lockean tradition with its
individualistic emphasis generally prevails, this prevalence is neither absolute nor incontrovertible. Using
rights in a way that emphasizes the values of responsibility, relationship, and community can challenge the
prevailing Lockean liberalism and thereby confront the ideology of the status quo.
This is what the animal rights movement has sought to do in reconstructing the meaning of rights. They have
employed the indeterminate, flexible language of the status quo and attempted to reconstruct this language in
ways that fit within the context of nonhumans. This reconstruction has involved a move away from
individualism and toward relationship, responsibility, and community. Moreover, this reconstruction has
proceeded in a strategic and cautious manner. Activists can and do think of rights in both critical and strategic
terms. Although we must recognize that some activists may be naively misled by a strong faith in rights, at
least a significant portion of activists have taken the disadvantages of invoking rights into consideration.
Furthermore, many activists maintain a strategic understanding of rights, weighing the political benefits and
costs of rights deployment in the context of particular movement struggles.
All of this suggests that rights can be reconstituted and infused with alternative notions and values. Rights need
not be discarded, as some critics recommend. A thoughtful, critical, and strategic awareness of rights language
provides the opportunity to challenge existing attitudes and power structures. Indeed, infusing rights with the
values of community and responsibility provides an opportunity to challenge and refine the meaning of the
language. Certainly, there is no guarantee that such challenges will be successful, nor is change likely to be
achieved quickly. Yet, when we consider the history of rights, the persuasiveness of the language, and the
available alternatives, it seems untenable to discard such an important and useful tool.
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INDETERIMINANCY GOOD—ALLOWS FLEXIBLE ADAPTION OF RIGHTS TO NEW
SITUATIONS AND GROUPS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 120
Rights language, like any other language, is indeterminate. Critics point to this indeterminacy in arguing that
rights are unreliable. Yet, the indeterminacy of rights does not mean only that the powerful can less can do the
same. Indeterminacy implies a certain amount of flexibility for both the powerful and the powerless. Of
course, the deployment of an indeterminate language by the powerless is constrained by traditional
understandings and practices. Nevertheless, indeterminacy and the associated flexibility allows the powerless
to challenge the status quo using the very language that is deployed by those in power. Moreover, rights are not
so indeterminate that they are arbitrary and meaningless. Those in power must, at least to a certain degree,
conform to established rights, and are therefore themselves constrained. If the powerful manipulate rights in too
arbitrary or inconsistent a fashion, their manipulation can be called into question.
“At the very least, the fact that dominant groups and officials voice fidelity to legal symbols, norms, and
practices creates practical obligations and standards of accountability that constrain their actions.”
Thus, rights become a constraint on those in power and a tool the marginalized can appropriate to check and
challenge oppressive forces.
INDETERMINACY OF RIGHTS ALLOWS ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT TO SHAPE ITS OWN
IDENTITY
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 232
However, animal rights go beyond all of these movements by steering away from the strict emphasis on human
rights. The identity of the animal rights is therefore unique. To be sure, this movement, like others, has
appropriated and internalized a dominant mode of speaking. As such, its identity has certainly been shaped by
the prevalence of rights language and its commonplace meaning. But this movement’s uniqueness suggest that
a movement’s identity can resist dominant constructions of meaning. The movement, assuming a rightsoriented identity, has not straightforwardly subscribed to accepted notions of rights. The indeterminate meaning
of rights thus provides the movement with space in which to shape its own identity.
INDETERMINACY OF RIGHTS GOOD – MEANS THEY ARE FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO
ENCOMPASS ANIMAL RIGHTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 78
Finally, all of the previous points about the movement’s deployment of rights language suggest that rights are
indeterminate. This in itself is not a novel observation, but most scholars point to the indeterminacy of rights as
a critique of the language, asserting that indeterminacy means that rights cannot be relied upon by movements
seeking social change. In contrast, the experiences of the animal rights movement offer a different perspective
on indeterminacy. Although admittedly indeterminacy poses a problem, it also offers flexibility. As McCann
contends,
”It is important to understand that these inherited legal symbols and discourses provide relatively malleable
resources that are routinely reconstructed as citizens seek to advance their interests and designs in everyday life.
In particular, legal discourses offer a potentially plastic medium both for refiguring the terms of past settlements
over legitimate expectations and for expressing aspirations for new terms of entitlement.”
For the animal rights movement, the indeterminacy and resulting malleability of the language has provided the
opportunity for meaningful reconstruction.
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AT: “CLS Kritik of Rights” – Indeterminacy Good
INDETERMINACY MEANS RIGHTS ARE FLUID AND FLEXIBLE ENOUGH TO INCLUDE
ANIMAL RIGHTS
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 79
Second, I will suggest that the indeterminate nature of rights contributes to the possibility of incorporating
alternative values into rights language. As several scholars have suggested, rights are indeterminate. That is,
recognizing a right does not determine the future in any significant manner or provide any certainty. It does not
establish, in a specific or determinate way, which beings are rights holders, how rights holders will be protected,
or what other related rights will be granted. Although scholars have pointed to the indeterminacy of rights as a
critique of the language, I will argue that indeterminacy offers flexibility and the potential to advance new
conceptions of rights.
By arguing that rights language, as deployed by this movement and reflected in the media, instills new content
into the language and, at the same time, maintains its power, I offer an alternative interpretation of rights. This
interpretation suggests that the prevailing and traditional meaning of rights, while important in shaping social
movement activism, does not straightjacket a movement into a particular set of predominant values. To the
contrary, the open, fluid, and indeterminate nature of rights provides social movements with the opportunity to
reshape and reconstruct the meaning of the language. Relatedly, I offer in the following chapter a second
alternative perspective of rights, arguing that in this social movement activists are not misled by a naïve faith in
rights to deploy a counterproductive language. Rather, activists strategically and consciously deploy rights as a
result of their critical understanding of the politics of the language. In short, the argument put forth in this and
the following chapter suggests that, given the opportunity to redefine the meaning of rights through political and
strategic activism, we must reconsider the strategic mobilization of rights in a way that recognizes its potential
to advance social change.
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AT: “CLS Kritik of Rights” – General
CLS MAKES SIMPLISTIC GENERALIZATIONS WHILE IGNORING HISTORICAL RELEVANCE
OF RIGHTS TO MARGINALIZED GROUPS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 85
There have been numerous responses to these critical assessments of rights. Some scholars have elaborated
what has been called the “minority critique” of CLS. This critique suggests that the CLS indictment of rights is
unrealistic, overlooks the context and experiences of discrimination, and ignores the importance of rights for
marginal and oppressed groups. By neglecting the experiences and perspectives of oppressed groups, CLS
underestimates the need for rights. In a related fashion, other analyses argue that CLS assessments of legal
ideology are overly simplistic. Use of rights language is not all bad or all good but a complex mixture of both.
Moreover, the indeterminate nature of rights language not only means that the powerful can impose their views
but that opportunities exist for flexible interpretation of rights by the oppressed. Oppressed groups can
therefore employ rights as a weapon against the dominant.
EXTENSION OF RIGHTS DISCOURSE TO ANIMALS CAUSES A RECONSIDERATION OF THE
MEANING OF THE LANGUAGE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 77
This third point does not suggest that it is only when rights language is extended to animals that it moves
beyond individualism. The point is that the recent expansion of rights to animals has fostered reconsideration of
the meaning of rights. To a greater degree than past attempts to extend rights to blacks, women, workers, and
other human minority groups, the extension to animals has encouraged scholars and activists—and potentially
the broader community—to rethink our conceptions of rights. In the future, this reevaluation of the meaning of
rights language may inspire useful reconsideration of human rights issues.
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AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights”
NO LINK – THE ARGUMENT THAT RIGHTS ARE PATRIARCHAL BECAUSE MEN
DEVELOPED THEM NONSENSICAL
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 54
One possible defense of the feminist indictment appeals to the genealogy of the idea of individual rights.
After all, it was men who first formulated this idea—the Locke’s and Rousseau’s of the world, not the
Xanthippe’s and Hildegard’s. The genealogy defense (to give this line of reasoning a name) would have us
infer than an idea is patriarchal if it was originated by men.
This is an implausible defense. If we were to accept it, we would be obliged to say that our current
understanding of the circulation of blood is patriarchal because it was Harvey and his male contemporaries
who were the first to discover how blood circulates. No less absurd consequences would follow in every
other similar context (for example, Euclidean geometry must be patriarchal because Euclid was a man.)
Surely, it is absurd to imagine that Euclid’s definition of a right triangle is a symptom of male domination
of that it arbitrarily favors, or favors in any way whatsoever, the interests of men over those of women.
Logically, the fact that a man discovers, creates, or simply says something does not entail that what is
discovered, created, or said is tainted by male prejudice.
NO LINK – THE FACT THAT RIGHTS HAVE BEEN UTILIZED BY A PATRIARCHAL
SYSTEM, DOES NOT MEAN THAT THEY INHERENTLY ENTRENCH OR PERPETUATE
PATRIARCHY
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 54-5
A second possible defense of the feminist indictment, the implementation defense, takes a different route. Even a cursory view of
social history, from classical Greek civilization up to the present, confirms that by claiming rights for themselves, men
have routinely received advantages that have been routinely and systematically denied to women (Regan,
2000). No less clearly, men have overwhelmingly been the ones to decide who is to be the beneficiary of these advantages. Thus,
because reliance on the idea of individual rights can be shown to have thee patriarchal results, should we not conclude that the
very idea of individual rights is patriarchal?
It seems not. Ideas are not shown to be patriarchal simply because they have been used in a patriarchal
fashion; if anything, the patriarchal use of ideas shows that those who use them are patriarchal, not that the
ideas themselves are. To make this point clearer, consider an example from another quarter. Various people over time
have used the idea of genetic inheritance as a basis for classifying the members of some race “superior” and
others “inferior.” Does this show that the idea of genetic inheritance is a racist idea? Clearly not. What it
shows is something very different—namely, that some people have used the idea of the genetic inheritance
in a racist fashion.
The same is true of individual rights. One cannot logically infer that the idea of the rights of the individual
is tainted with male bias because biased men have used it to forward their interests at the expense of
women’s.
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AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights”
TURN – THE FEMINIST KRITIK OF RIGHTS IS PATRIARCHAL
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 57-8
In addition to facing legitimate concerns about its empirical underpinnings, the male mind defense also
seems to confront a damaging paradox of its own making. Notwithstanding its purported attack on
patriarchy, the male mind defense arguably bears symptoms of the very prejudice it seeks first to expose
and then to supplant. Partisans of this defense not only denounce the valorization of those qualities that
they claim have been traditionally associated with the masculine; they also celebrate those qualities
(emotion, subjectivity, an ethic of care) traditionally associated with the feminine. Yet the implied claim to
superiority on behalf of these feminine qualities appears highly paradoxical, first, because celebrating the
“feminine’ set of qualities over the masculine is to engage in the very sort of dualistic, hierarchical thinking
alleged to be characteristic of the male mind, and second, because the collective portrait of those qualities
that are definitive of the female, like every other portrait in the patriarchy, will have been drawn not by
women but by men. How paradoxical, then, that pursuant to their liberation from the crippling vestiges of
patriarchy, some women should choose to define themselves in the very terms in which they have been
defined by the patriarchal traditions they seek to overthrow.
TURN – THE SYSTEM OF VIEWING ANIMALS IN A HIERARCHICAL FASHION MIRRORS
PATRIARCHY
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 204
Thus in the age of “liberty, equality, and fraternity,” many oppressed groups were disparaged for their
alleged “low mental caliber” and consequently scaled low in a hierarchy of worth. The measurements of an
individuals or group’s value was based on the purported level of intelligence, measured or attribute in
ethnocentric, anthropocentric ways. In addition, ecofeminists have observed that ideas about the hierarchy
of worth are deeply intertwined with patriarchy, a system of social organization in which masculinity is
valued over femininity (both being social constructions).. Ecofeminist Janis Birkeland put it this way:
”In the dominant Patriarchal cultures, reality is divided according to gender, and a higher value is placed on
those attributes associated with masculinity, a construction that is called ‘hierarchical dualism.’ In these
cultures, women have historically been seen as closer to the earth or nature….Also, women and nature have
been juxtaposed against mind and spirit, which have been associated in Western cosmology with the
‘masculine’ and elevated to a higher plane of being…It is clear that a complex morality based on
dominance and exploitation has developed in conjunction with the devaluing of nature and “feminine”
values.”
TURN - ANIMAL ACTIVISTS USE RIGHTS DISCOURSE TO EMPHASIZE COMMUNITY AND
AN ETHIC OF CARE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 71
In short, rights language as deployed in movement literature and activities has been associated with the
values of relationship, responsibility, caring and community. Constant reference to the label animal rights
is combined with the facts of mistreatment, the proposition that animals are related to humans and part of
the community of life, and the suggestion that we have a responsibility to act on behalf of animals. As a
result, the deployment of animal rights within movement literature conveys values that contrast with the
traditional individualistic underpinnings of rights.
AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights”
TURN - ANIMAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE PRESENTS OPPORTUNITY TO TRANSFORM
RIGHTS DISCOURSE TO ENCOMPASS COMMUNAL VALUES AND AN ETHIC OF CARE
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Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 114
I have argued to this point that animal rights language as deployed by this movement begins to refine the
meaning of rights. The ethic captured by animal rights supports the relationship and continuity between
human and nonhuman life and thereby advances a broad notion of community. Moreover, it has been
argued that the ethic of animal rights is at least as supportive of mutual responsibility as of individualism.
Indeed, the advancement of animal rights moves us away from the stark, simplistic hyperindividualism
suggested by some scholars by countering the prevailing view that individual humans have a right to do
whatever they want to animals and nature. The responsibility and implication of relationship underlying
animal rights thus suggest that rights language can be infused with values of caring and community, where
the notion of community includes more than just the community of humans. Furthermore, while it may be
true that animal rights talk perpetuates a type of absoluteness, the exaggerated nature of this absoluteness is
itself exaggerated. At times, absoluteness may be desirable and may heighten awareness of responsibility.
PERMUTATION SOLVES – COMBINING RIGHTS DISCOURSE AND DICOUSRSE OF
CARING ARE CRITICAL TO SOLVE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 115
To critique the language of compassion is not to say that the notion of compassion should be discarded.
Animal rightists would not suggest that we avoid speaking in terms of compassion. Indeed, references to
compassion and caring endure within the animal rights movement. However, these references are
combined with the notion of rights. And the need to join the concepts is apparent as long as compassion,
when it is used alone, is associated with kindness to inferiors, as it still is within the notion of animal
welfare.
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AT: “Feminist Kritik of Rights”
TURN - DISCOURSE OF COMPASSION AND PROTECTION IS PATERNALITSIC AND
LIMITED
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 114-5
From the perspective of animal advocates, the primary problem with the language of compassion and its
associated language of protection rests in the emphasis on humans. Humans, in fulfilling their proper role
in humanity, should treat animals with compassion and concern. If not, the important result is not so much
that animals will be harmed but that humans will be acting cruelly. The reflection, then, is upon human
activity and character rather than on animals. Moreover, the notion of protection tends to inspire
paternalistic attitudes toward animals. Animals need protection because they cannot help themselves. This
paternalistic perspective does two things. First, it suggests human superiority over the nonhuman world,
with humans acting as the defenders of animals. Second, the paternalism stemming from protectionism
clouds the fact that the protection animals require is protection against humans. As such, protectionism,
again, is human-centered. The concept of human protection of animals both includes the notion of
hierarchy and suggests that animals need protection from something besides humans.
Another problem with the language of compassion stems from its limited nature. As it is traditionally
understood, the notion suggests that humans should be compassionate in our use of animals. In other
words, humans can use animals for whatever ends we desire, but in doing so we should strive for
compassionate treatment. Thus, when raising animals for clothing, meat, entertainment, and so forth, the
conditions should be tolerable. As long as our treatment of animals is not characterized by wanton and
gratuitous cruelty, then compassion is being achieved. From this perspective, animals are still viewed as
objects for human pleasure and disposal, and the assumption of animal inferiority is reinforced.
FEMINIST KRITIK OF RIGHTS BASED ON SIMPLISTIC, VAGUE GENERALIZATIONS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 56
Now there is, I think, much that is unclear in the preceding account. The concepts used to describe male
mind are so general and vague that it seems the better part of wisdom to withhold judgment of the idea’s
validity until a much fuller, more precise story has been told. I will have more (but not enough) to say on
this topic later. These matters to one side, what may be said for and against the male mind defense? I will
consider five areas of controversy. The first is empirical and concerns disputes about the evidence for the
portrait of patriarchy sketched previously; the second concerns the paradoxical presuppositions of the male
mind defense; the third and fourth challenge the alleged shortcomings of “hierarchical” thinking; and the
fifth explores, albeit incompletely, the way some feminist theorists have used elements of the male mind
defense to criticize my position regarding animal rights.
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AT: Feminist Kritik of Rights
PLACING REASON OVER EMOTION IS NOT PATRIARCHAL
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 59
We have all had similar experiences, and most of us have had them not rarely but fairly often. Moreover,
most of us are familiar with the process by which we come to recognize that our feelings (for example,
about members of religions or races other than our own) are grounded in beliefs that we have accepted
uncritically (for example, the belief that Native Americans are lazy and shiftless). Once we see through the
prejudicial character of such beliefs, the feelings we have toward others (for example, Gentile feelings
about Jews, or Caucasians’ feelings about African Americans) can and often do change. Throughout this
process our capacity to reason is called on to play a role that our capacity to feel cannot perform.
More generally, emotions without reason can be blind. The task of checking the factual and inferential
basis of the emotions we feel exceeds both the reach and the grasp of our power to feel them. In a very real
sense, this is part of the human condition. How, then, can it plausibly be judged to be patriarchal to
recognize the limits of emotion or the role of reason in this regard? We do not denigrate the importance of
emotions in human life if we rank reason “above” emotion. For my part, then, I am not convinced that
recognizing a dualism or hierarchy between reason and emotion is a bad thing in general or a symptom of
male dominance in particular.
ANIMAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE INCORPORATES EMOTION
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 6
Fourth, I emphasize that in defending the need for rational discourse, I am not in any way diminishing the
importance of an emotional response to the plight of animals. Indeed, I agree with feminist Marti Kheel
that a “unity of reason and emotion” is important for animal rights theory, and with Tom Regan, who
maintains that “philosophy can led the mind to water but only emotion can make it drink.”
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AT: “Human Suffering Higher Priority”
HUMAN SUFFERING IS NOT AN EXCUSE TO IGNORE ANIMAL SUFFERING
Jane Goodhall, World Renowned Expert on Chimpanzees, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 14-5
Finally, there is a growing concern for the plight of nonhuman animals in our society. But those who are
trying to raise levels of awareness regarding the abuse of companion animals, animals raised for food, zoo
and circus performers, laboratory victims and so on, and lobbying for new and improved legislation to
protect them, are constantly asked how they can devote time and energy, and divert public monies, to
“animals” when there is so much need among beings. Indeed, in many parts of the world humans suffer
mightily. We are anguished when we read of the millions of starving and homeless people, of police
tortures, of children whose limbs are deliberately deformed so that they can make a living from begging,
and those whose parents force them—even sell them—into lives of prostitution. We long for the day when
conditions improve worldwide—we may work for that cause. But we should not delude ourselves into
believing that, so long as there is human suffering. Who are we to say that the suffering of a human being
is more terrible than the suffering of a nonhuman being, or that it matters more?
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AT: “Animal Rights Prop up Capitalism”
TURN-COMMODIFICATION OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS IS AKIN TO CAPITALIST
EXPLOITATION OF WORKERS
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 19
However, one of the key themes in this approach I hope to outline in what follows, is that the politics of
animal rights and welfare is much more indissolubly intertwined with other issue than this simple
human/animal opposition supposes. The subjection of animals to intensive production regimes, and their
extensive use of experimental subjects for commercial purposes are both forms of social practice in which
the needs of living beings are systematically overridden. What I have elsewhere called the “intentional structure”
of such practices as these is one in which animals are treated as means to socially established ends, not as
“ends in themselves”, nor as beings whose own ends or preferences need to be taken into account. There is a
clear parallel here, with a fairly standard socialist moral critique of the treatment of wage-workers in capitalist industry, according to
which workers are estranged from their own life-activity, and reduced to the status of a mere commodity. Of course, the analogy is
not complete, since the commodity-status of the worker lasts as long as the working day, and leaves open the
possibility of a more autonomous period of “free time” for reproduction, recreation and consumption. Many
socialists and feminists would, of course, question the character of these activities, too. However, the formal distinction
remains. The commodification of the lives of nonhuman animals in these regimes is more fully realized,
though, arguably, qualitatively comparable with that imposed on human wage-workers.
ALTERNATIVE DOESN’T SOLVE- EMPIRICALLY AND STRUCTURALLY SOCIALISM
FAILS
St. Petersburg Times, “Education is a better solution than taxation”, January 09, 1999, 0 South Pinellas
Edition, EDITORIAL; LETTERS; Pg. 15A, lexis.
John Reiniers, Hernando Beach Socialism will only hurt Re: Taxes should limit the gap between rich and poor, letter. The letter writer
correctly points out that capitalism produces much more wealth than socialism because, as he puts it, capitalism motivates "the
best people to work harder" while socialism fails to "create the essential motivation for harder work." So
far, so good. But then, inexplicably, the writer recommends a solution to the so-called income gap between
rich and poor that is pure socialism: the "redistribution of income via progressive taxes that take from the
rich to give to the poor." (Incidentally, as used in the referenced letter, progressive is a euphemism for discriminatory.) As
Winston Churchill was fond of pointing out, capitalism produces unequal wealth while socialism produces equal
poverty.
NO LINK AND TURN- EMPIRICALLY ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS STRONGLY RESIST
AND DENOUNCE CAPITALISM
Karen Armstrong, “BOOKS: END OF A BEDROOM FARCE”, The Independent, May 19, 2001,
FEATURES; Pg. 9, lexis
A watershed occurred in November 1999 in "the Battle of Seattle", when protesters demonstrating against
unfettered capitalism and promoting environmentalism, animal rights, and support for exploited workers,
caused leaders to abandon the summit meeting of the World Trade Organisation.
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AT: “Animal Rights Prop up Capitalism”
TURN AND ALTERNATIVE DOESN’T SOLVE- EMPIRICALLY ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS
OPPOSE CAPITALISM AND SOLVE BETTER FOR IT THAN PHILOSOPHICAL
VIEWPOINTS
JOHN PLENDER, “Walking with animals, learning new tricks Defenders of animal rights are mastering
the arts of 'econo-terrorism' and beating the capitalist Goliaths”, Financial Times, March 17, 2001,
London Edition 1, FRONT PAGE - WEEKEND FT ; Pg. 1
Yet perhaps the most interesting development in relations between the mammals is the way a tiny group of
British animal rights activists is succeeding against capitalism where Karl Marx, the Baader-Meinhof Gang and
the Red Brigades failed. Barclays, Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, Credit Suisse First Boston, HSBC, Phillips & Drew, West LB Panmure,
Royal Bank of Scotland - a veritable roll call of financial Goliaths have been humbled by a bunch of Davids in
balaclavas. Confronted with the threat of violence by thuggish animal lovers, these powerful institutions
have all stopped providing financial services to Hunting-don Life Sciences, the UK animal testing company,
or to its shareholders. Some claim their exit was due to concern for their employees; others acted on purely commercial grounds.
Whatever their motives, it is probable that Huntingdon would now be bankrupt without the bold intervention of a singular-sounding
US investment bank called Stephens.
NO LINK AND TURN- AT THE CORE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISM IS THE OPPOSITION
TO CAPITALISM AS AN ENEMY TO DIVERSITY
MICHAEL VINEY, “Have we killed off nature?”, The Irish Times, December 11, 1999, CITY EDITION;
WEEKEND; ANOTHER LIFE; Pg. 76
They would like to live as if nature had its own intrinsic worth. The "deep ecology" activists who were among those
causing ructions at the World Trade Organisation conference in Seattle last week are on the radical wing of such a
view. Along with specific concerns about logging and animal rights, they see the free-trade policies of
transnational capitalism as an enemy of human diversity - of small, regional economies and minority cultural traditions.
They are heirs to the ideas of Arne Naess, the Norwegian professor who coined the term "deep ecology"
25 years ago. His principles were in tune with American Green thinkers such as Aldo Leopold and Rachel Carson, and have helped to
shape the "eco-ethics" platform shared by a growing number of European scientists. A central conviction is that human populations must be
reduced to the carrying capacities of the ecosystems in which they live - a discipline that applies to every other species on Earth
MUST PIERCE THE HEGEMONIC OPPRESSION OF CAPITALISM BY WORKING TO END
THE DAY-TO-DAY VIOLENCE AGAINST ANIMALS
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 254
The beginning of concerted political action by those on the Left and those working for the liberation of
other animals, and the growing ability of hundreds of thousands around the world to see through the
hegemonic legitimations for oppression, should give hope to all those determined to make plain the often
invisible oppression of other animals and devalued humans and to reduce, if not eliminate, that
oppression in the twenty-first century. We need to dedicate ourselves to stopping twenty-first century
versions of the Hinckley and Panzos massacres and the countless day-to-day attacks and routine killings of
the most vulnerable. This requires an understanding of the ways in which the oppression of so many
groups and other animals are intertwined and interdependent, of the fundamental economic basis of
oppression—and of the ultimate necessity of building a true political and economic democracy.
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AT: “Animal Rights Prop up Capitalism”
TURN- ANIMAL RIGHTS IS A THREAT TO GLOBAL CAPITALISM
Independent, “CBI TO PRESS BLUNKETT TO SET UP SPECIAL POLICE FORCE; DIGBY JONES
PLANS TO MEET THE HOME SECRETARY TO ASK FOR HELP”, November 7, 2004, Sunday, First
Edition; BUSINESS; Pg. 3
Digby Jones, the director- general of the CBI, is to press the Government to set up a dedicated police force
to tackle the rise in security threats against business. Mr Jones believes that British companies need more
help from the Government and the police to combat what he said are "threats to democratic capitalism" such as terrorist attacks, animal rights extrem-ism, espionage and computer hacking. "Do I intend to put
this high on the lobby agenda of the CBI? Yes, I do. And I intend to sit down with David Blunkett the
Home Secretary and raise the issue, because I know he will listen," he said.
NO LINK AND TURN- THE GOVERNMENT DEFINES BOTH ANTI-CAPITALIST AND
ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS WITHIN THE SAME CATERGORY
Andrew Parker, writer,”Anti-terrorism law may prevent violent protests LEGISLATION POLICE TO
HAVE GREATER POWERS AGAINST ACTIVISTS”, Financial Times, December 3, 1999, NATIONAL
NEWS; Pg. 2
The government's terrorism bill, published yesterday, will allow the police for the first time to use antiterrorism powers against "domestic terrorists". The catch-all definition of terrorism in the legislation means
police might be able to use the powers against anti-capitalism groups; as well as animal rights activists
and green campaigners, including those who oppose genetically modified food.
TURN- ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTIVISTS SUPPORT ANTI-CAPITALISM IN THE FIGHT
AGAINST GLOBALIZATION
Eetta Prince-Gibson, ”The burger they love to hate”, The Jerusalem Post, May 31, 2002, Friday,
FEATURES; Pg. 4B
But to others, McDonald's is the archvillian, the target for a host of environmentalists, animal rights
activists, vegetarians, trade unionists, and enemies of capitalism. During the past six years, according to
McDonald's own web-publications, McDonald's restaurants have been the targets of hundreds of violent
protests, including bombings from Rome, Prague and London, to Macao, Rio de Janeiro, and Jakarta. that
wherever they roam, wherever on the globe they find themselves, no matter what cultural challenges they
face, a Big Mac and fries will always look and taste the same. Yet, despite the universal homogeneity of the
food, the protests against and support for McDonald's in each country reveals much about the culture that
McDonald's was supposedly trying to homogenize-out.
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AT: “Animal Rights Trade Off With Necessary Biomedical
Research”
TURN - MANIPULATED CONDITIONS OF ANIMAL RESEARCH YIELDS INFORMATION
THAT IS EITHER INEFFECTIVE OR HARMFUL WHEN APPLIED TO HUMANS
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
In contrast to human clinical investigation, vivisection involves manipulations of artificially induced
conditions. Furthermore, the highly unnatural laboratory environment invariably stresses the animals, and
stress affects the entire organism by altering pulse, blood pressure, hormone levels, immunological
activities, and myriad other functions.90,91 Indeed, many laboratory "discoveries" reflect mere laboratory
artifact. For example, artifact from unnaturally induced strokes in animals has repeatedly misled
researchers.9 In the 1980s researchers reported 25 compounds that reduce ischemic-stroke damage in
nonhuman animals, but none proved effective in humans.96 Subsequently, agents showing efficacy in
animals have been unhelpful or even hazardous for human patients.100,101
TURN - ANIMAL RESEARCH UNNECESSARY AND OFTEN COUNTEPRODUCTIVE
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 116
Although many regard the use of animals in experiments as involving a genuine conflict of human and
animal interests, the necessity of animal use for this purpose is open to serious question as well.
Considerable empirical evidence challenges the notion that animal experiments are necessary to ensure
human health and indicates that, in many instances, reliance on animal models has actually been
counterproductive.
USE OF ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH EMPIRICALLY DELAYED CRITICAL
MEDICAL ADVANCES
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
Many other important medical advances have been delayed because of misleading information derived
from animal "models." The animal model of polio, for example, resulted in a misunderstanding of the
mechanism of infection. Studies on monkeys falsely indicated that poliovirus infects only the nervous
system. This erroneous assumption resulted in misdirected preventive measures and delayed the
development of tissue culture methodologies critical to the discovery of a vaccine.25,26 While monkey cell
cultures were later used for vaccine production, it was research with human cell
cultures which first showed that poliovirus could be cultivated on non-neural tissue.27 Similarly,
development of surgery to replace clogged arteries with the patient's own veins was impeded by dog
experiments which falsely indicated that veins could not be used.28 Likewise, kidney transplants, quickly
rejected in healthy dogs, were accepted for a much longer time in human patients.29 We now know that
kidney failure suppresses the immune system, which increases tolerance of foreign tissues.
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TURN – ARGUMENTS FOR APE RESEARCH ARE THE LOGIC OF THE HOLOCAUST
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 260The plea that "if it is language research today, it will be
cancer tomorrow" distills to "necessity." We must harm these apes if we are to help ourselves. But it is such
a thoroughly immoral argument, resting upon "might makes right," that only a "pure" Policy Judge, blind to
principle, could ever accept it. Nazi doctors invoked "necessity" to justify immersing Jews, Russians, and
convicted criminals in freezing water, forcing them to drink seawater, infecting them with typhus and
gangrene, trying to regenerate and transplant their bones, and exposing them to mustard gas in the
concentration camps. 67 "Necessity" justified the Japanese 731st Regiment's vivisecting living Chinese,
Koreans, Russians, and Mongolians without anesthetics, replacing their blood with horse's blood, infecting
them with syphilis, bubonic plague, anthrax, and cholera, immersing them in cold water and throwing them
into the winter, exposing them to high doses of X rays, and systematically starving them in vitamin and
nutrition research in Harbin, China, during World War II. Yet the two most famous legal "necessity" cases
in the English-speaking world denied its power to justify the taking of innocent life. In an American case,
sailors who threw passengers from a leaky life raft were convicted of manslaughter, though they had saved
other passengers from drowning and all would otherwise have died. In an English case, two drifting sailors
were convicted of killing a dying boy, then eating his body when food and water ran out.
PLACING SCIENCE ABOVE ETHICS PROVIDED JUSTIFICATION FOR THE HOLOCAUST
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
In addition to squandering scarce resources and providing misleading results, vivisection poses real risks to
humans. The mindset that scientific knowledge justifies (and may require) harming innocent individuals
endangers all who are vulnerable. Even after Nazi and Japanese experiments on prisoners horrified the
world, American researchers denied African-American men syphilis treatment in order to assess the
disease's natural progression,114 injected cancer cells into nursing home patients,114 subjected unwitting
patients to dangerous radiation experiments,115 and, despite no chance of success, transplanted nonhuman
primate and porcine organs into children, chronically ill, and impoverished people.116 Psychiatrist Robert
Jay Lifton argues that this "science at any cost" mentality may have provided medical justification for the
Holocaust.117
TURN –BIODIVERSITY
A)IMPORTING CHIMPS FOR RESEARCH RISKS EXTINCTION
Wendy Thatcher, Veterinarian, visited site on July 24, 2005, Chimpanzees: Test results that Don’t
Apply to Humans, http://www.pcrm.org/resch/anexp/chimps.html
Some 2,000 chimpanzees are maintained in U.S. laboratories,1 and approximately 100 chimps are born
each year to captive mothers.2 There are numerous problems with using chimpanzees as experimental
subjects. One concern is their depleted status in the wild. Chimpanzees are considered a threatened species
under the U.S. Endangered Species Act. Though importation of free-living chimpanzees from Africa is
currently restricted, some fear that the restrictions will be lifted because of increasing demands by
pharmaceutical industries, among others. This could present a serious threat to the survival of this species
in the wild. For each captured chimp that reaches his or her overseas destination, it is estimated that ten
others die en route.2
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B)CHIMPS ARE A KEYSTONE SPECIES –EXTINCTION WOULD UNDERMINE ENTIRE
ECOSYSTEMS
Ian Redmond, Wildlife Consultant. “Eating Our Relatives: Ethics, Ecology And Extinction”. Primate
Society Of Great Britain. 1998 http://www.psgb.org/Meetings/Spring1998.html
Unfortunately, the examples of sustainable use are few and far between when distant commercial markets
depend on populations of wild fauna and flora. If the level of hunting is causing a decline in the population,
there will be ecological ramifications. Primates are often keystone species in their habitat, and their
disappearance can lead to significant changes in the remaining ecosystem. Plants which depend on them for
seed dispersal, for example, will decline, as will any animal species which feed or otherwise depend on
those species of plant. Thus there are good ecological arguments for limiting hunting for bush-meat - and if
the habitat is a sustainable source of other revenues, good economic ones too. Whether for ethical or ecological reasons, however,
there is now a consensus among conservation and animal welfare NGOs that the bush-meat trade is out of control. Extinctions
will follow if nothing is done to control it. Perhaps today we can agree on how we as primatologists can
best respond.
C)BIODIVERSITY LOSS CAUSES EXTINCTION
John Tuxill and Chris Bight, research associates at the Worldwatch Institute, 1998, THE STATE OF THE
WORLD, p. 41-42
The loss of species touches everyone, for no matter where or how we live, biodiversity is the basis for our
existence. Earth's endowment of species provides humanity with food, fiber, and many other products and
"natural services" for which there simply is no substitute. Biodiversity underpins our health care systems:
some 25 percent of drugs prescribed in the United States include chemical compounds derived from wild organisms,
and billions of people worldwide rely on plant- and animal- based traditional medicine for their primary health care. Biodiversity
provides a wealth of genes essential for maintaining the vigor of our crops and livestock.
TURN - VACCINES FROM HUMAN TISSUE AND CELL CULTURES SAFER AND MORE
EFFECTIVE
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
Regarding vaccines, in 1949 researchers discovered that vaccines made from human tissue cultures were
more effective, safer, and less expensive than monkey tissue vaccines, completely avoiding the serious
danger of animal virus contamination. Likewise, many animal tests for viral vaccine safety have been
replaced by far more sensitive and reliable cell culture techniques.
COMPUTERS REPLACING THE NEED FOR ANIMALS IN RESEARCH
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
Because of computer technology, it is now possible to keep detailed and comprehensive records of drug
side-effects.157 A central database with such information, de-rived from post-marketing surveillance,
enables rapid identification of dangerous drugs.158 Such a data system would also increase the likelihood
that unexpected beneficial side-effects of drugs would be recognized. Indeed, the anti-cancer properties of
such medications as prednisone, nitrogen mustard, and act-inomycin D; chlorpromazine's tranquilizing
effect; and the mood-elevating effect of MAO-inhibitor and tricyclic antidepressants164 were all
discovered through clinical observation of side-effects.
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IN-VITRO CELL AND TISSUE CULTURES EFFECTIVE BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
ALTERNATIVE
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
In vitro cell and tissue cultures are powerful investigative tools. Between the mid-1950s and mid-1980s,
the NCI screened 400,000 chemicals as possible anti-cancer agents, mostly on mice who had been given
mouse leukemia.165 The few compounds that were effective against mouse leukemia had little effect on the
major human cancer killers.166
More recently, researchers have favored grafting human cancers onto animals with impaired immune
systems that do not reject grafts. However, few drugs found promising in these models have been clinically
effective, and drugs with known effectiveness often fail to show efficacy with these models.167 More
promising and less costly is a screen of about 60 in vitro human cancer cell lines, a much less costly and
more reliable alternative. Similarly, in vitro tests using cells with human DNA can detect DNA damage
much more readily than animal tests.169
TURNS - USE OF ANIMALS IN BIOMEDICAL RESOURCES COUNTERPRODUCTIVE—
WASTES HEALTH CARE RESOURCES
Kim Stallwood, PETA, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 205
We waste money on animal-based biomedical research to the detriment of the nation’s healthcare. In order
to demonstrate the link between animal and human suffering we must build alliances with healthcare
reformers to oppose biomedical research and to support increased public-health and disease-prevention
measures.
MORAL REQUIREMENT TO USE ANIMALS IN RESEARCH GROUNDED IN
UTILITARIANISM
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 70-1
Along with acknowledging these benefits to humans, of course, utilitarians must also consider the harms
done to nonhuman animals. “Let us do the weighing asked, by all means,” Cohen insists concluding:
“The pain that is caused to humans (and to nonhuman animals) by diseases and disorders now curable, or
one day very probably curable, through the use of laboratory animals, is so great as to be beyond
calculation. What has already been accomplished is enough to establish that. What is now being
accomplished, its benefits not yet in hand, would establish that truth with equal sureness even if only
partially successful. And a fair weighing will put on the scales also those great medical achievements not
yet even dreamed of but likely to be realized one day.” (1996:9, 93-40)
“To refrain from using animals in biomedical research is, on utilitarian grounds, morally wrong” (Cohen
1986:868).
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AFF- TURN APE RESEARCH LEADS TO RACISM AND SEXISM
Murry J. Cohen, M.D. and Stephen R. Kaufman, M.D. and Brandon P. Reines, M.D. 1995 “Aping
Science Summary: A Critical Analysis of Research at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center”.
Medical Research Modernization Committee http://www.mrmcmed.org/ape.html
Because many people see monkeys and apes as "almost human" but lacking human social conventions,
researchers often assert that nonhuman primates can model "human nature." Repeatedly, distorted notions
and caricatures of nonhuman primate "behavior" have been perniciously used to defend racism and sexism
as "natural." For example, a top government research official recently drew parallels between violent
behavior of captive monkeys and violent inner city youths. Of course, such flippant application of
laboratory data to humans is unwarranted. Furthermore, the data do not even reveal anything about innate
monkey behavior. Their violence is unnatural--caused by the researchers themselves--and reflects the pain
and suffering provoked by laboratory confinement.
VIVISECTION IMPOSES REAL SUFFERING ON TENS OF MILLIONS OF ANIMALS IN THE
US EVERY YEAR
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
The tens of millions of animals used and killed each year in American laboratories generally suffer
enormously, often from fear and physical pain, nearly always from the deprivation inflicted by their
confinement, which denies their most basic psychological and physical needs.
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AT: “Animal Testing Necessary”
NO LINK – HUMANS ARE ON BALANCE BETTER FOR TESTING THAN APES – THIS
AVOIDS THE ETHICAL QUESTIONS
Lindsey Linfoot, Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia
2002. “Submission on the Draft Policy on the Use of Non-Human Primates in Medical Research”.
Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia.
http://www.avwa.com.au/subprimates.pdf
Given there is so much evidence available that non-human primates have feelings that are comparative to
our own it is immoral and certainly unethical that they are used in medical research. It is apparent that it is
the threat of “legal” action that causes most researchers to cite as a defence the use of animal experiments
in their research. Clinical trials, “A scientific test of the effectiveness and safety of a therapeutic agent(as a
drug or vaccine) using consenting human subjects”16use just that ‘consenting human subjects’. All drugs
or therapies at some stage will be clinically trialled for success (or otherwise), side effects and long term
outcomes, certainly something that animals cannot communicate.
NO LINK - APES DON’T WORK FOR BIOMEDICAL TESTING
Murry J. Cohen, M.D. and Stephen R. Kaufman, M.D. and Brandon P. Reines, M.D. 1995 “Aping
Science Summary: A Critical Analysis of Research at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center”.
Medical Research Modernization Committee http://www.mrmcmed.org/ape.html
As depicted by animal research advocates, medical history is replete with major contributions from
experimentation on monkeys and apes. A review of two "discoveries" often attributed to experimentation
on nonhuman primates--the discovery of the polio vaccine and the importance of maternal affection in an
infant's psychological and social development--reveals how medical history has been distorted.
The use of rhesus monkeys in polio research as "models" of the human disease immediately distorted the
research. Although polio can paralyze both humans and monkeys, experimentally induced polio in
monkeys differs in important respects from human polio. The monkey disease is primarily a neurological
illness, whereas observations of humans prior to the monkey experiments suggested (correctly) that polio
began as a gastrointestinal disease. The leading animal model, in which monkeys were infected via the
nose, therefore contradicted this human finding. Nevertheless, researchers continued to trust the monkey
"model," conceiving polio as a neurological disease. Because it was considered too unsafe to develop
vaccines from neural tissue, vaccine development was retarded until John Enders and his colleagues, on the
basis of human experimental data, grew polio virus in human intestinal tissue. Dr. Albert Sabin himself
believed that "the work on prevention [of paralytic polio] was long delayed by an erroneous conception of
the nature of the human disease based on misleading experimental models of the disease in monkeys."
Maternal deprivation experiments have involved separating infant monkeys from their mothers and rearing
them with "surrogate" mothers made of wire and cloth or with "monster mothers" who abuse them. Other
protocols have included partial isolation in wire cages or total isolation in "pits" or "wells of despair."
While researchers repeatedly claim that these nonhuman primate experiments "prove" that maternal love
and affection are necessary for healthy psychosocial development, this was well known from preceding
studies of human infants who experienced maternal deprivation. Although researchers continue to
manipulate nearly every conceivable variable, such as length of separation or caging parameters, Stephen
Suomi, one of the major practitioners of this method, has acknowledged, "Most monkey data that readily
generalize to humans have not uncovered new facts about human behavior; rather, they have only verified
principles that have already been formulated from previous human data. . . To date the monkey data have
added little to knowledge of human mother-infant interactions."
Those who experiment on nonhuman primates have grossly exaggerated the role of nonhuman-primate
studies in medical progress and significantly minimized the misleading data that results.
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AT: “Animal Testing Necessary”
RESEARCH ON NONHUMAN GREAT APES IS IMMORAL AND SHOULD BE REJECTED
REGARDLESS OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL BENEFITS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions,
eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 133
Does the use of animals in experiments involve a genuine conflict between human and animal interests?
Even if a need for animals in research exists, the conflict between humans and animals in this context is no
more genuine than a conflict between human suffering from a disease and other humans we might use in
experiments to find a cure for that disease. Data gained from experiments with animals requires
extrapolation to humans in order to be useful at all, and extrapolation is an inexact science under the best of
circumstances. If we want data that will be useful in finding cures for human diseases, we would be better
advised to use humans. We do not allow humans to be used as we do laboratory animals, and we do not think that there is any
sort of conflict between those who are afflicted or who may become afflicted with a disease and those humans whose use might help
find a cure for that disease. We regard all humans as part of the moral community, and although we may not
treat all humans in the same way, we recognize that membership in the moral community precludes such
use of humans. Animals have no characteristic that justifies our use of them in experiments that is not shared
by some group of humans; because we regard some animals as laboratory tools yet think it inappropriate to treat any humans in this
way, we manufacture a conflict, ignoring the principle of equal consideration and treating similar cases in a dissimilar way.
ANIMAL RESEARCH INEFFECTIVE FOR GENETIC DISEASES
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
Scientists have located the genetic defects of many inherited diseases, including cystic fibrosis and familial
breast cancer. Trying to "model" these diseases in animals, researchers widely use animals--mostly mice-with spontaneous or laboratory-induced genetic defects. However, genetic diseases reflect interactions
between the defective gene and other genes and the environment. Consequently, nearly all such models
have failed to reproduce the essential features of the analogous human conditions.62 For example,
transgenic mice carrying the same defective gene as people with cystic fibrosis do not show the pancreatic
blockages or lung infections that plague humans with the disease,62 because mice and humans have
different metabolic pathways.63
MANY DRUG INTERACTION PROBLEMS NOT REVEALED IN ANIMAL TESTS
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
The General Accounting Office reviewed 198 of 209 drugs marketed from 1976 to 1985 and found that
52% had "serious postapproval risks" not predicted by animal tests.107 56 of 548 drugs (10%) approved
between 1975 and 1999 were removed from the market or needed one or more special warnings for
possible serious or life-threatening side-effects.108 Despite extensive animal testing, adverse drug reactions
remain a leading cause of mortality in the United States, accounting for roughly 100,000 deaths per year.109
HUMAN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL STUDIES MORE EFFECTIVE AND USEFUL
Physicians Committee for Responsible Medicine, 2000, Understanding claims about animal experiments,
http://www.pcrm.org/resch/anexp/understanding_claims.html
Comparative studies of human populations have provided important information about the causes of many
diseases. The discoveries of the relationships between smoking and cancer, cholesterol and heart disease,
high-fat diets and common cancers, and chemical exposures and birth defects came from epidemiologic
studies. Such studies also demonstrated the mechanism of transmission of AIDS, and showed how to
prevent it.
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AT: “Animal Rights Justifies Naziism”
HITLER’S SUPPORT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS DOES NOT CONDEMN THEM
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 62
I am not suggesting that the animal rights movement is tainted by Hitler’s support, any more than Hitler’s
enthusiasm for limited-access highways should be an embarrassment to our highway builders. The point is
only that animal rights have no particular political valence. They are as compatible with right-wing as with
left-wing views.
WE MUST AUGMENT HUMAN RIGHTS TO DECONSTRUCT NOTIONS OF HUMAN
SUPERIORITY – AS LONG AS WE DELEGATE OURSELVES GOD LIKE STATUS VIOLENCE
IS INEVITABLE
Kyle Ash, earned his B.A. in International Affairs and Political Economy from Lewis and Clark College,
his L.L.M. from Brussels School of International Studies of University of Kent at Canterbury, U.K., and is
currently working on an M.A. in Global Environmental Policy at American University in Washington, D.C.
“INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY”.
Animal Law. 2005
Human reason is a potent asset, and it can be terrestrially beneficent—but only if we convince ourselves to
stop using it maleficently. If Mill were alive today, arguing non-speciesist Neo-Utilitarianism, he might
reiterate that the Earth’s evolving legal system is suffering from the tyranny of the majority. “Society
collectively” is imposing its tyranny over “the separate individuals who compose it.” Protection will require
“protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to
impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices . . . to fetter the development, and,
if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in harmony with its ways . . . The logic of Kant
and Mill has been useful to our understanding of the shortcomings of natural law, but it has not contributed
to a better understanding of the natural world. Their views of other animals are the typical justification for
speciesism in international law, as represented by treaties, declarations, and the writings of academics.
Upon analysis, the tacit justifications for speciesism in international law are all non sequitur. Speciesism
reflects the backwardness of law in that it has not adequately integrated modern qualities of science,
namely to be evolutive, to exhaustively refer to empirically-deduced collective knowledge, and to be
interdisciplinary. In his book, The Health of Nations, Philip Allott says, “[t]he reality of the human world is
a speciesspecific reality made by human beings for human beings.”International law retains the archaic
notion that humanity transcends the biosphere. Allott says he is terrified of accepting that “knowledge,
mind, and meaning are part of the same world that they have to do with.” However, elevating ourselves to
god-like status creates a moral hazard for the way we relate to each other and all other life. Was that not the
lesson of our brush with fascism? In international law, the victory of compassion will not be in expanding
the circle of human rights, but in redefining their foundation. Human dignity will remain a misnomer as
long as it is defined in exclusionary terms.
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AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals –
Undermines Movements/Advocacy”
NON UNIQUE – THE MOVEMENT HASN’T MADE ANY PROGRESS
STALLWOOD, PETA, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert Garner, p. 197
For all its accomplishments, however, the animal advocacy movement did not march as far during its first
20 years as other movements for social change had marched during theirs. The animal advocacy movement
has not effected anywhere near the amount of federal or state legislation promoting its agenda as the
women’s and the civil rights movements have for theirs. Although Singer, Tom Regan, and others have
legitimized the moral status of animals as a topic worthy of philosophical discussion, concern for animals
has yet to be established as an accepted discipline in the academic catalogue, as women’s and African
American studies have been. There is no animal viewpoint in the literature, as there are women’s, black,
and increasingly so, gay and lesbian viewpoints. There is no animal rights caucus in Congress with the
leverage of the black and women’s caucuses. There is no animal advocacy magazine with the circulation
and the influence of women’s and black publications.
NON UNIQUE – ANIMAL MOVEMENTS INCREASINGLY FOCUS ON RIGHTS OVER
WELFARE
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and
the animal rights movement, p. 75-6
In the realm of political activism, animal rights ha become the dominant language of the contemporary
movement. To be sure, animal rights language continues to compete with the welfare movement’s
language of compassion. Nevertheless, popular debates and discussion regarding animals are not
dominated by the language of rights. Moreover, the movement increasingly combines the language of
compassion with the language of rights, arguing that humans should provide compassionate, kind, and
caring treatment to animals because animals have a right to such treatment.
ARGUMENT THAT RIGHTS AND LEGAL STRATEGIES ARE VULNRABLE TO COOPTATION IS NOT-UNIQUE, WOULD MEAN THAT WE HAVE NO TOOLS AVAILABLE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 229
Of course, it must be admitted that employing the language and institutions of the existing system may
foster co-optation. Upon entry into the mainstream, the possibility of co-optation increases. This may be
the biggest danger of using the legal system and its prevailing languages. At the same time, it may be the
biggest danger of using any part of the existing system. Short of revolution, all methods of challenge are
vulnerable to co-optation. And revolution is not always the best or even the most viable way to achieve
social change. Hence, when the legal system is critiqued for its co-optive tendencies, we should not forget that it is
not the only part of the system that has such tendencies. Furthermore, there are various ways to minimize the dangers
of co-optation when using law. Examining the animal rights movement from the bottom up points to two important
ways of minimizing co-optation: maintaining a critical strategic understanding of law and deploying law in multiple
ways and multiple locations.
NON UNIQUE – ANIMAL MOVEMENTS EMPLOY RIGHTS TALK
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and
the animal rights movement, p. 79
It is therefore not at all surprising that movement literature generally takes as given the ethical argument
that justifies bringing animals into the moral community. It is also not surprising that the movement relies
on rights terminology to do this. Rights language carries within it notions of fairness and equity. Rights
are recognized and accepted within our culture as a primary symbol of justice. As such, rights language
possesses a power that invokes images of right and wrong.
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AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals –
Undermines Movements/Advocacy”
NO LINK – ADVOCATES FOR ANIMAL INTERESTS HAVE NOT BEEN SEDUCED BY THE
MYTH OF RIGHTS – THEY USE THE DISCOURSE VERY STRATEGICALLY
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and
the animal rights movement, p. 85-86
To discover whether the animal rights movement’s appropriation of rights confirms or contrasts with
critical perspectives of the language, I conducted in-depth interviews with animal advocates. These
interviews sought to ascertain how activists view and deploy rights language. Although activists’
perspectives on rights were mixed, three overwhelming points emerged from these interviews. First,
activists did not demonstrate a false, unrealistic, or naïve hope in rights. Their views were critical, cautious
and balanced. Activists recognized the potential benefits of rights language but at the same time articulated
the problematic side of rights. Second, activists revealed a strategic understanding of the meaning of rights.
While they expressed strong and committed ethical views regarding the role and value of animals, activists
also maintained a strategic approach to advancing their ethics. Third, the critical and strategic approach
taken by activists offer reconstructions of rights that challenge predominant views and seek to recast the
meaning of rights. Overall, the interviews indicated that activists are not captured by the myth of rights.
To the contrary, activists’ views and uses of the language seek to promote what Scheingold calls “a politics
of rights”. In so doing, activists strategically constitute the meaning of rights.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE DOES NOT FRACTURE THE ANIMAL MOVEMENT*
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996
Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 233
It is important to note that internal movement splits are not peculiar to rights. Divisions within a
movement, and therefore within movement identity, could result without the turn to rights. Had liberation
become the dominant label and framework for animal advocacy, that, too, would have split the movement’s
identity. While the turn to rights certainly affects the way the lines are drawn and defined, rights
themselves are not the sole reason for internal disunity.
TURN – NON GOVERNMENTAL ANIMAL RIGHTS ACTION LEADS TO VIOLENCE
KNIAZ, @ University at Buffalo, 1995
Buffalo Law Review, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad 1995 (lexis)
One such instance in which the fruits of direct action exposed activities at a particular laboratory involved a
raid at the University of Pennsylvania Head Injury Clinic. In May 1984, members of the Animal Liberation
Front broke into experimenter Thomas Gennarelli's laboratory. During the raid, the liberators caused
approximately $ 20,000 in damage and stole 60 hours of videotapes.
DIRECT ACTION GIVES SYMPATHY TO ANIMAL ABUSERS
KNIAZ, @ University at Buffalo, 1995
Buffalo Law Review, Animal Liberation and the Law: Animals Board the Underground Railroad 1995 (lexis)
Some activists also feel that direct action diverts attention away from the issue of animal protection to the nature of
the direct action activities themselves. These law-abiding advocates worry that the public may "switch sympathy for the
animals . . . to the animal abusers."
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AT: “Animal Rights Counterproductive for Animals –
Undermines Movements/Advocacy”
TURN – ABANDONING THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS NOW WOULD DO MORE HARM
THAN GOOD TO THE ANIMAL MOVEMENTS BY REVIVING OLD STEREOTYPES
Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law, meaning and
the animal rights movement, p. 118
In addition to the persuasiveness and popularity of animal rights language, there is a further strategic reason
to continue using it in preference to the alternatives. For years, animal rights supporters were labeled
derogatorily as animal loves, human haters, extremists, little old ladies with twelve cats and tennis shoes,
and so on. While these stereotypes still persist, they have decreased significantly. Moreover, the reference
to animal rights has become quite mainstream. To change the reference now, at the moment when it has
achieved prominence, might do the movement more harm than good.
TURN – ANIMAL RIGHTS TALK DEPLOYED BECAUSE IT’S THE MOST EFFECTIVE WAY
TO MEET MOVEMENT GOALS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 228
The decentered approach further stresses the importance of considering context. Analyzing the deployment
of law from the perspective of those choosing between the various ways to effect change allows us to see
the factors that both constrain and expand choices. In the animal rights movement, the historical context of
rights-oriented movements provided the opportunity to further develop the language of rights. The
historical use of the language of compassion, which reinforced paternalism, protectionism, and the notions
of human superiority, inspired the turn to a new language. And the lack of viable alternative languages
certainly contributed to the choice of rights language.
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TURN - EMPHASIS ON THE RIGHTS OF GREAT APES FOSTERS INCREASED CONCERN
FOR HABITAT PROTECTION
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 216
And not only have she [Jane Goodall] and others, such as Dian Fossey, who was martyred for selfless
concern for the mountain gorillas, eloquently told the story of the great apes, they have also reminded us
that all of thee animals are members of endangered species. In this way, one can galvanize not only
members of society whose primary concern with animals is as individual objects or moral concern, but also
those who worry not about individuals but about the extinction of species. These disparate concern are
often at loggerheads; in this cased they can effectively converge.
ANIMAL RIGHTS VIEW NOT INCONSISTENT WITH FOCUS ON MEMBERS OF
ENDANGERED SPECIES
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2004, The Case for
Animal Rights, p. xl
The rights view can apply compensatory principles to animals (the East African black rhino, for example)
whose numbers are in severe decline because of past wrongs (for example, poaching of ancestors and
destruction of habitat). Although the remaining rhinos have no greater inherent value than the members of
a more plentiful species (rabbits, say), the assistance owed to the former arguably is greater than that owed
to the latter. If it is true, as I believe it is, that today’s rhinos have been disadvantaged because of wrongs
done to their predecessors, then, other things being equal, more should be done for rhinos, by way of
compensatory assistance, than should be done for rabbits.
In such manner, I believe, the rights view can account for our intuition that we owe more to the members of
endangered species of animals than we owe to the members of more plentiful species.
INDIVIDUAL ANIMAL RIGHTS OUTWEIGH THE GOOD OF THE ECOSYSTEM
Porcupine, Newsletter of the Department of Ecology and Biodiversity @ the University of Hong Kong.
“Animal Rights and Conservation”. 2005 http://www.hku.hk/ecology/porcupine/por32/32-cover.htm
At first sight, conservationists and people concerned with the well-being of animals would appear to be on
the same side, but conservationists are concerned with the survival of species, genes and ecosystems, while
animal rights advocates are concerned with the well-being of individual animals. It is common in practical
conservation work to kill large numbers of individual animals – not only invasives, but also native species
whose numbers have exceeded the carrying capacity of a small, isolated reserve. Many of us have killed
animals during research. We usually justify these killings, as well as any non-lethal suffering we cause to
animals, on conservation grounds. This defence is derided by some rights theorists as "ecofascism" –
individual rights are subordinated to the overall good of the species or ecosystem. They point out that
populations, species and ecosystems are merely human concepts and do not suffer, while individual
animals can and do.
Supporters of what has come to be called "strong animal rights" believe that individual animal rights
override all, or almost all, other considerations. It is just as wrong to use lab mice for experiments as to use
human children. These are the people who break into animal research labs. A slightly weaker version
simply asserts that the suffering of sentient animals deserves equal consideration with human suffering, so,
as with human suffering, one should always act to minimize it unless there is some other overriding
consideration. Sentient is used to mean "able to suffer", and philosophers, on no particular evidence, seem
to assume that this ability disappears somewhere between birds and fish. Do fish suffer? Note that simply
responding to stimuli is not by itself evidence for suffering – robots and protozoa can do that.
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TURN - THE LOGICAL CONCLUSION OF HOLIST PHILOSOPHY WOULD BE TO
SELECTIVELY “CULL” HUMAN POPULATIONS IN AREAS WHERE IT THREATENS
BIODIVERSITY
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 457-8
Holism—or, to speak more precisely, the unqualified, unequivocal version of holism sketched above—
takes a strong moral stance in opposition to whatever upsets the diversity, balance and sustainability of the
community of life. Unquestionably, it is the human presence and the effects of human activities that have
by far the most adverse effects on the diversity, balance and sustainability of the life community. Now, as
we have seen, the holist’s response to such effects when these are allegedly caused by nonhumans (for
example, by an overabundance of deer) is to recommend a limited hunting season, to cull the herd, and
thereby restore ecological balance. Why, then, should holists not advocate comparable policies in the face
of human depredation of the life community? In other words, why should holists stop short of
recommending that the human population be culled using measures no less lethal than those used in the
case of controlling the population of deer? Granted, the latter is legal, the former is not. But legality is not
a reliable guide to morality, and the question before us is a question of morals, not a question of law. And
it is the moral question that needs to be presented.
ANIMAL RIGHTS ETHICS FOSTERS INCREASED RESPECT FOR ECOSYSTEM—
CONNECTIONS TO OTHER BEINGS
Kyle Ash, lobbying strategist at the European Environmental Bureau, 2005 Animal Law
(INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY,)
2005 (lexis)
The main problem with Mill's utilitarianism is that he did not allow for morality to be based on any type of
intuition, n46 for the same reason that Kant displaced humanity from nature. Neither person realized that
humanity is part of and created in biology. The intuitive basis for morality is not entirely that which is
purported by religious zealots, n47 but is subject also to what we call in other animals "instinct." For
instance, Zane refers to one instinct of primordial humans: the "intense tendency in each individual to
preserve [her] social community as an organization." n48 Surely some remnants of this instinct remain
today, for example, in the form of human emotions that support natural sympathy. Viewing ourselves as
one of many primates, instead of viewing humanity as composed of transcendental beings somehow set
apart from our evolutionary kindred, makes it easier to better understand our social behavior. Our
valuation a priori of an action, i.e., our morality, is determined not simply by our ability to reason, but also
by the same biological mechanisms we use to explain the instinctive actions of other animals. These
biological mechanisms may influence intuition as Mill referred to it and as it is commonly understood.
ANIMAL RIGHTS RESTORES LINK BETWEEN THE LAW AND NATURE
Kyle Ash, lobbying strategist at the European Environmental Bureau, 2005 Animal Law
(INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY,)
2005 (lexis)
13 Humans and nonhumans alike suffer from the orthodoxy that "the role of law and the role of rights is to
elevate, to bring us up above the law of nature." Separating law from nature, or attempting to rise above
nature, reflects a predicament arising from what we have misnamed "social Darwinism," and is illconceived. Darwin's discoveries were not of a brutish "might makes right" natural world, as our Hobbesian
psychological associations have misinterpreted. Darwin saw an interdependent society of organisms that
includes humans.
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IMMORALITY OF HOLISM AS A PRINCIPLE MEANS IT CANNOT BE THE BASIS FOR
MORALITY OF ZOOS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 458
Either holists mean what they say, or they do not. If they do not, then there is no reason to take them
seriously. If they do, then they cannot avoid embracing the draconian implications to which their position
commits them…
As was true in that earlier case, it is no good attempting to defend zoos in particular by appealing to a moral
outlook that is morally unacceptable in general. Thus, because holism is not a morally acceptable outlook,
it is not an acceptable basis for assessing the moral justification of zoos.
RESPECT FOR INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS’ RIGHTS DOES NOT PROHIBIT ACTIONS TO
PROTECT THE SPECIES AS A WHOLE
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 389-90
Now consider again the situation of a captive animal that will be used as a part of a captive breeding
program. This animal is a wild animal, but we have accepted responsibility for its care and brought it into
the context of the conservation community, and in that context we have obligations to respect its
considerable ontological value, which requires that we respect the sentience of the animal by limiting its
pain, especially in the extremity of death. But full respect for a truly wild animal, an animal that exists with
integrity in its traditional niche and still inhabits the least disturbed areas of its traditional range, requires
that we recognize also the intergenerational aspect of the great striving toward life. The struggle of animals
to exist in the wild is both a struggle to survive individually and a struggle to perpetuate their species. A
reasonable concept of animal altruism must account for the natural instinct of animals toward individual
survival and, in addition, their natural instinct to perpetuate their species.
It is an awkward truth that humans must decide which members of the community will be sacrificed in the
furtherance of their species and of the ecological community that constitutes their niche. The problem of
exploding human population and destruction of habitats for other species is in a profound sense a human
problem. It is anthropogenic in its causes, and we must accept responsibility for our past and present
actions that inevitably shape the future. But the solution is surely not to domesticate all animals. If we
accept responsibility for a wild animal and then reduce that animal to a creature incapable of noble acts in
service of its community, this too is an act of disrespect, because in the wild the animal acted both to
survive and to perpetuate its species. We can now see the error in individualistic and extensioninst positions
on interspecific ethics. By denying that animal altruism in the service of higher ideals can ever be justified
because the crucial condition of voluntarism cannot be fulfilled, the individualists, respect only the drive
toward individual preservation and ignore the equally powerful drive of animals to perpetuate their species.
Individual members of every social species (which includes at least every sexually reproducing species)
live in existential paradox—the drives to survive and to reproduce one’s kind, usually mutually reinforcing,
can conflict, forcing a choice between individual preservation and contribution to species perpetuation.
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AT: “Zoos Key to Species Protection”
ZOOS DON’T CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO PROTECTING ENDANGERED SPECIES
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 457
Some people who accept a holistic ethic are skeptical of the real contributions zoos make to species
protection. It is appropriate for all of us to press this issue since, despite the claims sometimes made on
behalf of zoo programs whose purpose is to reintroduce endangered species into their native habitats, for
example, the rate of success might be far less than the public is led to believe.
ZOOS NOT A SERIOUS PART OF THE BATTLE TO PRESERVE ECOSYSTEMS AND
SPECIES
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 97
Even as a conservation strategy, keeping animals in captivity really only scratches the surface of the
problem. Thousands of species are endangered, not primarily because the animals themselves are killed
directly but because their habitat is being destroyed. It is therefore unrealistic in most cases to hope that
many species bred in zoos (and not all species, in any case, do breed successfully in captivity) can be
related into the wild, simply because there is no longer a place for them. Finally, even if it is accepted that
captive-breeding programs are a useful conservation strategy, this need not be undertaken by zoos but by
special centers which deal with one particular species and are not usually open to the public.
CAN MEET CAPTIVE BREEDING MISSION WITHOUT ZOOS
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 158
The final reason often used to justify zoos is their role in helping preserve endangered species. Zoo
breeding programs have had important successes; without them the Pete David Deer, the European Bison,
and the Mongolian Wild Horse would all now be extinct. However, we should not make too much of this
role of zoos. First, most zoos do very little breeding, or breed only species that are not endangered. So, at
most, this argument could justify the existence of only a tiny number of presently existing zoos. Second,
many of the major breeding programs are located in facilities specifically crated for this purpose, and far
from the attention of zoo-goers. The Bronx Zoo, for example, operates the Rare Animal Survival Center on
St. Catherine’s Island off the coast of Georgia; and the National Zoo runs its Conservation and Research
Center in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley. Most zoos have neither the staff nor the facilities to pursue any
meaningful breeding programs. So, if the purpose of zoos is to help preserve endangered species, then we
should replace them with these sorts of large-scale breeding centers.
IF ZOOS ARE NOT APPROPRIATE TO SAVE ENDANGERED HUMAN CULTURES ? THEY
ARE NOT APPROPRIATE FOR ENDANGERED APES EITHER
GRASP, 2002, [Great Ape Standing & Personhood], Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.personhood.org/main/faq.html
One often hears the argument that to condemn zoos would ignore all the educational value they offer. One
can consider extinction a very bad thing even if one does not care at all about conservation. But imagine
someone making the following statement:
"I worry about the Yanomami tribe of the Amazonian Rainforest becoming extinct because it means not
only that one of them or two get killed but that all members of their community are wiped out from the face
of the earth. This human loss is also loss of genetic biodiversity. We must prevent the absolute disaster for
those people, whose existence in the wild is threatened. A zoo in North America, for example, where there
is advanced health care and where captive breeding could augment their numbers, might be the only way to
save the tribe. Also, many underprivileged children in North American urban areas would not learn about
the Yanomami culture in any other way."
Toshisada Nishida has compared the cultures of non-human great apes to cultures of aboriginal human
groups. The zoo environment is not an appropriate answer to the problem of their dwindling numbers, any
more than it is appropriate for threatened human groups.
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AT: “Zoos Key to Species Protection”
HUMAN INTERACTION WITH ANIMALS AT PLACES LIKE ZOOS TO NOT FOSTER
ENVIRONMENTALISM
Joanne Vining, Associate Professor of Science and Chair Human Nature Research Laboratory @ Urbana
College. “The Connection to other animals and caring for nature”. Human Ecology Review Vol 10, 2003
http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her102/102vining.pdf
Finally, it is important to ask whether the development of caring for an individual of a species translates
into caring for the entire species and for the natural world in general. Miller (2002) argued that care for an
individual can preclude care for the species and may interfere with management of populations. He
mentioned the example of deer in and around urban centers where the public does not accept management
of the population by culling and predator control. He argued that the connection from caring for individuals
to caring for populations is not being made. Shore (2002) emphasizes that caring for a domesticated species
(through neutering, feeding, etc.) does not translate to the proper caring for a wild species. Research is
needed to examine whether there is a logical or feeling transition from caring for individuals, to caring for
populations, to caring for ecosystems. This requires a careful definition of the dependent variable of
“caring.”
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AT: “Zoos Key to Research for Animal Welfare”
ZOOS FAIL AT RESEARCH AND THERE ARE BETTER WAYS TO DO IT
Dale Jamieson, Professor of Environmental Studies and Philosophy at New York University, “Against
Zoos”. In Defense of Animals. 1985 http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/jamieson01.htm
The first point we should note is that very few zoos support any real scientific research. Fewer still have
staff scientists with full-time research appointments. Among those that do, it is common for their scientists
to study animals in the wild rather than those in zoo collections. Much of this research, as well as other
field research that is supported by zoos, could just as well be funded in a different way— say, by a
government agency. The question of whether there should be zoos does not turn on the funding for field
research which zoos currently provide. The significance of the research that is actually conducted in zoos is
a more important consideration.
UNNATURAL NATURE OF ZOO ENVIRONMENTS MAKES THEM A POOR PLACE TO
CONDUCT RESEARCH
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 156
The value of behavioral studies conducted on zoo animals is extremely dubious. The problem is that zoos
provide very unnatural environments for their animals, and these unnatural environments inevitably
produce unnatural behavior. So if our goal is to learn about the behavior of animals, then it is unclear, to
say the least, why the study of captive animals is the way to go. More accurate, hence more important,
results can always be obtained from animals in the wild.
ARGUMENT THAT ZOOS NECESSARY TO CONDUCT RESEARCH FOR ANIMAL HEALTH
IS ILLOGICAL
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 156
Anatomical and physiological studies are the most common forms of zoo research. What is the purpose of
this research? One goal is to improve the health of animals in zoos. This would be a laudable goal—but
only if you accept that animals should be in zoos in the first place. You can’t without being seriously
confused, justify keeping animals in zoos on the grounds that they provide useful research subjects for
improving the lot of animals in zoos. That would be what, in the philosophy industry, is known as a
circular argument; you are assuming the conclusion – that it is legitimate to keep animals in zoos – that you
are supposedly arguing for.
IMMORALTO JUSTIFY KEEPING ANIMALS IN ZOOS FOR RESEARCH GOALS
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 157-8
A final aim of zoo-based anatomical and physiological research is, allegedly, to gain knowledge about
animals for its own sake. I have nothing against knowledge; all things being equal knowledge is a good
thing to have. But the end does not justify the means. We would not justify painful experiments on young
children on the grounds that the experiments yielded interesting knowledge. Humans, perhaps, are
essentially inquisitive creatures. And for some humans, perhaps, a life not dominated by the quest for
knowledge is a life not worth living. Perhaps. But there are other channels for our intellectual curiosity,
ones that do not require such a high price in terms of animal suffering.
VERY FEW ZOOS INVOLVED IN CRITICAL RESEARCH TO BENEFIT THE ANIMALS
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 96
Research involving captive animals is aimed toward arriving at a greater understanding of the behavior and
anatomy of animals which would otherwise be unavailable for study. This research can be for its own sake
or to improve the life of animals in captivity or to benefit human health. The use of captive animals for
research is again, though limited, to very few zoos. In so far as it does take place, it is of limited validity.
Obviously, research to improve the quality of life for zoo animals would not be necessarily if the
institutions did not exist. As research tools to benefit humans, zoo animals are to continue to be displayed)
to undertake invasive procedures. Simply observing them is a poor substitute.
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AT: “Zoos Key to Research for Animal Welfare”
BEST WAY TO LEARN THINGS FROM CHIMPS IS TO LEAVE THEM ALONE AND LET
THEM BE THEMSELVES
Charles Siebert, Freelance Writer and Director, July 24, 2005, New York Times Magazine, p. 61
In fact, our increasing appreciation of the chimpanzee’s bioevolutionary complexity may be bringing us to
the point where the most significant knowledge we can gain from chimps is best obtained simply by letting
them be themselves, either in what’s left of their natural habitat or in our best re-creations of it. In a sense,
the saga of our keeping of the chimps has now come full circle. The chimps themselves have become the
edifying mirror of the old ape houses. They are offering us the best view into our own nature. Indeed,
much of the work now being done with chimps is focused on behavioral and neurological science, where
researchers from various disciplines, from evolutionary biology to neurology, are often engaged in
observational studies in which he healthier and more natural the environment is for the chimp, the more
reliable and useful are the results.
RESEARCH ON APES WILL SHIFT TO PARTICIPANT-OBSERVATION IN NATURAL
HABITATS RATHER THAN IN LABORATORIES
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 265
Anthropology is very much the science of the “other”. Instead of a subject-object approach it possesses a
pre-eminently subject-subject method: participant observation of, and living with, people in other societies
and other cultures. In contrast to laboratory scientists, who are content to register and measure from
without, anthropologists will want to study from within, as much as they possibly can. They will have to
immerse themselves in the other’s sphere, sharing their people’s daily life, learning their language as well
as their habits and views. Ideally they will seek to become Indian with the Indians. Participant observation
is virtually an exercise in empathy.
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AT: “Kritik of the Term ‘Animal’”
“ANIMAL” IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE TERM FOR COMMUNICATION
Peter Singer, Professor of Philosophy Monash University, 1995, Animal Liberation, p. xiv
In the popular mind the term “animal” lumps together beings as different as oysters and chimpanzees, while
placing a gulf between chimpanzees and humans, although our relationship to those apes is much closer
than the oyster’s. Since there exists no other short term for the nonhuman animals, I have in the title of this
book and elsewhere in these pages, had to use “animal” as if it did not include the human animal. This is a
regrettable lapse from the standards of revolutionary purity but it seems necessary for effective
communication. Occasionally, however, to remind you that this is a matter of convenience only, I shall use
longer, more accurate models of referring to what was once called “the brute creation.” In other cases, too,
I have tried to avoid language which tends to degrade animals or disguise the nature of the food we eat.
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Great Apes Denied Basic Liberty Rights Now
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS CREATED UNFETTERED AUTHORITY FOR THE
DETENTION WITHOUT CHARGE OF MANY NONHUMAN ANIMALS, INCLUDING GREAT
APES. THE CONSTITUTION PROVIDES BASIC PROTECTIONS AGAINST SUCH RIGHTS
INFRINGEMENTS AS ARBITRARY DETENTION FOR ALL PERSONS, BUT FEDERAL
COURTS HAVE INTERPRETED THE LAW TO EXCLUDE NONHUMANS FROM THE
DEFINITION OF PERSON.
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 32
US Criminal codes define murder as unjustifiably killing an “individual” or “person.” A dog is an
individual. But the law defines individual as a human individual. It also restricts “persons” to humans
(individual humans as well as entities such as corporations and governmental bodies, that represent some
group of humans.)
THIS INTERPRETATION, CONSISTENTLY UPHELD BY FEDERAL COURTS HAS
ENTRENCHED A RIGID SPECIES BARRIER THAT EXCLUDES ALL NONHUMAN ANIMALS
FROM THE PROTECTIONS OF PERSONHOOD.
Jane Goodhall, World Renowned Expert on Chimpanzees, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 16
If we could simply argue that it is morally wrong to abuse, physically or psychologically, any rational,
thinking being with the capacity to suffer and feel pain, to know fear and despair, it would be easy—we
have already demonstrated the existence of these abilities in chimpanzees and the other great apes. But
this, it seems, is not enough. We come up, again and again, against that non-existent barrier that is, for so
many, so real—the barrier between “man” and “beast.” It was erected in ignorance, as a result of the
arrogant assumption, unfortunately shared by vast numbers of people, that humans are superior to
nonhumans in every way. Even if nonhuman beings are rational and can suffer and feel pain and despair, it
does not matter how we treat them provided it is for the good of humanity—which apparently includes our
own pleasure. They are not members of that exclusive club that opens its doors only to bona fide Homo
sapiens.
This is why we find double standards in the legislation regarding medical research. Thus while it is illegal
to perform medical experiments on a brain-dead human being who can neither speak nor feel, it is legally
acceptable to perform them on an alert, feeling and highly intelligent chimpanzee. Conversely, while it is
legally permitted to imprison an innocent chimpanzee, for life, in a steel-barred, barren laboratory cell
measuring five foot by five foot by seven foot, a psychopathic mass murderer must be more spaciously
confined. And these double standards exist only because the brain-dead patient and the mass murderer are
human. They have souls and we cannot, of course, prove that chimpanzees have souls. The fact we cannot
prove that we have souls, or that chimps do not, is apparently beside the point.
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Exploitation of Great Apes Constitutes Genocide
KIDNAPPING, SELLING, IMPRISONING AND VIVISECTING CHIMPANZEES AND
BONOBOS IS GENOCIDE
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 7
I hope you will conclude, as I do in Chapter 11, that justice entitles chimpanzees and bonobos to legal
personhood and to the fundamental legal rights of bodily integrity and bodily liberty--now. Kidnapping
them, selling them, imprisoning them, and vivisecting them must stop--now. Their abuse and their murder
must be forbidden for what they are: genocide.
THE MASS KILLING OF CHIMPANZEES AND BONOBOS IS GENOCIDE
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 265 – 266
Chapter 1 concluded with the statement about chimpanzees and bonobos that "their abuse and their murders
must be forbidden for what they are--genocide." This was not intended as metaphor. The word "genocide"
emerged from the Holocaust. The Oxford English Dictionary defines it is as "the deliberate and systematic
destruction of an ethnic or national group." 94 Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary explains it as "the
deliberate and systematic destruction of a racial, political, or cultural group." The Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide says it means
any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or
religious group, as such: (a) killing members of the group; (b) causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group; (c) deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) imposing measures designed to prevent births within the group;
or (e) forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Genocide, in short, is the deliberate and
systematic destruction, or attempted destruction, of any group that shares a nation, a politics, a culture, a
race, a language, a religion, a tribe, or a history. Genocide is a crime whenever and by whomever
committed. Genocide "shocks the conscience." 97 Genocide need not spring from hatred. Had Westerners
worked every African slave to death merely for profit, there would have been genocide. Nazis who
murdered Jews to wash out racial impurities" committed genocide. American settlers who wiped coveted
land clean of whole Indian tribes were genocidal.
The Latin roots of "genocide" are "genus" and "caedere." Caedere means "to kill." Genus generally means
a class or kind that share common attributes. So genocide carries not just an explicit sense of destroying or
trying to destroy a discrete group but also the implicit sense that the destroyed and the destroyer share
membership in some larger group. Morris Goodman showed us that chimpanzees, humans, and bonobos are
literally all members of the genus Homo, or should be. Chimpanzees and bonobos share not just our
taxonomic trunk but our bough, our branch, our twig. If we don't all share a language, then we share
"language" or something remarkably like it. If we don't all share a common culture, we share "culture." 98 If
human politics and chimpanzee politics are not the same thing, both are still "politics." 99 Perhaps in the
end, we simply need to convince Judge Juno that we may not be an autistic species, just a narcissistic one,
transfixed by our own reflection and that she needs to put aside childish things and allow her mature
reason, her passion for liberty and equality, and her sense of fair play to open her eyes so that when she
gazes into the mirror of justice, she sees Jerom.
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CHIMPANZEES AND OTHER GREAT APES HAVE BEEN DETAINED IN ZOOS WHICH
SUBSTANTIALLY INTRUDE ON THEIR BASIC AUTONOMY INTERESTS MAKING LIFE
NOT WORTH LIVING.
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 153
If you are an animal confined in a zoo, the most obvious thing that you lose is your liberty. In Chapter 1,
the idea of weak autonomy was explained as the ability to do what you want, or what you choose, to do
this intentionally, with understanding, and without controlling influences that influence the action. Clearly,
being confined in a zoo will cut deeply into an animal’s autonomy. Many of its most natural behaviors will
be thwarted by its unnatural environment. It will not be able to hunt or gather its own food, nor engage in
the activities—moving around, sometimes over great distances, stalking and so on—that allow it to do this.
Many social animals will not be able to develop appropriate social orders; indeed, many of them may be
forced to live solitary existences. Many of the things that animals want to do are the result of millions of
years of evolution. These sorts of behavior we call natural. It’s a truism that you cannot have natural
behavior in an unnatural environment, and zoos are, typically, very unnatural environments. Therefore, in
zoos, many of the things animals want to do they cannot do. And this is a harm of deprivation; a
deprivation of autonomy.
All of this is obvious. Almost as obvious is the idea that a deprivation of an animal’s autonomy is a
thwarting of one of its most vital interests. Being able to do what you want, at least some of the time, is
ultimately what makes life worth living. Therefore, a serious deprivation of autonomy strikes at the core of
what makes a life worthwhile. So, one of the things you will know in the partial position is that
confinement in a zoo is, almost certainly, thwarting of one of the most vital interest of an animal.
CONFINEMENT OF ANIMALS UNDERLIES ATTITUDES THAT THEY ARE INFERIOR
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 199
A servile and listless demeanor follows when an individual is stripped of self-determination and liberty or
has never experienced them. The confinement of other animals in small or tiny areas, where they were
unable to behave in ways that were natural to them or even to distance themselves from mud and
excrement, to clean and groom themselves, and to seek comfortable bedding, also unquestionably
contributed to their devaluation and fostered the “lower” status that had been ascribed to them. For the
most part, recognition of the individuality and personality of confined other animals waned as their
numbers grew.
Thus as other animals became more deeply integrated into the day-to-day organization of agricultural
society, their “inferior” status, relative to human animals—especially those human animals perceived as
intrinsically important and valuable—came to be viewed as natural. The powerful and compelling forces
that diminished human recognition of the significance and individuality of other animals also subverted
recognition of and sensitivity to the individuality and suffering of devalued humans who were cast into
such positions as slave, peasant, and harem possession.
CONFINEMENT OF GREAT APES AKIN TO SLAVE TRADE
Anthony Jon Waters, Professor of Law at the University of Maryland School of Law. Seton Hall
Constitutional Law Journal, (PROPERTY TO PERSON: THE CASE OF EVELYN HART) 2000, p. 5-6
Toshisada Nishida, a Professor of Zoology, has compared the other hominids, with their complex cultures
and cognitive abilities, to members of hunter- gatherer societies. Were our government to import humans
from such a society in order to subject them to lifelong confinement and use them in painful research for
the benefit of U.S. citizens, the idea would be universally denounced as unconscionable, and our
Constitution would be invoked to confirm what our moral senses tell us. In light of our knowledge about
other great apes, their importation and enslavement ought to provoke the same responses.
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EXTENSIVE CAPTIVITY UNDERMINES THE SOCIETAL INTERACTIONS OF APES
Lindsey Linfoot, Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia
2002. “Submission on the Draft Policy on the Use of Non-Human Primates in Medical Research”.
Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia.
http://www.avwa.com.au/subprimates.pdf
However, cognitive responses in non-human primates are not limited just to chimpanzees, what we may
consider as normal and routine can cause distress in other non-human primates signifying that they are
extremely aware of events or activities. “Some of the normal daily human activities associated with
keeping primates are likely to be stressful to the animals. Collection of blood samples generally requires
physical restraint and the transient pain of venipuncture, and may be otherwise aversive. The disorientation
and loss of control caused by anaesthesia may itself lead to fear and distress.” 9Emotional bonds and
attachments formed between non-human primates and other species are well documented signifying that
the display of emotions is not just reserved for human beings. Bonding is even pointed out in your own documentation.
“Social interaction is paramount for well-being. Social deprivation in all its formsmust be avoided.”10“Rhesus have formed strong
and specific attachments to their canine companions(Mason & Kenney, 1974). Although the infant in this study appeared to show
some interest in the dog throughout testing, contact with the dog was more frequent near the end of the study. This may be indicative
of the bond formation process as well as the infant's development.”
Acts of kindness is another emotion not solely restricted to human beings; “Binti Juna, A female lowland gorilla was the center of
media attention in August of 1996. She had obtained "Hero" of the year after her rescue and gentile treatment of an injured child who
had fallen into her zoo exhibit. People were astonished at the video footage of the gorilla cradling the unconscious little boy and then
carrying him to a door where zoo keepers could reach him. This wasn't the first time a gorilla did such a thing, for several years ago, a
seven foot tall male (a silverback) named Jambo, received media attention when a young boy had fallen into his exhibit, and he too
astonished people with his gentile caressing of the unconscious child.” Captive breeding and confinement on the other
hand has negative effect causing social disorders and self-mutilation and boredom. “It was concluded that
hair-pulling-and-eating is an aggressive behavioural disorder in captive rhesus monkeys, reflecting
psychogenic adjustment problems in an unnatural environment. (Supported by NIHGrant RR00167).”Once again this negative aspect can be easily extrapolated to human beings where inmates of penal
institutions display anti social behaviour.
APES IN CAPTIVITY ARE TREATED BADLY
American Legal Defense Fund 2003 “Primate Prisoners”
http://www.aldf.org/archives.asp?sect=search&sectionid=4&section=Issues
In 1985, Congress told the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to protect the psychological
well-being of apes and monkeys in captivity. Yet today it’s plain to see that the USDA hasn’t followed
through. For proof, all you have to do is spend a few minutes with Chico and Terry. They’re both
chimpanzees who’ve been locked up alone for years. And they’re both suffering.
CAPTURING ANIMALS FOR ZOOS USUALLY INVOLVES VIOLENCE
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 155
In addition to the loss of autonomy, we also have to consider how animals get to be in zoos in the first
place. When chimpanzees, for example, are taken from the wild, the usual procedure is to shoot the mother
and capture the child. All animals face a traumatic capture and equally traumatic transport, usually over
long distances, to their place of confinement. In short, zoos typically thwart some of the most vital interests
of animals, and the route by which many animals get to be in zoos in the first place is one that often
involves considerable suffering. This is one of the things you will know in the impartial position.
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NO LOGICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR DETENTION OF APES IN ZOOS
Jared Diamond, Professor of physiology, UCLA, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 88
The next time that you visit a zoo, make a point of walking past the ape cages. Imagine that the apes had
lost most of their hair, and imagine a cage nearby holding some unfortunate people who had no clothes and
couldn’t speak but were otherwise normal. Now try guessing how similar those apes are to ourselves
genetically. For instance, would you guess that a chimpanzee shares 10, 50, or 99 percent of its genes with
humans?
Then ask yourself why those apes are on exhibition in cages, and why other apes are being used for medical
experiments, while it is not permissible to do either of those things to humans. Suppose it turned out that
chimps share 99.9 percent of their genes with us, and that the important differences between humans and
chimps were due to just a few genes. Would you still think it is okay to put chimps in cages and to
experiment on them? Consider those unfortunate mentally impaired people who have much less capacity to
solve problems, to care for themselves, to communicate, to engage in social relationships and to feel pain,
than do apes. What is the logic that forbids medical experiments on those people, but not on apes?
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Zoo Confinement for Great Apes Immoral
MORAL VALIDITY OF ZOOS EXTREMELY SUSPECT
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 96
In recent years, as the animal protection movement ha begun to step up its attack on the keeping of wild
animals in captivity and as the public’s knowledge of wildlife has increased, defenders have claimed a
variety of roles for zoos. The four main benefits that have been regularly cited are entertainment, education
research and conservation. In so far as zoos exist purely for the amusement of those who visit them—and
this probably applies to the bulk of them—their moral validity is extremely suspect. Only if they provide
exemplary environments for the animals, excluding those species which cannot be kept in captivity,
without suffering, can they be justified. Zoos also emphasize their educational value. In so far as they
do—and many zoos pay lip-service to providing an educational content to their displays – it has to be asked
whether viewing animals in cages or in small compounds can really teach anything of value – except
perhaps that wild animals should not be kept in this way. This is particularly the case now that excellent
natural history films are able to show to a wide audience the behavior or exotic wild animals in their natural
habitats.
ZOOS NOT MORALLY DEFENSIBLE WHEN WEIGHED AGAINST ANIMAL RIGHTS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 454
An alternative to the utilitarian attack on anthropocentrism is the rights view. Those who accept this view
hold that (1) the moral assessment of zoos must be carried out against the backdrop of the rights of animals
and that (2) when we make this assessment against this backdrop, zoos, as they presently exist, are not
morally defensible.
MORALITY OF CONFINING NONHUMAN ANIMALS IN ZOOS CAN ONLY BE JUSTIFIED
BY THE INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS’ INTEREST
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 455
Thus the central question: Are animals in zoos treated with appropriate respect? To answer this question,
we begin with an obvious fact—namely, the freedom of these animals is compromised, to varying degrees,
by the conditions of their captivity. The rights view recognizes the justifications of limiting anothers’
freedom but only in a narrow range of cases. The most obvious relevant case would be one in which it is
in the best interests of a particular animal to keep that animal in confinement. In principle, therefore,
confining wild animals is zoos can be justified, according to the rights view, but only if it can be shown that
it is in their best interests to do so. That being so, it is morally irrelevant to insist that zoos provide
important educational and recreational opportunities for humans, or that captive animals serve as useful
models in important scientific research, or that regions in which zoos are located benefit economically, or
that zoo programs offer the opportunity for protecting rare or endangered species, or that variations on
these programs insure genetic stock, or that any other consequence arises from keeping wild animals in
captivity that forwards the interest of other individuals, whether humans or nonhumans.
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Zoo Confinement for Great Apes Immoral
IMMORAL TO OVERRIDE AN ANIMAL’S FUNDAMENTAL LIBERTY INTEREST WITH
TRIVIAL HUMAN ENJOYMENT FROM ZOOS
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 154
Most people visit zoos for a “day out.” They go to be entertained, and zoos that wish to remain financially
secure need to cater to this. So, most zoos have some sort of “children’s corner,” etc. And even highly
rated zoos like San Diego have or have had dancing bears and the like. But while being entertained is
surely an interest of human beings, it is not on a par with our interest in autonomy. Being autonomous is a
vital interest, being entertained is not. It’s as simple as that. It would, in the impartial position, be
irrational to choose a world where the vital interest of autonomy was routinely overridden by a relatively
superficial interest in entertainment: you might turn out to be one of the things whose autonomy is
overridden. Therefore, it is, in the real world, immoral to endorse an institution that is based on the idea
that vital interests can be overridden by superficial ones. And the “entertainment” defense of zoos is based
precisely on this idea.
ZOOS IMMORAL—SHOULD BE ABOLISHED
Mark Rowlands, Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Hertfordshire, 2002, Animals Like Us,
p. 159
The existence of zoos sacrifices some of the most vital interests of animals to try to promote interests of
humans that are either not vital or are not effectively promoted by zoos. It would be irrational, in the
impartial position, to choose a world where this sort of trade-off happens. Therefore, it is immoral, in the
real world, to endorse this sort of trade-off. Zoos are morally illegitimate, and should be abolished.
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Failure to Extend Liberty Rights to Great Apes Threatens
Future Existence
THE FAILURE TO EXTEND PROTECTIONS AGAINST ARBITRARY DETENTION TO
GREAT APES HAS LED TO THE UNNECESSARY DETENTION OF A SUBSTANTIAL
NUMBER OF THEM
Charles Siebert, Freelance Writer and Director, July 24, 2005, New York Times Magazine, p. 30
There are an estimated 2,500 captive chimps in the United States, a number that’s difficult to pinpoint
because of the many private breeders still turning out baby chimps, mostly for private ownership or use in
entertainment. Of the 1,500 or so laboratory chimps, nearly half are no longer being used for
experimentation. Lab chimps today are largely confined to behavior studies and hepatitis and malaria
research, and an even greater number may soon be rendered unnecessary for research by advances in DNA
analysis and computer modeling. As for the remaining refugees of entertainment and private ownership,
their ranks continue to swell even though chimps are unmanageable much past the age of 6 and despite the
fact that advances in computer animation may soon obviate the need altogether for actual animal
performers.
EVEN THE BEST ZOOS IN THE COUNTRY DAMAGE THE INDIVIDUALS THEY CONFINE
AND ENTRENCH AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC ETHIC THAT IS BOTH IMMORAL AND
THREATENS OUR VERY SURVIVAL.
Dale Jamieson, Professor of Environmental Studies and Philosophy at New York University. ?Against
Zoos?. In Defense of Animals. 1985 http://www.animal-rights-library.com/texts-m/jamieson01.htm]
Many of these same conditions and others are documented in Pathology of Zoo Animals, a review of
necropsies conducted by Lynn Griner over the last fourteen years at the San Diego Zoo. This zoo may well
be the best in the country, and its staff is clearly well-trained and well-intentioned. Yet this study
documents widespread malnutrition among zoo animals; high mortality rates from the use of anaesthetics
and tranquillizers; serious injuries and deaths sustained in transport; and frequent occurrences of
cannibalism, infanticide and fighting almost certainly caused by overcrowded conditions. Although the zoo
has learned from its mistakes, it is still unable to keep many wild animals in captivity without killing or
injuring them, directly or indirectly. If this is true of the San Diego Zoo, it is certainly true, to an even
greater extent, at most other zoos. The second consideration is more difficult to articulate but is, to my
mind, even more important. Zoos teach us a false sense of our place in the natural order. The means of
confinement mark a difference between humans and animals. They are there at our pleasure, to be used for
our purposes. Morality and perhaps our very survival require that we learn to live as one species among
many rather than as one species over many. To do this, we must forget what we learn at zoos. Because what
zoos teach us is false and dangerous, both humans and animals will be better off when they are abolished.
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Denial of Basic Liberty Rights for Great Apes Immoral
SOME WILL RESPOND TO THE EVIDENCE THAT THE BASIC AUTONOMY INTERESTS OF
GREAT APES HAS BEEN VIOLATED THROUGH CURRENT DETENTION POLICIES BY
ARGUING THAT THE INTERESTS OF THESE CREATURES ARE OF NO MORAL CONCERN
TO US. WE FIRMLY DISAGREE. GREAT APES EXHIBIT MANY OF THE
CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSONS
Charles Siebert, Freelance Writer and Director, July 24, 2005, New York Times Magazine, p. 33]
The sophistication of the chimpanzee mind has been well documented in the near half-century since Jane
Goodhall’s pioneering studies of chimps in the wild. Chimps learn and use American Sign Language.
They have been taught to do math fractions and have demonstrated the intelligence level of a 5-year-old.
They have a clear sense of self-awareness. Hold a mirror in front of a chimp with a toothache, and he’ll
immediately set about pulling back his gums to find which tooth it is that’s hurting. Chimps feel sorrow
and remorse. They will mourn the death of a friend or relative. They are even thought now to have the
rudiments of their own culture.
“When we went and started looking at different populations of chimps across Africa, we found variations in
behavior that could not be explained in the useful biological ways,” William McGrew, a field primatologist
and professor of anthropology at Miami University in Ohio, told me. “They are passing on behavioral
patterns that seem to vary from place to place, and group to group, and from generation to generation, and
we were sort of forced in a way into the cultural analogy as a way to explain it because the traditional
biological ways for explaining it wouldn’t suffice.”
THE EXCLUSION OF GREAT APES FROM LEGAL PROTECTIONS IS ARBITRARY, UNJUST
AND IMMORAL.
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 253]
Moreover, the great apes possess these characteristics in substantially similar ways. That is, there is a high
degree of similarity among the great apes in terms of mental capabilities and emotional life – characteristics
which, for most of us, are central to the notion of “personhood”. And it is in this respect that exclusion of
any great ape from the community of equals must be viewed as being arbitrary and irrational, and not
merely morally unjustifiable.
THE EXCLUSION IS TOTALLY IRRATIONAL:
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 256-7
The Declaration of Rights is a sensible attempt to recognize what we have for too long ignored: that certain
nonhumans must be regarded as “persons” for purposes of obtaining legal protection of their fundamental
rights. Indeed, not to accord such protection to all great apes is irrational in light of the demonstrated
mental and emotional similarities among all great apes. It is, moreover, particularly unjustifiable under a
legal system that already regards some nonhuman entities as legal persons. These nonhuman entities are
regarded as persons not because they share any salient aspect of personhood; rather, their status is derived
from the need for modern capitalistic legal systems to provide for investor protection. If however, we
regard the term “personhood” even in a weakly objectivistic manner (i.e., as a concept with determinative
conditions of application) there can be no doubt that personhood is a term that must be applied to all great
apes.
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Denial of Basic Liberty Rights for Great Apes Immoral
THE ABSOLUTE EXCLUSION OF ALL NONHUMAN ANIMALS—EVEN THOSE FOR WHOM
NO MORALLY RELEVANT DISTINCTIONS CAN BE ARTICULATED AS JUSTIFICATION—
ENTRENCHES THE LOGIC OF THE HOLOCAUST.
Roger Fouts, Professor of Psychology; and Distinguished Professor of Research at Central
Washington University. 2004 “APES, DARWINIAN CONTINUITY, AND THE LAW”. Animal Law. 10
Animal L. 99
According to the Cartesian worldview, the mind is idealized for both political and theological reasons.
Man's domination of the less fortunate defectives is justified, and he is given a direct line to God through
the Rational Soul-Mind that is unique to him. The defectives were seen as godless or ignored by God. With
regard to the origin of language, Sarles bluntly makes this point when he states: "By setting man as unique
because of his mind, it (language) idealizes the normal use of language and sets up a group of defective (or
animal-like) humans, e.g. retarded persons, deaf persons, people who speak differently from the majority.
The problem is implicitly, perhaps necessarily, racist."
One only has to look at the history of Western Civilization to see how this view has been used to justify
everything from slavery in all its forms (e.g. the domination and oppression of women and the exploitation
of children) to genocides committed against peoples such as the Jews, the Gypsies, or the Armenians.
Western Civilization, which claims to be ruled by the Rational Mind, has yet to meet a people who lived in
harmony with nature it did not destroy on contact, and our civilization continues to do so. Just as we have
used our "special nature" to justify the exploitation of members of our own species, we have used it as well
to exploit and destroy our fellow organic beings, whether they are free-living or captive chimpanzees,
cows, rats, or trees.
UNEQUAL TREATMENT OF APES BASED ON THEIR SPECIES MEMBERSHIP IS UNJUST
Ingmar Persson, professor of philosophy, Lund University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 190
So far I have talked about (intraspecies) equality between humans, but it should be plain that they type of
considerations adduced could be used to vindicate interspecies equality as well. An individual’s belonging
to a certain species is obviously not a result of his or her own doings; it is—given the customary criterion
of species membership—something genetically fixed. Hence, a “speciesism” that proposes to treat, for
example, chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans worse than humans simply because they are chimpanzees,
gorillas and orang-utans would be unjust.
EXCLUSION OF GREAT APES FROM COMMUNITY OF EQUALS IMMORAL
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 253
Moreover, the great apes possess these characteristics in substantially similar ways. That is, there is a high
degree of similarity among the great apes in terms of mental capabilities and emotional life – characteristics
which, for most of us, are central to the notion of “personhood”. And it is which, for most of us, are central
to the notion of “personhood”. And it is in this respect that exclusion of any great ape from the
community of equals must be viewed as being arbitrary and irrational, and not merely morally
unjustifiable.
IRRATIONAL TO EXCLUDE GREAT APES FROM THE COMMUNITY OF EQUALS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 254
In this sense, the argument for including great apes within the scope of our moral concern is a most
powerful one. The argument does not require the inclusion of all sentient beings within the scope of our
moral concern as persons, but only requires that we include those beings who are so substantially similar to
human beings that their exclusion would be completely irrational—as irrational as creating a classification
of human beings based on hair coloring.
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Denial of Basic Liberty Rights for Great Apes Immoral
NO ATTRIBUTE JUSTIFIES THE LINE BETWEEN HUMANS AND OTHER GREAT APES AS
WORTHY OF MORAL CONSIDERATION
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 24
Since Linnaeus invented the system of biological classification we use today, humans have assigned
themselves to their own family, Hominidae, the taxonomic classification just above “genus,” Homo, and
“species” sapiens. We stuck even our closest cousins, the chimpanzees and bonobos, into a separate
family. Ethologists Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan point out that some scientists have suggested that at
least some apes join us in Hominidae. If they did, “we would have reason to extend to the other apes some,
if not all, of the rights that we presently afford humans.” But what reason would that be? Why should
species, genus, and family be relevant to the assignment of legal rights? Shouldn’t it be what they are, not
who they are that counts? To avoid speciesism and still justify depriving every nonhuman animal of rights,
we must identity some objective, rational, legitimate and nonarbitrary quality possessed by every Homo
sapiens, but possessed by no nonhuman, that entitles all of us, but none of them, to basic liberty rights. I
shouldn’t search too long because this quality does not exist. In this chapter, I identify one quality,
practical autonomy, that is sufficient to entitle any being of any species to liberty rights.
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Legal “Personhood” Key to According Apes Rights
EXTENSION OF LEGAL PERSONHOOD TO GREAT APES VITAL TO ACCORDING THEM
MEANINGFUL RIGHTS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 251-2
If the Declaration of Great Apes is to have any meaning as far as chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans are
concerned, then it is necessary that the concept of legal personhood be extended to them, and they must
cease to be treated or viewed as the property of humans. It is only then that apes may be regarded as
legitimate holders of legal rights.
PERSONHOOD STATUS VITAL TO EFFECTIVE LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 21
Generally the law divides the physical universe into persons and things. Things are objects over which a
person exercises a legal right. Roscoe Pound called legal persons “the unit of the legal order.” A button,
for example, buys nothing; the dollar does. For all of Western human history, nonhuman animals have been
buttons in the legal system; so were human slaves and women and children.
Those who write about persons and things may struggle to distinguish them. One of the most prominent
legal scholars ever to write, John Austin, defined things as “such permanent objects, not being persons, as
are sensible or perceptible through the senses.” Not helpful. Human slaves, “like cattle…are things and
the object of rights, not persons and the subjects of them.”
Daniel Defoe wrote:
Nature has left this tincture in the blood,
That all men would be tyrants if they could.
Humans can freely be tyrants over things. Personhood is the legal shield that protects against human
tyranny; without it, one is helpless. Legally, persons count, things don’t. Until, and unless, a nonhuman
animal becomes a legal person, she will remain invisible to civil law. She will not count.
LEGAL PERSONHOOD FOR CHIMPANZEES AND BONOBOS ESTABLISHES CIVIL RIGHTS
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 4
This book demands legal personhood for chimpanzees and bonobos. Legal personhood establishes one's
legal right to be "recognized as a potential bearer of legal rights." 6 That is why the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the American Convention
on Human Rights nearly identically state that "[e]veryone has the right to recognition everywhere as a
person before the law." 7 Intended to prevent a recurrence of one of the worst excesses of Nazi law, this
guarantee is "often deemed to be rather trivial and self-evident" 8 because no state today denies legal
personhood to human beings. But its importance cannot be overemphasized. Without legal personhood, one
is invisible to civil law. One has no civil rights. One might as well be dead.
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Respecting Liberty Rights of Great Apes Key to Challenging
War, Genocide and Slavery
ADHERENCE TO A RIGID SPECIES BARRIER BETWEEN HUMANS AND NONHUMAN
ANIMALS REINFORCES AN INSTRUMENTAL VIEW OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS AS
RESOURCES. THIS LOGIC OF EXCLUSION HAS HISTORICALLY BEEN USED TO DENY
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BASED ALONG RACE AND GENDER LINES TO GROUPS THAT
HAVE NOW BEEN INCLUDED IN THE COMMUNITY OF PERSONS. BREAKING THIS
BARRIER IS VITAL TO ESTABLISHING A MORAL ETHIC THAT CHALLENGES WAR AND
SLAVERY.
Amartya Sen, Nobel Prize-winning economist, master of Trinity College. “Living like Bonobos: An
Ecofeminist Outlook on Equality”. Great Ape Standing And Personhood. 2001
http://www.personhood.org/feminist/feminist.html
Whenever living, feeling beings are treated as commodities, their unique natures and capacities are subverted to the
purposes of others. They are enslaved. Enslaved individuals are valued as things rather than as persons. Thus, slavery
affects humans and non-humans in similar ways. If such a comparison offends any of us, it should affect no human
group disproportionately. Whatever our financial situation, whatever our educational background, whatever the tone of
our skin, whatever the shade and texture of our hair, we are all apes. There is no cause for alarm in the recognition of
our common heritage. As we shall see, some apes lead lives that could serve well as ethical models for all of us.
It is a common tactic to compare one oppressed group to a second group which is even more different or despised to
degrade the first. Women, Jews, and Africans have all experienced this phenomenon in recent times. All have been
compared, in a derogatory manner, to non-humans. Modern feminists and slavery critics pay particular attention and
reserve their most pointed critiques for discrimination accompanied by comparisons of the oppressed group to nonhumans, for such comparisons, in social context, really provided a justification for the exploiters to treat other groups
as sub-human. As Alice Walker points out, a significant proportion of readily-available pornographic material,
particularly material featuring black women as subjects, continues to draw these insidious parallels.
Rather than decry the comparison of humans and other feeling beings, it is important to find the basis for exploitation
that fosters oppression wherever it is found. What benefit is derived from ordering varied groups according to levels of
importance? Yet, if we did take the time to perform a serious comparison, we might be surprised at our discoveries.
For example, the Bonobos - a group of hominids who live in the swamp forests of central Zaïre - create and inhabit an
egalitarian and peaceful world. They have caused a fair amount of controversy in human academic circles, because they
don't fit in with the conventional image of the male-controlled ape cultures. Bonobos don't discriminate between the
heterosexual and homosexual members of their society. Bonobos' use of a wide variety of sexual behaviours to diffuse
aggression is so marked that it caused one scientist Frans de Waal to observe that "the art of sexual reconciliation may
well have reached its evolutionary peak in the bonobo." This capacity seems to have resulted in the nearest thing to
egalitarianism in any living hominid culture.
"We may be more bonobo-like than we want to admit," says Frans de Waal. But why would we decline to admit to
having Bonobo-like qualities? We might do well to emulate Bonobo society. In contrast to Bonobo culture,
humankind displays a striking propensity for creating oppressive hierarchy out of difference. Perceived
differences between men and women have been, and continue to be, used by men to devalue and demean women,
to rename women, to render women invisible, and to destroy millions of children before they have a chance even
to become women. Likewise, the classification of animals into species enables humans to proclaim that we
occupy an imaginary upper link in the taxonomological chain, to demean and manipulate other animals, to
destroy and consume them.
Cultural perceptions of difference form the templates for societal norms that law both reflects and enforces.
Controlling groups create privileges that correlate with the traits which separate themselves from others who
exist on the territory they strive to control. This is the dynamic of racism. It is the dynamic of sexism. And it is
the dynamic of a phenomenon philosopher Richard Ryder has termed speciesism.
As this essay is being written, Bonobos are being wiped from their forest homelands by bloody human civil
wars and related starvation, which has meant the consumption of Bonobos' bodies as food. Were humans
more like the peaceful Bonobos, it is possible that both groups would be spared the ravages of war, and the
horrors of slavery as well.
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EXTENDING LEGAL RIGHTS TO PROTECT THE FUNDAMENTAL INTERESTS OF GREAT
APES CHALLENGES THE LOGIC AND MORAL RATIONALES THAT ENCOURAGE
GENOCIDE TODAY.
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 237
Whatever legal rights these apes may be entitled to spring from the complexities of their minds. Today they
are legal Harveys, invisible to law, without personhood, lacking rights. We know what happens when
humans are stripped of their legal personhood and dignity-rights. Australian aborigines, African slaves,
Turkish Armenians, German Jews, Rwandan Tutsis and Burundian Hutus, and Kosovar Albanians fall
victim to genocide. It can be no surprise that not only bonobos and chimpanzees but also thousands of other
species of animals have been pushed into extinction or teeter on its brink. We do what we do to a Jerom
because he can't stop us. None of them can. We can only stop ourselves. Or some of us can try to stop the
others. The entitlement of chimpanzees and bonobos to fundamental legal rights will mark a huge step
toward stopping our unfettered abuse of them, just as human rights marked a milepost in stopping our
abuse of each other.
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EXTENDING LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR DUE PROCESS AGAINST ARBITRARY
DETENTION IS AN APPROPRIATE PLACE TO BEGIN TO PIERCE THE SPECIES BARRIER.
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 218
Here, I have suggested, we can accelerate the moral and legal enfranchisement of animals, at least of those
animals, by using the extant legal machinery, and letting them tell their own story in the context of the
judicial system. I am envisioning a plausible legal case based on the notions of denial of due process and
cruel and unusual punishment. Surely, one can make the reasonable case that these animals are, by all
rational standards, persons who have been denied the fundamental civil right and procedures due to
persons. These animals possess measurable intelligence, sometimes in excess of that possessed by certain
humans, they can reason and, most important, they can eloquently speak for themselves, and tell of their
anguish and sorrow.
THE LOGIC OF THE GREAT APE PROJECT IS THAT ATTACKING THE SPECIES BARRIER
AT ITS MOST VULNERABLE PLACE – THE LINE BETWEEN HUMANS AND THE OTHER
GREAT APES, IS THE MOST EFFECTIVE STRATEGY FOR ULTIMATELY BREAKING
DOWN THE RIGID BARRIER OVERALL. CONTRARY TO SOME CRITICS, THIS EMPHASIS
ON THE PRACTICAL DOES NOT COMPROMISE FUNDAMENTAL MORAL CONCERNS.
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 276
This practical conclusion [that it is more effective to start animal liberation by focusing on great apes]
should not be condemned as a compromise of liberation ideals. Too often when doing moral philosophy
we forget that is supposed to be a practical science, i.e. a study whose conclusions are not theories but
actions. Ideals are needed to guide moral action, but we cannot deduce what is to be done from ideals
alone. In addition to ideals, action is determined by the material with which we have to work to realize
those ideals. And the material for animal liberation—as for all moral change – is human beings as they
currently are, with their native (in)capacities and (in)sensitivities, established cultures, contemporary
(im)moral beliefs and practices, current economic dependencies and present world views. Developing and
deploying concepts and arguments which will move people as they are to make the world a better place is
the proper conclusion of moral philosophy, and moving them to make the world a better place for
nonhuman animals is the proper conclusion of animal liberation philosophy. Developing moral theory and
ideals, as has been done in this chapter, is only a means to that end.
Ideals must be kept in view if our efforts for nonhuman animals are not to be co-opted and to effect merely
rhetorical, complacent changes—as when vivisectors now readily agree that nonhuman animals have rights
but then go on to assert that those rights are respected in humane laboratory sacrifices of nonhuman
animals. On the other hand, those who insist that all animal liberation projects focus exclusively on the
ideal, and disdainfully reject all accommodation of liberation ideals to current realities, will likely succeed
only in feeling that their hands are clean and their consciences are pure. Willfully out of touch with many
of the forces that move and shape reality, they are not likely to succeed in helping nonhuman animals, and
their cherished, beautiful ideals will likely remain mere ideals while nonhuman animals continue to suffer
and die without relief.
So, engaging in campaigns – such as this one to extend protective moral and legal principles and rights to
nonhuman great apes –which take advantage of anthropocentrism and other human imperfections and
which, consequently, fall short of the ideals of animal liberation, is not compromising those ideals. It is
implementing and pursuing those ideals in the world as it is. That, rather than theoretical precision and
purity of conscience, is what moral philosophy and animal activism are finally all about.
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LINCOLN’S STRATEGY FOR EMANCIPATION OF HUMAN SLAVES IS A USEFUL MODEL
FOR THE EMANCIPATION OF NONHUMAN SLAVES. HE FRAMED HIS DEMANDS FOR
CHANGE AS THE “REALIZABLE MINIMUM”—THAT WHICH WAS POSSIBLE.
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 235
Historians have made clear what Lincoln was trying to do. David Zarefsky argues that he avoided “the
slippery slope by which freedom led to racial equality” by declaring freedom an economic right that did not
necessarily carry social and political equality with it. David Potter labeled Lincoln’s the “minimum antislavery position,” while Gary Wills said Lincoln’s “nub, the realizable minimum,” was that “at the very
least, it was wrong to treat human beings as property.” Lincoln was a famously practical lawyer, president
and commander-in-chief, known in the courtroom, political arena, and war room for affably conceding one
nonessential point after another, until his opponent believed he had won. But Lincoln rarely allowed the
essential to slip away.
Obtaining any legal rights for nonhuman animals in the present legal system requires fighting from the
platform of Lincoln’s realizable minimum. Lincoln believed the physical, historical, legal, religious,
economic, political, and psychological realities of his day meant that taking more than one step at a time for
black slaves would lead to no change in their legal status. In the 1850s, that meant that advocating the
social and political equality of black slaves, whatever Lincoln personally believed, would result in their
continued enslavement. Today, it means that advocating for too many rights for too many nonhuman
animals will lead to no nonhuman animal’s attaining rights.
EXTENDING RIGHTS FIRST TO GREAT APES IS THE BEST WAY TO BREAK DOWN THE
SPECIES BARRIER BECAUSE THIS IS WHERE IT IS MOST VULNERABLE
Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, Editor Edica & Animali and Professor of Bioethics @ Princeton,
1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 308
A solid barrier serves to keep nonhumans outside the protective moral realm of our community. By virtue
of this barrier, in the influential words of Thomas Aquinas, “it is not wrong for man to use them, either by
killing or in any other way whatever”. Does this barrier have a weak link on which we can concentrate our
efforts? Is there any grey area where the certainties of human chauvinism begin to fade and an uneasy
ambivalence makes recourse to a collective animal manumission politically feasible? As the philosophers,
zoologists, ethologists, anthropologists, lawyers, psychologists, educationalists, and other scholars who
have chosen to support this project show, this grey are does exist. It is the sphere that includes the branches
closest to us in the evolutionary tree. In the case of the other great apes, the chimpanzee, the gorilla and the
orang-utan, some of the notions used to restrict equality and other moral privileges to human beings instead
of extended them to all sentient creatures can cut the other way. When radical enfranchisement is being
demanded for our fellow apes, the very arguments usually offered to defend the special moral status of
human beings, vis-à-vis nonhuman animals – arguments based on biological bondedness or, more
significant still, on the possession of some specific characteristics or abilities – can be turned against the
status quo.
Chimpanzees, gorillas and orang-utans occupy a particular position from another perspective, too. The
appearance of apes who can communicate in a human language marks a turning point in human/animal
relationships. Granted, Washoe, Loulis, Koko, Michael, Chantek and all their fellow great apes cannot
directly demand their general enfranchisement – although they can demand to be let out of their cages, as
Washoe once did – but they can convey to us, in more detail than any nonhuman animals have ever done
before, a nonhuman viewpoint on the world. This viewpoint can no longer be dismissed. Its bearers have
unwittingly become a vanguard, not only for their own kin, but for all nonhuman animals.
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EXTENDING LEGAL RIGHTS TO THOSE WITH PRACTICAL AUTONOMY RATHER THAN
ALL SENTIENT BEINGS MORE ACCEPTABLE TO JUDGES WHO ACTUALLY HAVE TO
ENFORCE THE RIGHTS
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 33-4
I have been criticized for arguing in Rattling the Cage that practical autonomy, not just the ability to suffer,
entitles one to dignity rights. One animal protection lawyer wrote that “if one accepts the philosophies of
Jeremy Bentham and Peter Singer, then an animal’s ability to feel pain and suffer, and not its ability to
count or use tools, should be the measuring point in extending legal personhood.” Law Professor Cass
Sunstein wrote in The New York Times Book Review that he was unsure why I spent so much space
making the scientifically controversial argument that chimpanzees and bonobos are autonomous: “Would
cruelty toward them be justified if it turned out that (as some scientists content) chimpanzees do not really
understand American Sign Language? Why isn’t capacity to suffer a sufficient ground for legal rights of
some kind—for dogs, cats, horses, chimpanzees, bonobos, or for that matter cognitively impaired human
beings?” A subsequent letter to the editor of the Book Review damned my argument as “morally flawed”
and insisted that “suffering, not intelligence must be the only consideration”; hadn’t Bentham said, “The
question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?”
If I were Chief Judge of the Universe, I might make the simpler capacity to suffer, rather than practical
autonomy, sufficient for personhood and dignitary rights. For why should even a nonautonomous being
bee forced to suffer? But the capacity to suffer appears irrelevant to common-law judges in their
consideration of who is entitled to basic rights. What is at least sufficient, is practical autonomy. This may
be anathema to disciples of Bentham and Singer. I may not like it much myself. But philosophers argue
moral rights; judges decide legal rights. Ad so I present a legal, and not a philosophical, argument for the
dignity-rights of nonhuman animals.
GREAT APES ARE A BRIDGE TO OTHER ANIMALS
Daniel A. Dombrowski, 1997, Babies and Beasts: the argument from marginal cases, p. 146
No doubt some will worry that concentrating on the great apes implies a sort of intelligenciesm that does
not bode well for cows or mice. Cavalieri and Singer instead hope that a collective manumission of the
great apes is more politically feasible than the manumission of cows and mice, such that treating them as
the equals of marginal cases wsill enhance the situation of all animals, even the ones that are not
particularly bright. That is, the animals that are closer to us on the evolutionary tree must be liberated in a
decisive way before the plight of other animals, including those raised for the table and laboratory, can
significantly improve.
STARTING WITH GREAT APES HAS A BETTER CHANCE OF SECURING REAL
PROTECTIONS FOR ALL ANIMALS IN THE LONG TERM
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 276
We humans have social instincts: we tend to divide up the world into “us” and “them” and to feel much
more strongly obligated to those whom we consider kin. So, to the extent that we can bring people to
recognize that nonhuman great apes are members of our biological “family” and can thereby bring people
to extend their fellow-feelings to embrace these extended family members, we are more likely to secure for
nonhuman great apes the protection of their interests against human exploitation that they morally deserve
and desperately need. In this way there may be a practical, political pride of place for nonhuman great apes
– similar to that for companion animals, who are members of our socially extended families—even though
ultimately, without reference to human instincts and propensities, there is theoretically no obvious pride of
place for them, or for any other feeling species.
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GREAT APES ARE A CRITICAL STARTING POINT FOR FUTURE ANIMAL RIGHTS
Alex Kirby, Environmental Correspondent 1999. “Apes in line for legal rights” BBC News.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/sci/tech/277031.stm
Dr Goodall adds: "One has to make a start to break the arrogant perception that most people have that we
are totally different."
Many GAP supporters accept that argument, not as a criticism, but as the way forward in what Dr Goodall
calls "extending the circle of compassion, first of all to our closest living relatives".
If you deny rights to apes, they argue, then logically you should withhold them from mentally-disabled
human beings.
APES ARE A LIVING BRIDGE TO BREAK DOWN SPECIES BARRIERS
Jane Goodhall, World Renowned Expert on Chimpanzees, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 14
It is all a little humbling, for these cognitive abilities used to be considered unique to humans: we are not,
after all, quite as different from the rest of the animal kingdom as we used to think. The line dividing
“man” from “beast” has become increasingly blurred. The chimpanzees, and the other great apes, form a
living bridge between “us” and “them,” and this knowledge forces us to re-evaluate our relationship with
the rest of the animal kingdom, particularly with the great apes.
MORAL PROGRESS MOVES IN GRADUAL STEPS TO EXPAND UPON WHAT SOCIETY
ALREADY ACCEPTS
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 208
This Socratic notion can be extrapolated well beyond its roots in Platonism. In essence, it embodies the
insight that moral progress cannot develop out of nothing, but can only build upon what is already there. In
other words, the most rational and efficacious way to develop moral ideas in individuals and societies is to
show them that the ideas in question are implicit consequences of ideas they already accept as veridicial. In
other words, I can get others to accept my ideas by showing them that these are in fact their ideas, or at
least are inevitable logical deductions from ideas they themselves take for granted.
FOCUSING ON THE CAPACITY TO THINK PROVIDES FOUNDATION FOR AN
APPROPRIATE LINE
Cass Sunstein, Law Professor, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 12-3
Those who emphasize animal rights have a more complicated task. They tend to urge that animals should
be given rights to the extent that their capacities are akin to those of human beings. The usual emphasis
here is on cognitive capacities. The line would be drawn between animals with advanced capacities, such
as chimpanzees and dolphins, and those that lack such capacities. Undoubtedly a great deal of work needs
to be done on this topic. But at least an emphasis on the capacity to think, and to form plans, seems to
provide a foundation for appropriate line drawing by those who believe in animals rights in a strong sense.
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THINKING ABOUT THE PERSONHOOD OF GREAT APES IS A WAY TO INTERROGATE
THE WALL BETWEEN HUMANS AND NONHUMANS
Steven M. Wise, animal rights attorney and law professor, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds.
Armstrong & Botzler, p. 540
Recall that the abomination of human slavery was finally abolished in the West little more than 100 years
ago. It continues in a few countries to this day. The first thinking about the justices of the legal thinghood
of nonhuman animals occurred just as slavery was flickering in the West. To date, it has resulted mostly in
the enactment of pathetically inadequate anticruelty statutes. But as the scientific evidence of the true
natures of such nonhuman animals as chimpanzees continues to mount, that thinking will be its undoing.
Because to think about the legal thinghood of such creatures as the great apes will be finally to condemn
such a notion.
INCLUSION OF APES IN MORAL PERSONHOOD BEST WAY TO FOSTER GENERAL
ANIMAL ETHICS
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 215-6
These, then, are some of the basic reasons why the great apes are plausible candidates for actualizing as
fully as possible the emerging ethic. There are few animals so suited, both in rational and emotional terms,
for fostering the widespread agreement essential to granting them “human” rights in the context of our
ethico-legal system. The question which remains then, is how this can most expeditiously be
accomplished.
STARTING WITH GREAT APES DOES NOT CLOSE THE DOOR TO OTHER ANIMALS IN
THE FUTURE
Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, Editor Edica & Animali and Professor of Bioethics @ Princeton,
1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 309
Nevertheless, it might be said that in focusing on beings as richly endowed as the great apes we are setting
too high a standard for admission to the community of equals, and in so doing we could preclude, or make
more difficult, any further progress for animals whose endowments are less like our own. No standard,
however, can be fixed forever. “The notion of equality is a tool for rectifying injustices…As is often
necessary for reform, it works on a limited scale.” Reformers can only start from a given situation, and
work from there; once they have made some gains, their next starting-point will be a little further advanced,
and when they are strong enough they can bring pressure to bear from that point.
GREAT APES ARE THE BEST STARTING POINT FOR DEVELOPING AN ETHIC OF
CONCERN FOR ALL ANIMALS
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 213
In the fact of these Human considerations, it is manifest that the great apes, chimpanzees, gorillas, and
orang-utans, are probably the most plausible animals through which to nurture, articulate, express and
solidify the emerging ethic we have described. This is true for a variety of significant reasons.
One feature of the great apes which makes them a natural locus for the emerging ethic is the extraordinary
degree of fascination and, far more important, empathy, which they inspire in humans—the public response
to the work of Goodall and Fossey alone attests to this. This empathy can be found in unlikely places.
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EXTENDING RIGHTS TO GREAT APES IS A GOOD WAY TO START THE PROCESS OF
ANIMAL LIBERATION
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 52
That is the process Wise envisages for the animal rights movement, although the end point is less clear.
We have a robust conception of human rights that we apply even to people who by reason of retardation or
other mental disability cannot enforce their own rights but need a guardian to do it for them. The evolution
of human rights law has involved not only expanding the number of rights but also expanding the number
of rights holders, notably by adding women and minorities. We also have a long history of legal
protections for animals which recognize their sentience, their emotional capacity, and their capacity to
suffer pain; and these protections have been growing too. Wise wants to merge these legal streams by
showing that the apes that are most like us genetically are also very much like us in their mentation, which
exceeds that of human infants and profoundly retarded people. They are enough like us, he argues, to be in
the direct path of rights expansion. He finds no principled difference, so far as rights deserving is
concerned, between the least mentally able people and the most mentally able animals, who overlap them;
or at least he finds too little difference to justify interrupting, at the gateway to the animal kingdom, the
expansive rights trend that he has discerned. The law’s traditional dichotimization of humans and animals
is a vestige of bad science and of a hierarchizing tendency, which puts humans over animals just as it put
free men over slaves. Wise does not say how many other animal species besides chimpanzees and bonobos
he would like to see entitled but makes clear that he regards entitling those two species as a milestone, not
an end of the road.
GAINING PUBLIC APPROVAL VITAL TO SUCCESS OF EXPANDING ANIMAL ETHICS—
GREAT APES GOOD PLACE TO START
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 217
But it is well known that fundamental legislative change is excruciatingly slow, with that sluggishness
being directly proportional to the revolutionary nature of the moral change underlying the law. Thus
legislative conferral of rights for animals is a Sisyphean challenge. So long as powerful vested interests
oppose the change, it can become enmired indefinitely, unless public opinion can be galvanized on its
behalf. This can, in my view, best be accomplished by directing current law towards the enfranchisement
of animals. Such a task is of course a formidable one, since extant law basically reflects the traditional
social ethic for animals. None the less, I believe it can be accomplished, specifically in the case of great
apes.
Most of the public is sufficiently familiar with recent work done on teaching language, or what is seen by
most people as language, to the great apes. Though various scientists may insist that these animals do not
possess genuine language, ordinary institutions fall strongly in the other direction. After all, people can
watch these animals on television, and see them putting signs together in new ways, expressing joy and
sorrow, insulting and misleading researchers, and even coining new expressions. Since language is,
philosophically speaking, morally irrelevant to being a rights-bearer anyway, what matters is not whether
what the apes display is or is not language by some fairly abstruse scientific (or scientistic) criteria, but
rather that most people who think that the possession of language is somehow morally relevant to being
accorded rights see these animals as having language.
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EXTENSION OF EQUALITY WILL REDUCE PERCEIVED DIFFERENCES BETWEEN
HUMANS AND OTHER APES
Dale Jamieson, Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 225
However, it is interesting to note that perception of difference often shifts once moral equality is
recognized. Before emancipation (and still among some confirmed racists) American blacks were often
perceived as more like apes or monkeys than like Caucasian humans. Once moral equality was admitted,
perceptions of identity and difference began to change. Increasingly, blacks came to be viewed as part of
the “human family,” all of whose members are regarded qualitatively different from “mere animals.”
Perhaps some day we will reach a stage in which the similarities among the great apes will be salient for us,
and the differences among them will be dismissed as trivial and unimportant, or perhaps even enriching.
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MAJOR ETHICAL CHANGES REQUIRE INCREMENTAL STEPS TO SUCCEED
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 211-2
For whatever reason, then, society has begun to ‘remember’ the extension of our consensus ethic for
humans to animals. Like virtually all social revolutions in stable democracies, this has occurred by
articulating the implicit, in an incremental fashion, rather than by the imposition of radically new ideas
totally discontinuous with our social-ethical assumptions. The next key question is this: “How can one
ensure that this revolution continues to unfold, rather than becoming stagnant or aborted at its current
stage?”
We have already learned from Socrates something significant about ethical change. Let us now develop a
number of insights from Hume. Hume pointed out that morality involves a collaborative effort of reason
and passion, i.e. emotion. Reason may allow us to deduce logical consequences from our moral ideas, but
reason does not motivate us to act. We are motivated by emotional predilections and disinclinations, by
things that make us happy, or indignant, or excite in us pity, and so on. Second, Hume pointed out that
what fuels moral life is sympathy, i.e. the fellow feeling with other beings, which allows us to respond to
positive and negative feelings in them as motivations for our actions.
These insights of Hume seem to be borne out well with regard to our emerging ethic on animals.
Obviously, the first stirrings of concern for animals were for those animals with whom we enjoy a
relationship of sympathy or fellow feeling—companion animals. They respond to our moods and feelings,
we respond to theirs. This, of course, helps explain the overwhelming primacy of concern of the traditional
humane movement for pets, especially dogs. The further removed from us an animal is, the les likely we
are to share sympathy with it. Thus many leaders of the traditional humane movement were unabashed
anglers, and otherwise sensitive people feel no compunctions about dispatching snakes in any number of
ways.
Furthermore, our emotions with respect to an animal, or to its treatment, will inexorably shape our tendency
to apply the emerging ethic to that animal. Few of us will readily and naturally extend our ethic to sharks
or rats, though patently both of these animal meet the criteria for moral concern: they are conscious and
have natures. But we are acculturated to see these animals as noxious, as threats, as vermin, and thus we
are not exercised about their wanton destruction, even when it is done simply for fun, as in the case of
sharks, or in painful ways, as in the case of rodents. It is extremely significant that the general public in
California opposed the hunting of mountain lions until a film of lions taking prey was disseminated, at
which point concern for the lions dropped dramatically.
SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO EXTENDING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS DEMAND AN
INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO SUCCEED
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 9
An advocate for the legal rights for nonhuman animals must proceed one step at a time, for progress is
impeded by physical, economic, political, religious, historical, legal and psychological obstacles. Although
the historical and legal obstacles remain about the same for every nonhuman of every species, we’ll see that
the physical, economic, political, religious, historical, legal and psychological obstacles can loom higher
for some nonhumans than for others.
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FAILURE TO MAKE COMPROMISES RESULTS IN LESS PROTECTION OF ANIMAL
INTERESTS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 164
Garner assumes that “insider” status is desirable, although he does acknowledge that “there is a danger here
of giving the impression that all forms of insider dealing with the government are valuable.” And though
he does recognize that groups may be seriously compromised by efforts to achieve such status, he assumes
that “there are advantages in the compromise approach.” Garner argues that in the absence of such
compromise there might be “fewer and weaker animal protection measures” and that compromise may
claim responsibility for “improvement in the way animals are treated…in the short term.” Indeed, Garner
dismisses the notion that anyone would not want “insider” status: he claims that “most groups…want to
achieve access to government even if they will not admit as much.” He remarks that “some groups might
want to be outsiders, as no doubt some motorists might want to drive a ten-year-old-car.”
STARTING WITH GREAT APES DOES NOT ENTRENCH A NEW FORM OF SPECIESISM
Paola Cavalieri & Peter Singer, Editor Edica & Animali and Professor of Bioethics @ Princeton,
1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 309-10
How can we advocate inclusion or exclusion for whole species, when the whole approach of animal
liberationist ethics has been to deny the validity of species boundaries, and to emphasize the overlap in
characteristics between members of our own species and members of other species? Have we not always
said that the boundary of species is a morally relevant distinction, based on mere biological data? Are we
not in danger of reverting to a new form of speciesism?
This is a problem that has to do with boundaries, and boundaries are here tied up with the collective feature
of the proposed manumission. What, then, can be said in favor of such a collective manumission, apart
from recognition of its obvious symbolic value? We think that a direction can be found, once more, in
history. It is already clear that in classical antiquity, while the collective emancipation of Messenian helots
led to some dramatic social changes, the random manumission of individual human slaves never led to any
noteworthy social progress. Even in more recent times, when a conscious political design was not only
feasible, but also actually pursued – namely, during the first stages of the anti-slavery struggle in the
nineteenth-century United States –the freeing of individual slaves, or even the setting free by an
enlightened plantation owner of all the slaves on his plantation, did little good for the anti-slavery side as a
whole. Given that the global admission of nonhuman animals to the community of equals seems out of the
question for the moment, one way to avoid a parallel failure is to focus on the species as a collectivity, and
to opt for (otherwise questionable) rigid boundaries.
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APES ARE A GOOD STARTING POINT—LANGUAGE AND INDIVIDUALITY INCREASE
PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE OF THEIR CLAIMS ON THE MORAL COMMUNITY
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 214-5
Though splendidly different, these animals are like us—enough like us to trigger the essential and deep
empathy so important to including them in the moral community. This natural effect has been enhanced
and deepened by the work which has been done on communication with the great apes by the Rumbaughs,
Premack, Patterson, Fouts, and others. Leaving aside the objection of those scientists who seem hell-bent
on proving that no animal can really have language, the sort of communication that does go on certainly
counts as language in the minds of ordinary people. It is clear that apes can insult, joke, lie, ask, entreat,
express affection and numerous emotions, grieve, teach one another, care about pets, rhyme, and so on.
Such a level of communicative ability, be it language in the Chomskyan sense or not, so dramatically gives
a “window into the minds” of other animals, that it cannot fail to further augment our fundamental
empathy. When this is coupled with the exhaustive fieldwork done by people such as Jane Goodall, it
illustrates countless cases that can only be understood in terms of mental states like ours. As Goodall puts
it:
“All those who have worked long and closely with chimpanzees have no hesitation in asserting that
chimpanzees have emotions similar to those which in ourselves we label pleasure, joy, sorrow, boredom
and so on…Some of the emotional states of the chimpanzee are so obviously similar to ours that even an
inexperienced observer can interpret the behavior.”
Closely related to this latter point is the individuality manifested by the great apes. (As I have pointed out
elsewhere, one can find significant evidence of individuality among all animals; but in the case of great apes, as in the
case of humans, it cannot be missed.) Whereas scientists, for example, can treat all laboratory mice as
indistinguishable and interchangeable, one simply cannot do so with apes. They dramatically manifest differences
in personality, temperament, preferences, and behavior which are inescapable. Thus they tend to manifest
themselves as persons, worthy of designation by proper names. Recognition of a being’s individuality is a
powerful spur to according that being moral concern; conversely, depersonalization is a major step towards
disenfranchisement. It is no accident that the Nazis worked very diligently to make all concentration camp
inmates look alike, so that there seemed to be an endless supply of them, and individuals didn’t matter.
AN INCREMENTAL STRATEGY IS OK AS LONG AS IT DOESN’T RELY ON AND
REINFORCE SPECIEST ARGUMENTS
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 118
If speciesist arguments work to the advantage of nonhuman great apes (and I’m not convinced of that), they
do so at other animals’ expense. I’m not saying that we must emancipate either everyone or no one.
“Welfarists” often falsely accuse abolitionists of being “all or nothing.” I know that emancipating AfricanAmericans didn’t emancipate any nonhumans. I know that granting voting rights to African-American men
didn’t secure voting rights for women. I know that virtually no judge alive today would declare an ostrich
or a crayfish a person. But emancipating African-Americans didn’t rely on racist arguments, and
emancipating the first nonhumans shouldn’t rely on speciesist ones.
Someone might counter, “Isn’t it specisist to deny nonhuman great apes the chance to become legal
persons? GAP is just being practical. They simply want to do what will work. No matter how it’s
obtained, personhood for any nonhumans will be so groundbreaking that it will help all nonhumans. It will
breach the legal barrier between humans and other animals.” I completely support efforts to obtain greatape personhood, provided that they’re nonspeciesist. As with “welfarism” versus rights, the question is
what will work in the full sense of work—truly work for the animals in question, work over the long term,
work without benefiting some animals at the expense of more-numerous others, work without perpetuating
the very speciesism that personhood for any nonhumans should erode rather than reinforce. I’d sob with
joy if chimpanzees became legal persons, as long as their personhood wasn’t couched in terms that will
make it harder for other nonhumans to obtain personhood.
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CAN ADVOCATE PERSONHOOD FOR GREAT APES IN NON-SPECIESIST WAY
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 119
Why not seek great-ape personhood in non-speciesist ways? Why not build the foundation on which
animal equality must rest? Non-speciesist arguments advance everyone’s interests. They’re necessary for
full emancipation. At the same time, they don’t preclude starting with relatively few nonhumans whose
sentience is especially obvious to humans.
Given current attitudes toward nonhumans, someone pleading for chinchilla, spider, or sea-horse
personhood would be laughed right out of court. However, arguing for great-ape personhood doesn’t
require speciesist argumentation of the sort presented by GAP. As noted in the previous chapter, courts
have affirmed the “principles of equality and respect for all individuals” regardless of their “intelligence” or
ability to “appreciate” life. The individuals in those cases have, of course, been human, but the same
egalitarian principles could be applied in a legal case seeking rights for, say, chimpanzees or dolphins.
In fact, arguing based on sentience alone might be less threatening to judges than arguing based on humannonhuman similarities. Citing abilities such as nonhuman great apes’ ability to learn human language
suggests that animal rights advocates seek nonhuman participation in human society. We don’t. We’re not
asking that any nonhumans have freedom of speech or voting rights. So, what difference does it make if
nonhumans can learn human languages or show other human-like capacities and behaviors? We don’t want
nonhumans to remain in human society (which invariably would keep them subservient). We want them to
be free and independent of humans. In some ways, that’s less threatening than giving rights to a new group
of humans, who then share economic, social, and political power. Nonhumans wouldn’t share power.
They would be shielded from ours.
It’s right to seek legal personhood for nonhuman great apes. It isn’t right to do so in a speciesist way. As
currently conceived and presented, GAP reinforces a species hierarchy, with great apes ranking above all
other animals.
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Should Extend Legal Protections/Rights to Great Apes
SHOULD EXPAND BASIC LEGAL PROTECTIONS TO NON-HUMAN APES
Christoph Anstotz, professor of special education at Univerity of Dortmund, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 170
The knowledge we have today about profoundly mentally disabled humans and nonhuman primates gives
strong reason to revise the traditional interpretation of the idea of equality. The time has come to see the
community of equals no longer as a closed society, but as an open one. The admission of nonhuman
primates and the guarantee of certain fundamental rights in favor of all member of such a community,
including profoundly mentally disabled humans, would be a first important step. These rights should
include the right to life, the protection of individual liberty and the prohibition of torture.
THOSE IN THE MORAL COMMUNITY OF EQUALS ENTITLED TO BASIC PROTECTIONS
OF LIFE AND LIBERTY
Dale Jamieson, Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 224
In this chapter I will not try to say specifically what the community of equals is or to what its members are
entitled, since that has been covered elsewhere in this volume. Instead, I simply endorse the general
sentiment of the Declaration on Great Apes: the community of equals is the moral community within which
certain basic moral principles include the right to life and the protection of individual liberty.
IRRATIONAL TO DENY GREAT APES BASIC LEGAL PROTECTIONS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 256-7
The Declaration of Rights is a sensible attempt to recognize what we have for too long ignored: that certain
nonhumans must be regarded as “persons” for purposes of obtaining legal protection of their fundamental
rights. Indeed, not to accord such protection to all great apes is irrational in light of the demonstrated
mental and emotional similarities among all great apes. It is, moreover, particularly unjustifiable under a
legal system that already regards some nonhuman entities as legal persons. These nonhuman entities are
regarded as persons not because they share any salient aspect of personhood; rather, their status is deprived
from the need for modern capitalistic legal systems to provide for investor protection. If however, we
regard the term “personhood” even in a weakly objectivistic manner (i.e., as a concept with determinative
conditions of application) there can be no doubt that personhood is a term that must be applied to all great
apes.
MUST MAKE THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY FOR APES A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE RIGHT
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 248
The Declaration on Great Apes requires that we extend the community of equals to include all great apes:
human beings, chimpanzees, gorillas, and orang-utans. Specifically, the declaration requires the
recognition of certain moral principles applicable to all great apes—the right to life, the protection of
individual liberty, and the prohibition of torture.
If these principles are going to have any meaning beyond being statements of aspiration, then they must be
translated into legal rights that are accorded to the members of the community of equals and that can e
enforced in courts of law. Indeed, the Declaration itself suggests that moral principles would be
enforceable in courts of law.
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Should Extend Due Process Protections of Liberty to Apes
SHOULD LEGALLY PROHIBIT CAPTURE AND DETENTION OF GREAT APES
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 216
Perhaps the best practical step one can take is to press for legislation to leave apes alone. We should not
import them for zoos or for entertainment or for research, invasive or not. As Linden has pointed out, we
are simply incapable of respecting their natures and their attendant rights in captivity. We should let them
be, and let words and cameras in the hands of the Jane Goodalls and other morally directed naturalistscientists and artists tell of their inexhaustible wonders and grandeur. And let the dictum be proclaimed –
know without hurting, see without manipulating, cherish in itself, not for myself.
SHOULD EXTEND DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS TO GREAT APES
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 218
Here, I have suggested, we can accelerate the moral and legal enfranchisement of animals, at least of those
animals, by using the extant legal machinery, and letting them tell their own story in the context of the
judicial system. I am envisioning a plausible legal case based on the notions of denial of due process and
cruel and unusual punishment. Surely, one can make the reasonable case that these animals are, by all
rational standards, persons who have been denied the fundamental devil right and procedures due to
persons. These animals possess measurable intelligence, sometimes in excess of that possessed by certain
humans, they can reason and, most important, they can eloquently speak for themselves, and tell of their
anguish and sorrow.
WE OWE GREAT APES THEIR LIBERATION
Daniel A. Dombrowski, 1997, Babies and Beasts: the argument from marginal cases, p. 145
What giving the great apes their due means is a complicated matter that would require an examination of
several key issues in environmental ethics. Perhaps it largely means leaving them alone, setting aside
preserves for them with controls on human entrance. Nondisruptive research, some degree of medical care,
and perhaps emergency feeding would be appropriate, since we have already done much to destroy their
habitats. Although the great apes are in many ways at the mental level of human children, they are not
children but “wild” animals in that sense that their telos is not reached in zoos, circuses, laboratories, or any
other context where they are seen as someone else’s property.
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No Justification for Differential Treatment Among Great Apes
ATTRIBUTES OF PERSONHOOD DETERMINATIONS IN “CLOSE” CASES CLEARLY MET
WITH APES
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 252-3
What is peculiar about many of the discussions of legal personhood is that the attributes of personhood
often the focus of debate as to whether this or that being is a “person” are clearly present in all great apes.
For example, one of the more exhaustive sets of attributes of human personhood is presented by bioethicist
Joseph Fletcher, who sets out a list of fifteen “positive propositions” of personhood. These attributes are:
minimum intelligence, self-awareness, self-control, a sense of time, a sense of futurity, a sense of the past,
the capability of relating to others, concern for others, communication, control of existence, curiosity,
change and changeability, balance of rationality and feeling, idiosyncrasy and neocortical functioning.
Although we may doubt that chimpanzees, gorillas or orang-utan fetuses (or even very young chimpanzees,
gorillas or orang-utans), or the incompetent elderly chimpanzees, gorillas or orang-utans exhibit all of these
attributes, we are no longer able to doubt that all great apes (except fetuses, and perhaps the very young or
the incompetent elderly) possess these characteristics.
LACK OF AUTONOMY FOR APES NOT UNIQUE – FEW HUMANS HAVE FULL AUTONOMY
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 248-249
I will not argue that any chimpanzee or bonobo has full autonomy. But no bright line divides full autonomy
from realistic autonomy or realistic autonomy from the legal fiction that "all humans are autonomous."
However, a little mountain geography might help us understand the relationships among them a little better.
We'll start at the top of the world. The summit of 29,038-foot Mount Everest in the Himalayas will
represent those few humans who may have attained full autonomy. A few more occupy the apex of K-2 in
the Karakoram Range in northern Kashmir, which at 28,250 feet is the second-highest mountain in the
world. Millions cluster atop the highest mountain in the Hindu Kush Range, 25,260-foot Tirich Mir, located
in Pakistan along the Afghan border. The nearby Pamir Range in Tajikistan is filled with peaks above
20,000 feet. The autonomies of most adult Homo erectus, Neandertals, and Homo sapiens can be found
among those peaks.
SHOULD NOT JUDGE AN APE’S PERSONHOOD BY WHETHER THEY ACCEPT HUMANBASED MORALITY
H. Lyn White Miles, Department of Sociology, University of Tennessee @ Chattanooga, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 53
Apes, of course, adhere to their own patterns of behavior within the constraints of their social order. These
patterns are socially complex, rule-governed and based to a large extent on learning. Their acquired
behavior patterns are transmitted from generation to generation with variation from group to group in
gestures, politics, and social behaviors. Although most learning is based on simple observation, there is
some recent evidence for the actual teaching by apes, as described in Chapter 4 and elsewhere, and for a
degree of empathy or identification. Because of this complexity we are increasingly inclined to describe
the lifestyles of monkeys and apes under natural conditions as culture, or at least proto-culture. There is as
yet no evidence that apes living freely have developed ethical systems based on extensive empathy. Nor is
there yet evidence that apes have a theory of the mind, that is, an understanding that other individuals have
beliefs and mental processes similar to their own. However, this is also the case for the behavior of many
humans, especially young children. When we decide if apes are persons, we should not require sentient
beings to know of a human-based morality if they have not been exposed to one, because like human
children, they may have the potential to develop one, however rudimentary.
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Apes Meet Requirements for Legal Personhood
ARUGMENT THAT ONLY HUMANS ARE PERSONS IS WRONG
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 252
Some may argue that the concept of legal personhood cannot, as a conceptual matter, be extended to
anything but human persons. Indeed, it is the common lay view that humans have legal personhood and
that only humans can be persons. A brief examination of legal doctrine, however, demonstrates that this
view is incorrect. Not all humans are (or were) regarded as persons, and not all legal persons are human.
Slaves in the United States and elsewhere where clearly human, but did not enjoy legal personhood; they
were regarded as property in much the same way that nonhuman animals are regarded today. Similarly,
women in the United States were once regarded as the property of their husbands, and in some nations,
women still suffer significant legal disabilities. Children have certain rights and are not, strictly speaking,
the property of their parents; they are, nevertheless, disabled under the law from full legal personhood.
Just as not all humans are regarded as persons, not all persons are human. In the Le Vasseur case, the
defendant argued, in part, that the definition of “another” should include dolphins because “another” would
include corporations and the exclusion of the dolphins was unjustifiable. Under common law, corporations
are regarded as persons with full rights to sue, be sued, hold property, and so on. Indeed, it would not be an
exaggeration at all to suggest that much American law concerns the activities of corporations, and the
practice of most American lawyers contains at least some corporate work. When an economic system finds
it advantageous, its notion of “personhood” can become quite elastic.
WHEREVER THE LINE IS DRAWN – ALL GREAT APES SHOULD BE ON THE SAME SIDE
OF IT
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 253-4
Wherever we decide to draw the line, however, it is clear that all great apes belong on the same side, and
that it would be irrational to place some great apes on one side, and some on the other. Interestingly, such
an approach is thoroughly consistent with the most conservative of the tests employed in the interpretation
of equal protection guarantees under American law. That is, when someone challenges a government
classification as violative of equal protection, the challenger has the burden of showing that the
classification is irrational and not related to any legitimate government interests. (There are instances when
the government has the burden of demonstrating a compelling interest, and the government’s claim is
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. This more stringent test is applied when the classification affects a
fundamental right, such as the right of free expression. There are also other tests that fall in between the
“irrationality” test and the “strict scrutiny” test. For example, classifications based on gender receive
“heightened” scrutiny.)
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Apes Meet Requirements for Legal Personhood
NO JUSTIFICATION FOR DENYING GREAT APES LEGAL PERSONHOOD
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 84
Those who struggle to extend legal personhood to nonhuman animals may find themselves charged with
"unreasonable lumping," that is, accused of emphasizing overly general criteria for legal personhood and
erroneously thinking that one or more of the essential elements is irrelevant. Whenever reformers have
agitated to transform such "legal things" as slaves, women, children, and fetuses into "legal persons," their
ideas are, in Professor Christopher Stone's words, "bound to sound odd or frightening or laughable. This is
partly because until the rightless thing receives its rights, we cannot see it as anything but a thing for the
use of 'us'-those who are holding rights at the time." 104 I will inevitably be charged with unreasonable
lumping for demanding legal personhood for chimpanzees and bonobos and ignoring allegedly relevant
differences between human and nonhuman animals. This book is one long argument against that charge.
Legal splitters invariably want to limit legal personhood to those who have it. But their arguments are often
based upon overly specific criteria, and they end up erroneously believing that one or more of the
nonessential elements of legal personhood is essential. 105 I will argue in Chapter 11 that being human is an
overly specific criterion for legal rights and not an essential element of legal personhood. "Unreasonable
splitting" is the charge I levy throughout this book against those who refuse to extend legal personhood, for
no adequate reason, to chimpanzees and bonobos.
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Apes Have Intelligence & Self Awareness
APES HAVE INTELLIGENCE AND SELF-AWARENESS
Jane Goodhall, World Renowned Expert on Chimpanzees, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality
beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 14
Gradually, however, evidence for sophisticated mental performances in the apes has become ever more
convincing. There is proof that they can solve simple problems through the process of reasoning and
insight. They can plan for the immediate future. The language acquisition experiments have demonstrated
that they have powers of generalization, abstraction and concept-forming along with the ability to
understand and use abstract symbols in communication. And they clearly have some kind of self-concept.
MIRROR RECOGNITION IN GREAT APES INDICATES A SENSE OF SELFCONSCIOUSNESS
Robert W. Mitchell, Professor of psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 241-2
One traditional avenue for discerning self consciousness is recognition of oneself in a mirror. Mirror selfrecognition is present in many humans, chimpanzees, and orang-utans, and in a few gorillas, and is
commonly taken to be assign of pre-existing self consciousness. Recognizing oneself in a mirror implies
recognizing a simulation of one’s own body, which suggests a capacity to understand simulation as such, as
well as its relation to one’s own body. Once achieved, mirror self-recognition entails that the being
recognizes that an action the being experiences kinesthetically is identical to the visual display of that
action in the mirror, a capacity which is already evidenced in imitative pretence. Indeed, it is likely that
this ability to recognize simulation in a mirror is based, in part, upon a prevailing ability to imitate activities
of other beings via kinesthetic-visual matching.
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Apes Capable of Moral Reasoning
EVEN IF APES LACK THE SAME SELF-REFLEXIVITY AS HUMANS – THEY ARE STILL
CAPABLE OF MORAL REASONING
Robert W. Mitchell, Professor of psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 242-3
Although true for both humans and apes that “By means of the image in the mirror [one] becomes capable
of being a spectator of himself,” it may be true only for humans (and not even for all humans) that with
one’s self image appears the possibility of an ideal image of oneself—in psychoanalytic terms, the
possibility of a super-ego.” Because of reflexive self-awareness, the ideals of morality are possible. But
along with such reflective self awareness comes the ability to make a deliberate argument in support of
one’s moral vision.
So far it is clear that nonhuman beings, including the great apes, are not persons, in that they lack full selfconsciousness, or what I am here calling reflective self-awareness. It would appear that humans, but not
apes, because of reflective self-awareness “can ponder past and future and weigh alternative courses of
action in the light of some vision of a whole life well lived.” But the great apes seem to differ from human
beings in this way by degree rather than in kind, in that their self-awareness and perspective-taking provide
them with mental images which represents themselves and others, and they can use these images to plan
their activities. To plan is not merely to have a prospective image, but to imagine oneself within a
prospective image. Thus, the simulator can imagine different scenarios by which he or she can choose to
live, and in this sense has the beginnings of reflective self awareness. Chimpanzees (and other great apes)
may not be able to “formulate a general plan of life,” but can formulate a general plan for (at least) at day
or a night: for example, a chimp can select and carry a tool which will assist in obtaining food at a distant
location, or carry clumps of hay for warmth when moving from her inside enclosure to the outside which
she had experienced as cold the day before. These plans for the day can include plans for their offspring
for example that the youngster should learn manual skills through imitation of a parent’s demonstration.
Thus great apes can ponder past and future and weigh alternative courses of action in the light of some
vision of a whole day or night well lived.
MORAL CAPACITY OF APES JUSTIFIES BASIC PROTECTIONS
Robert W. Mitchell, Professor of psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 243
In many ways, the capacities of great apes show in relation to awareness of themselves, awareness of
others’ psychology and self-awareness indicate that they (at least in our present state of knowledge) are
much like young children. In the same way that we would protect children from torture, provide them with
(a restrained) freedom, and guarantee them a right to life, we must provide the same conditions for the great
apes. It is true that apes cannot make this deliberate argument for their rights, but neither can young
children or oppressed people whose oppressors refuse to learn their language; yet morally we protect their
rights, at least in principle.
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Apes Capable of Communication/Language
GORILLAS CAN LEARN TO COMMUNICATE WITH EACH OTHER AND HUMANS WITH
SIGN LANGUAGE
Francine Patterson & Wendy Gordon, President & research assistant, The Gorilla Foundation, 1994,
The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 59
Koko is not alone in her linguistic accomplishments. Her multi-species family includes Michael, an
eighteen year old male gorilla. Although he was not introduced to sign language until the age of three and
a half, he has used over 400 different signs. Both gorillas initiate the majority of their conversations with
humans and combine their vocabularies in creative and original sign utterances to describe their
environment, feelings, desires and even what may be their past histories. They also sign to themselves and
to each other, using human language to supplement their own natural communicative gestures and
vocalizations.
Sign language has become such an integral part of their daily lives that Koko and Michael are more
familiar with the language than are some of their human companions. Both gorillas have been known to
sign slowly and repeat signs when conversing with a human who has limited signing skills. They also
attempt to teach as they have been taught.
APES CHALLENGE “LANGUAGE” AS A DFENENSE FOR THE SPECIES BARRIER
Francine Patterson & Wendy Gordon, President & research assistant, The Gorilla Foundation, 1994,
The Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 61
Many of those who defend the traditional barrier between Homo sapiens and all other species cling to
language as the primary difference between humans and other animals. As apes have threatened this last
claim to human uniqueness, it has become more apparent that there is no clear agreement as to the
definition of language. Many human beings—including all infants, severely mentally impaired people and
some educationally deprived deaf adults of normal intelligence—fail to meet the criteria for ‘having
language’ according to any definition. The ability to use language may not be a valid test for determining
whether an individual has rights. But the existence of even basic language skills does provide further
evidence of a consciousness which deserves consideration.
USE OF HUMAN SYNTAX IN LANGUAGE NOT MORALLY RELEVANT
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert
Garner, p. 10
Following Chomsky, many people now mark this distinction by saying that only humans communicate in a
form that is governed by rules of syntax. (For the purposes of this argument, linguists allow those
chimpanzees who have learned a syntactic sign language to rank as honorary humans.) Nevertheless, as
Bentham pointed out, this distinction is not relevant to the question of how animals ought to be treated,
unless it can be linked to the issue of whether animals suffer.
HUMANS COMMUNICATE EMOTIONS NON-VERBALLY – LANGUAGE NOT A
PRECONDITION FOR CAPACITY TO SUFFER
Peter Singer, Professor of Bioethics, Princeton, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed. Robert
Garner, p. 10
Indeed, as Jane Goodall points out in her study of chimpanzees, when it comes to the expression of feelings
and emotions, humans tend to fall back on non-linguistic modes of communication which are often found
among apes, such as a cheering pat on the back, an exuberant embrace, a clasp of hands, and so on…SO
there seems to be no reason at all to believe that a creature without language cannot suffer.
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Apes and Humans Share DNA
DNA EVIDENCE PLACES HUMANS IN THE SAME POSITION AS PRIMATES
Lindsey Linfoot, Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia
2002. “Submission on the Draft Policy on the Use of Non-Human Primates in Medical Research”.
Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia.
http://www.avwa.com.au/subprimates.pdf
However, we believe that this type of reasoning must also applied to all the other species collectively
grouped together as “non-human primates”. Applying rules to one species of non-human primate and not to
all the others draws parallels to discrimination within the human race. It could be argued that one race is
inferior to another therefore it is acceptable to subject them to medical research, albeit “humanely”.
Alternately, people who suffer from mental disabilities could also be considered as experimental models
because they may not be able to adequately communicate their wishes. Both arguments hint of terrible
regimes that have come and gone and are, thankfully, considered repugnant in our modern society !In a
paper by Goodman, Morris it is pointed out “The other new paradigm rejects the traditional anthropological
view that we humans are greatly different from all other animal species. Instead, the molecular view
emphasizes how much we hold in common with other species, especially with our sister-group the common
and bonobo chimpanzees.” And furthermore “….in terms of the DNA and paleontological evidence on
primate phylogeny, a temporal based phylogenetic classification of primates that describes in an objective,
nonanthropocentric way the taxonomic place of humankind among the primates.”3Clearly suggesting that
the human race belong not above or below but amongst the classification of “primates” and there is no
difference between “non-human” and “human” primates within the classification.\
CHIMPANZEES ARE CLOSER GENETICALLY TO HUMANS THAN TO OTHER APES
Lindsey Linfoot, Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia
2002. “Submission on the Draft Policy on the Use of Non-Human Primates in Medical Research”.
Committee of Management and Members of the Humane Society of Western Australia.
http://www.avwa.com.au/subprimates.pdf
Chimpanzees are the species of great ape chosen for medical research, due to their greater similarity to
humans. Chimpanzees are hominoids along with human beings, bonobos, orang-utans and gorillas. Once
again however, humans are hominoids that escape the ‘great ape’ label. Chimpanzees are more closely
related to humans than they are to gorillas and possess many qualities that were once considered solely
human. “Humans and chimpanzees are more than 98.3% identical in their typical nuclear noncoding DNA
and more than 99.5% identical in the active coding nucleotide sequences of their functional nuclear genes
(Goodman et al., 1989, 1990).”4Chimpanzees have been shown to possess self-consciousness, anticipate
future events, count and speak in sign language, form deep bonds with humans and each other and to form
separate cultures within Africa.
HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES SHARE 98.3% OF THE SAME DNA
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 131-132
Each half-rung is composed of one of four kinds of protein called a "base," or nucleic acid. The double
strand of DNA hangs together because each half-rung of the DNA ladder is attracted to its opposite and
complementary half-rung like a magnet to iron filings. Our DNA and that of chimpanzees is more than 98.3
percent identical. That means that, on average, more than 983 out of every 1,000 base pairs along every
double strand of DNA in both species lie in the same sequence. But we're actually more closely connected
than that. Scientists have realized that chimpanzees and humans have a lot more DNA in their cells than
they could possibly need. A lot of it doesn't do anything; it's "junk DNA." Of the DNA that actually does
something, humans and chimpanzees share, on average, more than 995 of the same base sequences along
every double strand of DNA, or more than 99.5 percent. Investigators now believe that humans and
chimpanzees may differ by only several hundred genes out of approximately 100,000. A mere fifty genes
may control differences in our cognition. We apes (more on that as well) probably differ by only four or
five base pairs for every thousand that populate the double strands of DNA and one out of every five
hundred genes.
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Apes and Humans Have Similar Brain Function
HUMANS AND CHIMPANZEES HAVE INCREDIBLY SIMILAR BRAINS
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 133-134
Human and chimpanzee brains certainly appear similar. Human brains weigh perhaps three pounds. A
chimpanzee's brain weighs about one pound. Our brains contain between 10 billion (1010) and 100 trillion
(1014) neurons. That humans have triple the number of neurons of chimpanzees almost certainly makes no
difference when such vast numbers are involved. At least some of the physical structures believed to
underlie consciousness in all mammals are found in the cerebrum and especially its outer layer, which is
called the cerebral cortex. Many think the thalamus is also involved. However, the complex behaviors of
some birds, who lack a substantial cerebral cortex but possess highly developed striatal brain regions,
suggest that complex cognition may not necessarily be dependent upon a cerebral cortex. Anatomical
equivalents may also exist.
Eighty percent of our brains and 75 percent of chimpanzee brains is cerebral cortex. The area of our
cerebral cortex is about 2,200 square centimeters, compared to about 500 square centimeters for the
chimpanzee. Each square millimeter of the surfaces of the cerebral cortexes of both species contains about
146,000 neurons. Both cortexes therefore probably hold on the order of 10 10 or 1011 neurons, about the
number of stars in the Milky Way. The map of our cortical layers is also similar. The anthropologist
Katerina Semendeferi, an expert on neuroanatomy, has written that the most forward section of the cortex,
the frontal lobe, is often associated with the "most complex mental activities, such as language, creative
thinking, planning, decision-making, artistic expression, some aspects of emotional behavior, and working
memory." Both human and chimpanzee frontal lobes have nearly identical relative volumes (the ratio of
the frontal lobe to the rest of the hemispheric volume) and cortical surfaces. Humans average a 36.7 percent
relative volume and 35.9 percent cortical surface compared to the chimpanzee's 35.9 percent relative
volume and 38.1 percent cortical surface; each is about what would be expected of a primate with that size
brain. On average, each neuron in the cerebral cortex connects with the synapses of more than 1,000 other
neurons and can potentially connect with tens of thousands more, so that the synaptic connections in the
cerebral cortex number about 1 million billion (10 15) for both us and chimpanzees. For both species, the
combinations of neural connections is an estimated ten, followed by millions, perhaps trillions, of zeros.
There are about 1087 elementary particles in the entire universe.
The structures, numbers, and density of neurons, synaptic connections, and combinations of neural
connections in both brains are of the same kind and order of magnitude, while the cortical layer maps are
approximately the same. According to the psychologist Stephen Walker,
Much work has been done since Huxley emphasized 100 years ago that "every principle gyrus and sulcus
of a chimpanzee brain is clearly represented in that of a man," but there is nothing that contradicts his
conclusion that the differences between the human and chimpanzee brains are remarkably minor by
evolutionary standards.
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Apes Have Culture
ARGUMENT THAT ONLY HUMANS HAVE CULTURE IS A SELF-FULFILLING
PROPHESY—WE’VE NEVER LOOKED FOR EVIDENCE BECAUSE WE THINK THEY DON’T
HAVE CULTURE
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 259
Unlike human beings, animals tend to be regarded as organisms primarily governed by their individually
based genetic constitutions, i.e. by their instincts or by their genes. But this conviction turns out to be a
rather a priori one, given that almost no student of human society and culture ever pauses to ask the same
questions about animals that they ask about humans. One simply does not look for the social and the
cultural where surely it cannot be found., i.e. outside the human sphere. If one preconceives humans to be
the sole beings capable of creating society, culture or language, one will thereby have preempted “ape”
forms of society, “ape” culture and “ape” language almost by definition.
WAY WE VIEW AND STUDY ANIMALS IS THE REASON WE DON’T FIND THEY HAVE
CULTURES OR LANGUAGE
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 259-60
Paul Bohannan is among the very few anthropologists who do think animals worthy of anthropological
consideration; he warns against the methodology, are therefore dismissed as secondary, or, worse,
rationalized out of existence. Thus, the part of animals under scrutiny in the laboratory and under the
control of the positivist natural scientist comes to represent the whole animal. On top of all this came the
Cartesian notion of the animal-machine, a view which denied animals all subjectivity, feeling, suffering,
needs, fear or knowledge. In short, animals ended up as passive and law-bound products of the laws of
living matter.
BIOLOGICAL METHODOLOGIES INCAPABLE OF SEEING EVIDENCE OF “CULTURE” IN
NON HUMAN ANIMALS
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 262
Mainstream animal science such as biology and ethnology is just not designed to handle things that are
socially or culturally created (instead of genetically) and which in their turn shape their creators. Generally
speaking, biologists and ethologists do not possess the methodological equipment to conceptualize the nonmaterial aspects of culture such as ideas, meanings and values held by groups. Needless to say that many
biologists run the risk of giving biological deterministic explanations for human and animal behavior.
HUMAN CONSTRUCTION OF NON-HUMAN ANIMALS IGNORES THEIR CAPACITY FOR
CULTURE
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p.262
When, but only when such biological reductionisms are directed at humans, social scientists are up in arms.
In contrast, these students of human society and culture seem to uncritically endorse whatever animal
image is being put forward by animal scientists. What social scientists typically fail to appreciate is
whether or not this animal image really reflects the “truth” about animals. Contrary to the images of “man”
and more recently the images of “woman”, there has as yet been very little debate on the image of animals
as a product of human construction.
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AT: “Public Opposes Extension of Rights to Apes”
CAN’T PREDICT PRECISELY WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS ARE OF INCLUDING APES IN
THE MORAL COMMUNITY—RIGHTS WILL CONTINUALLY EVOLVE
Dale Jamieson, Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 225
But having said this, it is true that it is very unclear exactly what recognizing the moral equality of great
apes would man. Clearly it would end our use of chimpanzees in medical research, and our destruction of
areas in which mountain gorillas live, but what other changes would it bring? We can benefit here from
reflecting on the American experience of social change. Once slaves were emancipated and recognized as
citizens, it remained unclear what exactly their rights and protections were. For more than a century
various court decisions and legislative acts have continued to spell them out. This is an ongoing process,
one that cannot entirely be envisaged in advance. If we are to change social practices that cannot be
defended, then we must accept the unavoidable uncertainty that follows.
LEGAL AVENUES EXIST TO DEAL WITH PERSONS WITH LESSER AUTONOMIES NOW
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 32
A fair and rational alternative exists and it is this: most moral and political philosophers, and just about
every common-law judge, recognize that less complex autonomies exist and that a being can be
autonomous if she has preferences and the ability to act to satisfy them. Or if she can cope with changed
circumstances. Or if she can make choices, even if she can’t evaluate their merits very well. Or if she has
desires and beliefs and can make at least some sound and appropriate inferences from them.
In Rattling the Cage, I called these lesser autonomies “realistic.” I now think “practical” better describes
them. “Practical autonomy” is not just what most humans have but what most judges think is sufficient for
basic liberty rights, and it boils down to this: a being has practical autonomy and is entitled to personhood
and basic liberty rights if she:
1. can desire;
2. can intentionally try to fulfill her desires; and
3. possesses a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even dimly, that it is she who
wants something and it is she who is trying to get it.
Consciousness, not necessarily self-conscious, and sentience are implicit in practical autonomy.
POLITICALLY BEST TO START WITH APES AND THEN MOVE TO OTHER ANIMALS
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 276
None the less, from the perspective of liberation moral practice it may be appropriate and even politically
astute to emphasize the human-like characteristics of nonhuman great apes and to seek the moral and legal
protection of their interests as persons before seeking such protection of interests for all feeling animals.
INCREMENTAL EXTENSION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS MORE POLITICALLY FEASIBLE
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 58
An incremental approach to animal rights is also politically acceptable because it does not threaten the
complete and immediate elimination of the property status of animals. This is, of course, not to say that
incremental abolition will be welcomed. It will certainly be resisted by animal exploiters, who, by the way,
just as vehemently fight the most moderate of animal welfare measures. One need only read the legislative
history of the federal Animal Welfare Act and its various amendments to see how the biomedical
establishment fought that law at every stage despite the generally accepted view that the Act has done little,
if anything, to benefit animals. Nevertheless, the level of social concern about animals has not been higher
in recent years, and this concern can be harnessed effectively to support such measures as prohibitions on
particular experiments or procedures, prohibitions on particular practices used in animal agriculture, and
prohibitions on the use of animals for entertainment.
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AT: “Extension of Rights Meaningless- Courts Won’t Enforce
Them”
EVEN IF APES “LOSE” THEIR JUDICIAL HEARING, THE FACT THAT THEY GET ONE IS A
GREAT VICTORY
Bernard E. Rollin, professor of philosophy, Colorado State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 218
Whatever the outcome of such a trial, the animals would of necessity win. If the trial were lost, the issues
would still have been powerfully and unforgettably aired, and the failure of our current law and morality to
protect these innocent creatures forcefully and indelibly imprinted in the public mind. Indeed, even if the
case never came to trial, the same result would be accomplished by the vast—and doubtless sympathetic—
publicity which a skillful attempt orchestrated by first-rate legal, philosophical and scienitific minds would
undoubtedly generate. And, in the end, the new ethic we discussed earlier would be articulated and
enlivened, to the benefit of all animals, and most assuredly to the benefit of the great apes, whose shameful
treatment at human hands occasioned the need for the trial.
LIMITING RIGHTS FOR GREAT APES TO BASIC LIBERTIES SUCH AS FREEDOM FROM
ARBITRARY DETENTION ELIMINATES PROBLEMS OF FINDING ADEQUATE
GUARDIANS TO REPRESENT THEIR INTERESTS
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 255
One possible answer to this difficulty may be found by carefully describing the right accorded to nonhuman
great apes, thereby limiting the range of discretion that would need to be exercised. As the range of
discretion is limited, the identity of the guardian becomes less important. That is, in the case of human
”wards”, legal issues generally concern what is in the “best interests” of the ward. These issues are often
very complex because it is not always clear what is in the “best interests” of a human. For example, if a
guardian has to determine whether to place the minor ward in a different school, or the mentally disabled
ward in a different institution, it may not be clear, even after much investigation, what is in the “best
interest” of the child or the mentally disabled person.
If however, we conscientiously provide to great apes the rights articulated in the Declaration—the right to
life, liberty and freedom from torture—then, in most instances, we will know what is in the ‘best interests’
of great apes. For example, if we accept that there can be no unwarranted interference with the liberty of
any great ape, we can longer tolerate the incarceration of these animals at research laboratories.
Accordingly, the only role of the guardian would be to seek the immediate release of the great ape
unjustifiably restrained or imprisoned. Of course, it may be necessary to resocialize the non-human under
such circumstances, but there is far less disagreement about the methods of resocialization than there is
about whether these animals may be incarcerated at all.
FORMAL APPLICATION OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE CAN OVERCOME BIAS
OF JUDGES
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 42-3
Such conundrums are typically solved by invoking the “Rule of Necessity,” which states that if all judges
are disqualified from deciding a case, none are. But that does not give judges license to indulge their
biases. To the contrary. Formal use of the precautionary principle is necessary just to counteract judicial
bias. Judges ruling from necessity must, to rule as fairly as they can, exert every ounce of moral strength,
every particle of objectivity they possess, always keeping in mind that they are prone to decide in their own
favor and that long-standing inequities have, in law professor Laurence Tribe’s words, “survived this long
because they have become so ingrained in our modes of thought; the US Supreme Court recognized a
century ago that “habitual” discriminations are the hardest to eradicate.”
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AT: “Extension of Rights to Apes Creates Practical
Difficulties”
PERSONHOOD OF GREAT APES DEMANDS SOME PROTECTIONS – DIFFERENCE IN
MORAL REASONING JUSTIFIES LIMITED LIBERTY RESTRICTIONS TO PROTECT THEM
AND OTHERS
Robert W. Mitchell, Professor of psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 244
Clearly, the fact that great apes are not fully persons creates difficulties in our treatment of them: although
it is easy and reasonable to grant the right to life and protection from torture to these apes, the right to
liberty is more ethically cumbersome. Human beings murder other human beings, and can be held
accountable because they have chosen to violate the liberty of another—a moral transgression. Because
apes have no rules against murder, any curtailing of their liberty as a result of their murdering another—or
even to prevent a potential murder of another—creates moral difficulties if apes have the status of persons
without the responsibilities. We can hold a person responsible for his or her actions because he or she can
recognize the (legal and moral) consequences of these actions and give reasons for the goodness of these
actions. Because apes are not persons in this full sense of the term, they cannot be held accountable
because they cannot understand morality and give reasons for their actions. Thus, some restrictions upon
their liberty with the effect of avoiding their death or curtailing murder of them can be morally defensible
because we humans value our own and their lives. (Such curtailment is also practices, of course, toward
children and some intellectually disabled, immoral or amoral older human beings). Although great apes are
not persons in the full sense of the term, they have psychological capacities which make them ends-inthemselves deserving of our protection.
EXTENSION OF RIGHT TO NOT BE ARBITRARILY DETAINED DOES NOT NECESSITATE
IMPOSITION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY ON GREAT APES
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 256
It is clear, however, that the Declaration would prohibit resurrecting formal criminal liability for any
nonhuman (great ape or rat). However intelligent chimpanzees, gorillas, and orang-utans are, there is no
evidence that they possess the ability to commit crimes, and in this sense, they are to be treated as children
or mental incompetents. Such treatment is consistent with the use of the guardianship model to facilitate
the incorporation into the legal system of rights for nonhuman great apes. We have guardians who
represent the interests of wards, because the wards are deemed, for whatever reason, to be incapable of
making responsible choices for themselves. So too, use of the guardian model for nonhuman great apes
recognizes that these nonhumans lack certain capacities, and one such capacity is the ability to comprehend
and use legal rules. It would seem most unjust and unsound to recognize these incapacities for purposes of
appointment of a guardian, and then to permit criminal liability to be imposed.
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AT: “No Place to Send Liberated Apes”
GRASP AND OTHER GROUPS WORKING TO ESTABLISH SANCTUARIES FOR LIBERATED
APES
GRASP, 2002, [Great Ape Standing & Personhood], Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.personhood.org/main/faq.html
We place a strong emphasis on discussion with the sanctuary community about the principles of
personhood, because (a) one cannot free the apes unless one can think of a place for those at the beginning,
already confined, to safely live their lives in relative peace and calm; and (b) one cannot ensure absolutely
that they live in relative peace and calm, without betrayal, unless their legal personhood is recognized.
Of course, that involves changing the way people think, and that can take generations.
CAPTIVES COULD BE SET FREE OR CARED FOR IN APPROPRIATE SANCTUARIES
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 139
Non-“domesticated” captives would be set free if they could thrive without human assistance (after any
necessary rehabilitation) and if appropriate habitat existed. If not, they would be permanently cared for at
sanctuaries. As much as possible, these sanctuaries would provide natural, fulfilling environments
CONFINEMENT CAN BE JUTIFIED IN NARROW CASES TO PROTECT THE INDIVIDUAL
ANIMAL’S WELFARE
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 455-6
Now, one can imagine circumstances in which such captivity might be defensible. For example, if the life
of a wild animal could be saved only by temporarily removing the animal from the theatre of human
predation, and if, after this threat had abated, the animals was reintroduced into the wild, then this
temporary confinement arguably is not disrespectful and thus might be justified. Perhaps there are other
circumstances in which a wild animal’s liberty could be limited temporarily, for that animal’s own good.
Obviously, however, there will be comparatively few such cases, and no less obviously, those cases that
satisfy the requirements of the rights view are significantly different from the vast majority of cases in
which wild animals are today confined in zoos, for these animals are confined and exhibited not because
temporary captivity is in their best interests but because their captivity serves some purpose useful to
others. As such, the rights view must take a very dim view of zoos, both as we know them now and as they
are likely to be in the future. In answer to our central question—Are zoos morally defensible?—the rights
view’s answer, not surprisingly, is No, they are not.
DETENTION OF GREAT APES MAY BE JUSTIFIED IF RELEASE POSES A DANGER TO THE
APE OR HUMAN SAFETY
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1994, The Great Ape Project: equality beyond
humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 256
The Declaration envisages circumstances where a great ape can be deprived of liberty for committing a
crime. If this reference to criminal culpability is intended to apply to humans, and not to chimpanzees,
gorillas and orang-utans, then I see no difficulty with the notion. Alternatively, if apes may be detained or
incarcerated if they pose a threat to the community, then that notion may also be acceptable under at least
some circumstances. For example, if, for whatever reason, a gorilla presently imprisoned in a zoo cannot
be returned to the wild, some form of detention may be justified for the safety of both the gorilla and the
community.
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AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research”
TURN - AIDS RESEARCH ON APES IS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE – DIFFERENCES CAUSE
SCIENTISTS TO MISS VACCINES
Rachel Nowak, PhD and Editor of the New Scientist. “Dying So We Might Live”. The New Scientist. 1999
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/Animal%20Testing/Vivisection/newscientaids.htm
But Prince claims the chimp experiments are flawed. The virulent HIV strains are more aggressive than the
strains that usually infect people, he says, so potentially effective vaccines could get overlooked. Fultz
disagrees: "The strain I have is very much like HIV in humans."
TURN – AIDS RESEARCH ON APES RISKS SPREADING NEW STRAINS OF THE VIRUS
INTO THE POPULATION – THE LINK TURN OUTWEIGHS
Murry J. Cohen, M.D. and Stephen R. Kaufman, M.D. and Brandon P. Reines, M.D. 1995 “Aping
Science Summary: A Critical Analysis of Research at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center”.
Medical Research Modernization Committee http://www.mrmcmed.org/ape.html
Inadvertent human exposure to lethal nonhuman-primate viruses during experimental procedures could
initiate devastating epidemics. For example, hundreds of millions of people were innoculated with a polio
vaccine contaminated with the simian virus SV40, and this population has experienced a higher than
normal rate of certain tumors. Similarly, HIV and hepatitis B likely came from human exposure to
chimpanzees, perhaps in their capture or use for research.
There is no way to test for unknown viruses, and viruses hidden in nonhuman-primate DNA could have
fatal consequences for humans. Already the virulent herpes-family "B" monkey viruses have infected at
least twenty-five people associated with nonhuman-primate research, killing 16 of them. There is also
reason to fear Ebola viruses, which have been responsible for two outbreaks in central Africa that have
killed hundreds.
PRIMATE RESEARCH ON AIDS RISKS EXPOSING HUMANS TO PRIMATE VIRUSES
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html,
Furthermore, through animal research, humans have been exposed to a wide variety of deadly nonhuman
primate viruses. About 16 laboratory workers have been killed by the Marburg virus and other monkey
viruses, and there have been two outbreaks of Ebola in American monkey colonies.118-120 Polio vaccines
grown on monkey kidney cells exposed millions of Americans to simian virus 40, which causes human
cells to undergo malignant transformation in vitro and has been found in several human cancers.121
Ignoring the obvious public health hazards, researchers transplanted baboon bone marrow cells into an
AIDS patient. The experiment was unsuccessful; 122 moreover, a large number of baboon viruses, which the
patient could spread to other people, may have accompanied the bone marrow. Indeed, vivisection may
have started the AIDS epidemic. HIV-1, the principal AIDS virus, differs markedly from any virus found
in nature, and there is evidence that it originated either through polio vaccine production using monkey
tissues 123,124 or through manufacture in American laboratories, where HIV-like viruses were being
produced by cancer and biological weapons researchers in the early 1970s.
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AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research
IMPACT INEVITABLE – APES ARE BAD MODELS FOR HIV RESEARCH –THEY FAIL
Murry J. Cohen, M.D. and Stephen R. Kaufman, M.D. and Brandon P. Reines, M.D. 1995 “Aping
Science Summary: A Critical Analysis of Research at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center”.
Medical Research Modernization Committee http://www.mrmcmed.org/ape.html
A large proportion of available AIDS research funds has supported experimentation on nonhuman
primates, yet the approach is replete with shortcomings. The most widely used "models" of AIDS at Yerkes
and other primate centers are monkeys infected with different strains of simian immunodeficiency virus
(SIV). However, all SIVs differ markedly from the principle AIDS-related immunodeficiency virus (HIV1). Also, monkey immunoregulatory responses to SIVs fundamentally differ from human response to HIV1. Finally, clinical features of AIDS and SIV-induced illness differ.
Contrary to claims by Yerkes officials, Yerkes researchers cannot determine whether HIV can be
transmitted via breast milk by studying SIV transmission in monkeys. Major differences exist between SIV
and HIV transmission. For example, in utero transmission occurs only rarely with SIV but frequently with
HIV, making application of SIV transmission findings to humans problematic.
Yerkes researchers have also infected chimpanzees with HIV in an attempt to study "AIDS" in nonhumans.
However, it has been exceedingly difficult to make chimpanzees sick from HIV infection. Although many
HIV researchers concede that HIV-infected chimpanzees cannot serve as reliably "models" for humans
with AIDS, Yerkes researchers continue to study HIV resistance in chimpanzees in an attempt to uncover
methods of inducing HIV resistance in humans. Studies of people who have remained AIDS-free despite
chronic HIV infection are far more relevant.
Moreover, experimentation on chimpanzees is poorly equipped to test potential AIDS vaccines. Federal
regulators have sometimes waived animal-testing requirements when a potential vaccine or drug has
appeared particularly useful. To effectively combat AIDS, we must better understand the mechanisms of
HIV transmission in humans, the disease's natural history, and humans' immunological response to HIV.
Improved understanding requires studies of humans who develop and resist illness after exposure to HIV.
CHIMPANZEES POOR TEST SUBJECTS FOR HIV
Malcolm Wood, Autumn 2003, Family Obligations,
http://www.skeptics.org.nz/SK:VIEWARTICLE:1001.4405:waDeptTOC.1,A1236
On the other hand, Penny believes the case for testing with the great apes is often overstated. Take Aids, for
example. The epidemiological and laboratory evidence from human populations is actually very strong, and
"we have learned virtually nothing of benefit to humans from infecting many chimpanzees with HIV".
And his argument for ending experimentation with the great apes is much the same as that employed by
those who want it to continue: the great apes are so like us.
CHIMPS ARE NOT GOOD SUBJECTS FOR AIDS VACCINE RESEARCH
Charles Siebert, Freelance Writer and Director, July 24, 2005, New York Times Magazine, p. 31
The great lab-chimp surplus is, in part, an unforeseeable consequence of AIDS. In 1986, the National
Institutes of Health began an aggressive breeding program that nearly doubled the number of research
chimps in the country, on the seemingly logical but ultimately incorrect assumption that our closest genetic
kin would serve as ideal models for developing a vaccine. Chimps, it turns out, can contract the virus, but
they are virtually immune to its effects.
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AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research”
CHIMPS BAD FOR AIDS RESEARCH—THEY DON’T REACT TO THE VIRUS THE SAME
WAY AS HUMANS
Wendy Thatcher, Veterinarian, visited site on July 24, 2005, Chimpanzees: Test results that Don’t
Apply to Humans, http://www.pcrm.org/resch/anexp/chimps.html
Experimenters have been infecting chimps with the HIV virus since 1984. None have become clinically ill,
in spite of being infected with several different strains of the virus, having their immune systems altered with drugs, having treatments
designed to specifically destroy the cells which are thought to be most active in protecting the body from HIV infection, and being coinfected with other viruses which were presumed to help HIV gain a foothold . Experimenters have even injected human
HIV-infected brain tissue directly into chimpanzee brains, but to no avail. 5
HIV does not reproduce well in the infected chimp. This is apparently due to the higher baseline numbers5 and greater
proliferative response6 of chimp T8 lymphocytes, as well as the lower ratio of T4 to T8 cells, 7 when compared to human blood cells.
T4 cells are central actors in most immune responses, including both cell- and antibody-mediated defenses. T4 cells are preferentially
attacked by HIV in infected human patients.8 T8 cells are thought to suppress the replication of T4 cells.5
T-lymphocytes play a crucial role in defending the body against disease organisms, through the cell-mediated immune response.
While some individual chimps may demonstrate a reduction of T4 lymphocytes after HIV infection,9 they do not show the dramatic
depletion characteristic of the human infection.10 This depletion may have an autoimmune cause in humans, since blood from HIV
patients contains T-lymphocytes which kill uninfected T4 lymphocytes in culture. These killer cells are not found in HIV-infected
chimps.11
The antibody response to HIV is also more powerful in chimps. B-lymphocytes in the HIV-infected chimp
produce greater amounts of antibodies than in most human patients, destroying infected cells early in the
course of disease. This antibody-mediated cell-killing ability is not found in HIV-infected humans at any
stage of illness.6 Also, humans show a drop in antibodies just before becoming clinically ill—this drop has
not been seen in chimps.12 Perhaps due to the chimp’s immune system, HIV is found only in their blood
cells, with very few exceptions,5 whereas in humans, it is found free in the blood plasma.
The differences in the chimpanzee and the human immune system are dramatic, and highlight the
impracticality of using these animals as a model for human AIDS. Also, above and beyond the intrinsic
cellular differences, some authors have noted that the stresses associated with captivity can alter enzyme
levels, thus invalidating experimental data.13
USE OF ANIMALS HAS BEEN USELESS IN AIDS RESEARCH
Christopher Anderegg et al, Medical Research Modernization Committee, Europeans for Medical
Progress, 2002, A Critical Look at Animal Experimentation, http://www.mrmcmed.org/critcv.html
Despite extensive use, animal models have not contributed significantly to AIDS research. While
monkeys, rabbits, and mice born with severe combined immunodeficiency can be infected with HIV, none
develops the human AIDS syndrome.39 Of over 100 chimpanzees infected with HIV over a ten year period,
only a few have become sick.40 Even AIDS researchers acknowledge that chimpanzees, as members of an
endangered species who rarely develop an AIDS-like syndrome, are unlikely to prove useful as animal
models for understanding the mechanism of infection or means of treatment.41 Other virus-induced
immunodeficiency syndromes in non-human animals have been touted as valuable models of AIDS, but
they differ markedly from AIDS in viral structure, disease symptoms, and disease progression. 42 Animal
researcher Michael Wyand, discussing anti-AIDS therapy, has acknowledged:
“Candidate antivirals have been screened using in vitro systems and those with acceptable safety profiles
have gone directly into humans with little supportive efficacy data in any in vivo [animal] system. The
reasons for this are complex but certainly include . . . the persistent view held by many that there is no
predictive animal model for HIV infection in humans.”43
AIDS researcher Margaret Johnston has concurred, "HIV/AIDS [animal] models have not yielded a clear
correlate of immunity nor given consistent results on the potential efficacy of various vaccine
approaches."44
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AT: “Extending Rights to Apes Kills AIDS Research”
NO LINK - DNA DATABASES AND HUMAN TISSUE SAMPLES ELIMINATE THE NEED FOR
AIDS AND OTHER BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH ON CHIMPS
Charles Siebert, Freelance Writer and Director, July 24, 2005, New York Times Magazine, p. 62
Many scientists now say that the use of the DNA database and human tissue samples will do away with the
need for research on chimps or any other animal, the results of which, they argue, are often misleading and
inapplicable to humans. The recently appointed scientific director of Europeans for Medical Progress,
Jarrod Bailey, is now leading a campaign to end research on animals, not on the basis of animal rights, but
rather on the grounds that such methods are by and large archaic and have prevented scientists from making
the best use of new technologies.
“We are a very technological species,” Carole Noon said to me at Save the Chimps in Alamogordo. “We
can come up with something better. Something less cruel.”
TURN - USING CHIMPANZEES FOR AIDS RESEARCH IS SLAVERY
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 13
Some readers may shift uncomfortably at comparisons between human and nonhuman slavery. I began
Rattling the Cage by recalling the brutish life and lingering death of Jerom, a chimpanzee whom
biomedical researchers imprisoned for life inside a small, dim, often chilly cell that lay within a large
windowless grey concrete box at the Yerkes Regional Primate Research Center in Atlanta, Georgia.
Without mercy, and from the time he was a baby, they repeatedly infected Jerom with HIV viruses. After a
hellish decade, he died. In a February 2000 speech in Boston’s Faneuil Hall, constitutional law professor
Laurence Tribe said, “Clearly, Jerom was enslaved.”
The first definition of “slave” in the Oxford English Dictionary is “one who is the property of, and entirely
subject to, another person, whether by capture, purchase, or birth: a servant completely divested of freedom
and personal rights.” International law has, for most of a century, defined slavery as “the status or
condition of a person over whom any or all of the powers attaching to the right of ownership are
exercised.”
CHIMPS ARE A POOR MODEL FOR HUMAN HEALTH STUDIES
Wendy Thatcher, Veterinarian, visited site on July 24, 2005, Chimpanzees: Test results that Don’t
Apply to Humans, http://www.pcrm.org/resch/anexp/chimps.html
There are many physiologic and anatomical differences between chimpanzees and humans. These
differences make them a poor “model” for humans. Data obtained on chimpanzees cannot be extrapolated
safely to the human situation
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Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now
NO ANIMAL WELFARE LAWS ON THE FACTORY FARM
Matheny and Leahy 2007 (Gaverick and Cheryl, Dept. of Agriculture and Resource Economic at Un. Of
Maryland, “Farm-Animal Welfare, Legislation, and Trade”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter
2007, Vol. 70:325, pg. 336)
Even more remarkable than the exceptions to existing federal legislation is the absence of any federal law
protecting the welfare of farm animals while on the farm. As far as the federal government is concerned,
any husbandry act or omission is legal. State anti-cruelty statutes may provide some protection for farm
animals, but most states have exempted “customary” farming practices, no matter how abusive they may be
under an objective definition of “cruelty.” The remaining state statutes often restrict coverage of their
cruelty laws to “unnecessary” cruelty; injuring animals in order to produce food may not be considered
unnecessary. These exemptions mean that farm animals do not receive the legal protection we afford other
animals. Acts that are criminal when performed on dogs or cats can be legally performed on farm animals.
LAX PROTECTIONS FOR FARM ANIMAL WELFARE LEAD TO TREMENDOUS ABUSES
AND SUFFERING
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
390-1
Also since Sinclair's book, animal cruelty statues have become more broadly accepted. Statues such as
these were promulgated in Sinclair's time but were not frequently used. Animals should be more protected
than ever against intentional infliction of unnecessary pain, but again this is not the case today. In many
influential animal cruelty statutes such as state anti-cruelty statutes and the Animal Welfare Act, livestock
is exempted from protection. The agriculture industry gets a legal pass in their treatment of animals. The
result of this is that animals used in the food supply which are raised on factory farms (mostly cows, pigs,
and chickens) are subject to unrelenting cruelty. This cruelty is fueled by mass producing factory farms
which process millions of animals a day for slaughter and often do not have the time to abide by humane
slaughter statutes because of self imposed output requirements. n11 This is coupled with lax enforcement by
the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspectors who distance themselves from the
slaughterhouse floor so that the pain and suffering of factory farmed animals goes unnoticed. n12
FACTORY FARMING EXPLOITS ANIMALS AT ALL COSTS IGNORING AND DENYING
THEIR SUFFERING AND BASIC NEEDS
Joyce D’Silva, Chief Executive of Compassion in World Farming, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 39-40
So there’s Fast-track Farming for you. A series of methodologies and practices designed to exploit the
potential of different species of farm animals – at any cost. Never mind that the animals may never get to
walk or fly, never get to live in natural social groups, that the young may never get nurtured by their
mothers, or have only a highly abbreviated nurturing period, that daily life may be intensely boring – dare I
say soul-destroying – and may often be a life engulfed in pain. Fast-track farming, factory farming, or
whatever euphemism you wish to use, is based on the premise of utility: animals are there to be exploited to
their maximum physiological potential in order that maximum profit can be had. There is no true
husbandry.
Fast-track Farming is in denial of animals’ capacities as sentient beings. It often fails to recognize their
capacity for physical pain and suffering. It totally fails to acknowledge that farm animals, like their wild
ancestors, have psychological and social needs too. Calves want to be with their mothers – cows want to be
with their calves; the same goes for lambs and ewes, piglets and sows. Young animals want to play; older
animal often want to be in a family or social grouping of some sort. Fast-track Farming prides itself on
being modern and up-to-the-minute in its use of the latest technology or feed ingredient or breeding
method. In truth it is old-fashioned. It’s old fashioned because it hasn’t kept up with new research
showing the amazing range of farm animals’ abilities. It has not embraced new research showing the
capacity of chickens – and fish –to feel pain. It is in denial of research showing states of neuroticism in
crated sows or bereavement-type behavior in cows deprived of their calves.
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Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now
99% OF FARM ANIMALS ARE TREATED INHUMANELY
Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Professor Agricultural Economics U. Maryland & General
Counsel, Compassion over Killing, 2007, Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter, 70 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 325, p. 329
The changes in farm animal production have created a number of welfare problems on the farm, during
transport, and during slaughter. Contrary to the image of Old MacDonald's Farm, ninety-nine percent of
U.S. farm animals never spend time outdoors; n22 they spend their entire lives overcrowded with tens of
thousands of other animals, living in their own manure, in barren sheds. Most farm animals cannot engage
in natural behaviors such as foraging, perching, nesting, rooting, and mating, and many are not even able to
turn around or fully stretch their limbs.
CAFOs INCREASE SUFFERING – PHYSICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL DEPRIVATIONS
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 11
The final new source of suffering in industrialized agriculture results from physical and psychological
deprivation for animals in confinement: lack of space, lack of companionship for social animals, inability to
move freely, boredom, austerity of environments, and so on. Since the animals evolved for adaptation to
extensive environments but are now placed in truncated environments, such deprivation is inevitable. This
was not a problem in traditional, extensive agriculture.
INTENSIVE CONFINEMENT OF FARM ANIMALS IS CRUEL – IMPOSES MUCH SUFFERING
Humane Society of the US, 2008, An HSUS Report :The Welfare of Intensively Confined Animals in
Battery Cages, Gestation Crates, and Veal Crates, [http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/hsus-thewelfare-of-intensively-confined-animals.pdf], p. 1
Within U.S. animal agriculture, the majority of egg-laying hens, pregnant sows, and calves raised for
veal are reared in battery cages, gestation crates, and veal crates, respectively. The intensive
confinement of these production systems severely impairs the animals’ welfare, as they are unable to
exercise, fully extend their limbs, or engage in many important natural behaviors. As a result of the
severe restriction within these barren housing systems, animals can experience significant and
prolonged physical and psychological assaults. Indeed, extensive scientific evidence shows that
intensively confined farm animals are frustrated, distressed, and suffering. Battery cages for egglaying hens and crates for pregnant sows and calves are simply not appropriate environments.
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CAFOs INFLICT TREMENDOUS AMOUNT OF SUFFERING ON ANIMALS
Holly Cheever, Veterinarian, 2000, Albany Law Environmental Outlook Journal, Fall, 5 Alb. L. Envtl.
Outlook 2, p. 45-6
As mentioned, one of the greatest tragedies for the animals raised in modern intensive confinement systems
is their inability to lead anything remotely resembling a "normal" or natural life. In the interests of
increasing profit margins by cramming the maximal numbers of animals into the minimal amount of space,
animals are denied the opportunity to go outside, to exist in their evolutionarily determined natural social
groupings (note that all of the "food animal" species are intensely social beings), to eat a natural diet, and to
follow their natural biorhythms and hormonal patterns for reproduction. Their abnormal and highly
stressful existence produces a wealth of illness and abnormal stereotypic and aggressive behaviors, not seen
in their natural groupings. Rather than redesign their environments to eliminate these stresses, the animal is
redesigned (de-beaking in chickens and tail docking in hogs, for example) to minimize the damage that
each "product" can inflict on its cage- or pen-mates. Very little, if any, attention is paid to the animal's
physical and behavioral needs other than the minimum diet needed for growth and production. Yet animal
scientists and ethologists increasingly remind us that our domestically bred food animal species still have
the behavioral propensities and physical needs of their wild ancestors. n10 I will merely highlight some of
the standard industrial practices that are particularly cruel.
"Battery" chickens--the term for chickens raised for egg production--suffer horribly so that Americans can
consume massive numbers of eggs at low cost. The battery cage, roughly the size of the front page of a
daily newspaper, may hold 3 to 5 chickens, each one being accorded a mere 48 square inches of space
standing on wire mesh. There is no opportunity for dust baths, for preening and perching, nor for the hours
of concentrated food prehension and social interaction that occupy a natural hen's waking hours. There is
not even the opportunity to stretch their wings to their full 3-foot extent. After 80 weeks of egg production,
as the laying cycle begins to wane and egg numbers drop, the flock is shocked into a second season of
production by "forced moulting" in which the entire flock is abruptly denied any food for an average of 10
to 14 days. They are starved, in fact, in a manner that is illegal by every state's anti-cruelty statutes with
which I am familiar. However, due to the power of the agribusiness and farm bureau lobby, there are few
(if any) states' attorneys general willing to take on a case of this nature.
For those hens who survive this brutal process and then survive the reintroduction of feed two weeks later
(many hens die of choking and crop impaction in their frantic efforts to eat after their prolonged starvation),
they will demonstrate a drop of 25-35% body weight--think about that in your own terms--and will have
suffered atrophy of muscle, liver, skeleton, and reproductive tissues. They may have pathological bone
fractures due to calcium loss and will have a higher incidence of the transmission of Salmonella to their
eggs due to the well-known [*46] impact of stress and starvation on the immune system. The human
health impact of increased Salmonella in eggs has caused the USDA's Food Safety and Inspection Service
to ask egg and poultry producers to "eliminate forced molting practices and adopt alternatives that reduce
public health risks." n11 However, surviving hens will demonstrate increased egg production until their
slaughter at 110 to 140 weeks of age.
The de-beaking mentioned earlier is the means by which the hens are prevented from attacking each other
to the point of death as a reaction to their intense and stressful overcrowding. Despite the assurances by Mr.
Frank Perdue that de-beaking is no more painful than cutting off the tip of your "pinkie nail," it is a
horrendously painful procedure analogous to slicing off the front third of a human's face and results in
chronic phantom pain in addition to the acute pain of the procedure. Let us not forget the fate of the male
chicks born in an egg production facility: having no future as egg layers, they are exterminated by
economically profitable methods including suffocation by successive layers of discarded chicks in
dumpsters or in large plastic bags and by being ground alive in the equivalent of an industrial-strength
Waring blender. Unfortunately, these birds, whether male or female, never have an opportunity to express
many complicated behavior patterns and their intelligence, to which private flock managers can well attest.
Veal calves are another particularly abused species due to the production system that gives the public the
delicacy of pale-fleshed "milk-fed" veal. They are a byproduct of the dairy industry: male calves have no
future in the milking line and are sent off to veal calf operations at a few days of age (sometimes before
they are able to stand in the transport trucks, resulting in fractured legs during shipping). They are confined
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in straight slatted stalls of 22-inch widths, denying them the opportunity to turn around or lie down
comfortably and denying them also any access to natural forage, as well as the opportunity to move about
and socialize with conspecifics, an intense behavioral drive in ruminant species. They are fed an irondeficient, antibiotic-laced all-milk diet, which renders them slightly anemic (hence the prized pale flesh).
Due to their abnormal diet, their normal digestive processes as ruminants never start, and they excrete a
low-grade diarrhea throughout their short existence. They are slaughtered at 4 months of age, beyond which
their abnormal diet and husbandry would result in diminishing returns for the producer due to the calves' ill
health and increased mortality rates. The bottom line here is to slaughter them before they begin to fail. n12 I
again refer the reader to the books mentioned above for more detailed information concerning the suffering
imposed on "farm" animals in the name of corporate profit.
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Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now
MANY FACTORY FARMING PRACTICES INFLICT TREMENDOUS PAIN AND SUFFERING
ON FARM ANIMALS
Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Professor Agricultural Economics U. Maryland & General
Counsel, Compassion over Killing, 2007, Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter, 70 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 325, p. 330-2
In the United States, almost nine billion chickens, known as broilers, are raised for meat, and more than
270 million turkeys are reared and slaughtered each year. Virtually all these birds are members of fastgrowing breeds produced by a handful of breeding companies. Broilers now reach market weight in seven
weeks - around one-third the time it took fifty years ago. Turkeys now reach market weight in four months
- about half the time it took fifty years ago.
The birds' rapid growth contributes to a number of welfare problems, including skeletal, respiratory, and
cardiovascular disease, as well as chronic hunger in breeding stock. n27 Between one-third and one-half of
birds suffer from leg deformities, and one-quarter are believed to suffer chronic pain. n28 Because of the
vast number of broilers and turkeys raised each year, fast growth has been called, "in both magnitude and
severity, the single most severe, systematic example of man's inhumanity to another sentient animal." n29
Egg-laying hens face their own set of inhumane practices. Around ninety-five percent of the approximately
350 million egg-laying hens in the United States are housed in barren wire cages known as "battery cages."
n30
Battery cages are known to contribute to a number of welfare problems: they typically afford less than
half a square foot of area per hen, preventing the birds from stretching their wings; they contribute to bone
weakness and fractures during depopulation; and they are barren, preventing hens from natural behaviors
such as nesting, perching, or dustbathing. n31
By the end of their two laying cycles, most birds are physically wrecked from a lay-rate ten times higher
than natural. n32 Between eighty and ninety percent suffer from osteoporosis by the time they are considered
"spent," and one-quarter suffer one or more bone fractures. n33 In its 1996 report, the European
Commission's Scientific Veterinary Committee (SVC) condemned the battery cage, concluding, "It is clear
that because of its small size and its barrenness, the battery cage as used at present has inherent severe
disadvantages for the welfare of hens." n34
In the United States, six million breeding sows are maintained in commercial production, making up ten
percent of the U.S. pig population. n35 When pregnant, sixty to seventy percent of these sows are kept in
barren, individual, concrete-floored stalls, called gestation crates, measuring seven feet long by two feet
wide - too small for sows to turn around. n36 Nearly all of a sow's sixteen-week pregnancy is spent in the
crate; immobilizing sows decreases the costs of labor and extra feeding equipment. n37
In its review, the European Union's SVC concluded, "Since overall welfare appears to be better when sows
are not confined throughout gestation, sows should preferably be kept in groups." n38 The report notes that
when sows are housed in groups rather than in crates,
sows have more exercise, more control over their environment, more opportunity for normal social
interactions, and better potential for the provision of opportunities to root or manipulate materials... . As a
consequence, group-housed sows show less abnormality of bone and muscle development, much less
abnormal behaviour, less likelihood of extreme physiological responses, less of the urinary tract infections
associated with inactivity, and better cardiovascular fitness. n39
Calves raised for veal are typically tethered by the neck or confined in individual stalls, or both; the stalls
are so small that the calves cannot turn around during their entire sixteen to eighteen week lives. n40
Immobilizing calves reduces labor and housing costs and prevents muscle development, making the
resulting meat a pale color, preferred by some consumers. n41
Veal crates have been widely criticized on animal-welfare grounds, although it is unlikely they are worse
than gestation crates or battery cages. The European Union's SVC concluded,
The welfare of calves is very poor when they are kept in small individual pens with insufficient room for
comfortably lying, no direct social contact and no bedding or other material to manipulate... . In order to
provide an environment which is adequate for exercise, exploration and free social interaction, calves
should be kept in groups. n42
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COWS ARE TORTURED DURING PROCESSING AT CAFOs
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
401-3
Ramon Moreno worked at an IBP, Inc. meatpacking plant in Washington state. n110 His job was to cut the
legs off of dead cows that came past him on an assembly line, which sent by 309 cows per hour. n111 The
Humane Slaughter Act dictates that the cows are supposed to be rendered unconscious before Moreno starts
his job, but this does not always occur. n112 Moreno said that when the cows get to his station "They blink,
they make noises . . . the head moves, the eyes are wide and looking around." n113
Today's factory farms are so fast and have such heightened production that it only takes 25 minutes to
process a cow in the meatpacking plant and ship it off to supermarkets as prepackaged steak. n114 Moreno
states that he does his job regardless of whether the cow is dead or alive and that he is required to remove
the legs of "dozens" of live cows per day. n115 In fact, he states that cows may even make it through his
station still alive and reach further processing areas such as the hide remover that they are required to go
through while still alive. n116 Moreno states that the cows die in the meatpacking plant "piece by piece." n117
In 1998, the government discovered that a Texas slaughterhouse was cutting the hooves off of live cows
and received 22 citations but the government failed to act. n118 Even while workers cannot keep up with line
speeds the way they are, line speeds are continuing to increase. The rate "increased from 50 head of cattle
an hour in the early 1990s to almost 400 head an hour in some of the newest plants" in the United States.
n119
Yet, "[t]he line is never stopped simply because an animal is alive." n120
USDA is supposed to be enforcing the Humane Slaughter Act so that cows are immediately unconscious
before they are processed by workers like Moreno, but veterinarians state that Moreno's story ". . .happens
on a daily basis." n121 CAFOs have strict production quotas and USDA agents, even while observing a
violation, rarely stop the production line or else they are harassed by the CAFO owner for costing the
CAFO money. n122 Many USDA agents are therefore frightened to act and the result is that the Humane
Slaughter Act is rarely enforced. Even if a line is stopped or a violation is witnessed by the USDA,
"sanctions are rare." n123 This kind of cruelty even has an effect on quality of meat because "[f]ear and pain
cause animals to produce hormones that damage meat and cost companies tens of millions of dollars a year
in discarded product . . . ." n124 Apparently this loss of product does not bother the CAFO owners who
consider animals to be unfeeling automatons that are easily replaceable and easily bred. They see animals
that suffer and die from extreme conditions in their plant as a cost of doing business.
Unfortunately, another animal protection law, the Animal Welfare Act, protects animals used in research
and exempts livestock. n125 Furthermore, the anti-cruelty laws of various states also exempt farm animals so
unless the USDA is enforcing the Humane Slaughter Act, the evisceration of live animals a little at a time
at meatpacking plants is allowed to continue unnoticed.
VEAL CALVES SUBJECTED TO CRUELTY
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
403-4
Undoubtedly, the worst abuse of cows in meatpacking plants occurs to veal calves. Because the gourmet
meat of the veal calf is very unique and consumers have certain, strict expectations for it, the calf is raised
with unrelenting cruelty. The cruelty begins when the calf is born and is torn from its mother before
weaning. n130 The calf then is forced into anemia because it is only given powered milk to drink and no
water or solid food. n131 The calf is also drugged to increase its weight, and it is forced to remain immobile,
chained into wooden crates so small that the calf cannot even turn around. n132 The calf never leaves the
crate and is even forced to live in its own excrement which makes the calf vulnerable to respiratory
problems to the point where ten percent of CAFO veal calves die before slaughter even while force-fed
antibiotics.
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Farm Animals Subject to Abuse and Exploitation Now
CHICKENS ARE SERIOUSLY MISTREATED IN CAFOs
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
404-5
Even though the Humane Slaughter Act is virtually unenforced for the animals it is supposed to protect,
chickens and other poultry are completely exempted from Humane Slaughter Act protection. n134 This is
especially baffling considering that 80% of animals slaughtered for meat are chickens. n135 The lack of legal
protection leaves doors wide open for cruelty towards chickens. In fact, "[t]he on-farm death rate ranges
from a low of 4 percent for cows and calves to 12 percent for turkeys, 14 percent for hogs, and 28 percent
for some types of chickens." n136 Perhaps so many chickens are dying on the farm because of the lack of
legal protections they are afforded.
Broiler chickens are those chickens raised for meat while egg-laying chickens are raised for eggs. Broilers
were the first species to be confined to factory farms and just one person could be responsible for 10,000
chickens. n137 Broilers share their cage with many other broilers and do not have space to flap their wings
which is an innate behavior that chickens engage in. To compensate for this close confinement, factory
farmers (without anesthetic) remove the beak (debeak) of the chickens with a hot iron so that they cannot
peck each other or become cannibals. n138 Therefore, the factory farmers torture the birds due to a close
confinement condition that they create. If the birds were given more space, they would not have to be
painfully debeaked. The fact that the chickens exhibit such dysfunctional behavior when they are placed
too close together demonstrates that it is cruel and unnatural to confine the chickens in this manner. The
egg-laying chickens are kept in the infamous "battery cage" device, where four or five chickens are
expected to live in a "twelve by twenty inch space" which is also too small to allow the chickens to flap
their wings or turn around. n139 These metal wire cages cause foot sores and prevent the chickens from
scratching the ground. n140 Egg-laying chickens are starved so that egg producers can shock the birds into
laying more eggs. n141
PIGS ARE TORTURED – GESTATION CRATES PARTICULARLY CRUEL
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
400
Pigs have many of the same problems as chickens. Pigs are also closely confined to small spaces and this
practice causes the pigs to painfully bite the tails of other pigs. n142 In order to deter this behavior, pig
farmers, again without costly anesthesia, practice tail docking where the pig's tail is cut and teeth pulling.
Pigs in CAFOs can be seen trying to bite the metal bars in an attempt to escape their cages. n143 Pigs also
suffer similar abuses to cows in that the Humane Slaughter Act is violated. High line speeds make it
possible and even likely that many pigs are sent to the hot scalding water vat alive, which is the station they
pass through before they are skinned. n144
Sows are especially abused because they are kept in "gestation crates" where they are continually bred and
are not allowed to move because they are locked between bars which resemble a prison cell. n145 They exist
in complete darkness until it is their feeding time. n146 Perhaps it is good that they continuously have babies
because once they have outlived their usefulness and can no longer reproduce or they become sick, they are
killed by a captive bolt gun. They are then thrown in a hole or taken to the rendering department and then
delivered to die in mass graves, only to be consumed by other mass confined animals or by people through
Gummy Bears. n147 Even though exercise is a necessity for all animals, sows are forced to live within the
confines of their gestation crate and are not allowed to exercise as it allows them to ". . .carry more fetuses.
We get rid of them after eight litters." n148
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Factory Farm Abuse Immoral/Unethical
CAFOS UNETHICAL – INHUMANE TREATMENT OF ANIMALS
Leo Horrigan et al, Center for a Livable Future, Johns Hopkins, 2002, Environmental Health
Perspectives, Vol. 110, No. 5, May, [http://www.ehponline.org/members/2002/110p445456horrigan/EHP110p445PDF.PDF], p. 449
By concentrating hundreds or thousands of animals into crowded indoor facilities, factory farms raise
ethical issues about their treatment of animals. Each full-grown chicken in a factory farm has as little as 0.6
ft2 of space. Crowded together in this way, chickens become aggressive toward each other and sometimes
even eat one another. For this reason, factory farms subject them to painful debeaking (64). Hogs, too,
become aggressive in tight quarters and often bite each other’s tails. In response, factory farmers often cut
off their tails. Concrete or slatted floors allow for easy removal of manure, but because they are unnatural
surfaces for pigs, they result in skeletal deformities of the legs and feet (65). Ammonia and other gases
from the manure irritate animals’ lungs, making them susceptible to pneumonia. Researchers from the
University of Minnesota found pneumonia-like lesions on the lungs of 65% of 34,000 hogs they inspected
(66). Factory farms chain veal calves around the neck to prevent them from turning around in their narrow
stalls. Movement is discouraged so that the calves’ muscles will be underdeveloped and their flesh will be
tender. They are kept in isolation and near or total darkness during their 4-month lives and are fed an irondeficient diet to induce anemia so that their flesh develops the pale color prized in the marketplace (65).
ANIMAL CONFINEMENT VIOLATES BASIC ETHICAL STANDARDS
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, 2008, Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial
Farm Animal Production in America,
[http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Industrial_Agriculture/PCIFAP_FINA
L.pdf], p. 58
In addition, intensive confinement systems increase negative stress levels in the animals, posing an ethical
dilemma for producers and consumers. This dilemma can be summed up by asking ourselves if we owe the
animals in our care a decent life. If the answer is yes, there are standards by which one can measure the
quality of that life. By most measures, confined animal production systems in common use today fall short
of current ethical and societal standards.
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Factory Farms Result of Speciesism
HUMAN SUPERIORITY IN THE LAW IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CAFOS
Cassuto 2007 (David Cassuto, As. Prof of Law at Pace, “Bred Meat: the Cultural Foundation of the
Factory Farm”, Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter 2007, Vol. 70:59, pg. 61-2)
This article argues that the ability of large-scale industrial farms to commodify animals in the face of strong
countervailing social forces stems in large part from the legal system’s embrace of a secularized but
nonetheless deeply religious vision of human ascendancy. Within this belief system, animals comprise
beings through whom we define ourselves by contrast and to whom we deny ingress to the legal system.
The impulse to increase protections for nonhuman animals is offset by institutionally privileged categories
of behavior that commidify nonhumans and strip them of legal defenses. The resulting lattice of laws
purports to safeguard animals while instead sanctioning and enabling the practices from which they require
protection. The human–animal dichotomy is no more a “fact” than any other religiously derived norm.
Nevertheless, it enjoys a form of constitutional protection seemingly at odds with the Constitution’s
Establishment Clause.
It further leads to “speciesism,” a category of discrimination that makes membership in the privileged
species a prerequisite for access to the moral community. Despite the dominance of the mythic divide
between humans and animals and the economic and political ascendancy of factory farms, the discourse of
species and its accompanying ethical issues continues to shift. Therein lies the increasing vulnerability of
the idea of a singular, dominant species that alone possesses the characteristics necessary for entrance to the
moral and legal community. This fragile notion of human ascendancy as well as the complex social trends
undergirding it forms the foundation of this article.
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202
AT: “Confinement More Humane/Better for Animal Welfare”
DISADVANTAGES OUTWEIGH ADVANTAGES OF INTENSIVE CONFINEMENT FOR
LAYER HENS
Humane Society of the US, 2008, An HSUS Report :The Welfare of Intensively Confined Animals in
Battery Cages, Gestation Crates, and Veal Crates, [http://www.hsus.org/web-files/PDF/farm/hsus-thewelfare-of-intensively-confined-animals.pdf], p. 4
There is a strong argument firmly based on extensive scientific evidence that cages are not
appropriate environments for laying hens. The most recent comprehensive analysis of the welfare of
laying hens in cages and alternative systems was the LayWel project, a collaborative effort among
working groups in seven different European countries that examined data collected from 230
different hen flocks. After reviewing all of the current science, the report concluded:
With the exception of conventional cages, we conclude that all systems have the potential to provide
satisfactory welfare for laying hens….Conventional cages do not allow hens to fulfil behaviour
priorities, preferences and needs for nesting, perching, foraging and dustbathing in particular. The
severe spatial restriction also leads to disuse osteoporosis. We believe these disadvantages
outweigh the advantages of reduced parasitism, good hygiene and simpler management. The
advantages can be matched by other systems that also enable a much fuller expression of normal
behaviour. A reason for this decision is the fact that every individual hen is affected for the duration
of the laying period by behavioural restriction. Most other advantages and disadvantages are much
less certain and seldom affect all individuals to a similar degree.8
Indeed, in addition to the findings of the LayWel project, many other experts agree that, in general,
hen welfare is compromised more in cages than in properly managed alternative systems89,90 and
that the differences between cage and cage-free systems are such that there is a clear welfare
advantage for hens who are not confined in cages.77 According to Michael Appleby, former Senior
Lecturer in Farm Animal Behavior at the University of Edinburgh:
Battery cages present inherent animal welfare problems, most notably by their small size and barren
conditions. Hens are unable to engage in many of their natural behaviors and endure high levels of
stress and frustration. Cage-free egg production, while not perfect, does not entail such inherent
animal welfare disadvantages and is a very good step in the right direction for the egg industry.
CAFOs WORSE FOR ANIMAL WELFARE – VIEW ANIMALS AS PRODUCTION UNITS
RATHER THAN SENTIENT BEINGS
Humane Society of the US, 2008, Factory Farming in America: the true cost of animal agribusiness for
rural communities, public health, families, the environment and animals, [http://www.hsus.org/webfiles/PDF/farm/hsus-factory-farming-in-america-the-true-cost-of-animal-agribusiness.pdf], p. 10
As industrial animal production facilities displace the independent family farmers who once raised
most of the nation’s farm animals, animal agribusiness has also lost the traditional U.S. farmer’s
connection to—and compassion for—the animals. Rather than regarding animals as sentient
individuals, today’s animal agribusiness industries treat them as “production units,” denying the
billions of animals raised for food in the United States most of their natural behaviors and subjecting
them to selective breeding for overproduction, overuse of antibiotics, overcrowding, intensive
confinement, and physical mutilations including castration, dehorning, and beak-trimming—all
performed without painkillers.*
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Abuse of Farm Animals Threatens Human Survival
PROTECTION FOR ANIMAL WELFARE VITAL TO HUMAN SURVIVAL
Roland Bonney & Marian Stamp Dawkins, Zoology Professor Oxford & Director Food Animal
Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R.
Bonney, p. 2
As Bernie Rollin explains more fully in the next chapter, this interdependence between humans and
animals can be seen as a kind of contract – a “deal” that goes back over thousands of years of human
history. Traditionally, the deal was that farm animals provided us with food, clothing and much else while
we provided them with food, protection from the elements from predators. Humans have most often cared
for their animals not out of sentiment but because their animals were valuable to them. With the
industrialization of agriculture, we have broken that contract. Many people are no longer in touch with
how farm animals are raised and so the health and welfare of food animals no longer seems to affect their
own survival so directly. But indirectly it still does. Disease in food animals has potentially catastrophic
effects on human health and the ecological effects of poor farming practices threaten the very life of the
planet. It is time to renew the ancient contract for the benefit of all us, not because it would be a pleasant
extra if we could afford it but because it is a necessity we cannot afford to be without.
The exact terms of the new contract have yet to be worked out in detail because there are no easy solutions
to the problems that confront us. On our side, there will have to be many changes – in our mind sets, in our
diets, in our business models, and in the ways we keep animals. Furthermore, the future itself is uncertain
as far as the technology that might become available or the changes in climate that might occur are
concerned. But the essential elements are already clear. As this book shows, there are successful ways of
farming that give priority to animal welfare, deliver high quality food, protect the environment, and most
importantly, make business sense. What people value in their food is changing and continues to change.
As a result, there are some surprising changes in the way that global businesses set their priorities. There
are commercial as well as social and ethical benefits to animal welfare.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE NEEDS AND WELFARE OF FARM ANIMALS CAN LEAD THE
WAY IN CHALLENGING INDUSTRIALIZATION TRENDS THAT THREATEN PLANETARY
SURVIVAL
Kate Rawles, Lancaster University Lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 59
To conclude, then, animal welfare and environmental problems have a shared root cause in the mindset that
sees others in purely instrumental terms as a set of resources for humans; and that sees ourselves as
detached and separate managers of these systems. This worldview, and the inadequate shallow
environmental ethic that accompanies it, are amongst the most significant things that need to be tackled if
we are to respond to the clear wake-up calls that are coming from many quarters – from climate change,
from the desperately accelerated extinction of our fellow species, and from systematically poor levels of
animal welfare. These issues are all connected and cannot be tackled separately. To take them together is
to see that industrialized societies are heading in the wrong direction and that profound changes are needed.
Farming is both implicated in this and strongly positioned to show the way forward. Farming affects all of
these issues – animal welfare, the environment, human health and well-being. And farming and food
production affects us all. We all have a stake in its future. What sort of farming with what sort of ethics,
underpinned by what sort of worldview do we want? One that leads towards ecological disaster or one that
leads us towards a saner, healthier, fairer future for all? The general answer is clear.
To get there, we need to re-forge the ancient contract between humans, animals, and the land, and
understand ourselves as members of a living ecological community in which others are treated with respect.
This does not mean treating them as sacrosanct and unusable but it does mean treating animals as sentient
beings with social, behavioral and other needs, and it does mean working with the grain of living systems
rather than against, ensuring that farming is compatible with biodiversity and minimizing its climate change
impact.
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Abuse of Farm Animals Threatens Human Survival
FAILURE TO ACCOUNT FOR ANIMAL WELFARE THREATENS HUMAN SURVIVAL
Bernie Rollin, Professor Philosophy Colorado State University, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming:
renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 11
The subject of this chapter is a betrayal of great magnitude, the modern human abrogation of our ancient
contract with animals and with the earth, which contract nourished and sustained the growth of our
civilization and, with consummate irony, allowed us to develop the science and technology which in turn
enabled us to cavalierly disregard that same contract. This betrayal is not only a moral violation of our ageold relationship with animals, but a prudential denial of our own self-interest. For unless we renew the
symbiosis intrinsic to that contract, we will be unable to nourish ourselves physically; in the end, like all
animals, we must eat to live, reproduce, and survive. And the end of this contract means an end to a
renewable food supply, without which abrogation cannot be sustained.
ANIMAL WELFARE IS CRITICAL TO SUSTAINABLE FARMING AND PLANETARY
SURVIVAL
Roland Bonney & Marian Stamp Dawkins, Zoology Professor Oxford & Director Food Animal
Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R.
Bonney, p. 169
We hope you have enjoyed the book and have found it interesting or surprising or informative or thought
provoking or, best of all, all of these. The future of animal farming is more uncertain than perhaps it has
ever been and the one thing we can expect is change. In dealing with that change and working for a
sustainable future for the planet, all of us who care about animals, and indeed the health of our own species,
need to make sure that animal welfare remains firmly at the center of what is meant by sustainable farming.
Farming that ignores animals welfare cannot be “sustainable.”
ANIMAL WELFARE KEY TO PROMOTING HUMAN WELFARE AND ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPROVEMENTS
Roland Bonney & Marian Stamp Dawkins, Zoology Professor Oxford & Director Food Animal
Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R.
Bonney, p. 1-2
But in today’s global economy, with its increasing concern about climate change, is this possible? Isn’t
animal welfare a luxury for a rich minority and quite irrelevant to the majority of people in the world who
cannot afford it? Surely there is not enough space, or enough money, or enough anything to achieve high
standards of animal welfare when we are not even managing to ensure basic standards of human welfare?
Surely we are going to have to make some very difficult choices. Of course we are. The point we want to
make in this book is that those choices should put animal welfare at the heart of farming, even for those
who put human welfare first. You don’t have to care much about animals at all to see that their health and
welfare will affect the health and well-being of you and your family and the whole human species through
the food you eat, the diseases that might affect you, and the impact that agriculture of all sorts has on the
whole planet.
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Abuse of Farm Animals Threatens Food Safety
HUMANE TREATMENT OF FARM ANIMALS KEY TO FOOD SAFETY
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, 2008, Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial
Farm Animal Production in America,
[http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Industrial_Agriculture/PCIFAP_FINA
L.pdf], p. 38
The Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production considers animal well-being an essential
component of a safe and sustainable production system for farm animals. Food animals that are treated well
and provided with at least minimum accommodation of their natural behaviors and physical needs are
healthier and safer for human consumption. After reviewing the literature, visiting production facilities, and
listening to producers themselves, the Commission believes that the most intensive confinement systems,
such as restrictive veal crates, hog gestation pens, restrictive farrowing crates, and battery cages for poultry,
all prevent the animal from a normal range of movement and constitute inhumane treatment.
HUMANE TREATMENT KE TO ANIMAL WELFARE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC
HEALTH THREATS
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, 2008, Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial
Farm Animal Production in America,
[http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Industrial_Agriculture/PCIFAP_FINA
L.pdf], p. 83
There is increasing, broad-based interest in commonsense, husbandry-based agriculture that is humane,
sustainable, ethical, and a source of pride to its practitioners. Proper animal husbandry practices (e.g.,
breeding for traits besides productivity, growth, and carcass condition) and animal management are critical
to the welfare of farm animals, as well as to the environment and public health. Evaluating animal welfare
without taking into account animal health, husbandry practices, and normal behaviors for each species is
inadequate and inappropriate.
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Abuse of Farm Animals Increases Disease Risk
ANIMAL STRESS INCREASES DISEASE TRANSMISSION
Holly Cheever, Veterinarian, 2000, Albany Law Environmental Outlook Journal, Fall, 5 Alb. L. Envtl.
Outlook 2, p. 46-7
One common denominator seen in the intensive confinement systems outlined above and in the reference
readings is the development of intense stress in the animals subjected to these forms of husbandry. With
overcrowding and its resultant highly concentrated ammonia fumes come a high density of pathogens and
an impaired immune system weakened by the constant release of stress hormones. An impaired immune
system, in turn, causes increased susceptibility to and transmission of disease organisms. When coupled
with the producers' desire to maximize growth and hasten slaughter time, food additives are introduced to
increase growth rates while keeping animals alive in hostile environments. These additives can have serious
repercussions on human health and the development of antibiotic resistance in pathogenic bacteria. n13
Growth enhancers have been used heavily in beef, veal, and swine operations. By treating animals with
these hormones and hormone-like substances, a better profit margin of weight gain versus feed costs is
achieved. A popular substance used in the 70's was DES (diethylstilbesterol), which was later found to have
carcinogenic properties in humans. n14 Clenbuterol, a steroid-like chemical, was then used in veal
production for growth enhancement during the 90's. It could increase daily growth rates by as much as
30%, n15 but was illegal due to the toxic effects suffered by many humans exposed to this chemical. Side
effects include an increased heart rate, headaches, muscle tremors, nausea, dizziness, and even death. n16 I
encourage the reader to obtain the Humane Farming Association's Special Reports for an account of the
successful prosecution of the veal producers using this illegal drug, despite the attempts at a cover-up by
the Federal Drug Administration.
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Abuse of Farm Animals Increases Disease Risk
INHUMANE CONDITIONS AT CAFOs INCREASE HEALTH RISKS
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
391-3
Most Americans give little or no thought to the origin of the food they consume. Many think food is safe
because it is regulated by the USDA. Yet as the continuation of e-coli infections show, this is not the case.
As of 2003, "foodborne illness continues to sicken an estimated 76 million, hospitalize 325,000, and kill
5,000 Americans each year." n13
E-coli and Salmonella can be found in the intestines of healthy livestock, but poor sanitation causes these
pathogens to "contaminate meat during sloppy high-speed slaughter." n14 There are machines in
slaughterhouses that rip out the intestines of animals, spilling fecal material containing e-coli and other
pathogens onto meat intended for consumption. n15 Before, animals contaminated with fecal material had to
be condemned (not put into the food supply) but the USDA now considers feces a "cosmetic blemish,"
allowing workers to rinse it off and further process it for consumption. n16 Cross-contamination is especially
likely since the meat that goes into one hamburger could be from over 100 different animals. n17
An especially egregious example of food poisoning occurred in the 1980s. At that time, the U.S.
government bought of the ground beef used for USDA's school lunch program from one company, Cattle
King Packing Company. n18 An investigation found the meatpacking plant to be overrun with rats and
cockroaches and the company frequently ". . . hid diseased cattle from inspectors, and mixed rotten meat
that had been returned by customers into packages of hamburger meat." n19 Furthermore, when a plant in
Texas that supplied 45% of school lunch beef was tested, a 47% salmonella contamination rate among all
the ground beef was discovered. n20 Salmonella causes 1.4 million illnesses annually and its presence is
indicative of fecal matter contamination. n21 Even for some time after this discovery, the USDA remarkably
still bought the meat. n22 If school children with low immunity are given this kind of priority by the
government, the outlook for the average American meat consumer is grim.
Safe Tables Our Priority (S.T.O.P.) is a non-profit organization that serves as advocates for food safety in
regards to meat. They especially advocate for children since children's immune systems are not yet fully
developed and therefore children are especially vulnerable to contamination and pathogens in meat that has
not been cooked or handled properly. n23 In fact, 16,000 students fell ill from tainted school meat
throughout the 1990s and 300 instances of foodborne poisoning were reported in schools. n24 E-coli
poisoning is very dangerous and can cause death. One woman recounts her 6 year old son Alex's battle with
e-coli:
I watched my child die a brutal death, I watched in horror as his life hemorrhaged away in a hospital
bathroom. I stood by helplessly while bowl after bowl of blood and mucus gushed from his little body, I
listened to his screams and then the eerie silence that followed as toxins that had started in his intestines
moved to his brain. I sat with my only child as I watched doctors frantically shove a hose into his side to reinflate his collapsed lung, as brain shunts were drilled into his head to relieve the tremendous pressure.
Then I watched as his brain waves flattened. n25
Pathogens such as e-coli are found in the digestive systems of farm animals. n26 E-coli poisonings such as
those reported above occur because of poor sanitation at farms where animals are raised. In the above
instance, the poisoning occurred from e-coli tainted feces in a hamburger that Alex had eaten. To alleviate
the problem of pathogens in meat, S.T.O.P. calls for "changes in the way livestock is raised." n27 S.T.O.P
states that the food system is becoming increasingly contaminated due to the rise of factory farms in the
1990s. n28
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Abuse of Farm Animals Undermines Sustainable Agriculture
ANIMAL WELARE IS A CRITICAL COMPONENT OF SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
Roland Bonney & Marian Stamp Dawkins, Zoology Professor Oxford & Director Food Animal
Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R.
Bonney, p. 1
The aim of this book is to challenge the “them and us” thinking that sets the interests of humans and farm
animals against each other and to show that to be really “sustainable,” farming needs to include, not ignore,
the welfare of farmed animals. Animal welfare is so closely linked to human health and to the quality of
human life that true sustainability cannot be a choice between economics and ethics or between human
welfare and animal welfare. Sustainability must mean having it all – viable farms, healthy safe food,
protection for the environment, as well as better lives for our farm animals.
WORKING TO IMPROVE ANIMAL WELFARE IS CRITICAL TO PROMOTING
SUSTAINABLE AGRICULTURE
Roland Bonney & Marian Stamp Dawkins, Zoology Professor Oxford & Director Food Animal
Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R.
Bonney, p. 4
We will be questioning the pessimistic view that there are just two possible futures for animal farming:
either more and more intensive farms or no meat eating at all. Many different people will argue from many
different points of view that these are not the only alternatives in front of us. We want to show that there is
another future that involves farming in a sustainable way but also makes sure that food animals have
reasonable lives. The basis for this optimism is the fact that there already are successful commercial farms
that are putting into practice many ideas that could form the future for animal farming if enough people
want them and are prepared to make them work. The contributors to the book come from a diversity of
backgrounds – from big business, from animal welfare organizations, from academic institutions, and from
practical farming. They certainly do not agree with each other on everything but two common threads
unite them. They all agree that farm animals matter and they all agree that sustainable farming must have
animal welfare at its core, along with healthy food, human welfare, and environmental protection.
ANIMAL WELFARE CRITICAL TO MEANINGFUL HUMAN LIFE AND OVERALL
SUSTAINABILITY
Roland Bonney & Marian Stamp Dawkins, Zoology Professor Oxford & Director Food Animal
Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R.
Bonney, p. 168
With such uncertainties about what farming in the future will be like, it is clear that we have to be both very
clear about what our priorities are and also very flexible in how we go about achieving them. The message
of this book is that animal welfare is one such important priority, although one that is in danger of being
sidelined as climate change assumes greater and greater importance in peoples’ thinking. But as our
various contributors have argued, trying to define sustainable human food production without including
animal welfare is unlikely to be successful. Not only are we humans utterly dependent on the earth and
welfare of animals for our own health and survival (as the threat of bird flu constantly reminds us), but a
world of animal abuse is not a world many people want to live in. The quality of human life depends both
physically and emotionally on thee quality of our relationship with nonhuman animals. Animal welfare
therefore has to be as much part of sustainability as environmental protection, food quality, and economic
prosperity. To put it another way, “sustainability” has three elements – Economics (affordable food),
Environment (a viable planet) and Ethics (what is socially acceptable) – and animal welfare is part of all
three.
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Should Recognize Rights of Farm Animals
FARM ANIMAL RIGHTS ETHIC DESIGNED TO PROTECT ANIMAL INTERESTS
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 18
Thus, the new animal rights ethic we have described in society in general should not be viewed as radically
different from concerns about animal welfare, as agriculturalists often mistakenly do. It is, in fact, the form
that welfare concerns are taking in the face of what has occurred in science and agriculture since World
War II. The demand for rights fills the gap left by the loss of traditional husbandry agriculture and its builtin guarantee of protection of fundamental animal interests.
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Kantian Ethics Requires Treating Farm Animals with Respect
KANTIAN ETHICS WOULD DEMAND THAT FARM ANIMALS BE ACCORDED THE SAME
WELFARE PROTECTIONS AS RESEARCH ANIMALS
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 47
As Kant long ago pointed out, an overriding element of morality is consistency. It is not a demand of
benevolence but a fundamental component of justice and fairness, and indeed, of reason. Given that
animals used in agricultural research and biomedical research are similar in all morally relevant ways, they
are entitled to similar treatment in all morally relevant animals are designed to model animals that will be
used in unregulated situations, as in the case of the second lamb mentioned above, and thus should not be
treated any better than the animals they model. This argument is open to two responses. First, the fact that
pain and suffering is not controlled in farm animals is one of the fundamental reasons for and concerns of
the new social ethic for animals. Thus, to argue from what is done under field conditions to what should be
done under research conditions is to beg the question. One of the major motivations for welfare research is
to change field conditions so as to satisfy public concerns.
Indeed, as Hiram Kitchen, the chairman of the AVMA Panel on Pain and Suffering, a group convened to
help explain the new research animal laws with regard to the notion of pain and suffering to the research
community pointed out to the panel, the law’s demands for controlling pain and suffering articulate the
social standard for animal treatment. Thus the fact that agricultural practice deviates from these standards
is not a justification for the status quo; it is rather a mandate for agriculture to change its practice to be
more in accord with socially mandated standards.
Second, many features of research do not replicate the situations the research is intended to model. Rats
are not people; cages are not the real world; artificially high doses of toxicants do not reflect natural
ingestion patterns; cattle with rumenal fistulae differ from ordinary cattle. Research differs from what it
replicates in myriad ways. It could be argued that although providing anesthesia for castration, for
example, does indeed not replicate field conditions, it controls a variable, that is, pain and suffering induced
by surgery, which can affect what is being studied. As expressed in federal law, the social ethic asserts that
the only possible times pain and suffering should not be controlled in animal research of any kind is when it
cannot be, that is, either when pain and suffering are the direct objects of study or when one can
demonstrate that all possible methods for controlling pain and suffering will inexorably skew what one is
looking at in one’s research and that the research is valuable. (Sometimes control of pain and suffering
skews the data in a way that can be accounted for predictably.)
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What We Eat is an Inherently Ethical and Moral Act
NO SUCH THING AS ETHICS-FREE FARMING OR ETHICS-FREE FOOD
Kate Rawles, Lancaster University Lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 46
There is no such thing as ethics-free farming. Farming by its very nature has relationships with and impacts
on animals, on other living things, on ecosystems, on people, and on health. Whether explicitly or not,
farming cannot help but take a position on what these relationships and impacts should be – on how these
various “others” are to be treated. This means, of course, that there is no such thing as ethics-free food,
either. However far removed many of us have become from agriculture, we all eat the products of farming,
even if processed beyond recognition, two or three times a day. The future of farming therefore concerns
everyone, or at least, everyone who eats, and we are all party to the ethics embedded in farming. In relation
to mainstream, industrialized agriculture, this is not necessarily a comfortable place to be.
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AT: “Rights Discourse Bad for Improving Animal Welfare”
ANIMAL RIGHTS GROUPS INCREASINGLY ADDRESSING FARM ANIMAL ISSUES
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 64
Organizations like People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals (PETA) and Farm Sanctuary, neither of
which existed before the 1980s, now have tens of thousands of active members and assets in the millions.
Meanwhile, traditional animal protection groups like HSUS and the ASPCA have begun addressing farmed
animal issues – an area they once largely ignored. And the financial resources of these groups have grown
significantly. Assets of HSUS and the ASPCA grew about tenfold between 1982 and 2002.
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT PUSHING TO IMPROVE FARM ANIMAL WELFARE
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 70-1
One of the best things that can happen to farmed animals is when people start questioning the morality of
raising animals for food. The animal rights movement inspire vast number of people to ponder the ethical
implications of animal farming. Moreover, the movement is blessed with a range of arguments that are
beautifully constructed and difficult to refute.
ACTIVISTS AND MOVEMENTS EFFECTIVE AT PROMOTING FARM ANIMAL WELFARE
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 71
Activists have made astounding progress by pushing for animal welfare. In 1994, the late Henry Spira
successfully pressured the USDA to drop its requirement for face-branding cattle imported from Mexico.
In 2001, PETA and others successfully convinced the top three burger chains to issue new animal welfare
guidelines to their suppliers. And in 2002, Farm Sanctuary and the HUSUS spearheaded a ballot initiative
that banned the use of gestation crates at Florida’s pig farms.
These achievements are only the start of what is possible, and the great potential of animal welfare is still
largely untapped. Right now, in regard to welfare concerns, America’s meat eaters are sitting on the
sidelines. We need to get them involved.
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AT: “Impractical to Change Animal Agricultural Practices”
MANY WAYS TO IMPROVE FARM ANIMAL WELFARE – EU PROVES REFORM IS
FEASIBLE
Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Professor Agricultural Economics U. Maryland & General
Counsel, Compassion over Killing, 2007, Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter, 70 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 325, p. 343-4
The animal-welfare problems described above can be solved, in most cases, by returning to husbandry
practices used before World War II. This could be achieved through several different approaches, including
government regulation, trade agreements, and labeling and retailer campaigns. Each approach has its
drawbacks and critics. For example, the farm-animal industry often resists regulation, claiming it can selfregulate. The few reforms industry has voluntarily adopted have been insignificant. Trade agreements
reduce the effectiveness of regulation, as it is unlikely that countries will be permitted to restrict the import
of lower-welfare products. Despite their drawbacks, these approaches can lead to substantive gains in
animal welfare. Although regulation would increase production costs, surveys suggest consumers would be
willing to pay these costs. Labeling and retailer campaigns can reduce trade substitution.
Substantive changes need to be made to conventional farming practices; European practices demonstrate
that these changes are realistic. Modifications to birds' environment, diet, and breeding can slow growth
and significantly improve welfare. n127 Growth rates can be reduced by shortening eating periods and by
modifying poultry feed to provide a lower protein-to-energy ratio. n128 Genetically, slower growing breeds including traditional breeds used before World War II - can be selected by primary breeding companies. In
France, breeds with a lower growth rate have been used to produce "Label Rouge" chickens for more than
twenty years and now comprise around one-third of broilers raised in that country. n129 In the United States,
several slow-growing breeds are available, but their market share is limited. n130
Due to concerns about hen welfare, member states of the European Union are phasing out the use of the
conventional battery cage, and some countries have already banned all cages. n131 Producers are now
adopting other housing systems, including "furnished cages" that provide perches, nest boxes, scratching
mechanisms, a litter area for dustbathing, and typically more space per hen; non-cage, barn systems that
allow birds to move freely indoors; and free-range systems that combine a barn system with outdoor access.
n132
Although each system has advantages and disadvantages, there is virtual scientific consensus that each
alternative is significantly more humane than the conventional battery cage. n133
Alternatives to conventional sow gestation crates are group-housing systems, where sows are kept together
in large pens, affording mobility and the opportunity to socialize, and free-range, group-housing systems
that allow outdoor access. n134 In Europe, more than four million sows are housed in groups. n135
Alternatives to veal crates are group-housing systems in which calves are kept together in large pens,
allowing social interaction and freedom of movement. Some facilities keep calves on wooden-slatted
flooring, while others provide deep straw bedding materials. Virtually all of Europe's calves are now
housed in groups. n136
US SHOULD LOOK TO EU ON TREATMENT OF FARM ANIMALS
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
414-5
There are ways to make farming safe for consumers and more conscious of animal suffering. The United
States would be best off following the practices of its European allies in regards to agriculture. The
European Union (EU) recognizes animal welfare as a goal that is important to them and as such they have
statutes that provide for better husbandry standards than those in the U.S. n198 These statutes provide for
sick animals to be treated quickly, no subtherapeutic antibiotics, free movement, attention to psychological
needs specific to the species, and no perpetual darkness. n199 The EU also protects chickens against battery
cages by requiring much larger cage sizes so that there is room to move and the chickens are not forced into
hostility, therefore needing their beaks removed. n200 The United Kingdom requires even larger cages than
the EU for chickens and larger stalls for pigs. n201 In the United Kingdom, the farmer must take into account
psychological needs of the animal and they have restrictions on the amount of animals allowed into one
stall. n202
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AT: “Impractical to Change Animal Agricultural Practices”
FAIR FARMING IS AN ALTERNATIVE TO CURRENT INHUMANE TREATMENT
Joyce D’Silva, Chief Executive of Compassion in World Farming, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 34
Is there an alternative way? I believe so. Farm animals could be bred back to more traditional, hardier
breeds. They could be kept in farms which provide both comfortable shelter and the chance to range freely,
as weather permits. They could be given feed appropriate to their species and left to seek some of their
own food outside as their ancestors did. They could be kept in such good environments that they don’t feel
frustrated and competitive with their peers, so that they will be allowed to keep their bodies whole and
intact. When the time comes for slaughter they could be taken quietly to a nearby slaughterhouse. I’m
tempted to all this kind of farming Holistic Farming, but in case that’s too alternative a description for you,
let’s call it Fair Farming. It encompasses the true husbandry that Bernie Rollin described in Chapter 2.
NEED FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN FARM ANIMAL WELFARE PRACTICES
Ruth Layton, Director Food Animal Initiative, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the
ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 88
Important though developing new breeds is for the future of animal welfare, there are some systems of
agriculture that are not at all valid for farmers or consumers who care about animal welfare. In order to
meet our side of the “ancient contract” we must rethink the many systems that involve regular painful
procedures, such as castration and tail docking or involve putting animals for long periods in situations
where they are bored or continually bullied by their peers without a route or escape.
At FAI we recognize that fundamental change requires considerable investment, may take some time
before the system is perfected, and even longer before it can be considered demonstrably “robust.” Robust
when applied to an agricultural system means that it must operate without serious problems through all
weather types, staff changes, holiday periods, and any other potential periods of disruption until the
developers of the system have complete confidence and can convey this to others. In our experience this
takes at least 2 years. Over the past 5 years we have developed a system for keeping pigs that addresses the
two major animal welfare issues of pig production, namely the current need to dock tails and the use of the
farrowing crate for sows.
ANIMAL RESEARCH PROVES THAT FAILURE OF THE INDUSTRY TO PROTECT ANIMAL
WELFARE RISKS PUBLIC BACKLASH
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 25
There is a good deal of truth in these remarks. But the public, if aroused, will demand immediate action,
which may cause harm to producers without benefiting animals. In this regard, it is worth recalling what
occurred in the area of biomedicine. While the biomedical community continued to resist even the enforced
self-regulation we had drafted, the public became increasingly convinced of the need for regulation of
biomedical research, and the passage of legislation became more likely. In comparison to the Research
Modernization Act, our legislation became more attractive to the research community. Thus, by the time I
was called on to testify before the House Subcommittee on Health and Environment on behalf of the
Walgren version of our bill in 1982, I carried the endorsement of the American Physiological Society, the
traditional opponent of any intrusion into the research process.
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AT: “Reduced Suffering Would Require Everyone to Become
Vegetarian”
SHIFT FROM CAFOs TO GRASS-BASED ANIMAL PRODUCTION REDUCES ANIMAL
SUFFERING – MORE HUMANE
John E. Ikerd, Professor Emeritus Agricultural Economics University of Missouri, 2008, Crisis and
Opportunity: sustainability in American agriculture, p. 168
All grass-based and free range animal products have the built-in advantage of being highly marketable to
customers who are concerned about the social and ethical consequences of industrial food and farming
systems. Grass-based systems are uniquely adapted to family farming operations because they rely on
intensive management, meaning more management per acre and dollar invested, and thus smaller farms.
Grass-based systems also offer a variety of opportunities for people with different skills and management
abilities, and thus are well suited to family farms. Grass-based, free-range production systems are naturally
humane environments in which to raise animals, since pastures are similar to the natural habitats of most
farm animals. Certainly, animals can be made to suffer in such systems, but suffering is virtually
unavoidable with factory systems of production. So, most well-managed grass-based and free-range
systems result in products that can be marketed and raised under humane conditions on family farms.
BEEF INDUSTRY SEPARATED INTO TWO COMPONENTS – RANCHING AND CAFOs
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 55
The beef industry has two distinct components, cattle ranching and cattle feeding, though it is often the case
that the same individuals are involved in both sectors. Of all production systems, beef production most
closely approximates the social ethic of husbandry. The ranching aspect of the industry, wherein animals
live their lives under the conditions for which they were evolved, is virtually the same extensive system it
was one hundred years ago, and feedlots are the least problematic of all intensive production units.
RANCHERS DISTINCT FROM CAFO OPERATORS – COMMITMENT TO STEWARDSHIP
AND WELFARE
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 55
I have long argued the falsity of this stereotype. Many ranchers are small family farmers who must often
work multiple jobs to hold on to their ranches. Furthermore, they are the standard bearers of the old
husbandry ethic that society is trying to preserve – their animals are more than mere economic commodities
to them. Few ranchers have ever seen their animals slaughtered; even fewer wish to. The vast majority see
themselves as stewards of land and animals, as living a way of life as well as making a living. Many
express significant distaste for industrialized agriculture.
CAN WORK FOR MIDDLE GROUND BETWEEN DOING NOTHING AND GIVING UP
EATING ANIMALS ALTOGETHER
Mary Midgley, Philosopher, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M.
Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 31
Remedying these anomalies may, however, be easier now than similar reforms have been in the past. It is
clear today that we do not face a single drastic choice between “eating animals” and “not eating them.”
There is a huge range of choice available to us about how to treat them first, even if we do still eat them.
The situation is like that over animal experimentation, where a similar realization is dawning that we do not have to
choose between forbidding all experiments and accepting every method that is used at present. Today –even though,
unluckily, a tiny minority of extremists continues to darken counsel on this subject – effective discussion about it now
goes on between humane scientists and scientifically literate humanitarians who share the aim of ending bad practice,
whether that practice is bad from the ethical or the scientific angle or indeed, as often happens—from both. Similarly,
over farm animals, it is now clear that farm-literate humanitarians can work together with humane farmers
to get a much more tolerable quality of life for creatures who have long been most bizarrely neglected. We
should all wish more power to their elbows!
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AT: “Animal Rights and Animal Welfare Approaches TradeOff”
ANIMAL WELFARE CAMPAIGN COMPATIBLE WITH ABOLITION
Gaverick Matheny & Cheryl Leahy, Professor Agricultural Economics U. Maryland & General
Counsel, Compassion over Killing, 2007, Law and Contemporary Problems, Winter, 70 Law & Contemp.
Prob. 325, p. 325
It is worth noting that welfarist campaigns can be compatible with abolitionist objectives, such as those
Francione discusses in this volume. n217 Welfarist campaigns not only educate consumers, some of whom
may choose to become vegetarian, but also drive up production costs, driving down consumption. In the
case of eggs, per capita consumption has steadily decreased in Switzerland and Sweden, following the bans
on battery cages in those countries. n218
Campaigns directed toward pigs and cattle, however, could have a negative welfare effect by shifting
consumption to poultry and fish products, which provide significantly less food per animal life-year. In
fact, removing only poultry, eggs, and farmed fish from the diets of one hundred people would affect more
animals than turning ninety-nine people vegan. If it is easier for consumers to shift consumption among
animal products than to eschew all animal products, then this arithmetic has implications for both welfarist
and abolitionist strategies.
EUROPEAN ANIMAL RIGHTS GROUPS HAVE FOCUSED ON FARM ANIMALS – HAD SOME
SUCCESSES
Joyce D’Silva, Chief Executive of Compassion in World Farming, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 42
The European Commission itself has changed, allotting far more resources to farm animal welfare and
taking the initiative in promoting action like the EU Community Action Plan on the Protection and Welfare
of Animals. Meanwhile groups in the US were, on the whole, slow to take up the cause for farm animals,
preferring to campaign on “safer” issues such as companion animals and wild animals. Around the late
1990s CIWF started engaging with leaders of the US groups and speaking at their conferences, urging them
to campaign on farm animal welfare.
ABOLITIONISTS MOVEMENT DEMONSTRATES THAT SUCCESS DEPENDS ON LIMITED
OBJECTIVES – FOCUS ON WHAT MOST PEOPLE CAN AGREE WITH
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 82
The limitations of abolition’s agenda were not rooted in laziness or complacency. These limitations were
in fact the cornerstone of a brilliant strategy. At the time, slavery constituted the single greatest abuse of
blacks at the hands of whites. This abuse was rooted in the fact that many Americans viewed blacks as an
inferior race, and would never accept the notion that blacks deserved social equality. Abolition’s great
achievement was to recognize that, no matter what your opinions about race, you didn’t have to be terribly
progressive in your thinking to view slavery as an abomination.
The key to abolition’s success lay in confining its objective to weakening and overturning slavery, thereby
maximizing the number of people who would participate. Asking nineteenth century Americans to accept a
doctrine of racial equality would have been poison to the abolition movement. Many of the people who
fought and died to end slavery held beliefs that would today be judged as racist. But, under abolition,
people did not have to buy into the idea of there being full equality between the races. Abolitionists asked
only that Americans recognize slavery as a grotesque evil and take action to end it. With slavery out of the
way, it was only a matter of time before more subtle forms of oppression would be exposed and stamped
out. But before any of these other advances could occur, slavery first had to go.
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AT: “Animal Rights and Animal Welfare Approaches TradeOff”
ANIMAL WELFARE APPROACH LIMITED TO CORRECTING PAST ABUSES – NOT
PREVENTING FUTURE ONES
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 76-7
It’s true that, over time, the welfare movement will work its way down to eradicating lesser cruelties. The
trouble is that animal agriculture is a moving target and is continually developing new methods for raising
animals. If there’s one thing we can be sure of, it’s that the people who brought the word beak searing,
gestation crates, and battery cages are certain to dream up comparably cruel innovations in the future. So,
while welfare reformists busy themselves getting rid of the worst of today’s cruelties, the industry is rapidly
devising new practices for tomorrow. What’s worse, the rollout of new practices is usually gradual, and it
may be some time before new cruelties become widespread enough to gain the attention of welfare
reformers.
The trouble with welfare reform is that it is always behind the curve. However, effective welfare reform
may be at gradually getting rid of existing cruelties, it will always b powerless to prevent new cruelties
from emerging.
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AT: “Improving Conditions for Farm Animals Trades Off with
Trend Toward Vegetarianism”
SHOULD NOT SACRIFICE PROGRESS IN ANIMAL WELFARE HOPING TO CONVINCE
EVERYONE TO GIVE UP MEAT
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 71
One of the most unpleasant realizations I’ve had during my years in animal protection is that most
Americans are simply unwilling to stop eating meat. They will often listen closely to the arguments
supporting vegetarianism, but they will not change their diets. Despite this, most of these people do care
about what happens to animals, and adamantly oppose cruelty. You won’t find many non-vegetarians
joining vegetarian societies or sending money to animal rights groups. But animal welfare is the one cause
that everyone can get behind, regardless of diet. I think that anyone who eats meat, yet opposes cruelty to
animals, faces a moral imperative to become involved in seeking welfare reforms.
Many factory farming reforms are initiated by animal rights-oriented groups. The welfare movement will
truly realize its potential when it inspires the country’s meat eaters to become active in seeking reform.
When the day comes that the nation’s meat eaters demand better farmed animals welfare, enormous
improvements will happen overnight.
DISMANTLEMENT MOVEMENT MORE EFFECTIVE THAN VEGETARIANISM
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 84
What’s more, people who agree with dismantlement are much more likely to become involved with
activism than are people who are merely vegetarian. And the greatest threat to animal agriculture is that the
general public will get off the sidelines and take action against the industry. Animal agriculture takes a
small hit whenever somebody becomes vegetarian or vegan, but the loss of one customer is something the
industry can live with. What the industry won’t be able to endure is a steady stream of new activists
seeking to put an end to animal agriculture.
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**NEGATIVE ARGUMENTS**
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**Animals Don’t Need Expanded Rights**
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Captivity Doesn’t Threaten Animal Interests
CAPTIVITY DOES NOT NECESSARILY HARM AN INDIVIDUAL ANIMAL’S INTEREST
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p.
98-9
In the case of zoos and pet keeping the extent to which captivity harms interests will surely be a matter or
empirical observation. Some animals, as we saw, do suffer from captivity by an inability to perform their
natural behavior and it is likely that for many of these—polar bears, for instance – no zoo could provide an
environment which did not harm their interests significantly. For other zoo animals, though, it is far from
certain that captivity does harm their interests to any great extent or that for others, who at present are
harmed, a more appropriate environment could not be created which would counter the harm objection.
Similarly, we could apply the dame kind of analysis to the keeping of companion animals. Thus, it is
difficult to find an animal rights objection in the case of a dog which is well-fed, regularly exercised, and is
never deprived (or rarely deprived for long) of associating with animals of the same species. What
interests, it should be asked, are being harmed in this case? The granting to animals of a right to liberty,
therefore, will be a continent matter since we cannot say a priori at what point for different species captivity
does begin to harm their interests.
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Zoos Good
TURN - DESPITE THE CONTROLLED NATURE OF ZOOS THEY ALLOW US TO SOLVE
THE HUMAN-NATURE SPLIT AND CREATE A CONNECTION WITH ENVIRONMENT
Joanne Vining, Associate Professor of Science and Chair Human Nature Research Laboratory @ Urbana
College. “The Connection to other animals and caring for nature”. Human Ecology Review Vol 10, 2003
http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her102/102vining.pdf
The main thrust of the formulations presented here is the alienation of humans from their natural roots, and
their reluctance to see themselves as natural entities in a natural ecosystem. For many in the industrialized
world, nature has become a sentimental luxury and along with it, the animals that either live there or in our
homes. Keeping pets, watching wildlife, and visiting zoos offer connections with nature in ways that may
be somewhat satisfying, but are still carefully controlled. Nonetheless it may be those activities that help us
to gain a sense of ourselves as natural entities, subject to natural forces. If intimate association with animals
is in fact an attempt to reconnect with our natural world, then it may be possible to heal the human-nature
split and approach the world in a spirit of cooperation and conservation.
TURN - ZOOS HAVE SHIFTED TOWARD CONSERVATIONISM AS THEIR MAIN ETHICAL
OBJECTIVE
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 471
It is widely recognized that the original objective of zoos in maintaining collections of wild animals can no
longer be condoned. Modern-day zoos, therefore, have redefined their missions in light of questions about
the right to hold animals captive and the relevance and humaneness of this practice. They have done so by
aligning themselves with conservationist objectives, a process that has entailed the investment of
substantial resources in education, improved training of staff, modernization of exhibits, breeding, and in
some cases, reintroductions, and research designed to improve health, welfare, and propagation efforts.
The modern zoo also takes note of the world-wide decline in populations and their habitats and increasingly
envisions a time when at least some species will exist only within their confines. For the vast majority of
those who labor in the profession, therefore, pride of achievement and a personal sense of fulfillment are
commonly found. Indeed, for most it is a pursuit to be nobly and passionately held.
TURN - ZOOS COMMITED TO THE HOLISTIC GOALS OF SPECIES PRESERVATION –
DOES NOT MEAN THAT ANIMAL WELFARE IS DISCOUNTED
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 478-9
It is fair to presume that zoo professionals are strongly committed to animal welfare, but less so to animal
rights. Theirs is a profession that, by its very nature, shares the holistic ethic, viz., that preservationist goals
can only be achieved by unfailingly giving highest priority to collections of individuals. Zoo professionals
frequently find individual welfare and species preservation to be in conflict and in such cases will give
higher priority to the preservation of species. It does not follow, as it often claimed, that there is
indifference to the interests of individuals or lack of respect for them. In fact, goals of species preservation
are more likely to be realized where the lives of individuals are given the highest respect, and where every
effort is made to safeguard their interests. These dual concerns indicate that those who toil in zoos readily
embrace the ethical pluralism that offers a basis for reconciliation with any who question the morality of
their acts.
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Zoos Good
TURN - MUST BALANCE SUFFERING OF ANIMALS IN ZOOS WITH THE BENEFITS THEY
RECEIVE
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 94
It is extremely difficult to assess the moral validity of modern zoos in general (from the perspective of the
moral orthodoxy at least) because the conditions in which animals are kept vary to such a great extent, as
do the non-entertainment functions performed by zoos. In addition, different species have very different
needs. Measuring the suffering inflicted on wild animals by captivity is a further problem. Clearly,
suffering includes more than just physical pain and poor health, but because it may be accompanied by
visible signs it is often difficult to assess whether or not, or to what extent, an animal is suffering (this
problem is examined in more detail in Chapter 4 in the context of farm animals). It is not enough to
conclude that captive animals must be suffering simply on the grounds that they are unable to behave in
ways that are natural to them. On the one hand, some captive animals are able to perform most of their
natural behavior and obviously the better the environment for them (in terms of space, contact with other
members of their species and other stimuli) the more natural their behavior will become. On the other
hand, it is necessary to balance the restrictions which inevitably are placed upon captive animals with the
security that captivity provides for them.
NO IMPACT - ZOOS ARE PHASING OUT ANIMALS THAT IT IS INAPPROPRIATE TO KEEP
IN CAPTIVITY
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 95
That some animals obviously suffer in captivity can be seen by the exhibiting of abnormal stereotype (or
repetitive) behavior elicited by their captivity such as excessive grooming, inactivity, self-mutilation and
rail sucking. For some, relatively minor adjustments to their environment can improve the situation. For
others, because of their size, the complexity of their social lives or their instinctive need to hunt over long
distances, it is impossible to cater adequately for their needs. The classic example here is the polar bears
(although other captive animals such as tigers and foxes also exhibit abnormal behavior patterns) which in
the wild will travel hundreds of miles in search of food. Reputable zoos now no longer entertain the idea of
buying polar bears because they recognize that they are a species which cannot be kept in captivity.
Similarly, it is being recognized increasingly that there can be severe welfare implications involved in
keeping elephants in captivity. There are about 1,700 zoo elephants worldwide, 500 of whom are in
Europe. A report by an Oxford zoologist found that Asian elephants can live up to 65 or longer in the wild,
whereas the average life expectancy of these animals in European zoos is 15.
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No Moral Obligation to Animals
MEMBERSHIP IN THE HUMAN SPECIES IS A MORALLY RELEVANT FACTOR
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 64-5
I feel no obligation to defend this reaction, any more than I do to prove that my legs remain attached to my
body when I am asleep, or for that matter when I am awake. My certitude about my bodily integrity is
deeper than any proof that could be offered of it to refute a skeptic. Likewise the superior claim of the
human infant than of the dog on our consideration is a moral intuition deeper than any reason that could be
given for it and impervious to any reason that anyone could give against it. Membership in the human
species is not a morally irrelevant fact, as the race and gender of human beings have come to seem. If the
moral irrelevance of humanity is what philosophy teaches, so that we have to choose between philosophy
and the intuition that says that membership in the human species is morally relevant, philosophy will have
to go.
Moral intuitions can change. The difference between science and morality is that while it has never been
true, whatever people believed, that the sun revolves around the earth, morality, which as a practical matter
is simply a department of public opinion, changes unpredictably; there are no unchanging facts to anchor it.
Someday we may think animals as worthy of our solicitude as human beings, or even more worthy. But
that will mean that we have a new morality, not that philosophers have shown that we were making an
erroneous distinction between animals and humans all along.
CAN’T GENERALIZE ABOUT ANIMAL RIGHTS – WHAT THEY ARE DUE DEPENDS ON
THEIR SOCIAL RELATIONSHIP TO HUMANS
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 38
In determining what might be meant by ‘interests’ or well-being for nonhuman species, it obviously will
not do simply to extrapolate from the human cases. If we accept, for the purpose of the present argument,
that the point of moral regulation is to secure individual well-being, then the content of this notion must be
specified differently to take into account the species-specific requirements for each mode of life. In the
case of domestic social animals, most notably pets such as dogs, at least some of the social needs of the
animal are met through learned adaptations to human social norms. This implies that, if humans have
obligations to secure the well-being of such animals in their charge, that responsibility includes
responsibility for emotional and social well-being, beyond ensuring that the animal is fed and watered.
For other species, such as sheep and cattle, which, under traditional forms of husbandry, retained much of
their pre-domestication forms of social life, the responsibility is to provide the conditions for those patterns
of social life among the herds themselves to be maintained. This moral requirement would rule out
intensive rearing regimes, but would not, as in the case of Regan’s rights theory, of itself rule out animal
husbandry as such. However, the forms of animal husbandry which would be acceptable on this more
socially-informed view of ‘vulnerability’ rights would be ones which also acknowledged the wider
biophysical conditions of the mode of life of social species; that is their habitat requirements are to be
understood as central to any full understanding of their well-being.
MORALLY RELEVANT DIFFERENCES JUSTIFY LIMITING RIGHTS TO HUMANS
Kyle Ash, lobbying strategist at the European Environmental Bureau, 2005, Animal Law
(INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY,)
2005 (lexis)
21 Ruth Cigman claims that "death is not, and cannot be, a misfortune for any creature other than a
human." n99 Cigman refutes that nonhumans should have even a basic right to life based on the following.
The "range" of suffering is greater in humans. Humans have a greater capacity to desire not to die.
Behavioral expression in humans indicates more profound mental experience. Loss of opportunities for
accomplishment in life by humans is greater upon dying. Nonhumans blindly cling to life, while humans
want to live because they value life. Therefore, nonhumans do not have a right to life, because of their
incapacity to have categorical desires. Finally, she states that though "all human beings are human beings"
is a tautology, it is a useful one.
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No Moral Obligation to Animals
WE ONLY HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES TO OTHER HUMANS
Dr. Thomas Dorman, author and editor of an alternative medicine news letter, “Species are Distinct”,
Paracelsus corporation, November 1999 volume 4 issue 11,
http://paracelsusclinic.com/articles/display.asp?ID=139
To a careful observer, it is evident that all species have distinct characteristics, the most familiar of which is
often expressed by the unique behavior and postures we observe, for instance, in our domestic cats; but
virtually any species has a sentinel character. Many artists have been able to convey these unique features.
That has usually been dismissed as mere art; but is it? I would propose that there is a universal
characteristic of creatures which defines them distinctly and separates them from others. What is the
distinct characteristic of Human Beings? People have a rational mind. Now, it is true that many other
characteristics are unique to our species. Readers will know that I have personally conducted serious
research on the role of the human pelvis as a unique transducer of the forces of locomotion in walking.4 It
is not conceivable that the mechanism in the human pelvis, which regulates walking, could have derived its
origins from a quadriped creature. This alone puts a kibosh in Darwin's theory of the mechanism of
evolution. Once one started investigating this matter, one found hundreds nay thousands of serious thinkers
who have drawn the same conclusion from a broader perspective with deep analysis covering all aspects of
morphogenetics, of evolution, of the relevant biochemistry, and it is evident, as I have mentioned before
(and I propose to devote a newsletter to this subject alone in the future, i.e., to morphogenetics), the
anatomical and probably the personality characteristics of species cannot be explained mechanistically. We
have to think in terms such as God, universal hologram, an astral presence and as Walter Elsassar has
pointed out, based on a reductionist analysis of the mechanistic options, it is quite clear that the
biochemical, or reductionist, tool will not suffice to explain these commonplace observations.5,6,7 I draw
from this the conclusion that animals are not on a par with humans. None of this stops us loving them or
pampering our pets. We need, however, to reaffirm our philosophical position that we as a species are
different and have a responsibility to other members of our species that exceeds that to animals; hence the
modern idea of speciesism is specious.
NO JUSTIFICATION FOR ABSOLUTE RIGHT TO LIBERTY FOR ANIMALS – MUST
CONSIDER THE RIGHT IN TERMS OF THEIR UNIQUE NEEDS
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 2004, Animals, politics and morality, p. 98
It is not clear to me, however, these conclusions necessarily follow from the application of animal rights
philosophy. Prohibiting both practices only becomes morally required if one adopts the view that the right
to liberty should be granted to animals on the grounds that it is a good in itself. As Rachels points out, however, it
only makes sense to grant rights in accordance with the harms that are likely to accrue if those rights were to be infringed. Thus, it is
not sensible to grant to animals a right to vote or a right to worship since to deprive them of this right is not
to harm them. Similarly, we should only grant to animals a right to liberty if to deprive them of it is to harm their interests. In the
same way, as Regan and others have argued, taking a healthy animal’s life is wrong because it harms that animal’s interests, as a
subject-of-a-life, in continuing to live. Taking the life an animal racked with pain which is untreatable, short of
rendering it permanently unconscious, is in a different moral category (Regan describes it as preference
respecting euthanasia) since in this case it is in the interests of that animal to be humanely destroyed
because this is the only way we can satisfy its preference to be rid of pain. Incidentally, the widespread practice of
euthanizing animals which are in pain and have little or no chance of recovery is arguably the only instance where the law upholds the
interests of animals in a way which it does not for humans in the same circumstances.
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No Moral Obligation to Animals
INTRINSIC VALUE JUSTIFICATION FOR MORAL RIGHTS FLAWED
Robert James Bidinotto, Director of Development and Special Projects@ theInstitute for Objectivist
Studies. “Environmentalism or Individualism”. 2003 http://www.econot.com/page4.html
The basic premise of preservationism is that all of nature--except, of course, human nature--has "intrinsic
value" in itself, and thus a "right" not to be affected by Man. But this premise, which is the moral core of
modern environmentalism, is a colossal fraud.
The simple little question that punctures the balloon of intrinsic value is: Why? Why is the status quo of
nature good in itself? No one has ever offered an intelligible answer.
To declare that a Northern spotted owl, a redwood tree, or the course of a river has "intrinsic" or "inherent
value in itself," is to speak gibberish. There's no inherent "value" or "meaning" residing in nature, or
anything else. "Value" presupposes a valuer, and some purpose. It's only in relation to some valuer and
purpose that something can be said to "have value." Thus, there's no such thing as "intrinsic value." The
concept is meaningless. There are only the moral values and meanings that are created and imposed upon
an otherwise meaningless nature by a conceptual consciousness.
Animals, lacking any rational capacity, survive by adapting themselves to nature. Human beings survive
only by utilizing reason to adapt the rest of nature to themselves. This means that even to subsist, Man must
unavoidably use and disrupt animals and their habitats, transforming natural resources into food, clothing, shelter, and tools (capital).
Yes, we too are part of nature; but our nature is that of a developer.
As the only entity on earth having both the conceptual ability to define "good" and "evil," and the power to
choose between them, Man is the only natural source of moral values. The environment, then, acquires
moral value and meaning only insofar as it's perceived, developed, used, and enjoyed by human beings.
That's why it's morally appropriate to regard the rest of nature as our environment--as a bountiful palette
and endless canvass for our creative works.
To Enlightenment thinkers, this was Man's power and his glory. To environmentalists, however, Man is the
only thorn in an otherwise perfect Garden of Eden. But again--why? By the only moral standards there are-ours--human creativity is not a vice, but a virtue; our products are not evils, but--literally--"goods"; and the
term "developer" is not an epithet, but a title of honor.
If we reject the idea of nature's intrinsic value, we may also reject its corollary: the notion that animals have
inherent rights not to be bothered by people. Rights are moral principles that define the boundary lines
necessary for peaceful interaction in society. Any intelligible theory of rights presupposes entities capable
of defining and respecting moral boundary lines. But since animals are, by nature, unable to know, respect,
or exercise rights, the principle of rights simply can't be applied to, or by, animals.
Practically, the notion of animal rights entails an absurd moral double standard. It declares that animals have the "inherent right" to
survive as their nature demands, but that Man doesn't. It declares that the only entity capable of recognizing moral boundaries is to
sacrifice his interests to entities that can't. Ultimately, it means that only animals have rights: since nature consists
entirely of animals, their food, and their habitats, to recognize "animal rights," Man logically must cede to
them the entire planet.
All animals may be equal in animal rights theory; but--as Orwell pointed out in Animal Farm--some
animals are more equal than others.
This environmentalist double standard applies to humans not just in our relation to animals, but also in our
relation to all of nature. If a hurricane erodes miles of seashores--well, that's nature for you; if a man
bulldozes a beach to build his home, however, that's a desecration. If the Mount St. Helens eruption
destroys hundreds of square miles of timber, that's natural; if a man clears a patch of that very same forest
in order to raise his crops, that's a biological holocaust--and he's contributing to global warming, to boot. If a beaver
builds a dam and floods a dry field, that's an "ecosystem"; if a developer builds a duck pond on the same dry field, that's an ecological
atrocity, and the felon must be sent to the slammer.
IRRATIONAL TO ACT ON PURE “ANIMAL RIGHTS” BELIEFS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 65
I am sure that Singer would react the same way as I do to the dog-child example. He might consider it a
weakness in himself if he were unable to act upon his philosophical beliefs. But he would be wrong; it
would not be a weakness; it would be a sign of sanity. Just as philosophers who have embraced skepticism
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about the existence of the external world, or hold that science is just a “narrative” with no defensible claim
to yield objective truth, do not put their money where their mouth is by refusing to jump out of the way of a
truck bearing down on them, so philosophers who embrace weird ethical theories do not act on those
theories even when they could do so without being punished. There are exceptions, but we call them
insane.
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No Moral Obligation to Animals: Wild Animals
NO MORAL OBLIGATION TO WILD ANIMALS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 378
I believe that wild animals, considering as individuals, are valuable in an important sense, but that in most
situations they are not morally considerable to humans. Individual animals are valuable to humans – they
are often valued aesthetically and sentimentally, for example – but they do not exist in a relevant moral
sphere for us. Let me explain this assertion, because it is sure to be controversial.
NO JUSTIFICATION FOR MORAL OBLIGATIONS TO WILD ANIMALS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 379
It is clear that animals have varying levels and acuities of experience including varied levels of selfawareness. But it is equally clear that the experience we share carries with it both a striving to perpetuate
that experience and the inevitability of diminution in some situations, and certain death in the long run.
Ontological goodness, and grades of it, correspond to the strength and vitality of the experience of
individual organisms. But this ontological goodness does not in itself entail moral goodness or moral
obligations to interfere to protect it. Humans cannot and ought not to accept responsibility to avoid deaths
of individual animals in the wild. Building on Donnelley’s distinction between ontological and moral
value, I suggest it is not this content of animal experience but the context in which we encounter it that
determines the strength and type of our obligations to animals and other natural objects. The content of the
experience of some animals is surely rich enough to make killing feral goats on an island to protect the
indigenous plant communities there, even though I have no doubt that the individual goats have a greater
ontological value than the plants. Ontological value is morally relevant in some situations – as when
animals are in captivity – but it is morally irrelevant in the wild, because the maintenance of the animal’s
wildness (appropriate behaviors in a wild context) prohibits our manipulating that experience. The
forbearance we exercise here is very similar, psychologically and perhaps morally, to the attitude of wise
parents who, after the time of maturity, let their children live their own lives.
NO MORAL OBLIGATION TO INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF WILD SPECIES
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 383
The more we meddle in the daily lives of wild animals, the more we accept moral responsibility for the
consequences of our actions in their individual lives. The context in which we interact with domesticated
animals implies a contract to look after them. No such contract exists with wild animals; for this reason,
we have no moral obligations to individual members of wild species who remain in their natural habitat.
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Animal Rights are Immoral
ANIMAL RIGHTS FAILS WITHIN THE ETHICAL ROUND AS IS BOTH ANTI-HUMANIST
AND ECOLOGICAL
Peter Staudenmeir, human rights advocate and philospher, “THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANIMAL RIGHTS”,
March 2003, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
It is nevertheless essential to face such misgivings squarely, in the hope of provoking a more thoughtful
debate on the merits of animal rights. I view animal rights thinking as a specific kind of moral mistake and
a symptom of political confusion. Much like its ideological cousin, pacifism, the political and moral theory
of animal rights offers simple but false answers to important ethical questions. At the risk of collapsing
competing versions of animal rights theory into one monolithic category, I would like to consider several of
these questions from a social-ecological perspective in order to show why much of the ideology of animal
rights is both anti-humanist and anti-ecological, and why its reasoning is frequently at odds with the project
of creating a free world. (3)
THEIR KRITIK OF SPECIESISM RESULTS IN ANTI-HUMANISM AND CRUSHES THE
SOLVENCY OF RADICALISM AND HOPE
Peter Staudenmeir, human rights advocate and philospher, “THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANIMAL RIGHTS”,
March 2003, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
Rightly rejecting the inherited dualism of humanity and non-human nature, animal rights philosophers
wrongly collapse the two into one undifferentiated whole, thus substituting monism for dualism (and
neglecting most of the natural world in the process). But regressive dreams of purity and oneness carry no
emancipatory potential; their political ramifications range from trite to dangerous. In the wrong hands, a
simplistic critique of ‘speciesism’ yields liberation for neither people nor animals, but merely the same
rancid antihumanism that has always turned radical hopes into their reactionary opposite.
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Treating Animals Differently Not Akin to Racism and/or
Sexism
SPECIEISISM NOT AKIN TO SEXISM AND RACISM
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 64
But I do not agree with any of these things under the compulsion of philosophical arguments. And I
disagree that we have a duty to (the other) animals that arises from their being the equal members of a
community composed of all of those creatures in the universe that can feel pain, and that it is merely
“prejudice” in a disreputable sense akin to racial prejudice or sexism that makes us discriminate in favor of
our own species. Singer assumes the existence of the universe-wide community of pain and demands
reasons that the boundary of our concern should be drawn any more narrowly: “If a being suffers there can
be no moral justification for refusing to take that suffering into consideration.” That is sheer assertion, and
particularly dubious is his further claim that (the title of the first chapter of his book) “all animals are
equal,” a point that he defends b y arguing that the case for treating women and blacks equally with white
males does not depend on the existence of factual equality among these groups. But the history of racial
and sexual equality is the history of a growing belief that the factual inequalities among these groups are
either a consequence of discrimination or have been exaggerated. Wise wants to argue similarly that the
cognitive differences between people and chimpanzees have been exaggerated, but Singer declines to take
that route—rightly so, if my criticism of Wise’s approach is sound
ANALOGY OF EMANCIPATION OF SLAVES AND WOMEN TO ANIMALS INAPPROPRIATE
Richard A. Epstein, Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and
new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 151
It follows therefore that we should resist any effort to extrapolate legal rights for animals from the change
in legal rights for women and slaves. There is no next logical step to restore parity between animals on the
one hand and women and slaves on the other. Historically, the elimination, first of slavery and then of civil
disabilities to women, occurred long before the current agitation for animal rights. What is more, the
natural cognitive and emotional limitations of animals, even the higher animals, preclude any creation of
full parity. What animal can be given the right to contract? To testify in court? To vote? To participate in
political deliberations? To worship?
ANALOGY TO THE EMANCIPATION OF SLAVES INAPPROPRIATE – NO CLEAR END
GOAL IN SIGHT FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 56-7
There is a related objection to his approach. He wants judges, in good common law fashion, to move step
by step, and for the first step simply to declare that chimpanzees have legal rights. (This corresponds to the
cauistic method of doing moral philosophy). But judges asked to step onto a new path of doctrinal growth
want to have some idea where the path leads even if it would be unreasonable to insist that the destination
be clearly seen. Wise gives them no idea. His repeated comparison of animals to slaves and the animals
rights cause to the civil rights movement is misleading. When one speaks of freeing slaves and giving them
the rights of other people, or giving women the same rights as men, it is pretty clear what is envisioned,
although important details may be unclear. When the National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People set out on its campaign to persuade the Supreme Court to repudiate separate but equal, it
was pretty clear what the end point was: the elimination of official segregation by race. After that was
achieved, other race-related legal objectives hove into view, but the campaign’s proximate goal was at least
clear. But what is meant by liberating animals and giving them the rights of human beings of the same
cognitive capacity? Does an animal’s right to life place a duty on human beings to protect animals from
being killed by other animals? Is capacity to feel pain sufficient cognitive capacity to entitle an animal to at
least the most elementary human rights? What kind of habitats must we create and maintain for all the
rights-bearing animals in the United States? Should human convenience have any weight in deciding what
rights an animal has?
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Animal Rights are Immoral
STRUGGLE FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS DISTINCT FROM CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENTS—
DON’T SEEK THE SAME TYPES OF RESPECT AND INCLUSION
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 236
Activism for animal rights is also distinct from activism on behalf of civil rights and women’s rights,
despite some important similarities. The latter movements, like animal rights, have struggled to secure
respect for their constituents. They have, in addition, employed similar legal and political strategies to gain
power and protection. But a significant difference rests in the fact that the activists for and members of the
civil rights and women’s rights movements are often (although not always) the direct beneficiaries of the
movements. These are not movements comprised of people who work solely for the benefit of others.
ANIMALS LACK CAPABILITY TO BE BEARERS OF ACTIVE RIGHTS FOR SELFDETERMINATION FOUND IN STRUGGLES AGAINST RACISM AND SEXISM
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 29-30
The upshot of this is that there is a fairly minimal use of the term rights, as ‘passive’ rights, according to
which rights are merely the formal correlates of libations on the part of moral agents, in which animals may
properly be said to possess rights. However (so we may reasonably suppose), animals generally lack the
range of conceptual and cultural learning capacities to become bearers of the kinds of active rights for selfdefinition and self-determination which have been at the heart of the human struggles which advocates of
animal rights are inclined to use as analogues. It may still be held that these struggles have a special and
distinctive character, without conceding to a “speciesist” denial of the positive moral standing of animals
ARGUMENT THAT ANIMAL RIGHTS ARE AN EXTENSION OF RIGHTS FOR MINORITIES
AND WOMEN RISKS ALIENATING THEM
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 93
An additional problem arising from the association with human rights stems from the specific connection
between the language and the movements for civil rights and women’s rights. Many activists suggested the
difficulty of arguing that the move to animal rights is the next logical extension following civil and
women’s rights. Many activists suggested the difficulty of arguing that the move to animal rights is the
next logical extension following civil and women’s rights. The difficulty is that claiming such an extension
may alienate minorities and women who interpret the extension as bringing them down to the level of
animals.
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Treating Animals Differently Justified
SPECIES BARRIER JUSTIFIED: SOLVING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN HUMANS AND
ANIMALS IS IMPOSSIBLE – IT IS NET BENEFICIAL TO HAVE FEELINGS OF OTHERNESS
Joanne Vining, Associate Professor of Science and Chair Human Nature Research Laboratory @ Urbana
College. “The Connection to other animals and caring for nature”. Human Ecology Review Vol 10, 2003
http://www.humanecologyreview.org/pastissues/her102/102vining.pdf
Nonetheless, it must be acknowledged that “nature” is a big idea and a large entity, to which humans may
not be able to relate. The global concept of the environment may not be as meaningful to most people as
specific entities within the environment. For example, an individual might endorse protection
of a predator generally but object to the existence of the same predator nearby. Moreover, the environment
includes entities that disgust as well as those that enchant. Thus, the prospect of humans developing caring
responses to the environment or nature as a unified concept may be problematic.
Finally, the idea of healing the human-nature split is complicated by the possibility that such a split may
function in a variety of ways to simplify and order our relationship with the physical environment. For
example, affection for animals (and perhaps the environment) may be enhanced more by the idea that they
are separate from us. Is nature more likely to be on a pedestal, and perhaps protected, if we view it as a
special “other” rather than a part of ourselves?
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Human Needs and Suffering Outweigh Animals Interests
HUMAN SUFFERING OUTWEIGHS, HUMAN SUFFERING IS FAR WORSE AND THEIR
EVIDENCE IS BASED OF OFF THE THEORIES OF SINGER WHICH IS FUNDAMENTALLY
FLAWED
Nicholas Yea, Philosopher and Human rights advocate, “DO ANIMALS DESERVE RIGHTS?”, 2003,
http://www.nickyee.com/ponder/animal.html
Singer wants to claim that all suffering must be taken into equal consideration, and thus the suffering of a
crippled ant deserves equal consideration as that of a crippled human child, and if we could only save one,
Singer has to say that we should flip a coin and decide or else we would be speciests. The major flaw in
Singer's argument is that not only has he chosen the arbitrary measure of suffering, but he assumes that all
suffering is equal. He wants us to believe that the suffering of a human child is comparable to that of an
ant's. This is clearly absurd. The suffering that a Holocaust victim endures is more intense than that an ant
will ever endure because human beings have the cognitive and emotional capacity that other animals do not
have. Shoot a son in front of his mother and the mother feels anguish beyond imagination that will scar her
for as long as she lives. On the other end, when male langurs kill the infants of captured female langurs, the
female langurs seem to become attracted to the male langur and promptly resume estrus. Singer is trying to
avoid pulling intelligence and human cognition into the equation, but he fails to see that it is impossible not
to. It is human intelligence that can inflict and understand the kind of overwhelming agony that is part of
human existence. It is also human intelligence that allows us to bestow and understand the kind of aweinspiring joys.
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Sentience Not A Good Standard for Rights
THEIR CONCEPTION OF ETHICS AS SENTIENCE EXCLUDES PLANTS WHICH
INCREASES ANTHROPOCENTRIC THINKING AND COLLAPSES ETHICS
Fox 86 (Michael, York U.-Enviro Sci., Agricide, p. 110-1)
The cycles, densities, and distributions of coadapted plant and animal species (and the presentient substrata
of earth, air, and water), within the totality of interdependent biofields that constitute the ecosystems of
earth, are where the hierarchy of relative rights should be formulated. To separate sentient animals from
nonsentient plants and soil microorganisms is like separating warm-blooded from cold- blooded animals, or
humans from other nonverbalizing animals. This drawing of arbitrary lines is philosophically, biologically,
and ecologically incompetent and misleading. All "lines" in the time-space continuum of evolution and
ecology are interconnected, and to attempt to partition off plants from animals, animals from people, or
blacks from whites on the basis of sentience, intelligence, color, or whatever is untenable. Phyletic,
"speciesist," and racist divisions are all tarred with the same narrow enculturated view of anthropocentrism,
no matter how humane and ethical the legal or philosophic intentions may be. A more nondiscriminatory,
nondualistic, and integrative orientation is needed—one that is transpersonal and transpecies, and that
embraces a nondiscriminatory reverence for all life (both sentient and pre- sentient). It is only within the
total framework of eco-ethics that the significance, value, and rights of each and every individual,
community, and species can be apprehended.'
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Arguments Supporting Human Dignity Not Speciest
CLAIMS OF HUMAN DIGNITY DO NOT AMOUNT TO SPECIESM
Kyle Ash, working on an M.A. in Global Environmental Policy at American University 2005
“INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY”.
Animal Law.
The concept of human dignity need not imply speciesism. Dignity is synonymous with respect or worth.79
If one feels dignified as a man, it is not based on denigration of women. If one feels dignified as a human, it
is not because he feels superior to nonhumans. Perhaps it results from the psychology of habitual
subjugation of other species that causes us to define our worth based not on what we are, but what we are
not. Ironically, this also indicates that we identify with other species in some way. The Author will call this
“exclusionary human dignity.”
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Animal Rights Unnecessary: Can Meet Moral Obligations
Without Rights
CAN ATTACK ZOOS ON MORAL GROUNDS WITHOUT SUBSCRIBING TO ANIMAL
RIGHTS VIEW
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 472
It would be inaccurate to assert that all who are concerned with the humane treatment (welfare) of animals,
including many who subscribe to vegetarianism, hold to the rights view. Nor would it be accurate to
assume that all opposition to keeping of wild animals in captivity arises only from this quarter. In an article
entitled “Against Zoos,” animal liberationist Dale Jamieson [1985] stressed human domination of animals
and their loss of freedom during confinement in zoos, rather than a rights ethic, as presumptively wrong.
He and many others who are deeply committed to conservation, does not see zoos as offering viable
alternatives to in situ efforts.
RIGHTS ARE UNNECESSARY AS LONG AS WE PROTECT FROM CRUELTY
Laura Ireland Moore, executive director of the National Center for Animal Law, 2005 Animal Law (A
REVIEW OF ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS) 2005 (lexis)
27 Posner questions the ability of the animal rights movement to analogize with other civil rights
movements, notably of women and minorities. n40 In part, this criticism is based on the ability of civil
rights [*316] movement leaders to articulate a goal and give a clear answer as to the desired outcome of
their struggle, in contrast to the varying strategies and goals of the animal rights movement. n41 Posner
believes the best way to protect animals is to forbid gratuitous cruelty. n42
SPECIES MEMBERSHIP IS MORALLY RELEVANT
Martha Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current
debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 309-10
We should admit that there is much to be learned from reflection on the continuum of life. Capacities do
crisscross and overlap; a chimpanzee may have more capacity for empathy and perspectival thinking than a
very young child or an older autistic child. And capacities that humans sometimes arrogantly claim for
themselves alone are found very widely in nature. But it seems wrong to conclude from such facts that
species membership is morally and politically irrelevant. A mentally disabled child is actually very
different from a chimpanzee, though in certain respects some of her capacities may be comparable. Such a
child’s life is tragic in a way that the life of a chimpanzee is not tragic; She is cut off from forms of
flourishing that, but for the disability, she might have had, disabilities that it is the job of science to prevent
or cure, whenever that is possible. There is something blighted and disharmonious in her life, whereas the
life of a chimpanzee may be perfectly flourishing. Her social and political functioning is threatened by
these disabilities, in a way that the normal functioning of a chimpanzee in the community of chimpanzees
is not threatened by its cognitive endowment.
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Should Protect Animal Interests Without Granting Animal
Rights
PROPERTY STATUS DOES NOT CAUSE AND IN FACT PREVENTS ANIMAL SUFFERING
Richard A. Epstein, Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and
new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 148
The historical backdrop invites a further inquiry: Why is it that anyone assumes the human ownership of
animals necessarily leads to their suffering, let alone their destruction? Often, quite the opposite is true.
Animals that are left to their own devices have no masters; nor do the have any peace. Life in the wild
leaves them exposed to the elements, to attacks by other animals, to the inability to find food or shelter, to
accidental injury, and to disease. The expected life of animals in the wild need not be solitary, poor, nasty,
brutish and short. But it is often rugged, and rarely placid and untroubled.
Human ownership changes this natural state of animals for the better as well as for the worse. Because
they use and value animals, owners will spend resources for their protection. Veterinary medicine may not
be at the level of human medicine, but it is only a generation or so behind. When it comes to medical care,
it’s better to be a sick cat in a middle-class US household than a sick peasant in a Third World country.
Private ownership of many pets (or, if one must, “companions”) gives them access to food and shelter (and
sometimes clothing) which creates long lives of ease and comfort. Even death can be done in more humane
ways than in nature, for any slaughter that spares cattle, for example, unnecessary anxiety, tends to improve
the amount and quality of the meat that is left behind. No one should claim a perfect concurrence between
the interests of humans and animals: Ownership is not tantamount to partnership. But by the same token,
there is no necessary conflict between owners and their animals. Over b road areas of human endeavor, the
ownership of animals has worked to their advantage, and not to their detriment.
“PERSONHOOD” STATUS NOT NECESSARY TO PROTECT ANIMAL INTERESTS
Cass Sunstein, Law Professor, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 11
There is, however, an underlying puzzle here. What does it mean to say that animals are property and can
be “owned?” As we have seen, animals even if owned, cannot be treated however the owner wishes; the
law forbids cruelty and neglect. Ownership is just a label, connoting a certain set of rights and perhaps
duties, and without a lot more, we cannot identity those rights and duties. A state could dramatically
increase enforcement of existing bans on cruelty and neglect without turning animals into persons, or
making them into something other than property. A state could do a great deal to prevent animal suffering,
indeed carry out the central goals of the animal welfare program, without saying that animal cannot be
owned. We could even grant animals a right to bring suit without insisting that animals are persons, or that
they are not property. A state could certainly confer rights on a pristine area, or a painting, and allow
people to bring suit on its behalf, without therefore saying that that area and that painting may not be
owned.
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Animal Rights Unnecessary: Can Meet Moral Obligations
Without Rights
CIVIL-RIGHTS APPROACH FOR EXTENDING ANIMAL RIGHTS FLAWED—PROPERTY
APPROACH BETTER
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 58-9
There is a sad poverty of imagination in an approach to animal protection that can think of it only on the
model of the civil rights movement. It is a poverty that reflects the blinkered approach of the traditional
lawyer, afraid to acknowledge novelty and therefore unable to think clearly about the reasons pro or con for
a departure from the legal status quo. It reflects also the extent to which liberal lawyers remain in thrall to
the constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court and insensitive to the liberating potential of
commodification. One way to protect animals is to make them property, because people tend to protect
what they own; I shall give an illustration later.
So Wise is another deer frozen in the headlights of Brown v Board of Education. He has overlooked not
only the possibilities of animal-protecting commodification but also an approach to the question of
animals’ welfare that is at once more conservative, methodologically as well as politically, but possibly
more efficacious, than right mongering. That is simply to extend, and more vigorously enforce, the laws
that forbid inflicting gratuitous cruelty on animals. We should be able to agree without help from
philosophers and constitutional theorists that gratuitous cruelty is bad—condemnation is built into the word
“gratuitous”—and few of us are either so sadistic, or so indifferent to animal suffering, that we are
unwilling to incur at least modest costs to prevent gratuitous cruelty to animals; and anyone who supposes
that philosophers and constitutional theorists can persuade people to incur huge costs to protect the interests
of strangers is surely deluded. Wise gives vivid and disturbing examples of cruel treatment of chimpanzees
but it is mistaken to think that the best way to prevent such cruelty is to treat chimpanzees like human
beings. The best way is to forbid treating chimpanzees, or any other animals with whom we sympathize,
cruelly. If that is all that, in the end, “animal rights” are to amount to, we don’t need the vocabulary of
rights, which is then just an impediment to clear thought as well as a provocation in some legal and
philosophical quarters.
ETHICAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS CENTERED AROUND ANIMAL RIGHTS
INEFFECTIVE WAY TO REDUCE THEIR SUFFERING
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 66-7
What is needed to persuade people to alter their treatment of animals is not philosophy, let alone an
atheistic philosophy (for one of the premises of Singer’s argument is that we have no souls) in a religious
nation. It is to learn to feel animals’ pains as our pains and to learn that (if it is a fact, which I do not know)
we can alleviate those pains without substantially reducing our standard of living and that of the rest of the
world and without sacrificing medical and other scientific progress. Most of us, especially perhaps those of
us who have lived with animals, have sufficient empathy for animals suffering to support the laws that
forbid cruelty and neglect. We might go further if we knew more about animal feelings and about the
existence of low-cost alternatives to pain-inflicting uses of animals. It follows that to expand and
invigorate the laws that protect animals will require not philosophical arguments for reducing human
beings to the level of the other animals but facts that will stimulate a greater empathic response to animal
suffering and alleviate concern about the human costs of further measures to reduce animal suffering. If
enough people come to feel the sufferings of these animals as their own, public opinion and consumer
preference will induce the business firms and other organizations that inflict such suffering to change their
methods. In just the same way, the more altruistic that American people become toward foreigners (for
example, the impoverished populations of the Third World), the greater the costs that they will be willing to
incur for the benefit of foreigners.
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Animal Rights Unnecessary: Can Meet Moral Obligations
Without Rights
FOCUS ON MORAL ARGUMENTS UNDERCUTS POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR ANIMAL
RIGHTS AGENDA
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate,
ed. Robert Garner, p. 126
There is no doubt that the animal protection movement can be a more effective campaigning force. Ryder
for instance, point to the constant need for a well-argued and balanced case when seeking to persuade
decisionmakers and the wider public. In addition, a theme of this book has been the importance of linking
animal protection with other issues such as public health and the environment. As Stallwood argues, this
would be a means of mobilizing the widest possible support. Too often, though, neither of these factors are
present. It would be wrong to single out the animal protection movement for exclusive blame here but it is
true that the overly moral and confrontational stance of many animal rights campaigns does hinder the
development of a case which will be persuasive to the widest number of constituencies.
HUMANCENTRIC APPROACH TO ANIMAL WELFARE MORE APPEALING
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 70
The approach that I am urging, the humancentric, takes account of such things as worry about leveling
down people to animals, people’s love of nature and of particular animal species, and people’s empathic
concern with suffering animals (feeling their pain as our pain). The approach, which draws sustenance
from the statistics that I quoted earlier from the Department of Agriculture, assigns no intrinsic value to
animal welfare. It seeks reasons strictly of human welfare for according or denying rights to animals, and
focuses on the consequences for us of recognizing animal rights. Those consequences are both good
(benefits) and bad (costs—a word I am using broadly without limitation to pecuniary costs) and can be
either direct or indirect. A direct humancentric benefit of giving animals rights would be the increase in
human happiness brought about by knowledge that the animals we like are being protected. There is
nothing surprising about human altruism toward animals. Remember what I said earlier about the
dependence of early man on animals. The relationship with animals which that dependence established
was not primarily about kindness, but one of use. As our dependence on animals declined, however, our
empathy with animals could stand free from any felt need to kill. If the current regard for animals on the
part of members of the animal rights movement seems sentimental, we should remind ourselves that the
sentiments are in all likelihood the expression of an adaptive preference that we acquired in the ancestral
environment.
BEST WAY TO APPROACH ANIMAL RIGHTS IS FROM A HUMANCENTRIC PERSPECTIVE
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 51
There is growing debate over whether to recognize “animal rights”—which means whether to create legal
duties to treat animals in approximately the same way we treat the human residents of our society, whether,
in effect, animals, or some animals, shall be citizens. I shall argue that the best approach to the question of
animal rights is a humancentric one that appeals to our developing knowledge and sentiments about
animals and that eschews on the one hand philosophical argument and on the other hand a legal-formalist
approach to the issue (an approach that turns out, however to have distinct affinities with philosophical
analysis.)
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Pragmatism Doesn’t Require Endorsement of Animal Rights
PRAGAMATISM DOES NOT REQUIRE ENDORSEMENT OF ANIMAL RIGHTS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 61-2
There are three misunderstandings here. The first is the conflation of philosophical and everyday
pragmatism. The proposition that people are clever animals is part of the philosophical side of pragmatism;
it is related to the distinctive pragmatic conception of inquiry and the associated pragmatic rejection of
metaphysical realism. Second, it is arbitrary to draw a normative inference from a biological fact (or
theory). Why should the percentage of genes that I have in common with other creatures determine how
much consideration I owe them? And third, a pragmatist need not be committed to a particular vocabulary,
realistic or otherwise, such as “man as animal.” A vocabulary of human specialness may have social value
despite its descriptive inaccuracy. To call human life “sacred” or to distinguish human beings from animals
may be descriptively, which is to say scientifically, inaccurate yet serve a constructive function in political
discourse, perhaps nudging people to behave “better” in a sense with which most everyday pragmatists
would agree.
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Singer’s Utilitarian Justification Flawed
ETHICAL JUSTIFICATION FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS LEADS TO RESULTS MANY FIND
MORALLY UNTENABLE
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 68
Singer claims that readers of Animal Liberation have been persuaded by the ethical arguments in the book
and not just by the facts and the pictures. If so, it is probably so only because these readers do not realize
the radicalism of the ethical vision that powers Singer’s views, an ethical vision that finds greater value in a
healthy pig than in a profoundly retarded child, that commands inflicting a lesser pain on a human being to
avert a greater pain to a dog, and that implies that, provided only that a chimpanzee has 1 percent of the
mental ability of a normal human being, it is right to sacrifice the human being to save the chimpanzees.
Had Animal Liberation emphasized these implications of Singer’s utilitarian philosophy, it would have
persuaded many fewer readers—and likewise if it had sought merely to persuade our rational faculty, and
not to stir our empathic regard for animals.
NATURE WILL RESIST EGALITARIANISM—EVOLUTION NECESSITATES ANIMAL PAIN
Sagoff, 84 (Mark, Acting Director and Senior Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public
Policy in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, “Animal Liberation and Environmental
Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce”, Law and Ecological Ethics Symposium ,Osgoode Hall Law Journal,
vol. 22, no. 2)
I began by supposing that Aido Leopold viewed the community of nature as a moral community—one in
which human beings, as mem- bers, have obligations to all other animals, presumably to minimize their
pain. I suggested that Leopold, like Singer, may be committed to the idea that the natural environment
should be preserved and pro- tected only insofar as, and because, its protection satisfies the needs or
promotes the welfare of individual animals and perhaps other living things. I believe, however, that this is
plainly not Leopold's view. The principle of natural selection is not obviously a humanitarian principle; the
predator-prey relation does not depend on moral empathy. Nature ruthlessly limits animal populations
by doing violence to virtually every individual before it reaches maturity; these conditions respect animal
equality only in the darkest sense. Yet these are precisely the ecological relationships which Leopold
admires; they are the conditions which he would not interfere with, but protect. Apparently, Leopold does
notthink that an ecological system has to be an egalitarian moral system in order to deserve love and
admiration. An ecological system has a beauty and an authenticity that demands respect — but plainly not
on humanitarian grounds.
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Singer’s Utilitarian Justification Flawed
THE UTILITARIAN DEFENSE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS REQUIRES HUMAN INTERVENTION
INTO NATURE—THIS DESTROYS AN ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC, WHICH IS MORE
IMPORTANT THAN PROTECTING THE RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL ANIMALS
Sagoff, 84 (Mark, Acting Director and Senior Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public
Policy in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, “Animal Liberation and Environmental
Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce”, Law and Ecological Ethics Symposium ,Osgoode Hall Law Journal,
vol. 22, no. 2)
In discussing the rights of human beings, Henry Shue describes two that are basic in the sense that "the
enjoyment of them is essential to the enjoyment of all other rights."19 These are the right to physical
security and the right to minimum subsistence. These are positive, not merely negative rights. In other
words, these rights require govern- ments to provide security and subsistence, not merely to refrain
from invading security and denying subsistence. These basic rights require society, where possible, to
rescue individuals from starvation; this is more than the merely negative obligation not to cause starvation.
No; if people have basic rights — and I have no doubt they do — then society has a positive obligation to
satisfy those rights. It is not enough for society simply to refrain from violating them. This, surely, is true of
the basic rights of animals as well, if we are to give the conception of "right" the same meaning for both
people and animals. For example, to allow animals to be killed for food or to per- mit them to die of disease
or starvation when it is within human power to prevent it, does not seem to balance fairly the interests of
animals with those of human beings. To speak of the rights of animals, of treat- ing them as equals, of
liberating them, and at the same time to let nearly all of them perish unnecessarily in the most brutal and
horrible ways is not to display humanity but hypocrisy in the extreme. Where should society concentrate its
efforts to provide for the ba- sic welfare — the security and subsistence — of animals? Plainly, where
animals most lack this security, when their basic rights, needs, or interests arc most thwarted and where
their suffering is most in- tense. Alas, this is in nature. Ever since Darwin, we have been aware that few
organisms survive to reach sexual maturity; most are quickly annihilated in the struggle for existence.
Consider as a rough but rea- sonable statement of the facts the following: All species reproduce in excess,
way past the carrying capacity of their niche. In her lifetime a lioness might have 20 cubs; a pigeon, 150 chicks; a mouse, 1,000 kits; a trout, 20,000 fry, a luna or cod, a million fry
. If one assumes that the population of each of these
species is, from generation to generation, roughly equal, then on the average only one offspring will survive
to replace each parent. All the other thousands and millions will die, one way or another." The ways in
which creatures in nature die are typically violent: prcdation, starvation, disease, parasitism, cold. The
dying animal in the wild does not understand the vast ocean of misery into which it and billions of other
animals are born only to drown. If the wild animal understood the conditions into which it is born, what
would it think? It might reasonably prefer to be raised on a farm, where the chances of survival for a year
or more would be good, and to escape from the wild, where they are negligible. Either way, the animal will be eaten: few die of old age. The
or more; an elm tree, several million seeds; and an oyster, perhaps a hundred million spat
path from birth to slaughter, however, is often longer and less painful in the barnyard than in the woods. Comparisons, sad as they are, must be made to recognize where a great
. The misery of animals in nature — which humans can do much to relieve —
makes every other form of suffering pale in comparison. Mother Nature is so cruel to her children she
makes Frank Perdue look like a saint. What is the practical course society should take once it climbs the
spiral of moral evolution high enough to recognize its obligation to value the basic rights of animals equally
with that of human beings? I do not know how animal liberationists, such as Singer, propose to relieve
animal suffering in nature (
opportunity lies to prevent or mitigate suffering
where most of it occurs), but there are many ways to do so at little cost. Singer has suggested, with respect to pest control, that animals might be fed contraceptive chemicals rather than poisons.18 It
may not be beyond the reach of science to attempt a broad program of contraceptive care for animals in nature so that fewer will fall victim to an early and horrible death. The government is spending hundreds of millions of dollars to store millions of tons of grain. Why
not lay out this food, laced with contraceptives, for wild creatures to feed upon? Farms which so overproduce for human needs might then satisfy the needs of animals. The day may come when enti- tlement programs which now extend only to human beings are offered
to animals as well. One may modestly propose the conversion of national wilderness areas, especially national parks, into farms in order to replace violent wild areas with more humane and managed environments. Starving deer in the woods might be adopted as pets.
They might be fed in ken- nels; animals that once wandered the wilds in misery might get fat in feedlots instead. Birds that now kill earthworms may repair instead to birdhouses stocked with food, including textured soybean protein that looks and smells like worms.
And to protect the brutes from cold, their dens could be heated, or shelters provided for the all too many who will otherwise freeze. The list of obligations is long, but for that reason it is more, not less, compelling. The welfare of all animals is in human hands. Society
must attend not solely to the needs of domestic animals, for they are in a privileged class, but to the needs of all animals, especially those which, withou t help, would die miserably in the wild. Now, whether you believe that this harangue is a reductioof Singer's position,
and thus that it agrees in principle with Ritchie, or whether you think it should be taken seriously as an ideal is of no con- cern to me. I merely wish to point out that an environmentalist must take what I have said as a reductio, whereas an animal liberationist must regard
if the liberationist shares Singer's commitment to utilitarianism. Environmentalists cannot
be animal liberationists. Animal liberationists cannot be environmental- ists. The environmentalist would
sacrifice the lives of individual creatures to preserve the authenticity, integrity and complexity of ecological
systems. The liberationist — if the reduction of animal misery is taken seriously as a goal — must be
willing, in principle, to sacrifice the authenticity, integrity and complexity of ecosystems to protect the
rights, or guard the lives, of animals.
it as stating a serious position, at least
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Singer’s Utilitarian Justification Flawed
UTILITARIAN RIGHTS CLAIMS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH A BROADER
ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC THAT SOLVES THE CASE BETTER
Sagoff, 84 (Mark, Acting Director and Senior Research Scholar at the Institute for Philosophy and Public
Policy in the School of Public Policy at the University of Maryland, “Animal Liberation and Environmental
Ethics: Bad Marriage, Quick Divorce”, Law and Ecological Ethics Symposium ,Osgoode Hall Law Journal,
vol. 22, no. 2)
A defender of the rights of animals may answer that my argument applies only to someone like Singer who
is strongly committed to a utilitarian ethic. Those who emphasize the rights of animals, however, need not
argue that society should enter the interests of animals equitably into the felicific calculus on which policy
is based. For example, Laurence Tribe appeals to the rights of animals not to broaden the class of wants to
be included in a Benthamite calculus but to "move beyond wants" and thus to affirm duties "ultimately
independent of a desire-satisfying conception."19 Tribe writes: To speak of "rights" rather than "wants",
after all, is to acknowledge the possibility that want-maximizing or utility-maximizing actions will be ruled
out in particular cases as inconsistent with a structure of agreed-upon obligations. It is Kant, no Bentham,
whose thought suggests the first step toward making us "different persons from the manipulators and
subjugators we arc in danger of becoming,"10It is difficult to see how an appeal to rights helps society to
"move beyond wants" or to affirm duties "ultimately independent of a desire- satisfying conception." Most
writers in the Kantian tradition analyze rights as claims to something in which the claimant has an
interest.21 Thus, rights-theorists oppose utilitarianism not to go beyond wants but because they believe that
some wants or interests are moral "trumps" over other wants and interests.22 To say innocent people have a
right not to be hanged for crimes they have not committed, even when hanging them would serve the
general welfare, is to say that the interest of innocent people not to be hanged should outweigh the general
interest in deterring crime. To take rights seriously, then, is simply to take some interests, or the general
interest, more seriously than other interests for moral reasons. The appeal to rights simply is a variation on
utilitarian- ism, in that it accepts the general framework of interests, but presupposes that there are certain
interests that should not be traded off against others.23 A second problem with Tribe's reply is more
damaging than the first. Only individuals may have rights, but environmentalists think in terms of
protecting collections, systems and communities. Consider Aldo Leopold's oft-quoted remark: "A thing is
right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when
it tends to do otherwise."24 The obligation to preserve the "integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic
community," whatever those words mean, implies no duties whatever to individual animals in the
community, except in the rare instance in which an individual is important to functioning of that
community. For the most part, individual animals are completely expendable. An environmentalist is
concerned only with maintaining a population. Accordingly, the moral ob- ligation Leopold describes
cannot be grounded in or derived from the rights of individuals. Therefore, it has no basis in rights at
all.20 Consider another example: the protection of endangered species.20 An individual whale may be said
to have rights, but the species cannot; a whale does not suddenly have rights when its kind becomes
endangered.27 No; the moral obligation to preserve species is not an obligation to individual creatures. It
cannot, then, be an obligation that rests on rights. This is not to say that there is no moral obligation with
regard to endangered species, animals or the environment. It is only to say that moral obligations to nature
cannot be enlightened or explained — one cannot even take the first step — by appealing to the rights of
animals and other natural things.
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**Animals Do Not Deserve Rights**
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Animals Lack Moral Agency Necessary for Rights
NON-HUMAN ANIMALS LACK MORAL AGENCY NECESSARY FOR RIGHTS
Peter Staudenmeir, Human Rights Advocate & Philosopher, 2003, The Ambiguities of Animal Rights”,
March, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
This decisive distinction is fundamental to ethics itself. To act ethically means, among other things, to
respect the principle that persuasion and consent are preferable to coercion and manipulation. This
principle cannot be directly applied to human interactions with animals. Animals cannot be persuaded and
cannot give consent. In order to accord proper consideration to an animal’s well—being, moral agents
must make some determination of what that animal’s interests are. This is not only unnecessary in the case
of other moral agents, it is morally prohibited under normal conditions.
ONLY HUMANS ARE MORALLY COMPETENT AND THUS THE ONLY BEINGS CAPABLE
OF RIGHTS
Peter Staudenmeir, Human Rights Advocate & Philosopher, 2003, The Ambiguities of Animal Rights”,
March, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
Animal liberation doctrine, far from extending this humanist impulse, directly undermines it. Moreover, the
animal rights stance forgets a crucial fact about ethical action. There is indeed a critically important
distinction between moral agents (beings who can engage in ethical deliberation, entertain alternative moral
choices, and act according to their best judgement) and all other morally considerable beings. Moral agents
are uniquely capable of formulating, articulating, and defending a conception of their own interests. No
other morally considerable beings are capable of this; in order for their interests to be taken into account in
ethical deliberation, these interests must be imputed and interpreted by some moral agent. As far as we
know, mentally competent adult human beings are the only moral agents there are.
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Animals Lack Ability to Participate in Asking for Rights
“RIGHTS” ONLY MAKE SENSE FOR THOSE THAT CAN ACTIVELY PARTICIPATE IN
DEFINING WHAT INTERESTS NEED PROTECTING
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 30-1
So, whilst animals may not be eligible as rights-holders in all of the respects in which (human) moral
agents are, and there may be problems in connection with the social relational conditions of rights for them,
there are still good reasons for holding that animals are not ruled out from the status of rights-holders by
their substantive natures. It is at this point in the argument that the other questions I posed earlier become
pertinent. What is the moral purpose of rights-attribution, and why do individuals stand in need of rights?
If we agree with Regan and the tradition of rights-theory upon which he draws, then the answer to the first
question is that rights afford protection of the basic interests, or welfare of the rights-holder. On this
supposition, the answer to the second question must be that the bearers of rights require them because they
are vulnerable. To say this much may be enough of an answer in the case of “passive” rights. However,
for moral agents, their capacity for self-definition and self-determination implies that what counts as their
welfare cannot be fully known independently of their own active participation in defining it. Moreover, the
social movements which the supporters of animal rights usually use as analogues provide evidence that
recognition and preservation of the powers of self-definition and self-determination are likely to figure
centrally as elements in the substantive views of their own welfare which they advance as rights-claims.
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Rights Demands Responsibilities
INCONSISTENT TO ARGUE THAT ANIMALS HAVE RIGHTS BUT NOT RESPONSIBILITIES
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 474
The philosophy works only if one provides an “out” for animals that do things that, in human terms, would
be immoral. A human who kills another human commits murder, whereas the lion that kills the zebra for
food does not. Only humans can be moral agents. In contrast, animals are likened to “marginal” humans,
i.e., infants of the mentally retarded who cannot be held accountable for their acts. They are, by contrast,
moral patients. Animals, then, according to the rights view, have rights but not responsibilities. One can
immediately perceive a certain inconsistency in the logic, namely, that it is their likeness to humans that
enjoins our respect, but a profound difference from humans in terms of moral accountability that gives
them special standing.
RIGHTS EXTEND ONLY TO THOSE CAPABLE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 30
A second set of problems in the way of attributing rights to nonhuman animals has to do with the absence
of any relational element in Regan’s ‘subject of a life’ qualifying condition. A thorough going
communitarian moral theorists would hold that animal rights are an absurdity, since to be a right-holder is
necessarily to be a member of a human community whose normative order assigns both rights and
responsibilities. But this communitarian view of rights faces the difficulty that it cannot readily make sense
of the critical role of rights as moral claims on communities to revise their existing normative structure in
favor of universalistic standards. This is precisely the aspect of the historical role of rights-claims that
advocates of animal rights seek to draw on.
EXTENDING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS UNDERCUTS NOTION OF RESPONSIBILITY
Kyle Ash, lobbying strategist at the European Environmental Bureau, 2005 Animal Law
(INTERNATIONAL ANIMAL RIGHTS: SPECIESISM AND EXCLUSIONARY HUMAN DIGNITY,)
9 At its inception in medieval Europe, modern secular law was considered, like its ecclesiastical
predecessor, an imperfect effect of a divinely rooted natural law that was also subject to conscience and
reason. n31 John Austin equated natural law to "Divine laws, or the laws of God, [or] laws set by God to
his human creatures ... ." n32 He said, furthermore, that some of God's laws were promulgated and others
not, but that we nevertheless were bestowed with reason to discover this "natural religion" in its entirety.
n33…Mill analyzed the concept of divinely rooted natural law as it pertains to the creation of legal rights
subsequent to comprehending moral rights. He said that people appear to have a disposition to see
obligatory morality as a "transcendental fact," even objective since it cannot be interpreted. n34 If morality
could be interpreted or created through human reason, there would be less incentive to be obedient. If a
person were to realize that restraint is entirely a matter of her own conscience, a self-imposed feeling, she
may come to the conclusion that her moral obligation ends as soon as she finds it inconvenient.
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Sentience Insufficient to Necessitate Rights
SENTIENCE INSUFFICENT TO JUSTIFY ANIMAL RIGHTS –DOESN’T REQUIRE MORAL
AGENCY
Richard A. Epstein, Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and
new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 154
Yet there’s the rub. Once that concession is made, then the next question is: Do we really think that
suffering is the only criterion by which rights are awarded after all? It does seem troublesome—nothing is
fatal in this counterintuitive metaphysics—to assume that animals are entitled to limited rights on a par
with humans while denying that they are moral agents because they are incapable of following any
universal dictates. And do we attach any weight to the unhappy fact that these animals are themselves
imprinted “speciesists” in that they have instinctively different relationships with members of their own
kind than they do with members of prey or predator populations? The test of sensation cannot generate a
clean account of legal rights for animals.
SENTIENCE INADEQUATE – CAN’T REDUCE WHAT IS MORALLY RELEVANT TO HUMAN
EXISTENCE AS PLEASURE AND PAIN, HUMAN & ANIMAL SUFFERING NOT
NECESSARILY SIMILAR IN KIND
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 22-3
It is therefore, not surprising that the utilitarian tradition has taken the lead in advocacy of a positive moral
standing for nonhuman animals. Its moral theory is, so to speak, less metaphysically demanding than its
main rivals. But the utilitarian tradition faces serious problems quite independently of its application to
animals. Among the more commonly advanced criticisms, at least two might be thought actually less
pressing when the theory is applied to nonhumans. The first of these arguments is that what is morally
important in human life cannot be reduced to pleasure and pain. Some pleasures may be deemed good,
others evil, while pain may be suffered for fine or noble purposes. Whilst there may be substantive moral
disagreement about these judgments, it is clear that the relation between good and evil, on the one hand,
and pleasure and pain, on the other is a contingent one. Similar considerations apply to ‘preference
utilitarianism”: what is good is not necessarily what is preferred, neoclassical economics notwithstanding.
A second long-standing objection to utilitarianism is closely related to the first. It is that the qualitative
focus of the doctrine limits its capacity to acknowledge qualitative differences among pleasures, or
preferences. Different pleasures differ not just in amounts—intensities, durations, and so on, but also in
kind, or quality. How many bars of a Mahler symphony are equivalent to a good meal? Since the
possibility of subjecting pleasures, pains and preferences to moral evaluation, and to qualitative
discriminations seems to be closely bound up with the culturally mediated, or formed character of human
experience, it seems that these two objections are effective against utilitarianism solely in its application to
the human case. So far as animals are concerned, perhaps the utilitarian identification of the good with an
optimal ratio of pleasure to pain is more plausible than the same doctrine applied to humans. But to argue
in this way would be to undermine the utilitarian case for animal liberation. For the doctrine to succeed in
including nonhumans within the sphere of moral concern, it has to be supposed that human suffering and
animal suffering are similar in kind, that each counts equally within the utilitarian choice.
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Sentience Insufficient to Necessitate Rights
SENTIENT-BASED JUSTIFICATION FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS LEADS TO UNTENABLE
RESULTS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 64
Singer will doubtless reply that these are just facts about human nature, that they have no normative
significance. Yet I doubt that he actually believes that in is heart of hearts. Suppose a dog menaced a
human infant and the only way to prevent the
dog from biting the infant was to inflict severe pain on the dog—more pain, in fact, than the bite would
inflict on the infant. Singer would have to say, let the dog bite, for Singer’s position is that if an animals
feels pain, the pain matters as much as it does when a human feels pain, provided the pain is as great; and it
matters more if it is greater. But any normal person (and not merely the infant’s parents), including a
philosopher when he is not self-consciously engaged in philosophizing, would say that it would be
monstrous to spare the dog, even though to do so would minimize the sum of pain in the world.
TURN: PROJECTING THE ABILITY TO FEEL PAIN ON OTHER ANIMALS IS SPECIESIST
David Horton, Philosopher, Deep Ecology and Animal Rights
A Discussion Paper, 2000, http://home.ca.inter.net/~greenweb/DE-AR.html
Animal rights supporters tend to favour animals that are seen as close to humans, which are understood to
experience "sentience" or pain or suffering. (The English 19th century philosopher of utilitarianism,
Jeremy Benthan, advanced this position.) A deep ecology supporter would see this position as a form of
anthropocentrism or human- centeredness. Also, it is a form of anthropomorphism, that is, projecting
human emotions upon other life forms. As Rod Preece said in Animals and Nature, "To assume that other
species possess similar emotions to humans is potentially to deny them their uniqueness." (Some animal
rights supporters argue that giving mammals more "value" than "lower" life forms is based on the notion
that animals with a developed central nervous system can feel pain, rather than on the anthropocentric
notion that they are "more similar" to humans. The animal rights motivation for different "valuation" of
species would thus be compassion rather than anthropocentrism.) Animal rights supporters are often highly
motivated to become agents of social change, by compassion for animals that are suffering. Deep ecology
supporters are not unconcerned with issues of compassion. They may seem to disregard individual
suffering, because their concerns are with the larger picture.
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Cognitive Capacity Does Not Necessitate Rights Extension
COGNITIVE CAPACITY IS A NECESSARY BUT NOT SUFFICIENT REQUIREMENT FOR
RIGHTS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 56
How convincing is his analysis, if we set to one side the criticisms of it that I have made thus far? The
major premise presents the immediate difficulty. Cognitive capacity is certainly relevant to rights; it is a
precondition of some rights, such as the right to vote. But most people would not think it either a necessary
or a sufficient condition of having rights. Wise does not take on their arguments or, more to the point, their
intuitions—for his major premise is itself an intuition and so he needs to give a reason for ignoring strongly
contrary intuitions. Many people believe, for example, that a one-day old human fetus, though it has no
cognitive capacity, should have a right to life; and the Supreme Court permits the fetus to be accorded a
qualified such right after the first trimester of pregnancy, though the cognitive capacity of a second- or
third-trimester fetus is very limited. It is difficult for Wise to resist the fetal analogy, because he thinks that
a one-day-old infant has rights, even though the one-day-old infant has little greater cognitive capacity than
the infant had a fetus a few hours earlier. Wise’s lack of concern with destroying a “conscious” computer
is a further indication that he does not take the idea that rights follow cognitive capacity seriously. Most
people would think it distinctly odd to proportion animal rights to animal intelligence, as Wise wishes to
do, implying that dolphins, parrots, and ravens are entitled to more legal protection than horses (or most
monkeys), and perhaps that the laws forbidding cruelty to animals should be limited to the most intelligent
animals, inviting the crack, “They don’t have syntax, so we can eat them” And most of us would think it
downright offensive to give greater rights to monkeys, let alone to computers, than to retarded people upon
a showing that the monkey or the computer had a larger cognitive capacity than a profoundly retarded
human being. Cognition and rights deservedness are not interwoven as tightly as Wise believes, though he
is not, of course, the first to believe this.
DIFFERENCES IN RIGHTS AND TREATMENT SHOULD NOT BE BASED ON SUBJECTIVE
INTERPRETATIONS OF INTELLIGENCE*
Marc Bekoff, Professor of Biology, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 2003, The Animal Ethics
Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 120*
People often ask whether “lower” nonhuman animals such as fish or dogs perform sophisticated patterns of
behavior that are usually associated with “higher” nonhuman primates…In my view, these are misguided
questions…because animals have to be able to do what they need to do in order to live in their own worlds.
This type of speciesist cognitivism also can be bad news for many animals. If an answer to this question
means there are consequences in terms of the sort of treatment to which an individual is subjected, then we
really have to analyze the question in great detail. It is important to accept that while there are species
differences in behavior, behavioral differences in and of themselves may mean little for arguments about
the rights of animals.
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY DRAWING LINES BASED ON
COGNITIVE ABILITY
Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, Professors of Neuroscience and Animal Behavior, University of
New England, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p.
193
We have presented evidence that current research into higher cognition of animals, and hence their degree
of awareness, is in its infancy. A handful of species have been researched in depth, and current findings
would suggest that many more species might be found to have exceptional cognitive abilities, if we only
looked. Drawing a line and giving animal rights to a select few on the grounds of higher cognition, for
instance, cannot, at this moment in time, be based in scientific facts because too few are at hand, that is,
decisions at the policy level are undersupplied by scientific information.
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Cognitive Capacity Does Not Necessitate Rights Extension
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE DOES NOT JUSTIFY LINES BETWEEN NONHUMAN ANIMALS
BASED ON SUPPOSED VALUE
Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, Professors of Neuroscience and Animal Behavior, University of
New England, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p.
186
However, rights deal with positive freedoms, and such freedoms must be enjoyed if they are content and
species specific. However, given our present state of knowledge of the needs and capabilities of classes of
animals, let alone individual species, we feel, as biologists, that we first and foremost ought to guard
against, or at least be very cautious about, the temptation of creating a scale of lesser or greater value of one
species over another.
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Cognitive Capacity Bad Justification for Rights
WRONG TO COUCH OUR MORAL DUTIES TO ANIMALS IN AN ANTHROPOCENTRIC
FRAMEWORK
Marc Bekoff, Professor of Biology, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 2003, The Animal Ethics
Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 121
It is important to talk to the animals and let them talk to us; these reciprocal conversations should allow us
to see the animals for who they are. To this end…Gluck (1997), in stressing the importance of considering
what we do to animals from the perspective of the animal, emphasizes the need to go beyond science and to
see animals as who they are. Our respect for animals must be motivated by who they are and not by who
we want them to be in our anthropocentric scheme of things. As Taylor (1986, p. 313) notes, a switch
away from anthropocentrism to biocentrism, in which human superiority comes under critical scrutiny,
“may require a profound moral reorientation.”
EMPHASIS ON COGNITIVE CAPACITY WILL REQUIRE RIGHTS FOR COMPUTERS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 55
Wise is aware that too much emphasis on cognitive capacity as the basis for rights invites the question: So
what about computers? Some computer scientists and philosophers believe that computers will soon
achieve consciousness. Wise brushes aside this possibility with the observation that chimpanzees and
human beings have traveled a similar evolutionary path, and computers have not—though one might have
thought that, since computers are a product of the human mind, they may “think” along somewhat similar
lines. Wise makes himself a hostage to future scientific advances by ignoring the possibility that there may
some day be computers that have as many “neurons” as chimpanzees, “neurons” that moreover are “wired”
similarly. Such computers may well be conscious. This will be a problem for Wise, for whom the essence
of equality under law is that individuals with similar cognitive capacities should be treated alike regardless
of their species. Nothing in his analysis would permit him to limit this principle to “natural” species—for
what if a human being could be created in a laboratory from chemicals, without use of any genetic
material? Wise would have to agree that such a human being would have the same rights as any other
human being; rights in his view are not based on genes. So why are computers categorically excluded?
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Genetic Similarity Does not Necessitate Rights
GENETIC SIMILARITY NOT NECESSARILY CORRELATED WITH HOW MUCH WE “LIKE”
THE ANIMALS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 62-3
Oddly, sentimental attachmen to animals is not well correlated with genetic closeness, as is implicit in my
noting that we can like some animals more than we like people. We are more closely related genetically to
chimpanzees than to cats or dogs or falcons or leopards, but some of us like chimpanzees less than these
other animals, and we might prefer, for example, to have medical experiments conducted on chimpanzees
than on these other species, though the relative pain that experiments inflict on different species of animals,
as well as differential medical benefits from experiments on different species, would be a relevant factor to
most of us. If chimpanzees’ greater intelligence increases the suffering that they undergo a subjects of
medical experiments, relative to less intelligent animals, the increment in suffering may trump our affection
for certain “cuter” animals. To the extent that the happiness of certain animals is bound up with our own
happiness, there is, as I have just noted, a utilitarian basis for animal rights (though “rights” is not the best
term here) even if the only utility that a utilitarian is obligated to try to maximize is human utility.
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**Problems with Recognizing Animal Rights”
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Animal Rights System Threatens Global Extinction
ANIMAL RIGHTS DENY OUR ABILITY TO LIVE AND CULMINATE IN EXTINCTION – ANY
GIVING OF RIGHTS DOOMS US ALL
Robert James Bidinotto, Director of Development and Special Projects@ theInstitute for Objectivist
Studies. “Environmentalism or Individualism”. 2003 http://www.econot.com/page4.html
There is only one fundamental alternative in the natural world: the alternative of life and death. Like all
living things, we humans must act to further our own interests, or we perish. But unlike other living things,
we cannot effectively compete as predators, with claws, fangs, speed, and strength. In order to survive and
flourish in nature, we must produce what we need. We must use our unique reasoning powers to transform
natural resources into the goods and services that sustain and enhance our lives.
Alone on a desert island, a man would realize immediately that the amount of his wealth is not fixed, but
expands based solely on what he produces. However, in a complex economy built on trade, where direct
causes and effects are harder to trace, it's easy to forget that overall material abundance doesn't exist in
some fixed, perishable quantity. As a result, many believe that the economy holds only a limited supply of
resources and wealth--like a pie of fixed size, so that if one person gets a bigger piece, his neighbor has to
get a smaller piece. And so, to many, "self-interest" in the economy has come to mean not productivity, but
getting something at the expense of others--acting not as a producer, but as a parasite, or even as a predator.
This premise--that the interests of men are inherently in conflict--is rooted in our tribal past. It's the source
of the myth that the pursuit of one's self-interest must necessarily harm others. And that myth, in turn, has
led to the corollary idealization of self-sacrifice: the belief that to reduce social conflict, the individual must
be made to sacrifice his interests for the sake of others, or of the "greater whole."
However, the premise isn't true. The belief that human interests are inherently in conflict fails to take into
account human creative intelligence. We aren't fighting over a fixed or dwindling amount of resources, or
an economic pie of fixed size. That's because we aren't just pie consumers: we're pie producers. By using
our creative intelligence to develop previously idle resources, we create a bigger pie--then more pies--then
better pies--then cake, as well.
The history of human progress is that Man takes things from nature, and by using his reason, transforms
them into ever-increasing abundance. He does so with ever-greater efficiency, too, creating more values
with fewer resources. And then he adds to his abundance by trading what he produces for other things that
he wants. Both sides to a trade get something that they want more, by trading away something they want
less. Such enlightened self-interest doesn't require anyone's victimization: free trade is a win-win situation.
Far from using up a fixed and shrinking amount of natural resources, then, Man's rational intelligence
produces a growing bounty of new resources from material previously considered to be useless. That is
why centuries of Malthusian predictions about resource depletion, mass starvation, population outrunning
resources, and the destruction of the planet have utterly failed to materialize--why global living standards
and life spans have, in fact, been rising at an accelerating pace.
Yet in the face of all the benefits of modernity, the primitive tribal ideal of self-denial still persists, most
explicitly in the environmentalist movement.
Because of the popularity of this ideal, many view environmentalists as sincere idealists, but simply too
extreme. Nothing could be further from the truth. In fact, their alleged "ideal" isn't ideal at all. No, I'm not
criticizing them for being too committed to a principle. I'm accusing them of being committed to the wrong
principle.
Ask yourself the following question: Where is there a place for humans and their works in a world where
pristine nature is deemed ideal, and the productive use of nature for human gain is deemed immoral?
In essence, environmentalists are attacking our very right to live, period. That position permits no
compromise. To concede an inch of ground to it is to surrender, in principle, the entire battle for our lives,
well-being, and happiness.
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Animal Rights Focus Trades Off with Efforts to Improve
Animal Welfare
SPLIT BETWEEN ANIMAL RIGHTS/WELFARE MOVEMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENTS
Kate Rawles, Lancaster University Lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 56
The attempt to prioritize climate change at the expense of animal welfare is in fact symptomatic of a spirit
between animal welfare and environmental issues that precedes the climate change scenario.
Concern about environmental issues and animal welfare issues is often pursued separately, by different
groups of people working for different organizations. Campaigning groups, for example, are often focused
on either environmental issues such as habitat degradation and loss, species extinction, pollution of various
kinds, climate change or animal welfare ones. They do not always have much familiarity with the issues
on the other side. At times there has been downright hostility between the two kinds of movements. I have
been to animal welfare conferences at which many delegates had barely heard of climate change. And I
have been at environmental campaigns where concern with animal welfare is marginalized or dismissed as
a luxury or an irrelevance.
This split is understandable in various ways. The practical campaigns are underpinned by very different
philosophical positions which have, amongst other things, a different ethical focus. Animal welfarists are
concerned with sentient animals, especially domesticated ones. In their view, all sentient beings are
ethically significant and should be treated as such. Environmentalists are typically concerned with the
well-being, not of individuals, but of habitats, landscapes, species, and ecosystems – of ecological entities
of various kinds. Whether or not these entities are sentient is considered irrelevant. And they are
especially concerned with natural or semi-natural entities rather than domesticated ones. In their view,
these ecological entities rather than individuals should be the primary focus of our ethical concern –
whether this be for shallow or for deeper reasons.
A further factor is the respective relationships between environmental movement, the animal welfare
movement, and science. The environmental movement has very strong links with science. Concern with
animal welfare, irrelevant from a conservation perspective, has been viewed with suspicion as presupposing
subjective mental states in animals – imagine! – within (some) scientific communities. It has sometimes
been dismissed as sentimental and anthropomorphic. Given that many of the different elements within the
environment movement draw heavily on science for their authority, being associated with animal welfare
might, in the past at least, have been resisted for fear of a loss of credibility.
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Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements
SPLIT BETWEEN ANIMAL RIGHTS/WELFARE MOVEMENTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL
MOVEMENTS
Kate Rawles, Lancaster University Lecturer in Environmental Philosophy, 2008, The Future of Animal
Farming: renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 56
The attempt to prioritize climate change at the expense of animal welfare is in fact symptomatic of a spirit
between animal welfare and environmental issues that precedes the climate change scenario.
Concern about environmental issues and animal welfare issues is often pursued separately, by different
groups of people working for different organizations. Campaigning groups, for example, are often focused
on either environmental issues such as habitat degradation and loss, species extinction, pollution of various
kinds, climate change or animal welfare ones. They do not always have much familiarity with the issues
on the other side. At times there has been downright hostility between the two kinds of movements. I have
been to animal welfare conferences at which many delegates had barely heard of climate change. And I
have been at environmental campaigns where concern with animal welfare is marginalized or dismissed as
a luxury or an irrelevance.
This split is understandable in various ways. The practical campaigns are underpinned by very different
philosophical positions which have, amongst other things, a different ethical focus. Animal welfarists are
concerned with sentient animals, especially domesticated ones. In their view, all sentient beings are
ethically significant and should be treated as such. Environmentalists are typically concerned with the
well-being, not of individuals, but of habitats, landscapes, species, and ecosystems – of ecological entities
of various kinds. Whether or not these entities are sentient is considered irrelevant. And they are
especially concerned with natural or semi-natural entities rather than domesticated ones. In their view,
these ecological entities rather than individuals should be the primary focus of our ethical concern –
whether this be for shallow or for deeper reasons.
A further factor is the respective relationships between environmental movement, the animal welfare
movement, and science. The environmental movement has very strong links with science. Concern with
animal welfare, irrelevant from a conservation perspective, has been viewed with suspicion as presupposing
subjective mental states in animals – imagine! – within (some) scientific communities. It has sometimes
been dismissed as sentimental and anthropomorphic. Given that many of the different elements within the
environment movement draw heavily on science for their authority, being associated with animal welfare
might, in the past at least, have been resisted for fear of a loss of credibility.
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Animal Rights Focus Undermines Environmental Movements
ARGUMENTS GROUNDED IN INTRISIC VALUE OR RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL SPECIES
INEFFECTIVE IN GAINING PUBLIC ACCEPTANCE FOR CONSERVATION GOALS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 468-9
While references to rights of wild species are appealing and may be rhetorically useful as propaganda, most
philosophers now agree that appeals to rights of nonhuman species do not provide a coherent and adequate
basis for protecting biological diversity. Many philosophers have therefore concluded that when
environmentalists speak of rights, they really mean that wild species have intrinsic value in some broader
sense, a sense that does not require that we attribute rights to them. What is important, on this view, is that
wild species are valued for themselves, and not as mere instruments for the fulfillment of human needs and
desires. This view is attractive in many ways, but it is extremely difficult to explain clearly. Does it mean
that other species had value even before any conscious valuers emerged on the evolutionary scene? Could
species be valued by no valuers?
Or does this view that species have intrinsic value mean only that all conscious valuers should be able to
perceive it. But what if some people, such as the little girl and her family, fail to see it? Do we simply
accuse them, metaphorically, of moral blindness? Or can we somehow explain to them what this intrinsic
value is and why they should perceive it?
My point in asking all of these questions is not to prove that intrinsic value in other species does not exist.
It may. I hope that someday we will be able to show that it does. In asking these questions, and
emphasizing their difficulty, I am trying to refocus attention on a related but importantly different question:
Can appeals to intrinsic value in nonhuman species be made with sufficient clarity and persuasiveness to
effect new policies adequate to protect biological diversity before it is too late? With some experts
projecting that a fourth of all species could be lost in the next two decades, I fear not. As a philosopher, I
can perhaps say in modesty what would appear to be carping criticism if said by someone else:
philosophers seldom resolve big issues quickly. We are still, for example, struggling with a number of
questions posed by Socrates. It seems unlikely that the issue of whether wild species have intrinsic value
will be decided before the question of saving wild nature has become moot. There are, then two separate
debates about environmental values. One debate is intellectual, the other is strategic. The first debate
concerns the correct moral stance toward nature. The second debate concerns which moral stance, or
rationale, is likely to be effective in saving wild species and natural ecosystems.
GROUNDING CONSERVATION ARGUMENTS IN INTRINSIC VALUE OF INDIVIDUAL
ANIMALS INEFFECTIVE
Steve Sanderson, Wildlife Conservation Society, 2001, Conservation of Exploited Species, eds.
Reynolds, Mace, Redford & Robinson, p. 478
Essential to conservation’s ability to counter such campaigns, or their analogues (pitting recreational and
commercial near-shore fishers against each other at the expense of local small-scale fishers; large-scale
agriculture against forest preservation in the tropics, with local settlers buffeted by both) is the willingness
to form coalitions with local contingents who may not be conservationists per se. These partners may be
near-coast shrimpers in Louisiana, or wildlife “poachers” from traditional Florida. They may even extend
to agriculturalists and hunters, as has been the case with migratory birds. To be associated with extreme
organizations advocating the complete sanctity of all animal life is to fly in the face of human history and to
give up far more in gains than could possibly result in productive alliance.
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SEDUCTION OF THE POWER OF RIGHTS PREVENTS SOCIAL MOVEMENTS FROM
PRODUCING REAL CHANGE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 83-4
The assertion that rights language deceives is not leveled by CLS scholars alone. The deceptive aspect of
rights language is related to the notion of the “myth of rights” elaborated by Stuart Scheingold (1974). The
myth of rights, according to Scheingold, instills naïve faith in the utility of rights and the legal system.
Many citizens and social movements attracted by the myth of rights turn somewhat blindly to the law in
search of social change. However, this naïve and hopeful appeal to rights does little to foster change and
instead reproduces existing power distributions.
ACTIVISM OUTWEIGHS LEGAL CHANGE – WORKING THROUGH THE LAW ONLY
REINFORCES THE SYSTEMS OF HIERARCHIES YOU CRITIQUE – ONLY SOCIETAL
CHANGE CAN END VIOLENCE
Gary Francione, Professor of Law at Rutgers . “An Interview with Professor Gary L. Francione on the
State”. Friends of Animals 2002 http://www.friendsofanimals.org/programs/animal-rights/interview-withgary-francione.html
I have no illusions about the usefulness of the legal system. Veterinary malpractice cases, cruelty cases, and
cases brought under the Animal Welfare Act are pretty much meaningless in terms of reducing suffering,
and have absolutely no effect on the property status of animals. But they have created job security for
lawyers. Anna Charlton, who has taught the animal rights law course with me at Rutgers University for
over a decade, often points out that the legal system will never respond differently to animal issues unless
and until there is a significant shift in prevailing social consensus about animal exploitation. For the most
part, the law reflects social attitudes and does not form them. This is particularly true when the behavior in
question is deeply embedded in the cultural fabric, as our exploitation of animals undoubtedly is. As long
as most people think that it’s fine to eat animals, use them in experiments, or use them for entertainment
purposes, the law is not likely to be a particularly useful tool to help animals. If, for example, Congress or a
state legislature abolished factory farming, that would drive the cost of meat up and there would be a social
revolt! There are some lawyers, such as those involved with the Animal Legal Defense Fund, who promote
the notion that law will be at the forefront of social change for animals. But these people make a living
from practicing law and they are not likely to say otherwise, are they?
Nonhumans will continue to be exploited until there is a revolution of the human spirit, and that will not
happen without visionaries trying to change the paradigm that has become accustomed to and tolerant of
patriarchal violence. At this moment, the job of the animal rights lawyer is not to be the primary force for
change within the system. As lawyers, we are part of the system that exists to protect property interests.
William Kunstler, although the most prominent civil rights lawyer of the 20th century, nevertheless once
said to me that I should never think that the lawyer is the “star” of the show. Our job as lawyers is to keep
social activists out of harm’s way. In my view, a useful “animal rights” lawyer is a criminal lawyer one
day, helping activists who are charged with civil disobedience; an administrative lawyer the next day,
helping activists obtain permits for demonstrations; and a constitutional lawyer the next day, helping
students who do not want to vivisect as part of their course work, or helping prisoners who want vegan
food. But the lawyer always serves and protects the activist. It is the activist who helps to change the
paradigm. Without committed clients who reflect a growing social consensus, lawyers are useless.
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ANIMAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES SHOULD FOCUS ON MICRO-LEVEL CHANGE
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 172-3
Even if the rights advocate agrees with this analysis and concludes that she is better advised, at least at this
stage of things, to pursue incremental change through protests, demonstrations, and boycotts, there is an
important matter that has yet to be discussed. The rights advocate may aim her educational efforts (in what
ever form) at getting people to accept the philosophy of animal rights – that is, she may urge people to
accept the ideal that all animal exploitation ought to be abolished and urge them on a micro level to become
vegetarians or to eschew animal products. In this case, the advocate does not really need a theory of
incremental change per se beyond the view that change will come incrementally only as more and more
people adopt abolitionist moral views and implement those moral views in their own lifestyles. The animal
advocate is pursuing incremental change in that she is not attempting to achieve “total victory” in “one
move.” She recognizes that this is going to be a slow, arduous process and that if the goal of abolition is to
be achieved, it will be only by incrementally convincing individuals of the rights viewpoint and the
abolition that it implies, and by securing insider status and a concomitant influence over legislation that will
invariably compromise fundamental animal interests.
FORMAL GRANTING OF RIGHTS DE-MOBILIZES MOVEMENTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 84
In addition to these allegations, other scholars critique what they view as the deceptive side of rights. Some
suggest that movements mistakenly equate the formal granting of a right with the substantive attainment of
it. Achieving a formal right, some argue, does not necessarily imply substantive change. To the contrary,
winning a formal right can mislead groups into believing that they have succeeded by giving the
appearance that justice is being served. The appearance of justice provided by the attainment of formal a
formal right frequently conceals the fact that, in substantive terms, the right continues to be violated.
Moreover, if the formal recognition of a right gives the false appearance that the battle has been won, this
may lead to the dissipation of movement efforts.
ATTAINING RIGHTS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE—CREATES ILLUSION OF SUCCESS THAT
DE-MOBILIZES MOVEMENTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 83
On this view, seeking and attaining new rights can hardly be considered beneficial. Indeed, the attainment
of a right may even be more harmful than failure since “winning” a right creates an illusion of success.
Such an illusion leads the members of a movement to feel that the battle has been won and results in the
diffusion of the movement.
FOCUS ON RIGHTS DISCOURSE FRACTURES THE MOVEMENTS CONCERNED WITH
ANIMAL ADVOCACY
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 233
Still, the meaning of rights is an important component of the continuing divisions in movement identity. Many
feminists within the animal advocacy movement believe that rights are inherently individualistic and competitive.
These feminists generally do not accept the notion that the standard conception of rights can be altered or that rights
can be separated from Lockean liberalism. Utilitarians also have fundamental problems with a rights-oriented
approach. Since utilitarians base their views on maximizing happiness, rights are essentially nonsense. The meaning
of rights, whether based on individualism, rationality, sentience, or anything else, is hollow. For those who buy into a
holistic approach, rights based on rationality or sentience do little to recognize the interconnectedness of the planet.
Rights, limited as they are, do not extend to plants, trees, or nature as a whole. Rights talk thus does not fit well within
a holistic approach. Finally, animal welfarists maintain traditional conceptions of the meaning of rights and do not
accept the view that rights apply to nonhumans.
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RIGHTS TALK MAKES THE ANIMAL MOVEMENT LOOK ABSURD
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 234
Along with internal conflicts, the shift to rights language has led to some crucial problems with the public’s
perception of movement identity. Because the public perceives rights as applying only to humans, the
notion of animal rights appears absurd. Animal rights are equated with what the public takes to be human
rights—the right to free speech, the right to the free exercise of religion, the right to vote, and so forth.
Translating these for nonhumans, one arrives at the ridiculous notions of dogs having a right to bark, cats
having a right to pray, and cows having the right to elect political representatives. Given the popular
perception that animal rights means animals having the same rights as humans, the movement’s identity
takes on the appearance of absurdity.
ANIMAL RIGHTS TALK HAS UNDERMINED ANIMAL MOVEMENT UNITY AND IDENTITY
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 232-3
Even with the space to shape its own identity, the shift to rights language has been problematic for
movement identity. From within the movement, dispute over a rights-oriented approach and the meaning
of rights has led to internal divisions. These divisions have inhibited the development of a unified
movement identity. From the outside, the prevailing meaning of rights generates unfavorable public
perceptions of movement identity. Thus, it seems that the indeterminate nature of rights and predominant
understanding of the language has problematic implications for movement identity.
The shift to rights language has fostered splits among animal advocates. The most prominent split is
located between traditional animal welfare groups that seek humane treatment of animals and the newer,
more radical groups that strive for animal liberation. There are also important divisions within the
contemporary radical branch of the animal advocacy movement. As we discussed in chapter 2, competing
frameworks have developed that attempt to justify animal liberation. The rights-oriented framework
competes with Peter Singer’s utilitarianism and with feminist and holistic approaches. Although the rightsoriented paradigm has come to symbolize the contemporary animal advocacy movement, the movement as
a whole has not internally accepted a rights-oriented identity. With these conflicts, the identity of the
animal advocacy movement has been under challenge from within.
RIGHTS TALK CREATES CONFLICTS THAT DISTANCE THE ANIMAL MOVEMENTS
FROM OTHER SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 94
In a more general sense, activists pointed to the way rights language creates cleavages within the overall
animal protection movement and divides it from other social movements. As Lucy Kaplan, staff attorney
for PETA, stated the terminology of rights
“has certainly divided some compassionate people from other compassionate people, because there are still
compassionate people who think that our duties are limited to keeping animals comfortable while they’re
being exploited. So it has been divisive.”
Relating the animal rights movement to other social movements, Kheel critiqued rights language:
”I just think it has a whole host of problems, including the fact that it alienates us from the environmental
movement. There is a division between the animal liberation and environmental movement[s] and I think
that rights terminology is one of the things that perpetuates that. Because it’s not very easy to talk about
rights for rivers, streams, air, and so on…Rights terminology neglects the environment. I think it’s very
problematic with the terminology of rights because it is traditionally associated with an atomistic
worldview. You have to be an individual entity to have a right. At least up until now it hasn’t been
successfully assigned to more than an individual entity.”
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ANIMAL RIGHTS POSITION TRADES OFF WITH HOLISTIC VIEW OF THE
ENVIRONMENT AND ECOSYSTEM PROTECTION
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 456*
Aldo Leopold, (1949) rejects the individualism…of those who build their moral thinking on the welfare or
rights of the individual. What has ultimate value is not the individual but the collective, not the part but the
whole, meaning the entire biosphere and its constituent ecosystems. Acts are right, Leopold claims, if they
tend to promote the integrity, beauty, diversity, and harmony of the biotic community; they are wrong if
they tend contrariwise. As for individuals, be they humans or other animals, they are merely “members of
the biotic team,” having neither more nor less value in themselves than any other member—having, that is,
no value in themselves. What value individuals have, so far as this is meaningful at all, is instrumental
only: they are good to the extent that they promote the welfare of the biotic community.
ECOSYSTEM COLLAPSE UNDERMINES GLOBAL BIODIVERISTY AND WILL CAUSE
EXTINCTION
GENESIS OF EDEN DIVERSITY ENCYCLOPEDIA, 2002, p.
http://www.dhushara.com/book/diversit/saceve.htm
Twenty years ago a group of nine leading American biologists warned that destruction of wildlife habitats
and their genetic and species diversity was a threat to civilization "second only to thermonuclear war".
Since then their concerns have largely gone unheeded but their dark prophesies are being fulfilled. Life on
earth may, at best, take millions of years to recover. We have had the Rio convention, yet the forest is
burning 34% faster and the seas are being overfished. In the next 25 years, if we don't take decisive action
the greatest species extinction for 200 million years will in all probability occur. An irreversible loss which
will severely compromise both the future prospects of humanity and the future evolutionary potential of the
biosphere, for which we will be condemned by our descendents for untold centuries to come. There is still
time to turn the tide of ignorance and inertia for the future of life.
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ANIMAL RIGHTS DO NOT ALLOW A HIGHER VALUE TO BE PLACED ON RARE OR
ENDANGERED SPECIES
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 476
As noted in an earlier quote from Regan, once inherent value is granted, there is little ground for making
distinctions between individuals. This applies to the distinction between animals that are rare or
endangered versus those that are more common. According to the rights view, a rare individual has no
higher moral standing than one who is common, since all share equally the basis on which they are granted
inherent value. Regan (1983), in an oft quoted comment states, “That an individual animal is among the
last remaining members of a species confers no further right to that animal, and its right not be harmed
must be weighed equitably with the rights of any others who have this right.” Taken to its logical
conclusion, this view allows for no special treatment in protecting threatened ecosystems by culling
unwanted animals, nor can it condone invasive technologies and the attendant suffering of individuals that
are intended to secure their future as a taxon on the grounds of rareness. Animal rights philosophers do not
oppose efforts to save endangered species, but neither to they single them out for special treatment.
According to Regan (1983), “the general policy recommended by the rights view is: let them be!” In
contrast, the zoo biologist or the park manager will usually opt in favor of steps that insure the survival of
specie over survival of individual members.
THE LOSS OF INDIVIDUAL SPECIES RISKS HUMAN EXTINCTION – UNCERTAINTY
ABOUT WHICH SPECIES IS THE KEYSTONE INCREASES THE RISK
Honnold, Attorney – Sierra Club Legal Defense Fund, 1995 [Douglas, Federal Document Clearing House,
4-26-95]
In the hustle and bustle of the making and enforcement of laws, it is important to stop and ponder: why
protect endangered species? One answer is suggested by Dr. Paul Ehrlich, who has compared the loss of
species to the loss of rivets in an airplane. See P.R. Ehrlich & A.H. Ehrlich, extinction, Random House
(1981) at i-xii. We may lose one, two, or even several rivets without affecting the ability of the plane to fly,
but eventually the loss of rivets puts the entire enterprise of flight at risk. This metaphor aptly conveys the
insight that species -- both charismatic and mundane -- serve critically important functions in the complex
web of life, the loss of which might prove disastrous. Through the loss of species, ecosystems, and
ecological functions we put at risk the very planet as a place that humans can comfortably inhabit. Put less
poetically, species serve numerous ecological functions that we are only beginning to understand. We don't
yet understand how the loss of one or several species will affect the persistence and survival of other
species and natural processes. Carelessly discarding life's rivets, to borrow Ehrlich's metaphor, is not an
experiment that a wise society knowingly engages in. As Aldo Leopold observed in Round River, one of
his classic essays: If the biota, in the course of eons, has built something we like but do not understand,
then who but a fool would discard seemingly useless parts. To keep every cog, and wheel is the first
precaution of intelligent tinkering. A second Justification for the protection of endangered species is
perhaps more readily grasped: nearly 1/4 of the prescription medicines distributed annually in the United
States are based on substances derived from nature. Many common treatments for heart disease, for
example, were derived originally from chemicals produced by plants. Two recent scientific discoveries drive
home this point. The bark of the Pacific yew, a tree of no apparent commercial value that was historically treated as a
"weed tree" suitable only for destruction, was found to contain taxol, a potent drug against ovarian and breast cancers.
Just this year scientific researchers revealed that a substance from birch trees can shrink malignant melanoma tumors.
Malignant melanoma is one of the many life-threatening diseases whose incidence is increasing, but whose treatment
options are limited. Are we as a society willing to gamble that the next species that we consign to extinction may hold
the cure for cancer, heart disease, diabetes, or other ailments? In addition to these utilitarian notions, many people
believe strongly that man has a moral and/or ethical duty to refrain from destroying the plant and animal
communities with which we share the planet. Whether from a Christian, Jewish, Buddhist, or more
agnostic, perspective, millions of Americans question by what right humans can purposefully and
knowingly drive other species into the abyss of extinction.
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BIODIVERSITY LOSS CAUSES EXTINCTION
John Tuxill and Chris Bight, research associates at the Worldwatch Institute, 1998, THE STATE OF THE
WORLD, p. 41-42
The loss of species touches everyone, for no matter where or how we live, biodiversity is the basis for our
existence. Earth's endowment of species provides humanity with food, fiber, and many other products and
"natural services" for which there simply is no substitute. Biodiversity underpins our health care systems:
some 25 percent of drugs prescribed in the United States include chemical compounds derived from wild
organisms, and billions of people worldwide rely on plant- and animal- based traditional medicine for their
primary health care. Biodiversity provides a wealth of genes essential for maintaining the vigor of our crops
and livestock.
PLACING THE INTERESTS OF ENDANGERED SPECIES OVER NON-ENDANGERED
SPECIES VIOLATES PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CONSIDERATION
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 116-7
We violate the principle of equal consideration of individuals when we give members of endangered
species greater moral consideration than members of highly populous species. An individual is fully
entitled to rights whatever the size of their group. Their importance (or unimportance) to other beings and
to ecosystems shouldn’t affect their rights. A kangaroo is just as entitled to basic rights as a giant panda.
To see group size as relevant to individual rights is to regard individuals as mere species representatives.
That’s a utilitarian, not a rights, view of other animals. It’s speciest. In fact, it’s old speciesist.
ADVOCATING RIGHTS BASED ON THE LEVEL OF EXTINCTION THREAT FOR THE
GROUP IS SPECIESIST
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 117
Many judges do value members of endangered species more than other nonhumans. However, such judges
could note that laws aimed at preserving species already exist. They also could recommend increased
efforts to breed nonhuman great apes. Genetically manipulating nonhumans violates their rights. To have
any solidity and integrity, individual rights must be independent of population size.
Claiming exigency based on the threat of extinction displays the same speciesism as the Endangered
Species Act and Marine Mammal Protection Act. Why shouldn’t the threatened use of a chimpanzee in
vivisection suffice to show exigency? And why isn’t the threatened rat equally pressing? If individuals
truly receive equal consideration, population size neither reduces nor increases the urgency when they’re
threatened with harm.
ANIMAL RIGHTS VIEW AT ODDS WITH SPECIES PRESERVATION GOALS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2004, The Case for
Animal Rights, p. xxxviii-xxxix
The rights view restricts inherent value and rights to individuals. Because species are not individuals, “the
rights view does not recognize the rights of species to anything, including survival” (359). Moreover, the
inherent value and rights of individuals do not wax or wane depending on how plentiful or rare are the
species to which they belong. Beavers are not less valuable because they are more plentiful than bison.
East African black rhinos are not more valuable than rabbits because their numbers are declining. “On the
rights view,” I write, “the same principles apply the moral assessment of rare and endangered animals as
apply to the moral assessment of rare or endangered animals as apply to those that are plentiful, and the
same principles apply whether the animals in question are wild or domesticated” (361). How, then, can the
rights view address our obligation to preserve endangered species?
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HOLISTIC THINKING JUSTIFIES MORALITY OF ZOOS INSOFAR AS THEY CONTRIBUTE
TO SPECIES PRESERVATION
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 457
Holism’s position regarding the ethics of zoos in particular is analogous to its position regarding the ethics
of our other interactions with wildlife in general. There is nothing wrong with keeping wild animals in
permanent confinement if doing so is good for the larger life community. But it is wrong to do this if the
effects on the community are detrimental. Moreover, because one of the indices of what is harmful to the
life community is a reduction in the diversity of forms of life within the community, holism will recognize
a strong prima facie duty to preserve rare or endangered species. To the extent that the best zoos contribute
to this effort, holists will applaud their efforts, even if keeping individual animals who belong to threatened
species in captivity is not in the best interests of those particular animals. In that and other respects (for
example the moral relevance of the educational and research functions of zoos), the implications of holism
are very much at odds with those of the rights view and much closer to those of utilitarianism.
ANIMAL RIGHTS POSITION THAT SACRIFICING THE LIBERTY OF INDIVIDUALS TO
PROTECT THE OVERALL SPECIES IS WRONG – DENIES ABILITY OF ANIMALS TO ACT
ALTRUISTICALLY
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 477
Although for their benefit, confining wild animals to a captive environment may be said to harm them
(Jamieson, 1985, 1995). At this point, the concept of animal altruism is invoked, to wit, the wild animal
taken captive sacrifices its freedom and sometimes its life for the good of its kind. By analogy, the soldier
who gives his life for his country goes into the breech willingly so that others might live and is regarded as
a hero. A difficulty with this analogy is the absence of volunteerism on the part of animals taken into
captivity. Lacking the capacity to evaluate and to decide for themselves, their sacrifice on behalf of an
abstract principle is without their consent. However, as noted by Norton (1995), an ethic that bases all
moral decisions on a single criterion such as Regan’s subject-as-a-life is “likely to conclude that sacrifice of
individuals for species survival is always wrong because the individuals cannot fulfill the key requirement
of voluntary acceptance of risk.” This, he points out, is to define altruism in anthropomorphic terms,
thereby disqualifying animals from ever acting altruistically in a cause implicit in their struggle to
perpetuate their genes.
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INDIVIDUAL FOCUS CONFLICTS WITH GOAL OF PROTECTING INTERESTS OF FUTURE
GENERATIONS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 379-80
The obligation to sustain biological diversity stretches far into the future, far beyond the point at which we
can identify individuals and requires that we shift our sights from individuals and the various elements of
biodiversity toward concern for the processes of nature. In this larger resolution, individuals can only be
seen as parts, functional elements in a larger process. I will now explore our obligations to wild species in
this longer, intergenerational context.
MORAL OBLIGATION TO ANIMAL WILDNESS PRECLUDES OBLIGATIONS TO WILD
INDIVIDUALS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 381
Looked at in this larger scale, humans have made mistakes in the past, by intentionally and unintentionally
introducing exotic species and by causing extinction. Among these, I believe it was a mistake to eliminate
predators on wilderness ranges – the policy of predator eradication destroyed a crucial (keystone) process
in those ecosystems, and it has saddled subsequent generations of wildlife managers with the onerous task
of destroying individuals of prey species who overpopulate and degrade their ranges. A failure to
understand a crucial process led our forefathers to destroy that process. The moral responsibility exists not
so much on the individual level as on the inter-population level. I am suggesting, then, that we make moral
decisions in different spheres, and that differing considerations should dominate at different scales.
Managing to protect biological diversity – and this will more often mean managing humans, not wildlife –
occurs on an intergenerational scale on which populations and species interact, not on an individual level.
Our moral decision to value wild animals as wild isolates us from moral obligations to wild animals as
individuals.
OBLIGATIONS TO WILD ANIMALS STRONGER THAN TO DOMESTIC ANIMALS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 383
Most of us can agree, I think, that our obligations to domestic animals – farm animals, pets, and other
animals that are integrated into our lives on a day-to-day basis – are far more extensive than our obligations
to wild animals. The context in which we interact with these animals implies a contract to look after them.
By living together with them, we have brought them into our community, and we are obliged to feed them,
to care for them if they are injured, and so forth. We also accept responsibility for controlling their
populations. My point is that it is the context of our interactions – the responsibilities we have taken – that
determines our moral obligations more than the characteristic of the individuals involved; some of these
responsibilities rest on us because of unfortunate choices and actions of our predecessors and ancestors.
The morally relevant fact is not usually the content of experience of an individual creature but the context
of our interactions with it. If I encounter the neighbor’s cat about to get a songbird in my back yard, I
would intervene if possible. If I were hiking in the wilderness and I were fortunate to see a wolf pack run
down and kill a deer, intervention would be profoundly inappropriate. The crucial moral fact that decides
cases like this has nothing to do with the relative mental or moral capacities of songbirds and deer and
everything to do with the context of the experience.
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DUTY TO RESPECT WILD ANIMALS AND RESPECT THEIR WILDNESS
Bryan G. Norton, professor of philosophy, science and technology, School of Public Policy, Georgia
Institute of Technology, 2003, Searching for Sustainability: interdisciplinary essays in the philosophy of
conservation biology, p. 378
While wild animals may be considered morally, this depends on the situation. In the most straightforward
situation – when individual wild animals live largely undistributed by human activities in their natural
habitat – humans accept no responsibility for animals as individuals. This very general claim of
nonresponsibility is not justified by any absolute claim about the intelligence or sensitivity of those
individuals. It is rather a manifestation of a decision to respect the animal individuals as wild. By deciding
to respect their wildness, we have agreed not to interfere in their daily lives, or deaths. We value them, but
we value their wildness more; to respect their wildness is, in effect, to refrain from placing a moral value on
their welfare or their suffering. It is to treat them as a separate community, one with which we limit our
interactions in order to encourage its autonomy from our own society. We also value wild animals as part
of natural processes. I believe that our interactions with animals in the wild take on a moral dimension
only at the population and species level, not at the individual level.
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Animal Rights Expansion Devalues Humans
ELIMINATING THE SPECIES BARRIER RISKS TREATING HUMANS AS BADLY AS WE
TREAT ANIMALS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 61
And there is even a secular argument for dichotomizing humans and animals, with or without reference to
souls. It is that if we fail to maintain a bright line between animals and human beings, we may end up
treating human beings as badly as we treat animals, rather than treating animals as well as we treat (or
aspire to treat) human beings. Equation is a transitive relation. If chimpanzees equal human infants,
human infants equal chimpanzees.
BROADENING THE COMMUNITY OF EQUALS INEVITABLY ENTAILS REDUCING THE
TOTAL BENEFITS TO MEMBERSHIP
Dale Jamieson, Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 226
A fourth source of the human resistance to equality is the recognition of the setback to human interests that
would result. The broader the membership of the community of equals, the fewer the benefits that accrue
to the members. This is part of the reason that there has been historical resistance to expanding the circle of
moral concern. Societal elites have resisted claims of equality from the inferior classes; men have resisted
such claims from women; and whites have resisted the claims put forward by blacks. The loss of unjust
advantage is part of the cost of life in a morally well-ordered society, but those who stand to bear the cost
typically try to evade it.
EXPANSION OF ANIMAL RIGHTS WILL DEPRECIATE HUMAN RIGHTS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 71
On the cost side, the practical impediments to defining and enforcing animal rights require particular
emphasis. The questions I raised about Steven Wise’s approach were concerned with those costs. For
example, what exactly does “freedom” for animals entail, and how do we decide through the case-by-case
method of common law rule making which species are to be endowed with what rights? The more we
think about these questions, the less apt the vocabulary of “rights” seems. My guess is that, if pressed,
Wise would admit that the only right to which most, maybe all, species should be entitled is the right not to
be gratuitously tortured, wounded, or killed—and as it happens those were, at least nominally (an important
qualification), the rights of Negro slaves in the antebellum South. Yet we think the essence of slavery is to
be without rights. To be told now that slaves had important rights shows how the movement for animal
rights can depreciate human rights.
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Animal Rights Expansion Devalues Humans
EXTENDING RIGHTS TO GREAT APES RISKS DECREASING PROTECTIONS FOR
“MARGINAL” HUMAN CASES
Daniel A. Dombrowski, 1997, Babies and Beasts: the argument from marginal cases, p. 147-8
The greater danger is not that we would establish a gulf between primates (humans and great apes) and
nonprimates, but rather that the present gulf between humans and nonhumans would remain absolute. Even
a reflective thinker such as James Nelson still wishes somehow to preserve this latter gulf, although for the
understandable reason that he does not wish, in Frey-like fashion, to revise downward the moral status
attributed to damaged humans. A defender of the strong version of the AMC can at least partially agree
with Nelson when he says:
”I’m not sure that I want to extend to virtuous parents the right to consent to a heart transplant for their
children if the donors are children with Down’s Syndrome…I have argued that there is a morally relevant
distinction between animals and marginal humans: the marginal humans have suffered a tragedy in
becoming the psychological equals of animals—a tragedy that animals have escaped. The sentiments
properly evoked by the recognition of such a tragedy—pity and compassion—speak strongly against
further injury to someone already so afflicted.”
In fact, William Aiken thinks that if any human beings should have their moral status revised downward, it
is not those with Down’s syndrome but violent psychopaths, whose worth as moral agents and beneficiaries
is inferior to that of chimpanzees. Or, at the very least, the partial affections of parents toward their
children can sometimes override the rights of a violent psychopath more easily than they can the rights of a
chimpanzee (the latter, after all, is innocent). Nevertheless, I am not convinced that Nelson can
legitimately move from the (defensible) claim that marginal cases should not be the victims of medical
research to the claim that animals can be so used. To put marginal cases on a firm moral footing, we need
not, as Nelson thinks, distance them from animals.
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Animal Rights Kills AIDS Vaccine - Shell
A)UNIQUE INTERNAL LINK – AN AIDS VACCINE IS COMING – TESTING ON HUMANS IS
NOT ENOUGH – FUTURE RESEARCH ON GREAT APES IS NECESSARY FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE VACINE
Rachel Nowak, PhD and Editor of the New Scientist. “Dying So We Might Live”. The New Scientist. 1999
http://www.animalliberationfront.com/Philosophy/Animal%20Testing/Vivisection/newscientaids.htm
"The good news is that we now have a pathogenic HIV model in a chimp," says Alan Schultz, head of
preclinical research in the AIDS vaccine programme of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious
Diseases (NIAID) near Washington DC. "The bad news is that to do meaningful vaccine experiments, we
will have to put chimps' lives at risk."
The NIAID is now funding Novembre to expose up to four more chimps to lethal HIV strains, with the aim
of working out the smallest dose needed to establish an infection via the rectum. Novembre and virologist
Patricia Fultz of the University of Alabama at Birmingham have already exposed chimps with good
immune responses to less virulent strains of HIV to one of the new aggressive strains. The existing
infection appeared to offer some protection.
Hopes for a vaccine that can completely prevent HIV infection are fading, however, so attention is shifting
towards vaccines that might slow the progression to AIDS. These could be tested in chimps infected with
the lethal strains. The alternative-going straight into tests on people with HIV-is complicated by the
widespread use of anti-retroviral drugs, which also delay the progression to AIDS. This would make it
difficult to distinguish the effect of the vaccine from that of the drugs.
Fultz argues that terminal experiments involving chimps are a necessary evil. "With 40 million people
infected in the world, there is a great need for a vaccine" she says.
B)LINK – ANIMAL RIGHTS WOULD REQUIRE THE RELEASE OF ALL ANIMALS FROM
RESEARCH
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 265
Moreover, declaring humans and other great apes to be all of one kind—as belonging to a community of
equal subjects—cannot but lead to a total revision of current ape research procedures. The proposed
change of attitude calls for a release of all ape objects of study from human laboratories. Instead it seems
fitting that humans should ask permission from their ape subjects before intruding upon their societies, just
as anthropologists need to do whenever they come upon a foreign community of people. Incidentally, both
Fossey and Goodall have made it quite clear that in their respective research situations they initially felt
like intruding visitors.
C)IMPACT – WITHOUT A VACCINE EXTINCTION FROM AIDS IS INEVITABLE
Alliance For Human Research Protection 2003 “AIDS Vaccine Worse than Useless”. Institute of
Science in Society http://www.ahrp.org/infomail/0603/25.php
The UN Population Division reported earlier this year that by 2050, the population of the hardest hit
nations will have risen by 400 million less than previously estimated because of AIDS. "This estimate
could be the first sign that HIV-1 will cause extinction of human beings in this millennium unless an
effective AIDS vaccine is developed," said a commentary by Veljko Veljkovic and colleagues in the
Lancet, published in February.
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AIDS Research DA – Link Extensions – Apes Key
APE RESEARCH CAN CREATE AN EFFECTIVE VACCINE
David Baltimore, president of the California Institute of Technology, won the Nobel Prize for Medicine in
1975. “CHALLENGE OF THE NEW CENTURY: FINDING AN AIDS VACCINE”. NPQ 2000
http://www.digitalnpq.org/global_services/nobel%20laureates/02-11-01.HTML
Two recent experiments provide hope that it is possible to make a human vaccine for AIDS.
One is an experiment based on pure or ``naked'' DNA injected into monkeys. DNA, of course, is the
hereditary material that encodes proteins. In this way, it is possible to protect monkeys against a highly
pathogenic challenge.
The breakthrough here is that all vaccines developed in the past have focused on inducing antibodies to
fight a virus. But antibodies don't work well against HIV, which coats itself with sugar and has other tricks
that make it resistant to antibodies, making that part of the immune system of little use in fighting HIV.
The DNA treatment is a new kind of vaccine that stimulates a relatively newly discovered mechanism of
the immune system -"T-killer cells'' -- to go looking for an infected cell and to kill it through secreting a material fatal to that
cell. If such a pure DNA vaccine can be developed, it can be used anywhere, including Africa. It is safe and
cheap and easy to use.
FUTURE APE RESEARCH IS CRITICAL TO SOLVE THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC
Dr. Anthony L. Rose, Ph.D @Institute for Conservation Education and Development
Antioch University Southern California. 1999 http://bushmeat.net/hiv-chimps299.htm
Now, our genetic kinship with apes has been discovered to be progenitor of a crisis that threatens the health
of humankind. Chimpanzees have been identified by medical scientists as the source of the viruses that
have propagated the world AIDS crisis. Bushmeat hunting along each new logging road could bring out
more than ape meat. It could transmit additional variants of SIV which then could mutate and recombine
into novel HIV types and further expand the pernicious AIDS plague faced worldwide.
Virologists have begun to present their evidence in journals and at major international conferences (Hahn,
1999). They are telling the public two things. First, we must stop the hunting and butchering of wild
chimpanzees in order to avoid transmission of new strains of SIV. Second, we must launch new programs
to protect and study wild apes in their natural habitat. Global human health could depend on saving the apes
and their homelands.
Chimpanzees are identical to humans in over 98% of their genome, yet they appear to be resistant to
damaging effects of the AIDS virus on their immune system. By studying the biological reasons for this
difference, AIDS researchers believe that they may be able to obtain important clues concerning the
pathogenic basis of HIV-1 in humans and develop new strategies for treating the disease more effectively.
In addition, a better understanding of exactly how the chimpanzee's immune system responds to SIV-CPZ
infection compared to that of humans is also likely to lead to the development of more effective strategies
for an HIV-1 vaccine. Coordinated biomedical research and conservation efforts will be key to preventing
further spread of SIV/HIV and AIDS.
The connection of wild apes and AIDS alters the priorities for conservation and retrovirus research. We are
challenged to work in collaboration, not in the usual competitive modes. The battles among egos,
professions, organizations, and nations must be set aside now. Having worked in both medical and
conservation arenas, I remain hopeful that this can be accomplished and that we can form and maintain
truly effective multidisciplinary teams to confront this complex crisis in unity. The future of apes and other
wildlife, equatorial ecosystems, African societies, and human health depends on our good will and our
good work.
www.hdcworkshops.org
Planet Debate 2011
September/October L-D Release – Animal Rights
274
AIDS Research DA – Link Extensions – Apes Key
APE RESEARCH CAN CREATE AN EFFECTIVE VACCINE
David Baltimore, president of the California Institute of Technology, won the Nobel Prize for Medicine in
1975. “CHALLENGE OF THE NEW CENTURY: FINDING AN AIDS VACCINE”. NPQ 2000
http://www.digitalnpq.org/global_services/nobel%20laureates/02-11-01.HTML
Two recent experiments provide hope that it is possible to make a human vaccine for AIDS.
One is an experiment based on pure or ``naked'' DNA injected into monkeys. DNA, of course, is the
hereditary material that encodes proteins. In this way, it is possible to protect monkeys against a highly
pathogenic challenge.
The breakthrough here is that all vaccines developed in the past have focused on inducing antibodies to
fight a virus. But antibodies don't work well against HIV, which coats itself with sugar and has other tricks
that make it resistant to antibodies, making that part of the immune system of little use in fighting HIV.
The DNA treatment is a new kind of vaccine that stimulates a relatively newly discovered mechanism of
the immune system -"T-killer cells'' -- to go looking for an infected cell and to kill it through secreting a material fatal to that
cell. If such a pure DNA vaccine can be developed, it can be used anywhere, including Africa. It is safe and
cheap and easy to use.
FUTURE APE RESEARCH IS CRITICAL TO SOLVE THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC
Dr. Anthony L. Rose, Ph.D @Institute for Conservation Education and Development
Antioch University Southern California. 1999 http://bushmeat.net/hiv-chimps299.htm
Now, our genetic kinship with apes has been discovered to be progenitor of a crisis that threatens the health
of humankind. Chimpanzees have been identified by medical scientists as the source of the viruses that
have propagated the world AIDS crisis. Bushmeat hunting along each new logging road could bring out
more than ape meat. It could transmit additional variants of SIV which then could mutate and recombine
into novel HIV types and further expand the pernicious AIDS plague faced worldwide.
Virologists have begun to present their evidence in journals and at major international conferences (Hahn,
1999). They are telling the public two things. First, we must stop the hunting and butchering of wild
chimpanzees in order to avoid transmission of new strains of SIV. Second, we must launch new programs
to protect and study wild apes in their natural habitat. Global human health could depend on saving the apes
and their homelands.
Chimpanzees are identical to humans in over 98% of their genome, yet they appear to be resistant to
damaging effects of the AIDS virus on their immune system. By studying the biological reasons for this
difference, AIDS researchers believe that they may be able to obtain important clues concerning the
pathogenic basis of HIV-1 in humans and develop new strategies for treating the disease more effectively.
In addition, a better understanding of exactly how the chimpanzee's immune system responds to SIV-CPZ
infection compared to that of humans is also likely to lead to the development of more effective strategies
for an HIV-1 vaccine. Coordinated biomedical research and conservation efforts will be key to preventing
further spread of SIV/HIV and AIDS.
The connection of wild apes and AIDS alters the priorities for conservation and retrovirus research. We are
challenged to work in collaboration, not in the usual competitive modes. The battles among egos,
professions, organizations, and nations must be set aside now. Having worked in both medical and
conservation arenas, I remain hopeful that this can be accomplished and that we can form and maintain
truly effective multidisciplinary teams to confront this complex crisis in unity. The future of apes and other
wildlife, equatorial ecosystems, African societies, and human health depends on our good will and our
good work.
The new vaccine resembles one developed at Harvard that also tested successfully. The Harvard vaccine
technique required six inoculations and used more of the HIV proteins. Robinson said her vaccine requires
only three shots and uses only three proteins.
"Ours is a simpler vaccine," said Robinson, "but
the fact that both our studies have achieved this type of control is
really encouraging and shows that this will work against the AIDS virus."
APE TESTING IS CRITICAL TO AIDS AND OTHER DISEASE RESEARCH
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Clive D Wynne. associate professor of psychology at the University of Florida. “The Soul of the Ape”.
American Scientist Online. 2001 http://www.americanscientist.org/template/AssetDetail/assetid/14338
This is not an abstract scholarly debate. There are about 1,600 chimpanzees held for biomedical research in
the U.S., and these animals are essential to the study of several maladies, ones for which few if any other
approaches are available. Probably the single most important example is liver disease. It was research on
chimpanzees that provided the vaccine against hepatitis B. Carriers of hepatitis B are about 200 times more
likely to develop liver cancer than the general population, so the hepatitis B vaccine can be considered the
first cancer vaccine. More than a million people in the United States have been infected with hepatitis B,
and nearly half the global population is at high risk of contracting this virus. Chimpanzees have also been
crucial for the study of hepatitis C, a chronic disease for some four million Americans.
And hepatitis just heads the list. AIDS is another prominent example, because chimpanzees are the only
nonhuman species that can be infected with HIV-1, the common form of the virus found throughout the
world. The reason became clearer last year, when investigators found proof that HIV-1 spread to humans
from chimps early in the 20th century. Now more than 36 million people around the world are infected with
this virus, and some 22 million have already died from AIDS. Chimpanzees continue to be immensely
valuable in the search for a vaccine. Chimps are also helping scientists to battle other dire health problems,
including spongiform encephalopathy ("mad-cow disease"), malaria, cystic fibrosis and emphysema.
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276
AIDS Research DA – Animal Research Key
ANIMAL EXPERIMENTATION RESOPNSIBLE FOR NEARLY EVERY MEDICAL ADVANCE
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 70
Cohen’s reasoning in support of continued widespread and possibly expanded reliance on nonhuman
animals in biomedical research is one of the utilitarian variety. “The sum of the benefits [of sing nonhuman
animals in biomedical research] is utterly beyond quantification,” Cohen writes. “Almost every new drug
discovered, almost every disease eliminated, almost every vaccine developed, almost every method of pain
relief devised, almost every surgical procedure invented, almost every prosthetic device implanted—
indeed, almost every modern medical therapy is due, in part or in whole, to experimentation using animal
subjects.”
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AIDS Research DA – Vaccine Key to Prevent Pandemic
ONLY A VACCINE WILL SOLVE THE GLOBAL AIDS PANDEMIC
David Fidler, Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow @ Indiana University. “Fighting the
Axis of Illness: HIV/AIDS, Human Rights, and U.S. Foreign Policy”. Harvard Environmental Law Review.
17 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 99 2004 lexis
The limited progress made to date against the devastating HIV/AIDS pandemic is, in the opinion of
UNAIDS, inadequate n202 and, in the undiplomatic anger of the U.N. Special Envoy on AIDS in Africa,
"the grotesque obscenity of the modern world." n203 Given this reality, the way in which HIV/AIDS,
human rights, and U.S. foreign policy mix together may encourage people to see a vaccine for HIV/AIDS
as the only viable option for mitigating the HIV/AIDS nightmare. n204 Technological advances in vaccines
and antibiotics have, in the past, allowed public health authorities to reduce infectious disease threats
temporarily (e.g., tuberculosis) or permanently (e.g., smallpox) without radical changes in national and
international governance responses to global health problems. A safe, effective, and globally accessible
vaccine would indeed be a scientific deus ex machina for the global struggle against HIV/AIDS. In the
absence of this technological fix, the prospects for effectively fighting the axis of illness as manifested in
the HIV/AIDS pandemic remain, despite increased political attention, funding, and new initiatives, n205
rather grim. n206
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AIDS Research DA – Global Destruction Impact
THE GLOBAL DESTRUCTION HAS JUST BEGUN – AIDS WILL CONTINUE TO RAVAGE
THE WORLD UNTIL A VACCINE IS CREATED
David Fidler, Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow @ Indiana University. 2003
“AMERICAN PRESENCE ABROAD: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY & ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR GENDER,
RACE & JUSTICE ARTICLE: Racism or Realpolitik? U.S. Foreign Policy and the HIV/AIDS Catastrophe
in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. Lexis
The global presence of HIV/AIDS and its continued penetration of populations around the world
demonstrate that HIV and AIDS do not depend on the presence of particular climatic or cultural conditions.
Another global infectious disease killer, malaria, differs in its threat profile because of the importance of a
warm, wet climate to the mosquito vector. Tropical and equatorial regions face, therefore, a malaria threat
greater than regions that experience suitable weather for mosquito populations only seasonably. n21
Culturally, HIV/AIDS has penetrated rich and poor countries, European and Asian cultures, homosexual
and heterosexual populations, drug addicts and hemophiliacs, and countries at the heart and on the
periphery of globalization. Historical precedents for such a rapid, global pandemic are hard to find. Perhaps
the only pandemic that may serve as a modern precedent is the global influenza epidemic of 1918-1919,
which killed an estimated twenty million people around the world. n22 Unlike HIV/AIDS, however, the
great influenza pandemic came and went quickly and did not continue to wreak morbidity and mortality
year in and year out.
HIV/AIDS has become endemic in every region of the world, posing a continual public health problem for
governments, international organizations, [*103] and non-state actors. In this respect, HIV/AIDS
resembles the global threat smallpox once posed to societies around the world before the development of
effective vaccines and ultimately the eradication of the disease. n23 Worryingly, experts believe that the
global HIV/AIDS pandemic is still in its early stages rather than being on the path to control or eradication
through an effective vaccine. n24
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AIDS Research DA – Racism Impacts
THE GLOBAL DESTRUCTION HAS JUST BEGUN – AIDS WILL CONTINUE TO RAVAGE
THE WORLD UNTIL A VACCINE IS CREATED
David Fidler, Professor of Law and Ira C. Batman Faculty Fellow @ Indiana University. 2003
“AMERICAN PRESENCE ABROAD: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY & ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR GENDER,
RACE & JUSTICE ARTICLE: Racism or Realpolitik? U.S. Foreign Policy and the HIV/AIDS Catastrophe
in Sub-Saharan Africa”. Journal of Gender, Race & Justice. , p. 102-3
The global presence of HIV/AIDS and its continued penetration of populations around the world
demonstrate that HIV and AIDS do not depend on the presence of particular climatic or cultural conditions.
Another global infectious disease killer, malaria, differs in its threat profile because of the importance of a
warm, wet climate to the mosquito vector. Tropical and equatorial regions face, therefore, a malaria threat
greater than regions that experience suitable weather for mosquito populations only seasonably. n21
Culturally, HIV/AIDS has penetrated rich and poor countries, European and Asian cultures, homosexual
and heterosexual populations, drug addicts and hemophiliacs, and countries at the heart and on the
periphery of globalization. Historical precedents for such a rapid, global pandemic are hard to find. Perhaps
the only pandemic that may serve as a modern precedent is the global influenza epidemic of 1918-1919,
which killed an estimated twenty million people around the world. n22 Unlike HIV/AIDS, however, the
great influenza pandemic came and went quickly and did not continue to wreak morbidity and mortality
year in and year out.
HIV/AIDS has become endemic in every region of the world, posing a continual public health problem for
governments, international organizations, and non-state actors. In this respect, HIV/AIDS resembles the
global threat smallpox once posed to societies around the world before the development of effective
vaccines and ultimately the eradication of the disease. n23 Worryingly, experts believe that the global
HIV/AIDS pandemic is still in its early stages rather than being on the path to control or eradication
through an effective vaccine.
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Animal Rights Kills Ebola Research – Shell
A)UNIQUE INTERNAL LINK – WE ARE IN THE PROCESS OF FINALIZING AN EBOLA
VACCINE THAT WOULD SOLVE EBOLA OR ANY BIOTERROR ATTACKS – FUTURE APE
RESEARCH IS KEY
Justin Gills, Washington Post Staff Writer. “Scientists Achieve Unexpected Success with Ebola Vaccine”.
2003 http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/unexpsucebolavac.html
Government scientists have developed a new vaccine against the dread Ebola virus that works rapidly after
a single injection, an unexpected success that means the nation could soon have a defense against one of the
most fearsome weapons in the terrorist arsenal.
So far the vaccine has been proven to work only in monkeys, which were completely protected against
death from Ebola infection when they were exposed to the virus a month after being inoculated. But
vaccine results in monkeys usually translate well to humans, and government scientists hope to launch
human tests of the vaccine by sometime next year. If all goes well, the vaccine could enter government
stockpiles in large quantity as a safeguard against Ebola outbreaks, natural or man-made, as soon as 2006, a
decade sooner than many scientists once thought it would take to get an Ebola vaccine.
"In terms of what we need for countermeasures against terrorism, it's highly significant," said Anthony
Fauci, director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, which sponsored much of the
research. "This could be a real advance in our ability to contain Ebola."
At the same time, the work, to be reported in tomorrow's edition of the journal Nature, raises complex new
scientific questions with implications for national security.
The new technique used to create the Ebola vaccine, which involved sophisticated genetic engineering,
may be used to create vaccines against other germs, including AIDS and potential terrorist agents. But
studies suggest it's possible that any given person could receive a vaccine of this type only once -subsequent shots might fail to work. That means the government must think carefully about how to use the
approach, and about whether to try to maximize its value by, for instance, creating a combination vaccine
that would protect against multiple bioterror agents.
B)LINK – ANIMAL RIGHTS WOULD REQUIRE THE RELEASE OF ALL ANIMALS FROM
RESEARCH
Barbara Noske, Researcher, Department of Social Philosophy, University of Amsterdam, 1994, The
Great Ape Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 265
Moreover, declaring humans and other great apes to be all of one kind—as belonging to a community of
equal subjects—cannot but lead to a total revision of current ape research procedures. The proposed
change of attitude calls for a release of all ape objects of study from human laboratories. Instead it seems
fitting that humans should ask permission from their ape subjects before intruding upon their societies, just
as anthropologists need to do whenever they come upon a foreign community of people. Incidentally, both
Fossey and Goodall have made it quite clear that in their respective research situations they initially felt
like intruding visitors.
C)IMPACTS –
FUTURE EBOLA ATTACKS WILL CAUSE EXTINCTION
The Toronto Sun, October 16, 1994, Pg. M6
Nor did the media go beyond Surat and explain how this largely inconsequential epidemic, a kind of false
alarm in a much larger microbial saga, was another sharp warning of our species' growing vulnerability to
infectious disease. Imagine, for a moment, if Surat had aroused a different airborne microbe, a so-called
"emerging virus," beyond the waning reach of antibiotics. Suppose that the headliner germ had been a new
strain of Ebola that dissolves internal organs into a bloody tar or the mysterious "X" virus that killed
thousands in the Sudan last year. Had such a microbe been unleashed, the final death toll might have been
millions, and the world might now be mourning a "new Black Death." The planet, in fact, might be an
entirely different and emptier place altogether.
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Ebola Research DA – Links – Apes Key
APE MODELS ARE KEY TO AN EBOLA VACCINE
Justin Gills, Washington Post Staff Writer. “Scientists Achieve Unexpected Success with Ebola Vaccine”.
2003 http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/bioter/unexpsucebolavac.html
The Vaccine Research Center, a unit of Fauci's institute at the National Institutes of Health, in Bethesda,
proved three years ago that Ebola vaccination would be possible. But the initial approach was complicated
and time-consuming, involving two different types of shots and taking six months or longer to produce
immunity. Such a vaccine might be useful to protect health-care workers or soldiers -- it remains under
development, in fact -- but it would not be useful to stop an Ebola epidemic.
As NIH worked on a vaccine, the lab in Frederick that works with live Ebola virus, part of the U.S. Army
Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases, met repeated frustration in its own attempts at vaccine
development, creating vaccines that worked in rodents but failed in monkeys, whose biology closely
resembles that of humans. At the same time, the Army lab was perfecting an "animal model" the closely
resembles human Ebola disease, using macaques, a type of monkey.
RESEARCH ON CHIMPS IMPORTANT FOR RESEARCH ON FUTURE EPIDEMICS
Charles Siebert, Freelance Writer and Director, July 24, 2005, New York Times Magazine, p. 61
For some, however, the chimp remains an indispensable tool for medical research, and scientists have
expressed fears that by endorsing the retirement of even a select number of chimps, the government might
be opening the door to their removal from research altogether. Stuart Zola, director of the Yerkes National
Primate Center, fully supports animal sanctuaries but argues that there will always be a need to study
chimpanzees. “The only thing we can predict with certainty is that there are going to be new epidemics
that will arise, as they have throughout history, and the chimp is going to be a unique animal model.”
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Animal Rights Flawed – CLS Kritik
USING THE LAW AND RIGHTS TO CHALLENGE POWER COUNTERPRODUCTIVE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 82
The strongest critique of law and rights leveled by critical scholars contends that the use of the legal system
is harmful to those seeking social change. According to this critique, asserted predominantly by scholars
within the school of thought known as Critical Legal Studies (CLS), the harm stems from the hegemonic
character of the legal system, that is, from the fact that the law encompasses a particular ideology beneficial
to the status quo. In a capitalist society, the underlying hegemonic ideology is founded upon notions of
individualism and autonomy. These ideological biases underlying the law impede community and
egalitarian values and support existing power structures. Those who think they are advancing change
through use of the law are instead replicating and legitimating the dominant values, structures, and
ideology of the system. Rather than making real strides, this replication strengthens those in power to the
detriment of the marginalized.
Like the overall hegemonic nature of the legal system, rights also lead to reinforcement of dominance. For
those who seek change, the problem with asserting rights is that it results in co-optation.
“People don’t realize that what they’re doing is recasting the real existential feelings that led them to
become political people into an ideological framework that coopts them into adopting the very
consciousness they want to transform.” (Gabel and Kennedy, 1984, p. 26).
WORKING THROUGH THE LAW FOR ANIMAL RIGHTS FAILS – HAVE TO COMPROMISE
THE IDEALS OF THE MOVEMENT TO EFFECT LEGAL CHANGE
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 162-3
Based on the structural defects of animal welfare and of the legal and political institutions that brandish the
property status of animals in enforcing some version of animal welfare, there are probably some
compelling reasons for animal rights advocates to spend their limited time and resources on incremental
changes achieved through various forms of education, protest, and boycotts. The primary reason is that
judicial or legislative change ought by formal “campaigns” requires some sort of “insider” status as
discussed by Garner. Once an animal advocacy group decides to pursue activity other than public
education, or more precisely, once the group decides that it want to have an affect on legislation or
regulatory policy, it becomes necessary to seek “insider status” in order to “achieve access to government”
and “to influence policymakers.” Garner states that it “is easy to see why insider status is valued so highly.
Access to government gives groups an opportunity to influence policy development at the formulation
stage, thereby avoiding the difficult and often fruitless task of reacting against government proposals” that
“are unlikely to change fundamentally” once they are formulated. Garner recognizes that this “insider”
status may be used to marginalize animal advocates through, for example, the creation of government
advisory bodies that do little, if anything, but that give the mistaken impression that animal concerns are
being taken seriously. Nevertheless, he holds to the view that “insider status can allow pressure groups to
have a significant input into the formulation of public policy.” This insider status, however, is largely
dependent upon a group’s being perceived by government as “moderate and respectable.” Garner observes
that although moderation and respectability are relative terms, “it is clear that the radical demands of the
‘rights’ faction of the animal protection movement are not regarded as acceptable enough” to give rights
advocates “insider status.” Garner argues that insider status is necessary for animal advocates to be
effective, yet states explicitly throughout his book that despite moderate status that animal welfarists have
enjoyed, “the animal protection movement has made relatively little progress in influencing decision
makers.
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LAW INEFFECTIVE TO ACHIEVE ANIMAL LIBERATION GOALS
Gary Yourofsky, Animal Liberationist, 2004, Terrorists of Freedom Fighters: reflections on the liberation
of animals, eds. Best & Nocella, p. 130
Remember, outlawing an act does not make that act morally wrong. And legal avenues are not necessarily
the best ones for facilitating substantive change. Laws have always been broken by free-thinking, radical
individuals who realize that it is impossible to make progressive changes within a corrupt, discriminatory
system.
Nelson Mandela, Rosa Parks, Martin Luther King, Jr., Mohandas Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau and Jesus,
to name a few, were routine, radical lawbreakers who went to jail for disobeying unjust laws. We see them
as heroes today, but in their time they were considered by many to be villains and radicals. The word
“radical” has a negative connotation in society today; however, it is simply the Latin word meaning “root,”
and what radicals do is to bypass pseudo-solutions and get to the root of a problem. Everyone should
realize that all social justice activists were considered radical in their time. It is only after social justice
activists die and society begins to evolve and comprehend their actions that the radical is placed on a
pedestal and embraced.
SEEKING CHANGE THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM REQUIRES SIGNIFICANT
CONCESSIONS TO THE RADICAL AGENDA
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 164
But whether to pursue “insider” status as Garner understands the notion, is at least one of the issues that
needs further consideration: should the advocate of animal rights seek “insider” status when, as Garner
acknowledges, such insider status comes only when the animal rights advocate is willing to be “moderate”
in demand and “respectable” in presentation? It is, of course, not particularly difficult to understand why
“insider” status is particularly problematic when considered in the context of animal rights theory. Insider
status requires negotiation and compromise with those on the inside of legislative and executive branches
of government. Again, no one seriously doubts that one of the government’s primary functions, especially
in a capitalistic economy, is to protect property rights. And animals are a most important species of
property. It is unlikely that any society with strong property notions will be inclined to compromise
property rights for solely or primarily moral concerns.
There is a fundamental political difference between the rights position and the welfare position. The rights
position is essentially an outsider position; it is the position of social protest that challenges basic social
institutions that have facilitated the exploitation of nonhumans. As I noted in Chapter One, animal welfare
does not require fundamental changes in industries that exploit animals, whereas the ethic of animal rights
clear does. Rights advocates are trying to change—and in m an cases ultimately trying to end—the
operation of institutionalized animal exploiters. The welfarist seeks to influence the system from the inside
as one of the participants in the system. When Garner makes the observation that those who accept the
status of outsiders are like those who claim to be content to drive ten-year-old automobiles, he fails to
understand that for at least some people a choice about fundamental moral issues is different from a
decision about automobiles.
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WORKING THROUGH THE SYSTEM REQUIRES ACCEPTANCE OF PROPERTY STATUS
AND WELFARE AGENDA—RIGHTS ADVOCATES MUST SPLIT FROM WELFARE
ADVOCATES
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 171
New welfarists assume that incremental change means change that depends on access to, and negotiation,
with government decisionmakers. But that is simply a consequence of their acceptance of the legitimacy of
welfarist reform in the first place. An animal rights advocate may reasonably conclude that attempting to
secure insider status is, because of the structural defects of animal welfare, counterproductive. In the cases
cited by Garner and Rowan, movement “unity” would have meant merely that those who agreed with the
rights view should not have expressed their views and their disagreement with the welfarist approach. And
had these rights advocates complied, and had they acted in a unified way, the results would have been the
same anyway. The whole point is that the legal system structurally limits the scope of reform to what is
dictated by the instrumentalist position. The best that can be hoped for is on rare occasions a strong radical
presence may help to judge welfarist reforms in the direction of providing protection that slightly exceeds
the level that would be provided pursuant to the orthodox position.
ANY ATTEMPT TO USE THE LAW TO PROTECT ANIMALS—EVEN IN A RIGHTS
PERSPECTIVE—RISKS COOPTATION
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 218-9
Fifth, I stress that any attempt to effect legal or administrative regulation will invariably involve the animal
advocate’s seeking some sort of “insider” status. Indeed, even if the advocate stresses that she is an
“outsider” who regards institutionalized exploitation as completely illegitimate, involvement in legislative
or administrative processes always entail risks. Any animal advocate who seeks to effect incremental
eradiation of the property status of animals in these ways is well advised to proceed with caution.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE UNDERCUTS COMMUNAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 83
Rights language, according to some within CLS, is deceptive in another way. Given its foundation in
liberalism and individualism, rights language minimizes our social and communitarian character and
therefore contributes to a false and misleading image of human beings. “The actual capturing of what it
means to be human, and in relation to other people, is falsified by the image of people as rights-bearing
citizens. It’s a falsification of human sociability.” And “The concept of rights falsely converts into an
empty abstraction (reifies) real experiences that we ought to value for their own sake.” Rights language
thus conceals and falsifies a more complete understanding of ourselves.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE REIFIES POWER HIERARCHIES
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 83
In part, use of rights language reinforces dominance because it “deceives” the powerless who deploy it.
According to some within CLS, this deception arises partly from the indeterminate nature of rights, that is,
from the fact that the existence of rights does not determine future outcomes or determine how those in
power will act. Hence, those in power can interpret rights any way they want and manipulate the language
to their benefit. On the other hand, groups challenging the status quo often become mystified by rights.
Instead of manipulating rights, the marginalized can become mesmerized and captivated by the ideals of
the language. Groups begin to focus solely on achieving specific fights and, in turn, lose sight of their
larger, broader goals.
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EXTENSION OF RIGHTS TO ANIMALS MAKES THEM MEANINGLESS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 49
The philosophical attempt to extend rights to animals outlined above might be cited by some scholars as a
further indication of the trivialization of rights. Several scholars critique rights language on the grounds
that its extension to various progressive causes empties the language of its content and power. The
multiplication of rights, on this view, trivializes the concept and it underlying values. Hence, to suggest
that rights apply not only to humans but also to animals undermines the notion and meaning of human
rights. Furthermore, it is argued, putting forward animals rights raises the question of where to draw the
line. Do plants have rights? Do future generations have rights? Does the planet have rights? The slippery
slope onto which we fall when rights are extended too far diminishes the power and utility of rights, for if
we extend rights to everything then rights become meaningless.
SUBSTANTIVE CHANGE DOES NOT NECESSARILY FOLLOW THE FORMAL GRANTING
OF A RIGHT
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 84
Kristin Bumiller (1988) offer another reason for the mistaken belief that formal rights imply substantive
change. Bumiller points to the fact that rights are generally bound up with the notion of individual
responsibility. As such, rights may not be protected unless an individual acts to ensure the right. Hence,
substantive change is frequently elusive despite the formal recognition of rights. Bumiller finds evidence
for this within the realm of formal laws that seek to advance racial equality. Antidiscrimination law,
according to Bumiller, has had limited success in achieving substantive change because individuals
experiencing discrimination must bear the costs and burdens of applying the law.
RIGHTS TALK INEFFECTIVE – TOO VAGUE AND CONFUSING TO BE USEFUL
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 95
A final critique offered by activists points to the problems with the philosophical nature of rights language.
Several activists asserted that rights language as a philosophical construct is vague, insufficiently defined,
and therefore misunderstood. As Tim Greyhavens, executive director of PAWS, summed it up, “it is such a
vague philosophical term that it’s very confusing to people.”
RIGHTS DISCOURSE IS DIVISIVE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 93
A number of activists echoed a common criticism leveled by legal scholars who suggest that rights are
inherently divisive. According to this critique, rights language encourages conflict and competition
because rights imply corresponding obligations. For instance, when a claim is made that children have a
right to education, there is an implication that someone has the corresponding obligation and burden to
provide for that education. In addition, rights frequently foster conflict as a result of the competition
between rights and the need to balance one right against another. Thus, for example, when women claim
the right to choose whether or not to have an abortion, the opposition asserts the competing rights of the
fetus. In some such situations, the conflict between rights is zero-sum.
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CAPITALISM IS THE ROOT CAUSE OF ANIMAL OPPRESSION--FOCUSING ON POLICY
REFORMS TO ADVANCE ANIMAL RIGHTS PREVENTS A SUFFICIENT CHALLENGE TO
CAPITALISM
Matthew Calarco, Assistant Professor of Philosophy at CSU Fullerton, in 2007, [“In Defense of Animals:
The Second Wave,” Journal for Critical Animal Studies, Volume V, Issue 1]
What is missing from this section, and from contemporary animal rights discourse more generally,
however, is a careful and sustained analysis of how global capitalism itself, combined with specific
modes of anthropocentrism, gives rise to these problems—which is another way of saying that one of the
chief problems facing animals today is global capitalism. By focusing on specific reforms/abolitions of
specific practices, as is done in this section of book, it is easy to lose sight of the fact that the spread of global
capitalism is at the very heart of the problems under discussion here (namely, the growth of factory farms,
invasive animal experimentation, and the more general marketing of animals). Capitalism is not a side effect of
these practices or something that might potentially thwart reforms made in the name of animal defense; it is
one of the chief causes of these problems as well as one of the main obstacles in the way of achieving and
sustaining genuine reforms/abolitions. It strikes me as naïve in the extreme to believe that thoroughgoing
changes for animals are going to occur without simultaneously developing alternatives to global capitalism.
If animal defense activists decide to accept global capitalism as the only game in town, they should
likewise decide to accept the fact that the fate of animals on this planet will only get increasingly worse in
future years. It is high time, especially in this era of “second wave” animal defense, to confront squarely the
problem of animals within global capitalism and to begin to imagine and enact alternatives to the current
state of affairs.
CRITIQUING ANTHROPOCENTRISM IS A MISPLACED SITE OF RESISTANCE AND
MERELY REPLICATES BOURGEOIS ETHICS, TURNING THE CASE
Institute for Social Ecology June 11, 2004, [“Ambiguities of Animal Rights,”http://www.socialecology.org/article.php?story=20040611140817458]
Many animal rights theorists readily acknowledge that mainstream western traditions of ethical thought are
unsatisfactory, but they focus their criticisms on traditional morality’s supposed anthropocentrism. This is
unconvincing; the primary problem with the mainstream western tradition is not that it promotes
anthropocentric ethics, but that it promotes bourgeois ethics.4 The basic categories of academic moral
philosophy are steeped in capitalist values, from the notion of ‘interests’ to the notion of ‘contract’; the
standard analysis of ‘moral standing’ replicates exchange relations, and the individualist conception of
‘moral agents’ obscures the social contexts which produce and sustain agency or hinder it.
Yet these categories are the same ones that animal rights theorists ask us to apply to those creatures (some
of them, anyway) that have typically been neglected by moral philosophy. In this way, animal liberation
doctrine perpetuates and reinforces the liberal assumptions that are hegemonic within contemporary
capitalist cultures, under the guise of contesting these assumptions. Indeed one of the chief reasons for the
popularity of animal rights within radical circles is that it appears to offer an extreme affront to the status
quo while actually recuperating the ideological foundations of the status quo.
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RIGHTS DISCOURSE INCREASES THE POWER OF THE STATE, SILENCES THOSE
OPPRESSED BY STATE POWER
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 84
The critique, elaborated by CLS and others, that rights language deceives is one that implicitly, and
sometimes explicitly, suggests false consciousness. The holders of power do not necessarily have false
consciousness, but for the marginalized rights language acts as a “filter”. The marginalized buy into the
view that rights protect them from interference without realizing that this belief perpetuates their own
oppression.
“In fact an excessive preoccupation with ‘rights-consciousness’ tends in the long run to reinforce alienation
and powerlessness, because the appeal to rights inherently affirms that the source of social power resides in
the State rather than in the people themselves.” (Gabel and Harris, 1983, p. 375)
PERCEPTION THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS “SOLVED” DISCRIMINATION MAKES THE
STRUGGLE AGAINST PRIVATE DISCRIMINATION MORE DIFFICULT
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 185-6
What is more, the increased but still insufficient opportunity for some members of devalued groups to
achieve economic security and even political and social power—that is, the opportunity to compete more
equally with privileged white males for a limited number of desirable positions within capitalist society, in
a competition that has created considerable backlash—has led many to believe that vestiges of innate
privilege have been eliminated and that the United States is now largely a society of equals. Political and
social criticism—particularly in the form of participation in demonstrations and protest marches—now is
viewed by many as an anachronism, an outlet only for “kooks” and fanatics.
THE POWER OF THE STATE IS A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN MAINTAINING EXPLOITATION
AND OPPRESSION OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 184-5
The state in contemporary capitalist society is, ironically, both a crucial avenue for progressive social
change and liberation for humans and other animals and, at the same time, one of the biggest obstacles to
that change. From its inception, the state has been used largely to protect and enhance the interests of the
powerful and affluent, and so it is used today.
The economic underpinnings of oppression of humans and other animals, and the complex web of
entanglements among oppressed groups, are tightly wrapped and meticulously cloaked by those who
control the various powers of the state. From the creation of early laws that institutionalized the
characterization of women and other animals as property, to state-sanctioned witch trials that scapegoated
women, cats, and others in the ranks of the devalued for social ills caused by tyrannical social systems;
from the protection of horrific treatment of animals cast as agricultural commodities and laboratory
subjects, with a government seal of approval on their use and consumption, to the displacement of family
and subsistence farms in the United States and the Third World, to the abusive treatment of workers and
consumers—the physical, political, economic, ideological, and diversionary powers of the state support and
build such entangled oppressions while giving such atrocities legal and social respectability.
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ANIMAL RIGHTS PERPETUATES PARTRIARCHY THROUGH RIGHTS TALK
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2004, The Case for
Animal Rights, p. xli
Some feminist theorists (liberal feminists, as they are called) believe in human rights. Other feminist
theorists, influenced by the work of Carol Gilligan, are of a different mind. They believe that “rights talk”
is symptomatic of patriarchal modes of thinking. As paradoxical as this might sound, these feminists (I call
them ethic-of-care feminists) argue that belief in animal rights perpetuates patriarchy, understood as the
unfounded belief in male superiority. Let me say something about patriarchal modes of thought, as they are
described in this context; then we can perhaps better understand how this type of criticism of the rights
view works.
Owing to a variety of cultural forces, ethic-of-care feminists maintain, men tend to think in certain ways,
women in others. To begin with, men (but not women) tend to think in dualistic, hierarchical terms. For
example, men tend to view reason as standing over emotion (a dualism), and also tend to think that reason
is the superior of the two (a hierarchy). This same pattern emerges in the case of objectivity and
subjectivity, impartiality and partiality, justice and care, culture and nature, and individualism and
communitarianism. In each of these and other cases, the world tends to be carved up by men into dualistic
terms, and, in each such case, one of the two terms is ranked higher, as being of greater importance of value
than its opposite.
What these theorists would term “male mind,” then, is characterized by dualistic, hierarchical rankings, a
summary of which would read as follows: men tend to believe that reason, objectivity, impartiality, justice,
culture and individualism are of greater importance or value than emotion, subjectivity, partiality, care,
nature, and community. More than this, men tend to think that men are characterized by the higher ranked
pair in each of the dualisms and women by the lower. Thus, women are supposed (by men) to be less
rational and more emotional, less objective and more subjective, and so on.
With the preceding serving as logical backdrop, the denunciation of individual rights voiced by ethic-ofcare feminists is intelligible. The idea of “the rights of the individual” they believe, is a product of male
mind. Why? Because it grows out of a conception of the world that places greater value on the
separateness of the individual (rights, after all, belong to individuals) over against familial and
communitarian relationships. Moreover, views that affirm individual rights place greater importance on
evaluation moral choices in terms of impartial considerations—such as the right to respectful treatment—
than on making evaluations based on our responsibility to nurture and sustain close interpersonal
relationships—such as the relationships that obtain between parents and their children. The moral
significance of these latter relationships is denigrated by male mind; nurturing is “women’s work” and thus
of less importance than the acts or policies that honor the universal equal, inalienable “rights of the
individual.” Against this judgment, ethic-of-care feminists celebrate the qualities (emotion, subjectivity,
and an ethic of care, for example) traditionally associated with feminists.
The objections these feminists raise against the rights view all follow the same logical pattern. Patriarchal
modes of thought are first characterized in terms of certain traits a,b,c,; the rights view is said to have traits
a, b, c; therefore the rights view is denounced as patriarchal.
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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS ENTRENCH PATRIARCHAL SYSTEM OF DUALISM AND
HIERARCHY
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 55
A third, more subtle defense of the feminist indictment (the last I will consider) takes the following form. Owing to a variety of
cultural forces, it is alleged, men in general tend to think in certain ways; women in others. This defense avers
that men tend to think in dualistic, hierarchical terms. For example, they tend to view reason as standing
against emotion (a dualism) and to think that reason is the superior of the two (a hierarchy). This same
pattern emerges in the case of objectivity and subjectivity; impartiality and partiality; justice and care,
culture and nature, and individualism and communitarianism; in each of these cases, men tend to carve the world in
dualistic terms, and in each such case, one of the two terms is ranked higher, as being of greater importance or value, than its
complement.
What we might term “male mind” then, is characterized by dualistic, hierarchical rankings men tend to
make—or so it is alleged—a summary of which would read as follows. Men tend to believe that reason,
objectivity, impartiality, justice, culture and individualism are of greater importance or value than emotion,
subjectivity, partiality, care, nature and community. Moreover, men also tend to think that men are
characterized by the higher-ranked item in each of the dualisms, and women by the lower. Thus, women
are supposed (by men) to be les rational and more emotional, less objective and more subjective, and so on.
With the preceding sketch serving as logical backdrop, the male mind defense of the feminist indictment
comes to this: the idea of the rights of the individual is a product of the male mind and thus of male bias. It
is a product of male mind because, for example, it grows out of a conception of the world that places
greater value on the separateness of the individual (the rights, after all, are the rights of the individual) than
on familial and communitarian relationships, and it places greater importance on evaluating moral choices
in terms of impartial considerations, such as justice, than on evaluating them in terms of our responsibility to care for (to
nurture and sustain) close relationships, such as the relationships that obtain between parents and their children. The moral
significance of these latter relationships is denigrated by male mind; they are, as it were, “women’s work”
and thus of les importance than the acts or policies that honor the universal, equal, inalienable rights of the
individual. Against this judgment, partisans of the male mind defense celebrate the qualities (for example,
emotion, subjectivity, and an ethic of care) traditionally associated with the feminine.
ANIMAL RIGHTS PERPETUATE AND ENTRENCH PATRIARCHY
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 95
In addition to the above criticisms, three activists suggested a feminist critique of rights. Rights, according
to these activists, are inherently paternalistic due to the fact that they are assigned by those in power to
those without power. As one advocate put it, “Using the language of rights you have the dominators giving
something to the dominated, giving this language of rights to the dominated. And that is disgusting in that
way.” According to Kheel:
“I see obligations and rights as coming out of the patriarchal framework…[They] feed into that kind of
worldview that says there are subjects and objects. Subjects are the rights givers and they’re given to
objects…Who are we to be giving rights to animals? Is it just a matter of power?...Humans may have
assigned that role to themselves, the powerful rights givers. But I think that’s where a lot of these problems
stem from, seeing our species as somehow unique in the universe that has been given these powers of
stewardship.”
As these comments imply, the act of granting right to animals replicates the hierarchy of power. It
perpetuates the prevailing attitude of human superiority over inferior animals. As such, animal rights
language or even the attainment of animal rights does not necessarily foster significant social
transformation. Instead, it reinforces the paternalistic and hierarchical system characteristic of the status
quo.
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ANIMAL RIGHTS ENTRENCH PATRIARCHAL NATURE OF INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2001, Defending
Animal Rights, p. 53
According to the criticism I have in mind, Narveson, Frey and Jamieson are correct insofar as they hold
that there is something seriously mistaken in the view that nonhuman animals have rights. But they are
mistaken when it comes to explaining why the idea is ill grounded. The fault likes in the very idea of the
rights of the individual. This idea, these critics allege, is symptomatic of a deep, systematic prejudice that
has distorted Western moral and political thought down through the ages. That prejudice is patriarchy,
understood as what is expressive of male bias. Paradoxoical though it may seem they claim that what is
fundamentally wrong with the idea of animal rights is that it encapsulates male bias. Before moving on to
explore this criticism (which for brevity’s sake I term “the feminist indictment”), three preliminary points
merit attention.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE MAKES STRUGGLE FOR ANIMAL LIBERATION SEEM MORE
REASONABLE AND RATIONAL AS OPPOSED TO EMOTIONAL
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 62-3
Relying on rights language is also important for a movement that has been traditionally associated with
emotionalism and sentimentality. Rights language provides the power of reason in contrast to an appeal to
the emotions. Although the animals rights movement combines the emotional appeal with an appeal to
reason in order to increase its persuasiveness, it is the balance between these appeals, using rights as the
balancing mechanisms, that is significant. Thus, movement literature works on human feelings by showing
pictures of horribly abused cats, dogs, and monkeys – “cute” animals – that outrage our emotional
sensibilities. At the same time, movement literature works on human rational abilities by invoking rights
terminology and explaining that oppression of animals is akin to oppression of humans.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE EMPLOYS DUALISMS
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 93-4
Marti Kheel, economist scholar and activist in Feminists for Animal Rights (FAR), voiced this common
critique, arguing that rights are “dualistic.” Rights are “part of the competitive world view. You have a
right to something against somebody.” Likewise, Lauren Smedley, another activist in FAR, elaborated this
critique in clear terms. According to Smedley, rights are:
”very limiting because they’re dualistic, and they assume a competition-based type of arena for resolving
the issues and for meting out justice. You have the problem just like you did with civil rights and any type
of minority rights, and what are called women’s rights: every right is considered [to be] conflicting with
another right. A women’s right not to be harassed on the street is conflicting with the man’s right of
freedom of speech and to harass women. It’s one right against another. In that sense rights are very
limiting and they’re inadequate.”
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Animal Rights Paradigm Counterproductive – Entrenches
Speciesism
THE ANIMAL RIGHTS PARADIGM IS ONE THAT LEAVES HUMAN EXCEPTIONALISM
AND DOMINATION INTACT—THE AFF DOES NOT CHALLENGE SPECIESISM, BUT
MERELY REARRANGES THE CATEGORIES OF CLASSIFICATION
Kappeler ‘95
[Susanne, lecturer in English at East Anglia University, “Speciesism, Racism, Nationalism . . . or the Power of
Scientific Subjectivity,” in Animals & Women, ed. Carol J. Adams, p. 330-34]
However, to me the problem seems less that feminist or animal rights approaches that implicitly rely on speciesism
universalize, generalize, or stereotype animals, than that the basis on which they wish to secure the rights of
women and now of animals is no different from that on which they were previously denied. That is to say,
the same hierarchy of categories is presupposed, only the boundary of those included in the group with
rights is extended “downward” along the ladder, shoring up a different dichotomy as the crucial —that is,
exclusionary — boundary. The idea of the ladder of categories — of the “objective” classification of given,
“natural” species —remains unquestioned and unchallenged, in the interest of those who see the chance of
being adopted into the top class. Equally unchallenged is the power of the original group that sees itself at
the uncontested top of the ladder, arrogating to itself the right to classify and to decide over the rights of
others — the epitome of the speciesist paradigm.
Thus white men, in their endeavor to buttress white male supremacy, used to draw the line defining “human” — and
thus “rights” —between(among others) whites and blacks as well as between men and women, on the basis of an
alleged natural and evolutionary hierarchy that placed both the race of black people and the sex of women on a stage of
development below that of white men and hence closer to “the animals.” In turn, the struggles for the emancipation of
black people and of women in the U.S. in the nineteenth century led to various proposals of how the crucial boundary
should be reshuffled: should it run between whites and blacks, including white men and women and excluding blacks
(men and women), or between men and women, including white and black men and excluding (black and white)
women? 15 Both black men and white women had something to gain (though it never was equality) depending on how
the line was drawn; but white men’s membership and their power to classify and to grant rights was unaffected either
way, as was the certain exclusion of black women, their assured position below any boundary. The eventual
emancipation of both black people (men and women) and women (black and white) in Western societies may have led
to their inclusion in the category of humans, even of citizens, yet without either group having become equal to the
white men who previously occupied that category exclusively. The boundary of inclusion/exclusion has been
shifted “downward,” yet the idea of a hierarchy of categories and the supremacy of the group at the top has
been left unshaken. The ladder of categorization (and subcategorization) continues to exist, both within the
category “human” and outside of it.
Hence to speak of “humans and the other animals” so as to signal the inclusion of humans among the animals — in the
interest of promoting animals into the class of those deserving rights — equally leaves the hierarchy intact,
shoring up instead the dichotomy between animals and nonanimals. As we know, the boundary between what
we consider to be animal life on the one hand and plant life on the other is less “natural” and less clear-cut than we
would like to think and these categories tend to imply, as is the dividing line between living and so-called dead matter.
But we need not even go that far “down” the ladder to see that what is at stake is not equality, that the crucial boundary
still exists, and the question simply is at what precise point it shall for now be fixed.
The zoological — and archetypally speciesist — subdivision of animals into different species has led animal
rights advocates to do with animals what on the level of humans we are trying to overcome: to affirm and
maintain an evolutionary hierarchy and to grant rights to some and not others on the basis of zoological
differences — say, to primates but not to worms. Or to wild animals, perceived as “natural” animals, but not
to farm and domestic animals, seen as “subanimals” (see Karen Davis’s article in this volume). The zoological
classification, however, is less biological than biologist, including factors concerning the animals’
lifestyles, habitats, and political history — that is, criteria concerning the sociopolitical coexistence of
animals and humans. Although the perspective of classification masquerades as the “objectivity” of no standpoint at
all, 16 it reflects the human-subjective — that is, speciesist — standpoint:
crucial principles of evaluation and hierarchizing are the animal species’ alleged similarity with or
difference from humans (the evolutionary order), their usefulness to humans, complemented by traditional human
(male, white, etc.) sympathies (or antipathies) for particular species (see Diane Antonio on wolves in this volume). That
is to say,
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the subjective norm of valuation is incorporated within the very objects being constituted, even as the
scientific subject disappears from its object-science.
The specific criteria by which it has been proposed that rights should be granted or withheld are either the
animals’ ability to feel pain (sentience) or to lead a life “worth living” 17 — both being judged by a jury of
self-appointed, white, human, scientific experts. Not only is sentience more likely to be perceived the more the
animals’ expression resembles human expression, but such expression tends to be tested in response to human infliction
of pain, thus revealing the real objective behind the withholding of rights from animals, namely that humans may abuse
animals. Similarly, assessing whether another’s life is worth living involves recognizing factors dear to the
judges: consciousness (long considered to be the defining characteristic distinguishing humans from animals),
intelligence (ditto), and moral agency, extended by Tom Regan to include the passive experience of so-called “moral
patients.” 18 The proposal that rights should continue to be withheld from domesticated or farm animals shows up the fundamental
cynicism behind “scientific” rights discourse: the disastrously violating — “inhuman”(!) — conditions that humans impose on farm
animals are acknowledged not in order to change them, but in order to disqualify the animals from rights, as though these conditions
were objective factors of biological capacity — the kind of life of which these animals are capable.
As is well known among critics of Peter Singer and Helga Kuhse, the latters’ consideration of “the differences”
among animals (and humans) as well as of their alleged capacity to lead lives “worth living” — also
measured as “objective” capacities of the “objects,” while excluding the social and political construction of living
conditions — has led them to reshuffle the ladder of rights at the bottom line: not just so as to include some
animals but so as to exclude simultaneously some humans — be it at the level of eugenic breeding (selective
aborting) or “euthanatic” killing. 19 What masquerades as an antispeciesist defense of (some) animals in fact is
a form of superspeciesism, redefining a superrace of the “healthy” and “whole” with lives “worth living.”
Similarly, the pseudo-objective “classes” (or “races” or “species”) of people whose rights were up for discussion in the “civil
societies” of the West over the last few centuries were classes of “domesticated” — farm, factory farm, factory, plantation, and
domestic — people: slaves (having been literally factory farmed and bred), peasants, domestic servants, workers, women, and black
people (former slaves). Similarly, in Western European societies today, it is migrant workers, however settled, whose political rights
are still being debated — that is, whether they should be granted any or continue to be deprived of them. In other words, “species”
or “kinds” of people are not only defined by those at the top of the human hierarchy, but defined
specifically in terms of their usefulness to and usability by them. Who shall be considered for rights at all,
and hence by what criteria rights are to be granted or withheld, was and still is defined by white, male,
property-owning, expert citizens, who also judge the candidates’ ability to fulfill these criteria — be it
women’s or black people’s ability to think politically and to hold political office, or migrants’ ability to assimilate
sufficiently and embrace the national political and cultural concerns of the country. 20 What we consider to be the
speciesist paradigm has never been the simple binary opposition between “humans” and “animals,” but the
complex interaction of speciesism, racism, sexism, classism, nationalism, etc., which crystallizes a narrow
yet historically changing group of masters who give themselves the name “human.” The zoological (including
the racist) continuum of classification blends with the classist instrumentalization of those classified, with the sexist
division thrown in as and when required.
Whether the criterion for animal rights now be sentience — judged not only from a human point of view, but
from that of white Western scientific experts — or a life worth living, judged by a similar selfappointed assembly
of human experts, these approaches to animal rights or animal liberation have nothing to do with challenging
the power hierarchy: they simply aim to adjust some positions in the middle, leaving the hierarchy as such
intact, above all leaving the position of judgment unchallenged. It is not speciesism that is being
challenged, but merely the content of the categories constituted by speciesism. Even the most radical
animal rights position, which would grant rights to all species of animals, is no different in theory from that
which denies such rights: not only does it need the crucial boundary shored up between animals and
nonanimals (or animals that qualify and those who do not), but it continues to arrogate to itself the right to
grant rights. Neither does it help if we speak of intrinsic value: value is a fundamentally relational category,
which implies the possibility of a lack of value as well as a subject defining and recognizing that value. The
very project of granting and extending rights is fundamentally speciesist, exempting the human agent and
judge into the category of subject ruling over an object world.
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Animal Rights Discourse Bad – Entrenches Anthropocentrism
RIGHTS VIEW FOCUSES ON “INDIVIDUALS” WHICH REFLECTS ANTHROPOCENTRIC
BIAS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2003, The Animal
Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 456
Although the rights view and utilitarianism differ in important ways, they are the same in others. Like
utilitarian attacks on anthropocentrism, the rights view seeks to make its case by working within the major
ethical categories of the anthropocentric tradition. For example, utilitarians do not deny the moral
relevance of human pleasure and pain, so important to our humanist forebears; they accept it and seek to
extend our moral horizons to include the moral relevance of the pleasures and pains of other animals. For
its part, the rights view does not deny the moral importance of the individual, a central article of belief in
theistic and humanistic thought; rather, it accepts this moral datum and seeks to widen the class of
individuals who are thought of in this way to include nonhuman animals.
Because both the positions discussed in the preceding use major ethical categories handed down by our
predecessors, some influential thinkers argue that these positions, despite all appearances to the contrary,
remain in bondage to anthropocentric prejudices.
GIVING “RIGHTS” TO ANIMALS IS BAD – IT REINFORCES ANTHROPOCENTRISM
David Orton, Coordinator of the environmental research group the Green Web. “Deep Ecology and
Animal Rights”. Green Web. 2000. http://home.ca.inter.net/~greenweb/DE-AR.html
Most deep ecology supporters do not approve of the use of the term "rights" as in
"animal rights". (For a discussion of this, see John Livingston's book Rogue Primate:
An exploration of human domestication, 1994, Key Porter Books.) Rights are
seen as a human-centered extension term applied to animals, with roots in power and privilege. The use of
this term overlooks the intrinsic values inhering in animals and their uniqueness, and hence the need for a
movement conceptualization which expresses this - not rights as an extension of human rights.
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Animal Rights Discourse Bad – Entrenches Anthropocentrism
THE INCLUSION OF “THE ANIMAL” WITHIN THE REALM OF ETHICS IMPOSES A
HOMOGENOUS VIEW OF ANIMALITY THAT MAINTAINS ANTHROPOCENTRIC
DUALISMS. MERELY ASSERTING A DEMAND FOR INCLUSION STILL MAINTAINS THE
HUMAN AS THE STANDARD FOR ETHICAL CONSIDERATION.
Calarco 2004, Matthew, Department of Philosophy @ Sweet Briar College, “Deconstructionism is not
Vegetarianism,” Continental Philosophy Review, 32.2, p. 184-5
Here again it is evident that Levinas’s humanism takes Heidegger’s delimitation of metaphysical humanism into account by not
equating the essence of the human with the metaphysical determination of man as animal rationale. But Levinas’s
displacement of the humanist subject of metaphysics is only partially successful; it still retains and
reinforces the anthropocentrism of classical humanism insofar as the question of the animal’s being is
never posed but is instead determined homogeneously and in relation to the measure of man (a tendency
which is largely true of Heidegger as well). For Levinas, the animal is without human ethics; the ethical relation
with the animal is based on the “prototype” of human ethics – the human remains always and everywhere
the measure of the animal. Nor does Levinas ever question this category (“the animal”) for its
homogenizing tendencies – as if we could trust the notion that “the animal” signifies a homogenous group
of beings located on the other side of the human. The thinking of singularity and radical alterity accorded to
the other human being by Levinas never seems to extend beyond the human to the other animal, to the
animal as other. It is these stubborn and dogmatic remnants of anthropocentrism that ultimately confirm
Derrida’s claim that Levinas’s thinking remains a “profound humanism.” Now one could contest Levinas’s
anthropocentrism by turning the tables on him, i.e., by reversing this binary opposition and demonstrating
that the animal as such calls us to responsibility or that the animal as such is itself capable of responsibility and
saintliness. No doubt a good case could be developed along these lines for certain forms of animal life. But this critical
response, however necessary and justified it may be, needs to attend to its implicit reliance on a set of
metaphysical distinctions (The Human and The Animal) that found and undergird the very
anthropocentrism being called into question. For those of us who are concerned about posing the question of
animal ethics in the context of contemporary Continental thought and related theories and practices, the issue of how
best to delimit and challenge this lingering anthropocentrism without naively reinforcing it is of primary
importance. I have insisted on reading Levinas’s remarks on animality at length because his anthropocentrism is representative of
the manner in which many of those who work in the post-Heideggerian tradition tend to understand the place of “the animal” with
regard to “the ethical,” however this latter term is understood. Most contemporary Continental philosophers are not simply Cartesian
or Spinozist, they are not likely to deny that animals have consciousness or to hold that vegetarianism is irrational or womanish. But
when it comes to rethinking community, language, finitude, or relation (all of these terms serving as different names
for a thought of “the ethical”), there is an implicit tendency to privilege the human and consider the animal
as having a secondary or derivative role. Such anthropocentrism is evident not only in Levinas but also, albeit it in
differentiated forms, in much of what goes by the name of “poststructuralism.” The critical question that needs to
be addressed, then, is not how to challenge a straightforward denial of the possibility of animal ethics, but
rather, how best to respond to this more nuanced and surreptitious form of anthropocentrism.
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Animal Rights Focus Promotes Romanticism
ATTEMPTS TO “PROTECT” NATURE DISGUISE A PATRIARCHAL DESIRE TO
CONTROL—THE ISOLATION OF ENVIRONMENTAL HARMS BLAMES THE VICTIMS OF
ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION
Heller ‘93
[Chaia, “For the Love of Nature: Ecology and the Cult of the Romantic,” Ecofeminism: Women, Animals,
Nature, ed. Greta Gaard, pp. 224-5]
The tendency to idealize nature is coupled with the fantasy of protecting an image of nature that is
portrayed as weak and vulnerable. During Earth Week 1990, an epidemic of tee-shirts hit the stores depicting sentimal images
of a soft blue and green ball of earth being held and protected by two white man’s hands. Huddled around the protective hands was a
lovable crowd of characteristically wide-eyed, long-lashed, feminine-looking deer, seals, and birds. Underneath the picture was the
caption “Love Your Mother.” The message was clear: nature is ideal, chaste, and helpless as a baby girl. We must save
“her” from the dragon of “Everyman.”
However, this romantic posture toward nature has an even nastier side. Romantic protection of nature often
hides men’s underlying desire to control and denigrate women and people of color. For example, members
of Earth First! And others in the deep ecology movement have been quoted as blaming nature’s woes
largely on “population.” The Earth First! Journal regularly advertises a sticker that says, “Love Your Mother, Donnnn’t Become
One.” Paradoxically, the same men who romantically express love for “Mother Earth” suggest that mothers
are to blame for the denigration of nature. In the name of “protecting Mother Earth,” women are reduced to
masses of brainless, brown women breeding uncontrollably in the Third World. Meanwhile “Gaia,” the
idealized mother herself, sits elevated on her galactic pedestal awaiting knightly protection from women’s
insatiable wombs.
The fantasy of romantic protection blends male perceptions of social reality with male fantasy. The
romantic can remain disdainful and ignorant of women’s oppression within society while maintaining his
fantasy of protecting “woman-nature”: in this way, the romantic can love his cake and hate her too.
However, removing the veil of romantic protection from the population discussion reveals population
imbalances to be the result of patriarchy, colonialism, and capitalism. These institutions disenfranchise
women from their own indigenous cultures and their traditional techniques of reproductive control.
Throughout history, women have ingeniously managed to control population. However, once women are robbed of cultural
knowledge and self-determination, they lose the cultural practices vital to population control. Additional factors, including high infant
mortality and the family’s need for child labor for survival, contribute to women’s having more children than they would ordinarily
desire.
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Animal Rights Focus Promotes Romanticism
THE ISOLATION OF INDIVIDUAL CONSUMPTION AS THE SOURCE OF
ENVIRONMENTAL DECAY IS AN AUTHORITARIAN FORM OF SOCIAL CONTROL THAT
MAINTAINS INSTITUTIONS OF DOMINATION
Heller ‘93
[Chaia, “For the Love of Nature: Ecology and the Cult of the Romantic,” Ecofeminism: Women, Animals,
Nature, ed. Greta Gaard, pp. 238-9]
These warnings to conserve natural resources and to exercise environmental constraint imply that "we"
have been "partying it up" and now must get sober. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The "party"
ended when domination emerged within society thousands of years ago, adding capitalism to its list of
atrocities only during the last several centuries. Under patriarchy, women and all oppressed peoples have
been forced to restrain their desire for freedom, expression, and self-determination. We have constrained,
held back, our passions, creativity, and desires for a truly liberatory society.
When George Bush, "the environmental president," instructs us to conserve nature, perhaps he is really
warning us to conserve the structure of this authoritarian society. The media campaigns have an
authoritarian flavor that appeals to our expectations of social control and direction. Surely these campaigns
do not encourage the public to question the economic and social structures that are the true causes of
ecocide.
We are asked to conserve more, waste less. However, capitalism itself is never challenged as a system that
promotes and depends on wasteful consumption. Ironically, capitalism shapes the false needs that we are
chastised for attempting to satisfy. Our lives are vacuous. We are alienated in our work, in our
communities, and in our ideas of nature. We live within an economic system that depends on a poor
underclass, a system that requires ever-new human and natural "resources" to survive. Yet, again, no one
questions whether this system is inherently flawed. Instead, the flaw is assumed to be inherent within
"human nature."
Indeed, wasteful consumption must end. But this end must be achieved by abolishing capitalism and social
domination, not merely by recycling and encouraging the rich to buy expensive "ecologically sound"
products. The slew of new "environmentally friendly" products that crowd even mainstream market shelves
are unaffordable to many working- and middleclass consumers. These products alleviate the ecological
anxiety of the rich while perpetuating an oppressive economic system that ultimately exploits humans and
nature.
The romantic drama of ecology is over. It is time for a new era. The knights can stop protecting nature and
restraining their unchivalrous desires. The dragon no longer hovers over the romantic countryside flashing
the generic name tag of "technology" or "humanity." The dragon has finally taken off its mask. It wears the
face of the capitalist draining the blood from the land and people of the "Third World." The dragon wears
the fist of the batterer beating the last breath from the woman who dared survive. The dragon wears the
face of domination, the face of all institutions, ideologies, and individuals who strip people of their land,
culture, passion, and self-determination.
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Animal Rights Focus Promotes Romanticism
THE CHARACTERIZATION OF HUMANS AS ENVIRONMENTAL DESTROYING MACHINES
ESTABLISHES A RELATIONSHIP WITH NATURE BASED ON REPRESSION—THIS
PREVENTS A POSSIBILITY OF AN ETHICAL RELATIONSHIP
Heller ‘93
[Chaia, “For the Love of Nature: Ecology and the Cult of the Romantic,” Ecofeminism: Women, Animals,
Nature, ed. Greta Gaard, pp. 227-8]
The Environmental Defense Fund had a recent television campaign showing the "whole earth" photograph suddenly and audibly
crumpled by two white man's hands. A stern voice stated dryly, "If you don't recycle, you're throwing it all away." In both instances,
the message is clear: If individuals do not constrain their desire to "trash" nature, the natural world is done
for.
The theme of romantic constraint is problematic in two ways. First, it actually increases alienation within
society and between society and nature. Second, it camouflages the true enemies of both nature and social
justice. Western, industrial capitalist society is alienated from nature. To heal this alienation, ecological theory must invite people to
come to terms with their distinctive place and role in natural evolution. To accomplish this, ecological theories must help people to
recognize and express the human potential for sociability and cooperation both within society and with nature. We need to uncover
our ability to be humans-in-nature and humans-as-nature in a new, creative, and liberatory way.
However, the environmental call for individual constraint implies a pessimistic view of society's potential
relationship with nature. It suggests that our relationship with the natural world is inherently predicated on
a repression of a desire to destroy nature rather than on a desire to enhance nature. "Love as constraint"
portrays love only as a holding back, a repression of a destructive desire, rather than as a release of human
desire to participate creatively in the natural world. Loving nature through constraint keeps us from
identifying and demanding our distinctively human potential to love nature through creativity and
cooperation within society. Thus, we fail to see that we can actually release our desire to create a just
society where there would be neither "helpless ladies" nor a "helpless Mother Nature" to protect. Focusing
on self-restraint obscures the potential for self-expression that we need to create a society free of all social
and ecological degradation.
"Love-as-constraint" suggests that we are inherently destructive to each other within society and toward
nature. "Love as an enhancement of freedom" means we can actually enrich the development of other
humans as well as nature. This leads to the second point. "Romantic constraint" masks the face of the true
destroyer of nature and social justice. Its warped logic runs in this way: If true love is demonstrated through constraint of the
desire to defile, then a defiled nature results from the refusal of the lover to.constrain her/himself. Thus, in the case of
environmental degradation, nature's destruction results from the refusal of individuals to restrain
themselves. In this way, each individual is chastised and shamed for betraying nature.
But is the cause of environmental degradation the failure of individual constraint, and the betrayal of nature? Or
is it a few elite men's betrayal of the world? It is essential to distinguish between desire and greed. Desire
does not inevitably ravage the earth or its peoples. Desire has the potential to be expressed in liberatory
ways that can actually enhance social and ecological relationships. It is the greed for power over others that
reduces women, the poor, and all of nature to booty to be bought, sold, and dumped in a landfill.
However, greed is a far less romantic cause for ecocide than is unrestrained "desire." It is much more seductive to wear a button that
says, "Love Your Mother" than it is to carry a banner saying, "End Domination and Greed Within Society!" We must uncover the
perpetrators of this greedy war against oppressed humanity and nature. We must renounce our vows of "constraint"
toward nature while releasing our desire for both a free nature and a free society.
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Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity
Counterproductive
THE COMPARISON OF ANIMALS AND HUMANS THROUGH RIGHTS TALK ENGAGES IN A
POLITICAL ECONOMY THAT CAN ONLY RESULT IN RE-HIERARCHIZATION—ON
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
The similarity argument, in the context of advocacy for animals, claims that animals are like humans in the
capacities that are relevant to legal entitlements and, therefore, that a just society would provide speciesappropriate legal entitlements that mirror the entitlements society gives humans. A fundamental problem
with this argument is that it is not possible to resolve completely the question whether some or all animals
are sufficiently like humans that justice requires treating the two groups alike, even if there were agreement
about which capacities are relevant for comparison. (10) Information about animals' capacities, independent
of comparisons to human capacities, is useful information about animals and may change public attitudes
about animals. Nevertheless, if the basis of the claim for increased protection is that like entities (humans
and animals) should be treated alike (both should have entitlements to protect themselves), information
about animals simply as animals (and not as compared to humans) is not useful for the purpose of giving
animals increased protection and reducing the rights of humans to (ab)use them. If animals do not have
characteristics considered essential to humans in the ways that those characteristics exist in humans, it is
possible to dismiss claims of similarity raised for purposes of curtailing humans' use of animals. Even if
one is seeking only better treatment for animals and not legal rights, the argument of similarity to humans is
weakened by counterarguments that animals are not similar enough to create an obligation in humans to
treat them better. For example, animals may feel pain but cognitively process it differently or manage it
more effectively. (11) Animals may think, but not in the ways that humans do. If an animal lacks selfconsciousness or the cognitive ability to anticipate his life in the future, the loss of his life may be deemed
less meaningful than the loss of a human's life because humans do have self-consciousness and can project
themselves into the future. (12) Moreover, new information that appears to prove similarity between
humans and animals may only result in a redefinition of the term "human" so that the oppositional
categories of "human" and "animal" remain intact. Just as the finding that chimpanzees make tools meant
that humans would no longer be defined by reference to toolmaking, newfound similarities between
animals and humans may result only in new or refined definitions of humans, in order to retain the
singularity of humans.
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Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity
Counterproductive
THEIR GROUNDING OF ANIMAL RIGHTS IN A SIMILARITY TO HUMANS CREATES A
DISASTROUS PROCESS OF LINE-DRAWING WHERE CERTAIN ANIMALS ARE EXCLUDED
FROM ETHICAL CONSIDERATION
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
Difficulty in proving similarity to humans and subsequent redefinition of humans when similarity is found
are only two of several serious problems with the similarity argument. Use of the similarity argument
inevitably creates a hierarchy of worthiness based on how closely an animal approximates the
characteristics of humans, because the similarity argument posits that animals deserve protection
comparable to that of humans only precisely in relation to how closely they approximate humans. Creation
of hierarchy, especially by way of controlled scientific laboratory research to prove precise degrees of
similarity, results in problems of line-drawing between and among animals.
Line-drawing and prioritizing some animals as more worthy of protection than others is the likely outcome
of the similarity argument because it is unlikely that giving some entitlements to some animals, such as
great apes, would, by itself, break down resistance to giving rights to other animals. (28) Because humans
have strong interests in keeping the comparably protected community small, humans would not be likely to
expand the reference point to include great apes for purposes of examining other species to determine their
similarity to current rights-holders (humans and great apes). Humans would most likely continue to use
themselves as the exclusive reference point for establishing similarity for purposes of the similarity
argument. Just as close attention to similarities and dissimilarities between great apes and humans would be
the origin of rights for great apes, each species of animals would have to undergo comparison to humans,
and each animal species would have to be found sufficiently similar to humans that justice would require
each species to receive comparably protective treatment. (29) Advocates for animals may seek to
restructure society to end and prevent exploitation of animals (for example, ending animal flesh-food
consumption), (30) but use of the similarity argument for that purpose is arduous, at best, until the last
apparently exploitable, edible animal is proved to be similar enough to humans to merit protection. Since,
despite decades of research, we have not yet proved sufficient similarity between humans and great apes-with whom we share the closest evolutionary relationship--just how likely is it that we will prove sufficient
similarity between humans and cows, humans and pigs, humans and sheep, humans and rabbits, humans
and chickens, or humans and fish?
EXTENDING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS ON THE BASIS THAT THEY ARE “LIKE” HUMANS
BELITTLES THE DIVERSITY AND UNIQUENESS OF ANIMALS BY VALUING THEM ONLY
INSOFAR AS THEY MIRROR A SMALL SET OF HUMAN CHARACTERISTICS
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
The similarity argument has other serious flaws. It requires representing animals not by reference to their
complexity, but by reference to whether they have one or a few characteristics considered essential to being
human. Thus, the ideological basis for justice that like entities be treated alike is disrespectful to animals
because it requires proof that they are, in essence, humans. The wondrous diversity of human and animal
life is both muted and mooted by the similarity argument, and adopting the standard of “Man is the
Measure of All Things” (156) leads inexorably to the development of a hierarchy of worth and access to
resources. The similarity argument cannot have a transformative effect on society because neither the status
quo’s acceptance of “man as the measure” nor the hierarchical ordering of access to resources is challenged
by the similarity argument.
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Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity
Counterproductive
EXTENDING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS MAINTAINS A HIERARCHICAL RELATIONSHIP THAT
MAINTAINS HUMAN DOMINATION, TURNING THE CASE
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
In the hierarchy created by the similarity argument, humans would occupy the top position in the hierarchy
because humans are the standard against which other animals are measured. Human-made hierarchies already
exist, such as those based on how cute animals are, whether we want to eat them, and whether they hold some symbolic
value for us (for example, eagles representing majesty and snakes representing evil). Those hierarchies, unlike the
hierarchy generated by the similarity argument, did not result from attempts to help animals. Yet, even though the
origins of the similarity argument lie in an effort to help animals, the hierarchy created by its application
can cause harm in two ways. First, it creates a priority of protection of only certain animals when, in fact,
all animals exist interdependently and each is important to sustaining the web of life in which we all live.
Two hypothetical letters written by Richard Dawkins in his contribution to The Great Ape Project provide the basis for
illustrating how the similarity argument creates a hierarchy based on prioritizing the protection of animals most similar
to humans. (31) In the first letter, the writer rejects advocacy for gorillas until the needs of every child have been
addressed. In the second, the writer rejects advocacy for gorillas until every aardvark has been saved. Dawkins
contrasts the two letters, noting that the first is completely plausible because the oppositional categories of animals and
humans replicate our society’s belief that animals have less value than humans. The second letter is not plausible
because both subjects of the second letter are animals, and both subjects (not being human) fall into the less valued
category. However, advocacy on the basis of similarity would create a hierarchical ordering of animals in
relation to their similarity to humans. Then it would be plausible for a writer to prioritize assistance to one
animal species (aardvarks) before another (gorillas). (32) Yet, while humans are prioritizing one animal
over another, animals are living in an interdependent world in which all animals, regardless of their
similarity to humans, need protection. (33)
Second, hierarchical ordering of animals based on their similarity to humans would increase harm to
dissimilar animals by facilitating exploitation of dissimilar animals for the benefit of animals deemed to be
like humans. (34) Exploitation of animals for the sake of other animals already occurs as, for example, when humans
feed (and over-feed) their companion animals pet foods made from factory-farmed animals. The hierarchy derived from
application of the similarity argument provides yet another basis for exploitation. If entitlements flow from a
determination by humans that a species of animal is similar to humans, to assure receipt of such
entitlements, the law granting rights would provide for human representatives to act on the animals’ behalf.
If, for example, sea lions were found to be sufficiently similar to humans that justice required their
receiving entitlements, their representatives surely would try to safeguard the health of sea lions by
securing for them all the fish they need, which would most likely mean increasing the production of fish by
intensive fish-farming. (35) Overall consumption of fish would increase, so that no sea lion would be
undernourished, which occurs now when sea lions must do their own fishing. Sea lions—via their human
representatives (36)—would thereby add to the exploitation that fish already experience at the hands of
humans. (37) This assumes that fish had not been granted entitlements at the same time as sea lions, which is likely if
similarity to humans is the basis for deciding which species shall be admitted to the community of those protected by
application of the justice argument that like entities be treated alike. If the approach to law reform for animals is not
premised on similarity to humans but is premised instead on respect for diversity of life, then sea lions and fish would
be equally situated at the same point in time.
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Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity
Counterproductive
THE SIMILARITY BASIS DEPLOYED TO DEFEND THEIR CONCEPTION OF ANIMAL
LIBERATION CANNOT BE COMBINED WITH A MORE RADICAL ALTERNATIVE THAT
VALUES ANIMALS FOR THEIR DIVERSITY AND AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES.
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
The similarity argument that justice demands like treatment of like entities requires advocates to focus on
animals' similarity to one or a few very specific human characteristics that are important to the definition of
humans. At first glance, it may not seem that the similarity argument forecloses discussion of diversity. In
the context of the argument that justice requires like entities to be treated alike, advocates could (and do) portray humans as so diverse
that a spectrum of, say, consciousness exists that would include animals at various points along the spectrum occupied by humans.
(52) However, opponents have two responses at their disposal. They can reply either (1) that there is no spectrum for definitional
purposes because humans are defined by reference to the consciousness of a mentally competent adult human being (53) or (2) that
there is a spectrum but that animals fall clearly outside of it. (54) Advocates may try to preserve respect for the rich
diversity of animal life by supplementing the similarity argument with evidence of that diversity. Yet,
doing so is counterproductive to use of the similarity argument because emphasizing diversity undercuts
the claim that animals are so like humans that justice requires treating them as such. If advocates
themselves point to a more complex reality, the complexity of the reality can be used by opponents to
obfuscate the issue of similarity to humans. Moreover, a focus on the similarity of animals to humans
cannot but devalue the unique meaning that animals, in light of their wonderful diversity, bring to the
concept of life, because it is only on the basis of similarity to specific characteristics of humans, and not on
the basis of the tremendous diversity of animals at the individual or species level, that animals are deemed
worthy of protection at all.
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Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Increases
Animal Research
BASING ANIMAL LIBERATION ON SIMILARITY TO HUMANS COMPELS OPPONENTS TO
FIND DISSIMILARITIES—THIS INCENTIVIZES DISCIPLINARY RESEARCH, TURNING
THE CASE
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
Unfortunately, the similarity argument has several shortcomings. Advocacy based on similarity proceeds
with great difficulty when differences are obvious. Opponents readily reject proffered bases of similarity
and find new bases for their claims of dissimilarity. Opponents have incentives to prove dissimilarity
because findings of similarity sufficient to invoke the similarity argument call into question moral
entitlements to exploit animals. When opponents seek to prove dissimilarity or advocates seek to prove
similarity to the rigorous degree required by their opponents, both use controlled scientific research to
prove their claims. This conflicts with goals of reducing or eliminating research on animals, and it is
particularly troubling if the point of comparison under experimental research review is animals' capacity to
suffer. For purposes of scientific curiosity or human benefit, animals are already subjected to painful
research procedures. The similarity argument provides an additional reason for subjecting animals to such
procedures--to prove that animals suffer like humans. It is no small ethical problem for animals' advocates
to create incentives for such research or to use such research in their advocacy. It is all the more troubling
to stimulate research on animals if, as our knowledge of humans and animals increases, old questions about
similarity are simply replaced with new questions about similarity, and if, therefore, fundamental questions
about similarity are never answered with finality. After all, it is unrealistic to expect humans to readily
relinquish the oppositional categories of "human" and "animal" when humans have defined themselves as
"not animal" for so long.
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Grounding Animal Rights in Human Similarity Bad – AT Perm
THE SIMILARITY BASIS DEPLOYED TO DEFEND THEIR CONCEPTION OF ANIMAL
LIBERATION CANNOT BE COMBINED WITH A MORE RADICAL ALTERNATIVE THAT
VALUES ANIMALS FOR THEIR DIVERSITY AND AS ENDS IN THEMSELVES.
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
The similarity argument that justice demands like treatment of like entities requires advocates to focus on
animals' similarity to one or a few very specific human characteristics that are important to the definition of
humans. At first glance, it may not seem that the similarity argument forecloses discussion of diversity. In
the context of the argument that justice requires like entities to be treated alike, advocates could (and do)
portray humans as so diverse that a spectrum of, say, consciousness exists that would include animals at
various points along the spectrum occupied by humans. (52) However, opponents have two responses at
their disposal. They can reply either (1) that there is no spectrum for definitional purposes because humans
are defined by reference to the consciousness of a mentally competent adult human being (53) or (2) that
there is a spectrum but that animals fall clearly outside of it. (54) Advocates may try to preserve respect for
the rich diversity of animal life by supplementing the similarity argument with evidence of that diversity.
Yet, doing so is counterproductive to use of the similarity argument because emphasizing diversity
undercuts the claim that animals are so like humans that justice requires treating them as such. If advocates
themselves point to a more complex reality, the complexity of the reality can be used by opponents to
obfuscate the issue of similarity to humans. Moreover, a focus on the similarity of animals to humans
cannot but devalue the unique meaning that animals, in light of their wonderful diversity, bring to the
concept of life, because it is only on the basis of similarity to specific characteristics of humans, and not on
the basis of the tremendous diversity of animals at the individual or species level, that animals are deemed
worthy of protection at all.
THE PREOCCUPATION OF DEMONSTRATING SIMILARITIES BETWEEN ANIMALS AND
HUMANS DELAYS THE DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES FOR VALUING ANIMALS
BASED ON THEIR DIVERSITY
Taimie L. Bryant, professor of law, UCLA School of Law, 2007
[“Similarity or Difference as a Basis for Justice: Must Animals be like Humans to be Legally Protected from Humans,”
Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 70]
Finally, as long as the similarity argument is in play, the focus of debate about the exploitation of animals
will remain on the worthiness of animals to be protected rather than on what a non-animal-consumptive
society would look like or how we can get there. Compared to descriptions of animal exploitation and the
injustice of exploiting animals so like humans, there are relatively few discussions and debates about what
specific rights animals would have, other than not being property, or what an animal-respecting society
would actually look like. This is not just a function of advocates' difficulty in stepping far enough outside
the framework of their society's extensive use of animals to imagine a different societal relationship to
animals. If, as a prerequisite to change, advocates are preoccupied with proving that animals are like
humans, that preoccupation will deter and delay the development of concrete, detailed strategies for
moving our society in the direction of valuing animals for the diversity of life they represent and for their
unique qualities.
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Animal Rights Entrenches the Logic of Nazism
THEARGUMENT THAT THERE IS NOTHING SPECIAL ABOUT HUMANS FUELED NAZI
IDEOLOGY
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 61
Against this concern it can be argued that Darwinism shows that there is nothing special about human
beings; we are an accident of nature’s blind processes just like all the other animals and so it is arbitrary for
us to put ourselves on a higher plane than the other animals. (This is the negative implication of
Darwinism; the positive implication, which seems to me dubious, or at least arbitrary, is that Darwinism
establishes our kinship with animals, and we should be kind to our kin.) This may well be true, but it
ignores the potential social value of a rhetoric of human specialty—think only of how the Nazis used
Darwinian rhetoric to justify a law-of-the-jungle conception of the relations between human groups. And
the Nazis, I am about to note, believed passionately in animal rights. What is more, if natural laws is
understood naturalistically, not as Christianity or any other religion that asserts a deep and wide gulf
between animal and human nature but as the law of the jungle, then as denizens of the jungle we have no
greater duties to the other animals than the lion, say, ha to the gazelle. But all that these points show is that
there is no normative significance to our having descended from the apes.
HITLER BLURRED THE LINE BETWEEN HUMANS AND NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 62
Rather the contrary, Hitler’s zoophilia, and Nazi environmentalism more generally, were connected with a
hostility to “cosmopolitan” intellect, that is, to intellect not rooted in ethnic or other local particularities.
The distinction between humans and nonhumans fell away. The Nazis were constantly blurring the line
between the human and animal kingdom, as when they described Jews as vermin. The other side of this
coin was the glorification of animals that had good Nazi virtues, predatory animals like the eagle (the
Eagle’s Nest was the name of Hitler’s summer home in the Bavarian Alps), the tiger and the panther (both
of which animals gave their names to German tanks). Nietzsche’s “blond beast,” the opposite pole of
degenerate modern man, was the lion. These examples show how animal rights thinking can assimilate
people to animals as well as assimilating animals to people.
THE CONCEPT OF ANIMAL RIGHT IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE NAZIS
Peter Staudenmeir, human rights advocate and philospher, “THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANIMAL RIGHTS”,
March 2003, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
A 1939 compendium of Nazi animal protection statutes proclaimed that “the German people have always
had a great love for animals and have always been conscious of our strong ethical obligations toward
them.” The Nazi laws insisted on “the right which animals inherently possess to be protected in and of
themselves.” These were not mere philosophical postulates; the ordinances closely regulated the
permissible treatment of domestic and wild animals and designated a variety of protected species while
restricting commercial and scientific use of animals. The official reasoning behind these decrees was
remarkably similar to latter-day animal rights arguments. “To the German, animals are not merely creatures
in the organic sense, but creatures who lead their own lives and who are endowed with perceptive facilities,
who feel pain and experience joy,” observed Goering in 1933 while announcing a new anti-vivisection law.
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Animal Rights Entrenches the Logic of Nazism
ANIMAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE IS FASCIST AND RESULTS FROM THE SAME BASIC CORE
PRINCIPLES OF PURITY WHICH FUNCTIONALLY ENABLED THE HOLOCAUST
Peter Staudenmeir, human rights advocate and philospher, “THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANIMAL RIGHTS”,
March 2003, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
While contemporary animal liberation activists would certainly do well to acquaint themselves with this
ominous record of past and present collusion by animal advocates with fascists, the point of reviewing
these facts is not to suggest a necessary or inevitable connection between animal rights and fascism. But the
historical pattern is unmistakable and demands explanation. What helps to account for this consistent
intersection of apparently contrary worldviews is a common preoccupation with purity. The presumption
that true virtue requires repudiating ostensibly unclean practices such as meat eating furnishes much of the
heartfelt vehemence behind animal rights discourse. When disconnected from an articulated critical social
perspective and a comprehensive ecological sensibility, this abstentionist version of puritan politics can
easily slide into a distorted vision of ethnic, sexual, or ideological purity.
THIS IS THE LOGIC OF THE HOLOCAUST – THE NAZIS IMPOSED THE STRICTEST
ANIMAL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT IN THE WORLD AND JUSTIFIED THEM WITHIN NAZI
IDEOLOGY
Peter Staudenmeir, human rights advocate and philospher, “THE AMBIGUITIES OF ANIMAL RIGHTS”,
March 2003, http://www.communalism.org/Archive/5/aar.html
The list of pro-animal predilections on the part of top Nazis is long, but more important are the animal
rights policies implemented by the Nazi state and the underlying ideology that justified them. Within a few
months of taking power, the Nazis passed animal rights laws that were unprecedented in scale and that
explicitly affirmed the moral status of animals independent of any human interest. These decrees stressed
the duty to avoid causing pain to animals and established extremely detailed and concrete guidelines for
interactions with animals. According to a leading scholar of Nazi animal legislation, “the Animal
Protection Law of 1933 was probably the strictest in the world”. (19) A closely related trope is the recurrent
insistence within animal rights thinking on a unitary approach to moral questions.
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Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Ethical Arguments Insufficient
to Change Attitudes
ETHICAL ARGUMENTS CAN’T CHANGE OUR INTUITION TO PUT HUMANS FIRST
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 67
I do not claim that our preferring human beings to other animals is “justified” in some rational sense—only
that it is a fact deeply rooted in our current thinking and feeling, a fact based on beliefs that can change but
not a fact that can be shaken by philosophy. I particularly do not claim that we are rationally justified in
giving preference to the suffering of humans just because it is humans who are suffering. It is because we
are humans that we put humans first. If we were cats, we would put cats first, regardless of what
philosophers might tell us. Reason doesn’t enter.
MORAL ARGUMENT INEFFECTIVE IN CHANGING BEHAVIOR
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 69
And although the efficacy and soundness of moral arguments are analytically distinct issue, they are
related. One reason that moral arguments are ineffective in changing behavior is their lack of cogency—
their radical inconclusiveness—in amorally diverse society such as ours, where people can and do argue
from incompatible premises. But there is something deeper. Moral argument often appears plausible when
it is not well reasoned or logically complete, but it is almost always implausible when it is carried to a
logical extreme. An illogical utilitarian (a “soft” utilitarian, we might call him) is content to say that pain is
bad, that animals experience pain, so that, other thing being equal, we should try to alleviate animal
suffering if we can do so at a modest cost. Singer, a powerfully logical utilitarian, a “hard” utilitarian, is
not content with such pabulum. He wants to pursue to its logical extreme the proposition that pain is bad
for whoever or whatever experiences it. He does not flinch from the logical implications of his philosophy
that if a stuck pig experiences more pain than a stuck human, the pig has the superior claim to our
solicitude, or that a chimpanzee is entitled to more consideration than a profoundly retarded human being.
(He does not flinch from these implications, but, as I said, in his popular writing, and in particular in
Animal Liberation, he soft-pedals them so as not to lose his audience.)
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Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Rights Can’t Pierce
Anthropocentrism
ANTHROPOCENTRISM PRECLUDES PEOPLE FROM ACKNOWLEDGING OPPRESSION OF
NONHUMAN ANIMALS
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 197-8
Ethnocentrism/anthropocentrism is essential to this process. If the masses are taught to discount the
oppressed as “foreign,” “alien,” ‘uncivilized,” ‘unclean,” “stupid,” “inferior,” and so on, they become
socially distanced from the devalued others, thus precluding both opportunities and tendencies for
empathetic response. Many humans are deeply situated in the status quo, through indoctrination, social
position, and self-interest, even express indignation at any suggestion that “others” particularly other
animals, are oppressed.
THOSE WHO BENEFIT FROM THE OPPRESSION OF OTHERS VIEW HIERARCHIES IN
STATUS AS “NATURAL”
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 199-200
Meanwhile, those who do not suffer oppression, and may even reap some benefits from the oppression of
others, similarly are steeped in a social reality that presents the arrangement as natural. Again, drawing an
example from the pervasiveness of racism in the Southern United States, civil rights activist Virginia Durr
recalled:
“If you are born into a system that’s wrong, whether it’s a slave system or whether it is a segregated
system, you take it for granted. And I was born into a system that was segregated and denied Blacks the
right to vote, and also denied women the right to vote, and I took it for granted. Nobody told me any
different, nobody said it was strange or unusual.”
Powerful ideological and social forces frequently produce distorted outlooks and dispositions that
naturalize oppression, a process social theorist and educator Paolo Freire referred to as “domestication” of
the human animal.
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Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Ineffective Strategy for Social
Change
RELIANCE ON “RIGHTS” STRATEGY FOR ANIMALS IS A HOLLOW HOPE –
INEFFECTIVE AT PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 54
This leads us to address further concerns raised in the scholarship on rights language. Are activists
captivated by the “hollow hope” of rights led to deploy an ineffective and even harmful language
(Rosenberg, 1991)? And do the language and meaning of rights shape this movement in detrimental and
undermining ways? These questions relate to the larger issue of whether the appropriation of rights
language contributes to social movement attempts to advance social change. If recent legal scholarship is
correct, there is good reason to be skeptical of the turn to rights language common in modern movements.
There is reason to believe that political activists seeking to advance progressive social change are
misguided by the empty promise of rights. Whether animal rights activists are misled in this way and, as a
result, diminish the effectiveness of their movement and the power of rights are issues that must be
addressed.
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Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Focus on Rights Undermines
Success of Movements
ANIMAL RIGHTS MOVEMENT FOCUSING ON PEOPLE, NOT GOVERNMENT—BUT
STRATEGY IS FAILING
Robert Garner, Professor of Politics, University of Leicester, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate,
ed. Robert Garner, p. 123-4
Whilst the cultural changes referred to in the previous paragraphs are hugely important, the animal
protection movement also needs (and, more to the point, has sought) to enter into conventional pressure
group politics. Clearly, it is a bankrupt strategy simply to wait for major cultural changes to somehow
miraculously emerge. For one thing, the effect that governmental action can have on social behavior
should not be underestimated. For another, there is much, of course, that can be done to improve the lot of
animals short of the major social transformation that is no doubt needed for the achievement of the
abolitionist objectives of animal rightists. Furthermore, there is some evidence that the opponents of the
animal rights movement (the pharmaceutical companies, the bio-medical community and the meat industry)
have mounted a relatively successful counter-mobilization so that the animal protection movement finds it
much more difficult now to gain positive publicity for its campaigns.
ANIMAL RIGHTS ADVOCATES VIEWED AS ANTI-HUMAN
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 234
As if this were not bad enough, additional problems associated with public perceptions stem from the
competing claims rights often foster. Because the notion of animal rights implies a human obligation to
cease most if not all current use of animals, the movement’s identity is associated with a challenge to such
human rights as choosing the clothes we wear, the food we eat, and the sports in which we engage. Most
importantly, the identity of this movement is connected to the assertion that it is immoral to experiment on
animals. This, in turn, identifies the movement with a challenge to the human right to life.
The move from welfare to rights thus transforms the publicly perceived identity of animal activists from the
traditional, somewhat derogatory image of animal lovers to the new, extremely disparaging image of
human haters. Animal rights activists have come to be viewed as people who prefer animals to humans,
who fight for animals when humans are still in need of protection, and who would sacrifice human lives for
the lives of animals. This image is captured nicely by animal rights opponents who ask the question: Your
child or your dog?
To a large extent, such public perceptions of movement identity would have occurred had animal liberation
rather than animal rights come to symbolize this movement. Animal liberation, like animal rights, seeks to
end the way we presently use and conceive of animals. However, the language of animal rights is
especially problematic for public perceptions. It pushes the public toward the belief that the movement’s
identity is about giving cows the right to vote. In so doing, the rights-oriented identity amplifies the
absurdity of animal rights and reinforces common perceptions of rights.
ANIMAL RIGHTS POSITION DOESN’T ALLOW COMPROMISES -- UTOPIAN
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 160-1
Any response to the claim that animal rights theory is “utopian,” “unrealistic,” or “absolutist” also requires
an examination of the macro components of these various theories in order to determine what each
prescribes to achieve the ideal state of affairs for animals, beyond personal changes in lifestyle. It is a
central tenet of new welfarism that rights theory represents an “all or nothing” approach that cannot provide
a theory of incremental change. If, the argument goes, rights theory regards complete abolition as a
societal ideal, and as a matter of micro-level personal behavior, then the rights advocate cannot
affirmatively seek any change short of complete abolition without acting in conflict with rights theory.
Since there is no realistic possibility of complete abolition anytime soon, rights theory is dismissed as
“utopian” in that it seeks an ideal state without a corresponding theory about how to get there.
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Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Focus on Rights Undermines
Success of Movements
THE EXTENSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TO ANIMALS IS INEFFECTIVE AND LEAVES
ETHICAL DOUBT, DOOMING THEIR PROJECT
Kathy Rudy, Associate Professor of Ethics and Women's Studies at Duke University, currently working on
ethical issues in speciism and human-animal relationships, “ETHICS IN AMERICA: The Question of
Animals”, Summer 2005, www.mals.duke.edu/Courses_Summer_2005.pdf
This course reviews the many ways that ethical theory has been used to advocate a better world for animals.
In the world named but not captured by the term “animal rights,” ethical and legal theories once sanctioned
for use only in relation to humans are now applied to animals, with a varying array of outcomes and
conclusions. This section will compare and contrast traditional formulations of rights with new models of
utility. We will also examine the strategies of animal protection as a form property law, animal welfare,
and environmentalist approaches to animals. The extension of human rights to animals, while in some
senses strategically useful to the well being of animals, may leave some of us wanting a more seamless
approach to ethics and law regarding animals.
ANIMAL RIGHTS DISCOURSE UNDERMINES PUBLIC SUPPORT—VIEWED AS RADICAL
AND EXTREME
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 91-2
Probably the most common criticism leveled by activists pointed to the continued association between
animal rights and extremism. Despite the popularity of rights in general and the increasing acceptance of
the term animal rights, activists suggested that, in the minds of many, animal rights remains a radical
concept. According to one activist, the language “really alienates a lot of people. I think they think that’s
too radical…Animal rights is a kind of buzzword.” A second activist suggested that speaking of animal
rights “sets a lot of people off.” Likewise, a third noted that “it almost seems to be a red flag to some
people. When you think of rights it brings up very strong emotions in people.”
“ANIMAL RIGHTS” LABEL TURNS PEOPLE OFF—ASSOCIATED WITH EXTREMISM
Helena Silverstein, Professor, Lafayette College of Government and law, 1996, Unleashing Rights: law,
meaning and the animal rights movement, p. 92
Many animal rights organizations continue deploying rights in spite of, and sometimes because of, its
connections to radicalism. Moreover, while many express wariness regarding the radical connotations of
animal rights, they also note that this connection is not peculiar to animal rights or to rights language alone.
Earlier rights movements were similarly associated with extremism. One activist made this point in the
following manner:
“It’s like people who say I’m not a feminist, but I’m in favor of equal pay for equal work…People are
ready to concede they agree with you on lots things, but they’re not ready to make that jump with you on
lots of things, but they’re not ready to make that jump and label it that thing they’ve heard has been so
fringey for so long.”
AN ABSOLUTE STANCE ON RIGHTS DISCOURAGES ANIMAL WELFARE PROGRESS
LAURA IRELAND MOORE, executive director of the National Center for Animal Law, 2005 Animal
Law (A REVIEW OF ANIMAL RIGHTS: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEW DIRECTIONS) 2005
(lexis)
31 Francione's argument leaves no room for the progress of animal welfare, incremental changes that
reinforce the property status of animals, or balancing interests from a solely human perspective. He notes
that if humans are to truly prohibit the unnecessary suffering of animals, we cannot use them for our own
purposes. n55
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Animal Rights Strategy Fails – Will Never Gain Acceptance by
Public or Leaders
LIGHT YEARS AWAY FROM CULTURAL ACCEPTANCE OF RESPECT FOR ALL ANIMAL
RIGHTS
Tom Regan, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy, North Carolina State University, 2004, The Case for
Animal Rights, p. xliv
Adoption of animal rights is another matter. Tragically, we find the same injustices today as were present
in 1983. Billions of animals are slaughtered for their flesh. Baby seals bludgeoned to death on the ice.
Greyhounds kept in crates for twenty-three hours a day even as greyhound racing flourishes. Wild animals
deprived of their very being as they are taught to perform tricks in circuses and at marine parks. So many
wrongs remain to be righted. Realistically, we are light-years away from creating a culture in which the
rights of animals are respected. Nevertheless, signs of positive change give hope for a better future.
RIGHTS DISCOURSE DOES NOT ENHANCE THE CASE TO IMPROVE ANIMAL WELFARE
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 71-2
No doubt we should want to do more than merely avoid gratuitous cruelty to animals. One of the horrors in
Wise’s anecdotes about the treatment of chimpanzees is that the chimps in question had been befriended by
humans—had even been used to humans’ profits as experimental animals—only to be abandoned to cruel
treatment by other humans. Consideration of reliance and gratitude would move most people to share
Wise’s passionate condemnation of such conduct. More broadly, neglect and cruelty are linked, neglect
can be cruel. But neither philosophical reflection, nor a vocabulary of rights is likely to add anything to the
sympathetic emotions that narratives of the mistreatment of animals can engender in most of us.
ABSTRACT NATURE OF RIGHTS UNDERMINES ITS EFFECTIVENESS AS A STRATEGY
FOR ANIMAL LIBERATION
Daniel A. Dombrowski, 1997, Babies and Beasts: the argument from marginal cases, p. 154-5
Benton’s view is that the moral status of animals is a function not so much of the kinds of beings they are
as of the relations in which they stand to human moral agents and their social practices: “It seems on the
face of it unlikely that the single philosophical strategy of assigning universal rights of a very abstract kind
to them would be a sufficient response. Is, for example, the moral status of a farm animal or a domestic
pet, or a ‘wild’ animal to be conceptualized in identical terms?”
In one sense yes. All these animals deserve equal moral consideration of their interests , at least if marginal
cases do; in that they have gratiutiously. The question as to whether we also have a duty to prevent other
animals from killing wild rabbits, say, is a complicated one that I have briefly treated before. The point to
notice here is that wild rabbits are equally deserving to have their interest considered and equally worthy of
immunity from torture and death at the hands of human beings, at the very least. In contrast, Benton wants
us to believe that pets, farm animals, and wild animals each have a different moral status because of their
different relations with human beings; likewise, the moral status of these animals is different from that of
young children or mentally enfeebled adults, again because of the relations these marginal cases have to
normal human beings: “All human adult moral agents have been young children, and will have some
memory of that state…In the case of mentally disabled human adults there are, again, generally sufficiently
powerful subject-to-subject affective bonds to give grounds for thinking that those who campaign on behalf
of the mentally handicapped would themselves campaign for if they were able to do so.”
If I understand Benton correctly, he is saying that if mentally enfeebled human beings were rational, they
would want to be treated fairly, which is true. But the same sort of conditional claim could be made on
behalf of animals.
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KRITIKS HAVE DEMONSTRATED SHORTCOMINGS OF RIGHTS FOR HUMANS – WOULD
BE MAGNIFIED FOR ANIMALS
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 31-2
However, now we have briefly addressed the question of the moral purpose of rights-attributions, it is
possible to go on to ask further questions about how far, under various actual or possible conditions, the
attribution of rights succeeds in achieving that purpose; whether that purpose is itself made necessary only
because of alterable social conditions; and whether some other set of moral concepts might not serve the
subjects of rights-attributions better. The supporters of rights for animals have generally hoped that the
moral authority of the idea of human rights could be drawn upon and extended for the benefit of
nonhumans. Understandably, they have been less concerned with addressing the long tradition of radical
criticism of the discourses and practices of rights in the human case. Understandable though this is, I shall
argue that it is mistaken. More specifically, the liberal-individualist concept of rights which Regan adopts
is open to a number of powerful objections, many of which apply equally or even more strongly when that
concept is applied across the species-boundary.
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Inadequacy of Rights
JUDGES RESPONSIBLE FOR EXTENDING AND ENFORCING LEGAL RIGHTS FOR
NONHUMANS ARE BIASED
Steven M. Wise, Animal rights attorney and professor Vermont Law School, 2002, Drawing the Line:
science and the case for animal rights, p. 42
If judicial attitudes reflect society’s, most judges believe their health or the health of their families and
friends may depend, in part, upon the use of nonhuman animals in biomedical research. They probably eat
animal flesh, drink animal fluids, wear animal skins and fur, take their children to circuses to enjoy the
“performances” of captive nonhuman animals, hunt them, and participate in some of the numerous ways in
which society exploits nonhuman animals. Judges have a personal stake in the outcome of cases that
decide whether nonhuman animals have legal rights in much the same way that judges of the antebellum
American South had personal stakes in the outcome of slavery cases. They will inevitably be biased, and
their biases will just as inevitably infect their decisions.
NEGATIVE RIGHTS INSUFFICIENT TO PROTECT INTERESTS OF NONHUMAN ANIMALS
Martha Nussbaum, Professor of Law and Ethics, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current
debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 307
In the human case, the capabilities approach does not operate with a fully comprehensive conception of the
good, because of the respect it has for the diverse ways in which people choose to live their lives in a
pluralistic society. It aims at securing some core entitlements that are held to be implicit in the idea of a
life with dignity, but it aims at capability, not functioning, and it focuses on a small list. In the case of
human-animal relations, the need for restraint is even more acute, since animals will not in the fact be
participating directly in the framing of political principles, and thus they cannot revise them over time
should they prove inadequate.
And yet there is a countervailing consideration: Human beings affect animals’ opportunities for flourishing
pervasively, and it is hard to think of a species that one could simply leave alone to flourish in its own way.
The human species dominates the other species in a way that no human individual or nation has ever
dominated other humans. Respect for other species’ opportunities for flourishing suggests, then, that
human law must include robust, positive political commitments to the protection of animals, even though,
had human beings not so pervasively interfered with animals’ way of life, the most respectful course might
have been simply to leave them alone, living the lives that they make for themselves.
PROMISES OF LIBERALISM ONLY BENEFIT A FEW.
David Nibert, Professor of sociology, Wittenburg University, 2002, Animal Rights/Human Rights:
entanglement of oppression and liberation, p. 245
Observing the incongruity between hopefulness for liberation and justice with the actual nature of corporate
capitalism, sociologist Immanuel Wallerstein writes, “Liberals have always claimed that the liberal state—
reformist, legalistic, and somewhat libertarian—was the only state that could guarantee freedom. And for
the relatively small group whose freedom it safeguarded, this was perhaps true. But unfortunately that
group always remained a minority perpetually en route to becoming everyone.”
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Effective
NON-RIGHTS DISCOURSES STRATEGIES MORE EFFECTIVE IN PROTECTING ANIMAL
INTERESTS
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 40-1
However, there is a sound point to be made here. It is that good moral reasoning cannot of itself produce
right action: for this to happen, actors may act morally because they want to do what is morally right, or
they may act morally because that is what they would wish to do independently of moral considerations.
Also, a variety of different moral considerations might each produce grounds for the same action. So,
accepting that the purpose of the philosophy of animal rights is to protect the interests, or well-being of
nonhuman animals, it may be that this purpose may be served by other means than action motivated by
reasoned conviction that animals have rights. In particular, transformed social relations between humans
and animals in the direction of eliminating the kinds of institutionalized “reification” and
“commodification” I mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, might be expected to facilitate more
benign and compassionate moral sentiments. In such a transformed context, the need for moral or legal
regulation, whilst still present, would be far less pervasive.
MORAL DISCOURSE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN EXTENSION OF “RIGHTS” TO PROTECT
INTERESTS OF “DOMESTICATED” ANIMALS
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 37-8
For now, however, my task is to try to draw some lessons from the foregoing discussion of the radical
critique of rights as it bears on the question of the moral standing of nonhuman animals. To do this, I shall
start with a provisional distinction between animals in the wild and those which are in some way or another
bound up in human social life. I shall consider the latter first. Since it seems unlikely that any of these are
capable of full moral agency, it makes no sense to attribute what I have called “self-determination” rights to
them. Since these animals, or, more generally, their ancestors, have been removed by human social
practices from their ‘natural’ habitats, it is these same human social practices and relations for their wellbeing. The presupposition of a ‘negative’ liberal concept of rights, that the right-holder can be assumed
capable of autonomously securing its well-being so long as it is not interfered with, is simply absent in
these cases. Where animal-involving practices by their nature harm the interests of animals in ways that
cannot be morally justified, then there is a duty to transform or abolish those practices. Where the practice
is one within which the animals can flourish, then the obligation on the relevant human agent is a positive
duty to act for that end. In either type of case, it seems unlikely that a concept of “basic” rights will be
sufficient.
STRONG PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ANIMAL “RIGHTS” IS REALLY SUPPORT FOR HUMANE
TREATMENT
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 472-3
Although many individuals in our society subscribe to the view that animals have rights, it is equally clear
that this stance means different things to different people. For a majority, the intent in bequeathing rights on
animals is to assert that they deserve humane, respectful treatment. Rowan (1992) states that this is the
more common view held by the general public, 80 percent of whom believe that animals have rights. At
the other extreme are those who reject the notion that only humans among living creatures can have rights.
The basis for this view is variable, depending on some instances of animals’ advanced social or rational
capacities or on having the quality of sentience (the ability to experience pain and to suffer). Rightists
stress the similarities between humans and animals, and granting rights to animals is but a logical extension
of the struggle by humans to achieve social equality between races, classes, and genders as society becomes
increasingly sensitized to its unprincipled biases against minorities.
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Animal Rights System Creates Problems
ANIMAL RIGHTS CREATES MANY CONUNDRUMS
Richard A. Epstein, Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and
new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 153
Even if we could answer these conundrums, we still face a greater challenge: Do we have it within our
power to arbitrate the differences among animals? Do we train the lion to lie down with the lamb, or do
we let the lion consume the lamb in order to maintain his traditional folkways? Do we ask chimpanzees to
forgo eating monkeys? It is odd to intervene in nature to forestall some deadly encounters, especially if our
enforced nonaggression could lead to the extermination of predator species. But, if animals have rights,
then how do we avoid making these second-tier judgments? We could argue that animals should not be
restrained because they are not moral agents because they do not have the deliberative capacity to tell right
from wrong, and therefore cannot be bound by rules that they can neither articulate nor criticize nor defend.
But at this point we must ask whether we could use force in self-defense against such wayward creatures,
or must we let them have their way with us, just as they do with other animals? In answer to this question,
it could be said that animals cannot be held responsible by human standards because of their evident lack of
capacity to conform.
SAYING THAT PROTECTIONS SHOULD BE EXTENDED FOR ISSUES THAT IMPACT
ANIMAL INTERESTS UNWORKABLE—WOULD INCLUDE THE RIGHT TO VOTE
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 274
Voting is an example of this. Non-human animals cannot understand what voting is all about and how it
affects their interests. Consequently, unlike humans, nonhuman animals do not feel vulnerable or
demeaned because they are not allowed to vote. None the less, which politicians are elected and which are
not critically effect their interests. For instance, it would benefit the interests of nonhuman great apes if
politicians who oppose harmful experiments on nonhuman primates were elected. Thus, nonhuman great
apes have an interest in voting, even thought they cannot take an interest in voting. So, if we are to extend
to nonhuman great apes the same sorts of moral and legal protections of their interests that humans
currently (are supposed to) enjoy, then this interest in voting must enter into our deliberations.
We might conclude that nonhuman animals need the right to vote—through a concerned, informed
guardian – in order to protect their interests in life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. However, the
difficulties of implementing such a right are so great as to render that conclusion thoroughly implausible.
How are nonhuman animals to be counted and registered, and how are human proxy voters to be selected and nonhuman proxies
assigned to them? Also, in the case of children, whose interests are also affected by voting, we do not conclude that protecting their
interests entails that they have the right to vote. By analogy, protecting the interests of nonhuman great apes would not entail such a
right.
ARGUMENT THAT RIGHTS MUST BE GRANTED TO PROTECT ANYTHING SOMEONE
HAS AN INTEREST IN IS OVERLY SIMPLISTIC
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 274
Such cases indicate that it is simplistic to infer that because something has an impact on the basic interests of members of a group, and
those interests should be protected, we must conclude that members of that group have a right to (or against) that something. There is
a tendency, especially in the United States, immediately – and vociferously—to employ the concept of rights whenever questions of
protecting interests arise. But that concept does not readily fit all such situations, especially when the interests in
question are not those of normal, human adults, i.e. those of intellectually sophisticated, autonomous
agents. Consequently, morally and legally protecting the basic interests of nonhuman animals may involve
some ingenuity and thoughtful working with a variety of moral and legal categories, rather than
automatically demanding rights for nonhuman animals to (or against) those things which (can, will, would)
have an impact on their basic interests. For example, the Declaration of Great Apes defines the community
of equals in terms of “moral principles or rights”, and among the three principles enumerated, only one is
identified as a right, the others being a “protection” and a “prohibition.”
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GIVING RIGHTS TO ANIMALS DESTROYS DEMOCRACY
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 57-8
Wise has no theory of rights, no notion of why legal rights are created in the first place. It is not in
recognition of cognitive capacity. Slaves have cognitive capacity but no rights. Legal rights are
instruments for securing the liberties that are necessary if a democratic system of government is to provide
a workable framework for social order and prosperity. The conventional rights bearers are with minor
exceptions actual and potential voters and economic actors. Animals do not fit this description, and Wise
makes no effort to show that extending rights to them would nevertheless serve the purposes for which
rights are created. And to the extent that courts are outside the normal political processes, his approach is
deeply undemocratic. There are more animals in the United States than people; if the animals are given
capacious rights by judges who do not conceive themselves to be representatives of the people—indeed,
who use a methodology that owes nothing to popular opinion or democratic preference—the de facto
weight of the animal population in the society’s political choices will approach or even exceed that of the
human population. Judges will become the virtual representatives of the animals, casting in effect millions
of votes to override the democratic choices of the human population.
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Apes Differ from Humans in Moral Codes
MORAL BEHAVIOR OF APES DIFFERENT—CHIMPS EAT OTHER CHIMPS
Robert W. Mitchell, Professor of psychology, Eastern Kentucky University, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 244
Given that chimpanzees, for example, hunt and eat both humans and other chimpanzees, it is unclear how
one is to settle disputes: should a chimpanzee be held responsible for the murder of another chimp, or of a
human, whom the chimpanzee has killed for food? If so, how is such responsibility to be accounted for
legally? Among humans,
“those who desire to rule over others must give justifying reasons for their rule, which allows critics…to
analyze the reasons and expose any flaws. For chimpanzees no such rhetorical deliberations is necessary,
and thus there is no ground for moral criticism [of chimpanzees.]”
Unfortunately, any “moral vision” or sense of “justice” which is possible within the constraints of ape
mentality is egocentric and pragmatic, and does not involve argumentation and deliberate debate. The fact
that criticism of the behavior of chimpanzees and other apes on moral grounds is impossible has serious
consequences in that apes cannot be held accountable for their actions.
GREAT APE PROJECT INTERNALLY CONTRADICTORY – HIGHLIGHTS THE
DIFFERENCES IN MORAL CAPACITIES
Donald G. Lindburg, Zoology Society of San Diego, 2003, The Animal Ethics Reader, eds. Armstrong &
Botzler, p. 474-5
Regan’s “subject-of-a-life” criterion lies at the root of a recent proposal to bring the three great apes
(orangutans, chimpanzees and gorillas) into the human community as moral equals (The Great Ape Project,
1993). In support of this proposal, a distinguished roster of scientists wrote of the strong similarities
between humans and apes in social, emotional, rational and even incipiently moral capabilities, and used
these to argue for an end to human dominion over the great apes, particularly those held in captive
situations. Despite the obviously high level of sentience in these taxa and deeply felt concern for their
welfare, this case aptly demonstrates the difficulties encountered in finding a neat formula for action in
moral philosophies that are based on arguments that “likes” ought to be treated alike (see discussion of
“moral monism” by Norton, 1995). By wanting to do for the apes what they cannot do for themselves, it
must be asked if we can logically stress their continuity with humans in making the case for preferential
treatment without at the same time highlighting their differential standing as moral patients. Put another
way, it is a discontinuity between humans and apes that enables us to respect them for their continuities. In
striving to increase respect for the apes, care must be taken not to draw oversimplistic depictions such as
their having elements of a social system that is socially transmitted across the generations, a “finding” that
will come as no shock to any reputable zoologist. There are many welfare advocates on the other side of
this issue who worry that such well-intentioned eagerness leaves us but a short step removed from the
Disney-esque world of talking animals coming together to discuss the rules of the jungle. As Zak (1989)
stressed, it is the unlikes between humans and animals and an infinite combination of likes and unlikes
among non-human creatures that often leaves us on uncertain moral ground.
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Recognizing Moral Agency of Apes Excludes Other Animals
EVEN IF APES MEET MORAL AGENCY—USING THIS AS THE YARDSTICK LEAVES
MANY ANIMALS OUT
Ted Benton, Professor of Sociology, University of Essex, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 23
Regan solves this problem by way of a crucial distinction between moral agents and moral patients.
Something like Kant’s account of autonomy would be needed to characterize full moral agency. Only
moral agents in that sense are bearers of moral responsibility for their actions. Since there are close
conceptual ties between the necessary rational capacities, language use, and full moral agency, it seems
reasonable to accept that only individuals of the human species are moral agents. Of course, there may
have been other hominids with such capabilities and, indeed, it may yet be discovered that other living
species share them. Certainly research on other primates and some marine mammals has already produced
results which have challenged the ingenuity of the stalwarts of human uniqueness. But for the immediate
purpose of Regan’s argument these questions are not central. Even if it could be shown that moral agency
was possessed by one or two nonhuman species, to base the argument for animal rights on those grounds
would be to abandon concern for the vast majority of individual species.
DRAWING THE LINE AT APES CAN’T BE JUSTIFIED IF SENTIENCE OF CAPACITY IS THE
GUIDING PRINCIPLE FOR RIGHTS
Richard A. Epstein, Professor of Law, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and
new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 155
The subject provokes still deeper ironies. In part, Steven Wise undertook his new venture because in his
earlier work, Rattling the Cage, he sought to establish limited legal rights for chimpanzees, only to face the
same boundary question among species as everyone else. What about lions, tigers, alley cats, and jellyfish?
None of these can be excluded if the capacity for suffering is decisive. Nor ironically can any be excluded
on the grounds of a (more) limited cognitive capacity under Wise’s new tests. In the end, even the
proponents of animal rights must adopt an explicit speciesist approach, complete with arbitrary distinctions.
The line between humans and chimps is no longer decisive, but then some other line has to be. Perhaps it is
the line between chimps and great apes, or between both horses and cows, or between horses and cows and
snails and fish. Which of these lines are decisive and why? The continuum problem continues to plague
any response to the universalistic claim that the suffering of (some) animals counts as much as the suffering
of a human being—at least to the human beings who are calling the shots. It turns out that Lovejoy’s idea
of a great chain of being influences not only the traditional attitude toward animals but also the revisionist
beliefs of Steven Wise.
MANY OTHER NONHUMANS MEET THE SAME CRITERIA AS THE GREAT APES
Steven M. Wise, Professor Animal Rights Law at the Harvard Law School, 2000, “Rattling the Cage:
Toward Legal Rights for Animals” Questia p. 270
But the capacity for complex mental representations may not be limited to primates or even to species
evolutionarily close to humans. Bottlenose dolphins have passed the mirror self-recognition test. 14 The
songs of humpback whales may be constructed from a complicated syntax. 15 Both elephants and African
gray parrots use mirrors to help them search for objects. 16 Dogs have demonstrated Stage 6 object task
permanence. 17 ( Daniel Dennett, for one, would not be surprised if thousands of generations of human
enculturation have not caused the canine brain to reorganize and produce a more advanced state of
consciousness.) 18 New Caledonia crows regularly use hooks and tools that they manufacture to a high
degree of standardization to aid in the capture of prey. 19 Common ravens size up a complex problem of
thirty steps or more and solve it with no training and on the first try. 20 Scrub jays display "episodic recall."
They remember where they stored food, what they stored, and when they stored it. If enough time has
elapsed for the food they stored to spoil, they will ignore it. This ability in humans has been said to involve
"the conscious experience of self." 21 Alex, an enculturated African gray parrot, not only understands
shapes, colors, and materials, but can tell you--in English--how objects that he has never seen differ in
shape, color, or material and whether they are made of cork, wood, paper, or rawhide. 22
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Genetic Similarity to Other Apes Insufficient to Justify Rights
Extension
GIVING RIGHTS TO APE’S IS FLAWED – GENETIC SIMILARITIES ARE IRRELEVANT
Ilana Mercer, analyst for the Free-Market News Network. 2003 “No Rights for Animals” Worldnet
Daily http://www.wnd.com/news/article.asp?ARTICLE_ID=35022
Animal-rights advocates – some of whom even walk upright and have active frontal lobes – argue, for
instance, that because the great apes share a considerable portion of our genetic material, they are just like
human beings, and ought to be given human rights.
As of yet, though, Alexei A. Abrikosov, Vitaly L. Ginzburg and Anthony J. Leggett are not the names of
lower primates – they are the names of the 2003 Nobel Prize winners in physics. No matter how many
genes these men share with monkeys and no matter how sentient chimps are, the latter will never contribute
anything to "the theory of superconductors and superfluids," or author a document like the "Declaration of
Independence," much less tell good from bad.
Given that human beings are so vastly different in mental and moral stature from apes, the lesson from any
genetic similarities the species share is this and no more: A few genes are responsible for very many
incalculable differences!
Unlike human beings, animals by their nature are not moral agents. They possess no free will, no capacity
to tell right from wrong, and cannot reflect on their actions. While they often act quite wonderfully, their
motions are merely a matter of conditioning.
Since man is a rational agent, with the gift of consciousness and a capacity to scrutinize his deeds and chart
his actions, we hold him culpable for his transgressions. A human being's exceptional ability to discern
right from wrong makes him punishable for any criminal depravity.
Man's nature is the source of the responsibility he bears for his actions. It is also the source of his rights.
Human or individual rights, such as the rights to life, liberty and property, are derived from man's innate
moral agency and capacity for reason.
“COMMON ANCESTRY” DOESN’T JUSTIFY GREAT APE PROJECT
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 106
Today’s nonhuman apes don’t represent earlier stages in human development. Our common ape-like
ancestor lived about 15 million years ago. About six million years ago, human and chimpanzee evolution
parted. Chimpanzees didn’t prepare the way for us any more than we prepared the way for them.
The notion of higher and lower beings lacks scientific validity. In an 1858 letter, Charles Darwin expressed
his intention “carefully to avoid” referring to some animals as “higher” than others. Elsewhere he penciled
this reminder to himself: “Never the use the words higher and lower.” As stated by two neuroscientists,
ranking species in some linear order that suggests evolutionary progress makes “no sense” and has “no
scientific status.”
FACT THAT OTHER APES ARE LIKE HUMANS DOESN’T MAKE HUMAN RIGHTS
APPROPRIATE FOR THEM
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 57
Analogy is a treacherous form of argument. Chimpanzees are like human beings, therefore, so far as Wise
is concerned, giving animals rights is like giving black people the rights of white people. But chimpanzees
are like human beings in some respects but not in others that may be equally or more relevant to the issue
of whether to give chimpanzees rights, and legal rights have been designed to serve the needs and interests
of human beings, having the usual human capacities, and so make a poor fit with the needs and interests of
animals.
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Genetic Similarity to Other Apes Insufficient to Justify Rights
Extension
GENETIC CLOSENESS TO HUMANS IS NOT A JUSTIFICATION FOR LIMITING RIGHTS
PROTECTION TO GREAT APES
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 115
All sentient beings need and deserve the basic rights that GAP seeks for nonhuman great apes. Life, liberty
and freedom from pain are as relevant to bullfrogs and snakes as to bonobos. In fact, I can’t think of any
basic right that applies to nonhuman great apes but doesn’t also apply to all sentient beings. Turtles and
walruses don’t need freedom of speech or a right to vote, but neither do chimpanzees and gorillas. A
nonhuman’s genetic closeness to humans isn’t germane.
Other great apes “most resemble us in their capacities and their ways of living,” Cavalieri and Singer state.
Humans are “intelligent beings with a rich and varied social and emotional life.” Because they “share”
these characteristics, “our fellow great apes” deserve “moral equality.” No, nonhuman great apes deserve
moral equality because they’re sentient. Their degree of intelligence, sociability or emotionality isn’t
relevant.
GENETIC SIMILARITY NOT NECESSARILY CORRELATED WITH HOW MUCH WE “LIKE”
THE ANIMALS
Richard Posner, Federal Circuit Judge, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds.
Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 62-3
Oddly, sentimental attachmen to animals is not well correlated with genetic closeness, as is implicit in my
noting that we can like some animals more than we like people. We are more closely related genetically to
chimpanzees than to cats or dogs or falcons or leopards, but some of us like chimpanzees less than these
other animals, and we might prefer, for example, to have medical experiments conducted on chimpanzees
than on these other species, though the relative pain that experiments inflict on different species of animals,
as well as differential medical benefits from experiments on different species, would be a relevant factor to
most of us. If chimpanzees’ greater intelligence increases the suffering that they undergo a subjects of
medical experiments, relative to less intelligent animals, the increment in suffering may trump our affection
for certain “cuter” animals. To the extent that the happiness of certain animals is bound up with our own
happiness, there is, as I have just noted, a utilitarian basis for animal rights (though “rights” is not the best
term here) even if the only utility that a utilitarian is obligated to try to maximize is human utility.
GENETIC SIMILARITY INSUFFICIENT TO JUSTIFY DRAWING LINES
Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, Professors of Neuroscience and Animal Behavior, University of
New England, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p.
179-80
The second pint of relevance to this argument is that similarity of genetic material is determined by mixing
together two DNA samples in a test tube (hybridizing them) and then measuring how much the strands of
DNA match. This tells us about the code and the potential of the genetic material, but it does not tell us
exactly which genes are expressed (i.e., are functional). Not all genes are expressed at any one time or,
indeed ever expressed during a lifetime. When we speak of intelligence or any other aspect of brain
function, we are referring to the aspects of the individual that result from those genes that are actually
expressed. Two factors influence which genes are expressed: the course of the evolution and the influence
of the environment. Thus, to put it simply, two species may have the same genes but it may be expressed
in only one of those species. The net effect is two very different functional states. Hence, genetic
similarity may be an indicator of functional similarity but it cannot stand alone as the criterion on which we
should base arguments for fundamental divisions between species.
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INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO EXTENDING ANIMAL RIGHTS NOT WORKABLE
Gary Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Animal Rights: the changing debate, ed.
Robert Garner, p. 55
According to political theorist Robert Garner, Regan’s philosophy is an ‘absolutist approach’ in that he
recognizes that rights theory requires the immediate and total abolition of all animal exploitation. Garner
recognizes, however, that the rights theorist is not necessarily committed to this state of affairs. He states
that Regan acknowledges that rightists ‘can support a gradual program but each step must, in itself, be
abolitionist’. Garner doubts that this approach is workable. For example he argues that ‘surely there is
much that can be done to improve the lot of animals short of abolition of a particular practice.’ More to the
point, however, Garner argues that the incremental rights approach, which requires abolitionist steps, might
work in the context of particular practices involved in vivisection (for example, an abolitionist step would
be the elimination of toxicity tests altogether), but ‘this position does not regard reforms to animal
agriculture as acceptable because, whatever the methods used, killing animals for foods continues.’
MORALLY ILLEGITIMATE TO SEEK INCREMENTAL STEPS TO ELIMINATE PROPERTY
STATUS OF ANIMALS*
Gary L. Francione, Professor of Law, Rutgers University, 1996, Rain Without Thunder, p. 184*
Given that rights theory seeks as its long-term goal the abolition of institutionalized exploitation, can the
individual, as a macro matter, advocate for incremental eradication of property status, or is the only
legitimate incremental approach public education about the need to abolish immediately the use of animal
products on the micro level and to demand complete and immediate abolition on the macro level? In the
abstract, it would seem that pursuit of incremental steps toward eradiating property status would be
acceptable. Upon closer examination, however, a central concern of rights theory militates against this
conclusion. I have argued that using welfarist reform to achieve the eradication of property status cannot
work as a structural matter because these reforms assume property status and reinforce it, and, by
definition, property cannot have interests that are not expendable. Welfarist reform, however, is
problematic for another reason. Regan’s primary objection to animal welfare is that even if it did reduce
animal suffering (an empirically dubious point in its finest moments), it would still be immoral because it
fails to respect the inherent value of the animal. When animal advocates argue, for example, that
laboratories ought to be required to provide psychological stimulation for laboratory primates, they accept
the proprietary relationship between the laboratory and “its” primates, and that position is problematic
particularly for those who claim to accept rights theory. The rights advocate believes that the primates
have the moral right today to be liberated from property status and that the continued institutionalized
exploitation of the primates violates those moral rights. For the rights advocate to regard as acceptable a
reform that supposedly reduces suffering for primates used in experiments is tantamount to the advocate’s
ignoring the status of certain subjects-of-a-life today in the hope that the welfarist reform will lead to
something better for other subjects-of-a-life tomorrow.
This situation is problematic for rights theory for all the reasons that cause Regan to devote a major portion
of the The Case for Animal Rights to a critique of theories, such as utilitarianism, that are focused around
precisely these sorts of trade-offs. For the welfarist, who may believe that humans have rights but certainly
believes that animals do not, these sorts of trade-offs do not crate a theoretical problem, because a central
tenet of welfare though is that animal inte4rets can be traded away against a net gain for animals generally.
For the rights advocate, however, whatever other nonbasic rights animals possess, they certainly possess
the basic right not be treated exclusively as means to ends, the right to have their inherent (as opposed to
instrumental) value recognized and respected and protected under the law. And they possess this moral
right whether or not the legal system recognizes it. This right is violated by the instrumental treatment of
animals, notwithstanding the assumption underlying welfarist reforms that the status of animals as property
is legitimate.
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FRANCIONE REJECTS THE NOTION THAT APES DESERVE RIGHTS MORE THAN OTHER
ANIMALS
Gary Francione, Professor of Law at Rutgers. “An Interview with Professor Gary L. Francione on the
State”. Friends of Animals 2002 http://www.friendsofanimals.org/programs/animal-rights/interview-withgary-francione.html
Yes. In 1993, I wrote an essay entitled “Personhood, Property, and Legal Competence” which was included
in The Great Ape Project and I was one of the original signatories of the Declaration on the Rights of Great
Apes. I was the first legal theorist to propose a theory of legal personhood for the great apes. But I was very
careful in my 1993 essay to make the point that although the great apes were very similar to humans, that
similarity was sufficient for their being legal persons but was not necessary. That is, I argued that the only
characteristic that is required for personhood is sentience. If a nonhuman can feel pain, then we have a
moral obligation not to treat that nonhuman exclusively as a means to our ends. If that being has other
interests, then we ought to respect those interests as well, but a theory of rights should not be connected to
this additional set of interests beyond sentience. To put the matter another way: just because a cow does not
have the same cognitive characteristics as does a chimpanzee does mean that it is OK to eat cow any more
than the fact that the cow may have different characteristics from a fish mean that it is OK to eat the fish.
This is a central point in my newest book, Introduction to Animal Rights: sentience is the only
characteristic that is necessary to have the right not to be treated as a thing or as property. Jane Goodall is
currently urging that African people eat goats instead of chimpanzees. Why? Because chimpanzees are
more “like us” than are goats? This makes no sense to me and Goodall’s position is the antithesis of the
animal rights view.
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ADVOCATING RIGHTS FOR ONLY SOME CATEGORIES OF NONHUMANS IS SPECIESIST
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 77
Unlike old-specieisists, animal rights advocates believe that moral and legal rights should extend beyond
our species. At present, however, much animal rights theory is not egalitarian; it displays a relatively new
brand of speciesism, which I’ll call “new speciesism.”
New-specieists advocate rights for only some nonhumans, those whose thoughts and behavior seem most
human-like. They maintain a moral divide between human and most other animals, whom they devalue.
Further, new specieists accord greater moral consideration and stronger basic rights to humans than to any
other animal. They see animal-kind as a hierarchy with humans at the top.
SHOULD NOT LIMIT MORAL CONCERN TO ANIMALS LIKE US – SHOULD EMBRACE ALL
ANIMALS CAPABLE OF FEELING
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 272
Consequently, if we recognize that all beings with feelings should be liberated from human exploitation
precisely because they are feeling beings, we will have overcome speciesism and freed our morality from
anthropocentric prejudice. In such a morality we are called on to recognize not only that the exploitation of
human-like animals, such as nonhuman great apes, is wrong (prima facie) but also that the exploitation of
rats, lizards, fish and any other kind of feeling being, human-like or not, intellectually sophisticated or not,
is wrong (prima facie).
DRAWING LINES BETWEEN NON-HUMAN ANIMALS BASED ON INTELLIGENCE IS
SPECIESIST
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 270-1
Nevertheless, there is a strong tendency, even among advocates of animal rights, to retain a close
association between “person” in the descriptive sense, where it is just another name for human beings.
Some writers, such as Tom Regan, suggest that only the more intellectually sophisticated nonhuman
animals merit the protection of their interests against human exploitation and others, such as Peter Singer,
maintain that more intellectually sophisticated lives have a higher value than do less intellectually
sophisticated lives. It is not surprising that intellectuals retain a bias in favor of the intellectual, but the bias
opens the door to critics, such as J. Baird Callicott, who contend that animal rights remains an
anthropocentric value system. Instead of being human chauvinists, these critics maintain, animal
liberationists are human-like chauvinists, but that represents only a minor change.
Focusing animal rights concern and activity on nonhuman great apes and other nonhuman primates
expresses and continues this bias. We are called on to recognize that harmful experiments on nonhuman
great apes are wrong because these apes are genetically so much like us or because they are so intelligent,
again like us. Such calls clearly retain an anthropocentric view of the world, modifying it only through
recognizing that we are not an utterly unique life form.
Rejecting our species bias – overcoming speciesism—requires that we also reject our bias in favor of the
intellectual (at least as a criterion of the value of life or of personhood in the evaluative sense).
Overcoming speciesism requires going beyond the modest extension of our moral horizons to include
intellectually sophisticated, nonhuman animals, such as chimpanzees and whales. It requires recognizing
not only that the origin of value does not lie in anything that is peculiarly human; it also requires
recognizing that the origin of value does not lie in anything that is human-like or that humans maybe
assured that they have the most of (because they are the most intellectually sophisticated beings around.)
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GREAT APE PROJECT’S AIMS ARE NEO-CARTESIAN
Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, Professors of Neuroscience and Animal Behavior, University of
New England, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p.
194-5
The other stream of neo-Cartesians comes from within subschools of animal liberation. This, to an extent,
includes the Great Ape Project and writers like Wise (2002). They propose to give animals, such as the
great apes and even parrots, elephants, dolphins, and whales, human legal rights. It may come as a surprise
to some that we claim this to be neo-Cartesian as well. We do so because proponents of selective animal
rights either base their claims on the Descartian principle cogito, ergo sum (I think, therefore I am), or at
least they cannot break away from the Cartesian bind. Wise (2002) wants to assign a score for cognitive
abilities to each animal and then make a cut-off point for either awarding or not awarding legal rights. By
implication, those that are deemed incapable of thinking (are not intelligent or self-aware), according to
criteria set by human society, are also not of moral interest (appoint that also Immanuel Kant made). Moral
obligation may end completely or, in some more favorable scenario, moral obligation may exist but
according to a set of substantially reduced or different standards than applied to humans. Animals lacking
in the qualifying criteria could once again be cast adrift as “things.”
This idea ultimately falls victim to the perception of an ordered world by gradation of achievement.
Gradation of achievement, incidentally, is also typically linked to DNA correspondences. The closer the
connection to humans, the more likely the species is to make the grade. Tantalizingly promising, as the
rights-by-consciousness idea may be, it is dangerously laissez-faire. In this view, rights seem to be tied to a
binding precondition. Organisms need to show the irrefutable existence of thought and complexity, and
rights are then concerned with these conditions, not with life itself. Animal rights are not implausible and
represents a very important new debate in our use of animals, as long as such debates do not surreptitiously
resurrect scala naturae and make intelligence the linchpin for worthiness.
Considerations of animal welfare and animal rights aside, such views block our ability to look for examples
of behavioral complexity whenever they may occur. There has been a tendency to focus far too exclusively
on the primate line, and this primatecentric view is ultimately part of the gradation-of-achievement
syndrome.
DRAWING LINES BETWEEN NON-HUMAN ANIMAL INTERESTS IS SPECEISIST
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 5
In sum, speciesism is both an attitude and a form of oppression. Viewing humans as superior to other
animals, speciesists weigh human interests more heavily than equally vital or more-vital non-human
interests. It’s speciesist to exclude any non-human being from full and equal moral consideration for any
reason.
This, then, is the definition of speciesism that I’ll develop and defend throughout the book:
a failure in attitude or practice, to accord any nonhuman being equal consideration and respect.
BASING RIGHTS CONSIDERATIONS ON CHARACTERISTICS OTHER THAN SENTIENCE
IS IMMORAL
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 15
This stance is neither logical nor fair. Giving all humans and no nonhumans rights would be justifiable
only if (1) all humans and no nonhumans possessed the required characteristic(s) and (2) the
characteristic(s) had moral relevance. In reality, with regard to all proposed characteristics, some humans
lack them and at least some nonhumans possess them. More importantly, sentience is the only valid
criterion for basic rights.
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ADVOCATING RIGHTS FOR GREAT APES ONLY IS SPECIEST
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 100
The best-known proponent of this new-speciesist legal approach is lawyer Steven Wise. In his first book,
Rattling the Cage, Wise says of chimpanzees and bonobos, “Whatever legal rights these apes may be
entitled to spring from the complexities of their minds.” In his second book, Drawing the Line, he argues
that nonhumans “most deserving” of legal rights have “certain advanced mental abilities.” By now, this
should sound familiar; it echoes Peter Singer and other new-specieist philosophers.
FOCUS ON GREAT APES FIRST IS SPECIESIST
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 106
Wise’s approach is deeply specieist, utterly biased in favor of humanness. The “certain advanced mental
abilities” that Wise requires are those typical of humans. “The autonomy values we assign to nonhumans
will be based upon human abilities and human values,” he acknowledges. “The more exactly the behavior
of any nonhuman resembles our ours,” the more confidently we can assign them “an autonomy value closer
to ours.”
A SIMILAR APPROACH TO THE GREAT APE PROJECT WOULD HAVE ADVOCATED
FREEING ONLY THOSE SLAVES THAT MOST RESEMBLED WHITES
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 109
With good reason, Wise repeatedly compares nonhuman enslavement to the former enslavement of
African-Americans. If opponents of African-American enslavement had adopted a racist approach
comparable to Wise’s speciesist one, they would have advocated rights for only some blacks: those who
most resemble whites.
Before African-American emancipation, a number of slaves sued for freedom on the grounds that they were
white. Unable to prove whiteness, they had to demonstrate that they were so much like a white that they
should be given “the benefit of the doubt.” These plaintiffs presented physical evidence of whiteness, such
as light skin, eyes, and hair. They also presented behavioral evidence that they socialized with whites (for
example, attended church with them) and conducted themselves in a ladylike or gentlemanly way
associated with white respectability. Law professor Ariela Gross comments, “Doing the things a white man
or woman did became the law’s working definition” of whiteness. For instance, a person might
demonstrate accomplishments such as financial self-support. “People described others as white or black in
terms of their competencies and disabilities.”
Ancestry also factored in. Evidence of African ancestry counted against the plaintiff; evidence of European
or other non-African ancestry counted in their favor. In one case, the judge instructed the jury to award the
plaintiffs freedom if the evidence indicated that they were less than one-fourth black: greater than 0.75 in
whiteness.
We react with revulsion to the idea of demonstrating whiteness. We should react with equal revulsion to
the idea of demonstrating humanness.
GREAT APE PROJECT FURTHER ENTRENCHES HUMAN SUPREMACY IN THE LAW
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 110
Demonstrating whiteness never had the power to free more than relatively few individuals. Although
Wise’s approach would emancipate entire species, those species would amount to a select few.
Making freedom contingent on whiteness maintained white supremacy; it kept whites in the position of
judge and superior being. Outside a racist context, no one would aspire to whiteness. Analogously, only
speciesism could place nonhumans in the degrading, oppressive situation of having to demonstrate
humanness. Wise’s approach would further inscribe human supremacy into law.
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GREAT APE PROJECT IS SPECIEST
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 113
Some people have called GAP “anthropocentric” and “speciesist” because it focuses only on great apes,
GAP says. It isn’t GAP’s focus that I find speciesist but its stated reasons for that focus. Stressing humanlike capacities and behaviors, GAP suggests that the nonhumans who most resemble humans are most
entitled to legal rights. It promotes criteria developed by Singer and other new-speciesists.
GAP IS SPECIESIST EVEN IF IT IS JUST A “STARTING POINT”
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 114-5
Cavalieri and Singer address the complaint that GAP shows speciesist elitism: “It might be said that in
focusing on beings as richly endowed as the great apes we are setting too high a standard for admission to
the community of equals, and in so doing we could preclude, or make more difficult, any further progress
for animals whose endowments are less like our own. No standard, however, can be fixed forever.”
Whether or not a standard based on endowments is fixed, it’s speciesist. And applying such a standard
prolongs its existence. The very terms standard and endowments suggest that an individual must meet
certain criteria to qualify for rights. Again, focusing on nonhuman great apes isn’t the problem; the
problem is perpetuating the view that they’re more endowed, and therefore more entitled to rights, than
other nonhumans.
GREAT APE PROJECT REFLECTS ANTHROPOCENTRISM
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 116
Steve Sapontzis has observed of GAP, “We are called on to recognize that harmful experiments on
nonhuman great apes are wrong because these apes are genetically so much like us or because they are so
intelligent, again like us. Such calls clearly retain an anthropocentric view of the world.”
GRANTING GREAT APES PERSONHOOD ON SPECIESIST ARGUMENTS CREATES
PRECEDENT ENTRENCHING SPECIESISM
Joan Dunayer, Animal Rights Activist, 2004, Speciesism, p. 120
If a judge rules that a chimpanzee is a person because chimpanzees are so human-like, yet another
speciesist precedent will be set. Such a precedent would fuel the type of approach proposed by Wise.
Humans continually would judge nonhumans (especially captives) by the extent to which they demonstrate
human-like capacities. Such a scenario is degrading to nonhumans and frightening in its potential to
perpetuate nonhuman suffering.
GREAT APE PROJECT RISKS PRIMATOCENTRISM—DANGEROUS TO FOCUS ON
“INTELLIGENCE”
Marc Bekoff, Professor of Biology, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 2003, The Animal Ethics
Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 119
Narrow-minded primatocentrism must be resisted in our studies of animal cognition and animal protection
and rights…I and others have previously argued that it is individuals who are important. Thus, careful
attention must be paid to within species individual variations in behavior.
We must not think that monkeys are smarter than dogs for each can do things the other cannot. Smart and
intelligent are loaded words and often are misused: dogs do what they need to do to be dogs—they are dogsmart in their own ways—and monkeys do what they need to do to be monkeys—they are monkey-smart in
their own ways—and neither is smarter than the other.
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LINE-DRAWING BASED ON A HIERARCHY OF ANIMALS IS SPECIEIST
Marc Bekoff, Professor of Biology, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 2003, The Animal Ethics
Reader, eds. Armstrong & Botzler, p. 120
I wan to reemphasize that the use of the words “higher” and “lower” and activities such as line-drawing to
place different groups of animals “above” or “below” others are extremely misleading and fail to take into
account the lives and the worlds of the animals themselves. These lines and worlds are becoming
increasingly accessible as the field of cognitive ethology matures. Irresponsible use of these words can also
be harmful for many animals. It is disappointing that a recent essay on animal use in a widely read
magazine, Scientific American, perpetuates this myth—this ladder view of evolution—by referring to
animals “lower on the phylogenctric tree.” There are a number of objections to hierarchical ladder views of
evolution, two of which are: (i) a single “ladder view” of evolution does not take into account animals with
uncommon ancestries; (ii) there are serious problems deciding which criteria for moral relevance should be
used and how evaluations of these criteria are to be made, even if one was able to argue convincingly for
the use of a single-scale. To be sure, ladder views are speciesist.
APE RIGHTS RECREATE HIERARCHIES
Gary Francione, Professor of Law at Rutgers . “An Interview with Professor Gary L. Francione on the
State”. Friends of Animals 2002 http://www.friendsofanimals.org/programs/animal-rights/interview-withgary-francione.html
There are at least two serious problems with the ape personhood campaign. First, the campaign reinforces
the notion that some animals are better than others because they are more “like us.” That is, instead of
having humans at the top and all nonhuman on the bottom, we “allow” a few animals that are “like us” to
come on over to “our” side. That leaves the vast majority of the “other” animals still on the bottom and
without even a hope of moving “up” because they lack human-like characteristics that make “special” those
animals given admission into the preferred category. In other words, the campaign for ape personhood
threatens to substitute one hierarchy for another, and I am concerned that we eradicate the notion of
hierarchy altogether.
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Extension of Rights Not Necessary to Admit Apes to Moral
Community
EXTENDING RIGHTS NOT NECESSARY TO INCLUDE APES IN THE COMMUNITY OF
EQUALS
Steve F. Sapontzis, Professor of philosophy, California State University, 1994, The Great Ape Project:
equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 275
To summarize, while nonhuman great apes should be persons in the evaluative sense of the term—which is
to say that they should enjoy the same level of moral and legal protection of their interests as humans do (or
are supposed to) – this protection need not take the form of assigning rights in every case. Thus, liberating
nonhuman great apes from human exploitation need not take the form of extending “human rights” to them.
These apes will not need some of the rights humans do, if they do not share in all human interests, but they
may also need some rights that we do not, if they have interests which we do not share. Also, other moral
and legal protective categories may be more appropriate than rights to the capabilities and conditions of
these apes. Finally, from the perspective of liberation moral theory, nonhuman great apes do not obviously
have any more claim on personhood and this protection of interests than do other, less intellectually
sophisticated, nonhuman animals.
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Extension of Rights Fails to Treat Apes as Members of the
Community of Equals
CONTINUATION OF SEXISM AND RACISM BODES ILL FOR ACCEPTING APES AS MORAL
EQUALS
Dale Jamieson, Professor of philosophy, University of Colorado @ Boulder, 1994, The Great Ape
Project: equality beyond humanity, eds. Cavalieri & Singer, p. 225
A second source of resistance may generally be connected to the sources of racism and sexism. Humans
often tolerate diversity more in theory than in practice. The prevalence of interethnic violence and the
abuse of women by men is surely related to brute differences between the groups in question. Yet the
differences among humans seem slight compared with differences between humans and chimpanzees,
gorillas or orang-utans. The idea of admitting our moral equality with such creatures seems outlandish in
the face of such differences.
SUBSTANTIAL PROBLEMS WITH EQUAL PROTECTION FOR MARGINALIZED GROUPS
OF HUMANS DEMONSTRATED DIFFICULTY OF GREAT APE PROJECT
PSYETA, 1994, The Great Ape Project, http://www.psyeta.org/hia/vol8/tgap.html
Copies of this journal are no longer available for sale, but our other two journals, Society & Animals and
the Journal of We have not forgotten that we live in a world in which, for at least three-quarters of the
human population, the idea of human rights is no more than rhetoric, and not a reality in everyday life. In
such a world, the idea of equality for non-human animals, even for those disquieting doubles of ours, the
other great apes, may not be received with much favor. We recognize, and deplore, the fact that all over the
world human beings are living without basic rights or even the means for a decent subsistence. The denial
of the basic rights of particular other species will not, however, assist the world's poor and oppressed to win
their just struggles. Nor is it reasonable to ask that the members of these other species should wait until all
humans have achieved their rights first. That suggestion itself assumes that beings belonging to other
species are of lesser moral significance than human beings. Moreover, on present indications, the suggested
delay might well be an extremely long one.
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Releasing Apes from Confinement Counterproductive to Their
Welfare
RELEASE COUNTPRODUCTIVE
Laura G. Kniaz, J.D., University at Buffalo, 1995 Buffalo Law Review (: Animal Liberation and the Law:
Animals Board the Underground Railroad) 1995 (lexis)
Many of the nonhumans stolen from animal enterprises suffer greatly when they are released from
confinement. n186 Author Robert Garner rebuts this argument:
The animal research community often claims that this [animal release] is irresponsible either because the
rescued (or stolen, depending on your point of view) animals are incapable of survival in the wild or
because they would make unsuitable pets.
QUALITY OF LIFE FOR CONFINED ANIMALS OFTEN SUPERIOR TO LIFE IN THE WILD
Cass Sunstein, Law Professor, University of Chicago, 2004, Animal Rights: Current debates and new
directions, eds. Sunstein & Nussbaum, p. 10
But what if certain practices, such as confinement in zoos or other facilities, can be undertaken in a way
that is consistent with animal welfare? What if some animals would do well, or best, under human control?
Nature can be very cruel, after all, and many animals will live longer lives with human beings than in the
wild. Of course longer is not necessarily better. But, we could imagine that many lions, elephants,
giraffes, and dolphins could, in fact, have better lives with human assistance, even if confined, than in their
own habitats. If this is so, it is not simple to see what sort of response might be made by those who believe
in animal autonomy. Perhaps autonomy advocates disagree on the facts, not on the theoretical issue, and
think it highly unlikely, in most cases, that wild animals can have decent lives under human control.
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Humane Treatment of Farm Animals Increasing
GROWING MOVE AMONG STATES AND OTHER COUNTRIES TO IMPROVE FARM
ANIMAL WELFARE
Peter Singer, Professor Ethics-Princeton University, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the
ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. viii
This strategy can succeed. While I was writing this foreword Oregon became the third state in the US to
ban sow stalls – known in America as gestation crates—which are commonly used to confine pregnant
sows in metal crates too small for them even to turn around or walk a few steps. Earlier, Florida and
Arizona had passed similar bans as a result of referenda initiated by the signatures of large numbers of
voters. Significantly, the law in Oregon was the first in the US to come about through the normal process
of representative democracy at the state level. The European Union and Australia have also agreed to
prohibit sow stalls for most of the sow’s pregnancy. In addition to these legal changes, the suffering of an
even larger number of pigs will in future be reduced by the decisions of Smithfield Foods and Maple Leaf
Foods – the largest pork producers in the US and Canada, respectively – to phase out sow stalls.
HUMANE ALTERNATIVES TO ANIMAL PRODUCTION ARE POSSIBLE TO ACHIEVE
THROUGH DEMOCRATIC PROCESSES
Peter Singer, Professor Ethics-Princeton University, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming: renewing the
ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. viii-ix
Of course, getting rid of sow stalls is only the beginning. It doesn’t mean that pigs will be able to go
outside, to roam around a pasture, or to have straw rather than bare concrete to lie down on. Even when
sow stalls have gone entirely, there will still be a long way to go. But the readiness of voters, legislatures,
and big corporate animal producers to make changes shows that animal suffering can be reduced, on a very
large scale, by democratic, nonviolent processes. Obviously, as long as most people continue to want to eat
animal products, a key role in these decisions is the demonstrated viability of alternative ways of meeting
that demand. That is what the Food Animal Initiative is trying to achieve. When I toured their facilities at
Wytham a few years ago, I was impressed by the significantly better quality of lives for the animals kept
there than in the more conventional commercial operations I have seen over the years. Yet the farm at
Wytham is a viable commercial operation, paying its own way without the assistance of sponsorships or
research subsidies.
ANIMAL WELFARE PROTECTION IMPROVING ACROSS THE BOARD
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 63-4
Improved attitudes toward animals have led to progress on many fronts. The fur industry has been severely
weakened by the work of animal activists. Seventeen cities, out of concerns over cruelty, have banned
circuses that feature animals. And between 1990 and 2003, voters passed seventeen of the twenty-three
animal welfare initiatives that were put on state ballots. These ballot initiatives have delivered some of the
most strategically significant victories yet won by animal protectionists. Meanwhile, penalties for animal
cruelty are becoming more widely enforced. The year 1999 marked the first time that factory farm workers
received felony-level indictments for animal cruelty. And in 2002, three men pleaded guilty to felony
animal abuse charges for torturing a calf to death. This case set another encouraging legal precedent: in
addition to the felonies, the men were also convicted of misdemeanor offenses for tormenting the calf in
front of his mother, thereby inflicting psychological distress on the cow.
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Factory Farms More Humane than Alternatives
BIGGER CAFOs MORE HUMANE THAN SMALLER AFOs AND GRAZING OPERATIONS
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 11
It is important to note that not all confinement operations would treat the injured sow in this manner. The
large, highly capitalized hog operations I visited assured me that they would euthanize any such injured
animal immediately. It is generally the smaller operations, run on a shoestring, that fall prey to the sort of
problem described. It is also important to note that highly extensive agriculture can also lead to suffering
by virtue of neglect. In New Zealand, many sheep are unattended at lambing, and if climatic conditions are
not ideal, animals can be lost. Thus extensive agriculture, in and of itself, does not ensure that good
husbandry is practiced.
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“Animal Rights” Discourse Counterproductive to Improving
Farm Animal Welfare
COUNTEPRODUCTIVE TO ADDRESS FARM ANIMAL WELFARE AS AN “ANIMAL
RIGHTS” ISSUE
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 74-5
Singer and other ethicists deserve enormous credit for looking carefully at complicated issues like animal
testing, and for crafting sophisticated analysis rather than spouting simpleminded dogma. Unfortunately,
no good deed goes unpunished, and the general public cannot be expected to read this material. As far as
the public is concerned, all animal rights activists are dead-set against any form of animal use, regardless of
how little or how much humans stand to benefit.
All this makes animal rights philosophy poison when it comes to publicly debating animal agriculture. The
battleground for public opinion is radio, television, and newspapers. None of these forums provides
opportunity for protracted debate. When animal defenders and livestock producers trade jabs before the
public or are quoted in articles, neither side has the opportunity to develop a sustained and coherent
argument. All the public hears are sound bites. And it is here that the comprehensive nature of animal
rights philosophy becomes a terrible liability for the defenders of farmed animals.
Time and again, in public debates, factory farm interests have been able to wrest the discussion away from
the brutal practices of animal agriculture. The focus of debate is continually pushed into the thorniest
thickets of animal rights philosophy. Activists are then left with the unenviable task of explaining why
they are against animal testing, which could produce treatments for diseases that are currently incurable.
At every turn, activists should demand agriculture interests to account for the suffering that occurs on
factory farms. Unfortunately, it’s impossible to hold the spotlight on this cruelty when animal rights
philosophy is involved in the argument. Representatives of animal agriculture are smart enough to
continually drive the discussion away from the ten billion farmed animals who die each year, and toward
the contradictions that arise from the public’s simplistic understanding of animal rights.
SHOULD FOCUS ON ANIMAL AGRICULTURE ABUSES – NOT A BROAD ANIMAL RIGHTS
AGENDA—FOR EFFECTIVE ACTIVISM
Erik Marcus, Editor-Vegan.com, 2005, Meat Market: animals, ethics and money, p. 83
Just as slavery was once America’s most pressing human rights violation, there can be no doubt that the
effort to eliminate cruelty to animals should focus on agriculture. Animal agriculture accounts for more
than 97 percent of animals killed by humans in the United States. Farmed animals therefore deserve
priority, and arguments made on their behalf should not be weakened by lumping in rhetoric pertaining to
hunting, medical research, or companion animals.
We live in a world where the majority of people have a highly exploitative attitude toward animals. It’s
therefore of the greatest importance to convince the public that animal agriculture is a vicious industry, and
that regardless of one’s feelings about other forms of animal use, the situation regarding farmed animals is
intolerable. By continually drawing attention back to the harsh nature of animal agriculture, we can
maximize the number of people willing to take action.
The Civil War was fought and won largely by people with racist attitudes, who nevertheless viewed slavery
as an affront to human decency. Similarly, by confining our rhetoric and action to overcoming the
injustices of animal agriculture, we will enable as many people as possible to participate.
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“Animal Rights” Discourse Counterproductive to Improving
Farm Animal Welfare
CONCERN FOR ANIMAL WELFARE DOES NOT RELY ON WINNING ARGUMENT FOR
ANIMAL RIGHTS – BASIC ETHICS DEMANDS IT
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
407
One does not have to take an animal rights stance to believe that animals should receive minimal humane
standards of treatment at slaughterhouses and feedlots. Rather the position is one of more basic decency
and common sense for other beings that are very capable of suffering and feeling pain. Consumers should
become more educated as to the origin of their meat and demand higher standards. Perhaps the notion of
animals of property is something that needs to be changed in the law because it is obvious that animals can
feel pain as evidenced by the screams of pigs in the slaughterhouse being scalded alive. An animal is
simply not property in the same sense as a table or antique jewelry. An alternative to the animals as
property regime is to give animals "equitable self ownership." n161 This way, title is split into an equitable
and a legal title with the animal being holder to equitable title in itself because animals have the interest to
live. n162 This would allow an animal to sue to recover for injuries inflicted against it. n163 Perhaps adopting
a different paradigm for the ways animals are viewed within society and within the legal system will make
the factory farm obsolete.
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Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve
ANIMAL AGRICULTURE INDUSTRY SHOULD IMPLEMENT STANDARDS TO IMPROVE
ANIMAL WELFARE
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, 2008, Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial
Farm Animal Production in America,
[http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Industrial_Agriculture/PCIFAP_FINA
L.pdf], p. 83
Recommendation #1.
The animal agriculture industry should implement federal performance-based standards to improve animal
health and well-being.
a. The federal government should develop performance-based (not resource-based) animal welfare
standards. Animal welfare has improved in recent years based on industry research and consumer demand;
the latter has led, for example, to the creation of the United Egg Producers’ certification program and the
McDonald’s animal welfare council. However, in order to fulfill our ethical responsibility to treat farm
animals humanely, federally monitored standards that ensure at least the following minimum standards for
animal treatment:
Good feeding: Animals should not suffer prolonged hunger or thirst;
Good housing: Animals should be comfortable especially in their lying areas, should not suffer thermal
extremes, and should have enough space to move around freely;
Good health: Animals should not be physically injured and should be free of preventable disease related to
production; in the event that surgical procedures are performed on animals for the purposes of health or
management, modalities should be used to minimize pain; and
Appropriate behavior: Animals should be allowed to perform normal nonharmful social behaviors and to
express species-specific natural behaviors as much as reasonably possible;
animals should be handled well in all situations (handlers should promote good human–animal
relationships);
negative emotions such as fear, distress, extreme frustration, or boredom should be avoided.
b. Implement a government oversight system similar in structure to that used for laboratory animal welfare:
Each IFAP facility would be certified by an industry-funded, government-chartered, not-for-profit entity
accredited by the federal government to monitor IFAP. Federal entities would audit IFAP facilities for
compliance. Consumers could look for the third-party certification as proof that the production process
meets federal farm animal welfare standards.
c. Change the system for monitoring and regulating animal welfare, recommend improvements in animal
welfare as science, and encourage consumers to continue to push animal welfare policy. Improved animal
husbandry practices and an ethically based view of animal welfare will solve or ameliorate many IFAP
animal welfare problems.
d. Federal standards for farm animal welfare should be developed immediately based on a fair, ethical, and
evidence-based understanding of normal animal behavior.
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Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve
SHOULD INCREASE ANIMAL WELFARE RESEARCH
Pew Commission on Industrial Farm Animal Production, 2008, Putting Meat on the Table: Industrial
Farm Animal Production in America,
[http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorg/Reports/Industrial_Agriculture/PCIFAP_FINA
L.pdf], p. 87
Recommendation #5.
Improve animal welfare research in support of cost-effective and reliable ways to raise food animals while
providing humane animal care.
a. There is a significant amount of animal welfare research being done, but the funding often comes from
special interest groups. Some of this research is published and distributed to the agriculture industry, but
without acknowledgment of the funding sources. Such lack of disclosure taints mainstream animal welfare
research. To improve the transparency of animal research, there needs to be disclosure of funding sources
for peer-reviewed published research.
Much of today’s agriculture and livestock research, for example, comes from land-grant colleges with
animal science and agriculture departments that are heavily endowed by special interests or industry.
However, a lot of very good research on humane methods of stunning and slaughter has been funded by the
industry.
b. More diversity in the funding sources for animal welfare research is also needed. Most animal welfare
research takes place at land-grant institutions, but other institutions should not be barred from engaging in
animal welfare research due to lack of research funds. The federal government is in the best position to
provide unbiased animal welfare research; therefore federal funding for animal welfare research should be
revived and increased.
c. Focus research on animal-based outcomes relating to natural behavior and stress, and away from physical
factors (e.g., growth, weight gain) that do not accurately characterize an animal’s welfare status except in
the grossest sense.
d. Include ethics as a key component of research into the humaneness of a particular practice. Scientific
outcomes are critical, but whether a practice is ethical must be taken into account.
While there is a large amount of peer-reviewed research on animal welfare issues being done today, there is
room to improve the quality and focus of that research. More diversity in the funding sources for animal
welfare research is also needed. While land-grant institutions are where most animal welfare research takes
place, other institutions should not be barred from engaging in animal welfare research due to lack of
research funds. Federal funding for animal welfare research should be revived and increased. The Federal
government is in the best position to provide unbiased animal welfare research.
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Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve
SHOULD IMPLEMENT REGULATIONS PROTECTING FARM ANIMAL WELFARE
Robyn Mallon, Attorney, 2005, Journal of Medicine and Law, Summer, 9 Mich. St. J. Med. & Law 389, p.
409-10
Since there is a Humane Slaughter Act, there should clearly be a Humane Standards of Living Act to cover
how the animal is raised. Animals should be given the chance to do the things they naturally do such as
pigs rooting in the mud and chickens scratching the ground. All animals should be allowed the chance to go
outdoors and have the ability to move around freely, exercise, and socialize in a meaningful way. As part of
the return to sustainable agriculture, battery cages and gestation crates should be banned. Battery cages are
so small that when the chickens grow, their feet are forced to grow around the wire because they get stuck
to the bottom of the cage. n172 These cruel cages serve to immobilize the chicken trapped in it even more.
Since there seems to be no humane way of raising veal, the production of veal should be banned by states,
much like foie gras in California. n173 The treatment of veal calves is simply too barbaric in today's civilized
society. These types of concessions would eliminate the factory farm because the animals could no longer
be forced to remain indoors in cages. Allowing animals outside would require more workers to tend to the
animals which CAFOs would not be able to afford. Allowing animals to move about outside eliminates the
usefulness of the mechanized assembly line way of doing business at CAFOs.
Another part of the Humane Standards of Living Act would be a provision that eliminates antibiotics from
animal feed. This would eliminate factory farms because animals could no longer be kept in such close
confinement if antibiotics were disallowed. This would ruin the factory farm's economies of scale and cost
containment. There is simply too much of a risk for contracting superbugs and other diseases that are
immune to conventional antibiotics if humans continually ingest antibiotic tainted meat.
The Act would also have provisions that disallow for any changes to an animal's basic anatomy. For
example, the chicken cannot be debeaked and the pig cannot have its teeth pulled and its tail docked. It
cannot be castrated without anesthesia. A cow cannot have its horns removed. These actions are simply too
painful to be endured without anesthetics and the basic bodily integrity of these living beings should be
preserved, especially if one subscribes to the view of equitable self ownership.
The purpose of this Act would serve as a complement to the Humane Slaughter Act. The provisions above
would serve as a starting point for the Act. As science uncovers even better husbandry standards, those
provisions should be added to the Act at a later time. To enforce the Act, a neutral third party would be
required to inspect feedlots to ensure the mandated husbandry standards are being met since corporate
farms clearly are not capable of self monitoring and cannot even follow standing laws such as the Humane
Slaughter Act.
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Welfare Regulations Sufficient to Solve
SHOULD MANDATE HUMANE TREATMENT OF FARM ANIMALS
Bernie Rollin, Professor Philosophy Colorado State University, 2008, The Future of Animal Farming:
renewing the ancient contract, eds. M. Dawkins & R. Bonney, p. 17
The last component needed for a full analysis of animal welfare is the ethical dimension. Given that
husbandry no longer obtains, we must not only worry about the animals’ experiences entailed by meeting
or not meeting their needs, but must also ask which needs and to what extent we ought to meet them.
Industrial producers worry only about the physical needs required for productivity, and only to the extent
that such fulfillment meets maximal efficiency for production. Hence the feeding of bone meal, sawdust,
chicken manure, etc. to farm animals provides nourishment at minimal cost but with no respect for animals’
natures (such as whether they are herbivores), or about their physical health except to the extent that it
impacts on production. In today’s society, the new definition of welfare that is implicitly emerging as a
societal ethic is that in raising animals for food, we are obliged to worry about all needs emerging from
their telos we can practically meet (e.g. freedom of movement, social needs). Thus, whereas a producer
would accept a productive animal as well-off if it were producing milk, for example, even if it were
painfully lame, ordinary citizens would not accept an animal, however productive, living in constant pain!
As Europe has demonstrated, the emerging societal ethic decrees that if this no longer occurs automatically
as presuppositional to production, it should be mandated by regulation or legislation.
ANIMAL WELFARE LAW REGARDING RESEARCH ANIMALS EMBODIES THE WELFARE
ETHIC
Bernard E. Rollin, Professor of Philosophy, Colorado State University, 1995, Farm Animal Welfare:
social, bioethical, and research issues, p. 22
Only our fourth principle, about care and housing fitting the animals’ natures, was not fully adopted into
law. Instead, the law mandated “exercise for dogs” and environments for primates that “enhance their
psychological wellbeing. Other species are still generally housed in accordance with researcher
convenience, though more thought is being directed at creating “animal friendly” environments; an entire
issue of Lab Animal, a trade journal, was recently devoted to enriched environments for non-mandated
species.
Thus, the new ethic shaped these revolutionary laws governing biomedicine in a number of ways. First, the
use of animals in research does not in and of itself ensure, as did traditional agriculture, that animals are
relatively happy and are not suffering pain and distress. Second, at the same time, the pain and suffering
experienced by research animals is not the result of cruelty. Third, society has embodied its demand for
control of pain and suffering in the consensus ethic, at no little expense. (It is estimated that ensuring
compliance with the 1985 amendment to the Animal Welfare Act alone has cost $500 million between
1985 and 1995.) Concern for the animals supersedes human utilitarian (economic) considerations. The
right not to suffer in the course of being used for human benefit is thus encoded into law, as are the right to
exercise for dogs and the right to a stimulating environment for primates. Fourth, virtually all animals used
in biomedical research, with the exception of rodents and birds used in private industrial research, are
covered by law. And in 1992, a federal judge declared that exemption of rodents from protection of the
Animal Welfare Act by USDA regulations implementing the act violates the intent of the act. Finally, the
law is not abolitionist: it does not intend in any way to stop animal use in science but simply guarantees
that animal suffering is controlled as far as possible.
PUBLIC SU