Rob Compaijen
0401250
Reflective report Nietzsche-seminar 24-10-2008
‘Nietzsche and Japanese Buddhism on the cultivation of body-mind’ (A. van der
Braak)
I. Text
In his text ‘Nietzsche and Japanese Buddhism on the cultivation of body-mind’, André van
der Braak compares Nietzsche’s philosophy to Japanese Buddhist philosophy. Van der Braak
sees in Buddhist thought a philosophy that can help us comprehend Nietzsche’s philosophy
better. The text under consideration explores the ways both philosophies understand the
relation between body and mind. In the first part of the text van der Braak elaborates on
Nietzsche’s views regarding this subject, while the second part deals with the views of
Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dōgen, and points out the similarities between both
philosophies, regarding the relation between mind and body. Van der Braak makes two
claims: First, both Nietzsche and Dōgen practice philosophy by using the body (instead of the
mind) as guide. And second, Nietzsche, as well as Dōgen, view the task of personal
development not as a task undertaken by an I but as a ‘self-education of the drives’ (14).
I.1 Nietzsche
Van der Braak begins his article by writing that Western thought considered the mind and
body as two separate substances. In that sense, Western philosophy understands the relation
between both substances as dualistic. It is precisely this dualism that Nietzsche opposes
according to van der Braak. Instead of viewing mind and body as two dualistically related
substances, Nietzsche claims that the body is more fundamental than the mind. Put stronger:
he views the mind as ‘a word for something about the body’ (1), (AsZ, 1.4).
One consequence of this view is that the location of the process of knowing shifts from the
mind to the body. Unsurprisingly, then, Nietzsche speaks of knowing or understanding in
terms of incorporation (Einverleibung), and nutrition (Ernährung). This, in turn, means that
the preconditions for our knowledge are formulated in purely physiological terms, or, as van
der Braak puts it: “(…) which beliefs and views we hold is not determined by some kind of
correspondence to/with reality, but by their usefulness for our bodily drives, and by our
capacity to digest those views.” (3)
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Next to describing the way human beings know and understand reality, Nietzsche adopts a
more normative, or prescriptive standpoint as well: we should leave behind incorporated
illusory perspectives, and replace them with more truthful perspectives. This, however, poses
a problem: is the incorporation of truth even possible? Nietzsche famously formulated this
problem in a question in Die fröhliche Wissenschaft: ‘To what extent does the truth bear
incorporation?’ (FW 110). As this question indicates, there might be barriers that prevent us
from knowing the truth. Indeed, van der Braak writes that the belief in a permanent subject is,
for Nietzsche, one of the most persistent illusions that hinders the incorporation of truth.
Being able to incorporate new and heavier truths, and shifting between perspectives requires
what van der Braak calls a cultivation of the body. He describes this process as “the
development of different physiological habits”, and “education of the drives”. (7) There is,
however, no ‘I’ that is in charge of the process of cultivation. Instead, the drives have to
educate themselves, that is: the body is involved in a process of self-education.
According to van der Braak the Western philosophical paradigm does not enable us to
understand properly what a self-education of the body entails. He believes that Nietzsche’s
way of thinking is more closely related to Eastern thought. This is, he writes, clear when we
compare Nietzsche’s philosophy to Eastern thought, in particular Japanese Buddhism. Both
philosophies reject viewing the relation between mind and body as dualistic. Moreover, in
contrast to most of Western philosophy, both Nietzsche and Eastern thought focus strongly on
the perfection of the human being as a whole. Therefore, van der Braak writes, we should try
to understand Nietzsche’s notion of the self-education of the body from the perspective of
Japanese Buddhism.
I.2 Japanese Buddhism
In Japanese Buddhist thought, van der Braak asserts, ‘body and mind are not conceived as two
different substances.’ In its conception of the human being as made up of five aggregates
(skandhas) – 1) matter or form (rupa); 2) sensations or feelings (vedana); 3) perception
(samnja); 4; volitional dispositions (samskara); 5) consciousness (vijnana) – Japanese
Buddhism bears similarity to Nietzsche’s view of the human being as a constellation of bodily
drives. Another central point of comparison between both Nietzsche and Japanese Buddhist
thought is the emphasis they put on personal cultivation. Moreover, they both attach great
importance to the body, and the role it plays in personal cultivation.
It is here that van der Braak introduces the Japanese Buddhist philosopher Dōgen (1200 –
1253). This Japanese Zen-master stressed the central role the body plays in self-cultivation.
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Just like Nietzsche claimed, Dōgen’s approach rejects the existence of a mind (or: ‘I’) that
cultivates our bodily drives. On the other hand, the drives have to cultivate themselves. But
how does this happen? Dōgen recommends the practice of ‘zazen’, that is, seated meditation
practice, which can be seen as paying complete attention to the body. We can interpret, van
der Braak writes, Nietzsche’s eight hour walks as serving the same purpose. Through these
physical exercises the everyday dualistic perspective on the body and mind is cast off. A
higher perspective can now be incorporated: the body and mind seen as a unity. This, van der
Braak points out, expands our experience beyond our individual nature and gives it a cosmic
dimension.
II. Discussion
II.1 The incorporation of knowledge
The process of incorporating knowledge functions, van der Braak claims, according to a
scheme that we find in a Nachlass text from 1881:
Die Wiederkunft des Gleichen.
Entwurf.
1. Die Einverleibung der Grundirrthümer.
2. Die Einverleibung der Leidenschaften.
3. Die Einverleibung des Wissens und des Verzichtendes Wissens. (Leidenschaften der
Erkenntniss.)
4. Der Unschuldige. Der Einzelne als Experiment. Die Erleichterung des Lebens,
Erniedrigung, Abschwächung – Übergang.
5. Das neue Schwergewicht: die ewige Wiederkunft des Gleichen. Unendliche
Wichtigkeit unseres Wissen’s, Irren’s, unsrer Gewohnheiten, Lebensweisen für alles
Kommende. Was machen wir mit dem Reste unseres Lebens – wir, die wir den
grössten Theil desselben in der wesentlichsten Unwissenheit verbracht haben? Wir
lehren die Lehre – es ist das stärkste Mittel, sie uns selber einzuverleiben. Unsre Art
Seligkeit, als Lehrer der grössten Lehre.
(…) (KSA 9, 11[141])
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Van der Braak understands this scheme, in line with paragraph 110 of Die fröhliche
Wissenschaft, as illustrating five chronologically successive stages of human knowledge. He
believes that Nietzsche wanted to make clear what stages of understanding we have to go
through, in order to ultimately arrive at the incorporation of the idea of the eternal recurrence
of the same. This is a process not so much of incorporation, but, instead, of ‘excorporation’ –
a neologism that designates the process in which we free ourselves from the illusions that
prevent us from seeing reality.
Van der Braak’s interpretation of this enigmatic text is problematic. For example: freeing
ourselves from our basic errors (Grundirrthümer) to reach truth is comprehensible, but what
exactly does freeing ourselves from our passions (Leidenschaften) mean? Moreover, can we
understand stage three as a form of ‘excorporation’? These unanswered questions are
certainly shortcomings of van der Braak’s interpretation, which, therefore, make an
alternative interpretation of the 1881 Nachlass-text necessary.
One suggestion put forward is that because the idea of the eternal recurrence of the same is
such a central idea in Also sprach Zarathustra that it might be useful to interpret the scheme
in the light of the Zarathustra. One is then reminded of that other scheme important in the
Zarathustra: the three metamorphoses of the spirit. In a first attempt to link these two
schemes together, it is suggested that the camel corresponds to the first stage, the lion to the
second and third, and the child to the fourth. This interpretation, however, faces a problem:
because only the first four stages are taken into account, how should we understand the fifth
stage? In trying to resolve this problem, it is claimed that we should acknowledge a state
beyond that of the child, which corresponds to the child again. Another alternative would be
that the fifth stage corresponds to Zarathustra, seen as the teacher of the child’s innocence. An
objection against these attempt is that the status of the fifth stage remains unclear.
A question that arises when examining the above scheme is what it involves, when it is
viewed as describing stages of understanding not for the individual, but for humankind. It is
claimed, that the scheme manifests a narrowing down. That is, most people are living in the
first and second stage. The third stage, then, entails an elite community of so-called free
spirits. The fourth stage consists of the lonely philosophers. The understanding of the eternal
recurrence of the same involved in the fifth stage is inhumanly heavy: that is, no one is able to
bear it.
II. 2 The Will to Power
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The will to power, which is a central element in Nietzsche’s philosophy, is completely left out
of Van der Braak’s article. Leaving it out of this comparative study is understandable, because
Nietzschean will to power is hard to reconcile with Japanese Buddhist thought. Japanese
Buddhism, as van der Braak presents it, is aimed at attaining ‘the true human body’ (13),
which ‘functions freely and authentically in harmony with the entire universe’ (idem), and in
which ‘like and dislike [have] come to an end.’ (12). This account is on strained terms with
the will to power, which denies an ultimate endpoint that is viewed as harmony and
disappearance of the will. Moreover, whereas van der Braak seems to characterize the practice
of ‘zazen’ as a form of disinterested perception in which one is open to that which is
perceived, incorporation – as Nietzsche understands it – does not (want to) do justice to what
is incorporated, but instead instrumentalizes it.
Van der Braak responds to this criticism that the will to power is, in a certain sense, present in
Japanese Buddhism: it has the character of the fight against ignorance and limiting
perspectives. That is, the will to power manifests itself in the Buddhist practitioner as the will
to replace illusory perspectives by adopting a wider variety of true perspectives.
This, however, corresponds more to the Nietzschean virtue of Redlichkeit, than to the will to
power. Is it, then, possible to understand Redlichkeit as a shared notion in both philosophies?
Can we see both Nietzsche’s philosophy and Japanese Buddhist thought as seeking to
overcome illusions and striving for truth, as van der Braak defends?
Against this hypothesis it is objected that Nietzsche’s use of the notion ‘Redlichkeit’ and his
corresponding elaborations on illusion and truth are ambiguous. For instance, when Nietzsche
writes ‘I search the truth.’, we should not take this claim at face-value. We should read such
claims strategically instead: that is, understand them Nietzsche attempting to adopt a
standpoint in face of his opponents. Ecce Homo is a useful example, because it is a text that
should be understood as a manifestation of a particular standpoint in the debate on, for
instance, truth and illusion, rather then as a theory about what truth is, what reality ultimately
entails, et cetera.
II.3 Methodology
Insufficiently addressed during the discussion, is van der Braak’s methodology. His
comparative study on Nietzsche and Japanese Buddhism departs from the idea that
Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot properly be understood when we limit ourselves to a Western
philosophical paradigm. This is the case, because Nietzsche fundamentally breaks with
assumptions that ‘are common within the Western philosophical tradition’ (9). We should,
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therefore, use an Eastern philosophical paradigm. However, van der Braak’s attempt to found
this comparative study is questionable for (at least) three reasons.
First. Though Nietzsche indeed breaks with several core elements of Western philosophy, he
cannot for that reason be seen as standing outside Western philosophy. Rather, by continually
questioning and criticizing the Western philosophical tradition, Nietzsche places himself
directly inside this very tradition; though, of course, he takes within this tradition a somewhat
different position than other philosophers. Moreover, Nietzsche himself grew up, studied, and
worked inside a Western philosophical framework, so he must have thought in terms of ‘the
incorporated categories through which we traditionally understand the world and our
experience’ (8), to quote van der Braak. Thus, the claim that Nietzsche cannot be understood
from a Western philosophical paradigm seems to me unconvincing.
Second. When, however, we do accept that we cannot properly understand Nietzsche’s
philosophy because of our Western way of thinking, we face a fundamental problem: in
addition to not being able to properly understand Nietzsche, we should, on the same ground,
acknowledge that we cannot properly understand Japanese Buddhist thought. This means that
van der Braak’s method of turning to Japanese Buddhist thought to provide a more complete
picture of Nietzsche’s philosophy is doomed to fail. And this, in turn, seriously undermines
van der Braak’s project of comparing Nietzsche’s philosophy to Japanese Buddhist thought,
because, consequently, only readers who stand in both a Western and an Eastern paradigm of
thought would be able to comprehend such a comparison. We could, moreover, ask whether it
is even possible to stand in both paradigms of thought.
Third. One example van der Braak provides for showing that Nietzsche is more intimately
related to Eastern thought than to Western philosophy, is his focus on the perfected human
being. Van der Braak writes that in the Western philosophical tradition ‘personal development
has not been a major philosophical theme (…).’ (9). I believe this view is very difficult to
defend. Two examples suffice to support this claim: a) Aristotelian virtue-ethics. This
important philosophical-ethical theory focuses strongly on the theme of self-realization, which
is the key to becoming a virtuous, and thus happy, human being. b) Kierkegaard. Core notions
of his philosophy are ‘self becoming’ and ‘authenticity’.
Conclusion
A comparative study between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Japanese Buddhist thought can be
both perfectly viable and rewarding. However, wanting to justify the necessity of comparing
Japanese Buddhist thought to Nietzsche’s philosophy, as van der Braak wishes, seems to me
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to be impossible. Especially when one sees, as van der Braak, both traditions as constituted by
different paradigms of thought, which are, in turn, viewed as ‘incorporated categories’ (8). In
any case, it creates serious problems.
It might, therefore, be better if van der Braak, instead, makes clear that comparing Nietzsche’s
philosophy to Japanese Buddhist thought is interesting, and can shed light on both Nietzsche’s
thought and Japanese Buddhism, simply because both traditions are similar in several
respects.Van der Braak should, however, highlight more clearly in his text the differences
between Nietzsche’s philosophy and Dōgen’s thought.
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