Action, Emotion and Responsibility in Kanti It is generally accepted that for Kant the hallmark of rational action is that it is maxim-based. On this interpretation, Kant thinks that we do not act directly on the basis of desires. Instead, we act out of principles of action or maxims. Even when we do things in an apparently unconscious way - for example, reach for a hand towel or brush lint off a collar - we are guided by deeper rules that are in principle accessible and thus available for adoption or rejection. So, our responsibility in acting can be traced to the choice of underlying maxims that guide us. The passage that is perhaps most important in the attribution of this view to Kant is from Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. Kant writes: “An incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the person has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it a general rule according to which he intends to act)” (Rel 6: 24; 19; emphasis added). Some scholars have interpreted this passage to mean that for Kant “actions” are only possible when incentives are incorporated into maxims. Thus, a piece of behavior is only an action (for which we are responsible) if is maxim-based.ii If it is not maxim-based then it is not an action but merely an automatic reflex. But this strict dichotomy between rational maxim-based actions and reflexes begs a question. What about all those “actions” we perform that appear to be thoroughly spontaneous and/or unprincipled, and yet are not really reflexes? Think of impulsively banging your fist on a table in anger, or bursting into song in the shower. We can well imagine that there might not be underlying, or background, principles rationally justifying actions such as these. Are they then simply automatic reflexes? What about those “actions” that directly contravene principles that we hold such as smoking cigarettes against our pledge not to? Is there no place for these irrational and/or weak “actions” in Kant’s system? If there is not, then Kant appears to be vulnerable to a 1 version of the traditional criticism that he exaggerates the centrality and importance of rationality in human action. Kant’s strict division between reason-based action and reflex (if there is such a thing) would seem to tie our responsibility for actions too closely to our rational use of maxims. In this short paper I will defend Kant against this criticism by arguing that he believes in a third kind of human behavior: action that is emotion-based. Emotion-based actions will turn out to be somewhere between principled actions and mere knee jerk reflexes. In making this argument I will proceed in four main steps. First, in section I I will present a brief account of what the divide between an action and a mere reflex really amounts to. This will give us a sense for what an action that belongs between these two might look like. In section II I will introduce Kant’s understanding of emotion by situating this notion in the context of his primary psychological categories. In section III I will provide evidence for the claim that there are emotion-based actions in Kant, and then go on to explain the sense in which these actions are not connected to maxims. Finally, in section IV I will show how these actions provide us with a third possibility: actions for which we are responsible that are neither fully rational (in the sense of being maxim-based) nor merely reflex reactions. I In his book Kant’s Theory of Freedom Henry Allison is concerned to show that for Kant non-moral actions are not mechanically necessitated.iii Allison argues that Kant thinks that all actions are free insofar as they involve the incorporation of incentives into maxims. In maintaining that all actions (moral and non-moral) are maxim-based and free Allison draws a radical divide between rational and free action on the one hand, and merely determined bits of behavior on the other. This division goes a long way toward putting to rest the concern that (on Kant’s system) immoral actions are determined and thus not actions for which the agent is responsible. Allison’s division is certainly useful insofar as it removes this concern. But perhaps there is reason to pause here. Strictly speaking, the Incorporation Thesis does not rule out the 2 possibility that Kant believes in actions for which one is somehow responsible that are (at the same time) not maxim-based. After all, the Incorporation Thesis just says that for incentives to determine the will they must be incorporated into maxims. Clearly, this leaves open the possibility that the will might be determined in some way that does not directly involve maxims. Now, what exactly is the difference between an action and a reflex on Allison’s account? It is worth emphasizing that the relevant difference is not that one is conscious and the other unconscious. Of course, it is true that reflex actions are unconsciously caused, but at the same time it seems that there are many actions that Kantians such as Allison would acknowledge are maxim-based and yet largely unconscious. Think of walking into a room and sitting in a chair. The “decision” to sit down is often one to which we give no conscious thought. How, then, can it be a maxim-based decision? Allison argues that: “I cannot act on principle without an awareness of that principle, although I need not be explicitly aware of myself as acting on that principle” (Allison 1990, 90). His point is that on some level we must be aware of the principle in question, though we do not have to be aware of it as the basis for the action that we are performing. Allison goes on to claim that should we so desire we can self-reflectively access our maxims. This suggests that should we so choose we can always reject our maxims or adopt new ones. It seems to follow from this that every time we act on a maxim (even if we do not do so self-reflectively) we implicitly choose this maxim as a basis for action. In light of this we can conclude that the main difference between actions and reflexes (on the Kantian model) is that the former are chosen and the latter are not. A reflex is not a behavior that the agent chooses in any sense; it is not something for which the agent is responsible. So, in order to qualify as an action there must be some choice involved in the production of a piece of behavior. If it can be shown, then, that Kant believes in actions that both involve some kind of choice and yet are not maxim-based, then there will be good reason to believe that the distinction between maxim-based actions and reflexes is not exhaustive. 3 II Kant’s two practical psychological faculties are the faculty of desire and the faculty of feeling. The faculty of desire is the ability or power by which we bring things into existence. Kant writes: “The faculty of desire is the power to cause the objects of one’s mental representations by means of these same representations” (MM 6: 211). The determination of the faculty of desire produces a desire, and thus a desire is that by which we bring things into existence via the ideas that we have of these things. Inclinations, passions and instincts are all kinds of desire. Kant differentiates these desires in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View on the basis of their origins, the frequency with which they are experienced and the kinds of consciousness that accompanies them. The faculty of feeling, on the other hand, is the capacity to experience feelings. More specifically, it is the capacity to experience feelings of pleasure or pain in response to a representation. Kant writes: “The capacity (Fähigkeit) for having pleasure or displeasure in a representation is called ‘feeling’…” (MM 6: 211). All of the feelings that we usually differentiate - such as love, worry, sadness, etc., - are (for Kant) simply pleasure and pain experienced in different contexts, and/or caused by different things, and/or felt to different degrees. For Kant, emotions are feelings of a certain kind. They are sudden outbursts of pleasure or pain which “exclude the sovereignty of reason” (A 7: 251). In the Anthropology Kant says that emotion “is the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure at a particular moment, which does not give rise to reflection (namely the process of reason whether one should submit to it or reject it)” (A 7: 251). He echoes this point in the Metaphysics of Morals saying: “Emotions belong to feeling insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult” (MM 6: 407).iv And so, Kant thinks of emotions as unpremeditated bursts of feeling (of pleasure or pain) that tend to block, or suppress, any rational reflection. They are explosions of pleasure or pain that put us in a state of mind that makes reasoned reflection very difficult. Now, it seems from just this much that the notion of an action arising directly from an emotion has no place in Kant’s system. After all, the faculty of desire is defined as the capacity to 4 bring things about through our actions. Desires provide the basis for the formation of maxims (which immediately precede action) insofar as they throw up incentives, which can be incorporated or not depending on the agent’s choice. The faculty of feeling only seems to fit into this system of action-production insofar as feelings provide the ground for desires. In the second Critique Kant says: “All inclination and every sensible impulse is grounded (gregründet) on feeling…” (Pr. R 5: 73). In the Religion Kant illustrates the grounding relation between pleasure and inclination with an example: A propensity is really only the predisposition to crave a delight (Genusses) which, when once experienced, arouses in the subject an inclination to it. Thus all savage peoples have a propensity for intoxicants; for though many of them are wholly ignorant of intoxication, let them but once sample it and there is aroused in them an almost inextinguishable craving for it. (Rel 6: 29n; 24n) The feeling of delight or enjoyment taken in the alcohol converts a propensity into an inclination or kind of desire. These passages imply that feelings (and, presumably, emotions) only cause actions insofar as they cause desires, which in turn cause actions through maxims. III But, in spite of this implication, Kant makes it clear in several places that emotions can produce actions directly. In the Anthropology he writes: “What the emotion of anger does not accomplish (tut) quickly will not be accomplished at all” (A 7: 252). An angry person might strike out or she might not. The clear suggestion here is that emotions can “accomplish” or “do” things. Elsewhere in the same book Kant writes: Emotions of anger and shame share the characteristic that they weaken themselves with regard to their purpose (Zweckes). They are suddenly aroused feelings against an evil which has been interpreted as an insult. However, these feelings are also incapacitating because of their intensity, so that the evil cannot be effectively averted. 5 Who is more to be feared, he who grows pale in violent anger, or he who flushes in the same situation? The first one is to be feared instantly; the second is more to be feared later (because of his vindictiveness). In the first case the upset person is terrified of himself because he fears being driven to violence which he might later repent. (A 7: 260; emphasis added)v Presumably, the end of anger is removing an evil, and thus one of Kant’s points in this passage is that anger often results in a failure to act in such a way as to remove the relevant evil. Now, to say that this particular emotion can be incapacitating and fall short of its end or purpose is to imply that there are some feelings (including, at times, anger) that can produce actions. Thus, there are some feelings that do not prevent the agent from fulfilling their end. In the third Critique Kant uses the same kind of language in describing the unprincipled nature of emotion-based action. He writes: [E]very emotion is blind, either in the choice of its end, or, even if this is given by reason, in its implementation (Ausführung); for it is that movement of the mind that makes it incapable of engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to determine itself in accordance with them. (CJ 5: 272)vi Kant argues here that emotions do not allow us to choose ends rationally, or to act rationally toward ends already (and, perhaps, rationally) given. So, even if there is a maxim recommending to us that we avert a particular danger, an emotion will cause an action that is aimed at this end but not reflectively so. Kant’s point seems to be that in emotion-based action there is no stepping back and reflecting upon all of the relevant factors in a given situation. Even in acting toward rationally given (or maxim-based) ends the emotional agent is irrational in that she fails to consider other relevant principles or maxims. Earlier, I noted that Kant defines emotions as feelings that tend to block rational reflection. We can see now that the kind of reflection that emotions suppress is reflection on maxims. So, for Kant, emotions produce actions immediately insofar as they tend to block a 6 potentially mediating consideration of all of the maxims relevant to a given situation. When Kant says that emotions do not give rise to the “process of reason whether one should submit to it or reject it” (A 7: 251) he means the process of considering (via our maxims) whether we should or should not act in a certain way. We can conclude, then, emotion-based action is precisely the kind of action that takes place in the absence of a consideration of maxims. Now, Kant’s anthropological thought also implicitly contains an explanation of how emotions block rational reflection on maxims. He writes in the Anthropology: On the whole, it is not the intensity of a certain feeling which creates the emotional state, but the want of reflection in the comparison of this feeling with the sum of all feelings (of pleasure or displeasure) in one’s own condition. The rich person, whose servant clumsily smashes a beautiful and rare crystal goblet while waiting on table, would consider this incident of no importance if he compared at that moment this loss of a single gratification with the multitude of all gratifications which his fortunate position as a rich person affords him. But if he completely leaves himself to this one feeling of grief (Nun überläßt er sich aber ganz allein diesem einen Gefühl des Schmerzes) (without making such a quick survey in his thoughts), then it is no wonder that he feels as if his whole state of happiness (Glückseligkeit) were lost. (A 7: 254)vii Kant’s point here is that emotions also result from a lack of reflection. Thus, emotions not only lead to a lack of rational reflection, but they can also arise from a lack of reflection. When the rich person (in the example) experiences pain at the loss of the expensive object this ordinary feeling of pain becomes an emotion if there is not an intervening thought about the relative value of the pleasure associated with this object. Clearly, Kant thinks that we are capable of rational reflection immediately after we experience a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. If there is no such reflection, then the agent is just “leaving himself” to the feeling without any modification that might come from reflecting upon his other pleasures. This lack of reflection can turn a feeling of pain at the loss of an expensive object (for example) into an emotion of anger. And so it seems 7 that emotions are both grounded in a lack of reflection and can lead to a lack of reflection. What is the connection between these two things? For Kant, an agent’s pleasures are built into her non-moral principles or maxims. In other words, it is with her pleasures in mind that an agent constructs or adopts her maxims. Thus, if the rich man from Kant’s example gets great pleasure from expensive objects he might adopt a maxim according to which he will purchase one such object per month. Now, it follows from this that his lack of reflection on the totality of his pleasures and the relative value of the pain incurred might include a failure to consider the principles of action related to these other pleasures. So, the rich person gets angry when he fails to consider the hundreds of beautiful objects that he possesses and his practice of purchasing more. The result of this lack of reflection on his pleasures - and, by extension, the principles linked to these pleasures - is an emotion, and insofar as this emotion leads to action it will do so without reflection on these same principles. And so, the reason that emotions block principled reflection, and can issue directly or immediately in unreflective action, is that emotions are those very things that arise from our ignoring all of the pleasures that provide the basis for our principles and principled action. Thus, an emotion results in a lack of reflection because it grows out of a lack of reflection. It is perhaps more accurate to say, then, that emotions themselves do not cause the inhibition of reflection so much as they arise through this inhibition, and then prevent reflection through their continued presence. IV So, emotions play a role in inhibiting the use of maxims. As a result, the actions that come from emotions are unprincipled - they are unmediated by maxims. Now, this understanding of the role of emotions challenges the more standard reading according to which Kant thinks that actions are either governed by rational principles or are merely automatic reflexes. Actions that are grounded in emotions are neither maxim-based nor simply automatic. But where, then, do these emotion-based actions fit in Kant’s system? Remember, I argued above that an action is 8 between rational and reflexive if it is (in some sense) chosen but not maxim-based. In this case, the agent would be responsible for the action but not in view of any maxim chosen. It will turn out that emotion-based actions are chosen in the sense that they could have been prevented through choices made prior to the occurrence of the emotion in question. Now, we have already established that Kant thinks that emotion-based actions are not grounded in maxims. What, then, is the sense in which emotion-based actions are chosen? In fact, there are two points at which we can see that emotion-based actions involve choice and therefore responsibility. First, an emotion-based action is not merely automatic insofar as there is the opportunity for us to reflect upon our feelings of pleasure or pain, and to block the outburst of an emotion in view of this reflection. Kant says that the rich person “leaves himself to…one feeling of grief” (A 7: 254). The implication here is that the agent has an opportunity to block an emotion by reflecting on the circumstances and principles surrounding his grief. Secondly, once the emotion is experienced Kant believes that although there is a tendency to proceed in the absence of principled reflection, this kind of reflection is not impossible. Remember, we saw above that Kant says of the violently angry person that he “is terrified of himself because he fears being driven to violence which he might later repent” (A 7: 260). On this account, the agent is capable, in the case of anger, of reflecting upon later consequences, fearing them and thus not acting. In this case, a maxim concerning avoidance of harmful consequences is allowed intervene and block an emotion-based action. Now, for Kant, both of these forms of control - controlling the outburst of emotions (through reflection) and the reaction to emotions (also through reflection) - are only possible after long-term efforts to master our feelings. The critical element here is time. On Kant’s account, the responsibility for controlling our emotions is something that we must exercise prior to an event in which our control over these emotions is tested. Kant discusses this issue in the following passage from the Anthropology: 9 Hot temper can be controlled gradually by inner discipline of the mind; but the weakness of an oversensitive feeling of honor at moments of shyness does not lend itself so easily to control. Hume says (who himself was afflicted with such an infirmity, namely shyness of making public statements), that if the first attempt at boldness fails, the result is more bashfulness. As remedy, nothing else remains but to begin to be with persons whose judgment concerning behavior one does not care much about, so that one can gradually overcome the supposed important judgment of others…. (A 7: 260; emphasis added) The outburst of overly sensitive emotions (or actions based on these emotions) can be controlled through sustained efforts. Thus, one can either train oneself not to feel emotions in the first place, and/or one can train oneself not to act in response to emotions. When we act directly out of an emotion, then, we have implicitly chosen to ignore both of these possible avenues. So, an action that comes directly out of an emotion is not a pure reflex (but rather something for which we are responsible) since it is something that, though we may not be able to control in the moment, we could have learned to control over time. 10 i In this paper, the following acronyms for Kant’s works will be used: Critique of Practical Reason, trans. by Beck (Pr. R), Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. by Guyer and Matthews (CJ), Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by Greene and Hudson (Rel), The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by Gregor (MM), Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. by Dowdell (A). All references are to the volume and page number of the “Akademie-Ausgabe.” [Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-)]. ii See Jeanine Grenberg, “Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant’s Theory of Action,” Kant-Studien (2001): 176. iii Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990. iv Translation modified. v I will return to the second paragraph of this example later. vi Translation modified. vii Translation modified. 11