Action, Emotion and Responsibility in Kanti
It is generally accepted that for Kant the hallmark of rational action is that it is maxim-based. On
this interpretation, Kant thinks that we do not act directly on the basis of desires. Instead, we act
out of principles of action or maxims. Even when we do things in an apparently unconscious way
- for example, reach for a hand towel or brush lint off a collar - we are guided by deeper rules that
are in principle accessible and thus available for adoption or rejection. So, our responsibility in
acting can be traced to the choice of underlying maxims that guide us. The passage that is perhaps
most important in the attribution of this view to Kant is from Religion Within the Limits of
Reason Alone. Kant writes: “An incentive can determine the will to an action only insofar as the
person has incorporated it into his maxim (has made it a general rule according to which he
intends to act)” (Rel 6: 24; 19; emphasis added). Some scholars have interpreted this passage to
mean that for Kant “actions” are only possible when incentives are incorporated into maxims.
Thus, a piece of behavior is only an action (for which we are responsible) if is maxim-based.ii If it
is not maxim-based then it is not an action but merely an automatic reflex.
But this strict dichotomy between rational maxim-based actions and reflexes begs a
question. What about all those “actions” we perform that appear to be thoroughly spontaneous
and/or unprincipled, and yet are not really reflexes? Think of impulsively banging your fist on a
table in anger, or bursting into song in the shower. We can well imagine that there might not be
underlying, or background, principles rationally justifying actions such as these. Are they then
simply automatic reflexes? What about those “actions” that directly contravene principles that we
hold such as smoking cigarettes against our pledge not to? Is there no place for these irrational
and/or weak “actions” in Kant’s system? If there is not, then Kant appears to be vulnerable to a
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version of the traditional criticism that he exaggerates the centrality and importance of rationality
in human action. Kant’s strict division between reason-based action and reflex (if there is such a
thing) would seem to tie our responsibility for actions too closely to our rational use of maxims.
In this short paper I will defend Kant against this criticism by arguing that he believes in
a third kind of human behavior: action that is emotion-based. Emotion-based actions will turn out
to be somewhere between principled actions and mere knee jerk reflexes. In making this
argument I will proceed in four main steps. First, in section I I will present a brief account of
what the divide between an action and a mere reflex really amounts to. This will give us a sense
for what an action that belongs between these two might look like. In section II I will introduce
Kant’s understanding of emotion by situating this notion in the context of his primary
psychological categories. In section III I will provide evidence for the claim that there are
emotion-based actions in Kant, and then go on to explain the sense in which these actions are not
connected to maxims. Finally, in section IV I will show how these actions provide us with a third
possibility: actions for which we are responsible that are neither fully rational (in the sense of
being maxim-based) nor merely reflex reactions.
I
In his book Kant’s Theory of Freedom Henry Allison is concerned to show that for Kant
non-moral actions are not mechanically necessitated.iii Allison argues that Kant thinks that all
actions are free insofar as they involve the incorporation of incentives into maxims. In
maintaining that all actions (moral and non-moral) are maxim-based and free Allison draws a
radical divide between rational and free action on the one hand, and merely determined bits of
behavior on the other. This division goes a long way toward putting to rest the concern that (on
Kant’s system) immoral actions are determined and thus not actions for which the agent is
responsible. Allison’s division is certainly useful insofar as it removes this concern. But perhaps
there is reason to pause here. Strictly speaking, the Incorporation Thesis does not rule out the
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possibility that Kant believes in actions for which one is somehow responsible that are (at the
same time) not maxim-based. After all, the Incorporation Thesis just says that for incentives to
determine the will they must be incorporated into maxims. Clearly, this leaves open the
possibility that the will might be determined in some way that does not directly involve maxims.
Now, what exactly is the difference between an action and a reflex on Allison’s account?
It is worth emphasizing that the relevant difference is not that one is conscious and the other
unconscious. Of course, it is true that reflex actions are unconsciously caused, but at the same
time it seems that there are many actions that Kantians such as Allison would acknowledge are
maxim-based and yet largely unconscious. Think of walking into a room and sitting in a chair.
The “decision” to sit down is often one to which we give no conscious thought. How, then, can it
be a maxim-based decision? Allison argues that: “I cannot act on principle without an awareness
of that principle, although I need not be explicitly aware of myself as acting on that principle”
(Allison 1990, 90). His point is that on some level we must be aware of the principle in question,
though we do not have to be aware of it as the basis for the action that we are performing. Allison
goes on to claim that should we so desire we can self-reflectively access our maxims. This
suggests that should we so choose we can always reject our maxims or adopt new ones. It seems
to follow from this that every time we act on a maxim (even if we do not do so self-reflectively)
we implicitly choose this maxim as a basis for action.
In light of this we can conclude that the main difference between actions and reflexes (on
the Kantian model) is that the former are chosen and the latter are not. A reflex is not a behavior
that the agent chooses in any sense; it is not something for which the agent is responsible. So, in
order to qualify as an action there must be some choice involved in the production of a piece of
behavior. If it can be shown, then, that Kant believes in actions that both involve some kind of
choice and yet are not maxim-based, then there will be good reason to believe that the distinction
between maxim-based actions and reflexes is not exhaustive.
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II
Kant’s two practical psychological faculties are the faculty of desire and the faculty of
feeling. The faculty of desire is the ability or power by which we bring things into existence. Kant
writes: “The faculty of desire is the power to cause the objects of one’s mental representations by
means of these same representations” (MM 6: 211). The determination of the faculty of desire
produces a desire, and thus a desire is that by which we bring things into existence via the ideas
that we have of these things. Inclinations, passions and instincts are all kinds of desire. Kant
differentiates these desires in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View on the basis of their
origins, the frequency with which they are experienced and the kinds of consciousness that
accompanies them. The faculty of feeling, on the other hand, is the capacity to experience
feelings. More specifically, it is the capacity to experience feelings of pleasure or pain in response
to a representation. Kant writes: “The capacity (Fähigkeit) for having pleasure or displeasure in a
representation is called ‘feeling’…” (MM 6: 211). All of the feelings that we usually differentiate
- such as love, worry, sadness, etc., - are (for Kant) simply pleasure and pain experienced in
different contexts, and/or caused by different things, and/or felt to different degrees.
For Kant, emotions are feelings of a certain kind. They are sudden outbursts of pleasure
or pain which “exclude the sovereignty of reason” (A 7: 251). In the Anthropology Kant says that
emotion “is the feeling of a pleasure or displeasure at a particular moment, which does not give
rise to reflection (namely the process of reason whether one should submit to it or reject it)” (A 7:
251). He echoes this point in the Metaphysics of Morals saying: “Emotions belong to feeling
insofar as, preceding reflection, it makes this impossible or more difficult” (MM 6: 407).iv And
so, Kant thinks of emotions as unpremeditated bursts of feeling (of pleasure or pain) that tend to
block, or suppress, any rational reflection. They are explosions of pleasure or pain that put us in a
state of mind that makes reasoned reflection very difficult.
Now, it seems from just this much that the notion of an action arising directly from an
emotion has no place in Kant’s system. After all, the faculty of desire is defined as the capacity to
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bring things about through our actions. Desires provide the basis for the formation of maxims
(which immediately precede action) insofar as they throw up incentives, which can be
incorporated or not depending on the agent’s choice. The faculty of feeling only seems to fit into
this system of action-production insofar as feelings provide the ground for desires. In the second
Critique Kant says: “All inclination and every sensible impulse is grounded (gregründet) on
feeling…” (Pr. R 5: 73). In the Religion Kant illustrates the grounding relation between pleasure
and inclination with an example:
A propensity is really only the predisposition to crave a delight (Genusses) which, when
once experienced, arouses in the subject an inclination to it. Thus all savage peoples have
a propensity for intoxicants; for though many of them are wholly ignorant of intoxication,
let them but once sample it and there is aroused in them an almost inextinguishable
craving for it. (Rel 6: 29n; 24n)
The feeling of delight or enjoyment taken in the alcohol converts a propensity into an inclination
or kind of desire. These passages imply that feelings (and, presumably, emotions) only cause
actions insofar as they cause desires, which in turn cause actions through maxims.
III
But, in spite of this implication, Kant makes it clear in several places that emotions can
produce actions directly. In the Anthropology he writes: “What the emotion of anger does not
accomplish (tut) quickly will not be accomplished at all” (A 7: 252). An angry person might
strike out or she might not. The clear suggestion here is that emotions can “accomplish” or “do”
things. Elsewhere in the same book Kant writes:
Emotions of anger and shame share the characteristic that they weaken themselves with
regard to their purpose (Zweckes). They are suddenly aroused feelings against an evil
which has been interpreted as an insult. However, these feelings are also incapacitating
because of their intensity, so that the evil cannot be effectively averted.
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Who is more to be feared, he who grows pale in violent anger, or he who flushes in the
same situation? The first one is to be feared instantly; the second is more to be feared
later (because of his vindictiveness). In the first case the upset person is terrified of
himself because he fears being driven to violence which he might later repent. (A 7: 260;
emphasis added)v
Presumably, the end of anger is removing an evil, and thus one of Kant’s points in this passage is
that anger often results in a failure to act in such a way as to remove the relevant evil. Now, to say
that this particular emotion can be incapacitating and fall short of its end or purpose is to imply
that there are some feelings (including, at times, anger) that can produce actions. Thus, there are
some feelings that do not prevent the agent from fulfilling their end.
In the third Critique Kant uses the same kind of language in describing the unprincipled
nature of emotion-based action. He writes:
[E]very emotion is blind, either in the choice of its end, or, even if this is given by reason,
in its implementation (Ausführung); for it is that movement of the mind that makes it
incapable of engaging in free consideration of principles, in order to determine itself in
accordance with them. (CJ 5: 272)vi
Kant argues here that emotions do not allow us to choose ends rationally, or to act rationally
toward ends already (and, perhaps, rationally) given. So, even if there is a maxim recommending
to us that we avert a particular danger, an emotion will cause an action that is aimed at this end
but not reflectively so. Kant’s point seems to be that in emotion-based action there is no stepping
back and reflecting upon all of the relevant factors in a given situation. Even in acting toward
rationally given (or maxim-based) ends the emotional agent is irrational in that she fails to
consider other relevant principles or maxims.
Earlier, I noted that Kant defines emotions as feelings that tend to block rational
reflection. We can see now that the kind of reflection that emotions suppress is reflection on
maxims. So, for Kant, emotions produce actions immediately insofar as they tend to block a
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potentially mediating consideration of all of the maxims relevant to a given situation. When Kant
says that emotions do not give rise to the “process of reason whether one should submit to it or
reject it” (A 7: 251) he means the process of considering (via our maxims) whether we should or
should not act in a certain way. We can conclude, then, emotion-based action is precisely the kind
of action that takes place in the absence of a consideration of maxims.
Now, Kant’s anthropological thought also implicitly contains an explanation of how
emotions block rational reflection on maxims. He writes in the Anthropology:
On the whole, it is not the intensity of a certain feeling which creates the emotional state,
but the want of reflection in the comparison of this feeling with the sum of all feelings (of
pleasure or displeasure) in one’s own condition. The rich person, whose servant clumsily
smashes a beautiful and rare crystal goblet while waiting on table, would consider this
incident of no importance if he compared at that moment this loss of a single gratification
with the multitude of all gratifications which his fortunate position as a rich person
affords him. But if he completely leaves himself to this one feeling of grief (Nun überläßt
er sich aber ganz allein diesem einen Gefühl des Schmerzes) (without making such a
quick survey in his thoughts), then it is no wonder that he feels as if his whole state of
happiness (Glückseligkeit) were lost. (A 7: 254)vii
Kant’s point here is that emotions also result from a lack of reflection. Thus, emotions not only
lead to a lack of rational reflection, but they can also arise from a lack of reflection. When the
rich person (in the example) experiences pain at the loss of the expensive object this ordinary
feeling of pain becomes an emotion if there is not an intervening thought about the relative value
of the pleasure associated with this object. Clearly, Kant thinks that we are capable of rational
reflection immediately after we experience a feeling of pleasure or displeasure. If there is no such
reflection, then the agent is just “leaving himself” to the feeling without any modification that
might come from reflecting upon his other pleasures. This lack of reflection can turn a feeling of
pain at the loss of an expensive object (for example) into an emotion of anger. And so it seems
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that emotions are both grounded in a lack of reflection and can lead to a lack of reflection. What
is the connection between these two things?
For Kant, an agent’s pleasures are built into her non-moral principles or maxims. In other
words, it is with her pleasures in mind that an agent constructs or adopts her maxims. Thus, if the
rich man from Kant’s example gets great pleasure from expensive objects he might adopt a
maxim according to which he will purchase one such object per month. Now, it follows from this
that his lack of reflection on the totality of his pleasures and the relative value of the pain incurred
might include a failure to consider the principles of action related to these other pleasures. So, the
rich person gets angry when he fails to consider the hundreds of beautiful objects that he
possesses and his practice of purchasing more. The result of this lack of reflection on his
pleasures - and, by extension, the principles linked to these pleasures - is an emotion, and insofar
as this emotion leads to action it will do so without reflection on these same principles. And so,
the reason that emotions block principled reflection, and can issue directly or immediately in
unreflective action, is that emotions are those very things that arise from our ignoring all of the
pleasures that provide the basis for our principles and principled action. Thus, an emotion results
in a lack of reflection because it grows out of a lack of reflection. It is perhaps more accurate to
say, then, that emotions themselves do not cause the inhibition of reflection so much as they arise
through this inhibition, and then prevent reflection through their continued presence.
IV
So, emotions play a role in inhibiting the use of maxims. As a result, the actions that
come from emotions are unprincipled - they are unmediated by maxims. Now, this understanding
of the role of emotions challenges the more standard reading according to which Kant thinks that
actions are either governed by rational principles or are merely automatic reflexes. Actions that
are grounded in emotions are neither maxim-based nor simply automatic. But where, then, do
these emotion-based actions fit in Kant’s system? Remember, I argued above that an action is
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between rational and reflexive if it is (in some sense) chosen but not maxim-based. In this case,
the agent would be responsible for the action but not in view of any maxim chosen. It will turn
out that emotion-based actions are chosen in the sense that they could have been prevented
through choices made prior to the occurrence of the emotion in question.
Now, we have already established that Kant thinks that emotion-based actions are not
grounded in maxims. What, then, is the sense in which emotion-based actions are chosen? In fact,
there are two points at which we can see that emotion-based actions involve choice and therefore
responsibility. First, an emotion-based action is not merely automatic insofar as there is the
opportunity for us to reflect upon our feelings of pleasure or pain, and to block the outburst of an
emotion in view of this reflection. Kant says that the rich person “leaves himself to…one feeling
of grief” (A 7: 254). The implication here is that the agent has an opportunity to block an emotion
by reflecting on the circumstances and principles surrounding his grief. Secondly, once the
emotion is experienced Kant believes that although there is a tendency to proceed in the absence
of principled reflection, this kind of reflection is not impossible. Remember, we saw above that
Kant says of the violently angry person that he “is terrified of himself because he fears being
driven to violence which he might later repent” (A 7: 260). On this account, the agent is capable,
in the case of anger, of reflecting upon later consequences, fearing them and thus not acting. In
this case, a maxim concerning avoidance of harmful consequences is allowed intervene and block
an emotion-based action.
Now, for Kant, both of these forms of control - controlling the outburst of emotions
(through reflection) and the reaction to emotions (also through reflection) - are only possible after
long-term efforts to master our feelings. The critical element here is time. On Kant’s account, the
responsibility for controlling our emotions is something that we must exercise prior to an event in
which our control over these emotions is tested. Kant discusses this issue in the following passage
from the Anthropology:
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Hot temper can be controlled gradually by inner discipline of the mind; but the weakness
of an oversensitive feeling of honor at moments of shyness does not lend itself so easily
to control. Hume says (who himself was afflicted with such an infirmity, namely shyness
of making public statements), that if the first attempt at boldness fails, the result is more
bashfulness. As remedy, nothing else remains but to begin to be with persons whose
judgment concerning behavior one does not care much about, so that one can gradually
overcome the supposed important judgment of others…. (A 7: 260; emphasis added)
The outburst of overly sensitive emotions (or actions based on these emotions) can be controlled
through sustained efforts. Thus, one can either train oneself not to feel emotions in the first place,
and/or one can train oneself not to act in response to emotions. When we act directly out of an
emotion, then, we have implicitly chosen to ignore both of these possible avenues. So, an action
that comes directly out of an emotion is not a pure reflex (but rather something for which we are
responsible) since it is something that, though we may not be able to control in the moment, we
could have learned to control over time.
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i
In this paper, the following acronyms for Kant’s works will be used: Critique of Practical Reason, trans.
by Beck (Pr. R), Critique of the Power of Judgment, trans. by Guyer and Matthews (CJ), Religion Within
the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. by Greene and Hudson (Rel), The Metaphysics of Morals, trans. by
Gregor (MM), Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, trans. by Dowdell (A). All references are to
the volume and page number of the “Akademie-Ausgabe.” [Kants gesammelte Schriften, edited by
Deutschen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, 29 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1902-)].
ii
See Jeanine Grenberg, “Feeling, Desire and Interest in Kant’s Theory of Action,” Kant-Studien (2001):
176.
iii
Henry Allison, Kant’s Theory of Freedom. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
iv
Translation modified.
v
I will return to the second paragraph of this example later.
vi
Translation modified.
vii
Translation modified.
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