The causes of hunger.
Viktor Kondrashin
(translated by SGW)
The famine of 1932-1933 is the result of agrarian policy of the Stalinist leadership of the
USSR.
This agricultural policy was caused by the needs of industrialization, which were actively
pursued in the USSR by Stalin's leadership in the early thirties.
Funds were necessary for industrialization. They could only be obtained from within the
country. Only agriculture could provide these funds. And first of all, this meant bread.
Bread could be sold abroad and the proceeds used to buy equipment for the first five year
plan.
But a lot of bread was required and at very short notice. Small peasant farms were not
able to provide this. The grain collection crisis of 1927-1928 showed this. Therefore it
was necessary to change agriculture in the USSR. And Stalin's leadership did so,
beginning in 1930 with the collectivization of agriculture.
Collective farms had to dramatically increase commodity grain production. They had to
quickly give the state a large amount of grain. In addition, the collective farms had to
feed the cities, where the population was growing as a result of the construction of
factories, as part of the industrialization policy.
Collectivisation was begun, because Stalin and his team won the inter-party struggle for
power within the Communist Party. Stalin refused to slow the pace of collectivization,
which Bukharin and the so-called «right» (Rykov, and others) had introduced into the
first five-year plan.
Stalin's leadership took a policy of a fast rate of collectivization in two years.
Furthermore, Stalin's leadership initiated a policy de-kulakization, «the elimination of the
kulak as a class». At its core, this policy of dekulakization was a policy of intimidation of
those peasant farmers who do not wish to enter into a collective farm. Also, it was a
policy of suppressing the enemies of collectivisation in the village, who were the
«kulaks», strong and prosperous farmers.
Stalin did not want a famine, he did not plan one. This is contrary to his plans for rapid
industrialization. The country needed a labour force. There are no documents indicating
that Stalin planned a famine.
Why did the famine occur? This question has a common answer. «We want it better, but
it turned out as usual» - these are the well-known words of the Russian Ambassador to
Ukraine VS Chernomyrdin. They are appropriate. They help explain the main cause of
the famine.
The main cause of the famine - was the mistakes of the Stalin leadership in its policy of
collectivization.
First, collectivization was poorly prepared. It was poorly provided with material
resources, especially with agricultural machinery. That is tractors, combines and other
machinery, which were simply not available in the Soviet Union in the required amounts.
For example, the Kharkov and Stalingrad tractor factories only began to be built in the
early thirties.
Secondly, collectivization was carried out the Stalin regime by the use of violence
against the peasantry. This had very negative results. The vast mass of peasants did not
want to join the collective farms. It was therefore necessary to force them to join by
force. Peasants were afraid of being dekulakised. The state set high taxes for the peasants
who did not want to join the collective farm, and this devastated their economy and
forced them to join the collective farm.
But the major problem with collectivization was the state system of grain collections.
This system came into effect in 1930. It was aimed at obtaining from the collective farms
and peasant households as much grain as possible. Stalin had the illusion, that the
collective farms would give a lot of grain, because they were large farms and were
supported by state machinery, and other measures.
At first glance, this is what appeared to have happened in 1930. Because that year the
Soviet Union had the largest grain harvest in recent years. And Stalin thought that was
the result of the policy of collectivization. But in fact this was the result of the very good
weather of that year.
1930 was a year when the grain collection plans were able to take from the village a huge
amount of grain, twice as much as before the beginning of collectivization. This year
demonstrated the main drawback of the planning system - this was the attempt to take
from the village as much grain as possible, regardless of the interests of farmers.
The result of this huge seizure of grain from the village in 1930 was a lack of feed for
livestock. Therefore, we see beginning in 1930, a catastrophic reduction in livestock
numbers in the village, especially horses and cattle. The collective farms had a deficit of
fodder for livestock. And the cattle simply die from lack thereof.
Another negative result of the collection of grain was a decline in the peasant’s interest in
working on the collective farm. As a result of the 1930 grain collections, the peasants did
not receive fair payment for their work in the collective farm. Therefore, they had to
support themselves through other means. Among them – was the use of their own
livestock in the winter of 1930-1931 as food. In the first years of collectivization there
was a very large number of peasants leaving the village to seek work in the city.
These facts had a very negative impact on agricultural production. They led to a drop in
grain yields in the Soviet Union and to other negative consequences.
The system of planning grain collections in the USSR was illogical, because it do not
take into account the real situation in agriculture. Plans were set on the basis of
information from regions on the scale of sown area and average level yields for this area
in recent years. These plans were approved by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture
of the USSR (Narkomzem USSR) and the People’s Commissariat of supply the Soviet
Union (Narkomsnab USSR).
In 1930 - 1931 years as a result of collectivisation the sown area in the USSR was
significantly increased, since collective farms were expected to given more grain. For the
local authorities the indicator of a growth in collective farm sown area was the main
argument in showing the success of collectivization. Therefore, they all strongly
stimulated this process in their regions. The central government also strongly supported
this policy.
But in reality, a growth in the sown area did not necessarily mean improved work from
the kolkhoz peasants. As a result of the reduced number of working cattle, and the falling
interest of the collective farmers in working on the collective farms, the yields on this
sown area would not be high. But local authorities were not prepared to accept this, and
therefore they reported these inflated yield figures to the Center.
In addition, the local authorities in the regions often inflated the size of sown area on
their collective farms in order to impress the Center with their success in collectivization.
As a result of this situation the central government’s agricultural organs began to
overestimate planned collection of grain from the collective farms.
This was particularly the case in 1931.
It should be emphasized that the negative effects of collectivization and planned grain
procurements were made worse by the drought of 1931.
Thus, the cause of the famine was the complicated interaction of collectivization and the
system of planned grain collections. It was the result of the bureaucratic management in
agriculture which prevailed in the early thirties. This was a system which was designed to
receive from the village as many resources, especially of grain, as possible without taking
into account the interests of farmers.
Because the system of planning grain collection was flawed, its shortcomings had to be
compensated for by the application of violence against the peasantry. The Stalin regime
did everything possible to assist this. This was the force of state power. Documents show
that this was the case.
The documents indicate that there was a single mechanism causing famine in the USSR.
The massive famine with all its horrors occurred in grain regions of the USSR, because
these areas were the main source of obtaining grain for export to Western Europe. The
strength of the famine is determined by the share of the grain regions in grain collections
and grain exports. The victims of hunger in the grain regions were proportional to their
population. That is, the percentage of victims was comparable.
In Ukraine, the famine had the same causes as in other areas. There is not a single
convincing document that anywhere mentions the existence of a Stalin plan to organize
a «Genocide» of the Ukrainian people through starvation.
Famine 1932 - 1933 years - is the tragedy of the peoples of the Soviet Union.
This tragedy should not divide but should unite peoples, especially the peoples of Russia
and Ukraine as a common tragedy.