CHAPTER 7
THE EFFECTIVENESS OF SIGNALING AND DETERRENCE
I. The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Incident
On May 22, 1995, the White House approved a visa for Taiwanese President Lee
Teng-hui to visit the United States to attend a reunion at Cornell University, where
President Lee received his Ph.D. degree in 1968. The very next day, a Chinese foreign
ministry statement charged that this was an extremely serious move by the United States
to openly create “two Chinas” or “one China, one Taiwan” which totally contravened the
fundamental principles enshrined in the three Sino-U.S. joint communiqués. The
statement also said this was just the latest step in President Lee’s efforts to create “one
China and one Taiwan.”1
On June 16, when President Lee Teng-hui returned to Taiwan, China’s Taiwan
Affairs Office (TAO) under the State Council, proclaimed the suspension of the second
“Koo-Wang Talks” and China recalled its ambassador to the United States, Li Daoyu. In
addition, a Xinhua New Agency commentary on June 17 criticized the United States for
continuously adjusting its policy toward Taiwan since 1994, eventually reaching so grave
a point as to allow President Lee to visit the United States. “Lee’s words and deeds made
all too clear to the world his design to create ‘two Chinas’ or ‘one China, one Taiwan’,”
1
“Chinese FM Statement on U.S. Allowing Lee Teng-hui's Visit,” Xinhua News Agency, May 23, 1995.
234
the commentary noted. 2 In early 1996, Premier Li Peng claimed that the Taiwan
authorities’ fundamental purpose was to separate Taiwan from China and carry out
“Taiwan independence.”3
In response to President Lee Teng-hui’s visit to the United States, Beijing launched
six waves of military exercises aimed at Taiwan from July 1995 to March 1996. Starting
on July 21-26, 1995, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) launched a series of missile
tests and naval and air exercises in waters near Taiwan. It launched six surface-to-surface
missiles approximately 185 km from Taiwan. On August 15-25, the PLA held a second
series of military exercises, including guided missile, cannon, and other military tests in
the sea 136 km north of Taiwan. In late November, PLA marines and tanks made a
beachhead landing exercise backed by fighters and naval vessels.
On March 8-18, 1996, the PLA conducted surface-to-surface missile tests on a target
area just off the coast of Taiwan’s two largest port cities. Three missiles were launched on
target areas just twenty nautical miles from Keelung, Taiwan’s second busiest seaport, and
just outside of Kaohsiung harbor, the third largest container port in the world. On March
12-20, the PLA conducted air and naval exercises with live ammunition in waters near
Taiwan. On March 18-25, the PLA conducted a wave of joint ground, naval and air
exercises near the Pingtan Island, within ten nautical miles of Taiwan-controlled islands.
Through these actions Beijing intended to signal its disapproval of Taiwan and the
United States, and its resolve to deter Taipei and Washington from further acts supporting
Taiwan independence. Beijing chose military exercises and missile tests, coupled with
2
3
“USA; Commentary on Sino-US Relations Denounces US ‘Perfidy’” (in Chinese), New China News
Agency Domestic Service, June 17, 1995, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, June 19, 1995,
FE/2333/G.
“Text of Li Peng’s speech on reunification of motherland” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service,
January 30, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-021.
235
rhetorical threats, as a means to convey its determination and resolve. For example, after
the first wave of missile tests and military exercises in late July 1995, Beijing’s Xinhua
News Agency stated, “If some people were to dare separate Taiwan from Chinese territory,
the Chinese people would defend the country’s sovereignty and territorial integrity with
blood and lives.”[emphasis added]4
Thereafter, China’s civilian and military leaders have stated many times, in particular
before Taiwan’s December 1995 Legislative Yuan election and March 1996 presidential
election, that “The PLA will never sit idly when a single inch of territory is split off
China,” and that military exercises show China’s “determination and ability to safeguard
[its] sovereignty and territorial integrity.” In addition, Beijing would like to “make the
United States realize the importance of U.S.-China relations to prompt it to take the right
track” and deter the United States from interference and attempting to promote “Taiwan
independence.”5
Beijing also tried to coerce Taipei to change its policy. For example, on September 1,
1995, Chinese Defense Minister Chi Haotian warned, “If the Taiwan authorities cling
4
5
Suisheng Zhao, “Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing’s Strategy of National Reunification
with Taiwan,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 27, no. 4 (1999), p. 497.
“Taiwan; PLA Chief Zhang Wannian Says Army Will Not ‘Sit Idly’ on Sovereignty Issue,” Xinhua News
Agency, August 24, 1995, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, August 25, 1995, FE/D2391/G.
“China Defends Intimidatory Military Exercise,” Agence France Presse, November 28, 1995. “Chinese
Premier Li Peng Calls Taiwan Independence Seekers ‘Arch-criminals’” (in Chinese), Xinhua News
Agency, January 30, 1996, in BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, January 31, 1996, FE/D2523/F. “PRC:
Editorial on Jiang’s speech on Taiwan Issue” (in Chinese), Xinhua Hong Kong Service, January 30, 1996,
in FBIS-CHI-96-021. “Taiwan Issue, Focal Point of Chinese FM’s Press Conference,” Beijing Xinhua,
March 11, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-048. Renmin Ribao and Jiefangjun Bao Editorial Departments,
“Safeguarding the Motherland’s Unity Is The People’s Army’s Bound Duty” (in Chinese), Beijing
Xinhua Domestic Service, March 15, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-053. Rongdian Zhang, “Zhang Zhen meets
French visitors; views Taiwan crisis” (in Chinese), Xinhua Domestic Service, March 18, 1996, in
FBIS-CHI-96-055. Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility,
and the Use of Force,” International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), p. 95. ”PRC: Spokesman blames
Taiwan for lack of talks” (in Chinese), Zhongguo Xinwen She, January 30, 1996, in FBIS-CHI-96-020.
Renmin Ribao and Jiefangjun Bao Editorial Departments, “Li Denghui Practicing Taiwan Independence
Is the Biggest Danger for Taiwan” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, March 8, 1996, in
FBIS-CHI-96-048.
236
obstinately to their course of trying to split China, the Chinese government will never sit
back and watch.”6 From late January through February, the PLA amassed more than
150,000 troops in Fujian Province, directly across the Taiwan Strait. Beijing explained,
“The most urgent thing for the Taiwan authorities to do is to give up attempts to create
‘two Chinas,’ or ‘one China one Taiwan,’ and abandon their splittist policies.”7
Moreover, Beijing tried to influence Taiwan’s December 1995 Legislative Yuan
election and March 1996 presidential election by undermining President Lee Teng-hui’s
position. For instance, by August 1995, upward of 400 articles in the Chinese press
attacked President Lee by name.8 On March 7, 1996 the PLA fired three M-9 missiles
into the waters near Taiwan. That day, Defense Minister Chi Haotian explained, “[W]e
have more troops stationed in Fujian because we are facing a grim situation, in which Lee
Teng-hui and his gang are vainly attempting to split China.”9 A March 8 joint editorial in
the Renmin Ribao and the Jiefangjun Bao asserted, “The tension that has emerged in the
Taiwan Strait is purely due to Lee Teng-hui’s perverse acts of advocating Taiwan
independence and going all-out to practice ‘two China’ or ‘one China and one Taiwan.’
The real danger is letting Lee Teng-hui continue to advocate Taiwan independence and
undermine the reunification of the motherland. This will bring grave calamities to the 21
million compatriots in Taiwan.”10
“Chinese Defense Minister on Taiwan Issue,” Xinhua News Agency, September 1, 1995.
Steven Mufson, “China Masses Troops on Coast Near Taiwan,” Washington Post, February 1, 1996, p.
A16.
8
Allen S. Whiting, “China’s Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan,” International Security, vol. 26, no. 2
(Fall 2001), p. 121.
9
Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,”
International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), p. 107.
10
Editorial Departments of Renmin Ribao and Jiefangjun Bao, “Li Denghui Practicing Taiwan
Independence Is the Biggest Danger for Taiwan” (in Chinese), Xinhua Domestic Service, March 8, 1996,
in FBIS-96-048.
6
7
237
II. The 1999-2000 Taiwan Strait Incident
On July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui stated in an interview with Deutsche Welle
that the relationship between the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of China
on Taiwan is a “state-to-state or at least a special state-to-state relationship” (two-state
theory). On July 15, MAC Chairman Su Chi explained that President Lee wished to
debunk Beijing’s “one China” myth.11
President Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” again incited severe criticism from
China. On July 11, China’s TAO spokesman said, “The fact that Lee Teng-hui brazenly
twisted cross-Strait relations as ‘state-to-state relations’ once again exposed his consistent
malice of splitting China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, and his attempt to separate
Taiwan from China. His words showed that he is in collaboration with the ‘Taiwan
Independence’ splittist force and is moving further ahead in the path toward splitting the
motherland.”12
On July 14, a commentator’s article in the Renmin Ribao bitterly charged that the
secessionist statements made by President Lee Teng-hui “have completely unmasked their
longstanding and deliberate attempts to divide China’s territory and sovereignty…. [and]
bared his real secessionist intention.” 13 A Renmin Ribao commentary on July 19
contended, “[T]he political essence of Lee Teng-hui’s ‘state-to-state theory’ is the same as
Taiwan independence.”14
11
12
13
14
Wendy Chung, “Su Chi Says Taiwan Seeks to Build Democratic ‘New China’,” Taiwan Central News
Agency, July 15, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0715.
“CPC Taiwan Affairs Spokesman Criticizes Li’s Remarks” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic
Service, July 11, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0711.
Renmin Ribao Commentator, “Undermining the One China Principle Is the Crucial Issue” (in Chinese),
Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, July 13, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0713.
Taiwen Guo, “Behind Separatist Drama,” Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (Overseas edition), July 19,
1999, p. 1.
238
Beijing responded to President Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory” by canceling Wang
Daohan’s scheduled trip to Taiwan while Chinese officials at various levels gave the
impression that China was considering some form of military action against Taiwan.
According to statistics compiled by Taiwan’s MAC, from July to August 1999, there were
124 headlines about the Taiwan Strait crisis in the Hong Kong media. Due to a big
earthquake in Taiwan on September 21, China reduced the tensions across Taiwan Strait
by leaking fewer threats from the PLA and other sources. However, the reports of tensions
increased after October. In November, there were 43 headlines about the Taiwan Strait
crisis in the Hong Kong media. From July 11, 1999, to February 18, 2000, there were 179
reports and commentaries regarding possible Chinese military action against Taiwan.15
These reports and commentaries were not necessarily manipulated by Chinese
authorities, but the huge volume of reports and commentaries, backed up with Chinese
military exercises and deployment, de facto became a part of China’s deterrent effort
toward Taiwan. China publicly confirmed on July 15 what international security experts
have known for years that it possesses the technology to build a neutron bomb as well as
the W-88, the most advanced miniaturized warhead. “Wartime mobilization drills” were
held along the coast facing Taiwan on July 17-18. Chinese and Taiwanese fighter jets flew
hundreds of sorties between mid-July and early August along the center line of the
Taiwan Strait, a line previously given wide berth by both sides. On August 2, China tested
its Dongfeng 31 (DF-31) missiles, which has a range of about 5,000 miles and can carry a
miniaturized nuclear warhead. On November 23, Chinese media reported the expansion
in mid-October of a missile base across from Taiwan where nearly 100 of Beijing’s
15
Zhen-chang Cai, “Main Characteristics of China’s Psychological Warfare in the Taiwan Strait” (in
Chinese), Mainland Affairs Council (Taiwan), Mainland Work Briefing, March 9, 2000,
http://www.mac.gov.tw/mlpolicy/mwreport/8903/1-3.htm, accessed January 25, 2001.
239
newest short-range missiles (CSS-7 or M-11) systems were to be deployed. From October
1999 to February 2000, Chinese military conducted five large-scale military exercises.16
Parenthetically, in that period the United States sought to reassure China that it did not
accept President Lee Teng-hui’s “two-state theory.”
Just as in the 1995-96 crisis, Beijing tried to signal its disapproval of Taipei’s policy,
to deter Taipei from further acts supporting Taiwan independence, to coerce Taipei to
change its policy, and to shape Taiwan’s March 2000 presidential election in Beijing’s
favor. On July 15, 1999, a Jiefangjun Bao commentary article warned, “We will never sit
idly by and watch any territory severing from our motherland, not even one single inch.
The People’s Liberation Army…has the strong determination and sufficient strength to
safeguard national sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national unity.”17
Furthermore, China’s White Paper on Taiwan published on February 21, 2000,
explicitly laid out three conditions for the use of force against Taiwan: (1) any major
incidents of separation of Taiwan from China, under whatever pretext; (2) invasion and
occupation of Taiwan by foreign countries; and (3) the Taiwan authorities indefinite
rejection of peaceful resolution to the issue of cross-Strait reunification through
negotiations.18 The third condition represented a new explicit and formal threat and put
more psychological pressure on Taipei.
On March 5, two weeks before Taiwan’s presidential election, Premier Zhu Rongji
16
17
18
Seth Faison, “The China Cloud: Is a Bomb Being Waved at Taiwan?” New York Times, July 16, 1999, p.
A3. Oliver August, “Beijing Flexes Muscles in Taiwan Strait,” Times, July 19, 1999. John Pomfret and
Steven Mufson, “China, Taiwan Step Up Sorties Over Strait,” Washington Post, August 3, 1999, p. A1.
Willy Wo-Lap Lam, “PLA Elite Moved to Taiwan Region,” South China Morning Post, August 10, 1999,
p. 1. Bill Gertz, “China Points More Missiles at Taiwan,” Washington Times, November 23, 1999, p. A1.
A Jiefangjun Bao commentator, “Li Denghui, Don’t Play with Fire Again!” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua
Domestic Service, July 14, 1999, in FBIS-CHI-1999-0714..
“One China Principle & Taiwan Issue (Excerpts)” (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service,
February 21, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0221.
240
renewed the Chinese threat, warning, “We will not sit idly by and watch any serious
separatist activity aimed at undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, such
as those advocating the ‘two-state theory’ or ‘the independence of Taiwan’.” In addition,
Zhang Wannian, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, reiterated Beijing’s
three conditions for the use of force and warned, “The Chinese PLA completely has the
resolve, confidence, ability, and way to defend national sovereignty and territorial
integrity, and by no means will tolerate and sit by idly watching any plot to split the
motherland succeed…. ‘Taiwan independence’ means a war and splittism will preclude
peace.” [emphasis added]19
On February 25, TAO Spokesman Zhang Mingqing implicitly warned that there
would be a war between Taiwan and China if Chen Shui-bian were elected president.20
On March 14, four days before Taiwan’s election, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman
Sun Yuxi explicitly warned that China would take firm action if it did not like the
outcome of Taiwan’s presidential election, i.e., if Chen Shui-bian were elected
president.21 In a news conference on March 15, Premier Zhu Rongji said, “The Chinese
people will definitely safeguard the motherland's reunification and national dignity with
their own blood and lives.… At present, Taiwan people are facing an urgent historic
moment. They have to decide what path to follow. They absolutely should not act
impulsively. Otherwise, it will be too late for regrets…there are only three days left. It is
very hard to predict world affairs. Taiwan compatriots, you must be on your guard!”
19
20
21
“Zhu Rongji: China Will Not Tolerate ‘Separatist’ Activity,” Beijing Xinhua, March 5, 2000, in
FBIS-CHI-2000-0305. Yuwen Luo, “Zhang Wannian Discusses Taiwan Issue with NPC Delegates” (in
Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, March 5, 2000, in FBIS-CHI-2000-0305.
Ming-yi Wang, “Mainland TAO: No Ultimatum in the White Paper,” Zhongguo Shibao [China Times],
February 26, 2000.
“AFP: PRC FM Spokesman Warns Taiwan on Election Result,” Hong Kong AFP, March 14, 2000, in
FBIS-CHI-2000-0314.
241
[emphasis added]22
III. Chinese Calculation of Signaling and Deterrence
Based on the above discussion, Beijing had four common goals in the 1995-96 and
1999-2000 incidents: (1) to signal its disapproval of Taiwan’s policy; (2) to coerce
Taiwan’s leaders to readopt “one China” principle or give up further independence
activities, i.e., Taiwan’s flexible diplomacy; (3) to deter Taiwan leaders from formally
declaring independence; (4) to discourage the Taiwan electorate from voting for
candidates who favored independence, i.e., Lee Teng-hui, Peng Ming-min, and Chen
Shui-bian. In addition, Beijing also tried to encourage the United Stated to adopt a more
public and determined stance against Taiwan independence in the 1995-96 crisis.23
Chinese military threats were examples of both coercive and deterrence diplomacy.
Coercive diplomacy refers to threats adopted by a sender to persuade a target to stop or
reverse an action. Deterrence diplomacy refers to threats imposed by a sender to dissuade
a target from undertaking an action deemed detrimental to the sender. Military force was
used in an exemplary manner “to demonstrate resolution and willingness to escalate to
high levels of military action if necessary.” 24 This coercive and deterrence strategy
exploited Taiwan’s fear of war through military brinkmanship. To make this strategy
credible, Beijing purposely created an atmosphere of secrecy in which the PLA was
22
23
24
“Live News Conference by Zhu Rongji,” Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily] (Overseas edition), March 16,
2000, p. 1.
Robert S. Ross, “The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force,”
International Security, vol. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000), pp. 89-110.
Alexander George, “Introduction: The Limit of Coercive Diplomacy,” in Alexander L. George and
William E. Simons (eds.), The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder, Colo: Westview Press, 1994), p.
7.
242
preparing military maneuvers before and after the announcement of missile tests. In the
meantime, news media were mobilized to launch an attack on Taiwan’s independence and
to assert Beijing’s resolve to halt the independence momentum.25 John Garver argues,
“Beijing hoped to create a sense of apprehension and fear in the minds of [Taiwanese]
people. War and all its suffering was imminent! The Chinese Communists were
determined and prepared to attack regardless of costs!”26
Even though China’s official newspaper contended that the political essence of
“two-state theory” was the same as Taiwanese independence, Beijing never seriously
considered the use of force in the 1995-96 or 1999-2000 incidents, nor was there any
serious preparations made for war, as discussed on the section of the Taiwan issue in
Chapter 6. A TAO official pointed out that the military exercises in 1995-96 and
1999-2000 were intended only to threaten Taiwan.27 An American studies senior scholar
in Shanghai stressed, “The 1995-96 military exercises were mainly to coerce, bully, and
deter Taiwan from declaring independence. China never intended to use force.” 28 An
American studies scholar in Beijing emphasized, “During the 1995-96, it was China’s
instinct to punish Taiwan. In addition, China wished to remind the U.S. and other western
countries not to support Taiwan independence. At that time, it was totally impossible for
China to attack Taiwan. China even did not think about it because there was no military
preparation. China only wanted to bluff Taiwan.”29 Many prominent Chinese scholars
have conveyed the same ideas.30
25
26
27
28
29
30
Suisheng Zhao, “Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing’s Strategy of National Reunification
with Taiwan,” Pacific Affairs, vol. 27, no. 4 (1999), pp. 497-498.
John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan’s Democratization (Seattle: University
of Washington Press, 1997), p. 118.
A TAO official, interview with author, August 1, 2001.
An American studies senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, July 2, 2001.
An American studies scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 12, 2001.
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 15, 2001. An international
243
Moreover, Chinese leaders “indeed did not want to have a war with Taiwan”31 and
“wanted to avoid confrontation and were very self-restrained” 32 because “the core
priority for China was still economic development.”33 An international relations scholar
in Shanghai explained, “In 1995-96, ‘somebody’ guaranteed that the [Chinese] military
exercises would not have any accident because all of the cannonballs were outdated. The
military merely wanted closeout, so the military began to adopt a harder line.”34
In fact, Beijing never assessed the comparative effectiveness of signaling and
deterrence between military threats and economic sanctions in these two incidents. A
TAO senior official said, “In 1995-96, no one mentioned economic sanctions. If Taiwan
declares independence, China will directly attack Taiwan. There is no need for economic
sanctions.”35 A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing elaborated, “In 1995-96, nobody
proposed imposing economic sanctions against Taiwan because sanctions would hurt
TIEs, Taiwanese people, and China itself, rather than Taiwan independence supporters.”36
A Taiwan studies scholar in Beijing emphasized, “China did not even consider economic
sanctions as a warning. Military exercises targeted Taiwan independence while
businesspeople were innocent. Business is business and both sides were complementary.
There was no need to punish TIEs.”37
The primary concern for Beijing might be the comparative costs between military
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
relations senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 18, 2001. An international relations
senior fellow in Shanghai, interview with author, June 25, 2001. A Taiwan studies senior scholar in
Shanghai, interview with author, July 3, 2001. An American studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview
with author, July 12, 2001. A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 13,
2001. A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 29, 2001.
A senior fellow at the China Academy of Military Science, conversation with author, August 8, 2001.
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, July 3, 2001.
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 15, 2001. A Taiwan studies
senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 13, 2001.
An international relations scholar in Shanghai, interview with author, June 15, 2001.
A TAO senior official, interview with author, August 9, 2001.
A Taiwan studies senior scholar in Beijing, interview with author, August 3, 2001.
A Taiwan studies scholar in Beijing, interview with author, July 30, 2001.
244
threats and economic sanctions incurred on China itself. In the two incidents, military
threats did hurt TIEs and Taiwanese people, not Taiwan authorities. Economic sanctions
might have had the same effect, although more serious. The apparent difference between
military threats and economic sanctions is that military threats might be less costly to
China than economic sanctions. This might be the reason why Beijing adopted military
threats instead of economic sanctions against Taiwan in the two incidents.
To sum up, there is no evidence showing whether military threats or economic
sanctions were better tools for the Chinese government in terms of signaling and
deterrence because Beijing never intended to use force against Taiwan. Neither did
Beijing ever seriously consider imposing economic sanctions against Taiwan. The
1995-96 and 1999-2000 incidents show that Beijing concentrated on economic
development and had no intention of going to war with Taiwan. China wanted to
minimize damage on TIEs and its economic development during these two incidents. This
will reinforce the argument of Chapter 9, that Beijing had significant concerns about
domestic stability.
245