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IHPST/IJN Workshop ‘Intensional Verbs and Nonreferential Terms’
Paris, January 14, 2006
Intensional Verbs Revisited
Friederike Moltmann
IHPST
fmoltmann@univ-paris1.fr
1. ‘NP’-Intensionality
criterion: nonspecificity(not substitutivity, existential commitment)
linguistic tests:
[1] ‘special’ quantifiers and proforms: something, everything, the thing that…, several
things, that
(1) Mary is looking for an assistant.
Mary is looking for something / * for someone.
[2] identity conditions:
(2) John is looking for an assistant (who can type)
Mary is looking for an assistant (who speaks French).
John and Mary are looking for the same thing.
[3] no support of (nonspecial) anaphora:
(3) John is looking for a horse. Bill is looking for * it / ok that too.
verbs that come out intensional:
- predicates of absence, presence, transaction: own, posses, lack, need, owe, fit (into, onto),
offer, buy
- psychological verbs of absence: promise, desire, want
- predicates of resemblance: resemble compare, comparatives
- epistemic predicates: see, find, recognize, count
- predicates of representation: draw, paint, imagine, represent, show
- predicates of creation: hire, find (find a wife), build
- specificational be (Romero)
other intensional categories:
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prepositions (as, like, than)
nouns: a representation / image of a woman, the example of a horse
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2. The standard account of NP-taking intensional verb constructions
Montague, Moltmann (1997) etc: intensional verbs take generalized quantifier as argument
(4) a. John needs a horse.
b. needs(j, Q)
full NP: denotes intensional generalized quantifier
special NPs: take intensional generalized quantifiers as semantic values
special quantifiers like something ere ambiguous between extensional quantifier ranging over
objects and intensional quantifiers (and more)
inferences with special quantifiers:
(5) a. John needs two unicorns.
There is something / one thing John needs (namely two unicorns).
There are two things John needs.
b. John needs a good assistant and a secretary.
The thing John needs is a good assistant and a secretary.
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3. Some problems for the standard account of (intensional) quantifiers
acting as arguments of intensional predicates
the Substitution Problem, the Objectivization Effect (Moltmann 2003a, b)
(6) a. John needs an assistant.
b. John needs the quantifier that …
c. John needs the entity that ….
proposed solution: NP
complement and verb form complex predicate; both have syncategorematic meaning
issues:
- the connection to extensional use
- semantic decomposition?
the ‘modal account’ of intensional verbs (Moltmann 1997, Richard):
(7) a. John needs a horse is true iff for every minimal situation s such that John’s needs
are satisfied in s, John ‘has’ a horse in s.
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b. John needs Mary is true iff for every minimal situation s such that John’s needs are
satisfied in s, John ‘has’ Mary in s.
The question to address:
What do special quantifiers replacing nonreferential complements range over?
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4. The case of clausal and predicative complements (Moltmann 2003a, b,
2004)
something not substitutional
(8) John said something Mary never thought about.
something as a nominalizing quantifier (ranges over the kinds of things corresponding
nominalizations refer to):
evaluative predicates
(9) a. John said something nice.
b. John thought something shocking.
causal predicates
(10) John said something that caused Mary consternation.
restrictions on sharing intensional argument
(11) a. ?? John asserted what Mary imagined.
b. ?? John said what Mary whispered.
c. ?? John thought what Mary was hoping (namely that it will rain).
parallels with nominalizations:
(12) a. John’s assertion is nice.
b. John’s thought was shocking.
(13) a. John’s claim was Mary’s claim.
b. John’s assertion was Mary’s suggestion.
analysis as:
(14) a. The claim (which was made by John) is the claim (which was made by Mary).
b. The (strong) claim (of John) was the (weak) claim (of Mary.
(15) a. ?? John’s assertion was Mary’s imagination.
b. ?? John’s claim was Mary’s whisper.
c. ?? John’s thought was Mary’s hope.
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John’s thought that Mary will laugh:
The content consisting of John and Mary qua being entertained in the thinking mode.
Inheritance of content-related properties and properties targeting the attitudinal mode.
( John’s thought was true, John’s thought was nice)
Something as a quantifier ranging over particularized properties (tropes) or (relational) qua
objects (beliefs, assertions etc), or kinds of such objects
John thought something nice:
analysis as: for some sentence S, John thought that S is true and for some x such that
thought(John, x), nice(x).
John thought what Mary thought:
analysis as: John thought something that is something that Mary thought.
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5. Special quantifiers replacing intensional NPs
5.1. Evidence for something replacing intensional NPs acting as a nominalizing
quantifier as well
(16) a. John counted all he needed. (counted quantifiers?)
b. John enumerated the things he needed. (enumerated quantifiers??)
c. John described exactly what he needed. (described quantifiers???)
equivalent to:
(17) a. John counted all his needs.
b. John enumerated his needs.
c. John exactly described his needs.
(18) a. He promised a lot (namely a car).
b. John’s promise was great. (not: the quantifier… was great)
evaluative predicates:
(19) a. John needs ten maids.
b. John needs something strange.
c. What John needs is exaggerated.
causal predicates:
(20) a. John promised something that makes Mary happy (namely a trip).
b. John promise makes Mary happy.
5.2. Complications: Sharing of ‘intentional objects’
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5.2.1. Sharing with extensional and intensional verbs
valid argument:
(21) John buys whatever he needs.
John needs car.
John buys a car.
Montagovian solution: Extensional verbs also take intensional quantifiers as arguments;
meaning postulates do the rest.
Problem 1: not all extensional-intensional verb pairs can share intentional object:
invalid:
(22) Mary needs a book
John read a book.
John read what Mary needs.
refinement:
intuition 1: inference impossible
intuition 2: inference possible, but ‘feeling’ of coercion; fluctuating intuition:
semantic type shift to kinds (in Carlson’s sense): kinds (referents of bare nouns) allow
simultaneously for
-
intensional
-
existential
-
generic
-
kind reading
kind version:
valid:
(23) Mary needs books.
John reads books.
John reads what Mary needs.
other cases:
(24) a. ?? John drank what Mary needs.
(John drank a glass of water; Mary needs a glass of water.)
b. ?? John destroyed what Mary built. (John destroyed a hut, Mary built a hut.)
c. * John counted what Mary met. (John counted ten people; Mary met ten people.)
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Why is (24c) (as opposed to (24a, b) never good?
Coercion is impossible: no kind argument can be construed because intensional count requires
a quantificational NP (with a weak quantifier):
(24) d. John counted men.  no intensional reading available!
Problem 2: extensional verbs do not allow for special quantifiers in the same way:
(25) a. * John met what Bill is looking for, namely a rich heiress.
b. * John talked to what Bill needs, namely an assistant.
c. ? John married / found what Bill is looking for, namely a rich heiress.
Note: The same observations obtain for kind-denoting NPs:
(26) a. * John met what Bill met, local politicians.
b. * John met something, namely local politicians.
Note: no intuition 2 available in (25)!
This means coercion is impossible with special quantifiers, which supports the view that type
coercion takes place in (22), rather than an intensional reading being generated in an
extensional context.
Why can (25c) be ok?
Find is intensional (verb of creation or ownership or epistemic verb): allows for special
quantifier.
Why ok also with marry: marry is also intensional (!) (verb of ownership)
Problem 3: two extensional verbs cannot share an ‘intentional object’:
(27) a. ?? John read the same thing that Bill read, namely a book.
(John read a cookbook, Bill read Faust)
b. ?? John bought what Bill destroyed, namely a car.
intuition 2 available: sentences are possible, but involve coercion (as expected).
Circumstances when extensional and intension verbs can share intentional argument:
Extensional verb must specify specific situation or type of situation that would be satisfaction
situation of the condition specified by the intensional verb:
(28) a. John bought what he needed.
– actual situation is satisfaction situation
b. John bought what Mary really needs. (but John did not buy it for her)
– type of situation is satisfaction situation
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c. John got what his grandfather always dreamt of, namely a Ferrari.
– type of situation is satisfaction situation
(29) a. John has what Mary needs. (thus Mary should ask John for it).
– actual situation is possible satisfaction situation
b. John has what Mary at some point needed. – type of situation is satisfaction situation
(30) a. John gave Mary what she wanted.
– actual situation is satisfaction situation
b. John gave Mary what Sue wanted (John gave Mary a horse, Sue wanted a horse).
– type of situation is satisfaction situation
Generalization about when extensional verb and intensional verb can ‘share’ intentional
object:
1. if extensional verb describes situation that is a satisfaction situation of the condition
specified by the intensional verb
2. if extensional verb represent the type of situation that is a possible satisfaction
situation of the condition specified by the intensional verb.
3. if coercion takes place (shift from intensional quantifier as semantic value to a kind,
which will then act as semantic argument of the predicate).
5.2.2. Two intensional verbs sharing
two intensional verbs can share their intentional object:
[1] if they are the same or very similar:
(31) a. John needs the same thing Mary needs.
b. John would like what Mary wants too, namely an apple.
accounted for on the nominalizing-quantifier view:
(32) a. John’s need is Mary’s need.
b. John’s desire is Mary’s wish.
[2] if a possible satisfaction situation of the one will also be a possible satisfaction
situation of the other:
(33) a. John promised Mary only what she really needed.
b. John offered Mary what she wanted (namely a glass of wine – he actually did not get to
pouring her one).
or types of situations:
(34) John promised Mary what Sue really needs.
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[3] if any actual satisfaction situation of the one will also be a possible satisfaction
situation of the other:
(35) a. I found what I needed.
b. I now own what I needed (namely half the estate).
c. He accepted what I offered him. (namely a glass of wine, but before I could pour him
one, a fire broke out)
or types of situations:
(36) John has found what Bill is still looking for, namely a wife.
impossible sharing of intentional objects:
(37) a. ?? I imagine what I need. (I imagine a horse, and I need a horse)
b. ?? This resembles what I need. (This resembles a horse, and I need a horse).
c. ?? John is looking for what I painted. (John is looking for a rose, I painted a rose).
intuition 2: sentences are possible, but coercion is taking place, shift to a kind as argument:
(38) a. I imagine horses. I need horses.
b. This resembles horses. (?) I need horses.
c. John is looking for roses. I painted roses.
The account (sketch):
Special quantifiers are nominalizing quantifiers also with NP-talking intensional verbs, but
the semantic nominalization process taking place may involve ‘further abstraction’:
Grades of abstraction:
-
John’s need
-
the need (which is also John’s)
-
the set of possible situations satisfying John’s need
-
the type of situation satisfying John’s need
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5.3. Intensional NP-complements and sortals
distinguish two cases:
[1] epistemic predicates:
full NP with sortal, special quantifier disallow sortal predicate in relative clause:
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(39) a. John looked at the object in front of him and saw a grey horse.
b. * John looked at the object and saw something that was grey and a horse.
observation: the same conditions on ‘wide scope’ definite NPs:
(40) a. * The horse John saw was grey.
b. OK The thing John saw was a grey horse.
predicates of resemblance:
(41) a. John compared his dog to a pony.
b. *? John compared his dog to something that is a pony.
c. John compared his dog to something that would be a pony.
[2] verbs of absence:
special quantifier require modal of necessity when sortal predicate is in relative clause:
(42) a. John needs a biography of Churchill.
b. ?? John needs something that is a biography about Churchill.
c. John needs something that would be should be / must be a biography of Churchill.
(43) a. John is looking for a huge castle.
b. ?? John is looking for something that is a huge castle.
c. John is looking for something that would be / should be / will have to be a huge castle.
0bservation: same conditions on wide scope definite intensional NPs:
(44) a. *? The book John needs is about Churchill.
b. The book John needs must be about Churchill.
(45) a. *? The castle John is looking for is huge.
b. The castle John is looking for must be huge.
Those NPs are to be distinguished from special definite NPs, which are not subject to the
requirement of a modal:
(44) c. The thing John needs is a book about Churchill.
(45) c. The thing John is looking for is a huge castle.
Generalization:
What something ranges over are entities that do not have sortal properties in the actual
circumstances
-
either they have no sortal properties at all (epistemic predicates, predicates of
resemblance) or else
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-
they have those properties only in the relevant circumstances (satisfaction situations)
Thus [something that is N] has a different semantics from [some N] in intensional contexts
[something that is N] ranges over the same things that the N outside of the scope of the
intensional verb ranges over
[something that is N] ranges over intentional objects that may correspond to sets of possible
objects (with sortal properties) in the relevant circumstances
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6. Way do special quantifiers replacing intensional NPs differ from those
replacing clausal complements:
clausal complements (that-clauses etc):
represent intentional content
internalist account of clausal complements (most common):
clausal complement represents mental content
externalist account of clausal complements:
clausal complements characterizes possible situations in which the agent might find himself
Stalnaker’s account / motivation of possible worlds-view of propositions
intensional NPs: impose conditions on partial possibilities (situations), as on the modal
account of predicates of absence / presence
further evidence:
different understanding of quantifier in intensional NP and in clausal complement:
(46) a. John promised to write exactly two papers.
b. John promised exactly two papers.
(47) a. John needs at most one assistant.
b. John needs to have at most one assistant.
c. For every minimal situation s such that John’s needs are satisfied in s, John has at
most one assistant in s.
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7. Summary of (sketch of) the account
[1] Externalist account of intensional NPs: intensional NPs serve to characterize situations of
satisfaction, rather than (just) characterzing a representational content.
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[2] Special quantifier replacing intensional NPs range over intentional objects of a special sort
[3] Those intentional objects:
-
have no sortal properties themselves
-
have satisfaction conditions, representational properties (thus to an extent ‘incorporate
part of the meaning of the verb’)
-
define possible satisfaction situations, situation types which is what they may share
with extensional verbs
-
define possible satisfaction situations in which sortal properties can be fulfilled.
[4] degrees of abstraction:
- John’s need  the need (also shared by John)
- John’s need  the set of the situations / possible objects satisfying John’s need  the type of
situation satisfying John’s need.
References to previous work:
Moltmann, Friederike (2004): ‘Nonreferential Complements, Derived Objects, and
Nominalizations’. Journal of Semantics 21.1, 1-43.
------------------------- (2003b): ‘'Propositional Attitudes without Propositions'. Synthese 135,
pp. 70-118.
------------------------ (2003a) 'Nominalizing Quantifiers'. Journal of Philosophical Logic.35.5.,
2003, pp. 445-481.
----------------------- (1997) : 'Intensional Verbs and Quantifiers'. Natural Language Semantics
5.1, 1997, pp. 1-52.
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