Rejected by the American Anthropologist:
A Postscript to
“Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality:
An Anthropological Essay”
Lee Drummond
Center for Peripheral Studies
www.peripheralstudies.org
leedrummond@msn.com
Introductory Note.
This little essay and the mass of supporting documents represent, in part, the
fallout from my submission of “Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An
Anthropological Essay” to the American Anthropologist. The so-called “peer
review” process conducted by the editor-in-chief of AA consumed most of three
years. The correspondence and reviews generated during that period comprise a
valuable ethnographic collection, although not housed in a museum or having as its
object a bona-fide “primitive culture,” but a collection that reveals in some detail the
actual working of another doomed social formation: the enterprise of Cultural
Anthropology as practiced in turn-of-the-century America. What follows, then, is a
little slice of an ethnography of ourselves.
1
“Pee-You! Review”: A Call for Papers for an
Anti-American Anthropologist
to Commemorate the AA Centennial Year
(A very highly edited/censored and condensed version of this essay was published in
2002 as a letter in Anthropology News.)
The centennial year of an institutional American anthropology is rapidly
passing, and its celebrants are busily organizing plenary sessions, talking to the few
media folks who will listen, and publishing multiple volumes of reprints from a
century of American Anthropologists. Whoa! Wait a minute! What was that last
one? Don’t tell me someone is out there, going back and forth over yards and yards
of bookshelves, culling through dozens and dozens of dusty, unread volumes of our
“flagship” journal (Oh, imperialist metaphor!), and actually selecting some of those
tired old pieces to publish again? But yes! The project is well underway; volumes
are already rolling off the press!
A hundred years old. And anthropology, that is to say, cultural anthropology
(and not archeology, physical anthropology, linguistics, or primatology) is showing
her age. Badly. Never very pretty in the full flush of that drabness that passed for
her youth (you may view the evidence in the Margaret Mead exhibition at the
Smithsonian), these new commemorative volumes prop up the old crone with
pillows, apply an overdose of rouge to the cadaverous skin, hose her down with
perfume (l’air du temps perhaps?) to mask the smell of impending death. It’s a sad,
grotesque business, and terribly demeaning to a discipline that once aspired to the
title “queen of the sciences.”
The commemorative volumes can only “celebrate” or chronicle the
deterioration, the loss of vitality and vision, of cultural anthropology. I think most
of us realize this, in those infrequent moments when we approach honesty with
ourselves and our chosen vocation, our Weberian “calling.” Cultural anthropology
has painted itself into a corner, and while drastic measures are now called for, its
adherents are realizing they have lost their nerve. The sniping and nit-picking that
characterize the “dialogue” between cultural anthropology’s postmodernists and
positivists have stymied the field’s creative efforts to develop a holistic theory of the
nature of humanity. The very feasibility of such a theoretical quest, of course, is
garrulously challenged by every righteous pomo. So the queen of the sciences is
2
reduced to doing scut work: sometimes the applied or “development” anthropology
appropriate for political scientists or C-minus students of sociology; sometimes the
feel-good venting of moral indignation from the soap box of one or another
politically correct cause.
It was with these somber thoughts in mind that I wrote, over a year ago, to
Regna Darnell, co-editor of those commemorative volumes of American
Anthropologist reprints. I have not heard back from her, no doubt a reflection on the
U. S. and Canadian mails. I wrote with a proposal, and quite a positive one,
especially in view of my morose take on the commemorative project. My proposal
had two aspects, theoretical and practical or editorial. On the theory side, I
suggested that the AAA’s commemorators might embrace an idea put forward by
one of the very few cultural anthropologists working in North America to develop
anything like a theory of culture: Victor Turner. [The only other prominent figures I
would place in this group are Leslie White, Marvin Harris, Marshall Sahlins,
Clifford Geertz, and Roy Wagner — and even there Geertz’s “theory” denies the
importance of theory] The idea of Turner’s I commended to Darnell and her
commemorators was “anti-structure”: the notion that a society’s members don’t just
go on and on doing affirmative, integrative things à la Durkheim, but instead from
time to time denounce and suspend basic principles of social life, opting for a
temporary existence outside and subversive of the normal order.
The practical or editorial application of Turner’s anti-structure concept that I
suggested to Darnell was to supplement those multiple volumes of AA memorabilia
with one or two volumes of an Anti-American Anthropologist. Since we recognize
the presence of a system by encountering its boundaries, and the system’s
boundaries by encountering what is outside them (the modus operandi of our group
at the Center), I suggested we might acquire important insights into the American
Anthropologist and into American cultural anthropology as a whole by examining a
collection of papers submitted and rejected by the AA over the past century. By
their (erstwhile) works shall ye know them.
I think there is much to recommend such a collection. For one thing, cultural
anthropology’s theoretical constructions — its canon — are so flimsy that it is more
interesting to study the process of their composition and dissemination than the end
result. Much as I dislike admitting it, the pomos may be right here: the canon is a
residue of practices that create a long list of victims on the way to establishing an
arbitrary, historically inscribed “truth.” [Of course, Nietzsche first advanced that
thought, and long before he was (incorrectly) anointed as a “postmodernist.”]
The heart of the matter, though, goes to that long list of victims and the
means of their victimization by, in the present case, generations of AA editors and
anonymous referees following the procedures of “peer review.” You may well be
one of those victims; I know I am. And though it is considered bad form to bitch
3
and moan when one of our brilliant pieces of anthropological writing gets the
“reject” letter from the editor, the truth is that that inhibition shields a deeply flawed
American Anthropologist from criticism it sorely needs.
The problem is that peer review of cultural anthropology submissions to the
AA is really “pee-you! review”: a mishmash of editorial practices borrowed
haphazardly from natural science, social science, and humanities journals and
rendered completely unworkable by the absence of any theoretical foci or problem
areas within cultural anthropology. The editor, and evidently many referees,
proceed as though there were quite well-defined criteria for selecting or rejecting
papers: methodological thoroughness or innovation; theoretical contribution to a
distinct and ongoing research problem. That impression is strengthened among the
readership when the editor presents an annual report bristling with percentages
carried at least to the first decimal place and congratulating himself for maintaining
a rejection rate comparable to that of highly regarded journals in the social sciences.
Given the divisive, even anarchic state of discussion and debate in
contemporary cultural anthropology, such a report is a ludicrous fiction. The editor
seems to pretend, and may even believe, that there are communities of researchers
out there in AnthroLand whose members, despite differences in orientation, can
reach some consensus as impartial referees. In fact, there are no such communities,
or if such exist they are insignificantly small. Instead, there are individuals of wildly
different persuasions and intellectual capacities, often with temperaments to match,
and all with some particular ax to grind. The search for consensus in those
circumstances mirrors that of the last presidential election (Bush v. Gore), and with
equally unsatisfying results.
As a case in point, let me mention my own unhappy experience. In early
1998 I submitted a theoretical paper I quite liked to the AA: “Culture, Mind, and
Physical Reality: An Anthropological Essay.” Admittedly a rather narrow topic, I
nonetheless hoped it might hold some interest for the AA readership. Five months
(!) later I received a “revise and resubmit” letter from the editor, together with
copies of five “peer reviews.” Two reviews were enthusiastic and recommended
publication (one referee dropped the farce of anonymity and identified himself: an
eminent anthropologist whose work I greatly admire). His summary comment: “I
strongly recommend publication as is” (his emphasis). The other positive reviewer
commented: “this lively and lucid paper is worthy of the AA and the AA of it.” A
third referee was middle-of-the-road, noting some strong points, some weak points,
and recommending the standard scholarly solution of “revise and resubmit.” A
fourth referee judged it “not AA material” because it is a “highly philosophical essay
characterized . . . by a reliance on anecdote, metaphor, and thought experiment,
rather than actual data” (No doubt about his research paradigm! Ah, those Actual
4
Data!). A fifth referee really hated it: “Briefly, the paper is unsophisticated, out-ofdate, and very poorly argued.” Ouch.
How can an editor presented with such contradictory reviews proceed to
search for consensus? Where is the tenth of a percentage point in that turmoil? Isn’t
this a classic blind-men-and-the-elephant situation? My take on the set-to again
follows on and extends Turner: There is no consensus, no looming Normative Order
out there! None, nada, nichts, rien, zippo, buttkus, squadooch. C’est dommage.
Social process, including the tedious business of putting out a scholarly journal, is a
haphazard series of stagings, contestations, incursions, and all too often bloody
assassinations or massacres, which may, to those so inclined, assume an after-thefact appearance of order. I was therefore delighted with the extreme contrast of
reviews. Just that sort of Clint Eastwood spaghetti western stand-off between the
Forces of Light and the Forces of Darkness should ensue when people with different
views closely examine any meaningful piece of work. Otherwise, we would have
only a boring succession of “solid contributions” to an increasingly rigid and trivial
paradigm; the dead hand of competence would reign. But cultural anthropology has
nothing remotely like an established paradigm that simply needs a little tweak here
and there; it is rather a conceptual free-for-all where outlandishly divergent ideas
bounce off the walls.
But apparently not off the walls of the AA editorial offices. Disagreement
(the horror! the horror!) is bad; consensus is good. Hence: revise and resubmit!
Yielding to some masochistic urge, I did just that. This time around the AA
peer review took six months (!), only to produce — you’ll never guess! — another
set of contradictory reviews and a cover letter from the editor requesting me to, yes,
revise and resubmit. I did indeed address a number of critical points in that second
batch of reviews, and sent the now much-revised manuscript to the editor with a
request that he make the call to publish it or not. I felt enough was enough. It was
either third time lucky or go down for the third time. It was the latter. Scarcely a
month went by and I received the editor’s email rejection of my ill-starred essay.
Hence my call for an Anti-American Anthropologist, which I am convinced
would be a marvelously uplifting read before settling into the dreary business of
cracking those volumes of commemorative reprints. Reflecting on my own
experience, I would propose only one editorial criterion for inclusion in the new
volume(s). Darnell and the commemorators would need to sift through editorial
files of rejected manuscripts and select those in which one or two referees had loved
the submission, while another one or two had been really pissed off by it. Let the
games begin.
But I’m not holding my breath waiting for the appearance of the first volume
of the Anti-American Anthropologist. Chances are vanishingly slim on that score.
Alternatively, I would hope this little essay at least might encourage the AAA to
5
make available to members a website forum for anthropological writing – writing
that does not have to go through the ridiculous process described here. Writing that
is a blissfully unfettered, free market (we Americans believe in those, right?),
writing that is a take-it-or-leave-it, read-it-or-skip-it, like-it-or-hate-it affair, writing
that lacks an authoritarian seal of approval. When you shell out the subscription
bucks to AAA, shouldn’t you get a little razzle-dazzle, smash-mouth action, in the
form of accessible, highly charged, hotly debated essays, as well as (or, perish the
thought!, instead of) the dreary stuff that comes to us bound in the AA codex years
after its composition? God knows, cultural anthropology could use a little liveningup. Let’s hear it for an outlaw anthropology!
6
The Persistence of Memory
Captain’s Log Star Date: January, 1998. Original version of essay submitted to
AA. (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date: June, 1998. Editor’s first “revise and resubmit letter,
with copies of five “peer reviews.” (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date: August, 1998. My lengthy response to the editor and
five “peer reviews,” outlining a possible revision of the
essay. (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date: May, 1999. My letter to the editor accompanying an
extensive revision of the essay. (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date: June, 1999. Editor’s postcard acknowledging receipt of
revised essay. (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date: December, 1999. Editor’s second “revise and resubmit”
letter, with copies of four “peer reviews.” (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date:
March, 2000. My response to the editor and the four
“re-reviews” of the essay. (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date: June, 2000. My letter to the editor accompanying the
second extensive revision of the essay. (See below)
………………………………………………………….
Captain’s Log Star Date: July – August 2000. Exchange of emails between editor
and myself. Editor’s final rejection of essay. (See
below)
7
Center for Peripheral Studies
P. O. Box 477
Palm Springs CA 92263
Lee Drummond, Director
www.peripheralstudies.org
January 4, 1998
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
American Anthropologist
Department of Anthropology
Macmillan, Room 112
Washington University
St Louis MO 63130
Dear Professor Sussman,
Enclosed please find six copies of a manuscript, "Culture, Mind, and
Physical Reality: An Anthropological Perspective," which I would like to ask you to
consider for publication in the American Anthropologist. (A rather narrow topic, to
be sure, but perhaps not devoid of interest to your readers.)
I am also enclosing a completed Reviewer Data Sheet for your files.
Thanks very much for considering my submission.
With best regards,
Lee Drummond
8
American Anthropologist
Robert W. Sussman, Editor-in-Chief
Linda K. Sussman, Associate Editor
Department of Anthropology
Macmillan, Room 112
Washington University
St. Louis, MO 63130
June 3, 1998
Lee Drummond
Center for Peripheral Studies
P.O. Box 477
Palm Springs, CA 92263
Re: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Perspective"
Dear Dr. Drummond:
Thank you for submitting your manuscript, "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An
Anthropological Perspective," for possible publication in the American Anthropologist.
After careful consideration of the comments by the reviewers, I regret to inform you that
it is not acceptable for publication in its current form. However, I encourage you to
revise and resubmit the manuscript, taking into account the comments of the reviewers as
summarized below.
Reviewer #1 makes the following excellent suggestions:
1. Make the figures more clear.
2. Tighten up the argument with more examples from cross-cultural
research and from the neurosciences (also mentioned by reviewer #3
and to some extent reviewer #4).
3. Your critique of the physicalist approach and use of anthropological
literature should be widened so that it doesn't look so much like a
straw man argument (again mentioned by reviewer #3, see also
reviewer #5).
I agree with this reviewer that pinpointing the points to a variety of particular people and
theories would sharpen the argument and make it appear less casual.
telephone: (314) 935-4500 • fax: (314) 935-4384 • e-mail: aa@artsci.wustl.edu
9
Reviewer #3 also gives some useful specific suggestions. You might try to explain the
difference between your meaning of an "evolved human nature" vs. that of evolutionary
psychologists (see reviewer #4), though I wouldn't require this (and would agree more
with what you are suggesting than the views proposed by evolutionary psychology).
Addressing this reviewer's question of "where do we go from here?" would strengthen the
paper, and much of the criticisms of this reviewer, and reviewer #5, would be taken care
of by addressing the points above.
I like the paper and look forward to your revised version. I think that you will
agree that (most of) the reviewers have made some very useful suggestions.
If you have any questions, please do not hesitate to call or e-mail me. Thank you
for considering the American Anthropologist.
Sincerely yours,
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
Enclosures: Reviewer comments for author
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
MS# 1-0070
DUE DATE:
February 28. 1998
Title: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Perspective"
Comments for author (use additional sheet if necessary):
#1
I like this paper but I think it would he more appropriately placed in our section
Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness, of which 1 am a member and would like
to see its journal get some exciting articles. I would strongly recommend that the
author submit to the journal Anthropology of Consciousness, in care of [NAME
DELETED].
On Figure 2. (c) and (b). could you make "(c)" more distinct. The point is a little
lost as one compares the two figures. The distinction is a good one but the clarity of
the way the distinction is diagrammed is not well done.
My suggestion is that the manuscript as is be submitted to the above journal, who. I
suspect would accept it. After some discussion and debate in that journal, it could be
expanded and tightened for submission to AA later. The issue is an intriguing one that
ought to have general anthropological exposure, but in a less loose presentation. For
example, more examples of the way "semiospaces" get differentiated in different
cultures could be given — not an immense amount of data but some more examples that
make the point. Instead of using Mandelbrot as an analogy one could easily turn to
neuropsychologists, neurophilosophers. and neurocognitivists to "nail" the analogy [see
Patricia Smith Churchland's Neurophilosophy]. I am not suggesting that Mandelbrot is
not appropriate, just that one could make the same point more directly, less
metaphorically, with a brief look at neurophysiology.
I also think one could "attack" more than Crick and Minsky. After all, there are
more than those two who assert a "physicalist" position. A little expansion there also
would make it more pertinent to a broader anthropological audience. Those in the
Society for the Anthropology of Consciousness would not need such an expansion.
As to anthropologists. I think one could add more than Geertz and Bateson, and the
author, of course. A few more anthropologists would be good for the general
anthropological audience.
Some quotes by Crick. Minsky. physicists [ like the one by Johnson],
and anthropologists would give the paper some meat.
I like the article and its main points and would like to see the author get it into print
in the right journal, revise and expand it and tighten it for a future resubmission to a
larger anthropological audience. The expansion, in my mind, would enable the author to
pin the points made to specific people and theories better than the more loose
presentation done in this draft. My problem is that I think the points are too insightful to
be lost in a casual presentation, or "unsharpened" arguments.
11
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
MS# 1-0070
DUE DATE:
March 16. 1998
Title: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Perspective"
Comments for author (use additional sheet if necessary):
I find this essay brilliant in conception as
well as in its address to the topic, and quite a ppropriate to
contemporary sociocultural anthropology in the topic it
addresses.
The main point of argument, that of mind or
consciousness and its control of or even ability to conceive
of boundaries and limits for itself and its subjects, is
directly relevant, as Drummond suggests, to the whole
"postmodern" or post-Geertzian issue of what to make of an
interpretive anthropology. Or even to the question of whether we
should have one at all.
The other side, or theoretical facies of the essay, the
critique of Crick, the question of holography and Batesonian
thinking, even to Thomas' significant book The Tribe of Tiger,
is one that brings in a great deal of normally “peripheral” or
footnoted material. If Drummond can speak, .justifiably, of
anthropologists as themselves marginalized (not invited to the
prom), a conscientious anthropologist might also complain that
this other material, connecting human peripheries in the
animal world, physical and mathematical concepts of limit and
limitations, fractality and holography, has had only fleeting
cameos at the anthropological prom. There are only a few
discussions — Marilyn Strathern, Godelier, et. al. — that take
serious consideration of these ideas, though many of them (as
Drummond, indeed, says of Geertz's work) actually closer to
speculation in hard-science circles than what passes for
scientific thinking or critique in anthropology itself.
I strongly recommend this essay for publication as is, and
feel that it would add a great deal of material and
argumentation that other serious discussions of the place of
science in cultural anthropology have needlessly omitted.
My two cats thank the author as well.
NAME DELETED
12
American Anthropologist MS# 1-0070
Comments for the author
"Culture, Mind...."
#3
This piece is engaging, witty, and informative. To triumph,
it should be (able to be) published in Scientific American. But
the irony that the article documents and, if accepted, will
instantiate, is that it winds up published in the AA (a happy
fate, of course, but an outcome unlikely to preach to the
unconverted).
The article is something of a creative oddity: it addresses
the thorniest issue in the (still!) two-worlds notions of
science/non- (as well as the mysteriously lingering divide between
Geistes- / Natuur- wissenschaften) by offering anecdotal
narratives — the one about a cat/ca(l)f option of signifier -heard
that opens the dinner-table episode to thickish description; the
one about Kalahari lions as culture-too, drawing on Thomas's longview of Bushmen. These appealing discussions could well be
encountered in introductory cultural anthropology or linguistic
anthropology courses; and that is one of the piece's decided
strengths. (Lee Drummond has a wonderful track record in
authoring provocative rethinkings of major issues — ethnicity,
"creole cultures," U.S. popular culture; he imaginatively mixes
levels of difficulty and facility.)
One principal point is that physicalist theories o f mind
(here represented primarily by Crick) do indeed avoid or deny the
most manifest exponential "folds" of culture -enacted — whose
harmonies and dissonances amount to "something like a musical
score" (p. 12). Another is that nature/culture or matter/mind
(environment/brain) divides keep getting reinstated in the most
conventional ways by "scientists."
The essay puts meat ("clever meat"!!) on key analytic and
philosophical issues of iterative acts and reflexivity. It
recommends returning to Gregory Bateson — always a good idea. It
coins very vivid slogans for promoting its new-monism of
sentience-sapience (and does not conceal its own vested interest
in "peripheral studies" of peripheral systems (title p., p. 4).
Let me salute fine insights of the paper and then mention
several moment/s where its moves seem too quick (and cute),
causing the paper to get in its own way a bit.
Very nice:
1) theme of blurring figure and ground in semiospace as a
dynamic locus of interaction.
2) "The essence of a thing is its edges" (p. 10), although
this dodges the issue of whether something can be "all edges."
3) The "holographic engine" image captures the article's
drift; there may even be a better title or subtitle there.
4) "...one little typpo" [STET!] is very nice (p. 12) and is
something of a signature of the wit at work in this brainy essay.
5) "Lions ... people as mutual iterative constructs" (p. 16)
— a choice case accessibly presented.
6) pp. 18, 21. The "It from Bit" bit is well done and very
Batesonian.
continued
13
AA MS# 1-0070S
Now for some quibbles and queries:
p. 14. Where are "we" when asserting this anticipated
"something Else"? The paper might point out more semiotic
paradoxes of this dim imagination — just to make this paper
itself laudibly "messier" (still p. 14).
p. 17. Why is this outcome of rangers-displacing lions(humans) a "crowning irony"? Why isn't it just more of the same
ironies built in to interacting peripheries? To call it
"crowning" seems to drag back in a human (intention)/environiment
dichotomy — and the paper (ironically) sounds a bit
"progressive" when it calls the new something "quite ugly." (I
agree, but this suggests a smattering of inconsistency in the
paper's full-systems approach; nothing wrong with that).
p. 18. I don't think the 1962 essay by Geertz does simply
commit this two-worlds distinction. This paper's earlier elision
of Geertz and postmodernist positions also needs refining; the
more interesting suggestion on p. 20 recalls past work on Geertz,
Thomas Kuhn, etc.; the border between science and interpretation
is blurrier (if present) in Geertz than this paper implies.
p. 19. The tally of recent theoretical physicists on p. 19
is helpful. Some mention of (and perhaps notes on) other
varieties of scientist who strongly disagree with Crick (Gould,
etc. etc.— the NYRB is full of them) might also be informative.
Finally, I note the theme of information as "a fundamental
property of the universe" and a "welter of intersystems"
(misleadingly) called mind and nature. As an anthropologist I
observe with some astonishment that the once rather prominent
name of Levi-Strauss does not reappear here, along with Bateson.
Recalling that L-S ends most if not all his books by making such
distinctions as nature/culture (or any other opposition)
themselves part of a pervasive coding throughout esprit-geneticslangue-music-myth-social exchange-etc. (and "etc." too is
informational!). This argument may be most vivid at the end of
L'Homme nu and earlier La Pensee sauvage, but it really is
"perfusive" (to echo Peirce's word) throughout Levi-Strauss work
and the world it represents.
Finally-finally, Peirce surely acknowledged that the
"universe" perfused with signs "is itself a system of signs" (p.
21). At least I don't think this would be news to that central
peripheralist of semio-tics.
Again, this lively and lucid paper is worthy of the AA and
the AA of it. Scientific American will just have to go on
lacking culture (p.2)!
#
14
5
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
MS# 1-0070
DUE DATE: MAY 29. 1998
Title: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Perspective"
#4
Comments for author (use additional sheet if necessary):
In the name of motivating cultural anthropologists to participate in ongoing discussions
of the nature of mind, this paper attempts the admirable goal of revitalizing a
Batesonian perpsective on the distribution of mind. The basic message, that a human
mind is necessarily an enculturated mind, is one of the fundamental tenets of
psychological anthropology, dating back to Hallowell. While Drummond is most likely
correct in asserting that many cognitive scientists fail to recognize this unity, it is not
clear how preaching to the choir (i.e., addressing anthropologists) on this topic will
influence the debate. True, many anthropologists probably fail to conceptualize
culture-sharing as cognition which is distributed through time and space. However, I
suspect that data-driven efforts such as those of Edwin Hutchins and associates are
more likely to convince anthropologists of the utility of this perspective, in contrast with
Drummond's highly philosophical essay, characterized as it is by a reliance on
anecdote, metaphor, and thought experiment, rather than actual data. Accordingly, I
question whether publication of Drummond's piece would further what I take to be its
goals.
In addition to my principled reservations regarding Drummond's essay as a whole, I am
troubled by a number of discrete issues. The author devotes considerable space to
the argument that characteristics of apparently bounded minds emerge out of
interaction with a particular environment. Moreover, Drummond suggests that this is
true to such a degree that it is impossible to speak of a context-free mind, or rather a
constant human nature. Viewed from the perspective of evolutionary psychology, this
is an untenable position to adopt. Although a wide variety of evolutionary findings
support the proposition that organisms are sensitive to parochial conditions, in general
it appears that developmental plasticity occurs within a range of parameters, or even a
discrete number of more-or-less fixed ontogenetic trajectories. In short, the overall
boundaries of the system are set in advance of in-context development. Moreover, this
is precisely what we would expect given the robustly patterned nature of selective
forces over long periods of evolutionary time. For example, selection for finch beak
form may vary from year to year, but the general morphological features of beaks
remain constant. Likewise, the particular features of a mind may well depend not only
on the parochial cultural context, but also on the larger ecological niche in which that
mind develops. Nevertheless, the range of variation is limited -- even individuals living
under grossly unusual conditions possess minds which are recognizable in their
general outline and functioning. Oddly, having argued for a profound contextual
determinism (the 'lion' example), Drummond then seems to reverse himself (p. 18) and
suggest that there exists a relatively fixed evolved human nature. Most puzzling.
15
in addition to the above logical objections, and stylistic ones as well (the author's
fascination with fractals and complexity theory do little to make his position more
compelling), I have several elementary reservations about the essay. First, it is not
clear that it belongs in a journal, rather than in some less formal venue -- reasoning by
example and analogy are fine and good, but this should be by way of introduction to
the analysis of supporting data, a foundation which is notably absent from the paper.
Second, despite adopting the stance of a clarion call, the paper does not even hint at
what the next step might be -- no research agenda is outlined, no clearly testable
hypotheses are proposed, and no problems are listed for examination. Even if
Drummond is correct about everything he says, where do we go from here? Moreover,
if even an anthropologist is unclear what to do with his proposed framework, how are
we supposed to go out there and win over all those cognitive scientists Drummond
claims to see on the other side of the fence? (as an aside, it is worth noting that
Drummond constructs something of a straw man - Francis Crick is hardly
representative of cognitive science today).
Conclusion: Interesting ideas, nice to see people keeping Bateson alive, but as it
stands this is not AA material.
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#5
AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
MS# 1-0070
DUE DATE:
February 28. 1998
Title: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Perspective"
Comments for author (use additional sheet if necessary):
This is a heartfelt but poorly reasoned paper. It is an argument that the ideas of some cultural
anthropologists should be considered more relevant to various issues in the sciences.
The author fails to make a convincing argument. There is very little that is new here. Much of
the paper consists of unsupported assertions that lack either logical or empirical support.
Indeed, this paper is a good example of why cultural anthropology is being ignored.
For example, to argue against Crick's physicalist position on the grounds that he does not
treat boundary problems or reflexivity is beside the point. Crick has clear ideas about the
way in which the brain interacts with the world. Why does the author think because people
get sick if they learn that they have eaten a neighbor's cat that the physicalist position is
wrong? The author sees this as a counter-example of some kind - but it is totally unclear
why the author thinks this. To say that "speech is not strictly a part of your physiological
being" is exactly what Crick would deny. The peripheral systems argument is no better - to
say "I believe that Crick's physicalist theory of the brain runs into trouble from the outset
because he proceeds as though the brain were a discrete, well defined physical system
whose working parts he simply needs to describe." This just means that Crick has a physicalist
theory, and does not say anything about what might be wrong with that theory. Of course
there are many intersystems -so what? How does the notion of 'intersystems' help the author's
main point? Maybe if Crick had ever said that the essence of a thing is its edges, which the
author sets up as a strawman, one could argue that Crick was dumb. But Crick, to my
knowledge, has never said anything like that.
Most of the paper is centers on the problem of defining edges. This is simply not a problem
for the physicalist theory. Crick knows a great deal about the many perceptual systems of the
brain.
The author then goes on to say the brain is not like a computer. This is no t new. The author
might look at the now decade old literature on neural nets. The idea that consciousness is some
kind of holograph like device is also a physicalist idea - and not new to the author, and
generally rejected for the simple reason no one has been able to find the kind of interference
patterns the brain would need to make holograms.
The author then wanders through a series of sermons about evolution, the idea of man the
hunter, Bushmen and Lions, Descartes, and ends up with some assertions about the physical
world being an informational process. The pro-science forces in anthropology are equated
with cultural materialists (wrong) and somehow Peirce and Gell-Mann are an answer.
Briefly, the paper is unsophisticated, out-of-date, and very poorly argued.
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Center for Peripheral Studies
P. O. Box 477
Palm Springs CA 92263
Lee Drummond, Director
www.peripheralstudies.org
August 3, 1998
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
American Anthropologist
Dept of Anthropology
Macmillan, Room 112
Washington University
St Louis MO 63130
Dear Professor Sussman,
Thank you for your thorough editorial review of my manuscript, “Culture,
Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Perspective.” I would like to proceed
with a revision that addresses some of the issues reviewers raised, but first it is
essential that I get some clarification/direction from you regarding three matters:
the question/problem of style; the procedure for the (re)review process; and (mercifully
concrete!) the length of the revised manuscript.
Style. Reviewers 1 and 4 were troubled by the “casual” style of the piece,
which 4 said belongs in a “less formal venue,” and you raised that as a problem in your
letter. I think this was probably a factor in Reviewer 5’s strong dislike of the piece as
well (“unsophisticated, out of date, and very poorly argued”). We need to sort this
issue out, for its resolution will determine whether I can proceed with a revision. I also
believe this issue has far broader ramifications, for your journal and for the place of
anthropology in the wider world. True, my manuscript is not studded with footnotes,
parentheses, or tables, but I would never call it “casual.” Indeed, I believe the work is
far more composed than the scientistic articles that choke academic journals; their lack
of narrative flow and even thematic development renders those journals useless to the
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wider community of intellectuals, and even to a good part of their professional
readership (hence my reference to Tom Wolfe’s quip about the “subscription guilt”
anthropologists feel toward the AA). To me, “casual” describes the drivel that fills up
bulletin boards and web sites on the Internet – more exercises in typing than writing, as
Truman Capote said (perhaps unjustifiably) of Jack Kerouac’s novels.
I would call the manuscript an essay, specifically an anthropological essay, and
my first act of revision would be to retitle its subtitle “An Anthropological Essay,” and
not “An Anthropological Perspective.” Though not casual, an essay is experimental, a
trial, a prospecting report, an assay, in literal fact, and not a canonical statement filled
with bibliographical references. For me, an essay is the written trace of an individual
mind’s engagement with difficult problems. As such, I find it to be the purest form of
intellectual endeavor — the “truest sport,” to stay with Tom Wolfe-isms. This may be
a tad eccentric of me, but not idiosyncratic, for the essay form has an established place
in Western thought. And though many scientists (and, I suspect, many more wanna-be
scientists) regard the essay as a “soft” affectation of the humanities, I think the
outstanding example of an essay is taken from the “hardest” of sciences: Albert
Einstein’s first paper on special relativity. Published in 1905 in a prestigious Annalen,
the paper contains no footnotes, makes reference only to Max Planck, and
acknowledges only helpful conversations with a personal friend. Einstein simply sat in
his Bern patent office, thinking incredible thoughts about time slowing down and space
shrinking, wrote them down and mailed them off to the journal. It was a stunning feat
of the scientific imagination, and one we lesser mortals might well emulate — rather
than censor.
In the history of the human sciences as well, the essay form has been notably
more productive than the treatise. Rousseau’s Dissertation on the Origin of Inequality,
in my opinion, has it all over his tedious Social Contract, and the same goes for Marx’s
Eighteenth Brumaire versus Capital. A bit further afield: Nietzsche’s work is
generally identified as the origin of modern philosophy, though from first to last, from
Homer’s Contest to Twilight of the Idols (and well before he left academics), it lacked
any semblance of scholarly apparatus.
While musing over this business of the place of the essay in contemporary
cultural anthropology, I revisited an old friend: Geertz’s Thick Description: Toward an
Interpretive Theory of Culture, perhaps the most influential American contribution to
the field in the past quarter century (and indisputably so on a page-for-page basis).
Leafing through the essay (definitely, an essay) with my reviewers’ comments in mind,
I noted that it is “highly philosophical” and “characterized by a reliance on anecdote,
metaphor, and thought experiment rather than actual data” (Reviewer 4). Discussion
of the ideas of Suzanne Langer, Gilbert Ryle, Foucault, Ricoeur and Wittgenstein
completely overshadow the cameo roles assigned to Goodenough and Stephen Tyler.
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Sentence-length bites are allotted to the latter, while Ricoeur and Wittgenstein get
block quotes and much of the essay is a development of one of Gilbert Ryle’s
(woefully anecdotal!) examples. In keeping with its “casual” style, nowhere are any of
these sources formally cited — even the block quotes. I don’t believe there is a socialscience style parenthetical citation in the whole piece. There are six brief footnotes, all
explicatory of a passage in the text, none bibliographical. To make matters worse, the
entire essay, which purports to unveil a new theory of culture, is based on a couple of
pages from the author’s field journals — and even these are not bona-fide, empirical
observations of social life, but notes of an account by an aged informant of a (minor)
event that occurred over a half-century earlier, in 1912 to be exact.
You know what is coming next. I would like to propose a thought experiment
(like those Reviewer 4 found so objectionable): If Geertz’s essay had been submitted
to the AA in 1972 for anonymous peer review, do you think it would have been
accepted? If we rewrote the recent history of anthropology, editing out interpretive
anthropology (and in the process changing things beyond recognition), do you think
Geertz’s essay would be accepted today? If Reviewers 4 and 5 got ahold of it, I’m
afraid its chances would not be good.
In putting the manuscript together, I wanted it to be accessible, lucid, and
thought-provoking, to create a play of ideas not generally associated with one another.
The examples (anecdotes) I provide are elementary; but I believe my analysis of them
is not (and if I am “preaching to the converted,” how is it that reviewers’ reactions are
so strongly polarized?). I know there are lots of loose ends in the little piece, but I
think its message is articulated clearly enough: we are moving into some very
interesting theoretical times, in which human and physical sciences will discover
strong affinities in their subject matter (the informational, or sentience-infused, nature
of physical reality). I felt the essay form was perfect for such an exploratory endeavor
— I can hardly pretend to have nailed things down.
So . . . at this juncture in the editorial review process, I need to know whether
an essay can be published in the AA? I sent the manuscript off thinking that the AA
makes a point of including essays as well as more conventional pieces — hence the
“Articles and Essays” section in the Table of Contents. As I discuss later, I am
prepared to modify the manuscript — but I cannot strip it down and rebuild it as a
social-sciences article. I was encouraged to see Miles Richardon’s epic poem appear
in AA, and even thought: if that is published, then why not my “highly philosophical”
essay? The whole question, and an extremely important one it seems to me, is whether
the discipline’s flagship journal is prepared to allow a few loose cannons to roll around
on its decks from time to time?
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The (Re)review Process. I could never be an academic editor: the peer review
process is just too baffling. Here is the scenario as I reconstruct it from partial data.
You receive my manuscript during the first week of January. By mid-March you have
at least three reviews in hand (1, 2, and 5, assuming they were submitted by the dates
on the sheets). Reviewer 3’s sheet is undated, but it would be interesting to know
when hers/his was returned. Reviewer 1 likes it but thinks it’s too casual for AA, and
should be submitted to Anthro of Consciousness (I appreciate the suggestion, but the
major thrust of the essay is to dissolve the boundary between “consciousness” as a
separate activity and other, public areas of experience). Reviewer 5 really hates it:
“unsophisticated, out-of-date, and very poorly argued.” Reviewer 2 really likes it, and
gives it an unqualified endorsement for publication (even his cats like it!). Somewhere
along the way, with these three reviews or later, Reviewer 3’s extremely thorough
review arrives (please pass along my thanks for her/his perceptive and conscientious
remarks). Despite some “quibbles” Reviewer 3 recommends publication. So you have
two Nays (or one Nay and one “throw it out with the trash”) and two Yeas. How do
you make the call when the peers are so divided (and not just in numbers, but in the
evident strength of positive and negative reactions)? I guess this is why they pay the
editor-in-chief the big bucks. Unfortunately for me, at the end of May Reviewer 4
responds negatively (the Iceman cometh); was s/he brought in as a tiebreaker? 4’s
reaction, while not as hostile as 5’s, does not take the old revise-and-resubmit line; s/he
evidently finds little of value and rejects it as “not AA material.”
Now I’m going to reveal something that will show you why no one will ever
ask me to be an editor of anything (and will also point to other, deeper character
flaws): I would say that the sharply polarized reviews you received, with two of our
peers loving it and two hating it, is the very best reason to publish the essay right away.
As a forum for discussion and debate (with an emphasis on the latter), what could be
better than an article that stirs things up? As a (never-to-be) editor, I would shy away
from a set of reviews that were all positive. If everybody agrees with it, everybody
must be thinking along the same lines as the article, so why bother publishing it? I
would be intrigued by universally negative responses, especially if it was clear that it
was the ideas in the submission that raised reviewers’ hackles, and not just sloppy
work (recall the universally hostile reception Nietzsche’s philological colleagues gave
Homer’s Contest). For me, the best argument not to publish a piece would be getting a
batch of reviews like my Reviewer 1’s: not bad, but this and that need work, maybe
publish somewhere else — not the kiss, but the yawn of Death that a writer dreads.
Hence my perplexity over the (re)review process my manuscript would
undergo. Am I shooting for a 3-2 vote rather than a 2-3 vote in favor of publication?
Am I supposed to renounce the casual philosopher’s voice (??) in favor of more rigor
and a much longer bibliography? I really don’t think 4 and 5 are going to take a shine
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to my work, no matter how I polish it. So, before I start changing things, I need to
know from you how all this will play out.
My proposals for a revision are as follows. I found Reviewer 3’s suggestions
stimulating and, to some extent, even doable in the confines of the essay. I would like
to develop, mostly in footnote form to save space and preserve continuity (I do strive
for narrative flow), a bit more on the pro- and anti-science debate in anthropology, to
better situate my piece in that debate. A few citations might help there as well. Also,
3’s request that I clarify my position on interpretation vis-a-vis science is well-taken
and of great theoretical importance. I didn’t think I had much more room (see below),
but would like to elaborate a bit. Finally, I can add, again in footnote form, a more
detailed critique of Crick (a Crick-critique!) and his physicalist position. I was rather
surprised to find reviewers’ calling mine a straw man argument and saying Crick is not
representative. It seems to me that the co-discoverer of DNA, Nobel laureate,
Scientific American headliner, and author of a successful trade book with a title like
The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul is hard to dismiss as a
straw man/hack.
The essay builds on concepts — and more detailed arguments — developed in
my 1996 book, American Dreamtime: A Cultural Analysis of Popular Movies, and
Their Implications for a Science of Humanity. A good part of that work is a chapter,
“A Theory of Culture as Semiospace,” that, for better or worse, has a lot to say about
the notions of semiospace, intersystem, continuum, multiple realities, the tie between
anthropology and quantum mechanics, complexity theory, and where Levi-Strauss fits
into it all. The essay aims to develop its own mix of ideas, and alludes to those taken
from the book — but they are there. (As an aside, I wonder if you could tell me if the
book, sent to the AAA in the summer of ‘96, is scheduled for review in the AA? If so, I
hope it didn’t get sent to Reviewer 5!) [NOTE: It was never reviewed in AA.]
Length. I wrapped up the manuscript when my word processor counted about
9500 words — mindful of an AA guideline that set 10,000 words as an absolute
maximum. I had a lot of ground to cover (culture, mind, and physical reality), and
skirted topical literatures in favor of a synthetic, multidisciplinary approach (isn’t the
AA supposed to like those?). There was no room for more examples from “different
cultures” (and the concepts of intersystem and multiple realities undermine the very
notion of “different cultures”), nor for an Annual Reviews-style treatise on relevant
work in neurophysiology (I’m not qualified to do that, anyway). I do need to get a
graphics person to do the figures; mine are just sketches. Though some reviewers
didn’t like the manuscript, none said it was repetitive or suggested ways of condensing
its arguments. So, with a few hundred words to work with, I can try to expand on the
Crick business, the science wars, and interpretation vs. science (but those would be
some pithy footnotes!). That way, more names could be added to the bibliography.
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But when it comes down to it, there isn’t a lot of space available to handle the complex
issues I glossed over.
Please advise.
With best regards,
Lee Drummond
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Center for Peripheral Studies
P. O. Box 477
Palm Springs CA 92263
Lee Drummond, Director
www.peripheralstudies.org
May 14, 1999
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
American Anthropologist
Dept of Anthropology
Macmillan, Room 112
Washington University
St Louis MO 63130
Dear Professor Sussman,
Following our phone conversation several months ago, I have proceeded
with revisions of my manuscript, “Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An
Anthropological Essay.” These are now complete, and I enclose multiple copies for
your (re)review. Given the space limitation, I believe the revisions incorporate most
of the changes we discussed, particularly situating the argument with respect to
current theoretical debate in cultural anthropology (“Where do we go from here?”
Answer: a monistic postinterpretivist comparative science of sapience). I have
spruced up the line drawings a bit, but will wait for AA acceptance before engaging
the services of a graphics person (anyway, how much can you do with squiggly
lines?)
Of the reviews you sent me, I felt #3’s were the most substantive and
perceptive. In the revision I tried especially to deal with points s/he raised. From
my longish letter to you of last August, it is clear that I hold little hope of changing
the opinions of reviewers 4 and 5 -- them folks and me might never be able to geehaw. As well as or rather than returning the essay to them for their stamp of
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disapproval, I’d suggest other critical readers (all acquainted with my work but not
close associates): [NAMES DELETED] But please don’t trow me in de Pomo briar
patch!
In the reflexive/iterative mode of the essay, my August letter also identified
what I find to be intriguing problems in the academic review process. Particularly
as anthropologists examine their social relevance and public image (recent AN
topics), I think it’s fascinating to watch anthropology’s intellectual history unfold
through the process of journal submission, review and publication. To that historical
end, in re-submitting the essay I have bound it with copies of reviewers’ comments
and our own correspondence. Hopefully these will be of interest both to earlier and
new reviewers of the piece.
I almost hesitate to raise a final point: if a couple of reviewers were put off
by the “casual” style of the earlier version, they may be even more critical of the
present offering, which indulges in yet more word play and popular culture
allusions. It would be a mistake to view these elements as products simply of the
author’s jokey nature and coarse disposition (guilty on both counts). The jokes and
slang are of a piece with the deepest theoretical musings of which I am capable.
Here I feel a strong affinity for Nietzsche’s view that an Übermut (a prankish
exuberance, a lightness of mind) is a natural companion of original thought: “. . . we
should call every truth false which was not accompanied by at least one laugh.”
And better a bad joke than no joke at all. (As the concierge said to a hotel guest who
complained about finding empty bottles of liquor and of a certain Angostura mixer
from a previous party in his hotel room, “Ya gotta take the bitters with the suite!”).
Or not, comme on veut.
[A note on format: The mix of Times Roman and Courier fonts is due to my
ancient version of MS Word not having foreign language characters in Times
Roman (so the alternating fonts are not a devilishly clever Pomo trope).]
With best regards,
Lee Drummond
PS: How about the thought experiment I proposed in my August letter, involving
Geertz’s “Thick Description”?
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American Anthropologist
Robert W. Sussman, Editor-in-Chief>
Department of Anthropology
Washington University St. Louis, MO 63130
Dr. Lee Drummond
Center for Peripheral Studies
P.O. Box 477
Palm Springs, CA 92263
II,1,,,,!,I,.I,I,fl.mil.II.ml..II,nil,nil,,.M...I.II.,I
June 11, 1999
Lee Drummond
Center for Peripheral Studies
P.O. Box 477
Palm Springs, CA 92263
Dear Dr. Drummond:
This is to confirm receipt of your revised manuscript, "Culture, Mind, and
Physical Reality: An Anthropological Essay." We will be in touch with you as
quickly as possible. We appreciate your interest in the American Anthropologist.
Sincerely yours,
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
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American Anthropologist
Robert W. Sussman, Editor-in-Chief
Linda K. Sussman, Associate Editor
Department of Anthropology
Macmillan, Room 112
Washington University
St. Louis, MO 631 30
December 9, 1999
Lee Drummond
Center for Peripheral Studies
P.O. Box 477
Palm Springs, CA 92263
Re: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality:An Anthropological Essay"
Dear Dr. Drummond:
Thank you for resubmitting your manuscript "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality:
An Anthropological Essay" for possible publication in the American Anthropologist. I
realize that this has been a long and complex process. However, given the current
reviews, I must again ask you to revise and resubmit.
It is obvious that you have made some very strong and interesting points and that the
article is thought-provoking. However, I am afraid that I agree with some of the
serious points made by some reviewers and that without strengthening some of these
areas many readers will not take the article seriously. Your major points are very
good and the issues are important but perhaps too flippantly made. By ignoring
certain literature, you weaken your own case. The article could also be tempered a
bit and made a bit more judicious. This is not to say that I think you should be less
provocative, unconventional, or witty. In sum, I would like to see this article
published in the American Anthropologist but believe that the readers you are trying to
reach could too easily disregard your important points if you do not take some of the
reviewers' suggestions seriously. I also agree with reviewers who are bothered by the
length and tenor of the footnotes— some of this material could be put into the text and
some is inappropriate (such as responses and references to reviewers' comments). In
all, I find them distracting to your major points.
I hope you will consider the reviewers' comments, take them seriously, and consider
revising the article. Finally, I would like you to know that I sent the paper to two
initially favorable reviewers (who advised revision), one reviewer suggested by you,
and one new reviewer. I did not send it back to those reviewers who were most
negative about the original paper (original reviewers #4 or 5). Please feel free to call if
you would like to discuss this with me (314-935-5264).
Sincerely yours,
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
Enclosures: Reviewer comments for author
telephone: (314) 935-4500 • fax: (314) 935-4384 • e-mail: aa@artsci.wustl.edu
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AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
#1
MS# 1-020070
DUE DATE: July 28. 1999
Title: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Essay"
Comments for author (use additional sheet if necessary):
This essay is unconventional in several respects, given the forum of the American
Anthropologist (and many other anthropology journals): Its form and style are
somewhat loose, hyperrefexive (with interrogations of the discipline), and
unbalanced (with excessive footnotes and minimal references to the literature in the
main text). And the argument is daring: the author takes a fresh and provocative
look at anthropological practice and the culture concept (neither abandoning it nor
reifying its current use).
Because of the essay's unconventional nature it may be tempting to reject it. This
is not, however, a sufficient reason for rejection. The journal—and anthropological
discourse more generally—should tolerate unconventional, daring and somewhat
provocative reflections such as these. The essay, in my view, should be accepted. It
is quite strong in that:
* It explores an extensive theoretical space, combining cognitive anthropology,
informatics, environmental history, and environmental anthropology,
* It provides a strong and useful argument for monism. Much recent writing
advocating monism is highly romantic, and, as a result, of relatively little pragmatic
use. This essay presents a relatively a-romantic view of monism,
* And it is good to read.
The need for revision will very much depend upon editorial definitions and policy.
In my view the essay might well be accepted as it is. It might, however, be advisable
to make some changes:
* I suspect some of the text that is currently relegated to the footnotes was outlawed
during an earlier reviewing stage (some of the notes clearly suggest such a reading). I
think, however, that the footnotes are too long and some of the text might usefully be
integrated in the main body of the essay.
* I was struck by the lack of attention to some important theoretical avenues that
seem to resonate with the author's perspective. He might consider incorporating a
brief discussion of (or referencing to) some of these avenues, including theorizing
on embodiment and the somatic grounding of skills, practice and emotions (Lave,
Bourdieu, Czordas), the notion of "dwelling" in environmental anthropology
(Ingold), and the idea of "structural coupling" (Maturana and Varela).
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MS 1-20070 Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality
I applaud the piece and think it followed through admirably on my recommendations
about the earlier version. I do hope the author will temper the jokes just a bit to make it
all more "judicious.
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AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST
#2
MS# 1-02007O
DUE DATE: August 13. 1999
Title: "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Essay"
Comments for author (use additional sheet if necessary):
I have very little by way of substantive criticism. The author has a very good command of his
material, is an excellent writer, and makes a cogent argument. The piece would be of interest
to any anthropologist (because part of what Drummond considers is the absence of
anthropology in major scientific debate), and, despite its length, the author knows when a bit
of irony and humor can advance an argument in a compelling way. AA could publish this
piece as written, though the argument is worth protecting in some areas the author seems
somewhat disinclined to consider.
Here's where I think the piece could use some minor revising:
1) Though the semiotics of a dinner party make for a simple example that anyone could
appreciate, the author could help his reader accept the significance of his viewpoint by
telling them why he has not attended more seriously to the literature in the neurosciences
that is devoted specifically to how various environments influence the organic development
of the brain. There is a good literature, for instance on neuroplasticity, and some
philosophical works on the philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., Ed Hundert's book,
Philosophy. Psychiatry, and the Neurosciences') that would help demonstrate for
Drummond's audience why on earth they should pay attention to something as obtuse to
most of them as semiotics. Though Crick has had an impact on lots of people (because he
is Crick), there will be many readers who will dismiss the importance of this essay because
they think that the counter-examples (from Los Alamos and the information-theory people)
is on the fringe anyway (much the way biologists dismiss most of theoretical physics out of
hand). When one thinks of all of the misshapen arguments that come from things like pni
(psychoneuroimmunology), for instance, it seems appropriate that Drummond not miss the
opportunity to show how his argument about the false division between society and the
brain applies to terrible research designs that get well funded because they subscribe to
deeply embedded (but wrong) cultural assumptions.
2) As a cultural anthropologist I, for one, would be proud to see some recognition of the
literature in our discipline on body image and body image boundary. I say this because his
premise-that "the distinctiveness of the brain-environment boundary is due to the
fact... that the skull is full of some very interesting and important holes"—is shared
explicitly by lots of traditional peoples who have developed much better integrative models of
the organ-environment relationship than 'we' ourselves have. Replacing, for instance, figure
1c with an ethnographic example would be helpful.
3) I would like to know more about his interest in how the "edges" of things, as he says,
help shape the center—not only because anthropologists are all interested in liminality, but
because a number of us actually accept the notion that concepts (as well as social groups)
are defined at and by their borders. (This is especially relevant given Drummond's own
professional affiliation!) He cites his earlier work, but could summarize it in a way that
drew his reader's attention away from accepted scientific dogmas. Lots of us have written
about this. He doesn't need to cite everyone, but a reader new to this perspective could be
moved to consider his argument by his saying something about what's been done in this
area.
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4) I would like to know a bit more explicitly how his holographic engine model is better
than the ones that information theorists contrive. Maybe a clearer positioning of his
argument within cybernetics and network theory would help. I'm not sure about this; but
I'm not totally taken by the model offered. Not yet, anyway.
5) Just as he describes readers being brought up short by minor errors in a manuscript,
they will probably also not find his “messy” models appealing. There are other images
from life (e.g., fungi) where the merging of organ and environment seem less arbitrary.
6) Some thoughtful writers have spoke cogently of the brief career of humankind on earth
(e.g., James Lovelock).
7) Finally, Drummond does not push one bleak and obvious outcome of his argument: if
the brain and culture are intimately tied, and culture has lost its sense of what has been
called its 'environmental memory', then the life of humankind on earth may actually be
more brief than we suspect. What, if any, are the positive alternatives? Drummond could
offer his reader something to think about by suggesting one or two.
But these are all minor suggestions. AA should publish this piece. It is cogent, wellwritten, informed, and even witty. The questions, moreover, are important.
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AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST: comments for the author: MS# 1-20070 #3
Title: Culture. Mind, and Physical Reality: An Anthropological Essay
The manuscript makes a few good points but has some problems:
1. On pages 2-4 the author compares Sci. Amer. with AA. What is the point. No
anthropologists in Sci. Amer.? What about archeologists and physical anthropologists? I
remember issues in which they were featured. Perhaps the author believes they are not
really Anthropologists? The point sounds to me like sour-grapes.
2. On page 4 the author says the brain is full of holes, for sense organs. Right. So why
beat consciousness to death. What this author should really be looking at is cognition,
and there are a number of anthropologists in that field. The "permeability" of the brain is
learning, and there are a number of anthropologists dealing with learning. It is interesting
this author quotes Crick. In fact, I think his real debate is with the geneticists, like Crick
and Wilson, rather than the consciousness-ists.
3. The author's discussion of “t” or “f” surely is an issue of cognition.
4. The author's discussion of bacterium to human is really the issue of learning dressedup with different words. This gets us into "symbolism" and I know of a few
anthropologists that deal with that subject. When the author says: "We do utilize
phonologies and dietary systems..." (p. 7) what is new about that observation.
Anthropologists have worried about the difference between human learning and learning
in other animals, and the role of meadiating symbolic representations in human behavior.
These works are not mentioned, or does the author believe he discovered this anew.
5. This author's semiospace resembles the cognitive spaces of psychologists. He says the
environment impinges on our senses. That is not new. The issue is how does that
transformation happen, how is the internal biospace effected, etc., etc., and we are back to
cognition.
6. Minsky and Al-ers program learning into their nerve nets (p. 10). We are back to
learning.
7. On page 11 the author uses an illustration of reaching for a coffee cup. If there is
anything an orthopedic medical type could say about muscular control it is that it is not
done by a "holographic engine," at least, not a holographic engine that works as this
author describes it.
8. On page 16 the story of the lions that hunt by night and humans that hunt by day gets
us back to cognition. How many physical anthropologists have worried about the
evolution of color and diurnal vision in the primates?
9. Let me pass over the "postinterpretivist anthropology" section and turn to the "Notes."
What are these references to reviewers? Who are the reviewers, or rather, what were
their actual words in context? What was the original manuscript they read? In my
experience reviewers get a manuscript, read it, make comments, and then the author
revises the manuscript. The references to the reviewers in the notes should all be
eliminated. They are "red herrings." We do not know who they were, what they actually
said, fully quoted, nor what the original statements were that they were referring to.
This manuscript seems to say the AA is a lousy journal because it does not publish
pictures of space travel with beautiful illustrations. Anthropologists are all blind because
they never discovered symbolism, learning, cognition, and genes. Renaming topics is not
science nor insightful scholarship. If the author wants to delve more deeply into the
anthropological literature and revise this article, I think he could make a contribution. As
it is, he just sounds like he is mad because no anthropologist has been recognized as a
major contributor to the subject of "consciousness."
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#4
Comments on "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality"
(1) The footnotes to the ms are long-winded, name-dropping, often unnecessary, and at
times hostile.
(2) The use of vulgarity in the ms in unacceptable for a scientific publication.
(3) The author does not bother to cite the most relevant anthropological literature at many
places in the text, e.g., T. Deacon, Symbolic Species on evolutionary questions; essays in
Reflexive Language (Silverstein and Urban, eds.) for issues of reflexivity; T. Turner on
culture concept and multiculturalism; Rabinow's critique of interpretive anthro., etc.
(4) Generalizations about the contents of scholarly periodical need empirical support; how
many issues? how many articles? how many authors fail to use the "anthropological concept
of human culture"?
(5) The section about Crick (pp. 6-7) should cite Boas' early paper "Alternating Sounds"
and the work of Edward Sapir.
(6) How does the author's concept of semiospace relate to the widely accepted concept of
"semiosphere" (J. Lotman).?
(7) The sentence on p. 17: "We humans possess .." needs to be further explained. How do
humans "incorporate" the "essence of beings"?
(8) The reference to "normal science" as practiced by scientists who remain aloof from
quantum theory is just silly, as talking to any sane physicist at will quickly demonstrate.
(9) The serious claim that cultural anthropologists have "largely ignored developments in
science and mathematics" is a serious attack on the subdiscipline; give exact numbers of
people, articles, journals, books, etc to support the claim..
(10) The comment about the neglect of Nietzsche merely shows that the author is not
familiar with the work of J. Weiner and B. Knauft, among others.
(11) The comment about Peirce (p. 23) is exactly backwards: for Peirce reality is defined as
the way the world is totally apart from our interpretation of it.
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Center for Peripheral Studies
P. O. Box 477
Palm Springs CA 92263
Lee Drummond, Director
www.peripheralstudies.org
March 28, 2000
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
American Anthropologist
Dept of Anthropology
Macmillan, Room 112
Washington University
St Louis MO 63130
Dear Professor Sussman,
Thank you for the second set of reviews of my revised essay, “Culture, Mind,
and Physical Reality.” I have held off writing because I have mixed feelings about the
review process as it has unfolded up to now (not unusual, since ambivalence and
paradox are the stuff of life).
Of the four reviews, I find the two re-reviews thorough and insightful, if a bit
picky in their demands for literature review (do you recall my mentioning, now so long
ago, that the piece is intended first and last as an exploratory essay, and not as an entry
for the “Annual Review”?). If it cannot retain a semblance of that form, there is no
reason to proceed with this tedious process.
Particularly since the re-review process took over half a year, I was
disappointed that the two new reviews are, in my view, slipshod and very off-the-mark.
If the points raised there are the reason for your “revise and resubmit” evaluation, I can
see no hope for a future revision. Neither of the two new reviews are dated, I suspect
because their authors waited an unconscionably long time to provide them. So let’s
call them the ½ pager [#4] and the full-pager [#3].
If the ½ pager is by one of my suggested reviewers [Name Deleted], he should
check his own copy in his essays on Peirce and then reconsider my argument. His
point #11, “for Peirce reality is defined as the way the world is totally apart from our
interpretation of it” is precisely my brief critique of Peirce: Peirce’s insistence on
isolating sign and referent creates an insupportable dualism; he distinguishes physical
reality from information. So the reviewer and I are saying the same thing – we
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apparently draw very different conclusions from our compatible readings of Peirce.
How, then, have I got Peirce “exactly backwards”? I just do not see it. The reviewer’s
point #8, “the reference to ‘normal science’ . . . is just silly, as talking to any sane
physicist will quickly demonstrate,” completely misconstrues my argument and
indicates the reviewer’s own shaky grasp of contemporary science: from Einstein to
Penrose, some exceptional physicists have attended to the genuinely weird implications
of quantum theory, while other, less exceptional physicists have adopted a pragmatic
attitude and used quantum field equations to solve applied problems without troubling
themselves about bizarre theoretical implications. They do normal science and remain
aloof from the theory. Science writers routinely comment on this split – why should
the reviewer find it “silly”? This sage reviewer is also troubled by my “vulgarity”
(point #2). Good news: I’ve removed the cuss words. Score one. In sum, I find it
disturbing that you should receive such a shoddy piece of work as this ½ pager after
such a long time.
The full-pager reviewer is more substantial, but also disappointing. S/he adopts
a dismissive attitude (my “sour grapes”) towards the central theme of the essay: the
connection between cultural analysis and scientific theory. If s/he can’t see the
seriousness of the essay’s engagement with that topic, there is, again, no hope. I also
object to the reviewer’s efforts to redefine by work as really being about cognition and
learning – and on into the “Annual Review” objections. I use anecdotal situations to
delve into experience and interpretation, and NOT cognition and learning. Are
Wittgenstein’s Sprachspiele “really” about cognition and learning – they develop
simple anecdotes about feeling pain, perceiving color, etc.? I think not. For my
money, I’ll keep the Philosophical Investigations and chuck out much of the
cognition-learning stuff. In a similar vein, are Bateson’s discussions of mind just a
muddle-headed way of getting at cognition? No. I think the reviewer is hiding behind
jargon and a fashionable research topic; let him/her engage the experiential content of
my little anecdotes. What really floored me about the full-pager is his/her point #9:
“Let me pass over the ‘postinterpretivist anthropology’ section . . .” That section, good
or bad, is intended as a significant contribution to culture theory (and there aren’t many
of those around these days); it is the one reason for an AA submission. The reviewer is
free to disagree with it, but not to “pass over” it. And we wonder what’s ailing
anthropology?
Moving to the two re-reviews, I am a bit confused. Both these reviews seem to
recommend acceptance, not “revise and resubmit” – am I misreading something here?
Or do the two crummy reviews, late and slipshod as they are, devalue the two positive
re-reviews?
Both “good” reviews advocate including a brief discussion of literature on
body image and embodiment; this I am willing to do. They are quite correct that that
literature resonates with my points about brain/environment boundaries; if you think
this sort of “Annual Review” exercise is crucial, then so be it. The August 13 reviewer
(again) suggested doing more with the neurophysiology literature. I did accommodate
that suggestion in my revision, with an extensive discussion of Churchland’s
Neurophilosophy, but I am not inclined to delve further. My reluctance is not entirely
laziness, for the essay clearly favors a cultural analysis that accommodates physical
research without ceding its own program (again: experience, interpretation). I just
don’t see that scoring points in psychoneuroimmunology would measurably improve
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the essay.
To condense all this, I am prepared to make the following changes:
(1) remove the “vulgarity”;
(2) remove the references to reviewer’s criticisms (the “tenor” problem);
(3) incorporate a brief discussion of work on body image and embodiment;
(4) make explicit the connection between my ideas on boundaries and the
established body of work on liminality and ethnicity.
However, I am not prepared to undertake these changes under a “revise and
resubmit” arrangement. I feel things have gone on too long, and have reached a point
of diminishing returns (the two new reviews are very diminished – I’m not ready for
more of that). I believe the changes we are now discussing are editorial, and that they
can be managed with the essay’s acceptance for publication pending your own editorial
review. I think that belief is justified in view of the recommendations of the two rereviews – I cannot be misreading their comments that badly! Please let me know if we
can proceed with the above changes on this basis.
Thank you again for the considerable time spent on this single piece – I cannot
imagine how you do what you do.
With best regards,
Lee Drummond
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Center for Peripheral Studies
P. O. Box 477
Palm Springs CA 92263
Lee Drummond, Director
www.peripheralstudies.org
June 23, 2000
Robert W. Sussman
Editor-in-Chief
American Anthropologist
Dept of Anthropology
Macmillan, Room 112
Washington University
St Louis MO 63130
Dear Professor Sussman,
It’s taken a while, but I now have a revision of my essay ready to mail to you.
The latest version has incorporated most of the footnotes into the text and followed a
number of suggestions of reviewers. Pages 13, 17-18, and 20-22 in particular contain
references to the literature on embodiment, cognition, liminality, and ethnicity your
reviewers recommended. As the revised Abstract indicates, the basic argument
regarding culture-mind-physical reality is now grounded in a general interrogation of
contemporary cultural anthropology. With so much time elapsed since its composition,
I’ve added a two-page “Afterword” that brings out implications of the piece as they’ve
occurred to me during the rewriting.
Thanks again for persevering with this unwieldy correspondence. Hope this
makes the decks of the flagship.
With best regards,
Lee Drummond
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Lee Drummond
From: "Robert Wald Sussman" <rwsussma@artsci.wustl.edu>
To:
"Lee Drummond" <leedrummond@msn.com>
Sent: Thursday, July 06, 2000 9:13 AM
Subject:
Re: Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality III
Dear Dr. Drummond,
I look forward to reading the revised version of your paper and I hope that this one
does, indeed, fly. As you know, I like the piece and I think that if you have made
some of the more important changes the reviewers will be ready to accept this
version. We will be back to you as quickly as we can and I will try to speed the
process a bit given the history of the article. Thanks for taking the time to rework it.
Sincerely,
Bob Sussman
On Fri, 14 Jul 2000, Lee Drummond wrote:
> Dear Professor Sussman,
> Thanks for your email of 7/6 regarding the latest version of CMPR. From our
previous correspondence following the second round of reviews I had understood
that the ms was now at an in-house editorial review phase, with you deciding
whether the ms now incorporates reviewers' suggestions regarding embodiment,
cognition, ethnicity, and liminality. Your last message, however, seems to indicate
that we are now into a third round of sending it out to reviewers. I'm a bit confused.
Could you please clarify the editorial process as it's now being played out?
> Thanks very much,
> Lee Drummond
> leedrummond@msn.com
Lee Drummond
From:
To:
Sent:
"Robert Wald Sussman" <rwsussma@artsci.wustl.edu>
<leedrummond@msn.com>
Wednesday, July 19, 2000 6:19 PM
I will be out of town from July 15-21. If you need to speak to
someone immediately concerning the American Anthropologist, please call
Linda Sussman or Lisa Young at 314-935-4500 between 8 a.m. and 4 p.m. or
send an e-mail to aa@artsci.wustl.edu. For other matters, please call the
Anthropology office at 314-935-5252. Your mail regarding
"Review of "Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality"" will be read when I return.
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Lee Drummond
From: "Robert Wald Sussman" <rwsussma@artsci.wustl.edu>
To:
"Lee Drummond" <leedrummond@msn.com>
Sent: Friday, July 14, 2000 6:12 PM
Subject:
Re: Cultural, Mind, and Physical Reality III
Dear Dr. Drummond,
You are correct. The paper will not go out for another round of reviews. I will make the
final decision. I will be out of town for a week and then will be back to you soon after
that.
Sincerely,
Bob Sussman
From: "Robert Wald Sussman" <rwsussma@artsci.wustl.edu>
To:
"Lee Drummond" <leedrummond@msn.com>
Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2000 4:38 PM
Subject:
Re: Culture, Mind, and Physical Reality III
Dear Dr. Drummond,
I have carefully read the revised version of your manuscript and all of the reviews
and I regret to inform you that I still feel that it would need more work before it
could be accepted in the journal. Therefore, given our prior communications on the
paper, I am sorry that I feel I must reject it at this time. Thank you for submitting this
thoughtful piece to the American Anthropologist. I look forward to seeing more of
your work in the future.
Sincerely,
Bob Sussman
Th-th-th-that’s all folks!
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gBzJGckMYO4 (Please click on link +CTRL)
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