States of Affairs 1
Though many philosophers hold that propositions exist and that their ontological status resembles
that of universals, there is far less agreement on the existence of states of affairs. Some think states of
affairs are reducible to propositions (or vice-versa).1 Others consider states of affairs to be real,
irreducible entities, distinct from propositions. But even among these philosophers, there is significant
disagreement concerning their nature. In this essay I will present a series of arguments for holding that
states of affairs are indeed real entities distinct from propositions. Before doing so however it will be
necessary to consider arguments for the doctrine of propositional realism since arguments for states of
affairs realism parallel the former in several ways. I will then provide a new account of states of affairs
relying heavily on the concept of logical form. In the final section of this essay, I critique Roderick
Chisholm's and Quentin Smith's accounts of states of affairs.
Propositional Realism
Among contemporary philosophers propositional realism appears to be a far less controversial
doctrine than that of states of affairs realism. Thus, examining the reasons given for the former will, if
analogous to reasons for the latter, give us more reason to think the latter is correct. Now certainly these
reasons are not without controversy and we cannot stop to address all objections here. Our main task is to
consider the evidence offered for propositional realism which, considered in toto, provides significant
justification for holding the view. There are five common pieces of evidence offered for the doctrine.
These are: (1) propositions serve as the meanings of declarative sentences/statements; (2) propositions
are bearers of truth-values; (3) propositions stand in the relation of logical consequence that in turn
preserves the validity of arguments; (4) propositions are bearers of modal properties; and (5) propositions
serve as intentional content of various mental states like belief. Let's look at each of these briefly.
More common than any reason for holding to propositional realism is the argument that
declarative sentences, being basic units of language, must have meanings.2 Similarly, it is argued that
given the empirical fact that sentences of one language are translatable into those of another language,
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there must be a common meaning to both (pace Quine).3 Propositions are proffered as these common
meanings. As George Pitcher notes,
If one person says "It is raining," another "Il pleut," and a third "Es
regnet," a correct answer to the question "What did he say?" would in
each case be "He said that it is raining"—for each would have said the
same thing. And it is this element which all three utterances have in
common—this same thing that is said in all three cases—that is the real
bearer of truth, not the different sentences which the speakers happen to
utter.4
For those who do not accept this argument, it is sometimes argued that meanings could not have a
truth-value, and hence, propositions qua meanings could not have a truth-value. Thus, while one might
countenance propositions, she rejects that they are meanings.5 I do not wish to address this objection at
any deep level, but will say that this rebuttal is little more than question-begging. It seems to emerge
from the fact that we more commonly attribute meaning to individual words, but less so to sentences. But
common usage is not significant enough alone to show that sentences cannot have meanings. Perhaps we
rarely talk about the meaning of sentences in our common parlance because we learn language by starting
with words and then moving to complete sentences. But of course learning—coming to understand—a
language is about learning the meaning of the terms of the language and how those terms are properly
combined into sentences.
We have already seen the second common reason given for propositional realism in Pitcher’s
quotation above: propositions are bearers of truth-value. If propositions are meanings of
declarative/indicative sentences and we ascribe the value true or false to a sentence, we also ascribe truth
to the proposition it expresses. We see a natural progression from propositions considered as meanings to
propositions considered as bearers of truth-value.
Similarly, we see a natural progression from propositions considered as bearers of truth-value to
propositions considered as the relata of the relation of logical consequence. To take the case of a valid
argument as an example, we must assume that truth-valued entities exist if we are to categorize an
argument as such. Valid arguments are by definition those arguments that have premises which, if true,
logically entail their conclusion. For such an entailment relation to hold then, its relata must bear truth-
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values, by definition. Certainly there may be other forms of entailment that don't clearly have truthvalued entities as their relata, e.g., supervenience relations.6 But if we grant that there are valid
arguments, we have a clear example of the relation of entailment that holds between truth-valued entities.7
Propositions are the best candidate for such entities.8
A fourth reason for realism about propositions is the need to explain the intuitively obvious
necessary and contingent aspects of our thought and language content. Clearly, the content of certain
beliefs and sentences seems true in a unique way. For example, the content of 'Seven is a prime number'
seems necessarily true. But the content of 'There are nine planets in our solar system' seems contingently
true. Given that the manner in which these two sentences are true is intuitively different, it is thought by
many that there must be some entity that bears these modal values of necessary and contingent truth.
Propositions, again, are the most plausible candidate, especially if they are already thought to bear truthvalues, since modality seems, at least in part, to be a way in which the contents of our language and
thoughts are true.
Finally, many find propositional realism explanatorily powerful because intentional mental states
are, by definition, about something, and hence have a content. My belief that the earth is, on average,
93,000,000 miles from the sun has a content with a truth-value. What better candidate than a proposition?
Propositions could be the mental content of a whole host of other intentional states, e.g., hopes, some
desires, wishings, etc. I note this reason for propositional realism last since it is more controversial and
less agreed upon than those that precede it. As Jaegwon Kim notes, there is a wide disagreement about
the nature of objects of belief.9 Nevertheless, most philosophers of mind recognize that there is a problem
of content for such intentional states.10 Propositions are commonly offered as at least a beginning to a
solution of this problem.
Methodological Preliminaries
Having seen five common pieces of evidence for the doctrine of propositional realism, we are
now in a position to see that similar evidence is available for countenancing states of affairs as real,
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distinct entities from propositions. Before examining these reasons, however, I want to pause to consider
a method for doing ontology that Roderick Chisholm suggests. States Chisholm,
From the fact that a true sentence seems to commit us to the existence of
a certain object, it does not follow that there is in fact such an object.
What we should say is rather this: If (i) there is a sentence which seems
to commit us to the existence of a certain object, (ii) we know the
sentence to be true, and (iii) we can find no way of explicating or
paraphrasing the sentence which will make clear to us that the truth of
the sentence is compatible with the nonexistence of such an object, then
it is more reasonable to suppose that there is such an object than it is not
to suppose that there is such an object. Given an adequate view of the
nature of philosophy, it does not seem to me to be reasonable to deny this
conditional…
So, asks Chisholm,
Can we paraphrase 'There is something that Jones long dreaded and that
Smith tried very hard to bring about' in such a way that the result can be
seen not to commit us to the existence of propositions or of states of
affairs? I do not know of any such paraphrase.11
I quote Chisholm here to reveal my own proclivity to take a common sense approach in determining basic
ontological categories.
As we will see more closely later, Chisholm argues that propositions are in fact reducible to states
of affairs. Ironically, I will apply his own guide expressed above to argue that this reduction does not
satisfy Chisholm's three conditions. Certainly I think that ontological parsimony is a noble goal in doing
ontology such that if we can in fact do without a certain entity, like states of affairs, we ought to. But, as I
will argue, there is no plausible way that we can.
The Distinction between Propositions and States of Affairs
Before arguing for the distinction between propositions and states of affairs, I should first give a
brief sketch of what I mean by the expression 'states of affairs'. Later I will provide a more detailed
account, but something brief should initially be said here. By states of affairs I have in mind those
entities which are typically denoted by nominalized gerundive phrases like ‘snow’s being white’. So,
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Bush's being president, red's being a color, Santa's being jolly, yellow's being brighter than blue, and it's
raining are all states of affairs. As we see, all of these phrases are formed by the nominalization of
declarative sentences.12 For example, 'Bush is president' becomes 'Bush's being president'. As Jaegwon
Kim points out,
States of affairs are designated by gerundial nominalization of indicative
sentences. I believe this to be the most fundamental fact about states of
affairs; it seems to me that much of what Chisholm and others have to
say about states of affairs stem from their intuitions about these
nominalizations and their putative referents. Thus some examples of
states of affairs are there being horses, there being unicorns, Brutus
stabbing Caesar in 44 B.C. and all humans being mortal…However you
develop your theory of states of affairs, you get your initial grip on them
through sentence nominalization.13
With this initial grasp of states of affairs before us, we can now consider reasons for thinking they
are distinct from propositions. First, in our review of reasons for propositional realism, we noted that
indicative/declarative sentences are thought by many to express propositions. If in granting that words
are not the exclusive expressers of meaning, but that sentences express (distinct) meanings as well, we
will be hard-pressed to exclude other sorts of sub-phrases (like gerunds) as distinct expressions of
meaning.14 Thus, not only does the sentence ‘I'm thinking about there being unicorns’ express a
proposition as well the individual terms of the sentence (‘I'm’, ‘thinking,’ etc.) express individual
meanings, but so do sub-phrases like 'there being unicorns'. It is plausible to think that the meaning of
such sub-phrases is a state of affairs.
Secondly, we notice that propositional realists take ‘that’-clause nominalizations of indicative
sentences to refer to the proposition expressed by the indicative sentence. For example, the indicative
sentence ‘Jones is jolly’ can be nominalized to produce ‘that Jones is Jolly’. On propositional realism, if
the sentence is true, so is its nominalized ‘that’-clause. However, ‘that’-clause nominalizations are not
the only nominalizations one can perform on declarative sentences. We can also perform gerundial
nominalizations. Yet, when we do, we don't get the same result that we do in ‘that’-clause
nominalizations. For example, if we perform a gerundial nominalization on ‘Jones is jolly’, we get ‘Jones
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being jolly’. If we predicate ‘true’ of this nominalization, we get the ungrammatical sentence ‘Jones
being jolly is true’. This ungrammatical result points to a distinct denotation of the gerundial
nominalization than that of the ‘that’-clause nominalization of the same sentence. The distinction in
denotation, we can plausibly reason, lies between a proposition and a state of affairs. What does seem
grammatically correct (and possibly true) in the case of the gerundial nominalization is the sentence
‘Jones being jolly obtains’ or ‘Jones being jolly is so’ or ‘Jones being jolly is the case’. I will assume that
these various predications are synonymous and use the predicate ‘obtains’ as that which is expressed in
each of these examples. The significant point here is that the predicate ‘true’ and the predicate ‘obtains’
appear distinct in meaning.
One might object here that any apparent difference between a ‘that’-clause nominalization and
the gerundial nominalization is only linguistic, but neither semantic nor ontological. But, if we are to
follow Chisholm's methodology, we can ask the question, is ‘Red being a color is true’ a well-formed
English sentence? If it is not, then we cannot apply the additionally meaningful predicate ‘true’ to this
sentence. Such a sentence does not sound natural to our grammatical ear. Given our desire to take
natural language seriously, it would put undue strain on putative English grammar to say that this is a
well-formed sentence. Thus, the “sentence” does not commit us to an entity at all, much less one that is
identical to a proposition, since it fails Chisholm's second condition, viz. knowing a sentence to be true.
Yet, if we replace ‘is true’ with ‘obtains’ we not only gain a well-formed sentence, but one that is in fact
true. Thus, ‘Red being a color obtains’ is a true sentence and seems to commit us to the existence of the
object denoted by ‘Red being a color’, since there is no paraphrase readily available that will enable us to
avoid ontological commitment to the entity denoted by this phrase.
While we noted in our outline of reasons for propositional realism that mental content of
intentional states remains one of the more controversial appeals for the doctrine, I want to push the claim
that this reason is weak. While I am not prepared to provide any developed argument for the solution to
the problem, I do want to say that if we are willing to countenance the real phenomena of intentionality
for mental states like belief and we remain unsympathetic toward eliminativism in the philosophy of
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mind, it seems that propositions are the most plausible candidates for the contents of such intentional
states.
One of the primary reasons philosophers reject propositions as a solution of the problem of
mental content seems to stem from Naturalistic ontological constraints. For example, David Armstrong's
rejection of this solution is evidenced by his comment that “…no Naturalist can be happy with a realm of
propositions.”15 But if Naturalism is our only reason for rejecting the existence of propositions, this is a
weak reason for doing so. Armstrong's and other attempts to solve the problem of mental content fall
unsatisfactorily short. For example, Armstrong suggests replacing propositions with classes of
intentionally equivalent token beliefs making the fundamental correspondence not between truth (true
propositions) and their truthmakers (states of affairs for Armstrong), but between token beliefs and
thoughts on the one hand and truthmakers on the other. But this solution merely helps itself to the
common content of belief by postulating intentionally equivalent belief tokens while leaving the
intentional equivalence unexplained. For example, that George Bush is President is clearly the common
content of many persons’ beliefs. But Armstrong ignores the pressing question of what metaphysical
status this belief type has. His enthymematic assumption is that its status must be physical. Without any
argument for this, however, I see no reason to grant such an assumption. Without any promising
physicalist explanation on the horizon, propositions seem to be the most plausible explanation for this
intentional equivalence, since propositions, considered as universals, are capable of serving as the
common mental content of multiple minds.
Admittedly, these comments are preliminary and further argument is needed here. I offer them to
at least point to the power of propositions in providing a plausible solution to the problem of mental
content. Assuming there are good reasons to accept this solution, we can ask the further question: is
there any reason to think that only propositions can serve as the content of intentional attitudes? I do not
believe that there is any such reason.
Having favored propositions as the most plausible solution to the problem of the mental content
for belief, we can provide an argument along similar lines for the distinction between propositions and
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states of affairs. We do so by considering other intentional attitudes. Naturally, we can pick out many
intentional attitudes that would most naturally take propositions as their content. So, for example, belief,
supposing, and judging are all intentional attitudes we easily associate with ‘that’-clauses, which we have
said denote propositions. We believe that studying mathematics has intrinsic value in developing a sound
mind; We suppose that  p is true in a reductio ad absurdum; and We judge that modus ponens is a valid
inference form. In each of these examples it looks like the content of the intentional attitude is a
proposition denoted by the relevant ‘that’-clause. But now consider other intentional attitudes like
entertaining or thinking of. In building our children's anticipation of Christmas we might notice their
tendency to entertain a state of affairs in which a jolly rotund man travels at near light speed on the eve of
December 25th. First, we see the absence of a ‘that’-clause in the expression of this observation, but of
course the intentional attitude of entertaining. Clearly, the children's intentional state of entertaining has a
mental content. And, no doubt, they could believe, suppose, or judge that a jolly rotund man travels at
near light speed on the eve of December 25th. We could in such cases say that their belief, supposition or
judgment was either true or false. But to simply entertain a state of affairs in which a jolly rotund man
travels at near light speed on the eve of December 25th does not afford itself of an ascription of truthvalue as the former intentional attitudes do. Thus, the most plausible content of an intentional attitude
like entertaining is a state of affairs—a non-truth-valued entity.
Finally, one is just as inclined to ascribe modal predicates to nominalized gerundives as she is to
nominalized ‘that’-clauses. It makes just as much sense to say ‘snow’s being white contingently obtains’
as it does to say ‘that snow is white is contingently true’. Thus, just as some have thought that
propositions serve as plausible bearers of modal properties so too do states of affairs seem plausible
candidates for this role.
Having considered the several reasons to think that there is a real distinction, we are now in a
position to provide a more detailed account of states of affairs. I will postpone addressing objections to
the distinction I have argued for, since these objections are often aimed at various accounts given of states
of affairs.
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A General Account of States of Affairs
If states of affairs are distinct from propositions, the question becomes, how distinct are they?
Are they radically different from propositions or close ontological cousins? On the theory that I propose,
states of affairs are composed of concepts. So are propositions. Thus my theory of states of affairs will
analyze them as very similar to propositions, though distinct.
Concepts can be combined according to certain logical forms. For example, ‘The ball’ expresses
the concept of a singular ball and ‘is red’ expresses a predicate. When combined, ‘that the ball is red’
expresses the logical form of a singular proposition. The ‘that,’ of course, indicates that a proposition is
being denoted by the combination of concepts that follows it. Similarly, ‘the ball’s being red’ combines
concepts into the logical form of a state of affairs. Propositions and states of affairs, then, are to be
understood as two distinct logical forms of combined concepts.
Not all concepts can combine to form all logical forms. In the case of the concept is true, it
cannot be combined with non-propositional entities.16 Thus, when we attempt to predicate ‘is true’ of
‘snow’s being white’ we do not produce a well-formed English sentence because the logical form
expressed by the combining of these terms, a proposition, cannot be formed because ‘is true’ is being
predicated of a non-propositional entity—in this case the state of affairs denoted by ‘snow’s being white.’
Thus, this combination of terms produces an ill-formed sentence, which is not a sentence since any
sentence is a well-formed sentence.
Asserting that propositions and states of affairs are distinct logical forms is not to say that they
aren’t closely related. A proposition and an isomorphic state of affairs can utilize the same concepts with
only one conceptual difference. This is the difference expressed by the use of the genitive and the
participle ‘being’ in ‘Snow’s being white’ versus the use of ‘is’ in ‘that snow is white.’ So, the difference
between propositions and states of affairs is a fine-grained conceptual difference, but, of course, a
difference sufficient to produce distinct entities, by the indiscernibility of identicals. Of course there are
other logical forms that can be built out of propositions and states of affairs, e.g., conjunctions,
disjunctions, universal generalizations, existential quantifications, conditionals, bi-conditionals,
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negations, and the like.17 For example, snow’s being white and grass’s being green is a conjunctive state
of affairs just as that snow is white and that grass is green is a conjunctive proposition. It seems most
intuitive to organize these logical forms in a genus-species relationship such that propositions and states
of affairs serve as two genuses and conjunctions, disjunctions, etc. serve as species of these two genuses.
For example, a disjunctive state of affairs is a logical form species of the general logical form state of
affairs.
It is also more accurate to say that propositions and states of affairs are second-order logical
forms since there are a variety of logical forms a proposition or state of affairs can take. For example, a
proposition or state of affairs may be subject-predicate as in The ball is red or a universal generalization,
as in that all balls are round. The first-order logical forms in these examples are the subject-predicate
and universal generalization logical forms and the second-order logical forms are both propositions.
States of Affairs, Constituents and Identity Conditions
Because states of affairs are composed of concepts, I should clarify this notion of composition so
as to distinguish it from as existentialist theory. An existentialist theory holds that propositions, and
mutatis mutandis, states of affairs are composed out of physical particulars among other entities. In the
context of the existentialist/anti-existentialist debate, constituents are construed as objects like Socrates in
the proposition that Socrates is snubnosed. The existentialist tells us that Socrates, the man, is a
constituent of this proposition.18 Since states of affairs are composed of concepts, one might construe
these concepts as a certain sort of constituent, but, of course not in the same sense as objects like
Socrates. This raises the difficult question of what concepts the state of affairs Socrates being snubnosed
is built out of. Being snubnosed seems an obvious choice as a concept expressed by the linguistic
predicate ‘being snubnosed,’ but what about ‘Socrates’; what concept does this proper noun express in the
nominalized gerundive ‘Socrates being snubnosed?’ Without diverging into a consideration of the various
theories of names, I am inclined to say here that ‘Socrates’ expresses a name concept (a particular type of
concept) which functions as a referring device for the man Socrates. When ‘Socrates’ and ‘being
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snubnosed’ are combined to form a nominalized gerundive, this string of English words denotes the state
of affairs Socrates being snubnosed.19 By combining these terms into the nominalized gerundive we
indicate the concept of being snubnosed and the name concept of Socrates compose the second-order
logical form of a state of affairs.
With these basic principles established, we can ask what the identity conditions for states of
affairs are. There is a straightforward answer: Necessarily, for all states of affairs x, for all states of
affairs y, for all concepts c, for all logical forms L, x is identical to y iff x is composed of all and only
those concepts that y is composed of and vice-versa and x and y share the same logical form. We can
represent this symbolically:
xsoaysoacL (x = y  [xsoa(L[c1, c2...cn])  ysoa(L[c1, c2...cn)]])
In this definition we see the two orders of logical form at work. The first order involves the type
of state of affairs, which is represented by ‘L.’ As we noted, states of affairs come in various logical
forms like subject-predicate (Fa—a’s being F), bi-conditonal (Fa iff Gb—a’s being F iff b’s being G),
etc. The second order logical form is simply that of being a state of affairs. This is denoted by the ‘soa’
subscript.
Obtaining vs. Truth
As we have been distinguishing between states of affairs and propositions, we have seen that one
reason to distinguish them is due to the predicates ‘that’-clauses and nominalized gerundives can receive.
The former can meaningfully receive the predicates ‘true’ and ‘false’; the latter can meaningfully receive
the predicates ‘obtains’ and ‘fails to obtain.’ We see that by predicating ‘true’ or ‘false’ of the former or
‘obtains’ or ‘fails to obtain’ of the latter we produce well-formed English sentences. But if these are
distinct predicates expressing distinct concepts, surely there must be a close relationship between the two.
For example, the sentences expressing the propositions ‘That snow is white is true’ and ‘Snow’s being
white obtains’ must lie in a close relationship with each other even if that relationship is not identity.
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This relationship is one of logical equivalence. That snow is white is true iff only snow’s being white
obtains. By adding the appropriate predicates, we have produced well-formed English sentences that
express propositions that always share the same truth value; they are coextensive. Because states of
affairs are conceptual entities, they clearly do not stand in a truth-making relationship to propositions.
This role is reserved for facts, which, unfortunately, can be denoted by either ‘that’-clauses or
nominalized gerundives, thereby confusing the ontological map. For example, we can speak of the fact
that snow is white or say that snow’s being white is a fact. The primary difference between facts and
propositions/states of affairs is that facts involve property and relation exemplification; they are not
composed of concepts alone. Thus it is the fact that snow is white which makes the proposition that snow
is white true and the states of affairs of snow’s being white obtain. So, facts are neither true nor false and
they do not obtain or fail to obtain. They simply exist. If one wants to speak of possible facts, this theory
of states of affairs dictates that possible facts are nothing more than states of affairs, i.e., purely
conceptual entities.
By designating states of affairs as purely conceptual entities, we allow them to exist without
obtaining. This preserves the intuition that existence is univocal, that there are not Meinongian degrees or
modes of being. But this also allows us to preserve our modal intuitions with respect to propositions and
their isomorphic states of affairs even if those propositions and states of affairs fail to be true or obtain
respectively. That is to say, this theory comports with soft actualism. Such a view allows us to make
sense out of contemplating non-obtaining states of affairs and their isomorphic false propositions
admitting they exist, but denying that they obtain or are true.
Propositions and States of Affairs
We have seen that the primary argument for distinguishing states of affairs from propositions lies
in the predicates their linguistic expressions can receive in order to produce a well-formed sentence.
There is a fine-grained conceptual difference between states of affairs and propositions, between that
snow is white and snow’s being white. We have also seen that isomorphic states of affairs and
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propositions are logically equivalent such that if a proposition P is true, its isomorphic state of affairs S
obtains and vice-versa. So far we have not made explicit the relation of isomorphism that can hold
between a state of affairs and proposition, since this notion seems intuitive. Nevertheless, we might
inquire as to whether this relation can be specified. I offer this: Necessarily, For all states of affairs S, for
all propositions P, S is isomorphic to P iff S and P differ only in their basic logical form of state of affairs
and proposition respectively, while remaining identical in first-order logical form as well as conceptual
content. Take for example the proposition P having the logical form and composition aRb. The state of
affairs S, having logical form aRb is isomorphic to P since it contains the same logical form and
conceptual content as P. Since S and P are isomorphic, S will obtain iff P is true.
Interestingly, by making explicit the relation of isomorphism that can hold between a proposition
and a state of affairs we have also partially defined the truth conditions for any proposition. If proposition
P and state of affairs S are isomorphic, then S, in part, provides the truth conditions for P. By ‘truth
condition’ I mean the state of affairs under which a given proposition is true such that, if S obtains, P is
true. Now, this relation of isomorphism doesn’t fully specify the truth conditions for P. We will also
need facts to do this. Nevertheless, we do see a key ingredient for specifying the truth conditions for any
proposition. Formally, we can say if proposition P and state of affairs S are isomorphic, then if P is true,
S obtains. Later, when we examine facts, we will see that there is a second isomorphism between facts
and states of affairs that will complete our analysis of truth conditions.
With one element of truth conditions spelled out it is easy to see at least part of the answer to the
question of how to describe false belief. If a proposition P and state of affairs S are isomorphic and P is
false, it follows that if Jones believes P, S does not obtain. That is to say, the truth condition for P does
not obtain. Interestingly, because possibilism is not a plausible option, we cannot directly say that P is
false because some fact F does not exist, since non-existence is not a property.20 Non-existence cannot be
a property if possibilism is false, since it is a truth of logic that whatever has a property exists. Since
existence is univocal, it is logically impossible that some object x have a property of non-existence.
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States of Affairs, Facts, and Truth
As I have hinted, facts are needed for our theory of states of affairs if it is to comport with a
correspondence theory of truth. If states of affairs are logical forms of concepts, then they are not capable
of serving as the truthmakers for true propositions. Particulars having properties and standing in relations
are the sorts of things that make propositions like that snow is white true. Naturally, these are also the
sorts of the things that make states of affairs like snow’s being white obtain. Now we can’t limit our
notion of particulars to physical particulars since there are many true propositions about abstract objects
(properties, numbers, propositions, states of affairs, and the like).
Perhaps the most distinguishing feature of facts from states of affairs and propositions is that facts
involve the exemplification of properties and/or relations. Since we have limited the content of
propositions and states of affairs to concepts, properties and relations partially compose facts and thus set
them apart from propositions and states of affairs.
Some philosophers have suggested that facts are nothing more than obtaining states of affairs.
But this option won’t work for a theory that takes states of affairs to be built out of concepts. For such a
theory, there must remain a clear distinction between properties (or qualities) and concepts. If snow’s
being white is composed of the concepts snow and white arranged in the logical form of singular
predication and the second-order form of state of affairs, then the obtaining of this state of affairs cannot
transform it into an entity composed of particulars (snow), and properties (whiteness), for its essence
would be fundamentally different. So, we must turn to a third entity to do the work of making true and
making obtain (or making actual). And this entity is of course, a fact.
It is not within the purview of this essay to produce a theory of facts. Nevertheless, a rough idea
of these entities is necessary given what we have said thus far. Unfortunately, English can be ambiguous
when it comes to designating facts. We say, “It’s a fact that snow is white.” Here, the familiar ‘that’clause might suggest that the way ‘fact’ is being used here is in the sense of a true proposition. On the
other hand, one might mean that there is an entity, call it ‘snow’s being white’ that exists in the world
which makes it true that snow is white. But, confusion mounts as this expression suggests that one may
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be referring to what we have been calling states of affairs since it shares the nominative gerundive form
that we have said denotes a state of affairs. Herein lies an ambiguity: we can refer to facts or states of
affairs using the exact same nominalized gerundive expression, e.g., ‘snow’s being white’. The
ambiguity in natural language might suggest an identity between facts and states of affairs to some, but it
could just as easily suggest a logical relation of isomorphism. While the isomorphism that exists between
certain propositions and states of affairs was relatively easy to specify, that between states of affairs and
facts is not. We have seen that part of the reason this is the case is due to the fact that states of affairs and
facts are composed of very different entities, ontologically speaking. How do the concepts in the state of
affairs snow’s being white correspond to the properties and particular in the fact that snow is white? No
easy answers present themselves, but it is worth at least attempting to spell us this
isomorphism/correspondence.
At the minimum we can say that the concepts snow and white in our simple example have an
extension which is the set of all entities that falls under the concept, i.e., to which the concept applies.
Some concepts’ extensions are the null set such that there are no objects that fall under that concept. We
can say that if all of the concepts that are included in a state of affairs have a non-empty extension, and
the first-order logical form is mutually exemplified by the extensions of these concepts, then that state of
affairs obtains and its isomorphic proposition is true. For a further understanding of this correspondence,
let us briefly consider the correspondence theory of truth.
The Correspondence Theory of Truth
I have been developing a theory of states of affairs that is compatible with a correspondence
theory of truth. Others have persuasively argued for this theory in favor of other views like deflationary,
redundancy, minimalist, pragmatist, identity, exemplificationist and coherentist theories of truth, so I will
not do so here.21
Richard Kirkham distinguishes between two types of correspondence theory: correspondence as
correlation and correspondence as congruence.22 The former holds that the correspondence that exists
States of Affairs
16
between certain propositions and facts need not involve any logical isomorphism, while the latter does.
One of the advantages of a correspondence-as-correlation theory is that
On a correspondence-as-correlation theory, the fact referred to by a true
disjunctive statement need not itself be a “disjunctive entity,” whatever that could
be.23
This would also be true, mutatis mutandis, for other logical connectives and forms like
conditionals and negative facts. However, given our heavy dependence on logical form to specify the
isomorphic relation that exists between certain propositions and states of affairs, it would seem on the
face of it that a correspondence-as-congruence correspondence theory will be more likely for our theory
of states of affairs. To see how this will affect such difficulties as negative or disjunctive facts, let us turn
to a deeper exploration of the nature of facts.
The Nature of Facts
If states of affairs and propositions are isomorphic because they share the same logical form, will
the concept of logical form help in explaining how facts serve as truthmakers for particular propositions
and actuality-makers for their isomorphic states of affairs? Perhaps it will, however, the major difference
with facts is that we are dealing with particulars and property/relation exemplification, and not concepts
alone. Nevertheless, it still seems coherent to say that a fact has a logical form, e.g., the fact that snow is
white, or snow’s being white has a subject-predicate logical form. But of course, with a fact, we’re now
dealing with the physical particular snow, not just the concept snow. Moreover, we’re dealing with a
property instance of white, not merely the concept of being white. Nevertheless, snow and this property
instance are linked together in a logical form of subject-predicate. And this logical form will do work for
us in explaining the correspondence relation that holds between the proposition that snow is white and the
fact that snow is white. Both share the same logical form of subject-predicate. Additionally, the
particular and property instance involved in this fact serve to make the concept extensions of the
proposition non-empty. Thus we have a preliminary answer to what the correspondence relation consists
States of Affairs
17
of: 1) All concepts of a proposition must have non-empty extensions if some fact makes it true; 2) the
extensions of those concepts must include all of the constituents of a fact; and 3) that fact must share the
same logical form as the proposition it makes true. Naturally, for the isomorphic state of affairs, these
three conditions must be met in order for that states of affairs to obtain.
This, of course, leaves us with a peculiar result, that any fact isomorphic with a disjunctive
proposition is itself disjunctive. Since it does seem implausible to think that facts share the logical form
of disjunction with the state of affairs and proposition it corresponds to, it seems best to make a
distinction at this point. This distinction is between connective and non-connective logical forms. In
general we can say that connective logical forms serve to connect propositions or states of affairs; they
are logical relations whose relata are propositions or states of affairs. Connective logical forms include
disjunction, conjunction, bi-conditional, conditionals, and perhaps others. In the case of negative
propositions like  P, we need not say that there is a negative fact that makes this proposition true since
we can take negation as a special case of a concept that, necessarily, has an empty extension. Thus the
proposition It’s not the case that snow is green, is a proposition whose concepts are not all non-empty,
and thus there need not be a fact that makes this proposition true.
States of Affairs, Facts, and Events
Lurking in the periphery of our discussion of states of affairs, propositions, and facts, is the
question of events. Are events distinct from facts or identical to them? It would seem that facts are
spoken of irrespective of time or the passage of time, but events are spoken of in the context of time. So,
it would seem that facts are not identical to events since events can last over a period of time. True, facts
can remain unchanged over a period of time, but it would seem that they cannot undergo change while
remaining the same fact. For example it is a fact that snow is white, but, were snow to change in color,
this fact would cease to exist. On the other hand, events like a Baseball game can include a great deal of
internal change while remaining the same event. This is provisional; it might be possible to conceive of
facts in such a way that they are identical to events. Perhaps part of the motivation to speak of facts
States of Affairs
18
independently of time is that propositions (and states of affairs on our theory) are generally conceived of
as timeless, eternal entities. The truthmakers for such propositions would naturally be considered
atemporally. But this does not seem to be a necessary conception of facts.
Jonathan Bennett distinguishes between events and facts based on the grammatical distinction
between perfect and imperfect sentence nominals.24 Perfect nominals, which refer to events, are more
noun-like, e.g., the death of Cesar, the sinking of the Titanic, the theft that Mary committed, Quisling’s
betrayal of Norway, and Mary’s theft of the bicycle.25 On the other hand, imperfect nominals, where refer
to facts, have a verb alive and kicking inside of them.26 Thomas Wetzel comments,
Bennett suggests that the role of perfect nominals is often to pick out a complex
dynamic situation, by means of something like a definite description, in order to
describe it or attribute some property to it. The richness of the event is not fully
articulated in the designator. In (24)
(24) The quarrel between Sam and Enrique was savage.
the designator "the quarrel between Sam and Enrique" picks out a complex
situation that was made up of a variety of concrete events or processes such as
loud utterances, a glass being thrown against the wall, racial slurs, a punch to the
nose, and so on. The predicate "was savage" is here not taken to indicate a feature
that was constitutive of what unfolded that evening, but is a characterization of
the whole episode. In (24), a property is being attributed to the situation.
The imperfect, gerundive nominals that are used canonically to designate states
of affairs [facts in our parlance] have a "thinner" mode of reference. From these
expressions one can "read off" the composition of the state of affairs [facts] thus
articulated, Bennett suggests. "What you see is what you get," says Bennett.
"Mary's stealing the bicycle" designates a state of affairs [fact] in which the
relevant entities are Mary, the bicycle and the property of stealing.27
So, from Bennett’s research it appears that English reflects a distinction between facts and events.
Since no paraphrase appears readily available, my provisional position is that events and facts are distinct
entities.
With the basics of our theory of states of affairs laid out, we can now consider two contemporary
accounts of states of affairs that fail.
States of Affairs
19
Alternative Accounts that Fail
Chisholm's Reduction of Propositions to States of Affairs
While some philosophers have thought that a distinction between states of affairs and
propositions is untenable, the general tendency is to argue that states of affairs are reducible to
propositions. Roderick Chisholm, however, once held that states of affairs are the basic ontological
category of which propositions and events are species.28 Let's briefly sketch Chisholm's system before
seeing why this collapse for the sake of ontological parsimony fails.
Chisholm's identity condition for a state of affairs is:
p is a state of affairs =definition It is possible that there is someone who
accepts p.29
So, we see that Chisholm solely identifies states of affairs as the potential mental content of the
intentional state of acceptance. Chisholm distinguishes two species of states of affairs, propositions and
events:
p is a proposition =definition p is a state of affairs, and it is impossible that
there is a time t and a time t' such that p occurs at t and does not occur at
t'.30
In other words, if a state of affairs is a proposition and that state of affairs occurs
(obtains), it always occurs. In the case of an event,
p is an event =definition p is a state of affairs which is such that: (i) it
occurs; (ii) it is not a proposition; and (iii) it entails a property G which is
such that (a) only individual things can exemplify G, (b) it is possible
that no individual things exemplify G, and (c) G is not such that it may
be rooted outside the times at which it is had.31
The most significant difference between an event and a proposition for Chisholm is that events occur at
some but not all times whereas propositions, if they occur, do so at all times. On Chisholm's schema,
those propositions that do occur are true propositions and those that do not are false. Now it is not my
task to provide any complete critique of Chisholm's system here, especially of events, which others
elsewhere have done.32 Primarily for our purposes we are interested in Chisholm's reduction of
propositions to a species of state of affairs in the first definition above. Proleptically, Chisholm says,
States of Affairs
20
Yet it would seem that we are multiplying entities beyond necessity if we
say that among the things that exist eternally in all possible worlds is the
state of affairs of Socrates being mortal and also the proposition that
Socrates is mortal.33
But according to Chisholm's criteria for ontological commitment, if we are unable to do without an entity
in explaining the reference or meaning of our different terms and phrases, which in turn constitute
sentences we take to be true, then we ought not to dismiss the existence of that entity. Let's examine if
Chisholm provides a satisfactory linguistic explanation of this reduction.
Chisholm states an objection we might offer:
(i) Your theory implies that, if a man believes that a storm is occurring,
then that state of affairs which is the occurrence of a storm is the object
of his belief. But (ii) the sentence "He believes that a storm is occurring"
is natural and clearly grammatical, whereas "He believes the occurrence
of a storm" is unnatural and not clearly grammatical. Hence (iii) if a man
believes that a storm is occurring something other than the occurrence of
a storm is the object of his belief.34
Chisholm responds,
The premises of the argument are certainly true. If we wish to say of a
man that he believes that a storm is occurring, we do not say 'He believes
the occurrence of a storm'. But we may say 'He believes in or suspects,
or is counting on, or is mindful of, the occurrence of a storm'. And
where we may say of a man that he fears, regrets, hopes or knows that a
storm is occurring, we may also say, equally well, that he fears, regrets,
hopes for, or is cognizant of the occurrence of a storm. Such points of
usage may throw light upon various intentional attitudes. But surely they
give us no reason to suppose that ‘the occurrence of a storm’ and ‘that a
storm is occurring’ refer to different things. The argument is simply a
non sequitur.35
Sorting out the semantics of intentional attitude terms by examining various linguistic
expressions of those attitudes is an involved process with pitfalls at every turn. Chisholm's hasty
inclusion of several intentional attitudes in his list—all of which he argues take a state of affairs as their
mental content—will not withstand closer scrutiny, however. But a thorough inquiry of each intentional
attitude term is unnecessary. All that must be pointed out here is that Chisholm is trading on an
ambiguity in the reference of ‘the occurrence of a storm.’ The reason ‘He believes the occurrence of a
storm’ is unnatural and even ungrammatical is because the content of belief here is ambiguously
States of Affairs
21
expressed by ‘the occurrence of a storm.’ ‘The occurrence of storm’ could express the proposition that a
storm is occurring, in which case the sentence might be ruled grammatical. Alternatively, the event of a
storm or the state of affairs of a storm's occurring could equally be the referents of ‘the occurrence of
storm.’ In this case the sentence would remain ungrammatical since such states of affairs (or events for
that matter) are not eligible candidates for belief, since they cannot possess truth values. What would be
clearly grammatical, if ‘the occurrence of the storm’ was taken to denote a state of affairs, would be a
sentence like ‘Jones was entertaining the occurrence of a storm’ where the intentional attitude of
entertaining naturally takes a state of affairs as its mental content. Thus, the difference in how the
meaning of ‘the occurrence of a storm’ is taken strongly suggests that propositions are not a mere species
of states of affairs, but a distinct intensional entity. The distinguishing feature is that the former have
truth-values, but the latter cannot, as we have seen.36 So we see that Chisholm is betraying his own guide
for doing ontology by asserting an identical meaning here that is not at all apparent. There is no readily
available paraphrase to reduce such expressions of ‘the occurrence of a storm’ to a proposition that does
not in turn change the potential meaning of the expression; if one is reading ‘the occurrence of a storm’ as
denoting a state of affairs, then reducing it to a proposition will produce a new content, and thus a new
meaning, which is distinct from a state of affairs.
Jaegwon Kim extends this objection to Chisholm's identity condition for a state of affairs, viz.,
that it is possible that there is someone who accepts p. Kim argues that little sense can be made of
accepting nonpropositional states of affairs like events:
…a serious difficulty seems to arise for Chisholm's generic conception of
states of affairs as objects of intentional attitudes. As noted earlier, the
defining characteristic of states of affairs is that they are objects of belief
or acceptance. This is perfectly all right for those states of affairs that
are propositions. But what about those that aren't propositions, and, in
particular events? What is [it] to accept or believe an event?…What
sense can be attached to believing, disbelieving or suspending belief with
respect to, say, Jones walking at t…It would seem that acceptance makes
sense only with respect to truth-value bearers…I do not believe
Chisholm has provided us with an explanation of what belief or
acceptance really amounts to with regard to events and other
nonpropositional states of affairs.37
States of Affairs
22
Since, as we have seen, facts, events, and states of affairs are all commonly stated in nominalized
gerundive phrases, Kim's remarks here apply to facts and states of affairs as much as they do to events.
So, Chisholm's identity condition for a state of affairs is incomplete.
In summary, while there is a certain appeal to Chisholm's ontologically parsimonious account of
states of affairs, we see that he forfeits a plausible ontological explanation for such expressions as ‘the
occurrence of a storm’ in his reduction of propositions and events to states of affairs. We now turn to a
second failing account of states of affairs that Quentin Smith offers.
Quentin Smith's Account of States of Affairs as Truth-makers
Several philosophers have rejected such an analysis as ours on grounds that this account leaves
out the vital notion of a truthmaker. Quentin Smith has articulated such an objection.38 Smith notes that
accounts of states of affairs such as Chisholm's and Plantinga's hold that states of affairs are truth-valued
complexes whereas his account holds that states of affairs are what make truth-valued complexes true,
i.e., they are truth-makers of true propositions.39 We have already seen where our account departs from
Chisholm's. While our account is more complete than Plantinga's, his account is similar enough in its
fundamentals to ours that we can apply Smith's objections to Plantinga to our own account as well. Says
Smith,
It seems to me however, that there are no "states of affairs," if this
expression is used in Plantinga's sense to refer to something different
from both propositions and the truth-makers of propositions.40
With Plantinga, we have argued for the distinction between states of affairs and propositions while
denying the former the role of truth-maker. But Smith argues that the identification must be made if
‘states of affairs’ is not being used in his sense to refer to truth-makers. For Smith, the existence of a state
of affairs is sufficient for making some proposition true:
S is a truth-maker of [proposition] P if and only if (a) P's being true
consists in its correspondence to S and (b) S's existence is both sufficient
States of Affairs
23
and necessary for the relation of correspondence to obtain between P and
S.41
On my account, however, what makes the proposition that Spiro Agnew is the president of Yale
University true is Agnew's exemplification of the property of being president of Yale University. The
existence of this fact both makes the proposition true and makes the state of affairs of Spiro Agnew being
president of Yale University obtain. However, obtaining or being true is just a verbal difference
according to Smith; there is no reason to think that there is any ontological difference here. Says Smith,
But what are these strange “states of affairs” of Plantinga? Plantinga
distinguishes between their existence and their obtaining, since some
states of affairs exist but do not obtain. This means they are, in a
relevant sense, truth-valued complexes, since their “obtaining” and “not
obtaining” is exactly analogous to the “being true” or “being false” of
propositions. But it is hard to see, then, how Plantinga's states of affairs
differ, except verbally, from his propositions.
While we have said that there is an intimate relationship of logical entailment between a state of
affairs actually obtaining and its isomorphic proposition being true, we can still maintain a clear
distinction between each. But if the obtaining of a state of affairs entails that an isomorphic proposition P
is true, it does not follow, as we have said, that the former makes the latter true. Therefore, “exactly
analogous” in Smith's words does not prove to be the relation of identity; his move here is too quick.
Smith's account of states of affairs and consequent rebuttal to Plantinga rests on a constitutive
analysis of propositions and states of affairs. Smith argues,
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that the constituents of
Plantinga's states of affairs seem indiscernible from the constituents of
his propositions. Consider that the proposition expressed by a de dicto
use of the sentence “The tallest human is wise” consists of the properties
of being the tallest human, the property of wisdom, and a temporal
property. But Plantinga's state of affairs the tallest human's being wise
also appears to consist of all and only these properties (as ordered to each
other in the same way) and thus appears to be identical with the
proposition. If there is some difference between the constituents of the
state of affairs and the constituents of the proposition, Plantinga does not
tell us what it is. To say that one “obtains or does not obtain” whereas
the other “is true or false” seems to be merely a verbal difference, given
the absence of any difference in the constituents of the two complexes.
States of Affairs
24
As can be seen from our above argument, isomorphic states of affairs and propositions do look identical
in logical form when dealing at the “constituent” (concept) level of each. But a clear difference in logical
form is seen when we move to predicates true and obtains. Here an isomorphic proposition and state of
affairs do distinctly differ in logical form.
On Smith's account of states of affairs and propositions, each has the same parts, though they are
ordered differently in each. Moreover, these parts also include particulars.42 For example, when we
consider the de re proposition John is running, Smith tells us that
Both the proposition and the state of affairs [John running] have for their
parts John, running, and presentness. But they are ordered in the
proposition in a different way from how they are ordered in the state of
affairs. They are related in the proposition in such a way that (1) the
existents can be so related even if John is not presently walking (but
given that the proposition is de re, they cannot be so related if John does
not exist, since John is a part of this proposition only if he exists); (2) the
complex is not identical with John's present walking (this is entailed by
condition [1]). But, John, walking, and presentness are related in the state
of affairs in such a way that (1) they are so related if and only if John is
presently walking; (2) their being related in this way does not possess a
truth-value but corresponds to something (namely, the proposition) that
possesses the value of true; and (3) the state of affairs is identical with
John's present walking (i.e., it is not a set or merelogical sum or
aggregate composed of John's present walking, it just is John's present
walking and is nothing different from this or over and above this). The
state of affairs is John's exemplifying walking and his exemplifying
walking's exemplifying presentness. This entails that if there is the state
of affairs, then John is presently walking; accordingly, it makes no sense
to say that there is this state of affairs but that it does not obtain, since
this could only mean "There is this state of affairs, but John is not
presently walking," which, given my definition of a state of affairs, is an
implicit logical contradiction. Accordingly, if states of affairs are truthmakers, then there is no distinction between their existence and their
obtaining, such that “the state of affairs S exists” means “S obtains” and
“S does not obtain” means “S does not exist.”
My account takes propositions and states of affairs anti-existentialially. We can see in Smith's account
here a clear reason for doing so. According to Smith the proposition that John is running cannot exist
unless John exists. This claim leaves Smith with an unsavory result. Suppose that I am close friends with
John and that John is a long-distance runner. I know John has been training for the Boston Marathon for
several months. I know John well enough to know that his schedule is quite predictable and that he runs
States of Affairs
25
everyday between 10 a.m. and 12 p.m.. One day, during my 10:30 a.m. coffee break, I reflect on John's
upcoming trip to Boston. At this time I believe the proposition that John is running. Unbeknownst to me,
however, John has tragically died that morning as the result of an automobile accident. So, John no
longer exists and my belief that John is running is false.
But, on Smith's existentialist account of propositions, the mental content of my belief cannot be
the proposition that John is running since John does not exist; John's existence is a necessary condition for
the existence of this proposition. But surely the mental content of my belief is no different than it would
be had John remained alive and continued with his morning routine. The belief would have been true
instead of false, but its content would have been identical.43 So, on these existentialist grounds alone, we
can reject Smith's account of propositions and states of affairs.
Aside from this objection, however, we can see fairly easily that Smith is using ‘state of affairs’
in a manner similar to our use of ‘fact.’ But there is more than a trivial nomenclature debate ensuing
here. Smith is denying the category of a state of affairs as we have defined it, but as we have argued,
these intensional entities clearly seem to be the contents of certain intentional attitudes like entertaining or
thinking of. As Plantinga says, when authors of fiction tell us a story, they present or call our attention to
a state of affairs:
He brings it to our mind for us, helps us focus our attention upon it,
enables us to entertain, explore, and contemplate it, a procedure we find
amusing and titillating or edifying and instructive as the case may be.44
But Smith's account would force us to take propositions as the mental contents of such intentional
attitudes—attitudes that involve no predicable truth value of their content.
Smith's objection to such an accounts as mine also rests on a neglect of facts. Says Smith,
What is missing from the philosophy of Chisholm, Wolterstorff,
Plantinga, and others is the notion of a truth-maker of a proposition, that
is, the notion that I (but not they) express by “state of affairs.” They
would not deny that there is something that makes a proposition true, but
they have no theory of such items; and in this respect, their philosophy is
impoverished.
States of Affairs
26
As I have suggested earlier, we need another ontological category for truth-maker which I call a fact.
Plantinga does not mention, much less provide an account of such truth-makers. So, we can grant Smith's
objection to Plantinga's account at this point. However, the absence of such a category does not count
against our account of states of affairs, given our assignment of facts to this role. Yes, an account of facts
is needed for a complete analysis of the relationship between propositions, states of affairs and their
truth/actuality makers. Since I have little doubt that such an account is available, Smith's charge will not
stand against my account of states of affairs. Thus, we preserve good reason to maintain our distinction
between propositions and states of affairs noting that facts will play an important role in telling us what
makes the former true and the latter obtain.
In conclusion, we have seen that there is good reason to think that states of affairs are
intensional entities that serve as the mental content of certain intentional attitudes like
entertaining. We have examined the relation of isomorphism that holds between a state of affairs
and a proposition, both of which contain the same intensional entities, concepts. Additionally,
we have seen the need for facts as truth-makers of propositions and actuality-makers of states of
affairs. Finally, we have seen that both Chisholm's and Smith's accounts of states of affairs fail.
States of Affairs
1
27
See Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, Chapter IV "States of Affairs," (Open Court: La Salle, Illinois, 1976),
114-137 for a reduction of propositions and events to states of affairs. See Quentin Smith, Language and Time
(OUP: New York, 1993), 151-158 for a quasi-reduction of states of affairs to propositions. Smith does countenance
a distinction between propositions and states of affairs, but, as we will see in our examination below, he reduces our
notion of states of affairs to propositions. David Armstrong rejects propositions outright, but has developed a
complete analysis of states of affairs—one similar in many ways to Michael Tooley's and Smith's notion of states of
affairs. See David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997), 131
and Michael Tooley, Time Tense & Causation, (OUP: New York, 1997) 33-36, 238-240.
2
We need not be limited to indicative/declarative sentences, but these are the most common sorts considered. I will
set aside questions concerning indexical sentences that express different propositions while remaining identical
sentences.
3
See Alonzo Church, "Propositions and Sentences," in The Problem of Universals: a Symposium, (University of
Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1956), 3-11. I am assuming that Quine's argument for indeterminacy of translation
is unsound. See W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object (MIT Press: Cambridge, 1964), 26-73.
4
George Pitcher, "Introduction" in Truth, ed. George Pitcher, (Prentice Hall: New Jersey, 1964), 5.
5
See R. Cartwright "Propositions" in Truth, 81-103 and Michael Loux Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction,
(Routledge: New York, 1998), 142.
6
I am in fact skeptical that sense can be made of the supervenience relation at least with respect to the mind-body
problem. Nevertheless, this example merely suggests the possibility that there are entailments that lack truthbearing entities as their relata.
7
See also Jon Barwise and John Perry "Situations and Attitudes," The Journal of Philosophy 78:11 (November,
1981), 668-691 on the view that situations (non-truth-value-bearing entities) can also stand in entailment relations.
Other logical relations like that of compatibility and incompatibility are also thought to hold between bearers of
truth-value; see Michael Loux, Metaphysics, 139.
8
This argument will be charged with question-begging if the opponent rejects the existence of valid arguments.
Given that realism about valid arguments is not in significant dispute, however, we need not take this threat
seriously. I am assuming that sententialism is false. See Hartry Field's Truth and the Absence of Fact (ClarendonOxford Press: Oxford, 2001).
9
Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," Grazer philosophische Studien 7/8 (1989), 148. Here
Kim is using 'objects of belief' not as intentional objects—those objects in the world that our beliefs are about—but
as the mental content of our beliefs.
10
For example, see David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson, Philosophy of Mind and Cognition, (Blackwell:
Oxford, 1996), 176-179.
11
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 117.
12
I will assume from this point that indicative and declarative sentences are interchangeable for our purposes.
13
Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," 148-149.
14
I am assuming that the Fregian position that holds that sentences, but not words, are the only possessors of
meaning is wrong.
15
David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, 131.
16
I will be assuming that concepts are distinct from properties. The best reason to think so is due to Russell’s
argument that predicates like ‘being impredicable’ cannot denote properties, though they clearly express concepts.
Sometimes predicates like ‘is true’ denote both a concept and a property. Thus, I’m assuming it is a necessary
condition that any predicate express a concept, though not a property.
17
It is not clear whether there are finite number of logical forms or not.
18
For a successful argument to this effect see Plantinga, A. (1983). "On Existentialism." Philosophical Studies 44:
1-20.
19
I am here assuming that the individual words of the nominalized gerundive express concepts while the entire
nominalized gerundive denotes. John Pollock has developed a theory of names that is compatible with my theory
of states of affairs. His propositional designators are equivalent to my name concepts. See Pollock, J. (1982).
Language and Thought. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 19.
20
It is, however, a concept whose extension is null.
21
See Newman, A. (2002). The Correspondence Theory of Truth. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
States of Affairs
22
28
Kirkham, R. L. (1992). Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, MIT Press, 119.
Kirkham, R. L. (1992). Theories of Truth: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, MIT Press, 139.
24
See Bennett, J. (1988). Events and Their Names. Indianapolis, Hackett.
25
See Wetzel, T. (2003). States of Affairs, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2004, 23 for a good
explanation.
26
In Zeno Vendler’s word. See, reference See Wetzel, T. (2003). States of Affairs, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. 2004, 23.
27
See Wetzel, T. (2003). States of Affairs, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2004, 23
28
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 114-137. Chisholm eventually gave up belief in states of affairs
altogether. See Zimmerman, D. (2001). Roderick Chisholm, Part II: Metaphysics. A Companion to Analytic
Philosophy. A. P. a. D. S. Martinich. Malden, Massachusetts, Blackwell: 287-295.
29
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 117.
30
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 123.
31
Ibid.
32
See Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," 7/8 Grazer philosophische Studien (1989), 147162; John Pollock, "Chisholm on States of Affairs," Grazer philosophische Studien, (1979), 163-175; and Edward
Wierenga, "Chisholm on States of Affairs," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 54:2 (August 1976), 148-152.
33
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 123.
34
Ibid. Here again ‘object’ can be used ambiguously either for the mental content of his belief, or the intentional
object. I am assuming that Chisholm is using 'object' in the former sense.
35
Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object, 123-124.
36
Facts do not possess a truth value either.
37
Jaegwon Kim, "States of Affairs, Events, and Propositions," 155.
38
See Quentin Smith, Language and Time (OUP: New York, 1993), 151-158; David Armstrong and Michael
Tooley would also be good representatives of those who would offer this objection given their notion of states of
affairs. See David Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1997), and
Michael Tooley, Time Tense & Causation, (OUP: New York, 1997).
39
While Smith says that Plantingian states of affairs are truth-valued complexes, Plantinga never says as much;
propositions are, but not states of affairs.
40
Quentin Smith, Language and Time, 156.
41
Quentin Smith, Language and Time, 157.
42
Quentin Smith, Language and Time, 158.
43
I am assuming a narrow view of mental content here. See Frank Jackson and David Braddon-Mitchell Philosophy
of Mind and Cognition, 176-235 for a discussion.
44
Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, (Clarendon-Oxford: Oxford, 1974), 159.
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