KATEDRA STUDIÓW EUROPEJSKICH
Akademii Ekonomicznej w Krakowie
Jerzy Mikułowski Pomorski
Katedra Studiów Europejskich
Akademia Ekonomiczna, Kraków
Poles and Hofstede’s Dimensions of Culture: Directions of Change
1. Introduction
The Poles were not included in Geert Hofstede’s research and information about them is not
included in the IBM data. Nonetheless, some data about the Poles, as well as other Central and
East European nations, do appear in print: what is emphasized in these studies, however, is their
approximate character or their origin in different data, seemingly connected with the indexes
used in the IBM research. The value of the indexes has not been subject to critical analysis.
In academic literature there are several stereotypical opinions about the inhabitants of postcommunist Europe, which stem from two sources. One of them is rather superficial knowledge
of these countries’ past, which usually goes far back into the history of Europe.
What emerges from these opinions is the picture of traditional societies with strong power
structures, developed collectivism, high masculinity and low uncertainty avoidance.
The other source of stereotypes is the knowledge of the unifying role of communism, which left
a kind of uniform imprint on every one of these nations. These changes are argued to have
strengthened the power distance, imposed a certain form of collectivism and promoted a peculiar
form of femininity in encouraging women to work hard doing all possible jobs.
The transition periods between the old times and the advent of communism, and between the
decades of communist rule and the present transformation period are usually disregarded, as if
communism and market economy fell on these societies out of the blue. In fact, the processes of
embracing communism and turning to market economy developed unevenly. The end of World
War II did not coincide everywhere with the arrival of communism. For instance,
Czechoslovakia adopted the system in a quasi-democratic way only three years after the war,
while Poland in the years 1945-47 struggled for independence both at the international and
domestic front; analogous distinctions can be found in every country of the region. Similarly, the
autumn of 1989 was not the time of total breaking off with communism in every single one of
these countries: some of them have gone through that period quickly, while others continue to
struggle with basic market reforms until today. We can even talk about the gradation of the ways
these countries still remain in the system.
These processes were significant for the understanding of the role of national character factors in
effecting the changes; they also make it more justifiable to argue that the differences between
these nations remain valid, which supports Hofstede’s statement that “Eastern Europe is
culturally not a homogenous block; it is as heterogeneous as Western Europe”.
Full knowledge of the history of the transformations of such fundamental nature as the change of
economic system or decentralization of government make certain processes which have a
specifically national character more understandable and more manifest.
Societies which are capable of mobilizing for change go through the transformation differently
than those which remain in anomy and are unable to make any collective effort. The
transformation processes in societies ready to accept changes will thus be different than in those
unwilling to face the inevitable difficulties.
These examples already show that nations of Central and Eastern Europe differ at least along the
collectivism and masculinity axes. This means that the societies which quickly carried out the
changes were more collective and masculine than those which did not bring themselves to do
that.
Now the issue arises of the permanence of these features. It is worth answering the question
whether the national character features are invariable or whether we deal with a unique, timelimited period of their manifestation in these countries.
David Riesman and other authors of “Lonely Crowd” have focused on the changing of societies’
character under the impact of serious structural transformations. They argue that the character of
societies changes, and events in Central and Eastern Europe which we recently witnessed or
participated in make it more probable that this sort of change is taking place there. What
happened there were simultaneous transformations of the economic system, political structures
and the dominating management method. As I argued elsewhere, the Polish society currently
experiences the passage from internal steering, which is characterized by the sense of guilt, to
external steering, where the dominating factor is uncertainty avoidance.
The susceptibility to change depends on the degree of openness to it. The taking of extreme
positions on Hofstede’s dimensions heralds difficulties in adjusting to the needs of modern
society, which should clearly be able to accept new solutions.
In Hofstede’s view, the Poles take the middle position among Central and Eastern European
nations and other European countries in power distance (50 points on the 1-100 scale), which
locates them side by side with Italy, between Latvia at one hand and Japan at the other; they take
the middle position in uncertainty avoidance as well, with 50 points, side by side with Lithuania,
Estonia and Norway, and lower than Australia and the Netherlands; they score slightly higher on
individualism with 60 points, similarly to Czechs and Slovaks as well as inhabitants of Lithuania
and Estonia, and between Austria and Finland; only in masculinity the Poles obtain a high index
value of 70 points, which ranks them close to Italy and Switzerland, and between Germany and
Great Britain at the one hand and Hungary on the other.
But the general competitiveness index examined by Evert Van de Vliert locates the Poles at 19th
position among 42 countries, between Portugal and Canada, while in gender competition the
Poles rank 12 among 34 countries where masculine competitiveness is higher than feminine one,
between Sweden and New Zealand. This means that the Poles take the middle position on
masculinity and femininity, which is more moderate than their religion (Catholics are more
masculine than Protestants) and economic behaviour of the early 90’s (the masculine shock
therapy) as well as the estimates quoted above would indicate.
It is not my intention, however, to question these estimates, as they may accurately reflect the
psychological and social state of the Poles at the time this imperfect measurement was made. The
data quoted by Hofstede and Noorderhaven seem to originate from the significantly earlier
period than the calculations of Van den Vliert.
What I would like to emphasize is the periodic changeability, which is characteristic of this
nation and which, at certain historical junctures, makes individualism and masculinity come to
the fore, only in order to give way to collectivism and femininity at other times. I am prepared to
link these changes to December 1981 on the one hand (the introduction of the martial law), and
to the year 1991 (when the Polish shock therapy started to function) on the other. During this
decade the Poles were different than both before and afterwards.
This correlation does not indicate, however, that at certain moments the Poles become masculine
individualists only in order to turn feminine and collectivist afterwards, as experts in Western
societies might assume, but rather at these peculiar times masculinity co-occurs with
collectivism and femininity with individualism. If this assumption is correct, the Poles are the
case of the people, for whom collectivism was tough and demanding, whereas individualism was
soft and forgiving. Is it still the case? This is another question which requires an answer..
2 . Polish Social Sciences as the Source of Knowledge of the Polish National Character.
Serious interest in features of Polish national character dates back to the late 19th century and is
strongly European in background. We can even talk about high popularity of these
considerations in a nation deprived of its own state, several decades before regaining
independence.
This direction of research was continued in the period between the two world wars, and surprisingly - it flourished particularly during World War II and some time afterwards. In
sociology it peaked with the studies of Florian Znaniecki and his school (particularly Józef
Chałasiński), in pedagogy with the research of Aleksander Kamiński; the developments in
psychiatry were of particular importance, as it continued post-Kretschmer research on
temperaments (with Eugeniusz Brzezicki, Antoni Kępiński, and Kazimierz Dąbrowski).
Temporary dissolution of institutional sociology by communist authorities in Poland in 1953 led
to abandoning research in this field. The re-establishment of sociology in 1956 brought the
selective approach to research topics, and answers to the questions concerning the identity of the
Poles with regard to other nations were not attempted for political reasons.
Communist authorities intended to bring up a new socialist citizen who was not supposed to
represent a continuation of historical national traits. On the contrary, in the official propaganda
and in school programmes in most of these countries, nearly the entire national history was
treated as the period when serious errors were committed, for which the societies had to pay at
present, undergoing the cathartic transformation process. Under strict supervision of political
authorities, a new version of national history was written, in which only such events and
processes were selected and emphasized which were close to the ideological significance of
current politics and were connected, in the so-called “progressive” sequence of history, with
Russia and the Soviet Union.
In the teaching of history in Poland, this tendency was rigorously enforced until 1956, when a
certain “nationalization” of the past took place. This did not prevent the politicians, however,
from interfering with interpretations of national history and using it as an argument in political
struggle.
Initially, the communist educational policy was applied to the majority of mainstream culture as
well, where references to national tradition in literature, art, music, theatre, film and museum
collections were banned. The ban in the latter area concerned the exhibition of national symbols
or historical paintings.
No wonder that the clandestine education movement in the Polish society, which took the shape
of unofficial courses and “flying universities,” attached so much importance to national history.
As the historical awareness was being rebuilt, the interest in national features of the Poles was
argued to be threatening: what was predicted was the increase of resistance towards the
authorities which would push Poles to acts of collective disobedience, which in turn might prove
catastrophic for the nation. Therefore, whenever this national identity, contained in the Polish
character, made itself known and turned out to be an important factor effecting political changes
(1956,1970,1980), politicians as well as educators, worried about national future, were
immediately heard voicing their disapproval of studies of national character. The latter put down
this sort of research as leading to xenophobia, which could become dangerous in the political
situation at the time as ”a manifestation of anthropomorphism, psychologism and evolutionism
typical of 19th century science”, and the notion of national character itself was even regarded as
obscure. More moderate and rational critics thought that the Polish society undergoes such
thorough social and educational changes that any deliberations referring to the past are deprived
of significance.
The impact that these opinions, frequently expressed by widely respected public figures, had on
Polish social sciences was considerable. The studies on the Polish national character were
abandoned, and were later limited to research on national stereotypes; this was what the issue of
differences between nations was taken to amount to. Thus, due to this “heritage” of communist
past, Polish social sciences did not develop research into the Polish national character.
1. Dualism of the Polish National Character in Polish Academic Tradition
In the years following the Polish revolution of 1989, the historian Janusz Tazbir recalled the
argument important for our discussion, claiming that Polish national character is changeable and
comes into the open in extreme situations, when the nation’s existence is under threat
The hypothesis on changeability of national character is in opposition to the claim that it is
permanently heterogeneous. Both views had their advocates..
Heterogeneity
The fact that the Poles exhibit varying, often contradictory national traits was already noted by
early observers of Polish life. Such opinions were often expressed by foreign visitors to Poland
who emphasized the heterogeneity of Polish society. The 18th century French philosopher
Jacques Bernardin de Saint-Pierre wrote that “Poland consists of two nations: peasants and
nobility [Pol. szlachta], and perhaps the third one: the Jews.”
This opinion was referred to by the contemporary Polish psychiatrist, Antoni Kępiński. His
research led him to formulate a hypothesis on the existence of two personality types in Polish
society: the hysterical and the psycho-asthenic. This constitutes a reflection of the old class
division into peasantry and nobility.
The hysteric: s/he acts stormily, excessively dramatically, s/he has a false opinion of him/herself
and the world, s/he takes wishes for reality, s/he thinks of life in terms of play, s/he likes
manipulating people, s/he does not have his/her own hierarchy of values, s/he easily passes from
one extreme to another, s/he keeps looking for acceptance and applause of the environment, s/he
expects quick fulfilment of his/her plans, s/he is egocentric and incapable of great love, s/he
avoids effort, s/he has the feeling of being harmed and blames some “others” for the harm, s/he
is irresponsible, youthful, emotionally immature, and unpredictable in reactions..
The psycho-asthenic: great diligence, but lack of confidence in his/her own power and
possibilities, lack of determination, fear of people, fear of standing out, exaggerated sense of
responsibility, low self-esteem, weak vitality.
Kępiński believes that the two types complement each other. They have three features that link
them:
o
o
o
both attach great importance to what others think of them,
they do not have a strong value system, that is why they look for support in their
environment,
neither is capable of genuine strong love.
Changeability
Another possible reason for the duality is the periodic changeability of the Poles.
Many authors, already historical, emphasize the fact that the Poles behave differently depending
on the type of pressure that is brought to bear by historical situations.
Kępiński’s teacher, the psychiatrist Eugeniusz Brzezicki, in his study of the Polish temperament
proposed a new term to describe its type: the skirtotymic, which does not constitute a clear
somatic type. Brzezicki considered it to be a subtype of the leptosomatic or the dysplastic.
Leaving its physical characteristics aside, the feature of changeability should be emphasized.
“The skirtotymics include people with moods frequently changing under the influence of
psychological factors, with changeable feelings, with changeable pace of life, and unchanging
egocentrism. The characteristic innate feature of this group is the “play,” play with the gesture,
play with fantasy, but one profoundly experienced, not superficial, taking place in public, at the
stage of life, and thus in need of the audience.
What oscillates is largely feelings and the will. The will and feelings are rather egocentric, and
through his/her behaviour, the person tries to appeal to others and to him/herself, in order to
enjoy his/her role in life.
The second characteristic axial feature is the flash in the pan attitude (sudden enthusiasm for
projects and their quick abandoning).
The third feature is, on the one hand, softness and falling apart at the time of normal life, and on
the other, the mood of persistence and hardness in the period of cataclysms.
The axial features of this human type are the following: with regard to temperament a peculiar
lability of feelings and the will, and with regard to character the play with the gesture.”
The selected features of this type, relevant in view of the changeability are the following:

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




“play with the gesture” in order to stand out as a public figure,
lack of persistence, jumping from one issue to another, superficiality and broadness of
horizons, quick orientation in situations,
sentimentality and romanticism, fantastic imagination, good heart, ability to empathize
with the soul of another person,
takes hard times better, falls apart in normal times,
excels when quick orientation, bravado, courage are needed,
not very productive in systematic work, unless supervised,
too individualistic to contribute to tightly organized society.
In 1942, a prominent Polish educator and sociologist, Aleksander Kamiński, published in the
underground Information Bulletin a set of characteristically Polish virtues and vices, under the
influence of the observations of the behaviour of Poles made during the war.
Kamiński wrote the article in war time, when the psychologically motivated readiness to carry
the burden of the national crisis was particularly salient. In his categorization, he clearly
distinguishes the Poles of war time and the Poles of the ordinary peaceful life. What is easily
guessed is that here we deal with descriptions of as if two different communities.
The virtues and vices may be ordered as follows:
At war time:
1. Constant hatred of the foreign yoke, and rebellions.
2. Opposition against censorship and secret police.
1. The Poles have always granted asylum to people persecuted in other countries.
2. The honour is the factor which decides of staying in loyal service or abandoning it in
certain situations.
3. The Poles won battles thanks to their courage and bravado, and not due to superiority in
technology and outnumbering the enemy.
4. They conformed not to the authority, but to “the cause.”
5. Nowhere else did so many people give their life for the state.
6. Massive voluntary contribution to public projects.
7. The Poles find it easier to die for their Fatherland than to live for it.
8. Peculiar snobbery in risking life and making sacrifices.
At normal times:
1. Religious tolerance combined with great piety.
2. Tolerance of different outlooks, nations and races.
3. Easiness to forgive enemies and see human beings in them..
4. Troublemaking, systematic rebellion against the authority.
5. Incessant fear of absolute power.
6. Constant splits and political secessions.
7. Excessive softness of character and “wimpishness.”
8. Lack of bravery and sluggishness.
9. Excessive trust in strangers and yielding to their influence.
10. Lack of consistence and strictness at important moments.
11. Lack of persistence and everyday “heroism.”
12. Insufficient organization of actions.
13. Underestimation of experts and economic laws.
14. Patriotic “foaming,” superficiality and humbug.
Similar features can be found in the work of a contemporary psychiatrist, Kazimierz Dąbrowski.
In considering the reasons of the dualism of the Poles, the probability of the hypothesis of
permanent heterogeneity should be determined, as opposed to the seemingly self-evident
periodic changeability.
The latter hypothesis does seem more likely. As a result of historical changes, it is difficult to
maintain that the permanent ethnic or class divisions among the Poles still remain Today the
Poles are clearly a homogenic society, which is undergoing profound transformations.
There are a lot of indications that the Poles are currently undergoing a mental transformation,
characteristic of passing from the industrial to post-industrial society, and thus, using David
Riesman’s terminology, from the internally-steered to externally-steered society. This would
mean that the current transformation consists in the Poles passing from the time of crisis to the
life in the normal world.
The Role of the Latent Past
With the lack of satisfactory data, the Polish society is most frequently looked upon through
history. For outside experts history falls into simple blocks of important epochs, and periods that
are either unexplored or of marginal importance and thus negligible. The post-Word-War-I
period of Polish independence seems to be of marginal importance for outside observers, as it
lasted only 20 years and it was largely spent on completing the war effort (establishing borders
with the neighbouring countries) and unification of the previously separated regions. In fact,
these years gave rise to many notions of symbolic value which are significant even today.
Another unexplored epoch is that of 1980’s, sometimes called the time of martial law, when the
majority of the society withdrew from active participation in public life, as if in preparation for
the future. This resulted in the intensity and, to some extent, the course of Polish reforms.
The tendency to withdraw from public life requires an explanation. Why would so many people,
of their own free will, start to give up the possibility, limited as it was, to influence the current
politics of the country and their own well-being? And this was the period of self-imposed
limitations and sacrifices, when many promising careers were interrupted and many people gave
up their ambitions and plans.
What sort of force must be put into effect in order to attain such a large-scale effect and what
made these suicidal actions successful?
The key to the understanding of the epoch is the fact that a considerable part of the Polish society,
spontaneous and irrational in their motivation and apparently lacking in leadership, found
themselves in opposition to the oppressive authority for nearly ten years.
The assumption that national institutions or organizations, such as the Catholic Church, were
instrumental in evoking the opposition is only partly justifiable. The Church at the time of
communism fought for its rights, which were close to the objectives of the national resistance. Its
connection with national struggle consisted in demanding for the rights of the society to be
recognized, as well as in offering protection and giving shelter to those who represented the
opposition (this does not account for the activity of individual priests). It cannot be assumed,
however, that it was the Church that created the opposition and that was the opposition. In fact,
what constituted the essence of this historical show-down was a conflict between the state,
representing organization and rationalism, and the nation, acting spontaneously and motivated
irrationally. The Church lent the venues for these manifestations.
This period has not been subject to systematic research. Nonetheless, the activity of the
opposition is well documented. It consisted in organized actions such as:
o
masses for the Fatherland,
organized monthly at selected churches and attended by huge crowds,
o
o
pilgrimages to Catholic shrines, both religious and patriotic in their meaning,
boycott of official events by actors,
as well as spontaneous activity:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
refusal of actors to appear on state television,
boycott of certain highly-politicized academic conferences,
organizing of performances of professional artists and popular lectures of
academics in churches,
the activity of the “flying university,”
boycott of certain forms of state welfare,
boycott of official television news, at the time of which Poles ostentatiously left
home and went street-walking,
using the term collaborators (first employed during the Nazi occupation of
Poland) to describe people who supported the authorities, and penalizing them
with social ostracism,
escape into family life and close neighbourly links.
These manifestations of resistance were evidence of strong collectivism of the Poles. They
required strong identification with the group and ability to make sacrifices for its sake. When the
resistance threatened individual interests of the protesters, the resignation of state welfare forms
happened to the detriment of the potential beneficiaries: actors who did not play for television
became impoverished, sold their cars and refrained from going for expensive holidays, while
artists and scholars who chose not to participate in official events and conferences imposed
constraints on their professional careers.
These people were rewarded with public recognition and respect. This gave them the feeling of
establishing closer links with the protesting community, which was identified with the nation
(disputes were carried on to answer the questions who was the true Pole and whether
collaborators deserved to be called Polish). What is interesting is that these forms of protest
were also undertaken by people who had weak characters and who enjoyed the social recognition
as it gave them a sense of security and satisfaction.
This was also a proof of the society’s masculinity. The attitudes which were highly esteemed
were the following: one should be tough and demanding towards oneself, one should not be
indulgent to one’s weaknesses; a clear division of roles occurred within groups, and those
playing the roles were held responsible for entire groups and contributed to the groups’ security
and well-being. A clear division of duties was observed in families as well: some members were
held responsible for catering for the family’s well-being, others for upkeep and running of the
house, older children were responsible for taking care of younger children, while younger ones
were supposed to limit their demands. People wanted to take care of their neighbours.
Almost throughout the decade, Poles exhibited collective behaviours and cultivated masculine
features, regardless of their sex; frequently, responsible social roles were assumed alternately by
men and women, which was accepted as permanent commitment to the community.
The last clear manifestation of the attitudes was the consent to severe and painful economic
measures of the beginning of 1991. Along with the successes resulting from the reform’s
implementation the Pole of the normal times returned: the individualist with certain feminine
features.
The Poles started to take care of their own individual, family and class interests, the attribution of
success became more important than the actual successes, the consensus in the name of national
objectives gave way to conflicts of interests, while the desire to acquire wealth quickly led to
large-scale corruption. Here again we encounter the tendencies which are well known in Polish
literature as the weakness and lack of adjustment to normal life conditions.
Without the understanding of these changes, which all occured in a short period of time, it is
difficult to understand the present state of the Polish mind.
It is to some extent a reaction to the previous period of collectivism and masculinity.
5. The Poles in the Light of Geert Hofstede’s Categories.
We will refer here to the findings of western science, but also to the results of the studies I have
been carrying out for three years on the population of students in the cities of Kraków and Nowy
Sącz (1998-2000).
The students, aged 20-23, are representative of the people who did not actively participate in the
resistance period activities, but the life of their families was under a strong influence of the
values of the time. They were required to make sacrifices for the family and larger communities,
to offer assistance to family members and limit their consumption demands. We can argue that
we deal with children of the crisis, when the Poles were different than they are at normal times.
In large majority they came from families with many children, which was also characteristic of
model family life at the time. That is why this group is particularly interesting. It comprises
mainly students of business schools, who decided to study there convinced that the Polish
economic and social transformation is justified. This positive motivation to study and the sense
of importance of the profession make them face the question of their role in society, which is
coming out of economic backwardness. They must consider this role, however, in the light of
their personal objectives and aspirations. One cannot assume that they are a group of national
collectivists who wish to sacrifice their personal careers for the sake of national welfare. They
exhibit the critical attitude, typical of their age, towards the actions of older people. And so they
do not regard contemporary political elites as deserving of respect, they blame bureaucracy for
obstructing the changes, and they support speeding up the changes. Their criticism is not radical,
however: they value the achievement of the Polish Parliament and are not critical of the policies
of the Polish Church.
The affinity to the values of their childhood lead them to compromise between collective and
individual objectives.
Power Distance.
Hofstede estimates that the Poles take the middle position at the power distance axis.
A Polish author writing on the subject, Anna Lubecka, classifies them, however, as people of
high power distance. Niels G. Noorderhaven locates them as the people of low power distance
when compared to post-communist Europe, but clearly higher than Western European nations
Similar are the views of David J. Hickson and Derek S. Pough who classify Polish and
Hungarian management systems from the time of real socialism as moderately authoritarian.
This is how Noorderhaven’s analyses typify the Polish power problem in various historical
periods.
At the time of the Kingdom of Poland, szlachta (the nobility) had strong political power and
participated in the class democratic system. In their own estates, however, they ruled singlehandedly and exercised authoritarian power Poland did not have its own middle class which
would balance szlachta’s power. Poland was a peculiar mixture of democratic and authoritarian
elements. At the top decisions were taken democratically, while at the bottom magnates and
szlachta were in power.
At the time of partitions the central authority was considered to represent the oppressive rather
than legitimized foreign power.
In the period of communism, the system was more centralized than the one in the West. It
promoted strong authority, although people in management positions were limited by central
authority and could not consistently execute their decisions. The double hierarchy - the
government and the party - made independent management difficult. The people’s attitude
towards the authorities was ambivalent, thus when it was supported it was successful, while
when it failed to gain public approval it was defeated. A hierarchy of positions and instructions
was observed in enterprises, and obeying orders gave a sense of security. The power of the
opposition was also centralized as the influential institution there was the centrally governed
Catholic Church.
Alfons Trompenaars analysed the Polish management system. In his view, the Poles treat their
enterprise as a system, not as a group, which would indicate the recognition for the authority.
One should remember that these data concern principally the time when Poland was under the
socialist system.
Attitudes to people in power are well illustrated by the responses the students of economy gave
in the period 1998-2000.
On the majority of questions from Hofstede’s test they exhibit low power distance:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
they consider their superiors to be similar to themselves,
they believe that all people should be equal,
they reject the argument that the authority may be the source of ethical norms,
they believe in the solidarity of the powerful and the weak,
at the same time they accept that people in power can have certain rights, and
expect them to have personal authority,
they think that it is people and not the system that should be blamed for failures,
they think that people in power should command respect,
they think that a person in power has the right to have privileges,
they think that a person holding power cannot fully trust the subordinates.
Individualism
The higher position of Polish individualism is well anchored in the stereotype of the
individualistic Pole.
In Noorderhaven’s opinion, however, Poles are the most individualistic of post-communist
nations, but are more collectivist when compared with Western countries.
In communist times, collectivism was strengthened by the ethics of divided responsibility. It
consisted in sharing responsibility with other people in order to spread it. The escape into
collectivism would be a method of avoiding uncertainty.
Nowadays, Poles tend to create strongly linked groups which they meticulously establish. They
are afraid of doing business with foreigners. They first establish good relations and only then
start doing business.
According to Trompenaars, Poles favour individual decisions and opt for individual
responsibility.
The collectivist picture emerges more strongly from the study of economy students’ attitudes.
Generally, they already have a certain job experience. Furthermore, they clearly point out that
their earlier home experience was collectivist, while their first work experience was
individualistic. In contrast, they consider their student years to exhibit the reverse process: they
start as individualists, and the university gives them collectivist experience.
Asked about their preferences as to holiday company, they turn out to favour holidays spent in a
group, rather than individually or just with one other companion. The choice of the group and
living in it are rewarding for them, but they do realize that the new world of market economy
constitutes an individualistic challenge for them..
Faced with the choice of universal rather than particular principles in behaviour, they turn out to
be rather undecisive, although the universal responses dominate: what they would do most
willingly, however, is to reach some compromise.
They do not count on the protective role of the state in solving their vital problems
(individualistic attitude), while on the other hand, they are ready to work hard in order to bring
Poland out of poverty and backwardness (collectivist attitude).
Their individualism is manifested in this set of opinions:
o
o
o
o
o
o
They declare that there are objective values which apply to everyone.
Everybody has the right to private life and personal opinions.
They do not believe, however, that their private lives are dependent on the group
or organization in which they participate, or that their opinions coincide with
those of the organization..
They think that they can choose their friends on their own.
They know their needs and will first of all try to fulfil them.
They do not want to be members of a political party which they can serve and
which will take care of their interests.
Their collectivism is expressed in the following opinions:
o
o
o
o
o
They do not consider themselves to be the most important persons.
They do not believe that everyone should take care primarily of themselves and
their family.
But they argue that every human being belongs to a family, which takes care of
him/her and to which s/he should be loyal.
They are emotionally linked with their loved ones, with their organization and
institution.
They also believe that every human being should take into account the group s/he
belongs to.
Thus what we deal with here is individualism which protects personal integrity, and collectivism
which concerns the objectives of their actions, creating groups and exhibiting loyalty towards
them.
Finally, the young people who enter adult life declare the emphasis on individualistic motives in
their future professional life.
Masculinity
Hofstede affirms high masculinity of the Poles, placing them close to Italians and the Swiss.
Lubecka estimates Polish masculinity differently.
According to Noorderhaven, Poland, as the only post-communist country which applied shock
therapy to its economy, gave evidence of its strong masculinity. He points out, however, that the
Poles strongly emphasize building relationships at their place of work, which he classifies as a
collectivist feature. What is interesting is that Michael H. Hoppe links this feature with
femininity.
Also the responses of the students indicate strong femininity.
Only two of their responses point to masculine features, and these are the following:
o
attaching importance to the way their social roles are fulfilled,
o
orientation towards achievement, rather than attribution, and thus domination of
“what am I” over “who am I” type of assessment.
and
All the other opinions seem to support femininity. And so:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
People are dependent on one another.
There should be equality between the sexes.
The man does not have to be right.
If possible, women should pursue professional careers.
The man is not supposed to rule.
It is not true that the man’s task is to be right, and the women’s is to take care of
others.
They value a job on which they feel good and can develop their abilities more
than the high salary.
If their children did not do too well at school, they would not consider this their
personal failure.
o
They work in order to live and not the other way round, since they most strongly
believe that life is beautiful and one cannot overwork but should combine work
with pleasure.
The feminine society, not success-oriented but soft and friendly, is clearly the goal of the young
respondents. Certain masculine features do remain in this group, however, such as thinking more
highly of achievements than of personal merits.
Uncertainty avoidance
Hofstede locates the Poles in the middle range of his uncertainty avoidance axis.
Noorderhaven claims that the socialist welfare state and unclear responsibility system in
enterprises (spread responsibility) made Poles feel less uncertain. To that we can add low work
technology and dependence on employee risk, which can strengthen the argument.
Similarly, Trompenaars believes that Poles are capable of solving their own problems.
Have the change in work organization and new technologies destroyed this attitude?
David Riesman’s analyses indicate the growth of uncertainty in externally-steered society.
Let us examine the responses of our economy students.
What supports the high uncertainty avoidance is the clear tolerance for showing emotion, and
considering the written rather than oral discourse in gathering the necessary information.
High uncertainty avoidance is supported by the following opinions:
o
o
o
o
In order to live and act in peace, I need laws and instructions.
Time is money.
One should show the emotions.
I should imitate the behaviour of people who are successful.
while these support the opposite view:
o
o
o
I know life is full of surprises and I accept the fact that nothing is certain in it; I
consider this natural.
Conflict and competition antagonize us, but rules of fair play must be observed.
I think highly of my nation, but I do not consider it better than other nations.
o
o
Hard work is not a value in itself.
It is not true that the sense of uncertainty accompanies my entire life and that it is
the source of stress and tension.
Students are thus at the borderline between uncertainty and the sense of naturalness of taking
risks.
Discussion
The comparison between the data on the Poles presented here and Hofstede’s and
Noorderhaven’s assessments calls for some commentary.
What is striking is the difference in masculinity/femininity assessments of the Poles. From the
research of both Dutchmen, the Poles emerge as the clearly masculine society, while the
observation of current Polish life and the analysis of student responses indicate the tendency
towards femininity.
The current political scene gives evidence of these features of the Polish society which flourished
in “normal times,” and which were emphasized by authors in the past: wimpishness, falling apart,
personal quarrels, and excessive egoism, which links femininity with collectivism: the students
do represent feminine features linked with collectivism. These two patterns, femininityindividualism vs femininity-collectivism, merit further discussion.
Is the masculinity/femininity criterion unified? It is doubtful. The doubt is expressed by Evert
Van de Vliert, who points out that the masculinity/femininity dimension in Hofstede has a dual
nature, and is based on two criteria: difference in work objectives and degree of competition
between the sexes. Are the two criteria compatible? Explaining that the general index of
competitiveness is dependent on the affluence of the country, Vliert replies: “competitiveness in
societies does not correlate with masculinity, but rather correlates positively with power distance
and negatively with individualism. The occurrence of competitiveness differences between the
sexes significantly and positively correlates with masculinity. In some feminine countries women
regard themselves as more competitive than men”
In the light of this criterion, the Poles turn out to be less masculine than Hofstede’s index seems
to indicate.
The doubts should be extended to other criteria as well, which is proved by the results of
research on the attitudes of Polish students.
The responses of Polish students to the questions on feminine/masculine features brought
consistent results only with regard to feminine features, and only to those which stressed equality
of the sexes and mutual dependence of people. The consistency was absent in the responses
concerning interchangeability of duties between the sexes, the fact of men and women becoming
more and more alike, attitudes to the people who gained success, sympathy for the weak,
dependence of life order on work order, respect for people deprived of ambition, readiness to
serve other people and the significance of quality of life.
Can this selectivity be explained with the occurrence of collective attitudes?
It seems that individualism is not a unified feature either. Behind this criterion at least two
tendencies can be recognized: orientation towards oneself and towards one’s own interests, as
well as readiness to perform both individual and general tasks relying on one’s own effort only.
Individualism may have two facets: those of egoism and altruism, which are relevant when we
talk about the Poles. The ethnologist and sociologist, Kazimierz Dobrowolski, distinguished two
kinds of individualism in the Polish national character: the creative and the anarchic one. The
former has the sociocentric background, the latter stems from egocentric motives.27
The sociocentric individualism will serve others, but will not require the participation of others.
It will be collective in its objectives, but not in the means to achieve them. Thus one cannot talk
about escape from personal responsibility, but rather of the difference from individualism in the
colloquial sense of the term, which consists in the fact that altruistic aims are not achieved by
joint action. The egocentric individualism on the other hand can be argued to serve broad
objectives, although in the way which satisfies only individual wishes. Such individualism would
mean aiming at socially desirable objectives, but only in order to satisfy one’s individual needs.
The more individual that task is, unshared with others, the stronger the egocentrism..
Similarly, collectivism can be identified through the nature of objectives or the way of meeting
them.
Against this background, a certain gradation of collective objectives should be postulated.
Communities which we want to serve may vary in their range, but they can constitute a different
case of what used to be called social form. Community-oriented collectivism will be different
than the collectivism oriented towards those units, which Leopold von Wiese once called the
abstract collective. The more general, or abstract, the collectives become, the further removed
they become from experiencing the sense of community with their environment. The human kind,
the race, religion can antagonize people, the families, members of the same culture, neighbours,
or coparishioners. Serving such units, varying in abstraction/concreteness, may often lead to
different results.
The activity for the good of the abstract collective may exert a destructive influence on the
interests of particular communities. Józef Chałasiński, in his research on the causes of hatred of
other nations in multiethnic settlements of Upper Silesia at the time of political struggle over the
Polish-German border in the early 1920-ties, claimed that peacefully coexistent multiethnic
communities were antagonized by external propaganda which required the inhabitants to support
either the Polish or the German national side.
What is the collectivism of Polish students like?
It is the social but not abstract collectivism. The young people want to go along well with their
environment and want to serve its welfare.. There is a lot of altruism in this approach, but it does
not tend towards abstract collectives. The reluctance to engage in political life and to belong to a
political party, which would grant them security in return for loyalty, is clearly declared.
The only seemingly contradictory example, the readiness to bring Poland out of its backwardness,
may be explained in terms of serving the aims of their own or of the people they are close to.
This tendency towards femininity and collectivism gives us the image of the people who want to
create a comfortable society of equal chances by undertaking actions for the sake of their
families and friends.
1. Conclusion
The features of the Polish national character play a significant role in the transformations that the
Polish nation has experienced in the second half of the 20th century. That is why learning about
them may serve as an opportunity to verify many hypotheses concerning the criteria intercultural
differences should meet.
Unfortunately, the Polish society was not appropriately researched at the time. What we know
about it is tentative and approximate, although there is a great deal of observations and direct
experiences which may turn out helpful.
The hypothesis which we have tried to justify here concerns the changeability of the society, and
in the case of Poland, it concerns periodic changeability, noted already, as its peculiarity, by
researchers in the past.
The hypothesis proves the existence of certain permanent dispositions of the Poles to react to
their environment and treat themselves differently, depending on their perception of the situation
in which they have found themselves. According to this view, the Poles are different at the time
of crisis than they are in years of peace and normal life.
Taking this changeability into account, it is essential to explain what is constant in their
behaviour and what undergoes changes.
A closer analysis of the data throws light on the tools of the analysis which we employ, and
enables their critique.
The basic criteria of Hofstede seem to be too general and require a detailed analysis. This
becomes clear as soon as we analyse particular nations in their historical entanglements, and go
beyond making global comparisons.
The students whose attitude we have examined are a unique case, straddling the borderline
between the collective and masculine society of recent crisis years, and the individualistic and
feminine society of normal times. They owe their special character to their family upbringing at
the time of crisis, and to the rejection of current state of Polish mentality, typical of their age.