Ch. 19. Corporate Governance and Performance Corporate Governance Systems in US US – Wide-spread ownership Japan and Germany – concentrated ownership. Reasons for wide spread ownership in US; 1. protection of small shareholder 2. restrictions on commercial banks and insurance companies Benefits of wide spread ownership: 1. allows risk diversification 2. liquidity 3. limited liability of investors Costs of wide spread ownership: 1. separation of ownership and control 2. monitoring expenditures 3. conflicts between different stakeholders: stock holders, bond holders, employees, consumers 4. harder to deal with externalities (environment, research) Solutions: board of directors represents interests of various stakeholders; ownership of management helps to align interests Internal Control Board of Directors role: represent shareholders board composition: outsiders and insiders, board size compensation of directors: stock ownership, small monetary reward, mainly reputation. Ownership Concentration incentives vs. entrenchment ranges of managerial ownership Relationship to Tobin’s Q Bond returns 0-5% positive negative 5-25% negative positive >25% slightly positive slightly negative The table implicates that entrenchment effects are stronger than the effects from improved incentives only in the 5-25% range. Executive Compensation Jensen and Murphy (1990) found that sensitivity of compensation to stock price performance is about 3%. Incentives mostly come from option grants Outside Control Management Changes Outside Ownership: public pension funds, other large block holders. Pension funds are usually not very active. block holders improve firm performance. Evidence on majority stock holders (owners of more than 50%) does not support entrenchment hypothesis. Companies usually employ multiple control mechanisms. Empirically hard to tell the effect of each mechanism apart. Failure of control mechanisms leads to proxy fights of takeovers Proxy Contests - stimulated by poor performance - succeed if put at least 2 people on board - implies significant leakage of information - negative CARs are observed if proxy defeated by white knight or buyout - not clear if successful proxy fight improves performance M&A market for control Comparison to Alternative Governance systems Germany, Japan – better for large firms, but: Banks do not necessarily get involved, since their attention is wide-spread Banks have governance problems too Conflicts of interest for tied-up firms Slow governance change