Copyright © 2013
Avello Publishing Journal
ISSN: 2049 - 498X
Issue 1 Volume 3:
Principia Mathematica
Jason Wakefield
University of Cambridge
Review: Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures (2013) Kripke, S. Oxford University
Press.
This collection of lectures delivered at the University of Oxford spans from October 30th
-
December 4th 1973. Kripke was invited to present these lectures unusually before he received a full
– time position at the University of Princeton; as during this period Kripke had settled in New York
City, after teaching briefly at Harvard and nearby MIT. Kripke's contribution to classical studies
during this period is often overlooked. Kripke re-examines the ontology of fictional and mythical
characters, 'conceived of as abstract objects whose existence depends on the existence or non –
existence of various fictional or mythological works. I took natural language as my guide, which
just quantifies over these things' (Kripke 2013: x). After discussions on Frege and literary criticism
in fiction earlier in 1973, Kripke credits Dummett as the inspiration for these lectures. The
transcript to Kripke's lectures at the University of Oxford has been available for several decades,
Salmon has critiqued them as having an insufficient expostion of the ontology of fictional
characters, however perhaps of greater importance is the editing / rewriting of the transcript by Gary
Ostertag at the City University of New York.
The first lecture is a continuation of topics Kripke had delivered as lectures elsewhere at the
University of Princeton in 1970, which eventually appeared in book form as Naming and Necessity
in 1980. At the previous lectures at Princeton, Kripke wished to avoid the Weltangst and
philosophical confusions that many thinkers have associated with possible worlds terminology.
Kripke's thesis is that both names and descriptions have either rigid or non-rigid designators,
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replacing worlds terminology with a counterfactual situation or modal talk. Kripke's imperative is to
teach us how naming relates to existence, in particular to reference what does not exist and the
problematics of naming fictional entities. Audience members at an earlier conference at the
University of Connecticut in 1973 may recall Kripke speaking about imaginary entities, semantic
references and other existential statements. The perspective in this first John Locke Lecture 'is that
no problem has seemed to represent a more perplexing philosophical conundrum than that of the
use of names which have no reference' (Kripke 2013: 4). My monograph The Question of NonBeing? A Pragmatic Methodology of Casino Contingency engages with this conundrum in terms of
Deleuzo – Lacanianism, however Kripke prefers to posit Mill's argumentation against Frege and
Russell. The Millian paradigm finds a counter-argument in Frege and Russell on proper names and
definite descriptions.
One cannot, according to Frege and Russell, say of an object that it exists or not because, so
they argued, everything exists: how can one then divide up the objects in the world into
those which exist and those which don't? (Kripke 2013: 6)
According to Frege and Russell, an error or mistake in ontology is to treat existence as a first level
concept and that existence is not a predicate of individuals. The translations of Frege that Kripke is
specifically citing are those in Beaney (1997). 1Van Inwagen's journal articles on fiction, Hamlet,
Pegasus, Sherlock Holmes and other fictional entities all make significant appearances through out
these John Locke Lectures; however of most linear significance to the Frege / Russell discussion is
Donnellan's 'Reference and Definite Descriptions' Philosophical Review 75: 281-304. Kripke excels
at reading Donnellan through the prism of the question of how are contingent identity statements
possible? In Newtonian terms, Kripke is careful to rigidly designate the objects for which they
stand, even when describing things, such as heat, as the motion of molecules or objects made of ice
that only has an illusion of contingency. This was discussed in different terminology specific to
language, intentionality and translation by Wheeler and Troyer at the University of Connecticut in
1 See also Russell, B. (1905) 'On Denoting' Mind 14: 479-93 and Russell, B (1917) Mysticism and Logic Unwin.
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March of 1973, however Kripke prefered to focus on Russell's notion of scope as well as Frege's
theory of sense and reference. These John Locke Lectures at Oxford prepared the ground for
Kripke's counterfactual analysis of Nozick's Philosophical Explanations published later in 1981;
thus it is a very important part of history for Emeritus Professor's of Philosophy at the University of
Princeton who are currently teaching at CUNY or elsewhere in New York, that may also have
academic connections to Rockefeller University, Manhattan.
It is important to praise Kripke because he only has a B.A Mathematics Degree as a
qualification! This has not stopped him from lecturing on intuitionistic logic and winning awards
plus recognitions from Pro – Vice – Chancellors and Fellows across Europe and the United States.
Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures should be bought by all New Yorkers as a source
of pragmatic inspiration, alongside purchasing Rajchman & West's Post-Analytic Philosophy
(1985), Harlem Nocturne: Women Artists and Progressive Politics During World War II (2013) and
Crockett's Deleuze Beyond Badiou: Ontology Multiplicity and Event (2013).
In conclusion, Kripke's sholarship on reference and existence in fiction can be applied directly
to analysing my own work and books such as Goldhill's Rethinking Revolutions Through Ancient
Greece (2006), The Sublime: From Antiquity to the Present (2012) edited by Costelloe and Day's
Lucan and the Sublime: Power, Representation and Aesthetic Experience (2013). Thus Kripke is
woven in to the fabric of John Locke's legacy at the University of Oxford betwixt renowned
reformers such as Benjamin Jowett, Master of Balliol College, induced to accept the ViceChancellorship of Oxford in 1882.
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