Philosophy 425 –August 31
Frege: On Sense and Reference Uber Sinn and Bedeutang
A framing question in the philosophy of language concerns what is meant by the meaning of an
expression, especially within a context of investigating language in a systematic, scientific fashion.
John Locke’s ideational theory of meaning Locke’s philosophy of language arises from his Empirical, epistemological commitments. To speak of the
meaning of a word is to talk about the ideas with which expressions are associated.
Experience » ideas» meaning
Frege on ideas- ideas≠thoughts
Ideas are: private, subjective, non-sharable, non-comparable, mind-dependent
Thoughts: objective, shareable, independent
Problem-Frege rejects Locke’s ideational theory of meaning, because in Locke’s theory, the public
account of meaning is lost.
Why is the public account of meaning lost? Because if the meaning of an expression comes from an idea,
and ideas are the result of individual experiences, different ideas would have different meanings to
different people.
An example used in class- the idea of a cat. If my idea of a cat is sleek, and Jane’s idea of a cat is fluffy,
Jane and I would have different ideas of the same thing. Why is this a problem? If the meaning of an
expression is subjective, then it cannot be misunderstood.
Result? “Humpty dumpty” theory of meaning ( Lewis Carrol)-When I use a term it means only what I
want it to mean (mean by it) "neither more nor less".
What is missing in Locke’s account is objectivity.
What is objectivity?
Root of word=ject (to strike against)
Example: project, object
Why is objectivity in language important?
● acts as an anchor for meaning
●allows for communication of thought
●normativity in language
Normativity in language- short definition-given what I mean by an expression, I should use it in some
ways rather than others.
John Stuart Mill’s direct reference theory of meaningMeanings are not ideas. Meanings are referents of our terms.
Example, semantics of first order predicate logic
Problems with direct reference account of meaning●ambiguity (reference glut)
●substitution (co-referring names)
ExampleMark Twain, Samuel Clemens, and the author of the first American novel written with a type writer all
refer to the same person. If meaning is determined by reference, and all these names refer to the same
person, the meaning of all three expressions on Mill’s account is the same.
Frege does not think this is the case.
Why? What is different about Mark Twain=Mark Twain, and Mark Twain=Samuel Clemens?
Frege- Cognitive value
Another example, used by Frege- what makes A=A different from A=B?
A=A-offers no new information, and has no inferential consequences. It simply exhibits the principle of
self-identity.
A=B is ampliative and subject to an embedding test- (Can I believe B, without believing A?)
A=B and A=A differ in Cognitive Value. (assessed by inferential significances)
Frege rejects meaning as ideas (Locke) and meaning as reference (Mill), so where does this leave us?
Frege’s principle of Compositionality- (Frege’s principle)The meaning of a complex expression is
determined by structure and the meanings of its constituents
Should this be the case, different names with different senses can have the same denotation, such as
Venus and the Morning Star, or Sam Clemens and Mark Twain.
Frege- meaning depends upon sense, and reference.