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India’s Perceptions of and Responses to the Rise of China:
An Assessment
Zhang Guihong
Abstract
This paper makes a general assessment of India’s perceptions of, and responses to, the rise
of China. There exist three schools of perceptions and responses, namely those who view China as a
benign power and prefer an appeasement approach to China, those who regard China as a threatening
power and propose a containment-cum-encirclement policy, and those who consider China as a
competitive power and favor a balanced engagement strategy. The assessment will be focused on the
mainstream school of thought (which perceives China as a competitive power and responds with
balanced engagement) on several dimensions of China’s rise, such as economic growth, military
buildup, and regional influence of China.
Introduction
China and India rank among the world’s largest developing nations; fastest
growing economies; most populous states; and greatest ancient civilizations. But most
importantly, they are among the foremost rising powers in Asia. In the past quarter of
a century, China’s productive forces and overall national strength have been
constantly enhanced, which is now widely perceived as “the rise of China.”
Much has been discsused and written about the rise of China and its implications
for the other Asian countries. But we still do not know much about India’s perceptions
of and responses to the rise of China. Despite a common starting point in the late
1940s, the People’s Republic of China and the Republic of India have selected quite
different political systems and roads to development. Since then, relations between
them have shown a number of ups and downs over the past 50 years. It is the basis for
a better relationship between Beijing and New Delhi to have an objective and rational
view of the other side.
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The purpose of the paper is to help reduce the abundant misperceptions and
increase mutual understanding between China and India. It will also be helpful for
people in the other Asian countries to learn the implications for Asia of the rise of
China. Therefore, the following three questions arise (a) both opportunity and
challenge (assessment of Indian perceptions as well as misperceptions of the rise of
China)? (b) from containment to engagement (analysis of India’s policy and strategy
towards the rise of China)? and, (c) between cooperation and conflict (comment on
the implications of China’s rise for Sino-India relations)?
China’s economic growth and India’s understanding
There have been many reports that analyzed and predicted China’s economic
growth, and compare the economic reforms of China and India as well as their paths
to development. China began to initiate the reform and opening-up policy in 1978, 13
years earlier than India. Interestingly, according to the estimate of a newly published
Morgan Stanley research report, the Chinese dragon is 13 years ahead of the Indian
elephant.1
Many factors contribute to China’s economic success. Besides economic reform,
the opening-up policy and stable international environment, large-scale development,
export-oriented strategy, Central-led investment, and national consensus and support
play important roles in China’s economic growth. By contrast, India’s lag in GDP and
other benchmarks compared with China can be partly explained by the delay in
economic reforms, lower national savings rate, lesser inflow of foreign direct
investment (FDI), relative inefficiency of its bureaucracy, and the longstanding
dispute with Pakistan. Most Indian scholars think that these explanations are
reasonable and acceptable.
Two Indian China hands commented on China’ economic development with
balanced views. Arun Sahgal listed some issues likely to impact on Chinese economic
growth in the years to come. These issues include the ability to maintain the
momentum of reform process, the ability to deal with the socio-cultural inequalities,
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the political stability and the ideological role of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP),
the infrastructure development particularly the availability of energy resources, and
the manner of leveraging its strategic configuration of power to shape the overall
strategic environment. 2 Though there are many internal problems and negative
outcomes3 behind of China’s economic growth, they acknowledged that the Chinese
have gained more from economic reform than have lost. According to Sujit Dutta, the
success of China’s reforms and opening-up has strengthened the position of reformists
and pro-globalization forces in India and they have been one of the impetuses of
India’s economic reforms in early 1990s.4
While recognizing the fact that India is not able to match China in many
macroeconomic and headline numbers, many Indian as well as foreign scholars still
believe that by relying primarily on organic growth, India is making fuller use of its
resources and has chosen a path that may well deliver more sustainable progress. By
contrast, China’s development has reached the highest point within the current
organizational force. Meanwhile, China’s earlier advantage of a capital–driven growth
may turn to be a disadvantage if China fails to reform its banking system and establish
a real capital market.5
According to Indian scholars, the advantage of “India’s unique gradualism
growth model” is concentrated in the following:
·
Healthier banking system. India’s financial industry is much stronger with
adequate capitalization, risk assessment systems, and manageable level of
non-performing assets (NPAs).6
·
Better institutional framework. India has a better soft environment to attract
FDIs and develop its economy. Beside political democracy, India’s soft
power includes at least protection of private ownership and intellectual
property, media supervision, the rule of law (a legacy of British rule), and
the presence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).7
·
Stronger private enterprises.8 India has a large batch of world-level private
firms, notably Infosys, based on software and information systems. Their
improved corporate governance9 makes them capable of competing with
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their European and American counterparts.
· Higher capital efficiency. Considering India’s national savings rate is half that
of China’s and 90 per ent less FDI, but its growth rate is only around 20
percent lower than China’s, this means India’s efficient deployment of
capital and China’s inefficiency. In addition, the performance of India’s
stock market is greatly praised.10
·
Younger labor force. With similar amount of labor resource between China
and India, the latter’s laborer is relative young. Besides, provided that
common education in India is inferior to that in China, India’s high-level
education of technology and management for professionals is superior.
·
“World office”. Thanks to its mathematics and logic intelligence plus
language advantage, India has developed into a leading Information
Technology (IT) center in the world.
The number of India’s soft engineers
and exports is the most in the world. More and more transnational
corporations (TNCs) order IT service from India and establish their
overseas research and development (R ＆ D) centers in this “software
superpower”.
China’s military build-up and India’s threat perception
Different from the relative reasonable understanding of China’s economic growth,
Indian perception of China’s military build-up, by and large, is negative. One senior
analyst at IDSA wrote in 1998 that “[t]his combination of rising nationalism, its key
ideological role in regime stability, and the realpolitik strategic culture has made
China’s military power build-up a potent factor for uncertainty, insecurity, and
instability in Asia”, thus, “[t]his combination of the PLA’s size, growing strategic and
conventional capabilities, organizational restructuring and adoption of a new strategy
of preparing for ‘high-tech limited warfare’ are factors that its Asian neighbors have to
take seriously.” 11 A sense of China’s threat that has been occupying the Indian
strategic horizon since Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s entry Tibet in 1950,
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through the Sino-Indian border war in 1962, Chinese nuclear test in 1964, and the
strategic ties with Pakistan since 1965, right up to India’s nuclear tests in 1998 when
the Indian Defense Minister, George Fernandes, asserted that China was “potential
threat number one”, and Indian Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee cited the “China
threat” to justify India’s nuclear weaponization in his secret letter to US President
Clinton. Chinese military modernization (launched first in 1975, more effectively
formed in late 1979, and considerably enhanced after the end of Cold War), such as
annual double-digit increases in defense expenditures, large-scale imports of
advanced weaponry (mostly from Russia) to enhance service capability, the
renovation of military doctrine, the restructuring of the PLA as well as personnel
training, have worried Indian strategists.12
Indian negative perceptions of China’s military build-up were obvious, especially
during the event of India’s nuclear tests in 1998. Since then, perceptions have become
more positive as a result of the recent changes in Chinese Asian diplomacy, improved
Sino-Indian relations, and its greater sensitivity to some of the Asian concerns.13
The climate is more positive in New Delhi at present.
India’s concerns about China’s military build-up and foreign defense relations
includes:
·
China’s alleged deployment of missiles in the Tibetan plateau and other areas
that could potentially target India. “Every major Indian city is within reach
of Chinese missiles and this capability is being further augmented to include
Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs). The asymmetry in terms
of unclear forces is pronounced in favor of China and is likely to get further
accentuated as China responds to counter the US missile defense
programme.”14 From India’s point of view, Chinese missiles located in the
Tibetan plateau are a potential threat to India. Of many missiles bases, the
Kunming and Xining headquarters are perceived as containing missile
brigades targeting India. But just as some US scholars point out, the fact
that Beijing has never considered India a serious threat to its security until
now and the political disputes between China and India are too small
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reduces its need for pointing large numbers of missiles in India’s direction.15
In fact, India’s threat perception, mainly based on Beijing’s capability
instead of its intention, reflects New Delhi’s history burden and shortage of
self-confidence.
·
China’s long-term and deepening military relations, nuclear and missile
cooperation in particular, with Pakistan, the principal rival of India. While
taking notice of China’s adjustment of its South Asian policy in recent years
(characteristic of which is its dealing with India and Pakistan separately),
China’s apparent neutral position in the Kargil conflict, and China’s
continuing endeavor to improve its internal export control regulation and
actively participate in international non-proliferation regime,16 many Indian
officials and scholars still question the conformity between China’s words
and deeds, doubt China’s will to give up the “Pakistan card” in dealing with
India, and argue that the relations among China, India, and Pakistan are
highly intertwined.17
·
China’s deepening and close defense relations with India’s neighboring
countries. One Indian analyst point out that while “India hopes to ‘surround’
Pakistan – its ‘immediate’ adversary – and to ‘contain’ China, its
‘long-term’ security threat,” China and Pakistan “are pursuing similar aims
of strategically ‘squeezing’ Delhi.” 18
Some in the Indian media and
academe refer to the “reality” of China’s supplying nuclear and missile
technology to Pakistan, military ties with Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the
building of the deep-water Gwadar port in Baluchistan. According to Sujit
Dutta, “China’s military ties in the region around India remain a matter of
concern, including the fact that the bulk of its arms exports are to the
region.”19 China’s interests and goals in South Asia and Indian Ocean are
mainly economic – more trade partners and secure oil transportation. But
economic interests need to be ensured and protected by political relation and
security environment.
China’s military relationship with South Asian
countries is a part of this process, and is not necessary to be translated into
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India-target.
Moreover, Beijing’s ambitions to be a sea power by expanding and establishing a
naval presence in Southeast Asia and in the Indian Ocean is perceived to be a
challenge for New Delhi.20 From India’s understanding, China is now doing the
groundwork for a naval presence along maritime chokepoints in the South China Sea,
the Malacca Strait, the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Hormuz to protect its economic
security interests.
China’s regional influence and India’s response with competition
The rise of China, no matter in terms of economic growth or military build-up,
will inevitably have a certain regional implication. Different countries, however, may
have their own interpretation and response. India’s regional strategic concern “extends
from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Straits of Malacca in the east and from the
Central Asian Republics in the north to near the equator in the south.”21 According to
John Garver, “[F]ar geopolitical conflict has dominated relations between India and
China”, and “there have been five stages of India-China rivalry for status and
influence among the developing countries since 1949.” 22 Similarly, one Indian
analyst pointed out, “China and India straddle a common geopolitical space across the
Himalayas and South, Southwest, and Southeast Asia. This makes for strategic and
geopolitical competition.”23 On the other hand, “This also creates the impetus for
geopolitical regional cooperation if relations are to be stable,” he said.24 From India’s
perspective, there are at least three subregions, namely, Southern Asia, Southeast Asia,
and Central Asia, where the interests and influences of India and China have met or
will meet.
In South Asia, China shares borders with many Indian neighboring countries
(Pakistan, Nepal, Bhutan, and Myanmar), except Bangladesh and two island countries
(Maldives and Sri Lanka). In Indian eyes, China is an integral part of the Southern
Asian geopolitical and strategic environment. Although India and South Asia are not
central to China’s foreign relations and policy priorities at present, this is a growing
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area of Beijing’s interest. For New Delhi, however, whether positive or negative,
“China’s military doctrines, forced deployment postures, economic interests in the
South Asian region and South Western reaches of the Pacific (viewed from the US)
are a matter of interest to India.”25 A rising China will be more attractive to these
small countries in balancing Indian dominance in South Asia owing to their threat
perceptions about India.
According to Sujit Dutta, except India, there are three types of perceptions of
China’s role in the subcontinent. The first group – comprising Pakistan and
Bangladesh – sees China as a benign state and welcomes the growth of China’s
overall power and a balancing role. The second group – comprising Nepal and Bhutan
– survives between the “dragon” and the “elephant” and has close security ties and
open borders with India but also seeks peaceful ties with China. The third group –
comprising Myanmar and Sri Lanka – has friendly relations with India but also wants
peaceful and good relations with China. India’s perceptions are sui generis in South
Asia.26 As the dominant power here, India views China’s South Asian activities from
“a mixed perspective – China as a regional power poses challenges and also offers
opportunities.”27
On the economic front, whether India would try to keep China out of the
multilateral organization in the region or accommodate it in the subcontinent is still an
open question. But the fact is that initiatives such as the Kunming proposals (or BCIM,
including Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar) and Bangladesh-Myanmar-China
Trade Agreement (BMCTA) proposed by China to enhance the economic cooperation
between southwest China, eastern India and northwest of Southeast Asian region,
have less development partly because of India’s negative attitude based on its political
and security consideration. The Indians see them as a “Chinese plot to swamp the
sensitive Indian North-East”, thus the need to “block Chinese initiatives for
trans-regional economic integration.”28 Moreover, New Delhi tries to forge its own
trade bloc.29 “The sense of a Sino-Indian rivalry has dominated the perception of
Indian initiatives for trans-regional cooperation,”30 according to one analyst.
Southeast Asia has historically been an arena of competition for influence by
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India and China. It is because of historical and geopolitical fact that many refer to this
landmass between India and China as “Indochina.”
Indian former Prime Minister A.B. Vajpayee stated that there was “competition”
between India and China in cultivating the ASEAN nations and that this competition
was “healthy.”31 This was the first time ever that a head of the government of India
went public in describing China as a competitor. 32 The argument, from my
understanding, is not economics-driven and ASEAN region-related only, but is also
multidimensional and has a big security angle as well.
From 1999-2000, China moved from being suspicious of regional multilateral
organizations to participating in and even forming them.33 China is attempting to tie
up with the ASEAN countries through multilateral fora to enhance its economic and
political leverage, and so does India. Nevertheless, China stands closer than India with
the ASEAN in economic integration and security cooperation. Moreover, according to
ASEAN’s new geo-strategic doctrine, namely “circles diplomacy” 34, China is placed
in the second circle while India is in the third one.
China-Myanmar security relationship has attracted special attention from several
Indian analysts. One scholar expressed India’s concerns, saying that “the key factor of
a growing Chinese influence to our east deserves attention, especially since China has
established a strategic alliance with Pakistan on the other side.”35 Another Indian
scholar points out that “the growing China-Pakistan-Myanmar triangular relationship
is not threatening (India) but could be one in the long term.”36 Mohan Malik said in
2001, “Chinese strategists see Myanmar occupying the same place in the Chinese
calculus of deterrence vis-à-vis India in South-Southeast Asia that Pakistan does in
South-Southwest Asia.”37
Central Asia attracts the attention of the major powers not only for its
geo-strategic location and rich natural resource, but also for its unique position in
global counter-terrorism campaign. As a part of India’s strategic interest area, Central
Asia is the ‘immediate and strategic neighborhood’.38 The importance of Central Asia
for India is not only civilizational and historical but also geopolitical and
economically. Similarly, China is a rising and active factor in a new “Great Game” in
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Central Asia.
Some Indian analysts feel that Central Asia’s new political environment is
changing in China’s favor. “Between 1992-1993, the new states signed all necessary
bilateral agreements for cooperation with China. As the Soviet-build economic
infrastructure began to crumble, the Chinese were quick to reap the advantage in the
region’s economic sector.”39 China’s growing influence in Central Asia is a matter of
discussion in India. With regard to SCO and India’s relation with it, it seems that there
are different viewpoints in New Delhi. While some officials and scholars have
expressed India’s interest to join SCO, others, however, think it is not wise to join
SCO, at least now. Since “the US-led war against terrorism has completely
demolished the relevance of SCO”, and “the focus now appeared to have shifted from
fighting Islamic fundamentalism to that of dealing with the US presence in Central
Asia”,40 India’s response to SCO seems to turn from “eagerness” to that of “wait and
see”.
To be aware of “the multiple networks of roads, railways and pipelines
connecting Central Asia and Western China as well as Asia with Europe may isolate
India from major international transport and communication highways”, one Indian
scholar suggests the establishment of a project of “constructing oil/gas ‘Energy
Highway’ from Central Asia along Western China connecting to Northern India”, thus,
in response to the rising influence of China in Central Asia, “it is time that we factor
China in our Central Asia policy.”41
Conclusion
The rise of China is not only a past tense (Chinese people stand up, get rich, and
turn strong under the first, second, and third generation of leaders, respectively), but
also a present and more a future tense (peaceful rise under the new generations of
leaders and in the wake of globalization). India’s perceptions and responses are
highlighted as follows:
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·
A rising China means both an opportunity and a challenge for India. In the
economic field, India is likely to view China’s development as an
opportunity and in positive terms; in terms of security, China will continue
to pose problems and bring more challenge for India in the coming decades.
·
A rising China could not become India’s ‘brother’ but would not necessarily
be a ‘threat’. While both “appeasement” and “concirclement” are seen as
failing or useless, a balanced (constructive, or strategic, or structural)
engagement will be the most possible strategy.
·
In the short run, both India and China are likely to see peaceful ties, but in
the medium to longer run, a rising China as the most powerful state in
India’s neighborhood will affect India’s national interests politically,
economically, and militarily.
·
China’s phenomenal economic growth leaves a deep impression on India.
India, from fearing at first to accommodating “made in China” things later,
has begun to learn from China in some fields. However, India recognizes its
own unique advantage and development model. Moreover, India usually
views bilateral economic relations from political and security perspectives.
·
China’s nuclear weapon and missile programme pose the most immediate
and serious long-term security threat. India’ other security concerns include
the China-Pakistani nuclear and missile nexus, China’s defense cooperation
with Indian neighbors, China’s potential naval presence in Indian Ocean,
and China’s negative attitude to India’s nuclear power status and its bid for
the UN Security Council seats.
·
As both rising powers in Asia, India and China will be a competitor in
regional affairs, especially in South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia.
The rises of China and India will be the most significant event in this century.
With different national conditions, respective advantages and disadvantages, the two
countries will take varying ways and adopt differing models. There will be races and
competitions, as well as reciprocity and cooperation between them. Besides
promoting common interests and reducing divergence, a bright future Sino-Indian
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relationship needs better mutual understanding and improved security consideration of
each other in the context of the rise of both China and India.
References
1
.
In 1982, China’s per capita nominal $ GDP, at $275, was marginally lower than
India’s, at $280. However, over the last 21 years, China’s growth has been far
stronger than India’s. During this period, China’s real GDP increased by an
average of 9.7 per cent pa compared with India’s 5.7 per cent pa. In 2003,
China’s GDP of $1.4 trillion was 2.5 times India’s GDP of $575 billion. See Xie,
Andy and Chetan Ahya, “China and India: New Tigers of Asia,” at
http://www.morganstanley.com/GEFdata/digests/20040726-mon.html.
2
. Sahgal, Arun, “Dragon Awakens: Alternative Scenarios of Chinese Development:
Implications for Regional Security”, paper presented at IDSA weekly fellows
seminar on May 1, 2004.
3
. Such as weak State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), unhealthy financial industry,
increasing unemployment, serious corruption, regional imbalance, three
problems of “agriculture, country, farmer” [Sannong Wenti], and energy shortage,
etc.
4
. Sujit Dutta, 2004, personal communication.
5
. Vijay Nambia, 2004, personal communication.
6
. A research report by McKinsey & Company indicated that by 2001 only about 10
per cent of India's bank assets were non-performing loans, making up 4.4 per
cent of net assets and 8.8 per cent of gross loans. However, at least more than 25
per cent of China's bank assets, as Chinese banks willingly admitted alone, were
non-performing loans.
7
. These are also part of reasons for why World Bank decided to move its account
department to India instead of China in 2000.
8
. For example, in a survey of leading Asian companies by the Far Eastern
Economic Review (FEER) in 2003, only two Chinese firms had scores high
enough to qualify for India’s top 10 lists. Also, of the world's top 200 small-sized
companies listed by Forbes in 2002, 13 were India's; four were China's, all of
them in Hong Kong.
13
9
. A survey conducted in 2000 by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CLSA) on 25
newly emerging market economies worldwide showed that India was placed
sixth and China 19th in terms of standardized management.
10
.
India's stock indices rose 64.19 per cent in 2003. By contrast, at least CNY 800
billion vanished from the Chinese stock market over the past two years.
11
. Dutta, Sujit, “China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South
Asia,” in in Janathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang, eds., In China’s Shadow:
Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development,
Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1998, p.94.
12
. For a brief introduction of Chinese military modernization programme and its
impact on Indian security, see Kondapalli, Srikanth, “China’s Military
Modernization: Its Impact on Indian Security”, in Satish Kumar, ed., India’s
National Security Annual Review 2001, New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House,
2002, pp.29-51.
13
. Sujit Dutta, 2004, personal communication.
14
. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2002-2003, New
Delhi: Government of India, 2003, p.8.
15
. Gill, Bates, James Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, “The Chinese Second Artillery
Corps: Transition to Credible Deterrence,” in James C. Mulvenon and Andrew
N.D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization, Santa Monica,
CA: RAND, 2002, pp.510-586; Tellis, Ashley, “The Changing Political-Military
Environment: South Asia,” in Zalmay Khalilzad, et al, eds., The United States
and Asia: Towards a New U.S. Strategy and Force Posture, Santa Monica, CA:
RAND, 2001, p.208.
16
. For the details of China’s effort to non-proliferation, see “White Paper on China’s
Non-proliferation Policy and Measures”, the Information Office and State
Council, December 3, 2003, at
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/03/content_287062.htm.
17
. One interesting thing is that, while excluding any external big powers including
China to interfere the Kashmir issue, India is likely to pull China into nuclear
issue in South Asia. In his very first press conference, India’s new external affairs
minister Natwar Singh raised the possibility of India, Pakistan and China having
discussions on a joint nuclear doctrine.
14
18
. Bedi, Rahul, “China and the South Asia Circle,” Asia Times, April 29, 2003, at
http://www.atimes.com
19
. Sujit Dutta, 2004, personal communication.
20
. For details, see Garver, John W., Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the
Twentieth Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, chapter 10 “The
Indian Ocean in Sino-Indian Relationship.”
21
. Ministry of Defence, Government of India, Annual Report 2002-2003, New
Delhi: Government of India, 2003, p.5.
22
. Garver, John W., Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth
Century, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, p.5 and pp.110-111.
23
. Dutta, Sujit, “China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South
Asia,” in Pollack and Yang, In China’s Shadow.
24
. Sujit Dutta, 2004, personal communication.
25
. Dixit, Jyotinder Nath, “Emerging International Security Environment: Indian
Perceptions with Focus on South Asian and Central Asian Predicaments,” in K.
Santhanam and Ramakant Dwivedi, eds., India and Central Asia: Advancing the
Common Interest, New Delhi: Anamaya Publishers, 2004, p.22.
26
. Sujit Dutta, “China’s Emerging Power and Military Role: Implications for South
Asia,” in Pollack and Yang, In China’s Shadow.
27
. Sujit Dutta, 2004, personal communication.
28
. Mohan, C. Raja, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India’s New Foreign
Policy, New Delhi: Penguin Books India, 2003, pp.156-157.
29
. Such as BIMST-EC (Bangladesh-India-Myanmar-Sri Lanka-Thailand Economic
Cooperation) in 1997 and Ganga-Mekong project in 2000.
30
. Mohan, C. Raja, Crossing the Rubicon, p.157.
31
. See The Hindu, and the Indian Express, November 9, 2002.
32
. Nanda, Prakash, “India Versus China,” November 17, 2002, The Statesman.
33
. Keliher, Macabe, “Dragon seizes market share,” March 9, 2004, Asia Times, at
http://www.atimes.com.
34
. The “circles diplomacy”, copied from EC’s “three-phase rockets” and proposed
at first by Malaysian former Prime Minister Mahathir in 1996, includes three
circles: the core is ASEAN community (the agreement reached in 2003)
composed of all Southeast Asian countries, the second circle is East Asian
15
Community (under discussion), the institutionalized “10﹢3” (ASEAN plus
China, Japan, and Korea), the third circle is the future Asian Community
(together with Russia, India, and Australia).
35
. Singh, Jasit, “Our Eastern Neighbor,” at
http://www.india-seminar.com/2000/487/487%20jasjit%20singh.htm.
36
. Kuppuswamy, C.S., “China-Pakistan-Myanmar: The triangular relationship needs
careful watch,” South Asia Analysis Group (India), Paper no.401, at
http://www.saag.org/papers5/paper401.html/
37
. Pioneer, December 19, 2001.
38
. “India and Central Asia in the Emerging Security Environment,” speech
delivered by Indian (former) External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha at the
third India-Central Asia Regional Conference in Tashkent during November 6-8,
2003, in Santhanam and Dwivedi, India and Central Asia, p.7.
39
. Stobdan, P., “Central Asia and China Relations: Implications for India,” in
Santhanam and Dwivedi, India and Central Asia, p.346.
40
.
41
. Stobdan, P., “Central Asia and China Relations: Implications for India,” in
Ibid. p.351, 350.
Santhanam and Dwivedi, India and Central Asia, p.357.