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(U) The Ontology of the Shura:
Why We Get It Wrong & How to Get It Right
(U) Dr. David C. Ellis
(U) Mr. Scott Kesterson
8 July 2011
DRAFT
(U) Introduction
(U) Stability and transition in Afghanistan depend most critically upon rehabilitating and
empowering the local shura because it is the foundation for all social organization. The
Taliban intuitively understand the centrality of the shura and know how to empower it,
co-opt it, marginalize it, or destroy it. We do not. Until the Taliban are rendered
irrelevant in local, village-level governance and security, the international effort to secure
Afghanistan cannot succeed.
(U) Coalition Forces and the international community have spent nearly ten years and
tens of billions of dollars trying to build the capacity of the Afghan National Government
(GIRoA) to reach the population, assert authority, and stabilize the country. The
assumption underlying this approach is that district and provincial governments can
adequately re-establish local governance. Events over the last decade demonstrate this
assumption to be flawed for a multiplicity of reasons, but this does not mean governance
by Afghans for Afghans is beyond their reach. Instead, it simply means that local
governance must come from villagers working on their own behalf, not exclusively from
GIRoA’s district and provincial appointees. Devoting a fraction of the international
community’s resources to local, village shura rehabilitation and empowerment,
especially through Village Stability Operations (VSO), can result in geometrically better
results for the stability and transition effort.
(U) Fortunately, the local, village shura is comprehensible to foreign forces and can be
proactively supported by Afghanistan’s international partners if it is properly explained.
This paper explains the ontology of the shura and how to “get it right.” It is not a
meeting, as Westerners understand it. Rather, it contains an entirely different set of
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social relationships and infused meanings than Westerners assume; the assumptions we
bring to shuras are why we get them wrong and often destabilize them. Once the social
meanings and structures of the shura are elucidated, the international effort can expect to
see the Taliban lose their influence with the population, much like in 2001-2002. In other
words, the better we leverage natural Afghan social dynamics and social institutions, the
more we encourage peaceful transition as the international effort winds down.
(U) A Vital Local Shura Is the Strategic Objective
(U) A vital local shura is the strategic objective for international efforts in Afghanistan
because it is the only means of giving Afghans a sense of control over their destiny,
especially as the Afghan government muddles through its growing pains. In order to
achieve stability and transition, villagers must feel secure and empowered in their
villages, not just be subject to the authority of a government. The distinction between the
Afghan government and the local shura must be clearly established analytically in order
to make the best use of each. True, a shura can and should occur at the district
government center, but shuras can, should, and must exist outside of it as well. The
reason international forces conflate the shura with local government is due to blinders we
bring to government and governance.
(U) Afghan local politics does not function on the basis of chartered or incorporated
towns like in the United States. Conversely, Afghans participate in much less structured
associations, typically around particular issue areas. One scholar describes Afghan
communities as “opportunistic solidarity structures,” which connotes both closed systems
of in-group support and open systems of inclusion when the benefits of so doing become
apparent. Participation in a shura is, thus, not a contractual, legal determination based on
property location, but a conscious decision to make the boundaries of political
community by virtue of participation.
(U) A key error of the international effort has been to orient its local political efforts out
of the provincial and district government centers. To us, these offices represent “the
town” or the local community, at least in our conception of local governance. In reality,
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the district government represents the interests of the national government, not
necessarily (and not often) the interests of the broader population within the district’s
boundaries. We have often wondered why villager participation in local politics is so
sparse. The answer, generally, is that the boundaries of the districts and the decisions of
district governments are unrelated to the communities of interest Afghans themselves
value and create.
(U) Another way to look at this is that the shura process binds the “political community”
together. A healthy, well-functioning shura can include a wide range of tribes, subtribes, and ethnicities so long as the participants see value in the inclusion. Under such
circumstances, the shura emphasizes conflict resolution for the mutual benefit of all
parties. On the other hand, a small, tightly controlled shura indicates suspicion, fear, and
conflict with others. Communication between or within villages is broken, tensions
cannot be mediated, and political and economic progress can be impeded.
(U) The strategic value of the shura is that it mitigates conflicts for the mutual benefit of
all parties involved; the more robust the shura, the larger the “zone of peace.”
Discovering the historic, natural boundaries of political communities, determining why
they have been obstructed, and enabling them to reestablish themselves recreates local
governance. This is the building block of peace in Afghanistan, even in the absence of
the national government’s ability to assert authority.
(U) The implication of a vital shura for VSO is that it extends the influence of the Village
Stability Platform (VSP) beyond the embed site. Strategically placing the embed site in
an area located at the heart of the shura or multiple shuras – as opposed to the district
government center – allows the VSP to engage and influence a much larger segment of
the population due to its natural relevance to the community. The VSP will not have to
bring villagers in for consultation, the VSP will already be where they normally consult
one another.
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(U) How Shuras Bind Villages and Political Communities
(U) The term “political community” is defined as a group of people who share common
interests, identities, and organize for mutual benefit and protection. In the Western
conception, a political community is ideally represented by the concept of the “nationstate” and at the local level by the village, town, or city. This formulation is inaccurate in
the Afghan context. Though Americans consider their homes their castles, they are
lightweights as compared to Afghans, and this becomes apparent in the way they view
the shura process.
(U) In Afghan culture, the home is literally sovereign territory, much like Westerners
view the sovereign nation-state today. Nation-states do not accept a higher authority,
which reduces politics to negotiation or fighting. Similarly, Afghans do not look to
government first and foremost to reconcile competing interests; they negotiate accords
and treaties among themselves. They evaluate political power and influence, costs and
benefits, and agree to solutions. Or, they fight.
(U) Villages do function as political communities, but the basis of governance is different
than the formal governance that the Westerner expects. A villager can make a decision
for his household, but anything that impinges upon the rest of the village requires
consultation, a shura. More expansive problems demand larger shuras, which expands
the boundaries of the community. In other words, the shura is the means through which
Afghans express the boundaries of their political communities.
(U) Because of the special sovereign character of Afghan homes, and by extension
Afghan villages, the shura binds political communities together. Formal political
structures do not exist to represent these political communities. Shuras must fill this role.
What international forces must be sensitive to is which actors Afghan villagers state they
want to include in their deliberations, why they failed to invite others, and why they want
to exclude specific groups.
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(U) Defining the Shura
(U) Shuras as political and judicial bodies are very different in form, function, and
meaning than what occurs in the West, and international forces have not yet reconciled
their intentions with Afghan social practices. International forces view the shura as a
meeting. It is not. Indeed, thinking of the shura as a meeting as Westerners know it is a
significant reason why the international effort has failed to achieve stability in
Afghanistan over the last decade.
(U) The ontologies of a Western meeting and an Afghan shura are almost completely
opposite. The principles compared below demonstrate just how unproductive the
Western approach to meetings has been in Afghanistan, but they also demonstrate how
we can positively reorient the international effort to enhance traditional Afghan political
institutions.
(U) Relational vs. Contractual Interaction
(U) The Western world is so rooted in a legal contractual basis that it is actually difficult
to imagine a set of social relationships not founded upon an effective, functioning legal
system. This social structure allows anonymous individuals to engage in commerce,
politics, and law with a relatively high degree of trust about outcomes without actually
knowing anything about one another. The legal process of validating contracts
documents, determining obligations and responsibilities, and imposing fines or
punishment for defaulting on the terms is what allows Western societies to be dynamic
and fast-paced. Western societies value the rank, position, and title of an individual as a
result because his or her personal character is much less relevant than the institutional
power with which he or she is entrusted.
(U) From this ontology, it is quite easy to have an interaction between two individuals
who know nothing about one another, sign multi-million dollar contracts on behalf of
large institutions, and achieve the outcomes both parties desire. The legal system acts as
the guarantor of the agreement, and contracts and supporting documentation form the
basis of social obligation and trust. The Western meeting format is a direct result of the
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socio-political institutions we have worked hard to create over centuries of political and
judicial evolution. Moreover, this structure of generating trust reflects the individualistic
philosophy and ethics underlying Western society. Individuals attend meetings, represent
fictitious individuals (corporations), and rely on impersonal, unrelated, and supposedly
neutral institutions to compel the agreed upon behavior and outcomes from the
individuals. When overlaid with a Western, and largely American, sense of punctuality
and time urgency, it becomes clear how a Western meeting takes on a set of meanings
and subtext that are culturally peculiar and not well suited for the Afghan context.
(U) Yet Afghans – and most people in the world – have never lived in a state with a
trustworthy and effective judicial system. What’s more, rampant illiteracy renders a
written, contract-based system hard to generate for practical reasons. If formal social
institutions cannot generate trust among anonymous individuals, then something else
must fill the void.
(U) In Afghanistan, trust is a function of believing in an individual’s character, of familial
obligations, and of long-standing relationships. History is what is important, not
documents. Decisions to undertake business or political arrangements with others require
a pattern of deeds matching words. Honesty and rectitude are of paramount importance
since it is extremely difficult to develop credibility without them. In other words, a
history of positive interactions is a prerequisite for conducting business with Afghans,
which requires strong relationships to be formed over time.
(U) Afghans take measure of the man when deciding whether or not to work with
someone. Rank, position, and title of course play a role in interactions, but they do not
have the same meaning or importance as in Western society. Reputation is extremely
important to Afghans because
(U) The absence of a credible judicial system does not mean that Afghans lack a social
mechanism for guaranteeing agreements. Family, or kin, obligations serve as an
extension of reputation. Business in its commercial and political forms gets
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accomplished through the guarantee of reputation. An individual vouches for another
with a third party, which then obligates the individual to guarantee the interaction
between the others. Otherwise, a failed interaction sullies the individual’s reputation and
makes future transactions much more difficult to achieve. As one might imagine, the
pace of conducting business must by necessity be much slower than in Western societies
since so much emphasis has to be placed on measuring a person’s character.
(U) Thus, core differences in the ontology of how individuals conduct business have an
immensely important – and deleterious, as currently practiced in the Western tradition –
impact on the stability effort in Afghanistan. In short, meetings as designed by
international forces are entirely structured on the basis of rank, position, title; relatively
short deployments; and contractual, judicial underpinnings for working with Afghans.
Conversely, Afghans need long-term, trustworthy, and socially guaranteed interlocutors
developed over the course of multiple shuras to conduct real business. It is no wonder
why the international effort finds it difficult to generate commitments from Afghans,
especially when the Taliban routinely remind the population that international forces are
transitory, but they are permanent. Everything about our engagement strategy testifies to
this narrative.
(U) Equity vs. Hierarchy
(U) An important consequence of the sovereignty of the Afghan home is the physical
manifestation of the shura. At every level, the shura reflects the consultative, negotiated
nature of Afghan political communities. Members sit in a circle, symbolic of the
formally equal nature of each household or member of the shura. Although informal
hierarchies are of course present in the shura, its circular shape is an important subtext
denoting a degree of equity that demands a mutually agreed upon accord amongst
participants.
(U) The circular form has another important hidden meaning unparalleled in Western
meetings. The center of the shura circle represents shared community space. It is the
physical manifestation of the political community, and it cannot be impinged upon by any
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individual since it is community space. Moreover, the circular shura grows as the
number of participants grows. The circumference of the shura expands naturally as the
number of people increases.
(U) The communitarian nature of the shura is also manifested in the way food is shared at
the event. Food is shared communally, with trays of chicken, rice, lamb, vegetables, and
naan bread being laid out for two or more people to divide. Again, the principle of
shared space underlying the community is manifested by physical presentation and
consumption of food. This is very different than the Western way of breaking bread as a
group.
(U) The Western ontology is built around hierarchy, even in its dining tables, meeting
tables, and room architecture. Our minds are so accustomed to it that we do not even
consciously realize the power relationships being expressed. The Western table is
rectangular, and every seat at the table is individual space. At a meeting, the “head of the
table,” one end typically, is occupied by the most prestigious and powerful individuals,
with the least important people at the farthest end or not even situated at the table. In the
dining room, the head(s) of the household sit(s) at the head of the table, or both ends,
which denotes power and respect. Food might be shared on the table, but those partaking
in the meal place the food on individual place servings and eat off their own plates.
Moreover, the table does not grow; it is finite, and if extra people attend, they are
relegated to another, lesser table or room and are by default shown not to have much
position or relevance.
(U) Many important shuras are held outdoors in a large field instead of a building that
restricts space. Indeed, holding shuras indoors could have the unintended consequence
of limiting participation, resulting in two detrimental outcomes: (a) an unintended
hierarchy in the community is created by privileging those individuals allowed in the
building to participate, and (b) it prevents international forces from determining the true
extent of the political community on an issue because full participation cannot be
accommodated.
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(U) The Western ontology of a meeting therefore creates a series of imbalances in the
shura process simply by where and how international forces hold meetings. When a
shura consists solely of “key leaders,” the remainder of the community is left to believe
that international forces have created the social hierarchy, and the political community is
diminished by the lack of participation. Savvy Afghan politicians have recognized this
proclivity of international forces to unwittingly elevate them by organizing “shuras” in
the form of a Western meeting. Culturally attuned or cosmopolitan Afghans might
forgive or inform Westerners of their mistake, but the average rural Afghan is not in this
position. Instead, he is left to interpret the behavior of international forces as intentional,
with all the unintended consequences.
(U) Discussion vs. Lecture
(U) Western architecture reinforces this ontology of social relations. Western rooms,
especially meeting rooms, are rectangular and spatially restricted. If there is not
sufficient space for all participants, some are left out based on a hierarchy of relations.
Moreover, the rectangular form and tradition of placing the powerful at the head of the
room or table creates a particular subtext, that of the lecture.
(U) The egalitarian subtext of the shura creates an atmosphere of consultation and
negotiation. The shura circle invites discussion, with all those wishing to speak having
the right to do so. The shared, discursive space of the shura is what creates political
community in Afghanistan. Without this feature, Afghans feel a sense of being
dominated, which is directly contrary to the intrinsic sovereignty of the home and the
voluntary nature of political community.
(U) The Western rectangular meeting with an established hierarchy does not invite
discussion; rather it connotes a lecture and creates the sense of being talked to. The
hierarchy of the lecture tells people what to think and how to act, which are acts of
dominance. As noted, the intrinsic sovereign character of the Afghan household bristles
at this sense, though Afghans might accept it when power dynamics demand it. Such
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arrangements, however, last only so long as the power relationships hold or until
alternatives present themselves. Here the utility of the Taliban becomes apparent.
(U) How the Ontology of the Meeting “Gets it Wrong”
(U) A Western approach to a meeting in Afghanistan presupposes that anonymous
individuals can quickly work together with a restricted set of key leaders who can
credibly bring along their community members. In addition, these meetings take on the
character of direction instead of consultation, and expect that contracts suffice for
achieving outcomes. This core ontology of the Western mind is entirely at odds with the
Afghan ontology, and is, worse, counterproductive in achieving stability. It is possible
for international forces to reorient how they engage Afghans in the shura process, but it
begins by adopting the Afghan ontology of a shura and determining how to help Afghans
emphasize the consultative, mediatory aspects of their political culture. In other words,
expanding local Afghan political communities through the shura process is what will
ultimately stabilize Afghanistan, not an overly strong central government.
(U) Identifying the Boundaries of Political Communities
(U) As noted above, expanding the boundaries of local political communities through the
shura process is what will most efficiently stabilize Afghanistan. The conflicts of the last
thirty years have done tremendous damage to the shura process because rural Afghans
have lost infrastructure and have been reduced to below-subsistence survival behavior;
they, in many cases, simply do not have the resources to think beyond the immediate
environment. Moreover, the Taliban have been expert at exacerbating local conflicts
with the direct intention of destroying the shura process and filling the void with their
own brand of shura “justice.” Creating local, village-oriented “zones of peace” and
progressively expanding the boundaries outward to more villages is how stability can
most efficiently be achieved. Identifying the natural boundaries of pre-existing political
communities requires a special, but easily accomplished, process.
(U) “Mapping” Shuras
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(U) The first task is to determine the extent of existing issue-specific shura boundaries.
This is an empirical task of holding shuras on different issue areas (water, infrastructure,
crops, etc) and meticulously recording the villages represented. The next step is to hold
the same issue-oriented shuras at the more marginal villages to expand the opportunity
for participation. Within a few weeks, the natural limits of shura participation should
become apparent. While Coalition Forces should maintain open invitations for broader
inclusion, they should facilitate shura negotiations between villages as they join.
(U) Locating the Pattern-of-Life/Center of Gravity vs. the District Center
(U) One of the hardest mental leaps Coalition Forces will have to make is recognizing
that the District Center is not the natural center of rural Afghan politics. Yes, it is
necessary in many cases to locate forces at the District Center and with the District
Governor to provide valuable resources and mentoring. However, this is not the same as
rehabilitating the political process characteristic of the shura. Instead, Coalition Forces at
the District Center will in most cases be most valuable acting as honest brokers between
the District Government and the outlying villages. Over time, their mentoring and
negotiating skills will make working with the District Government a reasonable
alternative, not necessarily the center of political gravity.
(U) The real task is to determine the greatest density of Afghan social, political, and
economic interaction. In some cases, the District Center will be there, but in many more
the District Center will actually be a peripheral location chosen for political, not practical,
reasons. Overlaying the boundaries of the various issue-oriented shuras will reveal a
center of gravity, which forms the natural crossroads of the broader political community.
Emplacing VSPs in these areas will maximize the opportunity for Coalition Forces to
engage with the population; help them determine and reconstitute their shuras; and most
efficiently achieve access, placement, and rapport with the largest political community as
possible.
(U) Securing the Boundaries of the Shura
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(U) Unfortunately, the Taliban will do its utmost to prevent the natural political
communities from reconstituting through the shura process. This would be a catastrophic
strategic blow to their effort, so they will use targeted assassination and widespread
intimidation to disrupt the initiative. As a result, Afghans will be reticent in many cases
to participate in the shura process, especially in the most remote areas, unless real steps
are taken to secure the natural political communities.
(U) Many times Coalition Forces will hear Afghans state that they will work with them
so long as villages in the next valley agree. The typical interpretation is that this is an
attempt to maintain a balance of power. In some cases, this is true. In many others, this
is actually the open identification of the political community they know they must have
protected in order to effectively participate in building the political community. Afghans
possess an acute sensitivity to historical avenues of conquest, and they will demand
checkpoints be established to guard against those approaches. Coalition Forces must
facilitate the construction of these checkpoints to create the “zone of peace” that will
enable the shura process to take firm root. As the political community solidifies,
progressively more villages will ask to participate, and Coalition Forces will even be able
to link natural political communities back to District Centers and one another for broader
political and development planning.
(U) How the Taliban and Coalition Forces Disrupt the Political
Community
(U) What should be apparent from the discussion on Afghan political communities above
is that they are fragile constructs based on a normative and practical balance of respect
and power. Negotiation, trust, and need create them, and the introduction of foreign
powers and interests easily rupture them. Both the Taliban and Coalition Forces are
guilty of this, though the latter are in a much better position to mitigate and repair the
effects of their entry into the community.
(U) When the Taliban or Coalition Forces enter and take root in a village, they upset the
balance of influence and negotiation within a village or broader political community.
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They become “the strongest tribe” and make negotiations between households and
powerbrokers unpredictable. Whether wittingly or unwittingly, they elevate certain
individuals, marginalize others, and change the whole fabric of social relations within the
community. The only way to mitigate this damage is to become members of the
community slowly and methodically, mapping out the boundaries of shuras, trying to
identify needs, and distributing money and responsibility with great care.
(U) Rehabilitating the Shura for Strategic VSO Effect
(U) Village shuras form the basis of all political community in Afghanistan, and
disrupting this element destabilizes the entire foundation of politics for Afghanistan as a
whole. Consequently, Coalition Forces must recognize that they will always have an
initially destabilizing impact on a community whenever they enter it, and they must work
to rehabilitate the shura process as quickly as possible.
(U) Securing the Political Community
(U) The first step in shura rehabilitation is securing the political community.
Establishing the boundaries of participation, negotiating checkpoints, and helping locals
to man them create the opportunity for negotiation that the Taliban would otherwise
crush. At this point, Coalition Forces will continue to be a disruption to the political
community, but it will show itself to be a more honest broker than the Taliban and, in
many cases, the government. By creating security bubbles around embed sites, and
helping other villages in the political community to man and reinforce security
checkpoints, Coalition Forces will be able to create the political space for shura
negotiations. As the security bubble expands through added checkpoints, the Taliban will
be pressured out of the area or will be unable to intimidate locals from participating.
(U) Providing Opportunity – Civil-Military Operations (trust and rapport)
(U) Holding proper shuras cannot generate the kinds of access, placement, and rapport
Coalition Forces genuinely need to rehabilitate political communities. After so many
years of “getting it wrong,” Afghans need empirical evidence that the Coalition actually
can begin to meet their needs. Rural Afghans require targeted Civil Military Operations
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(CMO) designed to improve family wealth creation, healthcare, and conflict resolution.
CMO activities that directly help Afghans recapture lost food preservation skills, crop
disease mitigation, irrigation practices, and basic medical care stand to generate trust and
rapport because Coalition Forces will demonstrate a tangible desire to improve the
villages’ qualities of life. No other entity – whether Taliban, narco-trafficker, landlord,
international development agency, or government – has been able to credibly engage the
rural population in this manner since the invasion in 2001. As a result, CMO activities
will improve the Coalition’s reputation with the public, generate genuine access and
rapport, and enable forces to become trusted members of the community.
(U) Amplifying Civil-Military Operations: Effects Based Narratives (opportunity vs.
oppression)
(U) Expanding the boundaries of political community requires amplifying the security
and development gains achieved in discreet areas. Narratives that build upon the positive
gains demonstrated by security operations and CMO activities in nearby areas can
encourage other villages to begin the engagement process and eventually resist Taliban
dominance. Effects Based Narratives seek to change the Afghan perception from one of
Coalition incapacity to understand and improve the Afghan condition to one of the
Coalition coherently and progressively improving the opportunity structures, both
political and economic, of Afghan villagers. Demonstrating the rehabilitation of shuras
and political communities across the country will begin to change the Afghan calculus of
whether or not the Coalition can indeed “get it right” in their country.
(U) Restoring Political Community Governance through the Shura
(U) The simultaneous and cumulative effect of creating security, building genuine access
and rapport, and amplifying the positive gains across areas should improve the prospects
for local village shuras functioning properly as well as prepare populations within the
historic political community for eventual inclusion. The goal of VSPs should be to
rehabilitate political communities that, once reconstituted and governing local relations,
be able to function independently of Coalition Forces. Issue-oriented shuras should be
able to fulfill their historic role of governing, mediating, and dispensing justice even in
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the absence of national government oversight. While VSPs will indeed want to link
political communities to the government through activities at the District Center, they
will still be able to generate stability in the absence of resources coming directly from the
state. The political communities themselves will be able to maintain social order.
(U) Conclusion
(U) The key to stability and transition in Afghanistan is to rehabilitate the shuras
underlying Afghanistan’s natural political communities. The Taliban have expertly
destroyed political communities and undermined shuras because of their intrinsic
understanding of the process. Coalition Forces have struggled to be relevant to rural
Afghan communities because of fundamental differences in ontology between a Western
meeting and an Afghan shura. Adopting Afghan practices and understandings about
shuras can eliminate a key Taliban strategic weapon and turn it to the favor of Coalition
Forces.
(U) To rehabilitate Afghan political communities, Coalition forces will have to reorienting intelligence, civil affairs, and information operations toward generating shura
support.
(U) Fixing gaps in VSO Implementation
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