Impact Overview 2NC
There is an external impact — the affirmative’s faith in the legal system actively contributes to
authoritarianism. The law and legal interpretation are violent, ensuring the dominance of existing
powerful interests and killing off alternative visions of justice.
Henderson ‘91
[Lynne. Prof Law @ Indiana School of Law @ Bloomington. “Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law” The
Indiana Law Journal, 1991. ln/khirn]
The lack of scholarly acknowledgment, until very recently, of Cover's suggestion that law has too often been a
mechanism for state violence and human oppression indicates the difficulty legal scholars have in
acknowledging that law can be oppressive as a matter of course, rather than as an occasional exception. n146
Perhaps no other scholar has been more concerned with the violent and punitive nature of law than Cover. His
journey began with his study of judicial enforcement of the fugitive slave laws in Justice Accused n147 and
ended in an assertion that law was not an instrument of the state. He wrote that he was an "anarchist . . . with
anarchy understood to mean the absence of rulers, not the absence of law." n148 By this statement, Cover may
have meant to reiterate Paine's statement that it is the Rule of Law that is king, but it seems to have rested more
on Cover's belief that law is a site of struggle over meaning. n149 For Cover, law was not state power or even
an instrument of government, but rather is any social understanding of normative authority: n150 "[T]here is a
radical dichotomy between the social organization of law as power and the organization of [*404] law as
meaning." n151 Further, "in the domain of legal meaning, it is force and violence that are problematic." n152
Law was the normative and interpretive commitment of a community; it was meaning accompanied by such
strong commitment that it could lead to active resistance to other interpretations. While pure legal meaning was,
for Cover, divorced from power and coercion, judicial violence had to be tested against community
commitments. n153 Because, for Cover, "[a] legal world is built only to the extent that there are commitments
that place bodies on the line," n154 violence might be the only way to assure the dominance of one legal
interpretation over another. One need not accept that law is whatever someone is prepared to put her body on
the line for to gain an appreciation of Cover's exposure of the punitive and oppressive aspects of the American
constitutional system or the authoritarian nature of the judiciary and the state. Cover argued that the state sought
to control law, its means of social control, in part through its "imperfect monopoly over the domain of
violence." n155 He asserted that judges invoke and implement state violence by insisting on obedience to their
orders and sacrificing "legal meaning to the interest in public order." n156 Judges, according to Cover, most
typically applied a "statist" approach to law, denying the efficacy of alternative community interpretations. n157
But legal meanings developed by committed communities were law as much as the meanings developed by the
courts. He noted, "the jurisgenerative principle by which legal meaning proliferates . . . never exists in isolation
from violence. Interpretation always takes place in the shadow of coercion. . . Courts, at least the courts of the
state, are characteristically 'jurispathic,'" n158 literally killing off alternative legal meanings. n159 Cover also
described a kind of "process authoritarianism" by describing the jurisdictional reasons given by judges to "place
the violence of administration beyond the reach of 'law.'" n160 He argued that judges promoted substantive
authoritarianism through procedure, both by asserting their own power to punish and by deferring to state
violence. Judges, by using "jurisdictional excuses to avoid disrupting the orderly deployment of state power and
privilege," reinforced authoritarianism
CLS 1NC – Kritikal Affs
Appealing to formal legal structures to correct the injustice they have outlined, the 1ac does little more
than reify the legal system’s mechanistic conception of justice. The result is not liberation but alienation
– the affirmative approaches the law and begs instead of smashing it to pieces.
Glen ‘7 [Patrick. Attorney with the Office of Immigration Litigation, Former Law Lecturer @ Georgetown and
Northern Ohio. “The Deconstruction and Reification of Law in Franz Kafka’s “Before the Law” and the Trial”
Southern Interdisciplinary Law Journal, Vol 23 No 2. Winter 2007. ln/khirn]
The reification of law is made complete by the formalization of the legal apparatus, a total generalization of
legal principles that no longer requires man and operates on the basis of the cogs and wheels put into place by
initial and subsequent codifications. This mechanistic conception of justice creates the appearance of the empty
norm and, in severing the question of origin from its societal bases, obscures even those foundational premises
that should shed light on what the essence of the law is. An examination of Kafka's law and the legal
relationships in Kafka's stories displays this phenomenon with remarkable consistency. From an objective
perspective, it is clear that the law in these stories has become reified, transformed into a formalistic system. Although Kafka does not write a
great deal on the history of the court, through hearsay a few "legends" are conveyed. Titorelli, when apprising K. of the possible decisional outcomes, notes that definite
acquittal is no longer granted, though it had been in the legends told of the court. The ever-active Block, even though he has employed Huld and an array of pettifogging
attorneys, yearns to employ one of the "great lawyers," those brilliant jurists talked about only in legends who could secure any outcome they desired. These references
are brief and come to the reader after passing through many ears and mouths, yet these legends paint a portrait of a system that has not always been so rigid and formal.
The objective reification creates this image of eternity and the notion that the system has always been the way it is. By concealing these legends and chalking them up to
Subjectively, the
relationships of all who come into contact with the Law are reified. "Before the Law" is simplistic in its overt
construction; the sole relationship that consumes the reader is between the man from the country and the
doorkeeper. The law remains forever on the periphery. If the task of the man is truly to attain the law, has he achieved this goal? It seems
not. Yet if this is so, it is less a function of an emptiness behind the gate than of the formalism alluded to by Weber. Viewing the law as reified one is
led to the conception of the judge, and by obvious extension the law, [*58] that Weber characterized as
necessary in capitalist society. Justice becomes a matter of computation; the law is given information and a
judgment is disgorged. The man has given the doorkeeper some information, for the doorkeeper knows that he
has come from the city seeking admittance to the law. That being the case, non-admittance must be the result of
one of two things, both endemic to a reified system. First, the law might be in the process of computing the
judgment. It may have attained all necessary information and is simply passing it through the necessary
channels to decide the judgment. Perhaps the matter is extremely complex, requiring the consultation of any
number of codifications. Or perhaps the light shining in the dimness of the dying man's eyes is evidence of an
imminence of judgment. Maybe the process itself is infinite, tracing Deleuze and Guattari's field of immanence, the information passed
fantasy the system is able to perpetuate its own existence not only into the future, but also as a fiction that extends into the past.
on from room to room, another functionary always waiting behind the closed door to prolong the process indefinitely. The waiting may simply be a function of this
processing. In any event, this function itself is a result of the reification of law which expels the exhortations of the man from its midst to focus solely on the thingified
Second, if the law has become reified and thus formal, then surely the rules of
invocation are also formal and rigid. This matter has already been touched upon, but it is worth repeating in this context. German law was impersonal
relation he has brought to the gate.
and formal and no doubt required a certain form of invocation to summon it forth. Previously I had noted the doctrines of standing and justiciability. Obviously it could
No
matter the reason, the rules of the law have not been complied with and the law itself has not taken notice of the
man. A machine will only work if certain levers are pulled and buttons pushed. If the exact sequence is not held
to nothing will happen. Law as machine, reified law, has this exact characteristic; one must call it forth very specifically, taking care in the structure of the
be something far more mundane, such as a complaint being filed on paper of the wrong color or the improper structure of the man's question of entrance.
sentence, the order of the words, the color of the complaint, etc. If not, no audience will be granted. Whether the non-admittance of the man from the country is a
function of the first or second scenario is not important. In
either case it is the reification of law that has alienated the man, leaving
him alone on the slopes of despair waiting for a judgment that may or may not come, depending solely on how
well the machine is working or the question of whether it is even in the process of functioning. Ernst Fischer
paints this portrait succinctly: "The law is no longer a living being, but a petrified institution, no longer timely,
only still intimidating." 272 In such a stark portrait one is inevitably reminded again of Kafka's own words,
recast through the reified and clouded consciousness of the man: "How modest this man is. He comes to the
Law and begs. Instead of storming the Law [*59] and smashing it to pieces he comes and begs." This isn't
technically a quote - just my rephrasing of a statement Kafka had made.
Permutation 2NC – Immigration K
The permutation fails – tacking on critical legal studies to the implementation of legal policy replicates
the “imperial scholar”, a white liberal scholar that cites other similar scholars to analyze minority legal
rights – they’ll ignore the transformative potential of the affirmative, gutting empathy in favor of
detached irrelevance
Johnson 2k [Kevin R., Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law, University of California,
Davis School of Law. A.B., University of California at Berkeley; J.D., Harvard University, “RACE MATTERS:
IMMIGRATION LAW AND POLICY SCHOLARSHIP, LAW IN THE IVORY TOWER, AND THE LEGAL
INDIFFERENCE OF THE RACE CRITIQUE”, U. Ill. L. Rev. 525, University of Illinois Law Review, 2000,
lexis]
A. The Imperial Scholar in the Ivory Tower One palpable result of the two separate discourses goes far to demonstrate the need for mutual engagement .
Race
immigration scholarship often goes ignored in the mainstream scholarship. n112 This is understandable at some level because it
proves difficult to fit a broad race critique into doctrinal analysis, especially if one does not consider race to significantly influence immigration law and policy. Even
assuming that this may be true, the answer is not to ignore the damning charges of the race scholars but to take them seriously, whether through refutation, agreement,
or otherwise. n113 At a minimum,
we should acknowledge the relevance of race, perhaps at an unconscious level, n114 to
scholars tend to marginalize, downplay, or ignore race
scholarship on immigration law. This essay will not attempt to comprehensively document the "imperial scholar" phenomenon in immigration law that
Richard Delgado analyzed in the civil rights context, where well-meaning white liberal scholars almost exclusively cite to each other in
analyzing the civil rights of minorities. n115 Evidence suggests, however, that this practice thrives in immigration law. As one
observer noted, "that immigration scholarship [*548] has remained relatively insular and fairly reliant on traditional
writers and methods of interpretation seems to reflect a form of imperial scholarship suggestive of a closed
clique of writers almost entirely dependent on self-reference and conventional means." n116 For example, a well-known book
immigration law and policymaking. As it stands, however, majority
advocating reconsideration of birthright citizenship cites the scholarship of only one minority law professor in over twenty-five pages of copious notes. n117 Some of
the works of other established immigration law scholars rarely cite to minority law professors. n118 Similarly, in
the two leading immigration law
casebooks, excerpts from minority law professors are few and far between, even though roughly forty-two
percent of the immigration law teachers are minorities, and many write in the field. n119 In one of the casebooks, only two of sixty-nine
excerpted publications reprinted in the casebook were written by minority law professors (besides three written by one Asian American coauthor), neither of whom
writes primarily in the field of immigration law. n120 This particular casebook also is quite selective in its citation to minority [*549] legal scholars. In a competing
casebook, none of the twenty-seven excerpts presented were by minority law professors, although at least one selection appears to have been written by a minority
author. n121 Unlike the competitor, however, this casebook extensively cites the work of minority scholars. For example, although this casebook cites six articles by
Professor Michael A. Olivas (including one that has become a Critical Race Theory classic), n122 a former chair of the Association of American Law Schools Section
on Immigration Law and chair of the planning committee that organized the first immigration law teachers workshop in 1994, the competitor cites none. n123
Neither casebook, however, attempts to engage seriously the work or teachings of race theorists' analysis of
immigration. n124 Admittedly, casebook preparation requires difficult judgment calls, and these two casebooks prove to be excellent for teaching in many ways.
Nonetheless, important lessons could be taught to students by integrating a racial critique of immigration law and policy. The separation of two distinct immigration
discourses is readily apparent and can be seen in the treatment of the 1997 book Immigrants Out! The New Nativism and the Anti-Immigrant Impulse in the United
States, which includes the contributions of a number of minority legal scholars who critically analyze the U.S. immigration laws. n125 Although cited with regularity in
race immigration literature, the book has for the most part been ignored in the ivory tower immigration scholarship. One prominent immigration scholar summarily
dismisses Immigrants Out! as [*550] exaggeration based on "false" premises. n126 As of January 25, 2000, the book had been cited seventy-two times, fifty-one times
by minority scholars and seven times in student writings. n127 Importantly, any divide between the traditional-and race-immigration scholars is not necessarily along
liberal/open borders versus conservative/restrictionist lines. n128 Many, perhaps most ,
immigration law scholars are sympathetic to the
rights of immigrants and frequently criticize immigration doctrine in a way that generally could be classified as
"pro-immigrant." ,FN='130'> The white, liberal immigration law scholars, however, often do not fully acknowledge the racial
influences or impact of the immigration laws and, consequently, do not squarely address the thrust of the raceimmigration scholarship. n130 This may be a result of the "ivory tower" syndrome, viewing abstract legal principles
without a concrete, real-life appreciation of how they actually operate in practice. n131 The failure to incorporate minority voices into mainstream
immigration scholarship has costs. Most importantly, it allows for the question of the influence of race on immigration law to be
avoided by the most prominent and influential immigration scholars in the legal academy, which may well
retard study and policy reform in the field for years to [*551] come. In addition, majority scholars may operate from "factual ignorance or
naivete" and "a failure of empathy, an inability to share the values, desires, and perspectives of the population whose rights are under consideration." n132 Minorities
from communities deeply affected by immigration, such as Latino/as and Asian Americans, generally can be expected to have different perspectives on and concrete
knowledge about how immigration law and policy work in the "real" world, as opposed to an abstract, theoretical perspective. Scholars distant from those realities may
not fully appreciate the facts or fail to empathize with immigrants. n133 Consider that the leading - and unquestionably liberal - article exhaustively documenting the
legislative developments culminating in the Refugee Act of 1980 virtually ignores the desire among some members of Congress, and their constituents, to limit
Vietnamese refugee admissions that had increased in the 1970s with the fall of Saigon, n134 while a leading Asian American scholar demonstrated how the new law
was motivated in significant part by anti-Vietnamese sentiment. n135 Evidence
shows factual inaccuracies and lack of empathy in
ivory tower immigration law scholarship. For example, although they recognize the need to control undocumented immigration, traditional
immigration scholars often assume that enforcement measures will be applied in a race-neutral fashion despite
evidence suggesting the contrary. n136 Much "ivory tower" work is abstract, distant from the impact on the lives of
people affected by the operation of the law. Juiceless analysis of "the law," however, fails to capture the law's true effect on people's lives. Being
questioned about your citizenship when you are a fifth-generation U.S. citizen or having a relative, friend, or acquaintance deal with the INS in removal proceedings
"teaches" volumes about how the U.S. immigration laws work in practice. n137 Although obviously not the whole [*552] story, these practical impacts certainly are
part of it, and they cannot help but influence a scholar's perspective on immigration law and enforcement.
AT: Lame Duck
1. Our interpretation is that the plan must pass immediately –
2. It’s real world – special sessions happen, for instance this past summer.
Fox News, “Obama Signs $26 Billion Bailout for Cash-Strapped States,” 8/10/2010, http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2010/08/10/house-approves-billionteacher-bailout/
Representatives scattered around the country and world for the August break were summoned back to
Washington for the one-day session as Democrats stressed the need to act before children return to classrooms
missing teachers laid off because of budgetary crises in the states.
Republicans saw it differently, calling the bill a giveaway to teachers' unions and another example of profligate
Washington spending that Democrats would pay for in the coming election.
The Senate narrowly passed the measure last Thursday, after the House had begun its summer break, necessitating the special
session.
2NC Impact Calc
Probability – risk of nuclear war higher in Korea than anywhere else
Moore 9 – Shanghai correspondent for the Telegraph (Malcolm, 6/14. “North Korea claims US could provoke nuclear war.”
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/northkorea/5532319/North-Korea-claims-US-could-provoke-nuclear-war.html)
Meanwhile, the Tongbil Sinbo newspaper said that North
Korea is "completely within the range of US nuclear attack and the Korean
peninsula is becoming an area where the chances of nuclear war are the highest in the world." Over the weekend,
North Korea angrily responded to fresh United Nations sanctions by threatening to build as many nuclear weapons as
possible. Until now, it said, it had only reprocessed one-third of its spent fuel rods into weapons-grade plutonium. Analysts believe the rogue state
could end up with enough plutonium to make eight to nine bombs. The rogue state also claimed to have a uranium-enrichment
programme, the first time it has admitted to one. The claim is alarming, said Professor Yang Moo-Jin, of Seoul's University of North Korean Studies. "The North
has abundant natural uranium of good quality, which, if combined with technology and facilities, would result in a great
nuclear arsenal," he said.
Brink
Tensions are at their worst since the Korean war
ABC Online 9/22 (9/22/10, " Russia warns of conflict between North, South Korea ",
http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2010/09/23/3019418.htm?section=justin)
Russia warned on Wednesday that "conflict"
could break out any day between North and South Korea, saying tension between
the two countries was at its worst in a decade. The unusually stark words by Russian deputy foreign minister Alexei Borodavkin come two
months after the North said it would wage a "sacred war" against the United States and its ally, South Korea. Washington
replied that it would not enter a "war of words" with the North. "The political tension on the Korean Peninsula has reached an
extreme level, after which there can be only conflict," the state-run ITAR-TASS news agency quoted Mr Borodavkin as saying.
Not all securitization should be rejected—evaluate issue-specific securitization first
Floyd in 07
(Rita Floyd, University of Warwick, Review of International Studies, Vol 33 p 327-250)
Towards a consequentialist evaluation of security Considering the two brief overviews of the different schools
provided in the first section, it could be argued that Wæver has an overly negative conception of security,
whereas Booth and Wyn Jones have an overly positive conception of security. This article will aim to show that
what form security takes is entirely issue-dependent, leaving both camps having something important and valid
to contribute to the study of security as both camps can potentially be right. Issue-dependent hereby does not
mean that, for example, all securitisations in one particular sector are always positive (negative) – indeed this
article will show how differently securitisations in the environmental sector can turn out – it rather means that
every incidence of securitisation is unique. Since this is the case, however, security in general is neither as good
nor as bad as the two camps argue, but rather it is a mixed bag. In the approach proposed here, principles that
determine whether a securitisation is positive or negative can only be derived by considering what would have
been the alternative solution. Given that for the Copenhagen School, securitisation is nothing but ‘an extreme
version of politicisation’,45 the question to consider in evaluating the nature of securitisation must be: did the
securitisation in question achieve more, and/or better results than a mere politicisation of the issue would have
done? It is important to note here, that ‘more and better’, is not equivalent to the success of the speech act
(successful securitisation can still be negative), but rather it refers to whether the consequences of, and the
gains from, the securitisation are preferable relative to the consequences and gains from a politicisation. The
idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of a securitisation depends on its consequences corresponds to what
in moral philosophy is known as a consequentialist ethics. Consequentialism46 referring to a set of moral
philosophies, which hold ‘that the rightness of an action is to be judged solely by consequences, states of affairs
brought about by the action’.47 Or, put slightly differently ‘a consequentialist theory [. . .] is an account of what
justifies an option over alternatives – the fact that it promotes values.’48 These premises capture well what is
meant by positive and negative securitisation in this article, for the adjectives positive and negative do not refer
to the relative success of the speech act that is securitisation, but rather to how well any given security policy
addresses the insecurity in question. The approach introduced in this article will henceforth be referred to as a
consequentialist evaluation of security. In moral philosophy the idea that the moral rightness (or wrongness) of
an action is attributable to its consequences alone is of course contentious (see also fn. 46). The question that
arises is thus, why, in the evaluation of security/ securitisation, focus on consequences as opposed to, for
example, rights as deontologists would have it, or indeed virtues, as virtue theorists suggest? Much of the
answer to this question already lies in the argument of this article. Thus it is not only this author’s opinion that
the key to security evaluation lies with its consequences, rather scholars from both the schools discussed above,
with their respective positive and negative views of security, themselves already focus on what they take to be
the consequences of security. That is to say these scholars themselves are consequentialists. However, and as
this article aims to show, the consequentialism proposed by them is neither very balanced nor, in the long run,
particularly helpful, as in both cases, consequentialism is constricted by the nature of their respective theoretical
frameworks. Frameworks, whereby one promotes security as emancipation, therefore generating a necessarily
positive view of security, whilst the other school’s framework for analysis is void of emancipation altogether,
therefore partial to a negative view of security. That security is neither always positive nor negative but rather
issue dependent is the key hypothesis of this article. If this hypothesis holds true we are – as a discipline – much
in need of a more balanced and indeed critical evaluation of security than proposed by either school, a provision
of which is the purpose of this article. Given what has been said so far it should have become clear that the
herewith proposed consequentialist evaluation of security is also the key to rendering the above-mentioned
‘normative dilemma of speaking and writing security’ less important, as it enables the analyst to critically
evaluate his/her speaking and writing security, rather than his/her simply speaking and writing security. This
approach thus enables the previously solely analytical securitisation analyst to step into the security equation
and on behalf of the actors encourage some securitisations and renounce others, depending on the moral
rightness of the respective securitisation’s consequences. It is precisely at this point where the emancipatory
nature of the Welsh School’s security studies becomes crucially relevant for a consequentialist evaluation of
security, for – under this approach – it is the task of the analyst to fight ignorance (or, put differently, false
consciousness) on the part of existing and/or potential securitising actors and inform (or better enlighten) them
of the best possible actions. But how does the analyst know what the best possible actions are? Or, put
differently, with what standards in mind are the consequences to be evaluated? Is it enough to problematise
securitisation by elites for elites, and make majority consensus the measuring unit behind the principles for
positive/negative securitisation? One should think not. Although it is useful to assume, that the narrower the
interest group behind the securitisation, the more likely it is to be negative, this cannot be ascertained as the
only general principle. After all, majority consensus does not prevent the effective securitisation of something
that is morally/ethically wrong. But how to determine what is morally/ethically right? In security studies, one
way of doing so, is by entering the evaluation of positive/negative through the discourses of security prevalent
in the different sectors of security. Here, by working out the specific security relations in the competing
discourses that make up the individual sector – who or what is the referent object of security, who is the
securitising actor and what is the nature of the threat – it should be possible to determine the most and the least
advantageous strategies in addressing insecurity; thereby determining which approach to security (in the
individual sector) is the best (most positive) all-round – morally, ethically, effective – strategy. A
consequentialist evaluation of security thus postulates the maximisation of genuine security as its overarching
value. The invocation of values itself is perfectly legitimate, particularly considering that ‘every moral theory
invokes values such that it can make sense to recommend in consequentialist fashion that they be promoted or
in non-consequentialist fashion that they be honoured,
War creates the need to dehumanize enemies thorough racism.
Marable, 02. (Manning Marable, October 11, 2002, Professor of History and Political Science at Colombia University, “Global
Apartheid in the Twenty-first Century”, Peacework, http://www.peaceworkmagazine.org//DanLi)
The links between racism and war: The militarism and political intolerance displayed in the Bush
administration's response to the September 11 attacks created a natural breeding ground for bigotry and racial
harassment. For the Reverend Jerry Falwell, the September 11 tragedy was God's condemnation of a secularist, atheistic
America. Falwell attributed the attacks to "the pagans and the abortionists and the feminists and the lesbians and of
course the ACLU." After a firestorm of criticism, Reverend Falwell was forced to apologize. Less well-publicized were the hatefilled commentaries of journalist Anne Coulter, who declared after September 11 that "we should invade their countries, kill their
leaders and convert them all to Christianity." Similar voices of intolerance were also being heard in Europe. For example, Italian
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi stated that Western civilization was clearly "superior to Islamic culture ." He
praised imperialism, predicting that "the West will continue to conquer peoples, just as it conquered communism."
Falwell, Berlusconi, and others illustrate the direct linkage between racism and war, between imperialism and
militarism. The relationship is symbiotic. In a racialized social hierarchy, you cannot pursue a policy of mass coercion, the use
of the prisons as a means of warehousing the unemployed and the poor and the working poor in the United States, without
constructing an ideology that justifies your actions. The same thing is true in a global context. If you have a global world order of
apartheid, globalized apartheid, the haves and the have-nots, as Malcolm X put it at the end of his life, the fundamental division on the
global scale, when you pursue war in the interest of maintaining that division--you must utilize the demonization; you must denigrate
the cultures of the others. The globalized other, therefore, is demonized . Consequently, we cannot talk about the war against
terrorism and the construction of the globalized other unless we also look at its origins in terms of racism.