PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC
Modern symbolic logic has thrown light on a great many philosophical problems, but
gives rise to deep and challenging questions of its own. We say an argument is ‘logically
valid’ if it is necessary that its conclusion is true if its premises are: but what exactly is
‘necessity’, and what is ‘truth’? How do we know that the ‘rules of inference’ used by
modern logic give rise to all and only valid arguments? This module provides an
introduction to questions like these, which are central to contemporary philosophical
reflection about the way thought and language connect with the world.
Preliminary and Background Reading:
 Mark Sainsbury: Philosophical Logic, in Grayling (ed.): Philosophy. A Guide
through the Subject (Oxford 1995)
 Susan Haack: Philosophy of Logics (Cambridge 1978)
Lectures: The lectures for this module will be held in **, on Fridays from 2-3pm in the
Autumn Term. The lecturer is Dr. Nils Kürbis (n.kurbis@bbk.ac.uk).
Seminars: The seminars for this module will be held in **, on Fridays from 3-4pm in the
Autumn Term. They will be led by the lecturer and by **.
Readings: Every week there is one key reading that is the focus of the seminar
discussion. One of the purposes of the seminar is to help you to understand the reading,
so do not worry if you have not fully understood the reading in advance. Nevertheless, it
is essential that you attempt the seminar reading each week if you are to follow the
lecture and to participate in the seminar discussion. In addition, there is ‘additional
reading’ listed that will deepen your understanding and help you to get the most out of
the module. You are especially advised to cover the additional reading for those topics
on which you are planning to write.
Essays (BA): This module is assessed by two essays of a combined maximum length of
3,500 words. They must be written in response to the set questions listed below, except
with permission from the module convenor. For details concerning submission of the
essay, including deadlines, see the BA Handbook.
Prior to the assessed essays, you may also write up to two essays during the course, taken
from the titles below, and receive feedback on them from your seminar leader. These can
be useful practice for your eventual assessed essay. You should submit the first such
essay by the first seminar after reading week, and the second by one week after the last
seminar of term. [Notes: 1) You are always welcome to submit an essay earlier than
these dates; 2) the seminar leader should not be expected to comment on the same essay
more than once.]
Essay (MA): This module is assessed by two essays of a combined maximum length of
3,500 words. It must be written in response to the set questions listed below, except with
permission from the module convenor. For details concerning submission of the essay,
including deadlines, see the MA Handbook.
Moodle: Electronic copies of course materials are available through Moodle, at
http://moodle.bbk.ac.uk. You will need your ITS login name and password to enter.
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Week 1: Revision of First-Order Logic
Seminar Reading:
 Tomassi: Logic (London and New York 1999), pp.122-132, 268-310
Week 2: Identity, Philosophy and Proof-Theory
Seminar Reading:
 Black: The Identity of Indiscernibles, Mind (1952) 61: 153-64
 Hacking: The Identity of Indiscernibles, Journal of Philosophy (1975) 72: 249-256
Additional Reading
 Tomassi: Logic (London and New York 1999), pp.310-314
Week 3: Sense and Reference
Seminar Reading:
 Frege: On Sense and Reference, in Black & Geach (eds.): Translations from the
writings of Gottlob Frege,
 JS Mill: System of Logic, Book 1, Chapter 3, Sections 1 & 2
(http://www.laits.utexas.edu/poltheory/mill/sol/)
Additional Reading for weeks 3 to 5:
 Dummett: Frege. Philosophy of Language (London 1981), Chs 1, 4-6
Week 4: Names and Descriptions I, Formal Syntax
Seminar Reading:
 Russell: On Denoting, Mind 14 (1905): 479-493
 Donnellan: Reference and Definite Descriptions, Philosophical Review 75 (1966):
281-304
Week 5: Names and Descriptions II, Philosophical Issues
Seminar Reading:
 Kripke: Naming and Necessity, Lecture I
 Evans: The Causal Theory of Names, Aristotelean Society Supplementary Volume 47
(1973): 187-208
READING WEEK
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Week 6: Necessity and Possibility, Philosophy and Proof-Theory
Seminar Reading:
 Sainsbury: Logical Forms, chapter 5
Additional Reading:
 Edgington: Two Kinds of Possibility, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.
Supplementary Volumes, 78 (2004), 1-22
Week 7: Possible Worlds
Seminar Reading:
 Lewis: Possible Worlds, Counterfactuals pp.84-91, also in Loux (ed.): The Actual
and the Possible
 Stalnaker: Possible Worlds, Nous, 10 (1976), 65-75, also in Loux (ed.): The Actual
and the Possible
Additional Reading:
 Mondadori & Morton: Modal Realism: The Poisoned Pawn, Philosophical Review
85 (1976), 3-20, also in Loux (ed.): The Actual and the Possible
 Lycan: The Trouble with Possible Worlds, in Loux (ed.): The Actual and the
Possible
Week 8: Identity and Necessity
Seminar Reading:
 Kripke: Identity and Necessity, in Honderich and Burnyeat (eds.): Philosophy as it is,
 Gibbard: Contingent Identity, Journal of Philosophical Logic 4 (1975): 187-221
Additional Reading:
 Thomson (1983). Parthood and Identity Across Time, Journal of Philosophy: 80
(1983), 201-220
Week 9: Identity across Possible Worlds
Seminar Reading:
 Chisholm: Identity across Possible Worlds: Some Questions, Nous 1 (1967), 1-8, also
in Loux (ed.): The Actual and the Possible
 Plantinga: Transworld Identity or Wordbound Individuals?, in Munitz (ed.): Logic
and Ontologiy, also in Loux (ed.): The Actual and the Possible
Additional Reading:
 Lewis: Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic, Journal of Philosophy 65
(1968), 113-126, also in Loux (ed.): The Actual and the Possible
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Week 10: tba
Essay Questions
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‘Leibniz’ Law is a law of logic. So it’s necessarily true and can’t possibly be false.’
Discuss.
Are all identity statements necessary?
Does Frege’s Puzzle show that we need a notion of sense to account for the meaning
of expressions?
Is Russell’s theory of names at all defensible?
Is Kripke’s causal theory of names the best one available?
Is modal realism defensible?
How can we truth-fully assert that something may have been otherwise?
Is identity across possible worlds possible?
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