Perspective Taking, Religious Symbols and Jury Biases|1
Running Head: PERSPECTIVE TAKING, RELIGIOUS SYMBOLS, AND JURY
BIASES
Balancing Judgment:
The Role of Perspective Taking in Reducing Juror Biases and the Effects of Religious
Symbols
Eve F. E. Turow
Submitted to the Department of Psychology of Amherst College in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Bachelor of the Arts with honors.
Friday, April 24, 2009.
Faculty Advisor: Allen J. Hart
Perspective Taking, Religious Symbols and Jury Biases|2
Thank you to my friends and family who supported me throughout this process. Thank
you for keeping me sane, entertaining me and motivating me. Thank you to Professors
Foels and Schulkind for your statistical help and to the rest of the psychology professors I
had here at Amherst. Thank you to Dean Hart for your constant encouragement and
guidance. I had a great time completing this project with you and learned a great deal
throughout.
Perspective Taking, Religious Symbols and Jury Biases|3
Table of Contents
Abstract……………………………………………………………………………………6
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………..7
Religion in the United States……………………………………………………...8
The History of Religion in the United States..………………………….....9
Religion and Adjudication……………………………………………………….11
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….13
Chapter One: The Psychological Effects of Religion on Decision-Making……………..15
The Complexities of Religion.…………………………………………………...15
Morality………………………………………………………………….16
Prejudice…………………………………………………………………18
Effects of Religion on Rational and Experiential Thinking……………………...21
Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST)………….…………………22
Heuristic System Model (HSM)…………………………...…………….23
Schemas in Social Perception: Ingroup/Outgroup Attitudes…………………….28
Outgroup Punitiveness…………………………………………………...29
Similarity-Leniency Hypothesis…………………………………………32
Black Sheep Effect……………………………………………………….35
The Intricacies of Religious Groups………….……………………………….....39
Measuring Religious Prejudice…………………………….…………………….42
Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Orientation……………………………………43
Quest (Q) scale…………………………………………………………...45
Fundamentalism………………………………………………………….46
Chapter Summary………………………………………………………………..51
Chapter Two: The Role of Perspective Taking in Reducing Juror Biases and the Effects
of Religious Symbols…………………………………………………………………….53
Methods…...……………………………………………………………………...54
Participants………………………………………………………………54
Materials…………………………………………………………………54
Procedure………………………………………………………………...60
Hypotheses……………………………………………………………………….60
Perspective Taking……………………………………………………….60
Religious Conditions…………………………………………………......61
Results……………………………………………………………………………62
General…………………………………………………………………...62
Comprehension Check…………………………………………………...63
Effects of Perspective Taking……………………………………………64
Effects of Religious Conditions………………………………………….74
Gender……………………………………………………………………81
Discussion………………………………………………………………………..82
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Perspective Taking: Conclusions………………………………………...84
Religious Conditions: Conclusions………………………………………86
Limitations……………………………………………………………………….89
Suggestions for Future Research………………………………………………...91
Implications for the Future…………………………………………………….....91
Chapter Three: Regulating Religion & Implications…………………………………….94
Durkheim: Emphasizing Citizenship…………………………………………….96
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………...100
Further Conclusions…………………………………………………….103
Appendices
Appendix A: Trial Summary…………………………………………………………...105
Appendix B: Dependant Measures Survey……………………………………………..107
Appendix C: Vignettes………………………………………………………………….109
Appendix D: Correlations Chart………………………………………………………..110
Appendix E: Correlations without Atheist Participants………………………………...111
Appendix F: Regulating Religion……………………………………………………....112
Religion Clauses………………………………………………………………..112
Faith-Based Rehabilitation……………………………………………………..118
Innate Ties between Religion and Law………………………………….……...121
References………………………………………………………………………………126
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List of Illustrations
Figures
Figure 1: Recommended Sentences with & without Perspective Taking instructions
for all participants.…………………………………………………………….………..66
Figure 2: Recommended Sentences from Christian participants with & without
Perspective Taking instructions………………………………………………………..68
Figure 3: Religious Identification of all participants with & without Perspective
Taking instructions……………………………………………………………………..73
Figure 4: Devotionalism of all participants with & without Perspective Taking
instructions……………………………………………………………………………...73
Figure 5a. Reported Religious Identification of all participants…..………………...77
Figure 5b. Reported Religious Identification of Christian participants...……….….78
Figure 6a. Reported Devotionalism of all participants……………..………………...80
Figure 6b. Reported Devotionalism of Christian participants…………….………...80
Tables
Table 1. Sum of Perspective Taking with & without Perspective Taking
instructions……………………………………………………………………………...64
Table 2. Sum of Perspective Taking with & without Perspective Taking instructions
for all Christian participants…………...……………………….……………………..64
Table 3: Percent of guilty verdicts for aggravated sexual abuse in conditions with &
without Perspective Taking…………………………………………………………….66
Table 4: Percent of guilty verdicts for aggravated sexual abuse in conditions with &
without Perspective Taking; Only Christian participants…………………...............67
Table 5a: CEST Vignettes, Heuristic Means data of only Christian participants….70
Table 5b. CEST Vignettes, Logical Means data of only Christian participants……70
Table 6: Gender Data…………………………………………………………………..82
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Abstract
Through a review of literature relevant to the issues of perspective taking,
religion, and jury biases, we provide an overview of decision-making processes, ingroup
and outgroup biases as well as religious biases and their role in courtrooms today. A
study investigated the role of perspective taking and religious symbols on jury biases and
decision-making by manipulating perspective taking instructions and religious content in
a 3x2 factorial design. By including or excluding perspective taking instructions as well
as changing the religion of a defendant within a case summary (control, Christian or
Sikh), we were able to observe changes in participants’ judgments and thought processes.
Measures of perspective taking as well as experiential and rational thinking were
administered, utilizing Davis’ (1980/1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index along with
Epstein’s (1996) Rational-Experiential Inventory and Cognitive-Experiential Self Theory
vignettes, originally theorized by Cacioppo and Petty (1982). It was hypothesized that
perspective taking instructions would reduce the expression of juror biases and increase
rational thinking while the presence of religious symbols was expected to increase levels
of juror bias and experiential thinking. Evidence supported the first of these hypotheses,
with lowered sentences and higher rationality reported with perspective taking
instructions, while mixed results were collected regarding the effect of religious symbols.
Correlations between religious symbols, experiential thinking, Devotionalism, as well as
Religious Identification shifted between the Christian and Sikh conditions. Findings led
to the conclusion that perspective taking acts to inhibit the expression of juror biases and
increase rationality while the inclusion of religious symbols dulls the effect of perspective
taking by altering the ways in which participants view themselves as well as the
defendant. In the end, it is concluded that perspective taking instructions be added to
Judge’s instructions and that religious symbols be expelled from the courts.
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Introduction
The arenas of law and religion are often mixed in American culture. With the
country’s underpinnings set in Judeo-Christian thought, many see it as inevitable for
religion to work into the seams of United States policy and traditions. From the use of a
holy book for swearing in witnesses, to the formidable placement of the Judge upon the
pulpit, and jurors referring to the Bible to help reach their verdicts,1 religious
undercurrents are felt in courtrooms throughout the country. And while many accept
these undercurrents as inescapable and often an assumed part of the legal realm, several
studies have begun to show the biasing effects of religious salience within the courts (e.g.,
Howard & Redfering, 1983; Egland, 2004; Herek, 1987; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999;
Kerr et al., 1995; Miller, 2008).
These studies beg one to question the biases present within jurors around the
country and the role of religious content in further instigating the expression of religious
biases. Further, one must question how religious references affect a juror’s decisionmaking processes and adjudication. By investigating the influence of perspective taking
on juror biases and the effects of religion on rational and experiential thinking, I aim to
show that: 1) jurors hold inherent biases 2) the use of perspective taking (asking one to
take the perspective of another) can reduce expression of inherent biases 3) the presence
of religious symbols creates religious salience and instigates the expression of
ingroup/outgroup biases, effecting the ways in which we view ourselves and others, 4)
that the salience of religion also hinders one’s ability to think rationally, causing one to
rely on personal feelings over judge’s instructions and evidence provided within the case,
1
See, e.g., People v. Harlan (2003).
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and finally 5) perspective taking reduces these tendencies. Through this investigation, I
hope to demonstrate the significant biases present within jurors and the effects of religion
in the United States court system, and furthermore the importance of perspective taking
instructions in reducing juror biases and the need to extract any and all religious
references from the courtroom environment.
Religion in the United States
For many U.S. citizens, religion acts as an additional set of laws, instructing
believers in ethics and supplying a moral code for framing their lives. “All men desire to
know,” wrote Aristotle, 2 and religion lets us do just that; it opens the door to the intrigues
of life and death, the meaning of life,3 and the rules to follow for everyday laments. 4
Furthermore, religion plays an integral part in self-definition and positive self-evaluations,
often depicting one’s upbringing and daily actions (Kentworthy, 2003). 5 People say that
today, few topics are taken more seriously than religion (Spilka et al., 2003). We have
created a society in which religion is constantly invoked, whether through celebrations of
marriage or birth or for ceremonies for those we have lost. Particularly in the United
States, religion is omnipresent, and consistently influences our political system, laws, and
education.6
As cited in McKeon, 1941, p. 689.
Clark (1958) claims that “religion more than any other human function satisfies the need for meaning in life.”
4 Argyle (1959) claims that “a major mechanism behind religious beliefs is purely cognitive desire to
understand.”
5 E.g., Blaine & Crocker (1995).
6 In the 2008 Primary Presidential debates, held in New Hampshire on September 26, all Democratic nominees
were asked “What is your favorite Bible verse?”; Fallows, J (2008, 11). Rhetorical questions. Atlantic, 34-52;
Further discussion of religion’s role in U.S. politics and law can be found in Appendix F.
2
3
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Many fail to recognize the overwhelming number of religious Americans. A
2007 Gallup Poll found that 56 percent of Americans say religion is “very important” in
their own lives and 61 percent of Americans are members of a church or synagogue.7 For
the past 60 years, the percentage of individuals reporting that they believe in God has
exceeded 90 percent (Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Kentworthy, 2003); according to the
2001 Census, 79.8% of Americans label themselves Christians, 1.4% Jewish, and 0.6%
Muslim. These statistics explain why Judeo-Christian traditions are an integral part of
our society, indicating that most Americans believe in the Old Testament as well as the
concept of one God, and nearly 80% believe in the teachings of the New Testament.
The history of religion in the United States. It is essential to understand the
difficulty in addressing religion and the long-lasting role religion has played in the
formation of the United States. Thomas Jefferson stated that the First Amendment
clearly indicates a separation of church and state.8 Even so, the lines between the two
continue to be blurred. Whereas several laws have been put into place to limit the
government’s role in religious matters, splitting these two issues has proven to be nearly
impossible. From confusion regarding the Religion Clauses, to the blatant presence of
religion within American culture, religion has maneuvered its way into our courtrooms.9
Furthermore, Judeo-Christian beliefs influenced the founding of the United States, and
thus played an inevitable role in the creation of our laws as well as traditions.
Gallup Poll, Religion, 2007.
In a 1802 letter he wrote, “Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely between Man & his
God, that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship, that the legitimate powers of government
reach actions only, & not opinions, I contemplate with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American
people which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between Church & State.”; Jefferson, T.
(1802). Jefferson's Letter to the Danbury Baptists. U.S. Library of Congress, from
http://www.loc.gov/loc/lcib/9806/danpre.html. Retrieved 2/11/09.
9 More information on this topic can be found in Appendix F.
7
8
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Examples of Christian roots are present in several common-place American
traditions. 10 In fact, the precursors to the current Maryland Sunday closing laws are
undeniably religious. The first Maryland statute regarding Sunday activities, enacted in
1649, was titled “An Act concerning Religion.” It made it illegal to “profane the Sabbath
or Lords day called Sunday by frequent swearing, drunkenness or by any uncivil or
disorderly recreation, or by working on that day.”11 A later statute in 1962, entitled “An
Act for the Service of Almighty God and the Establishment of the Protestant Religion
within this province,” emphasized the importance of keeping the Sabbath and later called
for a Sunday labor prohibition. By 1973, the Sabbath-breaking section of the Maryland
statutes assumed its present form by omitting the specific prohibition against swearing
and the religiously significant title. 12 In recent years the religious motivations of Sunday
closings have been de-emphasized, with the focus shifted to a common wellbeing rather
than religious expectations, but Sunday closings remain today nonetheless. This is just
one example of Christian-based laws, plentiful in the legal history of the United States,
acting as the founding for laws in place today.
While religion acts as an assumed and natural part of American society, few
recognize its warping effects on one’s rationality, making the issue of religion’s role in
the legal world necessary to address. Because of the moral and emotional significance of
religion, its presence acts to inhibit the proper functioning of our judicial system.
Religion initiates experiential thinking, biases, and often reliance on one’s religious
Laws regarding religion date back to 1448 when Henry VI banned the selling of goods on Sundays in
England, which continued to be enforced through statutes such as, “Sabbath Breaking” and “Lord’s Day” in
Maryland and the “Bill for Punishing…Sabbath Breakers” in Virginia; McGowan v. Maryland (1961, p. 438 &
445).
11 Art. 27, §§ 492-534C; 1 Archives of Maryland 244-247.
12 McGowan v. Maryland (1961, p. 446).
10
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morals above the law, and in this manner prejudices juries and judges alike (Miller &
Bornstein, 2006; Miller & Bornstein, 2005). Whereas the ties between religion and the
law are difficult to address, the effects of religious beliefs on one’s psychological state
are enormous and therefore must be further researched.
Religion and Adjudication
It is unmistakable that jurors of all faiths feel pressure to adhere to their beliefs
while in court, depending upon religious teachings to guide them in adjudications. In the
past, jurors have met to “pray for divine assistance” during deliberations and have openly
admitted to researching Biblical passages in search of guidance (Howard & Redfering,
1983; Egland, 2004).13 Even political figures such as George W. Bush have openly relied
on religious morals when making legal judgments. While considering the death penalty
case against Karla Faye Tucker, then Governor Bush admitted that he had “sought
guidance through prayer” and decided to place the responsibility of judging another on a
“higher authority” instead of himself (Egland, 2004). Situations such as this highlight the
importance of religion to many jurors throughout the U.S. And not only does religion
provide an alternative book of guidance, but it influences the decision-making process.
Religious salience can affect the decision-making process in several ways, one of
which is eliciting experiential thinking. The topic of religion often evokes juror’s
emotions, instigating a purely experiential decision rather than a rational one, following
the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST). During experiential processing, jurors
are more likely to rely on religious teachings and biases to help them reach a verdict.
13
See, e.g., People v. Harlan (2003).
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Experiential processing is oriented around feelings of pleasure and pain and encourages
people to make decisions based on what feels best to them at the given moment, in a very
immediate manner.
Therefore, many prosecutors and attorneys exploit the religious
beliefs of citizens by incorporating Biblical statements into their arguments, attempting to
sway the jury for or against a defendant.14 By doing so, they encourage jurors to make
emotional evaluations. As such, the topic of religion greatly jeopardizes one’s ability to
think rationally about a case before them.
Additionally, as was the case with former President Bush, religious beliefs often
act as mental shortcuts that relieve the evaluator of responsibility in accordance with the
Heuristic Systems Model (HSM). Heuristics allow an individual to process information
in a cursory manner, often resulting in experiential decisions, reflecting any prejudice or
biases a person may hold. Additionally, by attributing one’s decision to his/her religious
teachings, he/she defers the responsibility of the decision from himself/herself to a higher
authority. As shown in several studies (e.g., Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Miller &
Bornstein, 2006; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 1992), the topic of religion
often elicits heuristic thinking due to its emotional and personal relevance. Heuristic
thinking greatly hinders one’s ability to make a rational and effortful decision,
compromising the validity and honesty of a potential juror.
Furthermore, beyond the mental processes involved in decision-making,
ingroup/outgroup biases are also a factor when it comes judging others, especially when
the religion of the defendant is known. Religion connects people; it socializes behavior
See e.g., Sandoval v. Calderon (2000); Andrea Yates’s prosecutor told the jury, “[it] was wrong in the eyes of God
and it was wrong in the eyes of the law” (Yates Found Guilty of Murdering Her Children, CNN.com, (March 13,
2002), at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/LAW/03/13/yates.trial/index.html.)
14
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and creates a common community. As stated by Lumsden and Wilson (1983), religion is
a “powerful device by which people are absorbed into a tribe and psychically
strengthened.”15 Emile Durkheim considers religion to be a collective action that
engages and fuses people together, legitimizing and reinforcing society’s values and
creating groups with common goals and idealization. According to Durkheim, one finds
collective effervescence within religious groups, unifying communities around a common
belief. 16 Due to the strong bonds between those of a similar religious group, ingroup and
outgroup biases are often triggered when the religious affiliation of the defendant is
known. Such biases manipulate thought processes through the similarity-leniency
hypothesis as well as the black sheep effect, both of which will be discussed in further
detail in the following chapter.
Conclusion
Some topics of discussion within this piece will include morality and prejudice,
inherent juror biases and the role of perspective taking in controlling for these biases, the
various psychological effects of religious material on decision-making and the difficulty
of addressing religious beliefs. Additionally, current research and the implications of
such research will be discussed. While studies have been conducted to address outgroup
religious biases (e.g., Van Pooigen & Lam, 2007; Kerr et al., 1995; Tajfel & Turner, 1986;
Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Daudistel et al., 1999) and the effects of religious defense
and prosecutorial arguments in courts (e.g., Miller & Bornstein 2005; Miller & Bornstein,
As cited in Spilka et al. (2003).
Collective effervescence is the electrical charge that takes place when people come together and do
something in common. It produces community and productivity; Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms of the
Religious Life, 1961, Collier Books. Discussion of this theory will continue in Chapter 3.
15
16
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2006), no study has looked into the possibility of an innate presence of religion in
courtrooms, triggered by the use of a holy book for swearing in and possible religious
symbols present on the defendant (such as a necklace or tattoo), and the effects of such
religious presence on juror decision-making. Therefore, in an effort to better understand
the role of religion in courts today, this study examines the role of perspective taking in
reducing levels of bias and altering court verdicts as well as assesses the impact of
religious symbols on a juror’s ability to think rationally and the effect it may have upon
sentencing decisions. Furthermore, it examines the effects of perspective taking
instructions and religious material on evaluations of the self and others. Upon
completion of the study, evidence was found to indicate that instructions of perspective
taking resulted in higher levels of rational thinking and decreased reliance on religious
convictions. Additionally, there was significant evidence that the presence of a religious
book and religious symbol within the courtroom effected jurors’ sentencing decisions,
reliance on experiential thinking, as well as how jurors viewed themselves. A complete
review of the findings will follow in Chapter Two.
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Chapter One:
The Psychological Effects of Religion on Decision-Making.
“The role of religion is paradoxical. It makes prejudice and it unmakes prejudice…Some people say the
only cure for prejudice is more religion, some say the only cure is to abolish religion.” –Allport (1954)
“The nature of the man himself is the element that determines the juror’s bias for or against his fellowman.
Assuming that a juror is not a half-wit, his intellect can always furnish fairly good reasons for following his
instincts and emotions. Many irrelevant issues in choosing jurors are not so silly as they seem. Matters
that apparently have nothing to do with the discussion of a case often are of the greatest significance.”
-Darrow (1940, p.488)
The Complexities of Religion
Evidence has shown that religion both exacerbates and reduces levels of prejudice
(e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Herek; 1987; Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988;
Perrin, 2000). For some, religion encourages kind behavior and acceptance. For others,
religion excuses destructive and discriminatory acts and provides a means by which they
develop feelings of supremacy. Religion is tightly bound to both morality and prejudice,
feeding both fires with its rhetoric and group cohesion. For this reason, the impact of
religious beliefs on one’s behavior is complex and not well understood. Yet, many
continue to judge others based on religious affiliation and devotion, often associating
one’s level of religiosity with kindness and honesty (e.g., Perrin, 2000; Krause &
Ingersoll-Dayton, 2001; Commonwealth v. Daniels, 1994). This, one may argue, is an
improper way to judge one’s morality because religious devotion may be an indicator of
several contradictory characteristics (e.g., acceptance vs. discrimination). Religion has
served as a means to heal as well as destruct, but how and why one uses religion for one
purpose or the other is still unclear.
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Morality. Many consider religion and morality to be inseparable concepts. Some
of the most public leaders and beneficiaries have had strongly religious backgrounds,
such as Mother Teresa and Martin Luther King Jr. Churches, synagogues and mosques
around the world support social services and recreational activities, expressing the need
for acceptance and equality, and as such, many deem religion and morality to be one and
the same. As taught in Buddhism, Christianity, Judaism, and many other faiths, religion
provides an ethical system that, if applied, could benefit us all. In fact, many religious
groups wish to legislate morality, making it a concrete structure in America’s political
system.17 Evidently, many believe that integrating religious morality would benefit our
government and society today, providing a stronger moral backbone for the nation.
Because of the connections between morality and religion, religiousness is often
associated with being a good person, with increased levels of honesty, trust and
forgiveness. In an effort to legitimize the claim that religion correlates with increased
levels of honesty, Perrin (2000) fashioned a study to evaluate honesty and religious
values of Christian students at a United States college. The study began with Christian
students completing a survey on religiosity, answering questions regarding their
frequency of church attendance, belief in the afterlife, and several other similar topics.
Afterwards, there was a simple test of honesty: after a weekly quiz, the student
participants’ teacher intentionally graded the exams incorrectly, giving each student an
additional point. Students were then told that there may have been a grading error and
were asked to re-grade their own quizzes. Afterwards, the students were instructed to
One such example is the Christian Coalition who desired to impose a Bible-based morality in the U.S.
(Birnbaum, 1992).
17
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write either, “I owe you a point,” “Quiz graded correctly,” or “You owe me a point,” at
the top of the page. Of the 130 students who participated in the experiment, only 32%
honestly admitted to receiving an extra point on the quiz, while 52% claimed the quiz
was graded correctly and 16% actually tried to get an extra point in addition to the one
incorrectly received in the beginning. But, when crossing the religion score with the
level of honesty, it was found that 45% of those who reported weekly church attendance
honestly reported the 1-point error, while only 13% of those who attended church once a
year honestly reported the error. Perrin took these results to indicate higher levels of
honesty in those who attend church more frequently, supporting the claim that morality
and religion are correlated. In fact, several other studies have mirrored her claim,
correlating religion with lower levels of social deviance (e.g., Tittle & Welch 1983;
Welch et al., 1991).
In contrast, many argue that religion is not an indicator of one’s morality, and that
the two concepts are wholly independent. In fact, Kohlberg argued that religion does not
directly contribute to one’s morality in any way.18 Supporting Kohlberg, conflicting
evidence has been found regarding the relationship between trust and forgiveness with
religiosity. Gorsuch and Hao (1993) demonstrated a positive correlation between
religious devotion and the desire to forgive, while McCullough and Worthington (1999)
observed weak ties between religion and forgiveness. Schoenfeld (1978) related church
attendance to increased trust in people (citing the effect of people’s extended trust in
God), but this correlation was not found by Ostow (1990) when looking at fundamentalist,
extremely conservative, and Pentecostal groups. Spilka et al. (2003) write that this
18
As cited in Spilka et al. (2003).
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finding is due to these groups’ general belief that people are primarily sinners, hindering
their ability to trust. Even so, it directly challenges the assumption that morality is
innately tied to religious convictions. By finding evidence to support both sides of the
argument, endorsement of religion’s correspondence to morality is nullified. This
contradictory evidence makes the link between morality and religion debatable. And
because of the confusion surrounding religion and morality, one cannot assume that
because one is religious he/she has high morals.19
Prejudice. Adding to the complex connections between morality and religion is
the presence of prejudice, a topic in direct opposition to morality, but also often
associated with religion. Several studies have connected the strength of one’s religious
beliefs to one’s level of prejudice through measures of intrinsic and extrinsic,
fundamental, and quest beliefs (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967; Donahue, 1985; Herek, 1987;
Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988). Looking further into predicting discriminatory behavior,
McFarland (1989) developed a study to examine religious orientation and several
possible prejudices. McFarland (1989) distributed a questionnaire to several students at a
United States university, entitled “Religious and Social Attitudes,” that measured
religious orientation and attitudes towards African-Americans, women, homosexuals, and
communists. After data collection, McFarland (1989) found (in correlations between
religious orientations and the discriminatory attitude scales) that all of the orientations
tested for within the questionnaire (fundamentalism, extrinsic, intrinsic, and quest
religious orientations) indicated a “general tendency to discriminate,” with residual scales
This argument stands in the courtroom setting; just because a juror is wearing a religious symbol does not
indicate higher morality or innocence. Similarly, lawyers arguing that their defendant is religious should not
sway a jury towards their innocence, as religious convictions alone do not reveal a concrete characteristic of an
individual.
19
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revealing differing discriminatory attitudes for each group (p.1). This indicates that while
these varying religious orientations held differing levels of prejudice affiliated with each
racial/gender/political group, all reported significant levels of discrimination. This is just
one of many studies that points to a connection between religion and discriminatory
beliefs, supporting the conjecture that religion has natural ties to prejudicial viewpoints.
While often a predictor for discriminatory attitudes, religion is frequently deemed
a catalyst for discrimination. These claims are made with the assumption that religion
can provide justification for many prejudicial beliefs (e.g., Whitehead, 1962;
Juergensmeyer, 2000). 20 Religious prejudice is apparent around the world, whether it is
in the ongoing battle between Jews and Muslims in the Middle East, violence against
Christians in Iraq,21 Catholics battling Protestants in Northern Ireland, or the constant
fighting between Sikhs, Hindus, and Muslims in India. History has shown over and again
the power of religious convictions and the negative attitudes they can create and often
condone. One illustration of religious support for discriminatory attitudes can be
observed in the issue of homosexuality and the Christian church. Hunsberger et al. (2005)
discuss that many Christians point to their religiously-based moral position against
homosexuality to justify their negative feelings towards homosexuality and homosexuals,
claiming that their feelings are not prejudiced, but religious (e.g., Fulton et al., 1999).
Yet, Hunsberger et al. (2005) found that this moral position acts as a predictor of
“One might well wonder whether religion does not directly contribute to intolerance, injustice, and even
violence,” writes Spilka et al. (2003) in reaction to Jerry Falwell, a fundamentalist preacher’s remarks blaming
abortionists, feminists, gays and lesbians for the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
21 The Christian owner of a car repair shop was killed execution-style in Iraq on January 17, 2009;
(2009, 1, 18). Christian merchant killed in the north of Iraq. The Boston Globe, Retrieved 1, 22, 2009, from
http://www.boston.com/news/world/asia/articles/2009/01/18/christian_merchant_killed_in_the_north_of_
iraq/.
20
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discrimination, legitimizing a believer’s intolerant viewpoint. In this way, prejudicial
beliefs are often rationalized through ones religious teachings, reasoning that one’s
convictions are supported by the religion. Christians’ attitudes about homosexuality are
not the only example of prejudice supported by one’s religious teachings. For example, it
has been found that Christianity directly contributes to feelings of anti-Semitism (e.g.,
Glock and Stark, 1966; Eisinga, Konig, & Sheepers, 1995), 22 today members of AlQaeda’s jihad claim to be following their Muslim faith when they attack innocents in the
Middle East and abroad, and many Zionists believe that the Torah gives Jews the right to
Israel, often validating their violent treatment of Palestinians. Religious teachings and
morals are used to uphold prejudicial attitudes around the world, in several religious
groups and nations.
Prejudice is ignited in several ways, including ingroup/outgroup prejudice,
stereotypes, emotional responses, and symbolic beliefs. In fact, a review by Batson et al.
(1993) found that 37 of 47 research findings on this topic conducted between 1940 and
1990 showed a positive relationship between levels of religiousness and prejudice.
Furthermore, only two studies showed a negative relationship. Hunsberger et al. (2005)
showed that perceived religious competition can increase prejudice, along with levels of
fundamentalism and intrinsic versus extrinsic orientations, concurring with the findings
in McFarland (1989). Several studies support the assertion that fundamentalism
correlates with increased prejudice (e.g., Jackson et al., 1997; Herek, 1987; Griffen et al.,
1987; Unger, 2002; Hunsberger et al., 1999; McFarland, 1989), and many others argue
22
As cited in Spilka et al. (2003).
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that religious orientation (extrinsic vs. intrinsic) predicts prejudice. In short, the evidence
supporting religious ingroup/outgroup biases is substantial.
Religion is often seen as a reflection of one’s moral fiber. Today, testimony
regarding a defendant’s religiosity is generally accepted because it is considered evidence
of the defendant’s character (Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Miller & Hayward, 2007)23. But,
as discussed, religion can be a predictor of one’s moral code as well as one’s prejudicial
beliefs. Simply because people are religious does not mean that they are honest and
trustworthy, nor does it mean they are discriminatory or prejudiced. Religion is a
complex matter that affects individuals in profound and extraordinarily different manners.
This conundrum leaves us with several questions to be answered: What do religious
beliefs indicate? How do they affect our thinking about ourselves and others? Do most
individuals maintain religious biases? These questions will act as a guideline moving
forward, challenging the common legal assumption that one’s character can be better
understood by one’s level of religiousness and/or religious affiliation (Commonwealth v.
Daniels, 1994). 24
Effects of Religion on Rational and Experiential Thinking
It has been found that the salience of religious beliefs can lead to instinctual and
heuristic decisions (e.g., Miller, 2008; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002; Miller & Bornstein,
2006). Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory (CEST) and the Heuristic System Model
(HSM) are the two leading theories explaining the use of heuristics and experiential
There is evidence of judges having allowed “questions about affiliation (e.g., State v. Purcell 2001), service as a
missionary (State v. Fuller 2004), strength of religious beliefs (U.S. v. DeJesus 2003), and religious occupation
(Highler v. State 2006)” (Miller & Hayward, 2007, p. 8).
24 As cited in Miller & Bornstein (2006).
23
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thinking. According to these models, when emotional content is salient, individuals are
often unable to make rational decisions and instead rely on biases and mental shortcuts to
make quick, instinctual, and outcome-oriented decisions. In doing so, heuristics often
utilize thoughts that lie outside conscious awareness, such as subconscious prejudicial
believes. Many claim that the presence of religious material in court sparks such
personal biases and heuristics, interfering with rational thought processes necessary when
making critical judgments (Miller & Bornstein, 2006); emotional content can jeopardize
logical assessments by compromising one’s rationality.
Cognitive experiential self-theory (CEST). The threat to logical thinking is best
explained by Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory. CEST creates a distinction between
two modes of thinking: experiential and rational. Rational thinking is a conscious,
effortful system that functions according to a person’s established rules of logic and
evidence. While thinking rationally, one employs an analytic and detail-orientated mind
frame. Rational thinking requires significant cognitive activity and can be, at times, quite
time consuming.
Because of the cognitive capacity and time required for rational thinking,
experiential thinking provides an alternative way to quickly sift through information.
Unlike rational thinking, the experiential system is a preconscious, automatic system that
relies on emotional cues for processing information (e.g., Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992;
Miller & Bornstein, 2005). When using the experiential system, generalizations and
heuristics simplify and speed up the decision-making process. While this system of
thinking has its evolutionary benefits, experiential thinking can result in illogical and
rapid judgments, often based on one’s emotions, making it ill-suited for solving problems
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that require logical analysis (Epstein et al., 1996), highlighting the concern of jury
members employing heuristics.
As stated earlier, individuals are likely to respond experientially instead of
rationally during emotionally significant events (Miller & Bornstein, 2006). This effect
was observed in a study by Bright & Goodman-Delahunty (2006), which inspected the
effects of jarring images on jurors’ emotional states, demonstrating jurors’ reactions to
gruesome photographs. Results indicated that jurors who saw the photographs had
significantly higher mean ratings of the weight of inculpatory prosecution evidence than
those who did not view the photographs. Furthermore, results indicated that mock jurors’
anger towards the defendant was significantly higher in the condition with gruesome
photographs and enhanced the weight of inculpatory evidence. This study showed that
emotional reactions can inhibit logical and rational decision processes and impair jurors’
abilities to deliver a verdict based only on the value of evidence in a case. Instead of
looking solely at the evidence at hand, mock jurors were emotionally affected by the
photographs, developing high levels of anger towards the defendant and weighing
inculpatory evidence very strongly. Several other studies have been conducted that have
collected similar results (e.g., Oliver & Griffitt, 1976; Douglas, Lyon & Ogloff, 1997;
Bright & Goodman-Delahunty, 2004), again emphasizing the distorting effects of
emotional content on one’s judgments and thought processes.
Heuristic system model (HSM). These emotionally-driven snap judgments are a
symptom of the heuristic system. While rational thinking utilizes systematic processing,
an in-depth and analytic approach, experiential thinking uses heuristic processing, a
structure that relies on “knowledge structures” created by past experiences (Chen et al.,
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1999). The role of heuristics is best explained by the Heuristic System Model (HSM).
HSM states that people process information in two distinct ways: cursory and effortful
(Miller & Bornstein, 2005). While rational-systematic processes require significant
cognitive efforts, experiential-heuristic thinking allows for quick, cursory evaluations.
Judgments made through heuristic shortcuts often reflect cue information (e.g., memories,
biases, past experiences) rather than information particular to the current situation,
excluding a thorough analysis of the situation, and instead forcing one to rely on personal
biases, subconscious thoughts and prejudiced beliefs (Chen et al., 1999). These heuristics
may explain the anger developed by mock jurors in the study by Bright & GoodmanDelahunty (2006). Seeing gruesome photographs could have triggered past memories
that biased and influenced the jury members’ decisions. Also, heuristic shortcuts
regularly lead to errors in judgment and prevent sufficient comprehension due to its
minimal cognitive demands, one more explanation as to why experiential thinking often
results in illogical decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
It is well documented that heuristics and experiential thinking are often activated
when religious content is salient (e.g., Miller & Bornstein, 2006; Miller & Bornstein,
2005; Howard & Redfering, 1983; Epstein et al., 1996; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992;
Johnson, 1984; Pfeifer, 1999). This evidence is of particular consequence in courtrooms
when religious material and/or symbols are present. In an effort to better understand the
role of religion in the courtroom, Miller and Bornstein (2006) designed an experiment to
evaluate the effects of religious appeals on jurors’ sentencing verdicts and their ability to
properly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors. The experimenters had participants
read a mock trial that varied in the number of mitigators and aggravators, whether or not
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the prosecutor used a Biblical appeal, and the way the defense incorporated religion
(either the defense attorney used a Biblical appeal, the defendant testified that he had
always been a Christian, the defendant testified that he recently converted to Christianity,
or no religion was mentioned). After reading the scenario, participants issued one of two
sentences: life in prison without parole or the death penalty.
Miller and Bornstein’s (2006) findings reflect their hypothesis: that the use of
religion by the defense would lead to fewer death sentences and interfere in jurors’
abilities to weigh mitigating and aggravating factors. While the prosecution appeals did
not affect verdict decisions, it was found that those in the “Always Christian” group
could not weigh aggravators and mitigators properly or accurately. Additionally, mock
jurors were least punitive toward the defendant who had converted to Christianity, rather
than the control group or the defendant who had always been a Christian, revealing juror
biases. 25 (The differing treatments of the defendant relate to several ingroup/outgroup
biases that will be discussed in further detail later). These biases may have been elicited
by heuristic-experiential thinking, implying the significant impact of religious
information. These results support the claim that heuristics are used when religious
material is present; the experiment suggested that religious content interfered with jurors’
abilities to think rationally and correctly weigh aggravating and mitigating factors, as
they relied on biases and acted leniently to the more religious defendant.
Similar findings occurred in a study by Johnson (1984) in which religious jurors were more severe in their
judgments of the defendant when religion was used as a defense, reflecting personal black sheep biases. This
effect was observed in the sentencing trial against Terry Nichols, the Oklahoma City bombing accomplice, who
did not received the death penalty because jurors believed his recent conversion to Christianity proved his
ability to do positive deeds (Miller & Bornstein, 2006, p. 676).
25
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Evidence from Miller and Bornstein (2006) also displayed the impact of defense
appeals on juror members. In fact, Epstein (1994) has suggested that religious messages
may be especially influential because they connect well with the experiential system.
This theory explains why religious appeals are often effective in swaying juries.26
Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) write, “As techniques are used that are designed to bypass
people’s need to present themselves as rational or that strongly engage their experiential
system, people increasingly behave in a way that conforms to the principles of the
experiential system” (p. 543). As discussed, these behaviors include reliance on biases,
quick and instinctual decisions, outcome-oriented decisions, and thoughts that lie outside
conscious awareness (Epstein, 1990). As such, defense attorneys as well as prosecuting
attorneys often utilize the emotional effects of religious appeals.
An additional consequence of experiential and heuristic shortcuts is the removal
of responsibility from oneself. Miller and Bornstein (2005) write, “Jurors experiencing
religious appeals are likely to use the appeal as a mental shortcut because…their highly
emotional state leaves them unwilling or unable to accept responsibility” (p. 53). By
relying on one’s religious beliefs, an individual defers responsibility for their decision to
their religious group or God, avoiding any personal negative feelings associated with the
decision. This rejection of responsibility not only hinders the decision-making process,
but is illegal if used in a death-penalty trial. If a juror defers responsibility due to a
religious appeal or symbol in a death penalty case, that statement or symbol will have
violated the Caldwell rule. As cited in Miller and Bornstein (2005), this rule states that it
An example can be seen in the case against Susan Smith. See e.g., Burritt, C. (1995). Seeking Meaning in
Smith Tragedy: Faith helps Ease Pain but ‘The Mystery is Why God Allows Certain Things to Happen.’ Atlanta
J. & Constitution, A12.
26
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is, “constitutionally impermissible to rest a death sentence on a determination made by a
sentencer who has been led to believe that the responsibility for determining the
appropriateness for the defendant’s death rests elsewhere”(p. 53).27 Therefore, deferring
responsibility for one’s opinion violates the law and challenges the logical evaluation
abilities necessary to make life and death decisions. Many would argue that those
deferring responsibility or making the decision through the use of heuristics is unfit for
jury duty (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). And, as discussed, heuristics are more likely to
be used when religion is salient. In short, this implies that religious material should be
kept out of courts, avoiding the deference of responsibility and encouraging a complete
understanding of the gravity of one’s decisions and verdicts.
In brief, the evidence reviewed implies that emotional content, including religious
material and/or symbols, can greatly affect the mental processes employed by individuals.
Evidence denotes that jurors who feel religious salience are likely to use experiential
thinking when delivering a sentence, make less rational decisions, and feel less personal
responsibility for their decisions. While studies such as Bright and Goodman-Delahunty
(2006) show the experiential effects of emotional content, Miller and Bornstein (2006)
illustrate that experiential processing is also activated when jurors hear religious appeals
from lawyers in court, inhibiting one’s ability to weigh aggravating and mitigating factors
in court. This evidence demonstrates the hampering effects of religious content on the
Caldwell v. Mississippi. (1985). 472 U.S. 320. In this case, the prosecutor advised the jury not to view itself as
deciding whether or not the petitioner would die, because a death sentence would be reviewed for correctness
by the Mississippi Supreme Court. Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the court stating, “there are several
reasons to fear substantial unreliability, as well as bias in favor of death sentences, when there are state-induced
suggestions that the sentencing jury may shift its sense of responsibility to an appellate court” (Pp. 472 U. S.
330-334).
27
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proper function of jury decisions and court structure. If religious material, such as
defense attorney arguments, effectively sways juries and harms jurors’ abilities to think
through trial evidence rationally and logically, then religious material actively
compromises the just functioning of the United States jury system. Additionally, a juror's
decreased feeling of responsibility for his/her verdict jeopardizes the jury pool and
sentencing of the accused.
Schemas in Social Perception: Ingroup/Outgroup Attitudes
While several biases may be elicited through one’s use of heuristics and
experiential processes, a different set of biases are ignited when the religious affiliation of
a defendant is known. Studies by Van Pooijen & Lam (2007) as well as Kerr et al. (1995)
suggest that social categorizations play a significant role in jury decision-making, stating
that if the religion of the defendant is known to jurors, ingroup/outgroup biases may be
activated. These biases can alter the way in which jurors judge a defendant’s character
and behavior, resulting in harsher or more lenient punishments depending on whether or
not the defendant is of the same religious group as the juror. These biases may cause
outgroup punitiveness, similarity-leniency, or the black sheep effect. These three theories
state that people often punish the outgroup, favor the ingroup, and/or punish the deviant
ingroup. These theoretical tendencies are caused by personal prejudices and compromise
one’s ability to judge other people and situations impartially.
Frequently, these biases are utilized when fashioning a jury. The jury pool
selection process, voir dire, provides attorneys with the opportunity to pick lenient jurors
for their defendant. In the past, controversies have been ignited due to discrimination of
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jurors based on race, gender, and religious affiliation.28 These discriminations take place
due to the power and efficacy of ingroup/outgroup biases and the way in which they
shape individual’s attitudes and behaviors towards others.
Outgroup punitiveness. Outgroup punitiveness is one of the most common
ingroup/outgroup biases perceived. According to the Social Identity Theory, people who
identify with a group often show more favorable attitudes towards ingroup than outgroup
members. This favoring enhances group members’ self esteem (e.g., Tajfel & Turner,
1986) and maintains a positive group image. But, at the same time, ingroup favoritism
acts as an impetus for severe negative outgroup stereotypes, creating a feeling that one’s
ingroup is unique and/or superior (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Sidanius, 1993) and
leads to outgroup hate and hostility (Brewer, 1999). In fact, both the Realistic Group
Conflict Theory (RGCT)29 and Social Identity Theory (SIT)30 claim that members of all
groups (e.g., religious, racial, team, etc.) are susceptible to prejudice against outgroup
members. Frequently, outgroup hostility is magnified when a group feels threatened,
increasing the need to maintain a positive image, often by acting against the outgroup.
This can occur in court if a defendant’s actions are somehow perceived as upsetting or
disrespectful to a juror’s culture or race. Superiority, fear and distrust of others, and
social comparisons all lead to ingroup favoritism and outgroup punitiveness.
Currently it is illegal, under the Supreme Court ruling of Batson v. Kentucky, to discriminate against jurors based on
gender and race. Yet, whether or not Batson applies to religious discrimination is up to debate (Egland, 2004); See,
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1; Batson v. Kentucky, 476 E.S. 79, 89 (1986). In relation, in 2005 it was revealed that
John Quatman, a prosecutor from San Jose, California, conspired with a judge to keep Jewish jurors off death
penalty cases because he believed that Jews would never vote for the death penalty (CNN.com, 2005, as cited in
Miller & Hayward, 2007). It was ruled that excluding jurors based on religion is illegal, and the trial was postponed.
29 The basic thesis of RGCT states that intergroup hostility is produced by competition and reduced by the
existence of mutually desired goals, only attainable through intergroup cooperation. (Jackson, 1993).
30 SIT states that the pressures of positive ingroup evaluations leads social groups to differentiate themselves
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986).
28
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Additionally, instead of direct hate or distrust towards outgroup members, ingroup
favoritism may develop through a lack of admiration and sympathy for outgroup
members. Previous research has shown that outgroup members are, “less likely to be
helped in certain ambiguous circumstances (Frey & Gaertner, 1986; Gaertner & Dovidio,
1977; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Johnson, 1982), more likely to be seen as provoking
aggression (Baron, 1979, Roger & Prentice-Dunn, 1981), [and] less likely to receive the
benefit of the doubt in attribution for negative behaviors (Weber, 1994)” (Brewer, 1999,
pp. 438). Each of these studies indicate the detrimental effect of being in an outgroup.
These disadvantages are particularly important when an outgroup member is in a place of
judgment. It is clear that whenever a defendant is of an outgroup to members of the jury
panel, they are at a natural and often unavoidable disadvantage.31
Several studies have indicated that outgroup prejudice is ignited by ingroup threat
and/or a lack of sympathy for others (e.g., Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Taylor & Hosch,
2004; Hunsberger, 1995; Griffen et al., 1987; Kerr et al., 1995). One example can be
seen in a study conducted by Daudistel et al. (1999). Daudistel et al. (1999) examined
noncapital felony cases in Texas to assess possible relations between ethnicity, conviction
31
Effects of racial outgroup punitiveness and lack of outgroup sympathy are apparent throughout the United
States legal history, with racial biases affecting verdicts in several states. One of the most recent is the case of
Joe Sullivan, a 13 year old who was sentenced to life without the possibility of parole. A New York Times article
states that, “according to court papers and a report from the Equal Justice Initiative, which now represents Mr.
Sullivan, there are only eight people in the world who are serving sentences of life without parole for crimes
they committed when they were 13…And there are only two people in that group whose crimes did not
involve a killing. Both are in Florida, and both are black.”
Additionally, no biological evidence was ever presented in court. “When Mr. Sullivan’s new lawyers recently
sought to conduct DNA testing on it, they were told that the state had destroyed it in 1993” (Liptak, 2009).
Considering the overwhelming lack of evidence presented against the defendant, the extraordinary
circumstances of the crime, and evidence that only black criminals have been convicted, the Supreme Court is
currently deciding on whether or not this case is of cruel and unusual punishment, due to the likelihood of
racial influence on the court’s decision. This case is just one example of outgroup punitiveness in United States
court rulings.
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rates, and sentences. Regardless of the crime type, Daudistel et al. (1999) found that
defendants’ ethnicities were correlated with the length of sentences rendered by juries.
Sentences for Anglo defendants were approximately twice as long as Hispanic
defendants’ sentences, with the sentences for Anglos rising as more Hispanics were
added to the jury. 32 The correlation between rising Anglo sentences and the number of
Hispanic jury members points directly to outgroup biases.
The Realistic Group Conflict and Social Identity theories apply to religious
affiliation as well. Religion often roots individuals to an ingroup, creating group
identification, that is, a tendency to make one’s group affiliation part of one’s identity
(Deaux, 1996).33 As such, maintaining the belief that one’s religion teaches the absolute
truth and represents the ideal morality, religion may contribute to ingroup preference and
generate prejudicial beliefs towards the outgroup. In many cases, one may feel as though
his/her religious morals are being challenged by a defendant’s poor behavior and react
with greater hostility towards the defendant. Or, one may feel a personal bond with the
accused and want to support and protect them, as they share the same traditions and faith.
The plethora of data on the effects of ingroup/outgroup attitudes directly highlights the
dangers in revealing the religious affiliation of a defendant, as it is one more way in
which one may affiliate themselves with an ingroup or outgroup.
A study by Pfeifer (1999) illustrated this dilemma. By creating a mock trial
where the defendant was either allegedly or admittedly participating in a satanic cult or
no mention of religion was made, Pfeifer (1999) found that the ratings of guilt were
significantly affected by the mention of cult involvement, with convictions increasing
32
33
As cited in Taylor et al. (2004, p. 587).
As cited in Jackson & Hunsberger (1999).
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with the mention of the minority religion. 34 Pfeifer (1999) claims these results indicate a
prejudicial reaction against minority religions, demonstrating the impact of negative
perceptions on jury decision-making. These biases are clearly of issue within courtrooms
when a defendant’s religious affiliation is known to the jury, as this information may
elicit outgroup biases, resulting in longer sentences and harsher perceptions of the
defendant’s behavior and character.
Similarity-leniency hypothesis. Biases towards the outgroup are not the only
significant prejudices in play. As stated by Brewer (1999), “discrimination can be
motivated solely by ingroup preference, in the absence of any negative affect or hostile
intent toward outgroups” (p. 431). As outlined by the Social Identity Theory, ingroup
biases are extremely influential and powerful. SIT states that individuals wish to be
viewed in a positive light. Positive perception can be gained in two ways: by behaving
more favorably towards the ingroup or by behaving negatively towards deviant ingroup
members. Leniency towards the ingroup is known as the similarity-leniency hypothesis,
while negativity towards the ingroup is coined the black sheep effect. In the context of
jury trials, this could indicate longer or shorter sentences for ingroup members, altering
the way in which the defendant is perceived and judged.
The similarity-leniency hypothesis states that individuals favor those who are
similar to themselves, or “the more similar a juror and the defendant are, the more lenient
the juror is likely to be” (Kerr et al., 1995, p. 546). All research on the similarityleniency hypothesis draws analogous conclusions, whether it is through similarities of
language (Stephan & Stephan, 1986), political beliefs (Amato, 1979; Griffitt & Jackson,
34
Regardless of whether the cult involvement was alleged or admitted.
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1973), or lifestyle (Griffitt & Jackson 1973).35 In each case, the jurors are less punitive
when the defendants are more similar.
Brewer (1999) suggests that ingroup favoritism is the result of human groupliving evolution, which she categorizes as the fundamental survival strategy that
characterizes humans. The result is the development of obligator interdependence,
indicating that we must rely on others for information, help, and resources, and must be
willing to share with others (Brewer, 1997; Caporael, 1997). This creates a system of
benefits, costs, and mutual cooperation (Brewer, 1999). Creating clear ingroup
boundaries provides a mechanism through which one can achieve benefits without
substantial costs. By limiting help to those in one’s ingroup, risks of nonreciprocation are
greatly reduced. Additionally, it creates communities of mutual trust and altruistic
behavior. In short, those within the ingroup expect to be treated well by other ingroup
members, eliciting and expecting altruistic behavior. As she states:
To the extent that all groups discriminate between intragroup social behavior and
intergroup behavior, it is in a sense universally true that ‘we’ are more peaceful,
trustworthy, friendly, and honest than ‘they.’ This is reinforced by a general
preference for the familiar over the unfamiliar. Social interactions within the
ingroup are more predictable and understood than intergroup interactions (p. 435).
An expectation for contingent altruistic behavior is what promotes attraction towards
one’s ingroup, creating a cycle of ingroup favoritism.
35
As cited in Kerr et al. (1995).
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Due to the altruistic origins of ingroup behaviors, similarity-leniency has been
observed in several court cases. Many attorneys utilize this hypothesis by picking jurors
similar to the defendant in hopes that they will be more lenient in their sentencing.
Gorbert and Jorden (1985) suggest that one should select jurors similar to the defendant
because they will have had similar life experiences and are more likely to understand the
actions of defendant, possibly excusing their behavior. 36 This same reasoning can be
applied to religious affiliation; if the religion of the juror and defendant are the same, and
the defendant’s religion is known, similarity-leniency may be used by jurors. In these
situations, ingroup members directly benefit from ingroup altruism.
In an effort to test the similarity-leniency hypothesis, Kerr et al. (1995) designed a
study in which the participant’s religion was crossed with the defendant’s religion as well
as the strength of evidence against the defendant. Kerr et al. (1995) hypothesized that
juror-defendant similarity would produce greater leniency toward the accused when the
evidence was weak, but greater harshness when evidence was strong. This relationship
reversal was expected due to the black sheep effect, anticipating harsh treatment of
deviant ingroup members. Experimenters recruited 66 all male Christian and Jewish
participants, recommended as strongly religious persons by colleagues and peers. Each
participant considered four case summaries: two with strong prosecution, two with weak
prosecution, two involved Christian defendants, and two involved Jewish defendants,
recommending a verdict and ancillary judgments for each case. 37 Results followed a
consistent pattern with the similarity-leniency hypothesis: Jewish mock jurors were less
As cited in Kerr et al. (1995).
Each case summary depicted a child molestation case because the topic was strongly “counternormative” for
both religious groups (Kerr et al., 1995, p. 550).
36
37
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likely to convict Jewish defendants than Christian defendants, whereas the opposite was
true for Christian participants. This effect was not altered by the strength of evidence
against the defendant.38 These results perfectly parallel the similarity-leniency
hypothesis, showing favorable verdicts for those of a similar ingroup. Several other
studies have mimicked these findings, such as a study done by Jackson & Hunsberger
(1999) where religious individuals measured positive attitudes towards religious others
and negative attitudes towards non-religious others. Inspection of the mean attitude
levels revealed that attitudes towards Christians and believers were well above the scale
midpoint, whereas attitudes towards atheists and non-believers were below the midpoint.
Each of these studies highlights the positive effects of ingroup favoritism as well
as the negative effects of outgroup punitiveness. Kerr et al. (1995) depict the benefits of
ingroup altruism and ingroup leniencies, while also showing signs of outgroup
punitiveness. Similarly, Jackson & Hunsberger (1999) clearly portray one’s liking of
similar others and dislike for those in a religious outgroup. Yet, simply being in one’s
ingroup does not ensure lenient evaluations. If an ingroup member is perceived
negatively by threatening the ingroup image, they may suffer from the black sheep effect.
Black sheep effect. As stated earlier, ingroup favoritism is maintained through a
positive group image; individuals identify themselves through their respective
communities, and therefore strive to maintain its integrity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). So
what happens if an ingroup member threatens this vision? In situations such as these, the
black sheep effect comes into play. First coined by Marques and Yzerbyt (Marques,
This goes against the black sheep effect, which suggests that ingroup members punish deviant ingroup members.
According to this theory, as the strength of evidence increased, conviction of ingroup members should have
increased as well.
38
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Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, 1990), the black sheep
effect suggests that deviant ingroup members will be punished more harshly than those in
the outgroup who commit the same crime.39 If the defendant is of the same religious
affiliation, but the juror does not feel as though they are upholding the core values of the
religion, the juror is likely to negatively evaluate the defendant (e.g., Biernat, Vescio, and
Billings 1999; Wilder, Simon and Faith, 1996).40 Consequently, those in the ingroup may
receive harsher punishment.
The black sheep effect may be caused by ingroup member’s familiarity as well as
one’s awareness of their ingroup affiliation. It is suggested that those who are similar
serve as the best self-comparisons, driving the desire to dissociate oneself from the
deviant actor (Taylor & Mette, 1971). Additionally, research shows that negative
ingroup behavior is more significant to other ingroup members. In fact, research
indicates that criminals may be perceived as dishonoring their entire ingroup (Lauderdale
et al., 1984; Marques, 1990). This issue may be particularly relevant with religious
ingroups/outgroups due to the moral issues at hand in court. As such, deviant ingroup
members are often seen as a threat to the betterment of the ingroup’s status and beliefs.
In order to further investigate the role of the black sheep effect in the courtroom,
Johnson (1984) ran a study to test the relevance and effect of a criminal’s religion as well
as religious defense statements. During the study, groups of participants (up to seven
people) watched a child abuse trial and were asked to judge the accused as guilty or not
guilty. For half of the participants, one line was added to the defense attorney’s argument:
Accordingly, Kerr et al. (1995) writes, “an unlikable or deviant ingroup member represents a threat to this
positive ingroup image, and should therefore be derogated more than an equally unlikable or deviant person
who poses no such threat” (p. 547).
40 As cited in Kenworthy (2003).
39
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“Donne’s minister said that Donne is a fine Christian man who follows the word of God
as stated in the Bible in conducting all of his family affairs and, thus, must be a good
father” (p. 215). For the remainder of the participants, no mention of religion was made.
After the video, participants were given transcripts of the tape and had 10 minutes to
review and reach a common verdict, which they reported on a questionnaire. Results
indicated that participants were more likely to find the defendant guilty in the religiousdefense condition than in the non-religious defense condition. In parallel, those in the
religious-defense condition recommended longer sentences than those in the control
condition. The degree of recommended sentence was found to be significantly related to
Christian-right orientation, church attendance, and the sex of the participants. Christians
Rightists were more severe in their recommended sentences to fellow Christians, but only
when religion was used as a defense. Johnson (1984) suggests that this is due to
Christians’ expectations and demands that people who claim to be part of their religious
community conduct themselves in a respectable way. These results mirror the
expectations of the black sheep effect, showing that devoted members of an ingroup will
negatively and harshly evaluate deviant members of their ingroup. The black sheep
effect can be observed in many other cases as well, including a study by Belli (1963) in
which Jewish jurors assigned harsher verdicts to fellow Jews than non-Jews.
Additionally, similar studies also show that as strength of evidence increases, so
does ingroup punitivenss. One example is the second 1995 study by Kerr et al. where
black mock jurors and white mock jurors suggested harsher verdicts for those of the same
race when the evidence against the defendant was strong. As such, the presence of strong
evidence acted as a catalyst for the black sheep effect, showing that jurors will judge
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ingroup members harshly under certain conditions. Strong evidence increases the need to
maintain a positive ingroup image and increases the evidence of deviance within the
ingroup, calling for harsher punishment.
In summary, ingroup/outgroup biases can often alter how a defendant is judged.
Religious biases may interfere when the religious affiliation of the offender is known.
These prejudicial attitudes may be expressed in outgroup punitiveness, similarityleniency, and the black sheep effect. Each of these theories and hypotheses correlate with
the Realistic Group Conflict Theory and Social Identity Theory, which claim that
members of groups are susceptible to prejudice against outgroup members in an effort to
uphold positive ingroup perception and self-esteem. Conclusively, the impact of a juror’s
religious affiliation on jury perception and decision-making is immense. Simply being
aware of one’s religion can greatly alter a juror’s perception of the case, the necessary
punishment for the accused, as well as the character of the defendant. These biases can
thwart proper decision-making, resulting in prejudiced and personal evaluations, rather
than rational and judicial decisions. This concept will be discussed further in the
subsequent chapter. Today, evidence of a defendant’s religion is often accepted as
evidence of his/her character, and while this is troublesome for several reasons, this
evidence may further bias the jury due to their own religious beliefs and preconceived
notions regarding religious persons, resulting in improper and partial sentencing (Miller
& Bornstein, 2005; Miller & Hayward, 2007).
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The Intricacies of Religious Groups
Considering the highly influential effects of ingroup and outgroup biases along
with experiential thinking and the use of heuristics, researchers have attempted to
decipher what religious groups and individuals are most susceptible to prejudicial beliefs.
But, more often than not, researchers have found that religion is far too complex to
systematically divide by religion, and that gathering an understanding of what an
individual believes by looking at one’s religious teachings is nearly impossible. With
consideration given to religious interpretation as well as the influence of one’s religious
community and personal relationships within that community, it has been determined that
understanding an individual’s beliefs by the label of one’s religion is impossible.
Religion is a matter of interpretation for many believers, analyzing and reading
into the meanings of holy texts. Interpretation is highly influential in death penalty court
cases, as most religious texts address the topics of murder, crime, life and death. As
Egland (2004) writes:
Although religious texts are not amendable, they are subject to interpretation by
any number of ministers, rabbis, and imams, each of whom potentially could
advocate a different interpretation. Indeed, 12 Christian jurors could have 12
different interpretations of a particular Biblical passage or rely on any number of
different passages to find support for, or opposition to, the death penalty. The
same critique applies to the Qur’an (p. 341).
Young (1992) concurs, pointing out Biblical evidence that could both support and
condemn use of the death penalty. In the legal world, prosecutors often employ quotes
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from the Bible to assert support for retribution (using quotes such as “an eye for an
eye,”41 suggesting equal punishment for the strength of the crime, along with a similar
quote, “[h]e that smiteth a man, so that he die, shall surely be put to death,”42 in clear
espousal of the death penalty) while defense attorneys quote the Bible to promote mercy
(often directly contradicting a prosecutor’s use of “an eye for an eye” by quoting, “You
have heard that it [has been] said ‘[an] [e]ye for an eye and [a] tooth for [a] tooth.’ But I
tell you…[i]f someone strikes you on the right cheek, turn…the other also”43). While
both prosecutors and attorneys use the Bible to persuade jurors, both are able to find
conflicting opinions within the text. There are conflicting arguments presented in the
Bible and several other religious texts. Evidently, one cannot assume that individuals in
the same religious group share the same outlook on the death penalty, or any other moral
matter. Many religions support both sides of the argument, indicating that one’s outlook
on moral issues may be shaped by, but not determined, by one’s religion.
Moreover, it has been suggested that one’s religious beliefs are as affected by the
religion itself as the environment in which the beliefs are taught. Bjarnason and Welch
(2004) tested the strength of Catholic parishioners’ attitudes towards capital punishment
on congregants, looking into the formation of moral judgments in a religious
congregation. Seeing as the Catholic Church has become a vocal opponent of the death
penalty, Bjarnason and Welch (2004) expected to observe greater disdain for the death
penalty within congregants who maintain an active and positive relationship with the
Exodus 21:24 (NIV); See e.g., Thompson v. State, 581 So. 2d 1216 1243 (Ala. Crim. App. 1991); People v.
Wash, 861 P.2d 1107, 1134 n.18 (Ca. 1993); Greene, 469 S.E.2d at 141; Hammond v. State, 452 S.E.2d 745, 753
(Ga. 1995); State v. Shurn, 866 S.W.2d 477, 464 (Mo. 1993). As cited by Miller & Bornstein, 2005, p. 33
42 Exodus 21:12 (King James); See e.g., Wash, 861 P.2d at 1134 n.18; People v. Mahaffey, 651 N.E.2d 1055, 106869 (Ill.1995); Williams, 510 S.E.2d at 642. As cited by Miller & Bornstein, 2005, p. 33.
43 Matthew 5:38-39 (NIV) (quoting Exodus 21:24). As cited by Miller & Bornstein, 2005, p. 37.
41
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parish, regardless of the attitude perceived through the Biblical text, and when the parish
has strong feelings against capital punishment. Results of the study indicated that the
effect of the moral message of the church depends upon the salience, direction, and
content of an individual’s religious beliefs. Results also directly reflected the expected
results: it was found that congregant’s support of the death penalty correlated with the
personal opposition by the priest, and their personal relationship to the priest.
Yet, the correlation is not so simple, as there are a multitude of factors that may
affect one’s relationship to a church and priest. Factors listed by the experimenters that
may influence this relationship are one’s gender, race, class, the characteristics of the
parish, the region in the United States, involvement of the priest with the parish
community, the parish priests’ personal opinions, and strength of one’s personal
relationship with God. Clearly, the relationship one maintains to one’s religious group is
complex and personal, and currently impossible to accurately evaluate or test. For this
reason, Bjarnason and Welch (2004) note that their data does not fully account for
differences in death penalty attitudes across parishes, citing that seemingly contextual
effects (such as a congregation’s geographical location, racial composition, and the
involvement and attitude of the priest) can be a consequence of individual differences
between parishes. Still, this study helps demonstrate the overwhelming number of factors
that contribute to the intricate assemblage of one’s religious, political, and moral attitudes
and prejudices.
These studies portray the complexities of religious thought, and the multitude of
opinions present within each religious group (e.g., Egland, 2004; Young, 1992; Bjarnason
& Welch, 2004). Egland (2004) argues that the flexible nature of religious thought and
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“religious legal interpretation makes it unsuitable for application in the modern American
justice system,” as it is still unclear how to decipher what individuals believe (Egland,
2004, p.341). Today, many consider it unacceptable to remove persons from jury duty
because of their religious affiliation,44 and according to the research discussed in this
chapter, that action would clearly be ineffective due to the multitude of beliefs held by
members within each religion. Yet, discovering a way to inhibit the expression of
prejudicial beliefs and biases in jury pools is still of utmost importance. If possible,
outgroup and ingroup biases as well as the use of heuristic and experiential thinking must
be discouraged. One additional way in which to address this issue is through
measurements of one’s religious orientation: extrinsic, intrinsic, quest, or fundamental.
Measuring Religious Prejudice
Frustrated by the inability to understand prejudice by religious affiliation, several
scales have been designed, including the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Orientation scale and
Baton’s Quest scale, in attempts to solve psychologists’ questions regarding what
characteristics make one prejudice, and from where the prejudice evolves. Most scales
have significant conflicting evidence and have continued to be molded in an effort to
create an accurate measurement; while one researcher finds supporting evidence of the
scale’s validity and accuracy, another researcher reports conflicting findings. By
Several courts and cases have decided that under the laws of Batson and J.E.B, religion-based peremptory
challenges are unconstitutional. See Casarez v. State, No. 1114-93, 1994 WL 695868 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 14,
1994). See United States v. Greer, 939 F.2d 1076, 1086 n.9 (5th Cir. 1991). Then again, the majority of courts
have ruled the religion-based peremptory challenges are indeed legal. See e.g., United States v. Clemmons, 892
F.2d 1153, 1157 (3d Circ. 1989); People v. Malone, 570 N.E.2d 584, 588-89.
44
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examining the history of these religion-prejudice scales, one is able to observe the
immense difficulty and complexity in measure one’s beliefs.
Extrinsic versus intrinsic orientation. In an attempt to better understand the link
between religion and prejudice and formalize the concern surrounding several
oversimplified measures of religion and prejudice (example: “how often do you go to
church?”), Allport and Ross (1967) created the Intrinsic and Extrinsic Orientation Scales.
By distinguishing between two religious orientations, extrinsic (E) as well as intrinsic (I),
Allport and Ross (1967) created scales by which to measure these concepts. Extrinsic
orientation acts as a self-serving approach that conforms to social conventions, often
utilizing “security, comfort, status, or social support.” In opposition, intrinsic orientation
uses religion as a framework through which life is understood (Allport & Ross, 1967, p.
441; Herek, 1987); “persons with this orientation find their master motive in religion” (p.
Allport & Ross, 1967, 434). Allport and Ross (1967) summarized these concepts by
saying, “the extrinsically motivated person uses his religion, whereas the intrinsically
motivated lives his religion” (p. 434).
Initial findings by Allport and Ross (1967) concluded that more intrinsic persons
were less prejudiced than extrinsic persons. They claimed that the lack of prejudice found
in intrinsic persons lies in their use of religion in everyday interactions, leaving “no place
for rejection, contempt, or condescension” towards others, while extrinsic persons use
religion as means for social acceptance and assimilation (p. 441). In short, Allport and
Ross (1967) believed that prejudice is part of one’s personality structure, intertwined with
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one’s religious orientation.45 A few years later, a study by Donahue (1985) found similar
results (along with studies by Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974 and Ponton & Gorsuch, 1988),
concluding that extrinsic orientation was indeed positively correlated with prejudice and
dogmatism, whereas intrinsic orientation was not.
Yet, in a similar study by Donahue’s (1985), findings were not nearly as strong
as Allport and Ross (1967), and pointed out several internal inconsistencies within the E
scale, as well as no correlation between the I scale and prejudice (rather than a negative
correlation as suggested by Allport and Ross (1967)). Moreover, several studies directly
contradicted the findings of Allport and Ross (1967) with results showing a positive
correlation between the I scale and prejudice against gays and lesbians (e.g., Batson and
Burris, 1994; Hunsberger, 1995; Herek, 1987) and persons of religious outgroups (e.g.,
Griffen, Gorsuch, and Davis, 1987; McFarland, 1989). One study that investigated the
role of intrinsic and extrinsic beliefs on attitudes towards gays, run by Herek (1987),
hypothesized that “attitudes towards outgroups serve different psychological functions
for persons with extrinsic and intrinsic orientations” (p. 34). In short, Herek, as well as
several others (e.g., Donahue, 1985; Hunsberger, 1995), came to the conclusion that the I
and E scales did not sufficiently measure one’s prejudicial attitudes due to the intricacies
of prejudice and discrimination. In fact, Altemeyer (1996) stated that the I and E scales,
“plainly failed to measure what they were supposed to measure…[and] they plainly failed
to show what they were supposed to show” (p. 154). In brief, the question of what
characterizes prejudicial beliefs was left unanswered.
As cited in Spilka et al. (2003), it may be argued that this is part of the reason religion and prejudice is so
difficult to measure.
45
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Quest (Q) scale. In response, attempts have been made to reinterpret the I and E
scales. For example, Batson (1993) argued that the element of social desirability may
have interfered in the measurements, confusing the relationship between prejudice and IE religiosity. Intrinsic persons may appear to be less prejudiced simply because they are
concerned with their social standing (Spilka et al., 2003).46 Upon further investigation,
Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978) found that when one controls for social desirability, a
positive correlation between intrinsic religion and prejudice is found. Moreover, they
reported a link between I scores and social desirability.47 In response, Batson (1993)
created a three factor model, known as the Quest (Q) Scale, building upon the I-E scales
put forth by Allport and Ross (1967). The additional quest scale incorporates an open
and flexible approach to religious issues, fulfilling the need to address open-mindedness.
Batson has argued that higher scores on the Q scale are negatively correlated to prejudice.
This claim was further proven through additional studies by Batson (Batson et al., 1978;
Batson et al. 1986). Additionally, research has found an association between the Q scale
and increased complexity of thought (Batson & Raynor-Prince, 1983) and openness to
different perspectives (McFarland & Warren, 1992).
But again, as with Allport and Ross’ I-E scale, conflicting evidence has been
found concerning the Q scale. Ponton and Gorsuch (1988) were unable to replicate the
findings of a negative correlation with prejudice and Altemeyer (1996) challenged the
Hunsberger & Jackson (2005) concurs, writing, “People high in intrinsic religiosity may try…to reject or hide
other forms of prejudice…also in order to maintain their self-image as good religious group members” (p. 819).
47 It is important to note that there is substantial evidence contradicting Batson et al. (1978). Hunsberger &
Platonow (1986) as well as Spilka, Kojetin, & McIntosh (1985) were unable to find a correlation between I
scores and social desirability. Moreover, Duck & Hunsberger (1999) along with Morris, Hood, & Watson
(1989) found that controlling for social desirability did not alter its relationship to prejudice. This data further
indicates the tenuous and complex relationship between I-E orientation and prejudicial beliefs.
46
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scale on psychometric grounds. Due to the conflicting evidence, several Q scales have
been formed, with additional questions tweaked in an effort to gain more accurate results.
Even so, a concrete and trustworthy Q scale is yet to be created, with several versions of
the measurements being used by researchers today.
Certainly, it is easy to see that the measurements of religiosity and prejudice are
contradictory and weak. Several of the models created by researchers have been
challenged by later studies, and confusion persists regarding what the best characteristics
are to focus on. Should one focus on extrinsic and intrinsic orientations or on one’s
religious group and religious leader? Unfortunately, these questions remain unanswered.
The one scale that has produced convincing and frequently replicated results, is the
fundamentalism scale.
Fundamentalism. Over the years, several studies have pointed to the connection
between fundamentalist beliefs and higher levels of prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1996; Kirkpatrick, 1993; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999).
The term “religious fundamentalism” (RF) has often been used to express an idea of
dogmatism, orthodoxy, and a traditional way of thought. However, the definition of
fundamentalism is obtuse, and can be defined in several ways. For the specific use of
religious prejudicial studies, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) created a definition of RF
that is theoretically separate from other aspects of religion, characterizing it as:
The belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the
fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity;
that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be
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vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the
fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and
follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity (p.
118).
This definition of fundamentalism applies to current research and is applicable to almost
all world religions (Spilka et al., 2003). Additionally, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992)
created a RF scale to measure their concept of fundamentalism, which has been applied
in several subsequent studies, providing an individual participant level of fundamental
religious beliefs.
Many explain fundamentalist prejudice by its correlation to right-wing
authoritarianism (RWA) (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger 1992; Hunsberger, 1995; Laythe
et al., 2002). This correlation has been found among members of varying religious
backgrounds, including Christians, Jews, Muslims, and Hindus (Hunsberger, 1996), as
well as several cultures.48 Altemeyer (1996) has defined RWA as a composite of three
attitudinal clusters: authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and
conventionalism. High scores in RF and RWA indicate several forms of prejudice,
including egocentrism and prejudice towards homosexuals, all associated with negative
outgroup feelings (e.g., Laythe et al., 2002; Altemeyer, 1996; Hunsberger, 1996).
Additionally, subsequent research has revealed a negative correlation between
Altemeyer’s (1996) authoritarian conditions and relativism (one’s ability to look at
Research in Ghana has found that RWA and RF are associated in Christian and Muslim subsamples
(Hunsberger, Owusu, & Duck, 1999; as cited in Spilka et al., 2003).
48
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situations from several points of view).49 As such, it is frequently argued that right-wing
authoritarian attitudes promote animosity towards outgroups, indicating an inability to
look at a situation from another person’s point of view (Altemeyer, 1996; Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995).
Seen as a personality characteristic, authoritarianism and fundamentalism share an
unquestioning nature. It has been suggested that those high in RF cling to existing
stereotypes and are unable or unwilling to change their current schemas in accordance
with new information (Spilka et al, 2003). Research has indicated that fundamentalists
do not have complex thoughts regarding religion, and instead stick to the information
they have been taught. Many psychologists assert that the mindset of fundamentalism
creates a substantial distinction between ingroups and outgroups. “[Fundamentalist]
beliefs make it easier…to divide the world into ‘us’ and ‘them’,” writes Unger (2002, p.
43). The black and white, teachings of fundamentalism foster ingroup tendencies and
greater outgroup discrimination. As discussed earlier, outgroup prejudice is also
influenced by strong ingroup identification, especially within religious groups. As such,
those who score higher on RF scales have stronger ingroup identification, and therefore a
higher chance of maintaining negative attitudes towards an outgroup (Hunsberger &
Jackson, 2005).50
McHoskey (1996) as cited in Laythe et al., (2002).
Research has also been completed indicating that the reduction of fundamentalism decreases prejudice. A
study by Billiet (1995) argued that in a sample of Flemish Catholics, “sociocultural Christianity” prevented
fundamentalism and ethnocentrism. Sociocultural Christianity was defined as “the values of solidarity, charity,
and social justice, which have been emphasized in the legitimations and the collective identity” (p.231). Billiet
(1995) proposed that when certain faiths values are taught, in this case sociocultural Christianity,
enthnocentrism and RF may be counteracted. The article states that Flemish “Catholic church leaders and
prominent Catholics declared openly that they favored this integration of immigrants” (p. 232).
49
50
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As mentioned briefly before, Jackson and Hunsberger (1999) created a study to
examine the link between religiosity and attitudes towards religious and non-religious
others. The study analyzed prejudicial beliefs held by devout Christians (those who
scored high numbers on the RF scale or Christian orthodoxy scale). Participants
completed a questionnaire assessing religiosity as well as group identification. Results
of the study revealed that religious group identification was significantly correlated with
RF and Christian orthodoxy. Furthermore, both RF and Christian orthodoxy were
positively correlated with positive attitudes towards Christians and believers, and
negatively correlated with atheists and non-believers. This, writes Jackson and
Hunsberger (1999) is especially indicative of fundamentalism’s association with
outgroup derogation and group identification ties to ingroup favoritism.51 These results
mirror the hypothesis that fundamentalism is often associated with prejudicial beliefs due
to its strength of ingroup identification, verifying the claim by Unger (2002) that
fundamentalism greatly defines ingroups from outgroups, “us” versus “them”.52
The biased attitudes often associated with fundamentalism are ever-present in
court decisions today, especially in death penalty trials. Young (1992) and Miller and
Hayward (2007) suggest that fundamentalist beliefs are in direct correlation with support
51
Jackson and Hunsberger (1999) also stated that while not all members of a group maintain identical forms of
prejudice (as discussed in the previous section), the form of outgroup prejudice is originated in intergroup
relations. Consequently, those who identify most strongly with their ingroup are likely to have pervasive and
cohesive outgroup discriminations, following the Social Identity Theory discussed earlier. This pattern of
ingroup strength and outgroup prejudice can be observed in the strict and deep-seated teachings of religious
fundamentalism.
52
These findings also lead one to an even greater question, which is whether or not religious prejudice is tied to
religion itself or the way in which one believes. Seeing as fundamentalism is found in almost every religion, and
all around the world, one may argue that fundamentalism is set in they ways in which one believes, not the title
of one’s religious affiliation or even the teachings of the specific religion. Instead, it is the way in which one
interprets and follows religion which defines fundamentalism.
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for the death penalty, with fundamentalist individuals experiencing less cognitive
dissonance about the appropriateness of such a punishment. “Fundamentalists tend to
deny the possibility of moral relativity,” writes Young (1992). “Such absolutism,
whether a cause or a consequence of fundamental beliefs, is likely to be associated with
the perception of considerable evil in the world, for the morality of human action is not to
be judged relative to social context” (p.78). Here, Young addresses the problem of
absolutism in fundamental beliefs, the rigid context in which life is often evaluated, and
one’s inability to separate the sin from the sinner.53 Sayyid Qutb, the creator of
fundamental Islam, preached the traditional reading of the Qur’an, banning any form of
interpretation. Islam just is, he says. (Euben, 1999). This closed-minded attitude
associated with fundamental beliefs can greatly alter how crimes are perceived. If
everything in the world is seen as black and white, good or bad, it seems sensible that
fundamentalists would more easily convict others for crimes, and feel less internal
conflict about sentencing someone to death.
The plethora of research regarding fundamentalist beliefs and thought processes
poses an interesting problem to the United States court system and jury selection.
According to these studies, individuals who score high on RF have innate ingroup
preferences and outgroup discrimination. Moreover, and most importantly, those with
high RF are unable to change their opinions and ideas, incorporating new information
into pre-set religious schemas instead of accommodating religious doubts or new
information (Spilka et al., 2003). This poses a direct threat to the functioning of a fair
jury hearing, seeing as fundamentalist jurors would likely be unable to impartially
53
This issue is also discussed in Spilka et al. (2003) in terms of fundamentalist attitudes towards homosexuals.
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consider a court case. Another argument to be made is that fundamentalists would likely
put their religious morals above the law, seeing as fundamentalism is often viewed as a
set of laws in itself. This would inhibit jurors from properly following judge’s
instructions and other legal protocol.
Chapter Summary
To conclude this chapter, evidence indicates that religion is frequently correlated
with both morality and prejudice, creating a web of complexity around the issues of
religious biases. Furthermore, experiential and heuristic systems are activated by
religious content, inhibiting effortful thought processes and logical assessments of
information. As seen in Miller and Bornstein (2006), this cursory system jeopardizes
rational decision making within courtrooms when religion is salient to jurors, specifically
when religious material is used as a defense. Furthermore, knowledge of a defendant’s
religion can spark ingroup/outgroup biases including outgroup punitiveness, similarityleniency, as well as the black sheep effect. These biases can directly help or hinder the
outcome for the accused, regardless of the evidence presented or arguments made within
the trial.
Moreover, identifying individual’s religious biases is a complex process. It is
impossible to know one’s beliefs based on his/her religious title. Additionally, several
religious orientation scales, such as the intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest scales, have failed to
create consistent correlation evidence between orientations and prejudicial attitudes. The
one scale that has produced consistent evidence is the religious fundamentalism scale,
which has repeatedly shown a connection between fundamentalism, right-wing
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authoritarianism, support for the death penalty and prejudice against several racial,
political, and religious outgroups.
This evidence demonstrates the implications of juror biases and the likely
presence of biases within jury pools today. Regulating the presence and expression of
personal prejudices is essential to fair and impartial trials.
Furthermore, findings
discussed in this chapter highlight the possibility of religious salience increasing the
expression of religious biases in court. While psychologists have gained a considerable
understanding of how religious material affects fundamentalists, the effect on nonfundamentalists remains unclear. Seeing as religious content can elicit emotions and
biases, one may argue that it is necessary to rid of religious content from within
courtrooms in the United States. In the following study, perspective taking will be
utilized in an effort to reduce juror biases as well determine whether bias exists within the
jury pool. Additionally, juror reactions to religious symbols are evaluated to see if the
presence of religion alters sentencing, the decision-making process, and expression of
biases.
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Chapter Two:
The Role of Perspective Taking in Reducing Juror Biases and the Effects of Religious
Symbols
“The life of almost any unfortunate, if rightly understood, can be readjusted to some plan of order and
system, instead of left to drift on to ruin, the victim of ignorance, hatred and chance”-Darrow (1940,
p.494).
This chapter will outline a study designed to investigate the effects of religious
symbols and perspective taking in courtrooms. This study aims to assess whether
religious symbols and instructions to take the perspective of the defendant will alter
participant’s levels of rational and experiential processing and in turn, how participants
come to their sentencing decisions. Furthermore, this study aims to determine whether
perspective taking can inhibit the expression of biases and experiential thoughts.
Additionally it investigates individual differences, such as one’s religious identification,
religious affiliation and reported devotionalism, which may affect verdicts and interact
with rational and experiential thought processes.
Specifically this research aims to answer the following questions: 1) Do
participants hold inherent religious biases? 2) Are sentences reduced when perspective
taking is present? Do directives of perspective taking reduce any religious biases present?
3) Are ingroup/outgroup biases provoked by knowledge of the religion of the defendant,
altering verdicts? 4) Does the presence of a holy book and religious symbols increase
experiential thinking as seen through REI measures? 5) Do directives to take the
perspective of the defendant increase rational thinking in jurors? 6) How does thinking
experientially versus rationally affect the verdict and how people come to their decisions?
Do jurors depend on instincts over facts when thinking experientially? And finally, 7) do
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the religious conditions affect the way participants view themselves, as seen through
measures of Religious Identification and Devotionalism? If so, how does this effect
decision-making? Through experimental manipulation, this study will inform the courts
about the effects of religious symbols in the courtroom and the role of perspective taking
in inhibiting heuristic thinking and biased actions.
METHOD
Participants
133 participants (50 men and 83 women) were recruited from Amherst College
and a local Amherst coffee shop. People participated in the study in exchange for course
credit or $5 compensation. Only six participants from the coffee shop were included, and
therefore separate tests were not run between the Amherst College and Amherst
community participant groups.
Materials
Participants received one of six packets containing general instructions, a case
summary, judge’s instructions, and a brief questionnaire. The questionnaire was
constructed to measure the participants’ levels of religious devotion and affiliation to
their respective religious group, ingroup and outgroup biases, levels of rational or
experiential thinking, and their use or nonuse of perspective taking during the trial. All
groups were given the same judge’s instructions and questionnaire. Half of the groups
were instructed to take the perspective of the defendant through an additional paragraph,
while the other half was not. Additionally, 1/3rd of the participants received a trial
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summary with a Christian defendant, 1/3rd received a Sikh defendant, and the last 1/3rd
received a control defendant where no religious affiliation or symbols were mentioned.
Trial summary. The written trial summary described the penalty phase of a man
convicted on charges of first-degree rape, first-degree sodomy, first-degree sexual abuse
and second-degree assault. The summary was approximately 560 words long. It was
based loosely on the case against Jose Santos who was sentenced 10 to 20 years in prison
on December 20, 1995 for beating and raping his estranged wife.54 The crime was
manipulated through the inclusion of alleged spying by the husband, with mention of the
husband’s tattoo. It was also altered by the name and religion of the defendant as well as
the swearing in procedure.
In a third of the packets, the trial highlighted a defendant of Christian beliefs. The
trial began with the defendant swearing in on a Bible, reciting, “I swear to tell the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.” Additionally, mention of the
defendant’s tattoo of a Cross was present in the case summary. This defendant’s name
was Paul Matthews. Another third highlighted a defendant of Sikh beliefs. The trial
began with the defendant swearing in on the Guru Granth Sahib reciting, “I swear to tell
the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.” Additionally,
mention of the defendant’s tattoo of an Ek-Onkar was present in the case summary. The
defendant’s name was Talib Rajpal. Lastly, the final third was the control condition. The
defendant swore in by putting his hand over his heart, reciting, “I swear to tell the truth,
See e.g., (1995, December, 21). Man Gets 10-to-20-Year Term for Raping Wife. The New York Times, from
http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9F0DE4D81439F932A15751C1A963958260&n=Top%2FR
eference%2FTimes%20Topics%2FSubjects%2FV%2FViolence; James, G. (1995, December, 6). Man Found
Guilty of Raping His Wife. The New York Times, from http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=
9403E7D81E39F935A35751C1A963958260&sec=&spon=.
54
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the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” A tattoo was mentioned without specification
of its content or image. The defendant’s name was Robert Johnson.
In half of these conditions, participants were instructed to take the perspective of
the defendant by including a paragraph that read, “Knowing the importance of
understanding others, go through the trial as if you were the defendant, walking through
the world in his shoes and looking at the world through his eyes. Know that there are two
sides to every question; try to look at them both. Try to imagine how you would feel if
you were in the defendant’s place.”
Instructions and verdict form. Participants were instructed to indicate a verdict of
guilty or not guilty for an additional charge of aggravated sexual abuse and to give a
recommended sentence for the defendant. The guidelines for the conviction of
aggravated sexual abuse were supplied from “Report to Congress: Analysis of Penalties
for Federal Rape Cases,” (1993) and was integrated into the judge’s instructions.
Participants were informed that if found guilty, the defendant was eligible for up to a
maximum of life sentence. Participants were also informed that the crimes the defendant
had already been convicted of were eligible for a minimum of 4 ½ to 9 years and a
maximum of 12 ½ to 25 years in prison. Participants were then told to determine the
appropriate sentence for the defendant, supplying a minimum and maximum sentence
along with a recommended sentence for the defendant.
Dependant and independant measures survey. The dependent measure survey
contained measures of the participant’s sentencing decision, confidence in one’s decision,
what influenced the participant’s decision, a participant’s level of religious identification,
a devotionalism measure, the Rational-Experiential Inventory, a perspective taking
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measure (Interpersonal Reactivity Index), and CEST measures. For more details please
see Appendix B.
Interpersonal reactivity index (IRI). Perspective taking was utilized in the
following study to curtail stereotypes and biases, in hopes that those who employed
perspective taking would report higher levels of rational processing and evaluate the
defendant in an unbiased and logical manner. In order to accurately measure perspective
taking, this study employed a section of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Davis, 1980;
1983), a scale that consists of 4 components: the perspective taking scale, the empathetic
concern scale, personal distress, and the fantasy scale. Only questions regarding
perspective taking were scored. The questions measured a particpant’s tendency to
adopt the psychological point of view of others in everyday life, with statements such as,
"I sometimes try to understand my friends better by imagining how things look from their
perspective." Participants rated each question on a 5-point scale from does not describe
me well to describes me very well. This scale was used to measure if and how much the
participant tried to take the perspective of the defendant.
The use of perspective taking, the active imagination of how an individual feels or
is affected by his/her situation, frequently produces an empathetic arousal that leads to
altruistic behavior (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Batson, 1991).55 Perspective taking
affects the attribution and evaluation of others, as perspective takers evaluate a situation
as if they themselves were in it (Jones & Nisbett, 1971). It has been shown that
perspective taking leads to the merging of the self and the other and an increased
cognitive accessibility of the self-concept (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). Just as
Davis (1983) found that perspective taking was positively correlated with social competence as well as selfesteem, which may also improve one’s positive and helpful behavior.
55
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the positive self-evaluation is related to the ingroup, the increased self-other overlap
caused by perspective taking could lead to more positive evaluations of the outgroup
target (e.g., a defendant), diminishing the accessibility and application of stereotypes
(Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000). In fact, a study by Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000)
found that perspective taking reduced evidence of ingroup bias by increasing evaluations
of the outgroup. Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) suggested perspective taking as an
effective strategy for debiasing social thought.56
Rational-experiential inventory (REI). The Rational-Experiential Inventory was
administered to investigate the role of thought processes (rational versus experiential) in
relation to perspective taking instructions and religious symbols. Based on CognitiveExperiential Self-Theory (CEST), as discussed in the previous chapter, REI was
constructed to measure two independent processing modes: analytic-rational and
intuitive-experiential. The REI consists of two parts: the Need for Cognition Scale
(NFC)57 and Faith in Intuition (FI) Scale,58 which were created to measure personality,
adjustment, achievement and interpersonal relations through thinking processes and
intuition levels (Epstein et al., 1996).59 A 5-item NFC scale was used in this study,
which reports the extent to which individuals enjoy and engage in, or dislike and avoid,
cognitive activities (Epstein et al., 1996). Providing the assessment of intuitiveexperiential thinking, Epstein et al. (1996) developed the Faith in Intuition scale,
A similar study was also conducted by Vescio et al. (2003), which found that perspective taking promoted
improved ingroup attitudes irrespective of stereotypicality.
57 Originally created by Cacioppo & Petty (1982)
58 Jung (1964/1968) proposed that thinking and intuition are among the most basic ways of interpreting
information.
59 Cacioppo and Petty (1982) showed that one’s score on the Need for Cognition scale measures analyticrational processing by indicating levels of heuristic thinking, associated with impression formation and people’s
receptivity to new information.
56
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measuring engagement and confidence in one’s intuitive abilities. A 5-item FI scale was
used in this study, which refers to having confidence in one’s feelings and immediate
impressions as a basis for decisions and actions (Epstein et al., 1996).60 Respondents
rated all items of the NFC and FI scales on a 5-point scale ranging from completely false
to completely true.
CEST Vignettes. In addition to the self-report scales, Epstein et al. (1996) created
heuristic vignettes to provide an alternate index of individual differences in rational and
experiential thinking. These vignettes act as a non-self-report measure from which
responses can be scored objectively as heuristic or rational. The vignettes depict
situations that require judgments about the degree of distress following arbitrary
outcomes or cost-benefit effects. On the basis of CEST, Epstein et al. (1996) correlated
heuristic responses with intuitive-experiential processing (as heuristics are the natural
mode of the experiential system). In conducting the vignettes, respondents are asked how
they themselves would respond (self perspective) and how a completely rational person
would respond (logical perspective) in the situations provided.61 These responses allow
participants to express their understanding of the rational response, even if they do not
believe it reflects common behaviors, and to demonstrate their awareness of the two
modes of thinking. If participants are aware of both modes (rational and experiential), it
is believed they can alter responses appropriately when asked to make judgments from
the different mode of thinking (Epstein et al., 1996), mirroring a judge asking a juror to
think logically and impartially. This also allows one to determine whether a participant is
Although the original NFC was 45 items then 19 items and FI was 12 items, Epstein et al. (1996) found the
shortened REI was sufficiently reliable and independent.
61 This procedure has been used successfully in previous research, demonstrating the differences between
rational and experiential thinking (Epstein, 1994; Epstein et al., 1992; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992).
60
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generally experiential or if they are thinking experientially due to the case before them.62
In the following study, participants were scored by their answers regarding how a rational
person would respond to the given vignettes, as it indicates a participant’s ability to think
rationally and awareness of the rational response. One point was given for each vignette,
either to one’s experiential or rational score. Therefore, participants were rated either 3:0,
2:1 rational or 1:2, 0:3 experiential. (For vignettes, see Appendix C).
Procedure
After participants read and signed an informed consent form, they were reminded
that they could terminate the experiment at any time. The experimenter then explained
the procedure, informed participants that they were to act as mock jurors at a trial, read
through all of the information carefully, and answer each question. After handing in the
packet, participants were debriefed, thanked for their participation, and then dismissed.
HYPOTHESES
Perspective Taking
Due to the debiasing effects of perspective taking, it was hypothesized that
perspective taking instructions would lower sentences in all three conditions. It was
expected that sentences would drop most significantly in the Sikh condition due to
decrease in outgroup bias (as no Sikhs are expected to be in the participant pool). It was
also hypothesized that those in perspective taking conditions would report higher levels
of rational thinking and lower experiential thinking due to a decrease in ingroup/outgroup
As Epstein et al. (1996) writes, “[the vignettes] provide an objective index of the ability to distinguish
between heuristic and logical thinking” (p. 393).
62
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biases. A such, it was expected that perspective taking would lower the expression of
biases in all three conditions, though more substantially in the religious conditions due to
increased levels of bias caused by religious symbols. Contrarily, those who did not
receive perspective taking instructions were expected to report higher experiential
thinking and rely more heavily on personal biases, basing decisions on feelings about the
case and defendant as well as their instincts about the case. Furthermore, perspective
taking was expected to positively correlate not only with rational thinking, but also how
participants came to their respective decisions. Reliance on one’s religious beliefs,
instincts, and feelings were considered experiential factors. Reliance on judge’s
instructions, logic and reason and evidence provided in the case were viewed as rational
factors.
Hypothesis 1a. PT will reduce sentences and conviction rates in all three conditions
Hypothesis 1b. Sentences will drop most significantly in the Sikh condition due to reduced
outgroup biases
Hypothesis 2. PT will decrease experiential thinking and increase rational thinking
Hypothesis 3a. Rational thinking will lower sentencing and correlate with participants being
influenced by judge’s instructions, logic and reason, and evidence provided within the case
Hypothesis 3b. Experiential thinking will raise sentences and correlate with participants being
influenced by personal feelings, intuition, and religion.
Religious Condition
Sentences and conviction rates were expected to be higher in the Sikh condition
due to ingroup/outgroup biases. Because of ingroup/outgroup biases and the larger
number of ingroup members expected in the Christian condition than the Sikh condition,
it was hypothesized that the Christian defendant would receive lower sentences than the
Sikh or control defendants. This expectation was based on the similarity-leniency
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hypothesis. Additionally, it was expected that lower ingroup sentences would be most
pronounced when only looking at Christian participants, as it isolates the ingroup.
Additionally, participants in the Christian and Sikh conditions were expected to
process more experientially than participants in the control condition due to the presence
of religious symbols and the salience of religion. These participants were also expected
to rely more heavily on intuitive-experiential factors rather than analytical-rational factors
when making sentencing decisions. Due to previous findings that emotional content
(including religious material) sparks experiential thinking, it was also anticipated that
those who rated themselves with high Religious Identification and Devotionalism would
be more likely to utilize experiential thinking when making sentencing decisions,
especially when religion was salient.
Hypothesis 4. Participants in the Christian and Sikh conditions will process more
experientially due to the presence of religious symbols.
Hypothesis 5a. Sentences and conviction rates will to be higher in the Sikh condition and
lower in the Christian due to ingroup/outgroup biases.
Hypothesis 5b. These differences in sentencing and conviction rates will be exaggerated in
the all-Christian group to due increased ingroup concentration.
Hypothesis 6. Those high in Religious Identification and Devotionalism will be more likely to
think experientially.
RESULTS
General
The overall sample size included 133 participants (38% males) with ages ranging
from 18 to 64 (with a mean age of 20.9 years old). Participants who did not provide a
recommended sentence, or who provided a range for recommended sentence, were not
used in sentencing data but were included in the overall data (N=5). One participant who
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suggested life was entered at 70 years to match the next highest sentence
recommendation. 59 participants (44%) were Christians, 14 (10.5%) were Jewish, one
(0.7%) was Hindu, four (3%) were Buddhist, one (0.7%) was Muslim, 16 (12%) were
Atheists, 16 (12%) were Agnostics, 14 (10.5%) indicated that they believed in God but
had no particular faith, and two (1.5%) indicated that their faith was “other” than those
listed (one Quaker and one Celtic Pagan). Each cell had an average of 22.16 participants,
with cell sizes ranging from 22 to 23 participants. Results were also examined in a
sample of Christian-only participants (N=59). Two participants in this group failed to
provide valid sentence recommendations, putting the sample size at 57 for tests regarding
sentences. Each cell had an average of 9.8 participants, will cell sizes ranging from 6 to
13 participants.
Comprehension Check
One false option was added to questionnaires to ensure participants’ close
attention to the case summary. When participants were asked to rate what influenced
their sentencing decisions, the false option read: “Evidence that the husband tried to
break his wife’s arm.” No such evidence was provided in the case summary, yet 68
participants (51%) marked that this evidence influenced their decision. Only 15 (11%)
participants marked that this did not influence them at all. These data may indicate low
levels of thorough comprehension and attention in the participant pool during the
conduction of this study, though ample significant data was found.
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Effects of Perspective Taking
Perspective taking instructions. It was found that perspective taking (PT)
instructions were effective in all three conditions (F (1,127) =4.81, p<.05) (N=133),
causing higher scores on the perspective taking scale in each PT condition.
Sum of Perspective Taking in PT and No-PT Conditions
(N=133)
Condition
No PT
With PT
Instructions
Instructions
28.23
30.32
Control
(4.49)
(4.82)
28.23
30.55
Christian
(5.69)
(4.26)
27.78
29.00
Sikh
(4.11)
(5.91)
Table 2: Sum of Perspective Taking with & without Perspective
Taking instructions
When examining only Christian participants (N=59), perspective taking instructions were
calculated as slightly less effective, though still significant in raising one’s level of
perspective taking (F (1, 53) =3.48, p<.10), partially caused by the fact that perspective
taking scales were higher in the Sikh condition when no perspective taking instructions
were given (M=28.38, SD=3.45) than when instructions were present (M=26.22,
SD=5.97).
Sum of Perspective Taking in PT and No-PT Conditions for all Christian Participants
(N=59)
Condition
No PT
With PT
Instructions
Instructions
27.67
31.45
Control
(3.82)
(6.24)
25.13
30.67
Christian
(4.61)
(3.72)
28.38
26.22
Sikh
(3.45)
(5.97)
Table 2: Sum of Perspective Taking with & without Perspective
Taking instructions for all Christian participants
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These results are slightly peculiar, indicating that Christian participants had lower
levels of PT in the Sikh condition when given PT instructions than when not given
instructions to take the perspective of the defendant. These results may reflect reluctance
to take the perspective of an outgroup member, but the implications of such data are
debatable. Most important to recognize is the overall significant effect of the perspective
taking instructions in the general participant pool as well as the Christian-only pool.
Sentencing. Recall the study by Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000), which
determined that perspective taking decreases ingroup/outgroup biases and often leads to
more positive evaluations of the target. As such, it was expected that the presence of
perspective taking instructions would decrease the average recommended sentence and
conviction rates in all three conditions. To investigate this expectation, a 3x2 ANOVA
was run with between subjects factors of religious conditions and perspective taking.
Supporting hypothesis 1a, perspective taking instructions lowered sentences in all
three conditions (F (1,122) =2.94, p< .10), with the average recommended sentence
within perspective taking conditions reported at 17.28 years (SD=1.57), in contrast to the
average recommended sentence of 21.07 years reported without perspective taking
(SD=1.57) (See Figure 1). This was the main effect of the perspective taking instructions.
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Recommended Sentences:
All Participants
(N=128)
25
Sentence (Years)
20
15
21.6
20.84
20.79
17.05
18.02
16.76
10
5
0
Figure 1: Recommended Sentences with & without Perspective Taking instructions for all participants.
Control
Christian
Additionally, convictions of aggravated
sexual abuse
were consistently lower
Religious
Condition
Sikh
No Perspective Taking Instructions
Perspective Taking Instructions
when instructions for perspective taking were present, running an average 53%
conviction rate in perspective taking conditions, as opposed to 65.5% without PT, though
these data were not found to be significant through a chi square test, indicating x² (2,
N=133) = 1.539, p> .05, as seen in Table 3. These data reflect expected findings and
demonstrate the altruistic effects of perspective taking, resulting in lower sentences and
conviction rates. These data also point to existing juror biases. Because perspective
taking lowers bias, its effect demonstrates the prior existence of bias.
Rates of Conviction for Aggravated Sexual Abuse:
All Participants (N=133)
Control
Christian
Sikh
No Perspective Taking
59.1%
63.6%
73.9%
Perspective Taking
54.5%
54.5%
50%
Table 3: Percent of guilty verdicts for aggravated sexual abuse in conditions with & without Perspective Taking
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Also important to note is the significantly higher tendency to convict the Sikh
defendant over the Christian and control defendants in the non-PT conditions. These data
support hypothesis 1b, reflecting outgroup punitiveness. According to the data, the Sikh
defendant had a 10.3% higher rate of conviction than the Christian defendant, and a
14.8% higher rate than the control defendant. Observing the power of perspective taking,
the discrepancies in conviction rates were greatly reduced and altered in the perspective
taking conditions, with the Sikh defendant’s rate of conviction becoming the lowest of all
three conditions. The same pattern in conviction rates was observed in the Christian-only
data as well (see Table 4), with an even larger discrepancy between conviction rates in
each condition. There, the conviction rates of the Sikh defendant dropped to 33.3%.
Interestingly, rates for the Christian defendant did not reflect the same pattern as
the control and Sikh conditions, with the percent of guilty verdicts with PT jumping to
80% (see Table 4). These results indicate that Christian participants were more likely to
convict the Christian defendant when perspective taking was present than not
(MnoPT=62.5%; MPT=80%). These conviction rates are in direct opposition to the pattern
observed in the control (MnoPT=54.5%; MPT=54.5%) and Sikh conditions (MnoPT=83.3%;
MPT=33.3%). These results were found to be significant through a chi square test x² (2,
N=56) = 20.88, p< .0001.
Rates of Conviction for Aggravated Sexual Abuse:
Only Christian Participants (N=59)
Control
Christian
Sikh
No Perspective Taking
54.5%
62.5%
83.3%
Perspective Taking
54.5%
80%
33.3%
Table 4: Percent of guilty verdicts for aggravated sexual abuse in conditions with & without Perspective Taking;
Only Christian participants.
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All-Christian participant sentencing followed the same pattern, not reflecting the
same sentencing results as the general participant pool (See Figure 2). Like the general
participant pool, higher sentences were recommended when perspective taking
instructions were absent in the control condition (MnoPT=24.68, SDnoPT=17.14; MPT=14.82,
SDPT=7.44) and Sikh condition (MnoPT=23.92, SDnoPT=11.01; MPT=14.89, SDPT=7.11). But
within the Christian condition, higher sentences were suggested in the perspective taking
condition (MnoPT=15.75, SDnoPT=7.09; MPT=28.33, SDPT=21.6). By completing a 3x2
univariate ANOVA between perspective taking and religious conditions, these data were
found to be significant (F (2, 51) =4.067, p<.05).
Recommended Sentences:
Christian Participants Only
(N=57)
30
28.33
Sentence (Years)
25
20
24.68
23.92
15
14.82
15.75
14.89
10
5
0
Figure 2: Recommended Sentences
from Christian participants withChristian
& without Perspective Taking instructions
Control
Sikh
Religious Condition
These results may indicate
several Taking
things. Instructions
It appears as though ingroup
perspective
No Perspective
Perspective
Taking Instructions
taking increased the negative evaluation of the target, pointing to the black sheep effect
and directly contradicting hypotheses of increased altruism (e.g., Galinsky & Moskowitz,
2000). This may have occurred due to participants’ increased identification with the
P e r s p e c t i v e T a k i n g , R e l i g i o u s S y m b o l s , a n d J u r y B i a s e s | 69
target and cognitive accessibility of the self-concept, escalating the sense of deviance
performed by the defendant (Davis et al., 1996). These results are in line with the Social
Identity Theory, supporting the rejection of the deviant ingroup member.
Clearly, perspective taking instructions influenced participants, affecting their
evaluation of the defendant and altering their sentencing decisions. Additionally, the
religious symbols within the case influence participants, as they altered reactions to the
perspective taking instructions; while PT instructions in the control and Sikh conditions
generated the expected altruistic reactions within Christian participants, knowledge of the
Christian defendant’s ingroup status affected Christian participants’ reactions to placing
themselves in the shoes of the defendant.
Recognizing the small participant pool in the Christian condition (N=14), and due
to the significant effects of the independent variables, further research should be
conducted to explain these findings, looking into the effects of perspective taking on
ingroup and outgroup biases. These results may reflect an additional danger in supplying
jurors with knowledge of the defendant’s religious affiliation, sparking ingroup biases
that directly affect a defendant’s likelihood of conviction.
Rational-experiential processing. It was hypothesized that instructions of
perspective taking would decrease levels of intuitive-experiential thinking and increase
levels of analytical-rational thinking. A univariate ANOVA evaluating the effects of
perspective taking and religious conditions on REI scales indicated no significant effect
of perspective taking on intuitive-experiential thinking (F (1,127)=.004, p>.05) or
analytical-rational thinking (F (1,127)=2.31, p>.05), not giving support to hypothesis 2.
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Similarly, the CEST measures did not indicate any effect of perspective taking on
heuristic (F (1,127) =1.45, p>.05) or logical thinking (F (1,127) =1.45, p>.05).
Likewise, in the all-Christian participant group, perspective taking did not have a
significant effect on analytical-rational (F (1, 53) =.019, p>.05) or intuitive-experiential
(F (1, 53) =.004, p>.05) processes as measured by the REI scale. But, when measured by
the CEST vignettes, data indicated that perspective taking significantly increased logical
thinking (F (1, 53) =3.14, p<.05) and decreased heuristic thinking (F (1, 53) =3.14,
p<.05), as hypothesized (See Tables 5a & 5b). Note that PT had the strongest effects on
rational/experiential thinking when religion was present, pointing to an effect of the
religious material on participant thought processes.
CEST Vignette Data
Mean Heuristic
Condition
No Perspective Taking
Control
Christian
Sikh
1.50
(1.08)
1.13
(0.99)
1.77
(1.09)
Perspective Taking
1.45
(0.93)
.67
(1.03)
.78
(1.09)
Table 5a: CEST Vignettes, Heuristic Means data of only Christian participants
Mean Logical
Condition
No Perspective Taking
Control
Christian
Sikh
1.50
(1.08)
1.88
(0.99)
1.23
(1.09)
Perspective Taking
1.55
(0.93)
2.33
(1.03)
2.22
(1.09)
Table 5b: CEST Vignettes, Logical Means data of only Christian participants
P e r s p e c t i v e T a k i n g , R e l i g i o u s S y m b o l s , a n d J u r y B i a s e s | 71
Perspective taking, rational-experiential thinking and sentencing decisions.
Significant positive correlations were found between the sum of perspective taking
and rational thinking, r (131) =.179, p<.05. Additionally, negative correlations were
found between PT and reliance on one’s instincts to make the sentencing decision,
r(131)=-.174, p<.05, as well as basing one’s sentencing decision on personal religious
beliefs, r(131)=-.194, p<.05, both experiential factors, all supporting hypothesis 3a.
Reliance on instincts correlated with the sum of one’s Religious Identification, r (131)
=.191, p<.05 and strongly correlated with experiential thinking, r (131) =.330, p<.01.
All of these correlations point to a negative relationship between perspective taking
and experiential processing and a positive correlation between perspective taking and
rational processes. These data show that the more participants utilized perspective
taking, the more they used rational thinking. It also indicates participants’ greater
reliance on instincts and religion when perspective taking was not being employed.
Rational-experiential thinking and sentencing in relation to perspective taking.
Several analysis indicated that intuitive-experiential thinking, as reported by REI,
positively correlated with basing one’s sentencing decision on “feelings about this
case,” r(131)=.178, p<.05, “instincts about this case,” r(131)=.33, p<.01, and
“feelings about the defendant,” r(131)=.177, p<.05. There were no correlations
between judge’s instructions, logic and reason, or any evidence presented in the case,
in line with hypothesis 3b. These data did not reflect significant correlations between
rational thought and what influenced participant’s sentencing decisions, except for a
negative correlation between “evidence that the couple had been estranged,” which
may be argued as a logical or emotional piece of evidence (r(1, 131)=-.177, p<.05).
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These data help support the argument that if PT instructions are applied within courts,
jury members’ decisions will be influenced more by the information provided from
the courts rather than personal and emotional reactions.
Religious identification and devotionalism. Along similar lines, data from the
control condition showed lower levels of Religious Identification as well as
Devotionalism in the perspective taking conditions. Religious Identification in the
control group without perspective taking instructions had an average Religious ID of
16.05 (SD=7.386), while with perspective taking the number dropped to an average of
12.57 (SD=6.169). Mirroring this pattern, levels of Devotionalism in the control
condition without PT averaged at 38.86 (SD=12.616), and with PT at 32.05
(SD=12.28). These data indicate the power of perspective taking in reducing one’s
reliance on religious beliefs. Interesting to note is the perspective taking instruction’s
lack of effect in the conditions containing religious symbols (Sikh and Christian).
Within these conditions, levels of RI and Devotionalism appeared to be
insignificantly altered by the presence of perspective taking, with levels barely
shifting. These data may be used to further support the use of perspective taking
instructions as well as the need to expel religious symbols from courtrooms.
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Religious Identification: All Participants
(N=127)
18
Religious Identification
16
14
16.05
13.86
12
14.86
12.57
10
11.68
10.95
8
6
4
2
0
Figure 3: Religious Identification of all participants with & without Perspective Taking instructions
Control
Christian
Sikh
Religious Condition
No Perspective Taking Instructions
Perspective Taking Instructions
Devotionalism: All Participants
(N=133)
45
Devotionalism
40
35
30
38.86
38.09
38.18
32.61
32.05
30.45
25
20
15
10
5
0
Figure 4: Devotionalism of allControl
participants with & without Perspective
Taking instructions
Christian
Sikh
Religious Condition
No Perspective Taking Instructions
Perspective Taking Instructions
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Effects of Religious Conditions
Rational-experiential thinking. It was hypothesized that the presence of
religious symbols would increase levels of intuitive-experiential thinking in
participants. Interestingly, data indicated the opposite effect, going against
hypothesis 4. A univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to examine
the effects of religious material on REI, combining the Christian and Sikh conditions.
Contrary to expectations, it was found that religion had a significant positive effect on
analytical-rational thinking (F (1, 131) =6.059, p<.05) with the highest levels of
rationality reported within conditions with religious material (M=20.76, SD=2.82),
over the control condition (M=19.41, SD=3.3). Furthermore, when all three
conditions were considered separately, it was found that religious material had a
positive effect on analytical-rational thinking (F (2,127) =3.4, p<.05). A Bonferroni
post hoc test indicated that the highest levels of rationality were recorded in the
Christian condition, with a difference of 1.64 (significance of p<.05) between the
Christian condition and control condition. These results directly contradict expected
results.
Additionally, religion was found to have no significant effect on intuitiveexperiential processes as measured by REI when religious conditions (Christian and
Sikh) were considered together (F (1,131) =.044, p>.05) or apart (F (2,127) =1.13,
p>.05). No effect was found in the CEST vignette measures either, showing no effect
of religious condition on logical or heuristic processing (F (2,127) =.805, p>.05).
Sum of Perspective Taking. Religious condition (Control, Christian, or Sikh)
was not expected to significantly affect levels of perspective taking, and analysis
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confirmed this prediction (F (2, 130) =.553, p>.05). Means and standard deviations
of the three groups were recorded as follows: (MControl=29.27, SDControl=4.727;
MChristian=29.39, SDChristian=5.109; MSikh=28.38, SDSikh=5.051).
Sentencing. Based on our understanding of ingroup favoritism, it was
expected that sentences in the Christian condition would be lower than the Sikh and
control conditions (as there are far more Christians in the participant pool than Sikhs).
Additionally, the Sikh condition was projected to have higher sentences due to
outgroup punitiveness. Results did not reflect the anticipated pattern, going against
hypothesis 5a. The control condition’s average sentence was calculated at 18.92
years (SD=11.7), the Christian condition at 19.43 years (SD=14.58) and the Sikh
condition at an average of 19.18 years (SD=10.87). These data were not found to be
significantly different from one another (F (2, 122) =.018, p>.05), showing no effect
of religious condition on average sentencing.
Sentencing was also examined in the all-Christian participant group (N=57).
Contrary to expectations, results did not indicate ingroup favoritism, going against
hypothesis 5b. Again, it was expected that the presence of religious symbols would
result in higher sentences for the outgroup member (Sikh) and lower for the ingroup
member (Christian). Yet, it was found that the highest sentence of 21.14 years was
reported in the Christian condition (SD=17.76). Second lowest was the Sikh
condition with a recommended average sentence of 20.05 years (SD=10.39) and the
lowest sentence in the control conditions averaged 19.75 years (SD=13.84). However,
these findings were not statistically significant (F (2, 51) =.206, p> .05). These data
may be the result of the black sheep effect, as Christians received the highest
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recommended sentence. Still, the reasons for this change in average sentencing are
unclear. Moreover, it must be noted that these sentences are an average of PT and
no-PT conditions. Recall Figures 1 & 2 for sentencing between PT and no-PT
conditions.
Factors that influenced the sentencing decisions. Factors found to correlate
with recommended sentences were one’s reliance on “personal feelings about rape” (r
(126) =.235, p<.01) and certainty in sentencing decision (r (126) =.336, p<.01); the
more certain someone was, the higher the sentence and the stronger their feelings
about rape in general. Most importantly, basing one’s decision on “personal feelings
about rape” strongly correlated with basing one’s decision on “feelings about the
defendant,” r (131) =.355, p<.01, “instincts about this case” r (131) =.252, p<.01,
“personal religious beliefs,” r (126) =.318, p<.01, and “feelings about this case,” r
(131) =.406, p<.01. All of these reasons reflect heuristic, feeling-based thinking.
None of these factors positively correlated with judge’s instructions (r (131)=-.07,
p>.05) or several questions regarding evidence presented within the case summary,
with the only exception found between personal feelings of rape and evidence that the
defendant showed no regret, r(131)=.217, p<.05. These correlations suggest that
those who proposed higher sentences were also processing experientially. For a full
chart of correlations see Appendix D.63
Reported levels of religious identification. It was found that a participant’s
reported Religious Identification was significantly effected by the religious condition
Also important to note is sentencing’s negative correlation with “evidence that the couple had been
estranged,” r (126) =-.265, p<.01), which may be considered intuitive-experiential or analytical-rational.
63
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of the study (F (2,121) =2.72, p<.10). A univariate ANOVA revealed the largest
discrepancy in Religious Identification between the Christian (M=14.35, SD=1.06)
and Sikh conditions (M=11.32, SD=1.05) (See Figure 5a). These results reflect a
direct relationship between the way in which one perceives his/her own religious
identity and the religious affiliation of the defendant before them. Most interesting in
the reported RI is the significant drop in the Sikh condition. This change may be due
to several factors, including higher rational thinking or the social desirability effect.
It is also a possibility that these results are symptomatic of a problem with random
assignment; it is possible that more religious participants happened to be assigned to
the Christian condition.
All participants
(N=133)
20
15
14.31
14.36
10
11.33
5
0
Control
Christian
Sikh
Religious Identification
Figure 5a: Reported Religious Identification of all participants
The discrepancies in Religious Identification between conditions were even more
pronounced in the all-Christian participant pool (See Figure 5b). Religious conditions
had a significant effect on one’s reported RI (F (2, 53) =4.32, p<.05), with a difference of
6.65 (p<.05) between the Christian and Sikh conditions, showing higher RI with a
Christian defendant and lower RI with a Sikh defendant.
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Christian Participants
(N=59)
20
15
18.29
16.39
10
11.64
5
0
Figure 5b: Reported
Religious Identification ofChristian
Christian participants
Control
Sikh
Religious Identification
These data indicate the substantial effects of the religious symbols within the trial
summary on participant’s evaluations of their religious affiliation and identity. Christian
participants reported far higher Religious Identification when the defendant of the trial
was of Christian faith than when no religion was mentioned. Moreover, Christian
participants’ evaluation of their Religious Identification significantly dropped with the
Sikh defendant. Reasons for this are unclear, though higher rationality and social
desirability effect may be argued.
Religious identification and factors that influenced sentencing decisions. In the
general participant pool it was found that RI negatively correlated with one’s level of
analytical-rational thinking (as measured by REI),64 r (125) =-.179, p<.05, and positively
correlated with a participant’s reliance on “instincts about the case” in making one’s
sentencing decision (r (125) =.191, p<.05), supporting hypothesis 6.
Interestingly, RI was found to be positively correlated with being influenced by logic and reason, (r (131)
=.193, p<.05). Previous research indicates that logic and reason should correlate with analytical-rational, not
intuitive-experiential thought, but results of RI do not reflect this expectation (Epstein et al., 1996).
64
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Furthermore, reliance on one’s instincts in making the sentencing decision was
correlated with intuitive-experiential thinking (as measured by the REI), r (131) =.330,
p<.01, and several other feeling-based decisions, linking Religious Identification and
experiential processing (see Appendix D for a full listing). This indicates higher levels of
experiential thinking as well as reliance on feeling-based reasoning for sentencing
decisions when levels of RI were higher. It should also be noted that Religious
Identification significantly correlated with measures of Devotionalism (r (125) =.611,
p<.01), linking the two measures. Additionally, all of these correlations were amplified
when Atheist participants were removed. For a chart, please see Appendix E.
Devotionalism. Religious conditions were found have a causal affect on one’s
reported levels of Devotionalism (F (2, 127) =3.42, p<.05). Post hoc tests showed the
largest discrepancy in reported Devotionalism between the Christian and Sikh conditions
(6.58, p<.05) (See Figure 6a). As with Religious Identification, the all-Christian
participant pool amplified these differences (F (2, 53) =3.65, p<.05), showing a
discrepancy of 10.62 (p<.05) between the Christian and Sikh conditions (See Figure 6b).
Again, these data suggest that the religion of the defendant in the trial influenced
participants’ evaluations of their own religious devotionalism.
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All Participants
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
38.14
35.45
31.56
Control
Christian
Sikh
Figure 6a: Reported Devotionalism of all participants
Devotionalism
Christian Participants
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
40.04
42.57
31.95
Control
Christian
Devotionalism
Figure 6b: Reported Devotionalism of Christian participants
Sikh
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Devotionalism and factors that influenced sentencing decisions. In the general
participant pool, levels of Devotionalism were found to be positively correlated with a
participant’s reliance on “personal religious beliefs” when making sentencing decisions, r
(131) =.217, p<.05. This correlation suggests that the higher levels of Devotionalism
observed in the all-Christian participant group indicate increased reliance on religious
beliefs when faced with a Christian defendant. Again, lower levels of Devotionalism in
the Sikh condition, as compared to the control condition, raise several questions, such as
whether or not participants were more rational in that condition, or whether they wanted
to appear less biased.
Gender
When looking at gender, no significant differences were found between genders
in regards to recommended sentence (F (1,126) =.016, p>.05) or guilt of aggravated
sexual abuse, x² (1, N=133) = 0.21, p> .05. Females recorded higher scores of
perspective taking, F (1, 131) =11.82, p<.05, indicating an elevated tendency for females
to take the perspective of others. In regards to all other dependant variables, no
significant differences were found between women and men: levels of devotionalism (F
(1,131) =1.979, p>.05), religious identification (F (1,125) =.677, p>.05), rational
processing through REI (F (1,131) =.035, p>.05), experiential processing through REI (F
(1,131) =.004, p>.05), rational processing by CEST (F(1,131)=.072, p>.05) or
experiential processing by CEST (F(1,131)=.072, p>.05).
P e r s p e c t i v e T a k i n g , R e l i g i o u s S y m b o l s a n d J u r o r B i a s e s | 82
Gender
Sentence
Guilty
PT
Dev
RI
Rat. REI
Exp.
REI
Rat.
CEST
Exp.
CEST
Male
17.94
(1.57)
18.57
(1.23)
54%
27.1
(0.68)
30.13
(0.53)
36.73
(1.71)
34.07
(1.33)
13.74
(.99)
12.98
(0.78)
20.36
(0.43)
20.31
(0.33)
16.33
(0.6)
16.44
(0.46)
1.76
(.89)
1.81
(1.03)
1.24
(.89)
1.19
(1.03)
Female
62.7%
Table 6: Gender Data
DISCUSSION
As hypothesized, perspective taking lowered sentences and correlated positively
with rational thinking; data suggest that as participants employed perspective taking,
rational thinking increased and sentences decreased. Interestingly, this implies present
biases within the jury pool. Furthermore, REI measures did not report changes in
intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational thinking from the presence of religious
symbols. Yet, one’s level of Devotionalism and Religious Identification shifted
depending on the study condition, with higher RI and Devotionalism scores in the
Christian condition, and lower in the Sikh condition. Devotionalism was found to be
positively correlated with reliance on one’s religious beliefs and experiential thinking and
RI scores were strongly correlated with reliance on instincts, a characteristic of
experiential thought. These data suggest that although REI measures did not directly
reflect the impact of religious material, changes in thought processes occurred within the
participant pool, depending upon the presence or absence of religious symbols.
Furthermore, perspective taking was found to reduce levels of RI and
Devotionalism in the control condition, but had no significant effects when religious
symbols were present, even though the average sentence was reduced. As such, while PT
was able to reduce bias and experiential thinking, other mental processes were not
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affected by PT in the presence of religious symbols. These data provide strong support
for the inclusion of perspective taking instructions and the erasure of religious symbols
from the courts.
Furthermore, several factors impact the decision-making process. This study
alone measured attitudes towards oneself (in terms of religiosity and devotion), attitudes
towards the defendant, and the impact of legal materials (e.g., judge’s instructions and
evidence of the case) as well as extra legal materials (e.g., intuition, feelings, religion).
Findings of this study highlight the complexity of decision-making and the ways in which
the decision-making process may be altered.
Most importantly, the impact of perspective taking on sentencing implies the
presence of juror biases. As found in previous studies, the increased self-other overlap
caused by perspective taking diminishes accessibility and application of ingroup and
outgroup stereotypes, and as such is suggested as an effective strategy for debiasing
social thought (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio et al., 2003). Data showing the
decrease in sentencing and increase in rational thought as a result of perspective taking
support these earlier findings. Furthermore, the larger effects of perspective taking
(lowering sentences by the most significant degree) in the Sikh condition, signify the
presence of outgroup biases, curtailed by the presence of perspective taking. PT also had
the greatest effect in Sikh conviction rates. As such, this study illustrates that religious
symbols of a Guru Granth Sahib (book) and Ek-Onkar (tattoo) are enough to generate
outgroup status of the defendant. Keep in mind that the way in which the Sikh defendant
swore in was identical to the way in which the Christian defendant swore in, “I swear to
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tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth so help me God,” thus
highlighting the impact of the symbols alone, regardless of the mention of God.
Furthermore, data regarding Devotionalism and Religious Identification reflect
the different modes of thinking utilized by jurors, changes in how jurors view themselves,
and how jurors come to their respective decisions (e.g., relying on judge’s instructions,
evidence, feelings, or intuitions). Uses of rational and experiential thinking shifted
between religious conditions, as did levels of religiousness and devotion. These changes
correlated with participant’s dependence on legal and extra legal materials when making
their decisions. These fluctuations, changing in response to the religion of the defendant,
show the instability caused by the presence of religious material in courts.
Perspective Taking: Conclusions
The results of this study exhibited the beneficial effects of perspective taking.
Most importantly, perspective taking lowered sentences in all three conditions,
illustrating the power of perspective taking in reducing biases. These claims were
evidenced through perspective taking measures’ positive correlations with rational
thought measures and negative correlations with religious influence and instincts.
Furthermore, perspective taking’s impact in reducing levels of Devotionalism and
Religious Identification in the control condition further demonstrated the power of
perspective taking in inhibiting one’s reliance upon religion. (Interesting to note is the
dampened effect of perspective taking on RI and Devotionalism in the two conditions
containing religious symbols, though the final result (sentencing) did reflect reduced
biases in lowered sentencing. These data point to the importance of using perspective
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taking in the courtroom in an effort to reduce bias, but also to the importance of
eliminating the presence of religious symbols within the courts. Without eradicating the
presence of religious symbols, perspective taking instructions cannot have their full effect
in decision-making. Although sentences were lowered, addressing how jurors come to
their decisions is still relevant.)
Due to perspective taking’s significant effect on rational and experiential thinking,
as well as levels of religious identity and devotion, perspective taking affected what
influenced juror decisions. Participants with higher levels of experiential thought were
more influenced by feeling and intuition-based factors than evidence or judge’s
instructions, whereas that those who utilized perspective taking and measured higher in
rationality were influenced by judge’s instructions and logic, over heuristics.
Furthermore, as observed in the Sikh sentencing condition, perspective taking
counteracted outgroup biases by greatly reducing Sikh defendant’s sentence and
conviction rates. Without perspective taking the Sikh defendant received a sentence of
21.6 years, the highest of all three conditions, and with perspective taking the sentence
reduced to 16.76 years. As stated earlier, these data point to the grave importance of
integrating perspective taking instructions into judge’s instructions. When jurors were
advised to consider the perspective of the defendant, biases lowered and rational thinking
increased. Both of these phenomena are essential to the proper functioning of the jury
decision-making.
Yet, adding perspective taking instructions to judge’s instructions is not the only
necessary alteration. Evidence of Christians recommending higher sentences in the
perspective taking conditions to Christian defendants presents a conflict. These data
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indicate a hindering effect of perspective taking instructions, as it may increase the
occurrence of the black sheep effect. As such, these data represent the dangers in
supplying jurors with information regarding the defendant’s religious beliefs. These data
also show that courts cannot simply integrate perspective taking into court instructions
with the hopes that it will counteract any religious, racial, or class biases present within
the court. Instead, religious content must be erased, as perspective taking can increase
biases within ingroups.
If a tattoo on a defendant is enough to spark the black sheep
effect, this evidence provides substantial support for the erasure of all religious symbols
and content within courts.
Another conflict is observed in lower levels of PT within the Sikh condition (with
the all-Christian participants group) when perspective taking instructions were given.
Reasons for this result are unclear, and should be given more attention. These data may
indicate one’s difficulty in taking the perspective of an outgroup member. Consequently,
this too could help support the argument that religious content must never be given to
reveal the religious affiliation of the defendant so as to reduce outgroup biases.
Religious Conditions: Conclusions
It was anticipated that religious conditions would affect the length of
recommended sentences with higher sentences in the Sikh condition and lower in the
Christian, and though the average sentence and rate of conviction without perspective
taking was highest in the Sikh condition, data did not indicate a significant effect.
Considering the evidence that several other decision-making factors shifted in response to
the religious affiliation of the defendant, sentencing’s failure to reflect these changes may
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be contributed to the lack of judgment standards provided and the large scale in which
participants could recommend sentences (4 ½ years to life in prison). Providing
participants with such an expansive scale allowed for innumerable interpretations of the
appropriate sentence, thus compromising sentencing data.
Furthermore, it was expected that religious content would produce intuitiveexperiential processing. Instead, results indicated that religious material had no effect on
experiential thinking as measured by REI or CEST and instead showed increased levels
of analytical-rational thinking. In fact, rational thinking was highest when the defendant
was of the same religion as the participant. It is unclear why these results would occur.
It is a possibility that the effects of religious material were not significant enough to be
detected by rational-experiential measures.
Yet, changes in experiential and rational thinking were illustrated in measures of
Devotionalism and Religious Identification. The overall data regarding Devotionalism
and RI reflected the anticipated obstructive effects of religious symbols on jury decisionmaking. First and foremost, the fluctuation in reported Devotionalism and Religious
Identification highlights the effects of the religious symbols used in the trial summary,
altering the way in which jurors judged themselves, depending upon the religion of the
defendant before them. These changes alone indicate the dangers in supplying jurors
with knowledge of the defendant’s religious affiliation.
Furthermore, negative correlations between RI and rational processes, as well as
Devotionalism’s correlation with experiential and religion-based decisions (e.g., instincts,
feelings, religion, etc.), indicate the expected hindrances of religion on the jury decisionmaking process. These correlations, related to the elevated levels of Devotionalism and
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RI reported in the all-Christian participant Christian condition, suggest that jurors rely
more heavily on religion and think less rationally when the defendant is of one’s religious
ingroup. These findings also suggest that the presence of religious symbols can change
how jurors evaluate a case before them, increasing experiential thinking and reliance on
feeling and instincts over evidence presented in a case. These findings are essential in
understanding that religious material within courtrooms alters juror decision-making,
compromising proper jury evaluations and verdicts.
What remains less clear is the causation behind the lower Devotionalism and RI
levels recorded in the Sikh condition. Two plausible explanations for these data are
higher rational thinking (when faced with an outgroup member) and the social
desirability effect. The social desirability effect, not giving honest answers in order to
conform with societal norms, commonly takes place when respondents are asked their
opinions on controversial issues, such as race and religion (e.g., Schuman & Converse,
1971; Kane &Macaulay, 1993).65 Amherst, Massachusetts, where this study was
conducted, is a highly liberal area where “political correctness” is held in high esteem.
Therefore, it appears likely that the pool of participants within this study would have the
desire to appear less biased against an outgroup member by reducing their reported
religious affiliation. In doing so, participants aim to reduce an image of outgroup
prejudice, reflecting the social desirability effect. Also, evidence of shifting levels of
Devotionalism and Religious Identification are not frequently reported, suggesting an
effect of participant pool. And lastly, increased levels of rationality when faced with
65
As cited in Streb et al. (2008).
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outgroup members is not an easily explained phenomenon, and is therefore an unlikely
cause for the downward shifts in Devotionalism and Religious Identification observed.
Limitations
It should be noted that measures within this study may suffer from problems such
as transparency of questions, weak attention, and the social desirability effect, as
discussed earlier. One question was added to the questionnaire to check for adequate
attention to details in the case study, which had participants mark whether they were
influenced by evidence of an event that had not been included in the trial summary. As
noted earlier, over half of the participants marked that the non-existent evidence
influenced their sentencing decision. These data imply a lack of attention and
understanding of the case summary by participants. Therefore, the answers in this study
may have been overly influenced by prior attitudes and beliefs. As Giner-Sorolla et al.
(2002) writes, “Prior attitudes and beliefs have been shown to influence legal decisions
especially when under conditions of low ability to process information- such as high case
complexity, cognitive load, or time pressure” (p. 508). The lack of accuracy in noting
this evidence as not affecting one’s sentencing decisions indicates low cognitive load and
understanding of the material.
Evidence within this study should also be taken with a grain of salt due to low
ecological validity. This study did not involve juror deliberations, limiting the interaction
of jurors and the possibility of shifting judgments based on others’ opinions.
Additionally, the materials of the study were typed out, not acted or filmed. This
presentation of information decreases its feeling of importance. Similarly, the fact that
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participants were not put in an actual court with a real defendant dampens the gravity of
the participants’ decisions.
Lastly, the issue of domestic abuse may be a limiting factor due to some religious
teaching’s support of abuse, as well as participants’ emotional reactions to the topic.
Spilka et al. (2003) note that several religious teachings condone abusive behavior as an
acceptable form of punishment (de Jonge, 1995; Kroeger & Beck, 1996; Volcano Press,
1995). For example, several Biblical passages may be seen as condoning physical abuse
by conveying messages such as the man is the head of the household. At the same time,
religious institutions have commonly taken stances against domestic abuse (Volcano
Press, 1995). Therefore, this study may be affected by whether or not one’s religious
teachings condone or prohibit abuse.
Similarly, the measures through the Rational-Experiential Inventory do not
control for one’s emotional reaction to the issue of sexual and physical domestic abuse.
While these statistics were read to represent one’s reaction to religious materials, it is
likely that participants’ emotional states were altered by the content of abuse within the
trial summary. Therefore, high levels of experiential thinking may have been read
inaccurately as a reaction to religious symbols rather than content of abuse. Furthermore,
this topic may have conjured up emotions for some participants while not affecting others.
Also, while this same scene was depicted in each condition, there is the possibility of
inaccurate random assignment.
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Suggestions for Future Research
Considering the presence of several unexpected findings within this study, further
research should be conducted. Specifically, it is important to gain a better understanding
of ingroup biases and how they manifest in juror decision-making as well as verdicts.
Also, one’s ability to take the perspective of outgroup members must be further
investigated as well. Recommendations for the inclusion of perspective taking may not
take place without further understanding of one’s ability to take the perspective of
another while in a position of judgment. Additional studies should be run to validate and
replicate the findings of this study. Further research should be conducted to verify the
presence of juror biases and the power of perspective taking in negating such biases.
Furthermore, the power of religious symbols over the decision-making process should be
given more attention. Lastly, variations in case seriousness should be studied in order to
gain a better understanding of the black sheep effect as well as similarity-leniency within
religious groups, especially in a time of judgment.
Implications for the Future
Considering the findings that all three conviction rates dropped when perspective
taking was added, and that perspective taking increased rational thought and reduced
reliance on religious beliefs, perspective taking instructions must be added to jury
instructions. Furthermore, as evidenced by the differences in sentencing and conviction
rates between defendants when PT was not applied, ingroup and outgroup biases clearly
influenced the decisions of participants. Simply knowing the religion of the defendant
caused sentencing and conviction rates to fluctuate between conditions. As such, jury
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biases cannot be ignored. Evidence from this study suggests that the inclusion of
perspective taking instructions can greatly improve the impartiality of jury pools, the
ideal in a time of judgment.
Furthermore, again considering the findings such as sentence and conviction
differences between defendants, as well as the possibility of the social desirability effect
in response to the Sikh defendant’s religion and the black sheep effect within the
Christian pool, simply adding perspective taking instructions will not solve the problem
of bias within the courtroom. As such, religious symbols must be eradicated from United
States courtrooms. If the presence of a simple religious sign such as the Bible or EkOnkar is enough to change how participants judge a defendant in a mock trial, one must
assume that even more blatant religious symbols faced in real-life trials would be far
more influential and emotionally significant. As cited by the Sixth Amendment, all
citizens of the United States have the right to a trial with an impartial jury.66 The
evidence of this study clearly exposes the biases held within jurors when religion of the
defendant is known, as such compromising the adherence to the Sixth Amendment and
the proper functioning of the United States jury processes. To sentence a defendant while
relying on intuition over evidence goes directly against the purpose of the Sixth
Amendment. With consideration given to these findings as well as United States law,
changes must be made in our legal system to erase and prohibit any sign of religion
within U.S. courtrooms. Without this change, jurors around the country will continue to
66“In
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury
of the State and district where in the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the
witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense”; U.S. Const., amend. VI.
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be unfairly influenced by outside, personal factors, risking the validity and impartiality of
the trial process.
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Chapter Three:
Regulating Religion & Implications
“The ordinary rules for the administration of law are rather simple and not difficult to follow. But judges
should be students of life, even more than of law. Biology and psychology, which form the basis of
understanding human conduct, should be taken into account. Without fair knowledge of the mechanism of
man, and the motives and urges that govern his life, it is idle to venture to fathom a situation; but, with
some knowledge, officers and the public can be most useful in preserving and protecting those who most
need such help. The life of almost any unfortunate, if rightly understood, can be readjusted to some plan of
order and system, instead of left to drift on to ruin, the victim of ignorance, hatred and chance.” -Darrow
(1940, p. 494).
While the debiasing power of perspective taking instructions remains the most
significant finding of this study, the assertion that religious symbols be removed from
courts must be further discussed due to several controversies surrounding the separation
of church and state. Acknowledging the presence of religious biases and the hampering
effects of religious content on jurors’ abilities to think rationally, one is faced with the
dilemma of regulating religion. As concluded in the previous chapter, perspective taking
should be encouraged during jury instructions to reduce juror biases and the expression of
such biases while in court. But the results of this study also indicated that religious
symbols influenced jurors’ self-judgment, sentencing, and convictions. Moreover, levels
of Devotionalism and religious identity shifted depending on the religion of the defendant,
regardless of the presence of perspective taking. Although other measurements showed a
reduction in bias (such as sentencing), it is still of utmost importance to regulate the
changes observed, caused by the presence of religious symbols (especially because
Devotionalism and Religious Identification correlated with experiential thinking and
basing one’s decision on religious convictions). Without the removal of religiouslybased symbols, religious biases may continue to be felt in jurors even with the utilization
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of perspective taking. Therefore, it is suggested that religious symbols be removed from
U.S. courtrooms.
This suggestion is made with the acknowledgment that many people believe the
erasure of religion within courts is impossible, citing various difficulties surrounding the
prohibition of religion in legal matters, such as government ties to religion (for more
information regarding government entanglement with religion, including U.S. legal
history surrounding the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause, the “Lemon
test,” faith-based rehabilitation, and the difficulties in regulating the government’s role in
religious matters, please see Appendix F) or furthermore, unnecessary and wrong, noting
American ties to Christianity and the benefits of invoking God in a time of judgment (e.g.,
creating unity, the sense of a higher judge, morality; e.g., Echoes of Grace: From the
Prison to the State House, 2007; Rothchild et al., 2007; Complicity or Justice and
Mercy?, 2007; Connelly, 1999).
While respecting the arguments of American Christian traditions and the
difficulty in separating church and state, it has become apparent through several
psychological studies (e.g., Miller & Bornstein, 2005; Giner-Sorolla et al., 2002; Howard
& Redfering, 1983; Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999; Johnson, 1984; Kenworthy, 2003; Kerr
et al., 1995), that allowing religion within courtrooms creates bias. Including the study
just conducted, it has been shown that religious beliefs hinder, provoke prejudice, and
alter the decisions of participants. When put in a decision-making position, the presence
of religious symbols, whether historically traditional or not, risks the proper functioning
of our judicial system. As such, without condemning Christianity or religious roots of the
American nation, it must be understood that the presence of such religious fervor when in
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a time of decision-making is not beneficial to the defendant or jurors. As observed in the
study, the invocation of religion increases ingroup and outgroup biases already present
within the courtroom, illustrating the biasing effects of religion within U.S. courts. While
religion may continue to play a role in several American traditions, the presence of
religion within courtrooms is problematic if we wish to achieve optimal rationality and
impartially within jury pools.
Durkheim: Emphasizing Citizenship
In the article Civil Religion in America, Bellah argues that it is not one religion
alone that unites Americans, but a “civil religion,” which entails “common elements of
religious orientation that the great majority of Americans share” (1967, p.171). The
inauguration of the President is one example of a civil religious event. Bellah cites
Dwight Eisenhower as saying, “Our government makes no sense unless it is founded in a
deeply felt religious faith- and I don’t care what it is” (p.170). This statement, Bellah
points out, negates the necessary presence of one specific religion. But according to
Bellah, civil religion cannot replace traditional religion because religion supplies the
awareness that the nation faces a higher judge: God. This awareness of authority and
formidable judge is essential to the functioning of a courtroom setting and maintaining a
law-abiding society. Jurors, defendants, and lawyer alike must feel the gravity of the
situation and also respect and adhere to the procedures within the court.
Emile Durkheim also credits religion for maintaining social order, citing the
social roots of religion in lowering acts of deviance. Today, according to Durkheim,
religion plays an important role in legitimizing and reinforcing society’s values and
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norms (Durkheim, 1961). Yet, Durkheim does not assume these collective sentiments
and ideas must be “religion,” as we think of it today. Unlike Bellah, Durkheim believes
that the social root of religion is based on the concept of “collective effervescence”
(1961). Collective effervescence is the primary form of religion, comprised of collective
action (a group performing an action together, such as going to church), idealization (an
idea that becomes known as a revelation, such as God), and concept formation (creating a
new idea, such as Heaven). When these three things occur together, Durkheim proposes
an electrical charge ignites between people that produces community and productivity.
To Durkheim, “cults” are the secondary form of religion, which includes the titles most
think of as “religion”: Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, etc. But to Durkheim, religion
can also include symbols, sports teams, bands, a concert, anything that brings people
together under a common idea and excitement. “What essential difference is there
between an assembly of Christians celebrating the principal dates of the life of
Christ…and a reunion of citizens commemorating the promulgation of a new moral or
legal system or some great event in the national life?” writes Durkheim (1961, p.475).
Unlike the common perspective of religion, Durkheim sees the secondary forms of
religion as fluid and inessential, but, no society can last without the primary form of
religion, collective effervescence: “There can be no society which does not feel the need
of upholding and reaffirming at regular intervals the collective sentiments and collective
ideas which make its unity and its personality” (Durkheim, 1961, p.474-5).
Therefore, according to Durkheimian theory and the importance of authority, as
discussed by Bellah, I propose that Christian symbols and moral traditions within the
courtroom be replaced with a secondary form of patriotism, an emphasis on citizenship
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and the nation. Instead of invoking religious morals, citizen responsibility and legal
regulations should be at the forefront of every person’s minds. Through this, secularism
within courtrooms may be achieved. Further, secularism can provide the same collective
effervescence as religion as long as it maintains the same elements: collective action,
idealization, and concept formation. By banishing religious symbols while adding
national symbols, attention would simply shift to another collective action. The ideal of
justice and the concept of a safe and law abiding community will be present. Put together,
these elements would result in a collective surge of patriotism, thus creating the same
foundational social roots necessary for the stabilization of society, expressing the shared
moral values of all Americans.
In order to achieve collective effervescence and social order through secular
nationalism, several things must be replaced in the courtroom setting. There should be no
swearing to God, no Bible, and no religious symbols allowed on any individual within the
courtroom. The presence of the Ten Commandments or any other religiously significant
phrases would not be tolerated or deemed legal within the courtroom setting (Associated
Press, 2004). Neither would prosecutorial references to the Bible or God. Instead, the
United States flag should be present, along with the U.S. Constitution and other symbols
representing the nation as a whole and emphasizing one’s role as a citizen in upholding
the laws that regulate social order within this country. In doing so, the court will
maintain the same authoritative air created by the current presence of religion, as
suggested by Bellah. The judge will still play as formidable a role as before, acting as
the person who upholds and enacts the laws of the United States, instead of invoking
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God-like qualities and jurors will still feel a moral responsibility to provide a fair and just
sentence.
Furthermore, Durkheim provides an argument in support of the termination of the
Bible-based swearing in process: using the Bible for swearing in assumes that each
defendant believes in God. If they do not, then the act of swearing on the Bible is
obsolete. As such, the United States should replace the use of religious material within
courtrooms with signs of national pride and citizenship. By doing so, defendants will
swear on their own pride and morals by covering their hearts instead of swearing by a
God they may or may not believe in. Another alternative would be swearing on the
Constitution, as such invoking the laws and traditions of the United States of America.
The influence of what a defendant swears in on was clearly observed in this study.
Recall that both the Sikh and Christian defendants used the words “so help me God”; the
only difference in their oath was the holy book on which they placed their hands. This
difference alone provoked the changes in perspective taking and rational thinking
observed in the findings of the study. Considering this evidence, removing the Bible and
creating one secular book or image on which defendants may take their oath will remove
additional religious biases present within jurors. Emphasizing national pride and
commitment to one’s personal religious morals will also reduce these biases. And,
according to Durkheim, this may be achieved without compromising the court’s feeling
of authority and power.
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Conclusion
As hypothesized, the findings of this study indicated that perspective taking had a
significant negative effect on sentencing as well as a positive correlation with rational
thinking. As participants employed perspective taking, rational thinking increased and
sentences decreased. Most importantly, the impact of perspective taking on sentencing
implies the presence of juror biases, as perspective taking has been found decrease group
stereotyping and debias social thought, therefore indicating bias in the non perspective
taking conditions (Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio et al., 2003).
Supporting these findings, changes in intuitive-experiential and analytical-rational
thinking were reflected in levels of Devotionalism, Religious Identification, and some
measures by the Cognitive Experiential Self-Theory vignettes. Levels of Devotionalism
and Religious Identification shifted depending on the study condition, with higher levels
in the Christian condition, and lower in the Sikh condition. Devotionalism was found to
be positively correlated with reliance on one’s religious beliefs and experiential thinking
and Religious Identification scores were heavily correlated with reliance on instincts, a
characteristic of experiential thought. Shifts of thought processes between religious
conditions correlated with participant’s dependence on legal and extra legal materials
when making their decisions, illustrating the instability caused by the presence of
religious material in courts.
These findings support the hypothesis that ingroup and outgroup biases are
present within courtroom today. It also suggests that the presence of religious symbols
may increase the expression of such biases, though instructions to take the perspective of
the defendant can negate bias. Considering these findings, it is suggested that perspective
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taking instructions be administered during the recitation of the judge’s instructions.
Jurors should be urged to take the perspective of the defendant when making their
decisions. These instructions will help diminish the presence and influence of personal
biases within the courtroom.
Additionally, it is suggested that a fundamentalism scale be added to the process
of voir dire, in order to determine jurors who will likely be unable to avoid prejudiced
decisions and experiential thinking (e.g., Jackson et al., 1997; Herek, 1987; Griffen et al.,
1987; Unger, 2002; Hunsberger et al., 1999; Spilka et al., 2003; McFarland, 1989; Miller
& Hayward, 2007). As noted, fundamentalist beliefs, the ascription to a religion’s
definition of the “inerrant truth about humanity,” drastically hinder the decision-making
process, plausibly altering the perception of a defendant as well as a case (Altemeyer &
Hunsberger, 1992).
There has been consistent criticism of the “death-qualifying”67 procedures
currently used during voir dire for their inability to detect juror biases. “If voir dire
questions can be utilized to indentify jurors who would both follow the law and be
impartial, then the process would help the court maintain an image of impartiality,”
writes Nason (2005). While we still do not have a complete understanding of juror bias,
we must take advantage of the knowledge that has been acquired regarding juror
prejudice. The utilization the fundamentalism scale would improve the current voir dire
jury selection methods as well as reduce bias in non capital punishment cases, fulfilling
the ideal voir dire selection. Additionally, this method would also inhibit discrimination
“Death qualifying” refers to choosing jurors who are able to follow the juror’s oath and the law, despite
whatever personal feelings they may have for or against the death penalty. See, Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S.
412, 424 (1985).
67
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against religious groups as a whole, as the scale would focus on individual beliefs, not the
title of one’s religious affiliation (the current laws set in Batson v. Kentucky68 and J.E.B.
v. Alabama69 regarding preemptory challenges forbid race and gender-based juror
discrimination, with several courts extending the law to cover religion-based
discrimination,70 claiming unconstitutional discrimination toward the excluded juror).71
Because of the overwhelming evidence pointing towards fundamentalism’s inherent ties
to right-wing authoritarianism, prejudice towards outgroups, and lower levels of complex
thought, I believe that individuals with high scores on the religious fundamentalism
scales should not be allowed to participate in juror panels and deliberations. While
according to this study’s findings perspective taking instructions would be beneficial in
courts, the integration of a fundamentalism test is also essential.
This study also highlights the negative effects of religious material within courts.
Seeing as data shifted depending on the religious affiliation of the juror, and that
perspective taking instructions were less influential on the Devotionalism and Religious
Identification scales when religious symbols were present, it must also be suggested that
religion be removed from the courts. As discussed earlier, emphasis on citizenship and
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1985); Batson held that race-based peremptory challenges violate the rights
of the defendant and potential juror: “The Equal Protection Clause guarantees the defendant that the State will
not exclude members of his race from the jury venire on account of race…[B]y denying a person participation
in jury service on account of his race, the State unconstitutionally discriminated against the excluded juror.” 476
U.S. at 86-87. (Barton, 1995)
69 J.E.B. v. Alabama, 114 S. Ct. 1419 (1994); Ruled that it was unconstitutional to remove a juror based on
gender.
70 See, United States v. Carolene Products Co., 204 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938), where the Court listed religion
along with race as a suspect category.
71 As stated in Barton (1995), “A government religious classification which results in members of a religion
being denied the opportunity to serve on a jury clearly constitutes a ‘burden’ on the free exercise of that
religion” (p. 207). Distributing a fundamentalism scale to each individual, regardless of religious affiliation,
would bypass this constitutional conflict.
68
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national pride should replace the cohesive effects of religion. Yet, understanding the
difficulty in replacing religion within the public sphere, and the innate connotations held
between “judgment” and “God,” the role of perspective taking in negating juror biases
and increasing rational thought remains the most integral and valuable finding of this
study.
Further conclusions. Findings of this study also emphasize the need for further
psychological analysis of religion. While the issue of religion is seen by many as a taboo
subject, recognizing the complications and intricacies of faith, studies such as this
demonstrate how strongly religious values dictate individual behaviors and how integral
religion is in the lives of many Americans. Evidence that religious values alter how
people think and judge others should be of key concern to psychologists researching
issues in and out of the courtroom.
Thought processes, ingroup and outgroup biases, and the ability to take the
perspective of others are issues relevant every day. While chapter one reviewed the
difficulties in measuring an individual’s religious beliefs and the several scales that have
been created and often disproven, religion itself is not a matter psychologists can push
aside. God is a powerful concept that overwhelms how many individuals think, act, and
feel, and as such is an integral issue for psychology.
The results of this study not only emphasize the need to integrate perspective
taking in courtrooms, but also the pervasiveness of religious thought and religious
reliance in the general public. The effects observed from participants reading a case
scenario with the written mention of religious symbols indicates the possibility of even
stronger effects of religion in everyday life. Because the issue of faith is so personal and
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powerful, psychologists should dedicate significant time and energy in gaining a better
understanding of how and why religion affects individuals the way it does, what about
religion is so enticing to the human psyche, why it is relied upon so often, and what the
consequences of these behaviors are. Moreover, where else is religion used to sway
people? Where are other religious symbols present? All in all, the issue of religion
deserves more attention from psychologists studying behaviors in and out of the legal
arena, as it affects millions of Americans every day and can drastically improve our
understanding of human behaviors and motives.
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Appendix A
This is the trial summary that was administered. The information in brackets
changed depending on the condition.
The Trial:
[The trial began by Johnson raising his hand and putting the other over his heart,
repeating, “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.” After
being sworn in, the trial proceeded.]
[The trial began by Matthews raising his hand and swearing on the Bible,
repeating, “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me
God.” After being sworn in, the trial proceeded.]
[The trial began by Rajpal raising his hand and swearing in on the Guru Granth
Sahib, repeating, “I swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
help me God.” After being sworn in, the trial proceeded.]
The following case facts were established during the trial:
On May 9th, 1995 [Robert Johnson/Paul Matthews/Talib Rajpal] arrived at the
home of his wife, [Rebecca Johnson/Mary Matthews/Roopali Rajpal], after her two
young children by another man had left for school, and began choking and pushing her.
She fell, her leg folded awkwardly under her, and her ankle broke. The two had been
having marital difficulties for quite some time. The victim testified that she and
[Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] had been married about a year when they became estranged.
Their marriage was stormy and they had many arguments after which [Mr.
Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] would move out to stay with his mother. [Mr.
Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] also admitted to having numerous affairs during their
marriage. Both spouses testified that until the May 9, 1995 incident that resulted in
[Johnson’s/Matthews’/Rajpal’s] conviction, he had never struck his wife.
[Mr. Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal], an unemployed guitar teacher, testified that his
wife slipped and broke her ankle as she attacked him with a kitchen knife. He then
grabbed her by the hand and threw her over the bed. With this, the knife buried itself in
the mattress, and [Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] claims he took the opportunity to take it
away. He said that he delayed calling an ambulance for three hours, even though she
claimed to be intense pain, because she was getting dressed and putting on her makeup.
"You know how women are," he said on the stand.
According to [Rebecca Johnson’s/Mary Matthews’/Roopali Rajpal’s] testimony,
[Robert Johnson/Paul Matthews/Talib Rajpal] came over to pick up papers he had left
behind at the house. According to the victim, upon his arrival he grabbed his wife by the
neck and began saying that she would have to learn how to respect him, because he was
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her husband and she had to do whatever he said, that this thing of her doing whatever she
wanted was going to come to an end. [Mr. Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] then grabbed a
kitchen knife and began yelling that it was too late for both of them and they both were
going to die. He began to rip her clothes off, she said, but when she screamed in pain he
ordered her to take them off. Then he sexually abused her. At one point,
[Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] tried to stab her but she moved aside and the knife pierced
the mattress. Then he broke down and asked her forgiveness. She finally convinced him
to call an ambulance around 11:30 A.M., about three hours after she broke her ankle.
At the hospital, the victim called a friend who worked for the Department of
Correction. When the friend arrived, she got [Mr. Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] to leave his
wife's side and got a hospital social worker to interview the victim, prosecutors said.
[Mrs. Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] says that her husband never expressed any
remorse over the attack.
[Mrs. Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] said that she did not know what had sparked that
particular outbreak, but that she was sure she had seen her husband outside her window a
few days prior. While the man she saw was dressed in black, head mostly hidden by a
cap, she noticed his tattoo [of the Christian cross/ of the Sikh symbol Ek-Onkar] on his
neck, and was thus able to identify him. [Johnson/Matthews/Rajpal] never confronted her
husband about the alleged spying.
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Appendix B
This is the dependant measures survey designed to measure the participant’s
sentencing decision, confidence in the decision, what influenced the decision, a
participant’s religious identification and devotionalism, rational and experiential thinking,
as well as perspective taking.
The dependent measure survey contained measures of:

The participant’s sentencing decision (guilty or not guilty; 4 ½ years to life sentence)

One question measuring how certain the participant is of his/her verdict (10 points)

One question asking how strongly the participant agrees that the defendant is guilty of all
four counts (10 points)

One question asking how strongly the participant feels that the defendant is guilty of
aggravated sexual abuse (10 points)

One question asking if the participant’s opinion regarding rape and adultery is based on
his/her religious beliefs (10 points)

Fourteen questions concerning how influenced participant’s were by thirteen elements
(judge’s instructions, evidence that the husband broke his wife’s ankle, the opinion that
the defendant showed no regret, evidence that the husband tried to stab his wife, evidence
that the couple had been estranged, personal religious beliefs, personal feelings about
rape, feelings about this case, instincts about this case, feelings about the defendant, logic
and reason, common sense, other) with one comprehension check of “evidence that the
husband tried to break his wife’s arm.” (10 points)

One manipulation check for instruction comprehension concerning whether the
participant was trying to take the perspective of the defendant (10 points).

A blank for participants to write their age

A question about gender (check Male or Female)

Two questions about student status (yes/no) and if yes, a blank to write major course of
study.
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
One question about ethnic background (check African American, Asian American,
Hispanic American, Native American, White American or other)

One question about religious background (check Christian, Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist,
Muslim, Atheist, Agnostic, “I believe in God, but do not have a particular faith” or Other)

One question regarding how closely the participant follows his/her religion (10 points;
Miller, 2006) and two questions regarding ingroup identification and religious
identification: “To what extent do you identify with other members of your religious
group?” and “To what extent do you feel close to other members of your religious
group?” (10 point scale, Levin & Sidanius, 1999). These were scored together to indicate
participant’s Religious Identification.

A 7-item Devotionalism measure (10 point scale; Putney & Middleton, 1961)

The 10-item Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI; 5 point scale; Epstein et al., 1996)

A 13-item perspective taking measure (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis 1980, 1983).

CEST measures (3 vignettes; Epstein et al., 1996).
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Appendix C
These are the vignettes administered from Epstein et al. (1999). These were
meant to be a non-self report measure of rationality and one’s ability to recognize the
rational decision.
1. Ms. Crane and Ms. Tees were scheduled to leave the airport at the same time, but on
different flights. They traveled from town in the same limousine, were caught in a
traffic jam, and arrived at the airport 30 minutes after their scheduled departure of
their flights. Ms. Crane was told that her flight had left on time. Ms. Tees was told
that her flight had been delayed and had left only 5 minutes ago. Who do you think
felt her dawdling was more foolish? Ms. Crane, Ms. Tees, or neither? Who do you
think should have felt her dawdling was more foolish? Ms. Crane, Ms. Tees, or
neither? Why?
2. Carol almost never takes hitch-hikers in her car. Yesterday she gave a man a ride and
was robbed. Nancy frequently takes hitch-hikers in her car. Yesterday she gave a
man a ride and was robbed. Who do you think felt more upset about giving the hitchhiker a ride? Carol, Nancy, or neither one? Who do you think should have felt more
upset about giving the hitch-hiker a ride? Carol, Nancy, or neither one? Why?
3. Steve had heard from his friend Jonathan about the fantastic cake he had eaten during
his vacation, when on a visit to Turkey. As Steve had a sweet tooth he was
determined to try it. Fortunately, he heard about a delicatessen store in the next town,
which supposedly had a good selection of foreign foods. The next day he drove there
and sure enough he found what he was looking for. The cake was very expensive,
and cost him $4.50 for a single piece. Now image a slightly different version. Bill,
another friend of Jonathan, had heard exactly the same thing. Assume that everything
is the same except that when Bill went to the delicatessen, he was fortunate enough to
run into a special promotion and got the same pastry for 25 cents. When both of them
tasted the cake, they decided it was too sweet for their taste. Who do you think will be
more likely to take more bites before discarding the cake? Steve, Bill, or neither one?
Who should take more bites before discarding the cake? Steve, Bill, or neither one?
Why?
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Appendix D
This chart represents the correlations between what participants based their sentencing
decision on.
Correlations
judge
judge
religion
personal
feelings
instincts
defendant
logic
common
sense
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
religion
personal
feelings
instincts
defendant
logic
.031
-.070
.318(**)
.025
.292(**)
.406(**)
-.105
.170
.252(**)
.638(**)
.126
.182(*)
.355(**)
.602(**)
.454(**)
.185(*
)
.109
-.033
.003
-.013
-.141
.072
.099
.037
.210(*)
.145
.050
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
N=133
KEY
judge= “Judge’s instructions”
religion= “Your personal religious beliefs”
personal= “Your personal feelings about rape”
feelings= “My feelings about this case”
instincts= “My instincts about this case”
defendant= “My feelings about the defendant”
logic= “Logic and reason”
common sense= “Common sense”
.500(**)
common
sense
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Appendix E
This chart represents the correlations between what religious participants based their
sentencing decision on and their levels of rational and experiential thinking as well as
perspective taking. This chart does not include participants who labeled themselves
atheists, in order to demonstrate the strong ties between religious beliefs and experiential
thinking.
Correlations without Atheist Participants
SUM OF
RELI ID
SUM OF
RELI ID
instincts
SUM DEV
SUM
RATIONAL
SUM
EXPERIENTI
AL
SUM PT
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
Pearson
Correlation
instincts
SUM DEV
SUM
RATIONAL
SUM
EXPERIENTI
AL
.243(**)
.609(**)
.047
-.204(*)
-.005
-.066
.155
.360(**)
.102
-.005
-.197(*)
-.199(*)
-.064
.185(*)
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
N=117
KEY
SUM OF RELI ID= Religious Identification
instincts=“My instincts about this case”
SUM DEV= Devotionalism
SUM RATIONAL= REI Rational Score
SUM EXPERIENTIAL= REI Experiential Score
SUM PT= IRI Perspective Taking Score
Appendix D
-.125
SUM PT
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Appendix F: Regulating Religion
The Religion Clauses
Religious content is frequently present in U.S. legal conflicts and arguments. The
number of legal cases regarding religious issues is too plentiful to count, including
religious objections to wars,72 public education73 and marriage laws.74 The most current
cases regarding religion include the American Jewish Congress vs. Corporation for
National Community Services,75 fighting direct public funds for religious teachings and
Lown et al. v. Salvation Army et al.,76 fighting religious selectivity. As such, the U.S.
government has attempted to control legal entanglement with religion in several ways,
the most prominent being the establishment of the Religion Clauses: The Establishment
Clause as well as the Free Exercise Clause. These clauses state that, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."77 This First Amendment clause was intended to afford protection against
sponsorship, financial support, and active involvement of the government in religious
activity; it was put in place so that the legal system would have rules to follow in regard
to religious cases.
See e.g., United States v. Seeger, 380, U.S. 246; 85 S. Ct. 850 (1965); Welch vs. U.S. 398 U.S. 338; 90 S. Ct.
1702 (1970)
73 See e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)
74 See e.g., United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14 (1970)
75 American Jewish Congress v. Corporation for National and Community Service, case No. 1:02CV01948, U.S. District
Court for the District of Columbia
76 S.D.N.Y., No. 04 Civ. 1562
77 U. S. Constitution, Amend. 1
72
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Yet the language of these Clauses is frequently debated, and the true meaning and
intention of the Clauses has been called “at best opaque.”78 The uncertainty and
incomplete understanding of the wording has caused innumerable debates regarding the
appropriate reading of the Clauses, including when and how they should be applied.
Some of the best examples portraying the controversy surrounding the Religion Clauses
lie in the cases of Everson v. Board of Education, Engel v. Vitale, the “Lemon test,” and
differences in interpretation between two United States Supreme Court Justices:
Rehnquist and O’Connell.
In the case of Everson v. Board of Education (1947), the U.S. Supreme Court
debated the reimbursement to parents of children attending a parochial school for bus
transportation expenses. After a lengthy debate concerning whether or not the
reimbursement violated the First Amendment, the Court decided to uphold the statute,
basing their decision on New Jersey’s claim that the money was applied to all citizens,
regardless of religious affiliation. Yet, the decision was not made with complete
certainty of its constitutionality. At the time of the trial, Mr. Justice Black, representing
the majority, wrote that the decision carried to “the verge” of forbidden territory under
the Religion Clauses. This occurrence, as stated earlier in Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971),
“compels acknowledgement…that we can only dimly perceive the lines of demarcation
in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.” Disconcertingly, Mr. Justice
78As
noted by Chief Justice Burger; Lemon v. Kurtzman, (1971), pg. 3. The authors of the Clause do not forbid
the establishment of a church or official religion, instead they instruct that no law shall be made “respecting an
establishment of religion”. The definition of “respecting” and its intended purpose have been argued time and
again, blurring the lines as to where and when religious acts are legal in the United States.
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Black’s remarks are but one example of government officials expressing their uncertainty
of the meaning of the Religion Clauses, and how best to apply them.
In an unrelated but similar trial concerning religion and education, the Supreme
Court ruled in the opposite direction as Everson v. Board of Education (1947). In one of
the most controversial legal battles concerning prayer, Engel v. Vitale (1962), the Court
held that the recitation of an allegedly nondenominational prayer in public schools
violated the Establishment Clause. In delivering the opinion of the Court, Mr. Justice
Black stated that, “there can…be no doubt that New York’s program of daily classroom
invocation of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regent’s prayer is a religious activity.”
Later he wrote that it made no difference if the content of the prayer was said to be
nondenominational, it was simply the presence of religion that was the problem. In
opposition, Justice Stewart passionately argued against Justice Black, arguing that
forbidding prayer was unconstitutional and unlawful. In the end, the Court went in
accordance to Black’s position, though the case was fraught with significant
disagreement largely caused by the space of interpretation left open by the Religion
Clauses.
In an effort to define how and when to follow the Religion Clauses of the first
Amendment, the case Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971) created what is now known as the
“Lemon test.” The “Lemon test” states that, “[a] statue must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, it’s principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion…; [and] finally, the statue must not foster ‘an excessive government
entanglement with religion’” (Lemon v. Kurtzman, 1971).
In the case of Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Court decided on the constitutionality of the Rhode Island Salary
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Supplement Act, which asked the state to supplement teacher’s salaries of secular
subjects in nonpublic elementary schools, and the Pennsylvania Nonpublic Elementary
and Secondary Education Act, which called for the government to directly reimburse the
school for textbooks, supplies, and teacher’s salaries in secular subjects. While
recognizing that “religious values pervade the fabric of our national life,” the court felt
that the religious motivations of these educational institutions qualified as “excessive
entanglement with religion” and did not uphold either act. Since the creation of the
“Lemon Test,” courts around the country have referenced the three pronged test in
determining whether or not a religious situation can and should be upheld by the
government.
Yet, even with this additional attempt at clarification, the “Lemon test” has not
achieved complete success in disentangling the issues surrounding the understanding of
the Establishment Clause. Most recently, this debate was observed through two recent
United States Justices: Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor, who both made key
contributions to Religion Clause jurisprudence. Chief Justice William Rehnquist has
argued that the reading of the Establishment Clause ignores the importance of religion in
the lives of individuals and communities in the United States (Lupu & Tuttle, 2005). In
the case of Wallace v. Jaffree (1985), Rehnquist asserted that secularization and
separationism (complete separation of church and state) is not required by the
Establishment Clause, dissenting that the majority’s reading of the Establishment Clause
was incorrect. 79 According to Rehnquist, the Establishment Clause should not be
79
The Court held unconstitutional an Alabama statute that instituted a one-minute period for “meditation or
silent prayer” at the opening of each day in public schools; 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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interpreted based on Thomas Jefferson’s claim supporting “a wall of separation” between
church and state, as the history following clearly indicates that this was a minority
opinion and that Jefferson himself approved support of religious movements (Lupu &
Tuttle, 2005).
Going further, in the case of Bowen v. Kendrick (1988), Rehnquist challenged the
illegality of direct payment of public funds to religious organizations, claiming that these
payments do not necessarily advance religion, and thus should be legal.80 Rehnquist
drew a line between pervasively sectarian institutions and religious organizations in
general, claiming that giving government funds to religious organizations does not go
against the third prong of the “Lemon test” (excessive entanglement of government and
religion). They, unlike pervasive sectarian institutions, are far more likely to abide by
government rules and regulate the pervasiveness of religion in their works (Lupu &
Tuttle, 2005). In response, over the next fifteen years, the Court’s decisions on the direct
funding of religious entities reflected the opinion of Rehnquist, allowing direct aid to
religious schools in several cases.81 This shift in Supreme Court decisions exemplifies
the fluidity and uncertainty surrounding the application of these laws, changing years of
Court verdicts based on one new interpretation of a text.
Unlike Rehnquist, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor’s main concern with the
Establishment Clause and “Lemon test” is the issue of governmental endorsement of
80
487 U.S. 589 (1988); This case involved “Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA), which awarded grants for
teaching and counseling teenagers about sexual abstinence and encouraged grantees to make subgrants to
religious organizations and other non-profit community groups, in order to expand the range of providers for
the counseling and educational services” (Lupu & Tuttle, 2005, p.5).
81 See e.g., Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), and Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810 (2000).
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religion.82 She has expressed that it is constitutionally necessary that government not aid
activities that are religious in content, and that the government establish, “reasonable
safeguards against diversion of public aid to impermissible purposes” (Lulu & Tuttle,
2005). For O’Connor, the Clause prohibits official governmental support or endorsement
of indoctrination into a religious faith, and does not take issue with the idea of secularism
or separation, like Rehnquist.83 Both of these Justices view the purpose of the Religion
Clauses differently and as such interpret the wording in contrasting manners.
As such, it is easy to see that even today Supreme Court Justices differ on their
readings of the Establishment Clause and “Lemon test,” resulting in inconsistent verdicts
and also compromising an appropriate measure of the separation between church and
state (whatever that may be). The three court cases of Everson v. Board of Education
(1947), Engel v. Vitale (1962), and Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), as well as the differing
opinions of Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor demonstrate our country’s battle in
regulating the role of religion in legal matters.
This concept is important to note when considering the findings of this study.
Though it was found that religion impacts juror decisions, the issue of removing religious
symbols from the courtroom is fraught with controversy. While it may be argued that the
removal of religion will increase rational thought and reliance on evidence and the
judge’s instructions to come to a verdict, this seems unlikely to occur given that the
“Endorsement [of religion] sends a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the
political community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community. Disapproval sends the opposite message.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring); As cited in Lupu & Tuttle (2005, p. 10).
83
Mitchell v. Helms (2000), 530 U.S. 793, 844-45 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment), as cited in Lupu &
Tuttle, 2005, p. 16.
82
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United States has shown its inability to separate itself from religion throughout history,
and continues to do so today. This fact serves to emphasize the importance of integrating
perspective taking instructions to counter the effects of religious biases.
Faith-Based Rehabilitation
In recent years, government leniency concerning “charitable choice”84 provisions
towards religious groups as well as prison population increases has created an emergence
of government funded faith-based rehabilitation prison programs in the United States.
These programs exemplify the government’s increasing participation in religious matters
and the ongoing troubles besieging the interpretation of the Religion Clauses. With the
creation of President George W. Bush’s “Office of Faith-Based and Community
Initiatives,” government funded faith-based programs were quickly put to work,
providing large grants for projects commonly favored by conservative Christians, such as
Charles Colson’s Prison Fellowship Ministries85 and Teen Challenge, a drug
rehabilitation program that encourages religious conversion.86 Many claim that the recent
resurgence of political religious action was due to President Bush’s religious fervor and
the need to retain religious voters.87
In 1996, President Bill Clinton has signed into law a bill that included the option of “charitable choice”
provisions, thus allowing religious groups the opportunity to compete for government grants (Jacoby, 2009).
85 According to the New York Times, “Prison Fellowship Ministries was founded by Charles, W. Colson, an ally
of President Bush and an influential evangelical who went to prison for his role in the Watergate cover-up in
the Nixon administration” (Banerjee, 2007).
86 According to an article by the New York Times, Teen Challenge goes so far as to call teenage converts from
Judaism to Christianity, “completed Jews” (Jacoby, 2009).
87 President Bush’s brother, Jed Bush, claimed that he and his brother believe that the best way to rehabilitate
prisoners is to “lead them to God.” As cited in Roy (2005); Price, J.H. (2003, December 30). Where
punishment must fit the faith, Washington Times, A1.
84
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One of the best-known and most controversial programs funded by the Bush
Administration is known as the InnerChange Freedom Initiative (IFI), an organization
affiliated with the Prison Fellowship Ministries and the Iowa Corrections Department.
IFI is a key example of a program that challenges the role of the Religion Clauses and
also highlights the everlasting and ever-growing entanglement of government with
religious matters. Based on Christian philosophies, IFI aimed to rehabilitate prisoners by
“spiritual and moral regeneration” through education and psychological programming,
which included religious instructions and one-on-one mentoring (Roy, 2005). Though
participation in the program was voluntary and claimed to be tolerant of various religious
beliefs, the curriculum of the prison was indisputably Christian.88 The prison’s brochure
labeled the program a “24-hour-a-day, Christ-centered, biblically based program that
promotes personal transformation through the power of the Gospel” (Banerjee, 2007).
“The notion of transformation,” notes Rothchild (2007), “has played a central role within
the Christian tradition” (p. 82). Additionally, it was later discovered that prisoners
participating in IFI were given privileges over other inmates, and had to accept
Christianity in order to participate.
In response, on December 3, 2007, a federal appeals panel ruled that the program
violated the Religion Clauses due to its effect of advancing and endorsing religion
(Banerjee, 2007). The case had been filed over four years earlier by Americans United
for Separation of Church and State and was decided upon by a panel of judges of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in St. Louis. In an article by
Roy (2005) writes that during one session an instructor announced, “For those of you who are Muslim, Jesus
is God…I’m sorry if I’ve offended you, but Jesus is God.”
88
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Banerjee (2007), Professor Robert Tuttle is quoted saying that the decision, “reaffirm[s]
the obligation of government not to fund programs that intermingle secular and religious
content.” This decision is said to have supplied more clarity for what institutions pass the
constitutional test.
Even so, governmental funding to faith-based initiatives has not slowed. This
year, President Barack Obama, though promising the prohibition of proselytizing and
religious hiring from federally financed programs, has left the Bush Administration’s
orders intact. In fact, the now-titled “White House Office for Religion-based and
Neighborhood Programs” expands upon Bush policies by providing government support
to religious organizations that supply social services (Zeleny & Goodstein, 2009). R.
Albert Mohler Jr., president of the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary even claims
that Obama’s goal of funding religious organizations while prohibiting proselytizing and
religious hiring is completely irrational and unrealistic (Jacoby, 2009). These two
elements are essential to the functioning of any religious organization, he stated. Halfheartedly recognizing this contradiction, the Obama administration has admitted that
there is a “lack of clarity in this area” and will thus review each case on a case-by-case
basis.
The decision to uphold government support of religious institutions directly
contradicts several previous Court decisions based upon the upholding of the Religion
Clauses. Furthermore, the recognition of the possible unconstitutionality of this law begs
one to question why government continues its connections with religion. Some claim
political reasons, such as gaining approval from the religious right, while others argue
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that religion is innate in our legal and government structures, and therefore should be
included.
Innate Ties between Religion and Law
Many claim that the difficulty of separating church and state lies within
America’s innate ties to religion. While our Founding Fathers stated that church and
state are to remain separate, the laws and traditions of this country grew from seeds of
Christian faith and moral standing. We share a public religion that Robert Bellah labels
the “civil religion”, that “provide[s] a religious dimension for the whole fabric of
American life (1967, p.171). Christianity, writes William Connolly, “is already inscribed
in the prediscursive dispositions and cultural instincts of the civilization” (1999).89 This
“subterranean flow” of religion, as Connolly labels it, “persists despite the
disestablishment of religion” (Smith, 1997).90
Sunday, Connolly writes, is a prime
example of a common word heavily overlaid with religious connotations, based on
Christian traditions. These connotations, whether we are aware of them or not, “color all
judgments” we make concerning the day (Connolly, 1999).91 Christianity, it seems,
maintains an innate connection to United States law.
A key example of this perspective was expressed by Justice Stewart in the dissent
of Engel v. Vitale (1962). Mr. Justice Stewart argued that, “to deny the wish of these
children to join in reciting this prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the
According to Connolly, there is a “subterranean flow” of religion running through our culture, constantly
mixing private religion and the public sector.
90 Smith labels this the “defacto disestablishment.”
91 The issue of Sunday closings was also discussed earlier in Chapter 1 with regards to McGowan v. Maryland
(1961).
89
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spiritual heritage of our Nation.” He then went on to list the ways in which Americans
are a religious people, including the addition of the words “under God” in the National
Anthem, the words “In God We Trust” printed on dollar bills, and the fact that both the
Senate and the House of Representatives open their daily Sessions with a prayer. “We
are a religious people, whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,” Stewart cites.92
Stewart argues that God and religion are everywhere, and we need to let people pray if
they so desire. Stewart’s argument exemplifies the role of religion in the United States
and the extraordinary challenge of demarcating places and times in which religious
beliefs are appropriate. His statement that “we are a religious people,” supports the
claims of Connolly and Bellah that whether we are aware of it or not, religion permeates
American culture and traditions. In the end, Engel ruled against school prayer, provoking
public retaliation and extensive ridicule of the Court, which, according to many, “had
betrayed the American way of life” (Feldman, 2000). Engel eventually led to a surge of
requests to add a Christian amendment to the Constitution; in fact, the 1964 platform of
the Republican Party proposed such an amendment, clearly supporting the argument of
Justice Stewart that we are a religious people, with our founding in Christianity.
For these reasons, many argue that secularization and the separation of church and
state are impossible. Christianity simply becomes underwritten as culture, claims
Tocqueville, without most citizens’ recognition (Tocqueville et al., 2000). Tocqueville
writes that American mores, traditions and customs, are controlled by religion, as is
reason. He considers these Christian dogmas to be political barriers, as citizens do not
know how to step outside of them, limiting our liberties to act outside of religious
92
Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313.
P e r s p e c t i v e T a k i n g , R e l i g i o u s S y m b o l s a n d J u r o r B i a s e s | 123
regulations. “For the Americans the idea of Christianity and liberty are so completely
mingled that it is almost impossible to get them to conceive of the one without the other”
(Tocqueville et al., 2000, p. 293). Even Supreme Court Justices have difficulty
separating their religious beliefs from their legal decisions. “Because most Supreme
Court justices are themselves largely embedded in the symbols and structures of
American Christian society, they tend to reach decisions that manifest and then reproduce
those very symbols and structures” (Feldman, 2000, p.4). Concerns regarding this
pattern arose when Supreme Court Justice Scalia recently made religious remarks at a
law school breakfast. His remarks prompted many to raise concerns regarding his ability
to objectively and evenhandedly make judgment, especially concerning church-state
issues (Saphire, 1998).
Many argue that it is simply impossible to escape the Christian roots, even within
the basic traditions of the judicial system. For example, in March v. Chambers (1983),
the Supreme Court upheld the practice of having a publicly paid chaplain, in this case a
Protestant minister, open state legislative sessions with a prayer.93 The Court came to
this conclusion by claiming it was American tradition to have a public funded chaplain.
As Feldman (2000) states:
The Court’s reliance on history tends to give a constitutional imprimatur to the
preexisting symbols and structures of American society to the symbols and
structures of Christian domination. Indeed, in Marsh, the Court stressed that it
93
March v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983)
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sought to acknowledge ‘beliefs widely held among the people of this country’;
such beliefs unavoidably manifest Christian values and practices (p.4).
If Christian influence is truly unavoidable in American culture, many question
why church and state should be separated (e.g., Echoes of Grace: From the Prison to the
State House, 2007; Rothchild et al., 2007; Complicity or Justice and Mercy?, 2007;
Connelly, 1999). Many believe that Judeo-Christian beliefs play an essential role of in
American culture and that Christian morality can aid our society. “Churches are explicitly
value-bearing institutions…Churches ought to articulate a vision of the good ordering of
society,” writes Livezey (2007, p.43). “Laws are not enough” (Livezey, 2007, p.43).
Going back to Judefind v. State in 1894, in arguing the legality of Sunday closings, it was
stated that, “It is undoubtedly true that rest from secular employment on Sunday does
have a tendency to foster and encourage the Christian religion,” which is all the more
reason to enforce it (As cited in McGowan v. Maryland, 1960, p.447).94
Even today, many judges and court officials support the incorporation of
Christianity in legal decisions. For example, on December 14, 2004 Alabama Judge
Ashley McKathan conducted a trial while wearing a judicial robe embroidered with the
Ten Commandments, easily legible throughout the court. McKathan justified his
behavior, telling The Associated Press that he believes the Ten Commandments represent
the truth "and you can't divorce the law from the truth. ... The Ten Commandments can
help a judge know the difference between right and wrong" (2004). McKathan stated that
94
Judefind v. State, 78 Md. 510, 514, 28 A. 405, 406 (1894).
P e r s p e c t i v e T a k i n g , R e l i g i o u s S y m b o l s a n d J u r o r B i a s e s | 125
he believes the law is based on more than just words written in law books.95 Former
Alabama Chief Justice Roy Moore supported McKathan’s decision, saying, “I applaud
Judge McKathan. It is time for our judiciary to recognize the moral basis of our law”
(Associated Press, 2004).96
In light of such actions, it is plain to see that there are many
Americans who believe that Christianity is inseparable from U.S. legal and governmental
decisions, and moreover should not be separated due to the beneficial factors of the
Christian faith.
Four years later, McKathan ordered a group prayer in the courtroom, asking that everyone hold hands and
pray (Associated Press, 2008).
96 According to the Associated Press (2004), former Alabama Chief Justice Moore was “removed from office in
2003 for refusing to remove a Ten Commandments monument from the rotunda of the Alabama Judicial
Building in Montgomery.”
95
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