National Code of Practice for Chemicals of Security Concern 1. Introduction and General Response The University of South Australia Context The University of South Australia has more than 35, 000 student spread across 6 campuses located in Adelaide and other South Australian regional centres. The University has 6 flagship research institutes and 17 research centres undertaking both fundamental and applied research in a range of research areas. With an extensive research and academic concentration, the introduction of the National Code of Practice for Chemicals of Security Concern may potentially impact on the research and teaching undertaken at the University, particularly in regards to requirements for detailed monitoring of usage and education of the University end-users of precursor chemicals. Use of Chemicals of Security Concern within the University of South Australia Scale of chemical use at the University of South Australia. The 11 chemical precursors to homemade explosives identified in the National Code of Practice are used throughout the University of South of Australia for both teaching and research purposes. However, due to teaching and research requirements, only small quantities of the chemicals are generally stored within individual laboratories on-site for immediate access by researchers or laboratory staff. The Code of Practice does not differentiate between volume of the chemicals utilised by end-users and security risk. The Code of Practice implies that the security risk is similar irrespective of the volume of precursor chemicals used by an end-user. We ask that the Code of Practice includes guidance to security measures that should be considered based on the volume of precursor chemicals used by the end-users in individual laboratories or work areas. Procurement of chemicals at the University of South Australia All precursor chemicals outlined in the Code of Practice are purchased through the University preferred supplier list. As outlined above, many University staff purchase small quantities of precursor chemicals for their own laboratory use. Tracking this purchase is difficult as there is little centralisation of chemicals purchased. It would therefore be advantageous that the chemical suppliers record these purchases as part of the supply of precursor chemicals. The current Code of Practice appears to be primarily targeting production, supply and transport industries where large volumes of precursor chemicals may be at elevated security risk of being removed. Management of security and access to chemicals The University of South Australia employs both research and academic staff whom manage their chemical requirements in conjunction with OHS&W staff. The exceptions are for staff utilising hazardous (acute toxic, carcinogenic) chemicals and ammonium nitrate where University policy and National security policy control the storage and handling of these chemicals. However, to ensure best risk management practice, chemicals, such as the 11 precursor chemicals identified in the Code of Practice have restricted access. To date, this level of security has proved to be adequate for the volume of chemicals stored in any one laboratory within research or teaching facilities. 2. Specific Responses General Will the code enhance your business’s ability to identify and manage security risks? The University of South Australia already has procedures in place addressing the storage and management of chemicals within the University. From a current University chemical database the storage of many of the 11 precursor chemicals is already known and the stored chemical quantities are low. Considering the low quantities of the 11 precursor chemicals stored and restricted access to the storage areas, the introduction of the Code of Practice is not likely to require significant changes to the current security practices within the University of South Australia. Will the code help businesses reduce the risk of terrorists or criminals stealing or diverting chemicals from the premises? The use of the chemicals at the University of South Australia is distributed among campuses and schools, research Centres or Institutes within the university. Importantly, the quantity of precursor chemical stored at any one laboratory is extremely small (probably less than 500g) and the code does little to advise the University on potential security measures that may be implemented at very low security risk organisations. The Code of Practice could be improved if it detailed examples of minimum practices that need to be implemented to reduce the risk of terrorists or criminals stealing or diverting chemicals from the premises with low security risks. At the moment the Code is targeting businesses which potentially sell or distribute large volumes of precursor chemicals. Will the code raise awareness of the national security risks associated with chemicals among businesses that deal with chemicals of security concern? The code will raise University employees’ awareness of the security risks associated with using the 11 precursor chemicals. However, many staff consider the security concerns are excessive considering the quantity of chemicals actually stored and used in various laboratories.