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Chapter 3, Part I- Art as Form
Formalism (pp. 108-115)
prehistory- response to photography, impressionism (when you stand up close to the paintings),
Cezanne, cubism--> Clive Bell’s book Art. abstract expressionism.
Significant form (p. 109)- “is comprised of arrangements of lines, colors, shapes, volumes,
vectors, and space (two-dimensional space, three dimensional space and the interaction
therof.)”
examples- David’s The Oath of the Horatii- arms and swords make a pleasing X. Also makes
sense of tribal decorative art, quilts, etc. Makes better sense of music than either
representationalism or expressionism. Dance (Andre Levinson). Architecture. Literature? yeahmeter, rhyme and generic structures such as sonnet form, and alternating point of view.
Formalism (p. 115)- x is a work of art if and only if x is designed primarily in order to
proossess and exhibit significant form.
The common denominator argument (p. 112), which only gets you that form is a necessary
condition for all artworks (arguably, everything has form).
1. Only if x is a feature of all artworks is x a plausible contender to be an essential (necessary)
feature of art.
2. Either representation or expression or form is a feature of all artworks.
3. Representation is not a feature of all artworks.
4. Expression is not a feature of all artworks.
5. Therefore, form is a feature of all artworks.
6. Therefore, form is a plausible contender to be an essential feature of all artworks.
The function argument (p. 114), which gets you that form is a sufficient condition for all
artwork, the view that art is distinctive in that the intentional exhibition of form is its primary
value. Examples, why still read Lucretius’ On the Nature of Things or Hesiod’s Theogony or
appreciate the architecture of Angkor Wat? All of these represent the cosmos falsely, but to the
extent that we see them as art, truth or falsity isn’t the point. Also we critique art that is too
preachy as propaganda A dumb, amoral film can be better than a moral one, because we are not
critiquing moral values.
1. Only if x is a primary function that is unique to art is x a sufficient condition for art.
2. The primary function unique to art is either representation, expression or the exhibiiton of
significant form for its own sake.
3. Representation is not a primary function unique to art.
4. Expression is not a primary function unique to art.
5. Therefore, the primary function unique to art is the exhibition of significant form for its
own sake.
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6. Therefore, the exhibition of significant form for its own sake is a sufficient condition for
art.
This is stated in terms of intention to differentiate art from natural beauty and to make room for
bad art that intends to exhibit significant form but fails to do so.
Objections to Formalism (pp. 115-125)
Problems with the common denominator argument- (problems with primary intentions (pp. 116117), the problem of bad art and nature (if you remove the intention part of the definition) (pp.
117-118)), problems with the notion of significant form (pp. 118-122),
(pp. 116-118) examples- churchs, triumphant marches and architecture, though maybe these are
made with multiple intentions, including the intention to be admired for form. examples- demon
masks intended to frighten, not to be formally admired. So drop intention requirement? Again,
problem of bad art and natural beauty. So dilemma.
(pp. 118-122) what is significant form? Can’t just be that it is arresting, because bad art can be
arresting. Can’t be just that it causes some special state in mind of viewers. What is that? State of
appreciating significant form? That’s circular. And this seems implausible anyhow, b/c art causes
all sorts of different mental experiences. Maybe you just know it when you see it? This isn’t
obviously crazy, there is a lot of convergence in formal judgments, especially about unity
(“repeating motifs, equilibria, strong contrasts, symmetries, and so on”). Counterexamples- art
exploring formlessness John Cage’s 4’33’’, Robert Morris sculptures Steam, Untitled
(Threadwaste), Untitled (Dirt). These “lack symmetries, balance, equilibrium, studied contrast
and counterpoint, and every other criterion that we typically use to apply the concept of form in
common discourse” (p. 120). Continues on with circularity worries.
(p. 121 bottom) Even if you can get it as a necessary condition, the definition still fails to be
sufficient. Counterexamples- elegant proofs, athletics, chess, etc.
What went wrong with common denominator argument? Second premise. There may be no
property that holds of all artworks. Or there may be other options not enumerated.
Problems with the function argument (pp. 122-123) Again, second premise is wrong. And
conclusion is false because definition is still too inclusive (math proofs, games, etc.).
Point of the Fall of Icarus example (pp. 123-125). Narrative structure and compositional
conventions are at cross purposes and set up a huge formal tension. But it wouldn’t even be there
if not for what is represented! So formal properties here are a function of representational ones.
Likewise with formal properties of literature.
Neoformalism (pp. 125-136)
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Neo-formalism (p. 126)- x is an artwork if and only if (1) x has content (2) x has form and (3)
the form and the content of x are related to each other in a satisfyingly appropriate manner.
For this to work- “The content of an artwork may be said to be its meaning - its theme - or
whatever it is about. Form, then, is the mode of presentation of its meaning, the way in which its
meaning is made to appear, the way it is embodied, presented or articulated” (p. 126). See
discussion of The Fall of Icarus (p. 127).
Things neo-formalism gets right: expressive dimensions (p. 128), “formless art” (p. 128), artistic
change (p. 129), critical and appreciative practices (pp. 129-130), what is unique about what the
artist does (130).
Problems with neo-formalism (pp. 131-136)
(pp. 131-133) Some art has no meaning, just produces effects in audiences. Maybe all such art
has the viewer as a subject matter, since it tells us something about the kinds of creatures we are,
the kinds of things we enjoy (examples- minimalists like Philip Glass and Donald Judd). But this
is implausible with art that is just intended to be beautiful, especially non-miminalist abstract
painting and music. Moreover, things like tap dancing don’t invite this kind of introspective
response! Just being pleasurable is not the same as being about our capacity for pleasure.
(p. 133) What about form condition? Again, trivially holds in sense that everything has form, but
does not seem to hold in the required sense that form is the mode of presentation of the content
(because some art has no content in the required sense).
(p. 133)- What about the third condition? Previous problems plus some new ones. Can’t account
for bad art. According to Carroll, it’s not enough to change the definition so that bad art lacks
form appropriate to content. “An artwork can be unsatisfyingly inappropriate formally in every
way; bad scienc efiction films and sidewalk paintings at art fairs are often like this they are not
bad because they are not formally appropriate enough. They are total disasters. The problme is
not tha tthey are insufficiently good; they are altogether bad. (p. 134).” Carroll, also thinks that
this makes being an artwork a matter of degree, and takes it as clear that it is not. [Note: the
instructor does not share his intuitions here.]
(p. 136) Final condemnation though. Again, fails to be sufficient. Many non-artworks satisfy the
definition.Ordinary Brillo boxes. Talking.